I go into a little proof here. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/12098/a-first-cause-is-logically-necessary/p1

To sum it up, there is existence without prior explanation. This is not a possibility, this is a logical certainty. This means there could have been nothing, then something without any cause or explanation. A God, while a statistical possibility, is only one out of an infinite possible number of alternatives and is in no way necessary.

I think you are seeing it as symmetrical, whereas I see it more asymmetrical. — Bob Ross

I would not say it is symmetrical, I just think there is a similar situation to consider. Inductions and deductions are like atoms, and their chain of reasoning is like molecules. How they combine creates a new identity to consider.

We may have a fundamental disagreement as to whether an induction can be deductively concluded. Perhaps its my language. Let me make it simple first. "Applicable knowledge is the conclusion of an induction". Add in "Deductive conclusion" because it is possible to believe the conclusion to an induction is another induction.

I could have just as easily, in the case of the latter, not posited a belief and flipped the penny from my pocket and it turns up tails (which would thereby no longer be applicable, yet I obtained the exact same knowledge distinctively). — Bob Ross

Yes, you could have. But that does not negate the situation in which there is an induction that you are actively trying to discover the end result.

I can, therefore, have a belief prior to my deductively ascertained knowledge that it flipped tails, but that has no bearing on how I obtained that knowledge. I could equally have not posited a belief and obtained the exact same result, which indexically refers to something relationally beyond my abstract consideration. — Bob Ross

Let me break down the indexical (or context) of the flip itself.

I can flip a penny, look at the result, and create the identity of "I'll call that heads". That is not applicable, but distinctive knowledge.

I can also flip a penny, look at the result and see a symbol that seems familiar. I then try to match the symbol to what is considered "heads" in my mind, and I do without contradiction. This is applicable knowledge.

The induction in this case is the belief that what I am observing matches a previous identity I have created. Does this side of the penny match heads? That is "the question". The result, "Yes it does, "if deduced, is "the answer".

If I had believed that the penny would result in heads, then the answer is the resolution to the induction. Identifying an induction that has not yet resolved, versus an induction that has a resolution in our chain of thinking is incredibly important! I could come up with an entirely fool proof deductive point about Gandolf in the Lord of the Rings. Isolated, no one would care. But if at the very beginning of my deduction I started with, "I believe Gandolf is a real person," that puts the entire "deduction" in a different light!

Knowledge is about a chain of thinking. We make claims all the time in the world, and people find their results very pertinent. When people make a bet on what horse will win the race, there is active incentive to find out what the actual result of the race is. We don't want to answer with, "Maybe your horse won the race." People also don't want to hear, "Oh, Buttercup lost? Well I'm going to redefine my bet that when I bet on Princess, I really bet on Buttercup". People want a definitive, or deduced answer to that question because there is a lot on the line.

For the most part, I agree with the underlying meaning I think you are trying to convey (i.e. recognizing our limitations), but I think your "distinctive" vs "applicable" isn't a true representation thereof. What I think you are really trying to get at is that "knowledge" is always indexical. — Bob Ross

Contextual, yes. Specifically distinctive and applicably contextual. We could view it as distinctive and applicably indexical if you wish. Although I may need to refine the meaning of those terms within contexts now that I've tweaked the meaning of applicable. Distinctive context is the set distinctive knowledge a person is working with. "A horse has X essential properties. The definition of winning a race has Y essential properties. Applicable context is the limitations of what can be used to find the result of the induction. "I'm blind, so I can't confirm essential properties that require sight".

Firstly, I don't think "uncertainty" directly entails that one has to formulate an induction: I can be neutrally uncertain of the outcome of flipping a non-imaginary coin without ever asserting an induction. So when I previously stated that inductions and abductions only provide the uncertainty, I was slightly wrong: we can deductively know that we do not deductively know something and, therefore, we are uncertain of it (to some degree). — Bob Ross

Agreed within the correct context. If I distinctively know "I do not know something", then I'm not making an induction. It is when I make a belief that X matches Y definition in my head that I am making an induction, and need to go through the steps to deduce that this is true. At the point the coin is flipped, the induction happens when I attempt to match the result to my distinctive knowledge. The implicit induction is, "I believe the result could match to what I distinctively know." One could also implicitly induce that the result will not match what one distinctively knows, and not even bother trying. A deduction after the result happens will determine which induction was correct.

Secondly, yes, we would, without uncertainty, know everything. However, where are you drawing that line? I think you are trying to draw it at "distinctive" vs "applicable", but I don't think those definitions work properly. As previously discussed, the non-abstract flipping of a coin could be either form and still be obtaining knowledge pertaining to something uncertain. — Bob Ross

I hope the above points have answered this. Let me know if they have not!

Yes, science does claim to "find the result" after a test, but the "result" has no relation to the induction (hypothesis) itself: that was merely posited as the best educated guess one could make prior to any knowledge deductively obtain after/during the test. — Bob Ross

Perhaps this is unimportant after the previous notes, but I felt I needed to address this. The hypothesis is absolutely key. Science does not seek to prove a hypothesis, it seeks to invalidate a hypothesis. A hypothesis must be falsifiable. There needs to be a hypothetical state in which the hypothesis could be false. Science attempts to prove a hypothesis false, and if it cannot, then we have something.

Science has been very aware that you can craft an experiment to easily prove a hypothesis correct, and that this is often faulty. Just as I've noted earlier in our conversations, we can craft distinctive knowledge in such a way that they avoid inductions. "I believe a magical unicorn exists that cannot be sensed in any way." This is something that is non-falsifiable. When it rains, I could say, "Yep, that's the magic unicorn using its powers to cause the rain." When someone tries to explain the water cycle to me, I simply respond with, "Well yes, that's how the unicorn works its magic."

The hypothesis is the key to the experiment. The main focus of the experiment is trying to prove the hypothesis wrong. Upon peer review, scientists will attempt to see if the experiment properly tested what could falsify the hypothesis, or if the results were baked for a positive outcome. You and I are discussing a theory of epistemology. It is important that we try to prove it false, to attack it, and put it to the test. While there may be instances both of us can see positives that would make the theory useful, what matters more is whether the theory holds up in logical consistency. We are not trying to prove the theory right by its positives alone, we are trying to prove the theory right by the fact that attempts at negating it do not work.

I think we are in agreement then! My question for you is: do you find it a meaningful distinction (categorical vs hypothetical), and what terminology would you translate that to in your epistemology? — Bob Ross

I think there is a meaningful distinction here. Categorical deductions involve no potential inductions. Hypothetical distinctions take a potential induction, and conclude a deduction based on a hypothetical outcome of the induction. I think that is very important in evaluating the risk and about how much we should care about the induction.

If I have to find an item at the store, I'm in a rush, and it could be in aisle 1 or 2, I can evaluate the outcomes if I pick correctly vs. incorrectly. Because the aisles aren't that big, I decide not to ask a member of the store where the item is, and quickly run through both aisles. Of course, if I'm in a rush and I don't know where the item is among 25 aisles, in evaluating the hypothetical outcomes, its much quicker on average to ask the person at the store next to me where the item in question is then potentially find the item on the 25th aisle I explored. Perhaps the hypothetical deduction might give a better way to evaluate which inductions are worth pursuing beyond the cogency hierarchy; something I know you've been interested in.

Testing in my mind in terms of my imagination, for example, does not automatically hold for that same "label" in non-abstract considerations. So I wouldn't say that "avoiding an induction" is a mistake, it is "avoiding the indexical consideration" that is the mistake. — Bob Ross

I did not intend to note that "avoiding an induction" is a mistake. I think it is a reasonable tactic at times to be efficient. But yes, you can call it "avoiding an induction" or "creating a different context that does not contain an induction" and that is fine.

If I look down and see a "red" "card", then I just deductively ascertained (without an induction) that non-abstractly there exists a "red card". — Bob Ross

Any time you attempt to match your identity of "red" to something else, you are making an implicit induction. Only until after you confirm the essential properties that it is "red" do you have the deduced conclusion. This can be done very quickly, but you do not look at the "red" card and create an identity called "red" for the first time. You are looking at the "red" card, and matching it to the belief that it is "red", the identity you created when you saw "red" for the first time.

In the second case where I state, "The next cat I will see will be green", I am putting something testable out there

But that belief has no bearing on uncertainty. You can have easily have simply deductively noted that you have no clue what the next cat will be, and then saw it was green (and you would know that you have no clue deductively). If you do submit such a belief (as you did), then yes we can deductively ascertain how aligned your induction was with real knowledge, but it never becomes knowledge. Even if you guessed right, you didn't know. — Bob Ross

I want to make sure you didn't misunderstand me here. I am not saying that an induction becomes knowledge. I am stating the deduced result of the induction becomes knowledge. If I believe the next cat I see will be green, that is an induction, not a deduction. If the next cat I see is deductively confirmed to be green, then my induction was correct, but it does not change the fact it was an induction. The induction itself is not knowledge, only the deductively concluded result is knowledge.
If I state, "I have no clue what color the next cat I see will be", the induction is when you see a cat, whether you believe that cat's color has a match to your distinctive knowledge of colors. That result is the deductive conclusion.

I could distinctively know that society does not define something a certain way.

This is where you sort of lost me. If by "distinctively know" you mean that you can categorically define "society" in a way that necessitates that they don't hold that definition of "cat", then I agree. — Bob Ross

Correct.

But I cannot applicably know that society defines something a certain way, when the result of that claim would show that they deductively do not.

I would agree insofar as the distinction being made is that my deduced abstract consideration of what a "society" or "cat" is has no indexical relation to non-abstract considerations, but I am failing to see how this has anything to do with necessarily positing an induction prior to deducing. — Bob Ross

I am not stating there is necessary induction prior to creating further deductions. I am simply noting that when one decides to induce, applicable knowledge is the deduced resolution to that induction.

Someone can look a table, and then say they didn't just look at a table, but they did (and I think you are agreeing with me on this). It is an essential property of "human being" that they are a reasoning being, but I think how you are using "reasonableness", they don't have to have it. But they nevertheless abide by certain rules, which is their reason, even in the most insane of circumstances, which is apart of the definition of being human. — Bob Ross

Using reason in the most basic way we have defined it so far, yes. Reasonable would be a human being who uses societally agreed upon logic over emotions and desires. In the case of our very basic definition of reason, yes, that is an essential property of I think all living beings. But having reasonableness, or agreeing to make decisions based on logic over emotions and desires, is not an essential property of being human.

I don't think any of this proves that I was in control of anything. What discerns actual accordance from coincidental repetition?

We do, colloquially, make distinctions between something like "intention" and what the body actually is capable of, but ultimately I fail to see how we truly control any objects (which includes all concepts, so thoughts, imagination, the body, etc). What proof is there that you are not along for the ride? — Bob Ross

What proof is there that we do not have control over certain things? My proof is I have control over certain things. I can will my arm to move, and it does. I can will against my emotions to do something more important. Are you saying that you have control over nothing Bob? I don't think you're intending that, but I think I need clarification here. And if you are intending that we can control nothing, it would be helpful if you could present some evidence as to why this is.

Do you think that you sometimes can control your "dream world" within your imagination, or all time? Or never? — Bob Ross

Sometimes.

When you say "outside of our mental control", this leads me to believe that you think that you control your mental, or abstract considerations, but I do not think you do. There is no point at which, in reference to any object, where we "know" that we controlled it. It is an induction at best. — Bob Ross

Again I'm confused here. I'll need this broken down more.

Upon further reflection, I don't think we deduce the hierarchy holistically (either as distinctive or applicable--either way they are both considered deductions). Nothing about the premises necessitates the conclusion that "possibility" is more cogent than "speculations". — Bob Ross

It was a while back, but I believe I did cover this. It had to do with chains of inductions away from the induction. A probability is one step from a deduction, a possibility is a less focused induction that probability, because it cannot assess the likelihood of it happening. A speculation is an induction introduces not only a possibility, but the induction that something that has never been confirmed to exist before, can exist. And then you remember irrational inductions.

Nothing about experiencing something once deductively necessitates that it is more likely to happen again over something that hasn't been experienced (and isn't an irrational induction). — Bob Ross

Correct. The hierarchy cannot determine which induction is more likely to be. It can only determine which induction is more cogent, or least removed from what is known. Cogency has typically been defined as a strong inductive argument with true premises. Here cogency is measured by the length and degree of its inductive chain away from what has been deduced.

Great conversation again Bob!

if the bounce is true and the big bang happened within the space of a previous Universe then the need for a 'first cause' or god, would either be not needed at all or be so far back in time eons that it has no significance at all to the Universe we exist in. THIS Universe would therefore be a result of the bounce effect and not a creation of god(s). — universeness

It doesn't matter what explanation you propose. It never will. Someone will always just move the needle back and say, "But what caused that?" Ironically, this needle also applies to a God. "What caused a God to exist?"

People will also just change the meaning of God. "Science just discovered how God made the universe". Science will never solve the God issue, because God really isn't about science. It is the need for there to be some intelligent design as the first cause, over accepting that a first cause could also lack intelligence entirely.

The only real conclusion you can ascertain is there is at least one first cause in a chain of events. (Proven here: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/12098/a-first-cause-is-logically-necessary/p1) But, due to the nature of a first cause, it could be a simple particle appearing.

The point is: Don't get excited and think this will change theist's minds. Theism is about far more than science and logic.

Great post Wayfarer! Lets look at a few things.

Hume recognized that there are two categories of knowledge: empirical and mathematical/logical. He called the former “Matters of Fact” and the latter “Relations of Ideas.”

First, I would state Hume was unable to prove this separation. Isn't a matter of fact a deduced relation of ideas? I do not hold to this definition.

Cause and effect in science is really a constant juxtaposition of events. We observe A followed by B. If this happens uniformly through Custom we infer causation, but we have no reason to justify this

Here is where I believe Hume made a valid point. The idea of cause and effect is that it will necessarily happen again. I calculate gravity, drop an apple, and record the speed. Then I assume if I drop the apple in the same conditions, it will happen again. Why? Why should it be that the laws of physics will be the same 2 seconds from now?

This cannot be deduced, only inferred by "habit" as Hume notes. We're used to things working consistently, so we assume they will continue to do so. We assume there are laws that will not change, so we make judgements according to those laws.

Of course, what Hume forgot to think about was, "What cause do we have to believe things will NOT be consistent in the future?" And it turns out, that's an inference too! I believe what we do is choose the most reasonable inference. Looking at history, the rules of physics have not really changed. If people stop breathing, they stop living. Until people can stop breathing and continue to live, it seems more reasonable to assume that breathing is necessary to live. This is Hume's "habit" explained. We walk around with what we have concluded until we are shown otherwise.

Science takes the same approach. Science never "proves" anything. What it does is try to disprove something. If after trying to disprove something in every single way we can think of, it still stands, then we have "proven" something. The same applies to causality. You can't disprove the notion of causality, period. They computer example is perfect proof. I would love to see someone come along and prove that you didn't cause the keys to be pressed on your keyboard to type your responses.

So, I have a deep confusion about why philosophy sees this disconnection between logical necessity and physical causation. — Wayfarer

I think a way to explain this is "abstract logic". 1+1=2. Now we know that 1 represents an identity, and 2 represents the recognition of 2 identities together. But what are those identities? How far spaced apart are they? Its not an object, a location, or a thing with weight. Its simply the concept of identities. Bananas, oranges, people, "things". As a logical necessity, 1 identity added with another make 2 identities. Does that mean we'll be able to add a banana from Honduras to a banana from America by bringing them to the same location? We need cause and effect there.

Now is cause and effect also logical? Yes. But just like all tigers are cats, not all cats are tigers. Cause and effect is not the entirety of logic, but cause and effect is entirely logical.

Another fantastic set of posts Bob! Lets get into your points.

Firstly, I think we need to revisit the "distinctive" vs "applicable" knowledge distinction holistically because I am still not understanding why it is important. — Bob Ross

This is fair, I really didn't go into it last post as I had initially intended. Deductions are knowledge, period. However, if there's one thing I think we can conclude from the epistemology, its the reasoning and path we take to get there that matters as well. This is why there is a hierarchy for inductions. This being the case, I see an identifiably different type of knowledge when we deduce the end result of an induction.

Likewise, I don't think "applicable knowledge", in the sense of a deduced conclusion pertaining to an induction, has any actual relations to the induction. The induction and deduction are completely separate: mutually exclusive. — Bob Ross

Applicable knowledge is the deductive result of an induction. It is not a deduction that follows an induction.

I believe the next penny flip will be heads. (Induction) ->
I have a penny in my pocket. (Deduction)

In this case, yes, though a deduction followed an induction in terms of the thought process, they are not connected. A connected deduction is the result of the induction.

I believe the next penny flip will be heads. (Induction) ->
I flip a penny I found in my pocket and it turns up tails. (Deduction)

It is not the deduction alone which is applicable. It is the combination of the induction, and its result. The deduction, by itself, would be distinctive. We are not analyzing the deduction itself, we are analyzing the steps it took to get there.

So why is this an important/needed distinction? Because it can help us realize our limitations. I noted earlier that one can create a fully deductive abstract in one's head. I could create an entire world with its own rules, laws, math, and it be a purely deduced achievement. A set of knowledge which has no inductions with deduced resolutions in its chain of reasoning is circumspect. The reality is we face uncertainty constantly. Our deductions which are reasonable at the time, may be countered in the face of new information. Part of reality is uncertainty, and our reasoning should reflect that. Arguably, the uncertainty of life is why we have the concept of knowledge at all. If there was no uncertainty in whatever we concluded, wouldn't we already know everything?

Lets look at science. Science is not a success because it has carefully crafted deductions. It is a success because it has concluded carefully crafted deductions to inductive situations. Science seeks not to deduce, but to induce and then find the result. Science's conclusions are essentially applicable knowledge.

So this is tricky. If by "doubt everything" you mean that everything is technically falsifiable, then yes I agree. — Bob Ross

I meant it as purely the emotional sense of doubt. You can doubt anything, whether its reasonable or unreasonable to do so. Yes, we are in agreement that despite having doubts, one can reasonably conclude that one's doubt is unfounded or incorrect. So to clarify, I was not talking about a reasonable doubt, which is limited, but the emotional non-reasonable doubt. In this epistemology, reasonableness is not a requirement of any person, it is always a choice. However, their unreasonable choices cannot counter a reasonable argument for those who are reasonable.

In regards to hypothetical deductions, I believe we are in agreement! It just seems we had some slight misinterpretations of what each meant.

1. IF an essential property of cats is they are green. — Bob Ross

It depends on how this is read. If we are reading this as "if this is true", then yes, this is simply an abstract premise and a deduction. If however this was read with the intention that we do not know the resolution, "An essential property of cats is they could, or could not be green", then it is an induction.

Basically the IF alone is ambiguous to the user's intent. Does IF mean, "I don't know the essential property" or, "Assume an essential property is X". In the former, if we are to apply it to actual cats, then we must decide what the essential versus accidental properties of a cat are. If not, then we have an induction. In the latter, we have a deduction because we have concluded the essential property of a cat is X, and if we discover something that has all the other properties but X, we will say that creature is not a cat.

From your answers, I think we are in agreement here on this breakdown. Please let me know if I'm incorrect here.

I want to use the example of logical 'if' conditionals to demonstrate the reason why I separate the two knowledges. I can craft distinctive knowledge that avoids an induction. So I can state, "Assume that the essential property of a cat is that its green." I'm putting a hypothetical outcome to an induction, not a deduced outcome of an induction. The hypothetical property can be a part of a deduction, but it is a deduction that has avoided the test of induction.

In the second case where I state, "The next cat I will see will be green", I am putting something testable out there. Hypotheticals are possible deduced solutions to that test. So I could deduce the conclusion that I would be correct if I found the next cat was green, and I could deduce a conclusion if it was the case that the cat is not green. But neither of those deductions are the resolution to the induction itself. They are deductions about what is possible to conclude from an induction, but they are not the deduced result of the induction itself. I find this distinction key to avoid ambiguity when someone claims they "know" something.

Finally, this is important to note when someone changes their definitions. If I claimed, "The penny will flip heads" and the result was that it was tails, the deduction from that conclusion is that the penny landed on tails. Afterward, if I decided to flip the meaning of heads and tails in my head, that would be new distinctive knowledge. The applicable knowledge still stands. "When my definition of heads was this state, the resolution was it landed on tails. After, I changed the definition of heads and tails."

Without first resolving the induction based on one's distinctive knowledge claims one had when they made the induction, then someone could attempt to claim, "Since I changed my definition of heads to tails, my induction was correct." But, the induction was not correct based on the distinctive knowledge at the time. In this, applicable knowledge acts as a historical marker of one's chain of thoughts.

If however, we pull another person into the equation, a society with written rules, then we have an evolution. I cannot conclude whatever I want. I must make an induction, a belief about what society will decide. The answer to that, is applicable knowledge. Even then, the abstracts of society that it creates, that I must test my beliefs against, are its distinctive context, not applicable context.

The same critique you made of solo contexts applies to societal contexts: I can deny whatever society throws at me, just like I can deny whatever I throw at myself. Ultimately I have to decide what to accept and what not to. If someone else came up with:

1. IF an essential property of cats is that they are green
2. IF an essential property of bob is that they are a cat
3. THEN bob is green

We are still in the same dilemma. I don't think the process is as different as you may think. — Bob Ross

You are correct in that we can decide to reject societies' definitions. But what we cannot do is claim applicable knowledge of, "Society doesn't actually believe that the color of a cat is non-essential" I can distinctively know my own definitions. I can distinctively reject societies definitions. I could distinctively know that society does not define something a certain way. But I cannot applicably know that society defines something a certain way, when the result of that claim would show that they deductively do not.

You could decide to never be convinced of anything

This is true in the sense that I can be convinced that I am not convinced of anything, however I am definitively wrong because I am thereby convinced of something. The danger of the mind is that it can fail to grasp things, not that it can do whatever it wants. Reason is not relative, it is absolute in relation to the subject at hand. I can utter and be convinced that "pon is false", but thereby it is true. — Bob Ross

Correct, if you decide to use reason, then you cannot reasonably be convinced that you are not convinced of anything. If you decide not to use reason, then you can. Its like a person who states, "Everything is absolute". Its completely unreasonable, but there are some who forego reasonableness, even when it is pointed out, and insist on their belief. Fortunately, we can use reasonableness, but this does not deny the fact that a person can reject all that in favor of what we might call insanity.

I suppose what I'm getting at in these "A person can feel or do X" is that there is nothing as an essential property of a person that requires them to be reasonable. There are unreasonable people that we still label as people. Holding reasonable positions is non-essential, meaning if a human is biologically or willingly an unreasonable person, there is nothing we can do to make them. A reasonable person will likely live a much better life, but may find the revocation of reasonableness in certain situations to be more profitable to what they desire.

I would also like to note very briefly that we have been kind of ignoring our friend "abductions", which is not an "induction" nor a "deduction". I'm not sure where you have that fit into this equation: is it simply merged with inductions? — Bob Ross

I think so. My understanding of abductions is that it is an induction that is the most reasonable one a person can hold given a situation. From the Stanford Encyclopedia, "You may have observed many gray elephants and no non-gray ones, and infer from this that all elephants are gray, because that would provide the best explanation for why you have observed so many gray elephants and no non-gray ones. This would be an instance of an abductive inference."
-https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abduction/#DedIndAbd

With the inductive hierarchy, an abduction would simply be choosing the most cogent induction in a situation. If you considered the color of the elephant non-essential, this would be an induction. This could also be considered simply distinctive knowledge. If you consider the color of the elephant essential, then upon discovery of a pink elephant, you would call it something else from an elephant, or amend the definition to make the color of an elephant non-essential. It is our chain of reasoning to conclude what we are stating that determines its classification.

I think where we disagree fundamentally is that you seem to be positing that we control reason (or our thoughts or something) in the abstract, but we do not. I do not decide to part and parcel in a particular way, it just manifests. There are rules to abstract though (again, pon). I can linguistically deny it, but nevertheless my reason is grounded in it. I cannot literally conjure whatever I want, because conjuring follows a set of rules in itself. — Bob Ross

Yes, there are aspects about ourselves that we may not have control over. I did not want to state that because we have the power to part and parcel existence, that it is something we always have control over. For example, there are people who are unable to recognize faces. People who are unable to visualize in their mind. This is the applicable context from which we are limited or given the gift of creating distinctive knowledge. Being reasonable is not a fundamental of being human. If it is, I have not been able to prove it so far.

Despite cases in which you cannot easily decide to part and parcel, there are other instances in which you can. Look at one of your keys on your keyboard. Now look at the letter. Now look at any space next to the letter. Draw a circle in your mind around that space. You could if you wish mark a circle, and have created a new identity on that key. You can look at my writing. The page. The screen. The computer system. The room. You can focus and unfocus, and create new identities distinctively as you wish.

There must be something outside of our own power and agency that creates a conclusion that does not necessarily follow from the premises we've created.

It seems like you are arguing you do have power over your thoughts (and potentially imagination): I do not think you do. They are all objects and reason is the connections, synthetic and analytical, of those objects. — Bob Ross

No, I am noting that while we have an incredible amount of power within our own agency, there are things outside of our control. I cannot fly with my mind alone, no matter how much I imagine I can. I cannot bend my limbs past a certain point. But I can imagine that I am able to. I have a world I can create, a logic I can form, and conclusions that will never apply to reality, but be valid in my mind.

Moreover, if I have a deduction, and it is sound, then nothing "outside of my power" (whatever that entails) cannot reject it (in the sense that "reality" rejects what "I want", or what have you). The deduction is true as absolutely as the term "absolute" can possibly mean. Inductions (and abductions) are the only domains of reasoning that can be rejected. — Bob Ross

True, and that is because we have defined it as such. We are being reasonable, constructing definitions, and holding to them to create a logic. But, someone could create entirely different definitions for deductions and inductions. Still, according to the epistemology, we could hold them to a rational standard that results from those amended identities. It is why epistemology is so important. It is a rational standard for which we can debate about what we can know and not know, when the human race by nature, has no standards besides what they themselves or a contextual group would hold them to. We are trying to create a standard that can elevate itself beyond individuals or groups, but can also note what those individuals and groups distinctly and applicably know. Does it meet this standard? Perhaps, but it is an ongoing test and challenge.

I also want to address something again. The idea of something "outside of my power". Basically there are things we cannot will. And you agree with me by stating there are things you cannot choose to part and parcel. Can it be granted at this point that we both believe there are things outside of our mental control?

For example, let's use your "Go Fish" example. Abstractly, I can determine that a game, which I will define as "Go Fish", is possible according to the rules I subject it to: thereby I "know" "GoFish" is possible in the abstract. However, as you noted, it is an entirely different claim to state that "Go Fish is possible non-abstractly" (as I conjured up "Go Fish" according to my rules) (e.g. it turns out a totalitarian regime burned all the playing cards, what a shame, or my rules do not conform to the laws of nature). I think, therefrom, you are intuitively discerning two forms of knowledge to make that meaningful distinction. — Bob Ross

I believe this is correct.

the claim of knowledge towards abstract "Go Fish", and more importantly the "cards" therein, is a completely different conception than "cards" being utilized when claiming "Go Fish is possible non-abstractly". The conflation between the two (what I define abstractly as "a card" along with its existence presupposed in reference to the abstract vs what coincides non-abstractly) is what I think you are trying to warn against. I may define "card" as "floating mid-air" and quickly realize that this is only possible in relation to "abstract cards" and not "non-abstract cards". — Bob Ross

Also correct!

Consequently, "distinctive" and "applicable" are the exact same. If I claim that "Go Fish is possible abstractly", I know this deductively. If I claim that "Go Fish is possible non-abstractly", I also know this deductively. — Bob Ross

Correct in that both are deductions. I hope I clarified here that the real distinction is the in the chain of reasoning.

Distinctive knowledge: Discrete experience or
A deduction that leads to a deduction.

Applicable knowledge:
An induction that leads to a deduced resolution

In other words, it is possible to ground an induction in knowledge (deductions), but not possible to ground a deduction in beliefs (inductions): the relation, therefore, is uni-directional. — Bob Ross

Correct. But we can obtain the actual outcome of the induction. When an induction resolves, we have the outcome.

This result in relation to the induction is the special category of applicable knowledge.

Furthermore, I now can explicate much more clearly what the hierarchy of inductions is grounded upon (assuming I am understanding correctly): the induction with (1) the most knowledge (deductions) as its grounds and (2) no dispensable entities is the most cogent within that context. — Bob Ross

The first part is part of the reason, but I did not understand what a "dispensable entity" was.

But an even deeper dilemma arises: the claim, and I would say key principle, underlying the hierarchy itself is an induction (to hold that the inductions that are more acquainted with, grounded in, knowledge is an induction, not a deductively concluded principle). Which inevitably undermines the hierarchy, since there is necessarily one induction (namely inductions grounded in more knowledge are more cogent) which is outside of the induction hierarchy (since it is itself contingent on it in the first place: we construct the hierarchy from this very induced principle). So, we do not "know" that the hierarchy of inductions is true, under your epistemology — Bob Ross

We distinctively know the hierarchy of inductions, we do not applicably know if the claim is true. That would require testing in a lab. I've given the arguments already for why the hierarchy exists. If we want to revisit it, we can, but this is enough to cover for now. Thanks again Bob, great points, and always feel free to post more if you have new thoughts and I haven't followed up yet!

Space, as you concede, is not nonexistent.

Space, or immaterial expanse, is not the same as nothing or nonexistence. — daniel j lavender

Just semantics at that point then. I think you're confusing our ability to create words and identities as if that makes them "things". If you're going the route of, "As long as one thing exists, then nothingness around it exists as well in relation to it," yes, that's fine. But its existence is an identity of nothingness we've created. Around that one thing, there is no actual existence.

I suppose the greater question for you is, what is your motivation that "nothing" not be possible? I think its the clear norm here, and easily proven. So why are you against it?

Rocks are neither good nor bad. Morality is about what we should do around others. Hence, your view is wrong. — Banno

I have not fully written out the morality I'm speaking of. It is a little more than "rocks make bad choices" :) I will likely write up a forum post on it once Bob Ross and I are done discussing knowledge. I only have time and energy right now for one serious topic, and currently, that's it. When I finally write it up, I look forward to your critiques.

Sounds like a decent set of ideals to be a woman as well. Introduce the concepts to him, and let him figure out which best fit him. Temper his weaknesses and encourage his strengths.

First, lets get word play out of the way. "Nothing" is the absence of some existence. Of course its defined in relation to things, because it is the negation of things. You cannot prove a definition of an identity does not exist by word play. Stating, "Nothingness is part of existence" is simply an invention of definition. Nothingness as identity is very clear. It is the absence of any other identity. What you have to prove is that this identity cannot exist in reality.

Space is part of the structure of existence. Space helps structure existence as spaces help structure sentences. Space allows for motion, transmission and dynamic interaction; it allows for things to integrate and disperse. — daniel j lavender

What you're describing is nothingness. Perhaps what you mean though is that space is an ether.
"ether or aether, in physics and astronomy, a hypothetical medium for transmitting light and heat (radiation), filling all unoccupied space; it is also called luminiferous ether."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aether_theories#Non-standard_interpretations_in_modern_physics

This is an old physics theory that fell out of favor years ago once the theory of relativity was created.

Your best bet is the Quantum Vacuum theory.
"Quantum mechanics can be used to describe spacetime as being non-empty at extremely small scales, fluctuating and generating particle pairs that appear and disappear incredibly quickly."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spacetime

Even then, note "appear and disappear incredibly quickly" At the moment of disappearance, there is "nothing". Now, it could be argued that there is something smaller or harder to detect, so perhaps we can't say for sure they really "disappeared", but this leaves another problem we've ignored until now, "space between other things".

While yes an atom is composed of neutrons, electrons, and protons, there is space between them. And yes, there are quarks floating in and around, but there is space between those as well. And when we get to the smallest particles appearing and disappearing, there is space there as well.

Meaning, we've never defined the world as not having a bit of "nothingness" in it. As I stated earlier, our definitions and word play of course mean nothing next to reality. But it seems that even at the smallest level of reality, we reach a point where "nothingness" exists, at least for a short time.

So I think until proven otherwise, the identify of "nothingness" does exist. Perhaps we are wrong. Perhaps there is an ether like substance flowing through everything, and the idea of "nothingness" is just an illusion we've constructed for a lack of information. But I don't think we have nearly enough to go on to declare that existence is eternal and infinite either. We have much more evidence for the existence of "nothing" at this point, then eternity.

Whether there is a smallest thing or not is rather inconsequential. Even if there were a smallest thing, a smallest object, a smallest particle, or a smallest pocket of space it would still be a thing, it would still be something, it would still be part of existence. A smallest thing would not create a gap of nonexistence. — daniel j lavender

I think we've seen here that it would. The only way for there not to be a gap is if it flowed and touched another of itself without any gap between them. We have yet to show such a thing exists.

A nice write up though! It is a neat idea that there is essentially an ether, and many great minds have wondered the same. The problem at this point is provability.

IQ is simply a constructed evaluation of what some people think it means to be intelligent. Considering we're still learning a massive amount about the brain, I'm quite sure in another 100 years we'll look back at IQ tests much like people looked at measuring the size of a person's skull for intelligence.

I believe morality applies to existence itself, not just human beings. Our own human morality comes from this.

I believe, and will likely write up at some point, a view that morality is actually a result of existential interaction. Of course, how that is calculated out is determined by the type of interactions one has. So in this it is "relative", but still has a foundation. What is morale is the obtainment of X, but that can vary dependent on different situations.

For example, killing a baby is usually wrong. But if a group is hiding out underneath the floorboards of a house where troops, who will kill them all on sight, are marching about, muffling a baby's cries to save everyone is the moral choice if there are no alternatives.

People have an intuition that there is underlying morality between all the relative situations, but the problem is no one has produced anything substantial that withstands logical examination. It is one of the unsolved mysteries of philosophy as of yet, so feel free to propose and think on any possibilities you wish.

Turns out I may not be able to get this published after all due to expense though it was accepted by the journal. The tragic saga of not having enough money. — Enrique

Get a small bank loan and pay it back later. Even a small line of credit will work.
Do not even THINK about not paying the fee to get published if this is a real journal. What is their total cost for publication and which journal has accepted your paper?

Yes, I've had that line of reasoning before as well. I'll respond more in depth when I have time later, but here I fall into agreement with you in the logical sense. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/12098/a-first-cause-is-logically-necessary/p1

Because it is logically necessary that there eventually arrive something in causality which has no prior cause, then it serves to reason that there can be no rules as to why, or why that thing should, or should not have been. It simply exists. As such, our entire universe is here, because it is. I DO believe we can obtain a morality from this, but again, I'll need more time to write it up than I have now.

Angelo, perhaps you're criticizing neuroscience and not philosophy? The realm of philosophy is where an incredible variety of theories of consciousness reside.

What I am talking about is not morality, it is knowledge, a different approach to knowledge. You cannot gain knowledge of consciousness through quantums and relativity, because consciousness is you, the subject, the one who is waiting to be met. You cannot meet yourself through quantums and metaphysics. — Angelo Cannata

To my understanding, this is what the hard problem is about. I might be able to reproduce the physics to create a bat, but we'll never understand what it is to be the experience, or consciousness of a bat. Philosophy is really the realm where there is an insistence that consciousness cannot be captured by the physical breakdown alone.

Was there some type of philosophy in particular about consciousness that struck you as wrong? I just think you're misplacing your ire here.

My main point here is that this would be a hypothetical deduction:

1. IF an essential property of cats is that they are green
2. IF an essential property of bob is that they are a cat
3. THEN bob is green — Bob Ross

This would fit. This would be a deduction based off of two inductions that we do not know the results of. The entirety of this would still be distinctive knowledge. Only after the 2 induced premises had a deduced conclusion, would we call the result applicable knowledge. The question will be when those first two premises are "inductions", and when they aren't.

So yes, we can make deduced conclusions based on hypothetical results to inductions. I still see this as only distinctive knowledge, because we don't have deductions within the premises, but inductions where we assert a possible outcome. The conclusion to the deduction has not been deduced. I will come back to this at the end.

Now to the main event! Fantastic post that took a lot of thinking and work. Let me see if I can adequately address it.

First, I want to commend that I believe you put together a great list of premises and arguments. I'm going to "translate" it where I can into the foundational epistemology I've proposed. I don't want this to come off as dismissive or unappreciative of the great argument you've set up. It is just the goal of this endeavor is to create an epistemology that can be applied and supply an answer to any epistemological question. So with this, I'll start.

1. I cannot doubt a thought until after it becomes apart of the past (therefrom an absolute grounding of trust is established). — Bob Ross

According to the foundational epistemology I've proposed, you can doubt anything you want. But can I distinctively know I have that thought? Yes. A memory is a thought which can be a recollection of the past. The question of course is, "How does the foundational epistemology resolve the question, 'Is my memory of the past accurate?'" And here we try to figure out the resolution.

2. Any given past thought is always recollected as a reliable memory (in virtue of #1). — Bob Ross

Here I want to slightly tweak this. Any given past thought is a current thought. Meaning that we can distinctively know that current thought. If I experience that my memory is reliable, that is what I distinctively know. If I experience that my memory is unreliable, that is what I distinctively know. I may have some unanswered uncertainty in my question, but I have certainty that the memory and questions I am experiencing are distinctively known.

3. The validity of a given past thought is deduced insofar as it relates to other past thoughts. — Bob Ross

When we say validity, it is a deduced conclusion. If we do not have applicable knowledge, we can only make a deduction about the accuracy of a past thought based on the distinctive knowledge we have. As past thoughts are distinctively known, this statement you've made seems accurate.

Lets continue with your conclusions.

It is a recursive operation that is inevitable, but can be accurately portrayed in a non-absurd manner if one realizes that it is all relative to the absolute point of trust: the present thought. — Bob Ross

This is where I want to go next. A memory is a present thought that is thought to represent a past time in some sense. But it is a present thought regardless. That memory, is what is discretely experienced currently.

Now, let me address your main contention here:
In short, in what we conclude in a prior reference to our memory, an abstraction, is a deduction because it is whatever we experience.

I think you are partially correct. In terms of the process of thinking as outlined previously, the reliability in relation to another past thought is deduced. Likewise, it is deduced that there is a "present thought" and that it necessarily is trusted. However, the reliability of set of past thoughts is not determined. — Bob Ross

When you say reliability, do you mean distinctive, or applicable? in the distinctive case, we know without question what that set of past thoughts is. If you extend it to an applicable level however, when you make an induction and a deduced conclusion can be reached, this is a different sense of "reliable". I believe when you agree that I am partially right, you are referring to the distinctive sense.

Also, I still think that an induction is possible abstractly, however your definition of "abstraction" doesn't allow it by definition (and I would say it is not a main stream definition of abstraction). — Bob Ross

I want to clarify that we can make inductions from abstractions. That is how we create beliefs. What I wanted to assert was that abstractions themselves are not applicable knowledge. This is because we can create any abstraction we want, and thus there is no conclusion that necessarily follows the premises besides what we invent.

For example, I tell myself, "I believe that 1+1=2." That is an induction, but if I have created the rules of math, it really isn't. If I remember 1+1=2, then that is what I remember. If I remembered that 1+1=3, then I wouldn't believe that 1+1=2. The only time I can make a seeming induction is if I state, "Maybe I don't remember what 1+1 equals", but even the solution to this is whatever I abstractly come up with.

To be a real induction, it must involve something we cannot simply conclude ourselves. There must be something outside of our own power and agency that creates a conclusion that does not necessarily follow from the premises we've created. Only in that situation, can you have applicable knowledge. And yes, the way I've defined abstraction, if an abstraction is the deduced conclusion to an induction, it was never an induction to begin with. Perhaps that is unfair, but its simply a conclusion I've come to using the epistemology.

To be very clear, this is because an abstraction has no rules besides what you make. There is no one besides yourself who can tell you your own created abstraction is "wrong". No one to tell you but yourself that your memory is "wrong". In short, abstractions are our limitless potential to "part and parcel" as we like.

1. IF I am remembering correctly that I previously answered 6.
2. THEN the answer to the square root of 25 is 6

Does the conclusion necessarily follow from the premise? No. Therefore, it is not a deduction. — Bob Ross

It is a hypothetical deduction as you noted earlier. The question comes into play when we consider what appears to be an induction in premise one. There is one key here. You determine whether you remember correctly that the previous answer is six. If you do, then you do. If you remember that it is 7, then it is 7. And if you never do, you never do. That conclusion is distinctive, not applicable. Because there really was no induction. There is no uncertainty, for the continuation of the deduction results that the answer is, "Whatever you abstractly choose".

This is why it is essential to keep a difference between distinctive and applicable knowledge. Inside of your own head (to simplify an example) we are masters of our own universe, and can "reason" however we wish. It is the fact that there are things beyond abstractions that force us to re-evaluate the world we've created. To look at our identities once again, and realize there is a "right" and a "wrong". That was the original intention of "reality", though I don't think the word is needed any more.

In our own head, inductions are just pauses before we formulate the answer. An induction can only truly occur when we are not the sole masters of the outcome.

But I realized this can nevertheless be proven (I think at least), because I can deduce (regardless of the validity of any thoughts) that if a past thought hypothetically was at one point actually the "present thought" and it wasn't immediately trusted (prior to another thought succeeding it) then I would never have a coherent sequence of reason. Therefore, I would never be convinced of anything. — Bob Ross

If you are a purely abstracting being, then you decided it was a coherent sequence of reason. You just as easily could have decided it was not. You could decide to never be convinced of anything. That is the danger of a mind that lives purely in abstraction. Such an experience would be a dream world. It is only our experience of situations in which our abstractions fail that we can realize certain abstractions are not useful. That is when we create true inductions, where we cannot deduce the outcome until we apply that induction and experience its resolution.

Going back to the start now.

1. IF an essential property of cats is that they are green
2. IF an essential property of bob is that they are a cat
3. THEN bob is green[/quote]

In the solo context, the answer to the "inductions" is whatever we decide. We decide if they are essential properties or not. They are not inductions, their conclusion is certain to whatever we decide.

If however, we pull another person into the equation, a society with written rules, then we have an evolution. I cannot conclude whatever I want. I must make an induction, a belief about what society will decide. The answer to that, is applicable knowledge. Even then, the abstracts of society that it creates, that I must test my beliefs against, are its distinctive context, not applicable context. We could encounter a society that decides math works differently. It is only when we apply that distinctive context to an actual situation, "1 potato plus 1 potato equals 2 potatoes" can we deduce whether societies abstraction can be applicably known as well.

Its been stated that successful philosophy becomes the sciences. Philosophy is sort of like a proto-science who's ultimate goal is to destroy itself.

Not if

There are no accidents.
— Master Oogway — Agent Smith

And if an accident is the reason something happened? :smile:

And now we've come full circle. Why? Why Not? Because. Because why? Why not?

My point is a sufficient reason does not mean it has to indicate something prior. If for example, you found something in the chain of causality that had no prior causality, it would not eliminate the fact that it still exists. If you could find no prior reason for its existence, then logically, it must exist by the evidence that it does. How does it exist? As a self-explained entity. This is reasonably concluded if there is no prior causality, thus a sufficient reason for its existence. In other words, "It just happened" can be a sufficient reason for something's existence.

An accident is meant here as a random event. — Agent Smith

I understand that. Isn't a random event a reason for why something happened?

Expressed differently,

There are no accidents. — Agent Smith

Wrong. The PSR states there is a reason for everything. But what if that reason is an accident?

A wonderful write up as always Bob. No worry on the time, quality posts take a while to write! I have to think through my responses quite a bit at this point myself, as you often ask new questions I haven't considered before, and I want to mull my initial thoughts over before responding. Lets get to it.

Firstly, "distinctive knowledge" is "deductions". "Applicable knowledge" is merely referencing the means of achieving that "distinctive knowledge" (i.e. the transformation of an inductive belief into deductive knowledge--belief into knowledge) and, therefore, is unnecessary for this distinction you are trying to convey. — Bob Ross

I think it is important that this distinction remain. What I might have been missing is a third category.
Deductions are knowledge. The difference between distinctive and applicable are what was involved prior in the chain of reasoning. This mirrors the induction hierarchy, though I don't think one deduction is more cogent than another. Deductions without any inductions immediately prior are distinctive knowledge. Deductions concluded immediately inductions are applicable knowledge. I would not mind renaming the words within that distinction, but that distinction is absolutely key to breaking out of the previously failed theories of knowledge. I will see if I can show you why in our conversation.

First, to be clear, deductions are forms of knowledge. Inductions are forms of beliefs. But how we determine those inductions and deductions allows us a different approach. I think the problem is maybe I haven't clearly defined an abstraction. An abstraction is not a deductive conclusion from an induction, it is the formulation of the essential and non-essential properties of an identity. Within a solo context is a tool of your own creation, there are no limits to what you can, and cannot create in an abstraction. If you create limits, those are self-imposed limits.

For example, making a game. Imagine there are no people around. I invent the game called "Go fish" on my own. Did anything in reality force me to create those rules? No. Now, can I take a real deck of cards and play a game? That is an induction. Once I confirm that I can, or cannot play that game, then I have a new type of knowledge, the conclusion of an induction. That is something that needed to test reality, and either passed or failed.

Another way to view it is when you discretely experience the color "red". Not the word, the experience. Then you say, "That is 'something'". That construction of the essential property, and non-essential property of what 'red' is, is the abstraction, and fully in your creative control.

For all intents and purposes here, I am going to elaborate with a distinction of "categorical" vs "hypothetical" deductions (not married to the terms, just for explanation purposes). Although they are both deductions (and, consequently, their conclusions necessarily follow from the overlying principle and subsequent premises), they differ in the validity of the overlying principle itself. If a deduction was "categorical", then it is necessarily (categorically) true. — Bob Ross

Your categorical deduction fits the bill perfectly. I agree that is a deduction. But I'm not sure the hypothetical is an actual deduction. Let me point it out

However, if I am asserting this "hypothetically", then I am thereby asserting in virtue of hypothetically holding that it is true that all cats are green. — Bob Ross

"All cats are green". Is that by definition, or is that an induction? That is the fine line that must be clarified. If cats are green by definition, as an essential property, then that is what is distinctively known. If however, color is not an essential property of a cat, then its involvement in our logic does not result in a deduction, but an induction. This is because I am admitting to myself that if I found a red creature with the essential properties of a cat, I would still call it a cat.

However, if it was "hypothetical", then the conclusions are only true in virtue of granting the overlying principle as hypothetically true. This can be demonstrated (both of them) in one example:

1. All cats are green
2. Bob is cat
3. Bob is green — Bob Ross

This is not hypothetically if you are the one who has determined the definitions. Lets flesh it out correctly.

1. An essential property of cats is they are green.
2. An essential property of Bob is that they are a cat.
3. Therefore, Bob is green.

Including non-essential properties turns this into an induction.

1. An accidental property of cats is they are green. (Could or could not)
2. An essential property of Bob is that they are a cat. (Must be)
3. Therefore, Bob is green.

This is not a deduction. This is an induction because we've basically stated, "Cats could, or could not be green". We have deduced an induction based on our abstractions. And we can classify this type of induction using the hierarchy. If, as you implied, we've always seen green cats, but we are willing to accept a cat that could be another color, then this is a speculative induction.

So, we can abstract both deductions and inductions. And this abstraction is distinctive knowledge.
They are not applicable knowledge, because applicable knowledge only comes about after we have taken our abstracted induction, and deductively concluded the result.

if I define "glass" as having the essential property of being "(1) clear and (2) made from melting sand", then, assuming I didn't watch it get made, I can't assert that this pane in front of me is actually "glass": it would be an induction. — Bob Ross

True. Based on the context of your definition, you will never applicably know whether that is glass.

So, although I deductively discover the properties of the presumably "glass pane" in front of me, I do not deductively obtain that it is thereby "glass" (I inductively assert it is). — Bob Ross

Just to clarify, if you meant that you deduced that the glass was made of silica, clear, and for all intents and purposes, had all the non-essential properties of a window, but you could not find the one essential property "That it was formed through melting sand", then yes, you could only ever inductively know it as a window.

I would also like to briefly clarify that my square root of 25 example was meant as a "solo context", as it can be posited as either one (but I should have made that clear, so that's my bad). The dilemma is still there if we were to presume that I came up with the mathematical operation of the square root. I came up with it a year ago, by myself, and began memorizing the answers of the square roots of like 100 integers (or what have you). Then, a year later, I ask myself "what's the square root of 25?". I immediately assert it is "6" in reference to what I believe was what I memorized a year ago (in accordance with the mathematical rules I produced). That's an induction. — Bob Ross

This is such a good point! Lets walk through this. So at the time when you state, "the answer is 6", that's still distinctive knowledge and deduction. That is because what you experience remembering as the answer, is the answer. There's no one else to tell you that you are wrong. There's no other answer you can give, because that is what you remember.

Stay with me here, because I know how that can sound at first. Later you may "remember differently" or find a record of the logic that you put down. At that time, you will know that your original deduction was wrong. But that was what you still distinctively knew at the time. With new knowledge to revise the structure that you had, you now distinctively know that the square root of 25 is not 6.

The bigger question, and the part where you may be right that we can induce abstractly, is when you make the claim, "What I remember today is the same thing I remembered yesterday." What a head twister honestly! That by nature is always an induction. Or is it? Can't I simply decide yes or no? I can, but it is a belief, and therefore an induction, is the deduced conclusion to that then applicable knowledge?

If I have no outside evidence of the past, or record of the past, the answer is still what I ultimately decide. If I remember, "Yes, I do," then I've been given an answer, but from my own mind. If I remember that I do in fact, remember what I remembered yesterday, that's an answer that I distinctively know. But is it true? Is that really a deductive answer to an induction? It is, because its the distinctive knowledge that I have. Same as if I experienced that I did not remember the same thing I did yesterday (even if I'm incorrect objectively). Finally it is deductive if I conclude, "I can't trust my own memory anymore, so I don't know."

But, and here's the kicker, is the answer to this induction, a deduction or another induction? What's interesting about this case is it may not fit either. I'm not sure, so I'm going to break it down.

Is there a premise in the drawn conclusion to the original induction?

Case 1. I remember that what I remembered yesterday, is what I remember today.

As what we discretely experience is what we distinctively know, then I distinctively know this. Thus this conclusion is actually a deduction, even if there was some outside evidence, even if this was not true.

Case 2. I remember that what I remembered yesterday, is not what I remember today.

The outcome is the same as case one. This is distinctive knowledge.

Case 3. I conclude "I'm unsure if what I remembered today is what I remembered yesterday."

Lets call this the Descartes Doubt case. The answer to case 3 cannot be found by anything outside of our own deductions again. This is the "I doubt even my own thinking". What is the answer that we deduce in this case? "That I cannot remember if what I remembered yesterday, is what I remember today." This is not an induction, as we have concluded that this is the case with no alternatives. This is what I discretely experience.

In short, in what we conclude in a prior reference to our memory, an abstraction, is a deduction because it is whatever we experience.

But, lets compare this to another scenario in which I know I wrote down what I remembered yesterday, "The square root of 25 is 5" (according to my made up rules). If I remembered this existed, and this paper could prove that I correctly remembered what I knew yesterday, then I would deductively know that I could not ascertain an answer unless I found it. This is not the same as claiming, "I believe the paper says the square root of 25 is 6" This is an induction, and can only be denied or confirmed once the paper is discovered.

The entire point I want to note is that abstractions, which are entirely in our head, can never be inductions in themselves. We can use those abstractions as inductions, and when we do, we can gain applicable knowledge be deductively solving the conclusion. When we make abstractions in our head and apply them to abstractions in our head (that we have made up) there is no induction, because it is whatever we conclude.

That being said, we can classify deductions in two ways, and I believe these are important identities.

1. Deductions in which the premises are not changed.
2. Deductions in which the original premises are changed and amended.

Recall that when one applies an induction, they can amend their terms to fit the new conclusions. So for example, if I considered all cats green as an essential property, and I found a feline that matches all the essential properties of a cat except that it was red, I might decide to amend the essential property of color into an accidental property. I could also simply keep the color as an essential property, and conclude from the induction that I had found a new animal. That choice is mine. But perhaps noting when we change or amend our original distinctive knowledge versus when we do not change or amend our original distinctive knowledge is a key difference.

I don't think this is what you meant by (0, 0): I think you are arguing for the allowance of minimally ambiguous terminology. — Bob Ross

This was a reference to a mathematical concept. If you're not familiar with it, its not a good example, so lets not worry about it.

I would clarify that the applicable is not the attempt to verify inductions, it is the deductive result of an induction

If this is the case, then it is distinctive knowledge. — Bob Ross

Since distinctive knowledge is a particular knowledge that precludes the involvement or prior inductions in its conclusions, no. Recall that both forms of knowledge are deductions. Just like the hierarchy of inductions, it is the steps that we take to arrive at those deductions that create the essential difference.

I still think we are slowly converging in our views, it is just taking a while (: — Bob Ross

Ha ha! Yes, I honestly feel our views are off by only very small differences. I think this is one of the reasons the conversation has been so engaging and helpful (for me at least). You've been able to point out that slightly semantic/alternative view point that really tests what I'm proposing, and makes me think. It has helped me amend and leave out a few approaches that you have shown are unnecessary or simply confusing. As always, it is appreciated to find another person who is interested in the truth of the matter and the refinement of the discussion.

I think you are starting to explore recursively reason on itself and, thusly, realizing that "deductions" and "induction" are innate in us. — Bob Ross

One thing I want to clarify is that I agree that the capability to deduce and induce are innately within us. Distinctively knowing these words and these concepts is something which must be discovered. One can accidently deduce or induce, but not have any distinctive knowledge that they do. So what I meant by, "The logic of deduction and induction are reached by..." I mean the knowledge of the logic of deduction and induction are reached by..."

I think "discrete experience" is a convenient clumping of many aspects of the fundamentals of the mind, but to achieve your grounding of deductions, premises, conclusions, induction, predictions, etc, I think you are going to have to at least conceptually analyze the sub-categories. — Bob Ross

Full agreement with you. Another large write up from me! I hope I covered the points, please let me know if there is something that I missed or did not clarify. I fully expect a response on the claim that abstracts are essentially distinctive knowledge and cannot be inductively concluded.

The difference between life and non-life can be boiled down to a fundamental. Non-life reacts and finishes. Life is an integration of reactions that seeks to sustain itself and other reactions like it as long as it can.

If you're going to propose something like a soul, it needs to be more than an untested concept. Being unable to comprehend that you are a self-sustaining set of chemical reactions does not suddenly make another proposal correct. What does a soul mean? What does it do that sustained chemical reactions cannot? How can we see the soul act? How does it interact with these chemical reactions?

If you can't answer questions like these, not just with a soul but with anything, then what you're talking about is something you've imagined. Nothing wrong with imagining things, but we shouldn't let what we imagine be assumed a part of reality, until we can observe it is part of reality. Its the unicorn test. If you can't prove something exists in the same way that you cannot prove a unicorn exists, then you know your claim is purely imaginary.

I think people always bare responsibility for their action or inaction, no matter whether they did it on their own accord to were lead there by societal norms. — stoicHoneyBadger

Agreed. My intention was more to convey that people who only rely and act on societies expectations without question or thinking about it, are avoiding their responsibilities as a being with agency.

"I have the right to do whatever I want and call it good, no matter how it affects other people."
— Philosophim

On the other hand, that is how the world works. People do what they believe is good, sometimes it is really good, sometimes they might be extremely delusional. — stoicHoneyBadger

To be clear, I was paraphrasing what you said. I don't agree with it. We have the capability to do whatever we want and call it good. That doesn't mean we're correct, or that we aren't responsible for what results from that decision. If I chose wrong in what I deemed to be good, those who had chosen correctly would have every right to stop me.

I more thought about it the other way around - that a person would NOT do what he deems as immoral, even if his society tries to force him to. — stoicHoneyBadger

Certainly! But whatever a person has concluded as a concept of reality is not necessarily concurrent with reality. Sometimes we are wrong. The capability to make a decision about what concepts we will follow is the power, and also responsibility of every human being. The issue I wanted to point out, and I think you realize it as well, is the notion of responsibility for what we decide to do. When we accept societies precepts without thought, we avoid responsibility and make our decisions based on things such as fear, avoiding rejection, or a host of societal pressures that shouldn't tie into the reasoning of the concepts themselves.

So I am glad to hear you say that. As I noted earlier, it was pretty much the only line of your OP I took issue with, everything else is a viable world view, and definitely a pattern I can agree with.

He himself has the authority to determine what is good or bad, regardless of other people. — stoicHoneyBadger

I could agree up until this point. This is 100% wrong, and dangerously so. Let me translate what this really means:

"I have the right to do whatever I want and call it good, no matter how it affects other people."

This is evidence of someone who has stumbled in their evolution of thinking and simply gave into their animalistic instinct of power and selfishness and need for dominance. You never have that right. Its a complete contradiction of the underlying notion of good.

Let me rephrase what could work, "I have the ability to do whatever I want and call it good, no matter how it affects other people." No denial there. But do you have the right? No. Do I have the right to nuke the entire world and call it a good thing? Absolutely not. The ability to do anything does not mean you have the right to do anything.

You have the ability to create your own words, and invent your own concepts. It is what we all did when we were children. But, you apply those words and concepts to the world. You see if they make sense. You see how they affect the world, society, and your own life. While it is good to dip back into a child like view of wonder to think on things again, never lose sight that the real world consequences of your words and concepts have impacts beyond your control, and any thinker must consider that as well.

Never give into the temptation to be all powerful and all knowing. History is littered with these "Gods" of humanity that cause pain, misery, and destruction all around them. We are not Gods. We are humans attempting to figure out how to view the world in a way that causes the world to be a better place not only for ourselves, but through minimizing unnecessary harm as well. We are always fallible, and we can always be wrong.

I hear that existence came from "nothing", but I've also heard that it is part of a vast assortment of other universes in a conglomeration known as the "multiverse". Some scientists even postulate that there are "parallel universes" where you and I have other versions of ourselves that have made alternate choices in life, possibly every version of ourselves having been carried out. — chiknsld

Even with those proposed explanations, there's still the question, "Well what caused parallel or mulitverses to be?" I explore the logic here https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/12098/a-first-cause-is-logically-necessary if you're interested.

In short, it is logically necessary that within any causal chain, there is a "first cause". This is something which has no explanation for its existence, other than the fact it is. The big bang might have been self-explained. The universe may have just popped into existence at once, in pieces, etc. There still may be self-explained things happening today. We honestly would have an extremely difficult time knowing, as a self-explained existence has no rules for what it can, or cannot be.

So just appreciate that what ever one or several first causes have made the universe what it is today, it just happened to be with no real reason behind it. The question really is, what will we do with what we have today? Decide your own purpose, and live it well.

One thing that might help is that words are entirely made up.
— Philosophim

That's not true. They aren't just made up, they're made up and then agreed to. Imperfectly. — T Clark

And they are still entirely made up between different people. And many times, several people will not agree to them. Just look around here! Words are tools is all I'm noting. There is no "one" definition that is used the same everywhere. Different contexts, groups, and settings will have their own definitions and implicit meanings to words they use. The tool of words is to convey concepts and meanings that fit what the group desires.

Some words are more logical, detailed, and effective at communication than others within different contexts. If you find the word too broad, which is a fair assessment, then I would work on defining sub-groups of causality that are more detailed and to your satisfaction. Then, when people bring up causality, bring up the subgroups and try to get them to narrow their word down to your more detailed analysis.

No word is an immutable aspect of reality,
— Philosophim

There's a whole discipline in metaphysics about that. If you throw out the words, you throw out ontology. I'm just trying to get rid of causality. You're trying to get rid of reality. — T Clark

I rather like reality. Reality persists despite whatever definition and words we invent. My point is that words are attempts to represent reality, and their representation is not an immutable aspect of reality.
The point that I wanted you to think about is that the problem that you have with causality, is a macro representative of every single word you ever think about. The problem is a pattern, not isolated to causality only. Also what I am describing is ontology, not trashing it.

But there is something you're trying to find that bothers you about it.
— Philosophim

You ignored my previous response in which I discussed this. — T Clark

I did not mean to ignore, I simply misunderstood. I assumed you were unsure of the reason why you seemed against causality specifically. It was an attempt to determine what that was.

If you don't want to give my former post a read, give that latter one a read at least.
— Philosophim

If I remember correctly, I participated in both those threads. — T Clark

I hope I was helpful, or at least gave you a different view point to mull over.

What leaves a bad taste in my mouth is when people fail to recognize their presuppositions are not somehow immutable aspects of reality. — T Clark

Ok, I think I see. One thing that might help is that words are entirely made up. They are just models we use within our personal context, and group context. Think of the word "tree". When you say tree, you think of something different than what I say tree. I might classify a bush as a tree, and a botanist may not. Who's right? Depends on what context is important to us. If I go into botany, then I better use words better than tree. If I'm with a group of friends, who cares?

If you're interested I've thought about these things for years. I have a paper I divided into several small sections here. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/9015/a-methodology-of-knowledge/p1 The discussion is poor at first, but once Bob Ross jumps in, it gets going well.

But back to your point. No word is an immutable aspect of reality, including whatever you replace causality with. But there is something you're trying to find that bothers you about it. Could it be:

How is causality different from determinism? — T Clark

Its not. And that can put a damper on it if you don't like the idea of determinism. Unfortunately, not using the word causality won't eliminate that either. For a non-deterministic universe to happen, there must be something that happens without prior cause. I don't necessarily mean a God. I mean a particle would need to pop into the universe without any prior causality and then influence the matter in our universe.

You may like another post of mine here. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/12098/a-first-cause-is-logically-necessary In the end I conclude that the end result of causality, is that there must exist something that is uncaused. There are a lot of people in there who are think its a God argument and make up straw mans, but ignore them. So logically, I suppose I conclude there that determinism is false. If you don't want to give my former post a read, give that latter one a read at least.

Let's say we just get rid of idea of causality. Doesn't your way of seeing things just revert to the hierarchical system we talked about last week - laws from below, constraints from above? What advantage do you get when you add cause to the mix? — T Clark

T Clark, from reading your replies in this thread, I suppose I still don't understand why in particular you seem to have an issue with causality. There is a motivation here. And that's not wrong. There is something about causality that leaves such a distaste in your mouth that you are more than willing to throw it all away.

That's an incredibly important thing to examine. We are not rational beings by nature, we are rationalizing beings by nature. When we figure out why we're rationalizing, why we're looking for a particular answer we desire, only then can we be rational.

I say this, because I have no particular love or hate for causality. Its just a word to me. I try listening to people's rejection of it, but I personally don't see a lot of logic here. Perhaps if we figure out why its so distasteful, then we can examine the issue in the way you seem to be looking for.

If the mind is the brain, then perhaps.

https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2021/03/210325115316.htm#:~:text=Women's%20brains%20are%20about%2011,%2C%20versus%20within%2C%20cerebral%20hemispheres.

Women's brains are about 11% smaller than men's, in proportion to their body size. Smaller brains allow certain features, such as a slightly higher ratio of gray matter to white matter, and a higher ratio of connections between, versus within, cerebral hemispheres.

Thus it wouldn't be a sure fire distinction, but if you took a sample of 1,000 brains across the average population and evaluated them using this metric, you could probably guess which brain was correct for most of the cases.

As we continue to drill down and learn how the brain functions, we could also probably find different areas of the brain that light up due to physical sex differences.

Maybe you meant to word your concept differently? "Authority" means they have command over you. But if a person you rely on does not live up to your expectations, they don't have command over you. You're forced at that point to rely on someone else, or yourself. Someone with authority can punish in a way separate from your reliance, like putting you in prison or harming you in other ways.

Note that the whole "everything needs a cause" creating God is yet further evidence that a narrow "cause and effect", or efficient cause, model of causality is too limited. A larger model of causality is required. — apokrisis

I would argue that's just an unexamined look at the nature of causality to its ends. I think its pretty obvious to anyone who's been in philosophy for even a short time that the next question becomes, "Well what caused God then?" Yes, theists often invent special circumstances for God, but its all made up, and they can never quite explain those special instances can only apply to God, and not well, anything else.

Regardless, reasoning about causality as a serious argument should not involve God. If a person avoids causality because they think a conclusion leads to God, that's not square thinking. Same as if a person holds onto a view of causality because they think a conclusion leads to God. An argument should never be agreed or disagreed with based on where it might lead, it should be considered on its logical merits of its immediate claims and deduced conclusions.

R.G. Collingwood wrote that cause is a process that started out referring to human action and only later took on meaning as a non-human physical process. He saw the term cause as it is used by philosophers to describe physical action as a metaphorical usage from that original meaning. — T Clark

I don't doubt it. Word use continually evolves over the centuries. I find that philosophy is often about amending and inventing words to fit logical concepts. Science tries to take those words and use them effectively. Good philosophy eventually becomes science.

The notion that something can act upon another is a genie out of the bottle now. Of course, this is not to be confused with intention, or the personification of objects. But I think its a fairly straight forward notion in science that we look for a cause to explain why a state exists as it does. Its our job as philosophers to find the nugets of the concept that are valuable, and refine out the rest.

in Newton's law, what causes an object at rest to move?
— Philosophim

It all depends on where you place the frame and what you set as the scale. — T Clark

Of course that's the answer. We've known this for a long time. We can see that in Newton's own laws. When you "act upon" something, you are placing the frame of reference on "something that is being acted upon" and "something that is doing the acting". The result of the acted upon's response to the "actor" is the response, while the "actor" is the cause.

Needing to apply scale does not make anything special or questionable. Its completely normal. Take a look at your keyboard right now. What is it composed of? Of course, I'm not asking you to give me the atomic composition right? We scale it to what's reasonable. If I wanted to dig down at a deep enough scale, the keyboard would disappear entirely. Does that mean there's no keyboard or identity? Of course not, that's absurd.

Take the words that you're using and realize you scale those as well. You scale them to your audience. You have implicit emotions and intentions behind them that your audience may never glean. And yet I can say, "I understand what you're saying T Clark". Even though if I go to a small enough scale, like reading what is exactly going on in your mind right now, I would not.

Scaling down something to the point of uselessness and incomprehensibility is not clever, though it appears a trapping for many. Anyone can do it by simply crossing their eyeballs. "Look, my view of the world is completely distorted now! Maybe I don't really see anything at all?!" My answer is to that person is, "Uncross your eyes you silly goose." Words are signs we use to convey conceptual intention, and the challenge is not to make them pointless, but to make them useful as we need to convey those underlying concepts.

If I would guess at the real underlying criticism of the word "causality", its that it has sub-concepts that are not easily conveyed through the context of a conversation. I'm not saying Aristotle's break down is correct, but you could construct a sentence with "causality" which could mean any one of the sub-types. Again, this does not mean "causality" does not exist or is useful. What is really being asked is. "Which sub-type are you intending through your context?" When conversation requires the accuracy of those sub-types be conveyed cleanly without possible ambiguity, then we should use a sub-type of causality.

Well, yes, I did. But it was not an answer to your liking. — Banno

It was not that it was to my liking, it is that I interpreted your intentions incorrectly. Your link to the article made your intention more clear. Above should include my response to that.

...in Newton's law, what causes an object at rest to move?
— Philosophim

Well, thank you for the example, and the opportunity it offers. You see, Newton's laws do not make mention of cause. That's the point made by Russell, and subsequently by myself. Phrasing them in terms of cause is removing them from their usual playing field and putting them into the language of our everyday interactions. — Banno

I notice you didn't answer the question. If I asked a scientist that question, would they be unable to answer? They would answer it without hesitation.

I'm going to post this part again, as you didn't address it.

So what causes a body to cease remaining at rest? A force acting upon it. Words describe concepts, and concept of causality is very much alive in science. Now causality can be considered a large word, more generic such as "good" or "tree". Science might try to use words that are more specific parts within the concept of causality, but that is not a negation of the word, or its usefulness in day to day communication. — Philosophim

Words represent concepts Banno. There are also synonyms. I don't care if you tallied a word count of all scientific articles and speeches around the world and found the percentage use of "cause" was lower than the rest of the population. They do use the word cause, and if they don't that specific word in a sentence, they use often use synonyms or more specific subsets of the concept of causality.

There are some ways to debate causality, but "Scientists don't use the word" is just silly. When you have to go to absurd lengths to avoid answering a simple and obvious question, its time to question whether your argument is absurd as well.

↪Philosophim Of course scientists talk of causes, in just the same way as non-scientists. But "cause" plays little if any part in their explanations. As your own examples show, scientists use force and calculation, not cause. — Banno

Banno, in Newton's law, what causes an object at rest to move?

These periods ("episodes") are rare and maybe on the verge of mania or psychosis but very intense. If you would always be depressed or know for sure it would never go away, it would be quite depressing! — EugeneW

I'm no medical professional, but maybe you should see a psychologist? I'm not sure your experiences necessarily describe medical depression. Sounds like you're unhappy with your lot in life, which no amount of medicine will fix. And don't take this the wrong way, I'm not some superior "I have my life totally together" person either. Sometimes a good therapist can assist you getting back on track and getting out of the doldrums.

I tried a few days, despite it made me feel worse after the first take. I couldn't imagine that it made me feel better after taking it longer. If I had known for sure I might have done it. Like smoking gets good after one packet only. — EugeneW

Right, I think they didn't inform you of what it was supposed to do. Depression medication isn't supposed to make you high or happy. Depression is usually about not being able to function or do anything about your emotional state. You can be sad or bored, but not depressed. Depression is where doing anything outside of minimal effort is incredibly difficult. If for example you feel you need an emotional high to do anything, that's an overcompensation for depression. You're essentially imbalancing your emotions in another way to be able to function.

Once you're on depression medication, then you can do something about your feelings. Instead of lying in bed or avoiding people, you're able to go out and do something. You'll get to the point where you can work on managing your emotions instead of reaching for a quick buzz. Of course, if you like that quick buzz, then you're also fighting addiction at the same time. Not being depressed can assist with that fight, but it won't do the work for you.

The advice was to continue swallowing them. The positive effect would take a few weeks. I didn’t do that. — EugeneW

Any reason why you didn't try to follow the medical advice and try it for a few weeks? Now I'm all for noting they don't make you feel good after that point, and if a doctor insists, get a new doctor. But I would try following medical advice to its end first.

Medicine is not intuitive like we want to believe it is. My mother was a nurse for many years and gave me several examples. She had a patient in her ward one time who was told after surgery, "Do not get up under any circumstances." Well, the guy thought he could because he felt well, didn't want to atrophy, and thought it would be better if he moved around. The nurses caught him walking around to their horror. After they examined him again they found his walking had blocked blood flow to his leg, and they had to amputate it.

Anti-depressents are not intended to make you feel happy and good. They are intended to make you feel normal. Suicide rates can go up when people are first prescribed anti-depressants as people are actually able to act, which is really what the medication is supposed to fix. It does not make your bad feelings go away. It lets you get out of your paralysis. You still have to work on yourself.

Benzo's and other stuff work better, but they won't prescribe it. — EugeneW

And now you know why after you got off of it. If you're looking for a high or happy pill, that's not what anti-depressants are for. Perhaps try again with this knowledge? Really talk and listen to your doctor. Go see a psychologist or psychotherapist if you need help getting through it. But don't go to a street dealer looking for highs.

I'd suggest that the apparent way to cash out the notion that A caused B, where A and B are considered to be two distinct events, is something like that in each and every case in which A occurs, B follows. Implicit in this are modal considerations, the is, necessarily, A causes B if and only if every event A is followed by event B. We thus arrive at counterfactual theories of causation, which, despite having all the apparatus of possible world semantics at hand, fail to produce a coherent account. — Banno

This is dependent on the scope of your measured causality. If you say, "That cue ball is now traveling at X velocity because it was hit Y seconds ago," then of course we cannot state, "The ball cannot ever travel at X velocity if it is never hit by a cue ball Y seconds ago." But we can reword it to state, "If the ball has a counter balance of forces to ensure force Z is in A direction, it will have a velocity of X every time." Take away all forces on the ball, and it will not travel at X velocity, because it cannot by definition.

The alternative, for which I have great sympathy, is that the notion of cause cannot be cashed out in any great depth, to follow Hume in concluding that cause is more habit than physics. — Banno

I believe the strength of Hume's argument is misinterpreted here. Hume cannot argue against taking all of the data in an experiment and determining why an outcome occurred.

What Hume argued against was the notion that everything would act that way again in the future. And to this, he is correct. The future is always an induction. The laws of physics may not remain the same 5 seconds from now. It is a matter of habit and faith that we believe the causality of today will be the causality of tomorrow.

And secondly, it is well worth noting that scientists, especially physicists, rarely if ever make use of the word "cause". — Banno

Banno, is this really a good argument? I've taken advanced physics courses in college, the word causality was used all the time. Typically this is noted by the entity with the initial acting force on the object. Just follow a basic Newton's law.

Law 1. A body remains at rest, or in motion at a constant speed in a straight line, unless acted upon by a force.

So what causes a body to cease remaining at rest? A force acting upon it. Words describe concepts, and concept of causality is very much alive in science. Now causality can be considered a large word, more generic such as "good" or "tree". Science might try to use words that are more specific parts within the concept of causality, but that is not a negation of the word, or its usefulness in day to day communication.