In any case, if one asks for proof then the person receiving that request is allowed to ask for the standard of the proof. — Shwah

100% in agreement here.

If, for example, the standard required is empirical, and the conception of God has no empirically knowable points, then the standard of evidence is allowed to be criticized. — Shwah

Incorrect. Lets not let words hide their clear meaning. "Empirical" simply means, "Something that can be detected/measured". In other words, something that exists. Even many of our internal feelings and emotions can be measured and detected by communicating with other people, as well as measuring the brain. Do not use ideas to avoid finding and presenting evidence.

Something that has no possibility of being measured or observed is not evidence. Now, can we observe our own internal states? Yes. I can feel that God exists. That's fine, that's your own evidence. No one can deny you feel that way. But if you want evidence that something all knowing outside of you communicates with you, then you need to show it to other people.

For example, lets say God only told you things that would lead to your success. We can set up experiments then. You tell the researcher when God tells you to do something, you do it, and we can evaluate whether its a positive or negative outcome. We can also scan your brain to see if there is some unexplainable new pattern that happens when you claim God talks to you. If so, that might be evidence of something.

Lets say God does miracles when people pray for them. We can set up studies in which people cannot be saved by medical means, then ask God to save them. If it turned out that prayer worked consistently, then we would have some evidence to work with.

Otherwise, we just have a unicorn. Someone can believe very strongly that there is a unicorn. They can live their life as if unicorn's exist. They can claim, "Unicorns just can't be detected or interacted with, but they exist" All of this is fine. But the moment they try to assert to others that a unicorn exists outside of their own personal experience, they need evidence that it exists outside of their own personal experience. That burden is on them, not on others.

I think it's a pretty standard basis that any rejection of a major position in a field requires a standard in which it can be rejected. — Shwah

Certainly! If we are talking about professional fields of study, I believe the standard is usually the scientific method. Provide a hypothesis, then try to prove it wrong. If you can't prove it wrong no matter how hard you try, then its likely pretty good.

Einstein didn't just yell at the other scientists that they just don't have proof. — Shwah

Here again you're conflating rude anti-theism with atheists. Being an atheist doesn't mean you're angry at atheists, or have to treat them derisively. Those are just rude, ego-centric people. You can also have theists who angrily yell at theists. How you address other people doesn't have anything to do with whether you are a theist, or an atheist.

Edit: also I believe that's Draper who edited that. — Shwah

I don't know, nor care. Who said something is much less important to me than what they said. Success in one area does not mean you will be successful in other areas, or the next day. Plenty of intelligent and capable people can say unintelligent and uncapable things when examined. If what I've stated is wrong, address those points, not the an appeal to an authority.

I would say everything you do is a belief and that everything you assert requires knowledge — Shwah

Ok, lets just go with this then. I actually don't mind, as words mean different things to people. Lets say everything we do is a belief, and we need a reason behind it. It doesn't change anything. If I don't believe in a God, then the reason is there is no evidence for it. Its that simple.

Theists still have "the burden of proof", because lack of evidence, is simply lack of proof. Word it however you want, the outcome remains the same.

so I would say any epistemological category is derivative of the ontological proposition (the nature or conception of God dictates the epistemological requirement one needs to know him and one's epistemological capability then is automatically categorized based on the requirement outputting belief/non-belief). — Shwah

This is a mess of words with very unclear meaning. You can communicate everything you need without a mess of words. Be honest. Be clear.

In any case, a corollary of that is that there's no passivity on either side of a position (i.e. one needs to establish evidence criteria in order to accept evidence and those can then be questioned — Shwah

Sure, if I defined belief as you did above, then the atheist must provide a reason. The reason is there is no evidence of God. If you believe the atheist to be wrong, then you must provide evidence of God. Its just a lot less work to note, "there is no evidence", then for someone to provide evidence.

As for "proper scrutiny", once someone presents evidence, a person must respond to demonstrate how the evidence is inadequate. Lets go with unicorns again. Lets say someone brought me a skull of a horse with a horn on it. I can't just dismiss that. I can't just say, "I don't believe it." At that point I need to look at your evidence. So I do. Then I point out, "There is super glue between the horn and the skull, this is obviously fake".

But, lets also not forget that if a person does not believe the evidence, that the evidence is wrong either. If I took a look at the skull and horn and just said, "Yeah, I don't believe that's real," I would still not believe in a unicorns, but I also did not invalidate the evidence that leads you to believe in unicorns either.

If an atheist insists on not believing there is evidence for a God, you provide evidence as such, and the atheist dismisses it, well, there's nothing you can do. But that dismissal did not prove your evidence wrong, or your belief wrong either.

Again, I think the author is miscontrueing anti-theism, or even people trying to prove theists beliefs are false, rather than understanding an atheist is someone who does not believe there is any evidence for a God's existence.

A "belief" in anything is taken as granted and unanalyzable (how would anyone check?). The contents of the belief can be propositional. — Shwah

I'm not sure where you got the idea that a belief cannot be analyzed. If you believe something, you have a reason for it. The question you have to ask yourself is, "Is everything I do a belief, or are there some things I can choose not to believe?"

If everything you do is a belief, it seems a bit of a worthless word at that point. Typically belief means the affirmation of something's existence. "I believe in life, love, and the pursuit of happiness" for example. To not believe in something, is to state that it does not exist. How do you prove something doesn't exist? You don't "prove" in the technical sense of the word, though in general language, I'm sure we use the word that way.

To "prove" something, you must provide evidence for it. Prove to me right now that a unicorn does not exist. You can't do it, because if it doesn't exist, there's no evidence for it. The "proof" in the colloquial sense is that there is no evidence. How do I show you that evidence does not exist? By simply noting no evidence exists.

That is why we say theists have the "burden of proof". The burden that all must bear when they try to prove something is provide evidence. If you cannot, then it is assumed whatever you are trying to prove does not exist.

Does that make sense? And by the way, I'm quite sure some atheists don't quite understand what burden of proof is either, and may just spout off an out of context quote somewhere without actually thinking about it. Being an atheist doesn't make you intellectually or morally superior. It just means they don't see the any evidence for a God's existence.

A psychological state is just saying "one believes God exists" etc. There's no truth aptness because it's not a proposition. A similar non-proposition is simply yelling "ouch!". — Shwah

Those aren't equivalent at all. What you're trying to state is non-belief in a God is a feeling. Atheism is not a feeling, period. I don't believe in a unicorn. I don't believe planet Zort is going to bomb planet Zeena. My emotions have nothing to do with it.

"Ouch" is the expression of the emotion of pain. There is no analysis as to the existence of pain, it is an expression of a feeling.

What you may be doing is confusing the word atheist with anti-theist. An anti-theist is someone who is against someone believing in a God. This may be more of a psychological state, or at least involves emotions.

For example, I am an atheist, but pro-theist. I do not hold contempt for those who believe in a God, and in fact, find it a postive for many people. I simply don't believe in a God because there is no evidence. There's nothing emotional or "psychological" about it.

Defining “atheism” as naturalism has the awkward implication that some philosophers are both theists and atheists. This is because some philosophers (e.g., Ellis 2014) deny that God is supernatural and affirm both naturalism and theism.

It is fine to propose that God is natural, but naturalism is also about the rejection of the supernatural. The supernatural is essentially unproven magic. If God is natural, then God should be able to be found quite easily in nature with evidence. If God is natural and found with evidence, then the definition of atheism would change. You can't make God natural however, if God is super natural.

Defining “atheism” as the state of lacking belief in God faces similar problems. First, while this definition seems short and simple, which is virtuous, it needs to be expanded to avoid the issue of babies, cats, and rocks counting as atheists by virtue of lacking belief in God.

A silly problem. Ignorance of the definition of God does not make you an atheist. It is when you hear the definition, and are not provided adequate proof that it exists that you are an atheist. Think of it like the belief in a unicorn.

This additional problem arises because one can lack belief in God while at the same time having other pro-attitudes towards theism. For example, some people who lack the belief that God exists may nevertheless feel some inclination to believe that God exists...While such people should not be labeled theists, it is counterintuitive in the extreme to call them atheists.

This is also silly. I don't believe in a unicorn, but I sure wish one existed. That doesn't mean I don't believe in a unicorn. Atheism is about the lack of evidence, and has nothing to do with one's desire that there should be evidence. You can have atheists that want there to be a God, and atheists that don't want there to be a God. Nothing counter intuitive about it at all.

One problem with defining “atheism” as a psychological state is that philosophers do not define “theism” as a psychological state, nor should they.

Who's describing atheism as a psychological state? I think this person misunderstands what atheism is. Its not an anger or emotion towards belief in God. It is NOT this. It is that a person does not find adequate evidence for a God's existence. Their emotional or psychological state has nothing to do with it.

This means, first, defining “atheism” as a proposition or position so that it can be true or false and can be the conclusion of an argument and, second, defining “atheist” as someone who believes that proposition.

It can be true or false already. Every belief has a reason behind it, and that can be correct, or incorrect. An atheists doesn't believe in a God because there is no evidence. Can they be wrong? Yes, if there is evidence. Is it up to the atheist to provide a lack of evidence? No, how can an atheist provide nothing? It is up to a person who asserts the existence of something to provide evidence that holds up against legitimate criticism.

Think about a person who believes in a unicorn. Do I have to provide evidence to someone that unicorn's don't exist? No. A believer in a unicorn must provide evidence they exist, and that evidence must stand under criticism.

This seems to be an attempt by a theist to justify the fact they have no evidence for a God that stands under scrutiny. Its just like a person frustrated that they can't get others to believe in a unicorn, and try to get them to "prove" that a unicorn doesn't exist. People who have evidence don't need to try to pull this. Either that, or the author is confusing an atheist with an "anti-theist", or someone who is against people believing in God. Either way, this seems like a poorly thought out article.

Atheism is not an assertion of lack of a deity. It is simply a lack of belief in it, no different than a lack of belief that my mailbox will spontaneously explode tomorrow, despite lack of hard evidence that it will not. Not sure what the official word is to describe a belief in the unreality of a god.
— noAxioms

This I never/don't got/get! Would you be so kind as to explain this to me. Thanks in advance. — Agent Smith

If someone has never heard of a God, they aren't atheist, they are just ignorant. Once a person has heard of a God, it is up to the people who believe in a God to prove that it exists.

To help out, lets imagine a unicorn. I might ask, "Where can I find a unicorn?" If your answer does not let me find a unicorn, then I don't believe it exists. Now, do we say that I had to prove that the unicorn did not exist? No. Can I assert that a unicorn does not exist? Yes. But this "assertion" isn't what noAxioms is trying to convey. The person who believes a unicorn doesn't exist doesn't have to prove anything. That's the assertion noAxioms means.

So yes, an athiest can claim, "God does not exist", but only because they don't see credible evidence of it. Asking someone to prove God doesn't exist is like asking a person to prove a unicorn does not exist. When you claim something exists, you have to prove it. Claiming something does not exist with a lack of proof, is default common sense.

I am glad I was of service! However, although it did clear things up a bit, I still am not fully agreeing with it nor do I think it is a clear distinction. — Bob Ross

Perfectly fine! For me it gave me a new avenue and way of describing what I've been thinking. Lets see if I can clear up your further issues.

Firstly, I am not finding it self-apparent that your definitions of "distinctive knowledge" and "applicable knowledge" are mutually exclusive — Bob Ross

Recall that what entails knowledge is a deduction that is not contradicted by reality. But now, I think with my further realization of the difference, I can finally remove "reality". Knowledge ultimately is a deduction. A deduction is a conclusion which necessarily follows from its premises. Adding, "reality" is redundant. Any legitimate contradiction to a deduction, means its not a deduction any longer. "Reality" was a place holder for basically, "legitimate challenges to deductions". If a deduction can hold despite other challenges to it, it is knowledge.

Knowing that this runs through both applicable and deductive, I've always noted there was a fine dividing line that we craft. The front and back of a piece of grass are different and necessary existences, but it can be difficult to tell the difference between the two without a zero point. A zero point is the origin of an X and Y graph. When you are looking at a line pattern, putting it to the zero point can give clarity on comparing its symmetry and slopes. What we're doing with definitive and applicable knowledge is putting knowledge on a zero point, and noting the X and Y dimensions. It is in essence a drawn line or parabola, but charted in a graph in such a way as to break it down into an easier calculation.

Honestly, my realization that applicable knowledge is simply the actual result of an induction makes me want to rewrite the entire thing. I believe I can make it so much clearer now. You see, you can have deductions without inductions. You can have inductions without deductions. X and Y. But you can only get certain outcomes when you combine the two. And when you combine the two, that result cannot be obtained without both an induction, and a deduction. 2,3 as a mark on a grid requires both to be. That point exists without a graph of course, but put it on a graph and you can make a breakdown far more useful.

But I go on. The entire point of the example is to agree with you, that sometimes certain knowledge outcomes are going to bleed into each other without clear definitions. The coordinate 2, 3 are clearly X and Y coordinates, but their existence as a combined coordinate is impossible without each other together. Remember that we can discretely experience whatever we want. We can throw away the grid if we want. But what would we lose if we do? Lets examine your points.

Imagine I am contemplating the square root of 25. Let's say I immediately (without performing the math) assert that it is 6 (because I memorized the square roots of certain numbers previously and, albeit incorrect, associated my memory of one particular square root problem as being answered by 6 with it being the square root of 25). — Bob Ross

What you are missing here is another ingredient we have not spoken about very much, but is important. Social context as mentioned in part 3. I realized I needed to point it out more last time we spoke. Implicitly, when I am talking about knowledge as a foundation in my head, I am referring to a person without any social context. I need to be pointing that out every time, and it is my fault for not doing so.

English and the symbols of logic of math, are not solo contexts. They are social contexts. You have an external reference to tell you that you are right or wrong. When you say you're making an induction that the square root of 25 is six, you're making an induction against societies definition of math, not your own. I can create my own math in my head where the square root of 25 is 6. Of course, my underlying essential property of what 25, 6, and all the words involved would need to be non-synonymous with societies. But within my personal context, I can make it whatever I want.

When you are learning 1+1=2, you are learning a societal definition of math. If you question, "What does 1+1 equal again?" you are asking for a definition that is not your own. You can learn math from other people. But when you are doing a math problem, and you cannot deduce the answer, you are making an induction about what societies rules would conclude the answer should be. Implicitly, you are unsure you have all the rules and process of thinking correct, and you need to check with others. In this way, once you find the answer, you have obtained applicable knowledge of the answer.

I feel in a self-contained context, the descriptors of distinctive and applicable are clear. It is when societal context enters in, that it can be potentially blurred. If someone tells you 1+1=2, and you clearly remember that, that would seem to be distinctive. If someone then asked you, "What does 1+1 equal"? you would distinctively know 1+1=2, but would you know that will be the accepted answer in this particular question? What separates an induction from a deduction is just a little uncertainty to that person's reaction to your answer.

Likewise, an induction that is verified via a deduction is not a "deduction which is not contradicted by reality": it an induction which is not contradicted by reality, but is distinguished from other inductions by the manner in which is confirmed (deduction). — Bob Ross

I want to word it more clearly from my end, though this may be semantics at this point. An induction, who's conclusion has been reached deductively, is applicable knowledge. As an example, I make an induction that the next coin flip will be heads. We could use the hierarchy to examine the cogency level of that induction. Whether it flips to heads or tails (or the ridiculous unlikelihood of landing on that knifes edge) we can examine the essential properties of the result, and deduce a conclusion.

That conclusion, no matter the result, is applicable knowledge. It doesn't mean we didn't make an induction. If for example I guessed heads, and it landed on heads, my induction did not itself become a deduction because I guessed correctly. It is only when the answer to that induction is deduced, that we have applicable knowledge. That knowledge may be, "I guessed heads, but it landed on tails". This differentiates itself from my distinctive knowledge, or definition of the essential properties of "landing on heads or tails" entails.

Finally, it is essential to note how the induction is concluded. Having an induction that happens to be correct is not the same as knowledge in any epistemological analysis I've ever read. And for good reason. A guess that happens to be right is not knowledge, its just a lucky guess. We can have knowledge that we made a guess, and we can have knowledge of the outcome of that guess, but that is it.

Furthermore, I think you are claiming that distinctive knowledge precedes (always) applicable knowledge, but in this case (depending on whether a belief is conjured) applicable knowledge could be obtained without using any prior distinctive knowledge (e.g. without asserting a preliminary belief, the deductive application of addition to 1 + 1 would produce distinctive knowledge, but with a preliminary belief it would have produced applicable knowledge without any preceding distinctive knowledge). — Bob Ross

I still believe distinctive knowledge always comes from applicable knowledge. If I experience something for which I have no distinctive knowledge, I first may try to match it to the dictionary in my brain. If I deduce that I cannot, I applicably know what I am seeing does not match what is in my brain. At that point, I create an identity for it. Its the sheep and goat example all over again. To avoid retyping it up again, do a ctrl-f 'goat' on section 2 to re-read the example.

To sum it up, we can use the deductions we arrive at from our inductions to amend or create new distinctive knowledge (solo context again). But distinctive knowledge is not an induction itself. It is the creation of an identity that can be used in a later induction or deduction. It can be amended, created, and destroyed. But the experience itself is created and thus known by us without any induction involved.

But abstract knowledge under your definitions would not be exclusively distinctive. — Bob Ross

Again, in a social context, you are somewhat correct. Because in this case, the abstract is something invented by society, something we do not have control over. It is the distinctive knowledge of society, and if we use inductions to say, "Do I understand societies distinctive knowledge correctly?" those deduced solutions are applicable knowledge. I also want to use "distinctive knowledge of society" with care. I think that's not quite clear, and I would very much consider this to be ambiguous and possibly confusing. I might need a new phrase here, which I believe I will think into more. This post is already massive enough as it is. :)

the coining of a term in reference to an object in front of me would be a pure deduction (which pertains to something non-abstract) and, thusly, would be distinctive knowledge. Whereas my belief that some object that isn't in front of me is the same as the one that is would be merely an induction (that happens to be verified/unverified by means of a deduction), therefore applicable knowledge. — Bob Ross

A fantastic summary.

And, moreover, when I go verify that that other object is indeed like the other one that I previously saw (thereby using deduction), that would be distinctive knowledge in the sense that it is a pure deduction.

Let me clarify a little here. The result of a deduced conclusion from an induction would be applicable knowledge. Using a deduction is knowledge. It is the situation that we use the deduction in that determines the classification of knowledge we are receiving.
— Bob Ross

And my consideration of that object, grounded in a pure deduction, being that of the same as the previous object would be a purely abstract consideration (i.e. I am comparing the properties of this object, gathered deductively, to the previous properties I deductively found of the other object--none of this is non-abstract). It is almost like a pure deduction is always distinctive, regardless to what it pertains, and applicable is really the attempt to verify inductions. — Bob Ross

I would clarify that the applicable is not the attempt to verify inductions, it is the deductive result of an induction. Again, a deduction is a deduction. It is about whether it follows an induction, or another deduction, that determines the classification of knowledge.

There is another implicit question you're likely asking as well. "Are inductions and deductions classifications of knowledge themselves?

We can have distinctive knowledge of our inductions and deductions of course. But what of the underlying logic itself of deduction vs induction? That is distinctive. We have created a set of rules and definitions that we use. We have applicable knowledge that both inductions and deductions can be used without contradiction. I can make the induction, "I believe I can use a deduction without contradiction", and applicably know this to be true after its resolution.

This is the part you might like Bob, as I believe you've been wanting some type of fundamental universal of "reason". This logic of induction and deduction is reached because we are able to think in terms of premises and conclusions. This is founded on an even simpler notion of "predictions" and "outcomes to predictions". Much like our capability to discretely experience, this is an innate capability of living creatures. I believe this coincides with your definition of "reason" earlier as "decisions with expectations".

Can we define this in a way that is undeniable, like discretely experiencing? If discretely experiencing is an act of "existence" perhaps "action" is the next act needed for an existence to sustain itself. I do not have it well thought out to the point where it is simple, incontrovertible, and self-evident, but an initial proposal is "the act of breathing". I cannot stop discretely experiencing no more than I can cease breathing entirely. From this autonomous action, comes the next evolution, agency; the act of intention with an expected outcome. This is evidenced by eating. A being cannot eat if if it has not intention and action on that intention.

With intention and expected outcome, and the evolution of imagination and the capability of language, we can arrive at inductive, and deductive thought processes. Premises can either lead to only one outcome, and premises can lead to more than one outcome. In a broad sense, the definitions of inductive and deductive cover these scenarios. The recognition and analysis of these is beneficial to a living being, because a being can figure out when there is higher and lower chances of their intentions arriving at a predicted outcome.. This allows the maximum type of agency afforded to a being, and the greater the agency of intention and outcomes, the more likely what one expects to happen, will come to pass.

So then, the knowledge of induction and deduction are formed distinctively in the solo context. Of course, if we use either of these in an induction, and deductively determine the outcome, then whatever is determined is applicable knowledge.

I admire your desire to keep it fundamentally easier to comprehend (and honestly that is your prerogative, I respect that), but I find your "will" incredibly ambiguous (I am gathering it might be purposely so?). For example, if "reality" is simply "what I do not control", then my body could very well not be apart of "reality". — Bob Ross

Perhaps it was how I explained it that made it ambiguous. Will is simply intention of action. That's all. If my intention of action is denied, than that is because of reality. Reality is an ever constant unknown which can deny my will at any time. Essentially reality is the potential my will can be denied. If I will my body to do something, and it does not happen, that is reality that I cannot deny. Whether reality denies me or not, is the outcome I await. I feel the current discussion on it is overcomplicating the issue for what we need at this time. If you want to flesh out will more, perhaps this should be saved for a later post. I don't think its necessary to discuss the current issues of applicable and distinctive knowledge, and I don't want the topic to lose that focus.

I agree that we can create abstract logic, but it follows from necessary logic. — Bob Ross

I don't know what "necessary logic" is. If you mean we have the innate capability to intend an outcome, no disagreements there. But that is not knowledge, that is action. Just like the ability to discretely experience is not knowledge either. I can distinctively know what I discretely experience, and I can distinctively know what I intend in my outcome. The creation of logic is distinctive, but if I use that logic in an induction, I must deductively conclude that outcome. That result of using that logic is applicable, and not distinctive.

I still think, so far, that the only clear distinction here would be reason and everything referred to by it (aboutness vs about). — Bob Ross

We have touched upon reason only in a few sentences. It has not undergone the same rigor as the rest of the arguments. I have tried to flesh it out here. Reason, as I initially understood it, doesn't seem to do any more than simply describe that we make actions with intention. I have hopefully broken down how this plays in with the analysis above, but as always, please put your input in and feel free to clarify or add to the initial meaning.

To even try to negate IF THEN in terms of its form, I would have to conditionally assume a hypothetical where I don't necessarily utilize IF THEN, which thereby solidifies its necessity. — Bob Ross

Its "necessity" is distinctively known. This is a deduction you have made without any other inductions involved.

Hopefully I've demonstrated that it isn't always tier 1, but application could be tier 1 as well. It really seems like you are distinguishing a deduction from an induction (that can only be verified by deduction--which would be thereby something verified distinctively). — Bob Ross

Application cannot be done prior to distinctive knowledge, because you must first make an induction. Do you distinctively know the induction you are making? Yes. Can you make a deduction without first distinctively knowing premises and rules? No. You can experience something, but experiencing something in itself is not applicable knowledge. Recall, you can experience a "sheep" for the first time, and that is your distinctive knowledge of the experience. If you later make an induction based off of that distinctive knowledge, "That over there is a sheep," the deduced outcome to that induction will be your applicable knowledge.

I can have inductions that do not pertain to objects (i.e. are abstract) which I can then thereafter determine whether they are true via abstract deduction. — Bob Ross

In a solo context, I do not believe it is possible to make an induction about abstract logic. You create the rules, so everything follows from your premises. You can create a logic that also does not have set outcomes. You distinctively know this, because you created it to be that way. For example, lets note that we conclude when a coin is flipped without knowledge of the force applied, it has a 50/50 chance of landing on either side. Barring all applicable knowledge where's the induction? The induction only happens if we predict a particular outcome by flipping an actual (non-abstract) penny. I can flip an abstract penny in my mind, but I determine the outcome don't I?

In claiming that we can have abstract inductions that we can then solve deductively, we have to be careful not to sneak in any applicable knowledge. Applicable knowledge is knowledge is the deduced result from an induction we don't have control over. We can create further distinctive knowledge from applicable knowledge, but that is a combination of abstract (distinctive) with non-abstract (applied).

Whew, major write up here from me. And yet still a lot I'm sure you want covered, such as societal context, and perhaps a further exploration into "will". To focus, I think it would be best if we finish the idea of distinctive and applicable in a solo context, and start bleeding that into societal context next. If you need a refresher on societal context, section 3 is where I went over it. Thanks again Bob, I look forward to your responses!

Self-cause is a rejection of PSR, not an amendment to it. If self-cause is allowed, then the PSR reduces to a non-principle: Nothing requires an reason or cause since it can always be self-caused. — noAxioms

You may be correct. If you read the rest of the reply I stated, "I leave it up to you." The part you quoted was a "maybe" statement of consideration. If you understand the OP by now, then we can conclude there must be self-explained existence, and that there is a reason, principle, and ground for determining that it must exist. In short, we have a logical reason why it must exist. The only thing the PSR cannot conclude anymore (if it ever did), is that there is a prior causality for everything's state of existence.

I don't think that is a narrowly confined or aging topic. I think its something new to think on, without an easily available answer. Have we not sufficiently reasoned that a self-explained existence must exist? Feel free to create a new topic if you wish, however. Maybe this question about the PSR should be a fresh post if the conclusion of the OP has been tentatively accepted. I do not have an answer yet myself, and would enjoy the discussion.

Have you asked philosophers what their opinion of the good life is? It sounds like you think philosophers generally don't have an opinion on this. How do you know the topics they cover are auxiliary to what they consider "the good life"?
— Philosophim

Elementary my dear Watson!
— Sherlock Holmes

Deduction! — Agent Smith

As it has been noted over the years by many, sometimes when Sherlock Holmes claims to use deduction, it is actually "Induction". You're doing that now Agent.

It's no different than saying, "Why do all firefighters hate the color blue?", then giving no examples. You're making broad assumptions about a profession based on...what? Have you asked a statistically significant number of firefighters? Have you asked even one? Are you just assuming they don't like the color blue based on how they act?

Why don't you ask some philosophers about the good life? What does it mean to them, and is it their primary motivation? Painting people with a broad brush of opinionated water while pretending it is factual colored oil may leave an image in your head that you want, but creates no tangible painting that others can see.

If you want to know, ask me for starters. Put some color on your palette.

Have you asked philosophers what their opinion of the good life is? It sounds like you think philosophers generally don't have an opinion on this. How do you know the topics they cover are auxiliary to what they consider "the good life"?

2. A first cause has to be self-caused unless you reject the principle of sufficient reason (PSR). The catch is: in all cases observed so far, the cause exists before the effect. If so, how can something be self-caused? It must exist before it exists!? :chin: — Agent Smith

Well, its not a rejection of the PSR, but an amendment. You see, the argument concludes that the principle of sufficient reason fails if not worded correctly. Inevitably, there will be something that does not have a "prior" reason. A self-explained entity has no rules or limitations at to what it can be. The reason for its being is merely its existence. There is nothing more than that.

Now, does that break the PSR? Perhaps not. We've logically concluded that the reason, principle, or ground of a self-explained entity, is the logical conclusion that at least one must exist. The reason a self-explained entity exists, is because it does. In other words, we've concluded such entities must be. Is that a reason that would fit the PSR? I leave that for you to judge.

Ahhh, yes blame it on my old age. I was breaking up one premise into 2 premises. I'm too used to old college days of at least 2 premises followed by a conclusion. — chiknsld

Not a worry! I have misread others arguments before as well. We're all human visiting a forum for some casual philosophy, not PhD professors. :)

Wonderful analysis Bob. I think you're seeing the distinction, but also the underlying sameness that runs through them both. This is because at their core, both types of knowledge are solved the same way; they are both deductions that are concluded without contradiction. However, there is a mix up of language here. I think you've been stating the only way to conclude anything is not a contradiction, is to "apply" it. This is not the same meaning as "Applicable knowledge". Since the vocabulary is confusing, a better way would be to state the phrase, "use reason" instead of "apply it". I'll flesh this out more through this response.

The distinction between Distinctive and Applicable is really more of a differentiation of steps in knowledge. Distinctive knowledge is obtained, and only after, can applicable knowledge be obtained. Perhaps the difficulty comes from defining "reality". As a foundational argument, I am restricted in what I can claim in my building blocks. So I will start with your question about "will".

As this is foundational, I'm trying to embrace definitions that any person could come to on their own. So in the beginning, reality is simple. If everything went according to my will, there would be no need for the identity of "reality". Everything I willed would happen. But, there is an existence which can counter my will. Sometimes it does. Sometimes it does not. Regardless, it has the capability to deny my will. Reality is the existence that can, or does not counter my will. That's all there is to it.

Moreover, I am also trying to hone in on what you mean by "will". When you say:

I will to wave my hand, and reality does not contradict that will. I will to fly by my mind alone, and reality contradicts this.

This makes me think you may be using "will" as one shared will between the mind and the body, but, given that the body doesn't have to abide by the will of the mind, I don't think this is what you are saying. I think you are trying to keep this a bit more high level, conceptually, than I am. — Bob Ross

To understand this fundamental definition of will, there is no mind or body initially considered. Will is intention, and that outcome is decided by reality. I have not fundamentally defined the body vs the mind at this point. If that is important to you, I will, but I don't want to add in things that should be unimportant to understanding what will and reality is.

Hopefully this will allow us greater clarity between distinctive and applicable knowledge. First, understand that we are currently not including social context. That changes things. In a solo context, I conclude that knowledge is what is deduced and what reality does not contradict. This is entirely to my will, and reality cannot deny that I made it. Is this distinctive, or applicable? This is distinctive. I formulated it, therefore its there. A = A, because I have defined it as such. I could just as easily have stated, A=B. I would distinctively know that A=B, but I could not apply it in any meaningful way.

But if I say, "That letter A is equivalent to that letter A over there", I need to carefully craft my context to ensure I'm not contradicted by reality. If I say, "I deduce that these two objects that I perceive by sight to be tomatoes, I must carefully check that they really do fit all of my essential properties of what a tomato is. I think what I'm finally realizing as I've seriously thought about this, is all applicable knowledge were initially beliefs that needed to be confirmed before they could be considered deduced conclusions.

A claim that needs needs to go through the process to determine if it can be applicably known, is always an induction, or a belief. Honestly, its a relief to finally smack my forehead and realize this clearly. I can claim A=A, but can I claim those two A's over there are equivalent before going over them closely? No. That's an induction. I suppose an induction which has a deductively concluded outcome is applicable knowledge.

And logic on its own, is a set of rules we construct

I think there are fundamental rules of logic we do not construct. — Bob Ross

There are fundamental rules that we construct, and are not valid as applicable knowledge. There are fundamental rules of logic we construct, and are valid as applicable knowledge. The application of reason, or "Deductions which are not contradicted by reality" runs through both. Abstract logic is something you create. You will that a particular definition means X. To hold the definition of X, Y is entailed. In other words, you've created a deduction. Now, you could create another definition Z, that entails Y does not exist, but X does exist. At this point, there is a contradiction from reality, but the reality that your will can create and modify. I can change the definition Z and what it entails. Same with X and Y. The contradiction exists only because I choose to hold definitions that contradict. In other words, no inductions are created and tested. This is distinctive knowledge.

If that abstract logic is applied to anything but other distinctive identities, then it is no longer an deduction, but an induction. And at that point, steps must be set out to determine a deduced conclusion. Once that conclusion is deduced, I call that "applicable knowledge".

Is application a good word to describe this though? Does it lend confusion? It appears it does. I don't know of a word that describes the process of finding the deduced result of an induction. Perhaps there is no word yet. Perhaps instead of actions I should be thinking in steps or tiers. Like tier 1 knowledge is distinctive while tier 2 is applicable. Instead of 'applicable', maybe another word? Processed? Gleaned? I'm open to suggestions!

But to claim to know a set of symbols purely as distinctive knowledge is application of reason. — Bob Ross

Right, recall again that both distinctive and applicable knowledge are both concluded exactly the same way. "A deduction with a conclusion that is not contradicted by reality". Reason can be said to be "applied", but it is not the same as taking what is deduced to be an induction, and taking the steps necessary to confirm its result.

There's no difference between a contradiction in abstract logic vs against my will. Is there? — Bob Ross

A good question. There may be. If you construct your abstract logic, (within a solo context) you are the one defining your terms and rules. You are deciding to hold onto them when a contradiction is met. This is not the same thing as using your logical set to induce an outcome that you must then confirm. By this I mean you are holding onto your definitions of logic, but cannot decide the outcome. When you can hold onto your definitions of logic, and decide your outcome, this would be considered distinctive knowledge.

It terms of your santa example, you know by application that modal statements like IF...THEN are true in terms of their form, but not necessarily that the IF conditional is automatically true. — Bob Ross

I think with this clarified, I know by distinction that IF THEN statements are true of their form. But if I am going to apply that if conditional to something that I do not yet know the outcome of, and its outcome is not something I can decide, then it would need to undergo the knowledge process to see which applicable knowledge I would learn from this application.

Bob, I can't thank you enough for your keen and pointed comments on this. I always knew distinctive and applicable knowledge worked, but I always felt it lacked refinement or a clear way to explain and demarcate it. I think I've found that now thanks to you. I hope this clarifies this issue for you as well!

Guess that "depends on the definition of is." :smirk: — jgill

In this case, it would be something that exists without prior causality.

I'm genuinely still unsure what you're trying to say with your reply. I did understand this last part.

In any case, because your work is written that way, you cover a lot of ground twice and inefficiently work with what you've been given. You can really write that all in one line (∃x(Px OR !Px & Fx) - there exists x such that it has a prior cause and if not then it is the first cause). — Shwah

If you are talking about the first premise being written in that logical format, yes. If you are talking about the conclusion, no, that's not what I conclude.

So, you are saying that (don't mind my rewording of the 2 premises)...

1. All things have a prior cause.
2. There is one or more first causes from which a chain of events follows.

Or more precisely...

1. All things have a prior cause.
2. There is a first cause from which a chain of events follows. — chiknsld

No. I am stating any one thing either has a prior cause for its existence, or it does not. Let me simplify it further.

Premise:

A. Every piece of existence can be explained by prior causality OR (Don't forget the or!)
B. There is at least one existence that has no prior causality for its existence, it simply is.

Sorry it's just a very strange way of saying that there simply is no beginning :snicker: (please correct me if I am wrong). — chiknsld

I think the problem is you are taking an 'or' premise as a conclusion. Did you read the rest of the steps and the actual conclusion? If you're just reading the first premise, you're not going to understand anything.

I missed the universal quantifier at the beginning. I think it's better written with an existential quantifier to be an actual "or".

Edit: you postulate variables it looks like but you can't check them with "1." because it uses a universal quantifier. To be able to check them with "1." you need it to be able to take in "X", "Y", "Z". — Shwah

Could you clarify this please? I don't understand what you're saying here.

The creation of eternal space and time requires a different kicker which must be divine in nature. An unknowable causal power. — EugeneW

No, the OP makes no claims to this. If anything is definitely negates the necessity of a divine being.

Let's take out the fluff...

1. All things have...prior cause.
2. There is...first cause of existence. — chiknsld

Don't forget the "or". Its one of two outcomes. Either infinite regression, or finite regression. In that first premise I am simply proposing there are only two outcomes of causality that can be concluded. This premise in no way indicates an assertion or conclusion as to which is true. If you're simply reading the first premise and judging the entire argument, you don't understand the argument.

The "or" logical connective is meant to make sure that only one condition has to be met for anything. It's to prevent infinite regression. — Shwah

No, this is not meant to prevent infinite regression. It is stating infinite regression is one possibility. Finite regression is another possibility. The "or", is the connector demonstrating that one or the other must exist.

"It just is."
— Philosophim

That's what a certain subgroup of scientists would say. Those who're in the business of description of nature. However, I believe there are some who aren't happy just reporting on how nature behaves. They wanna explain, answer why questions and for them the statement "It just is" is a beginning, not the end of science. — Agent Smith

Understandable. I note in later discussions that actually showing that a specific existence is self-explained would be nearly impossible. A self-explained entity has no rules for its existence, so there is nothing preventing a self-explained existence from appearing, that our physics or notion of causality would imply there was something prior. For example, the universe could have snapped into existence 5 seconds ago, but its organization and structure would lead us to believe it had existed for a vastly longer time.

So what is its use and application then? For one, it may be helpful to understand self-explained existences are logically necessary. There may come a time in exploration where there is no prior causality. And that's ok. There's no need to continue to invent something that caused what appears to be the limits of our understanding within causality.

This is also a replacement for any Kalem type arguments for the existence of God. While technically a God would be logically possible, it is no longer logically necessary to understand origins in existential causality. It can also just as logically be that "the big bang" had no prior explanation for its being besides that it just happened.

Existence on the other hand typically refers to ‘all of reality’. I’m not sure how you distinguish ‘existence’ and ‘universe’ from each other. Maybe you have totally different definitions of these things than what I’m guessing. — noAxioms

So "existence" is generally seen as "everything". "An" existence is a snapshot identity within. An atom is "an existence", but is part of "all existence". In the OP I am referencing Y as "an existence".

Y: represents an existence that may or may not have prior causality. — Philosophim

Is the above quote what you were asking to define existence for? In the future, try to cite your questions of vocabulary using the OP. This will help me ensure I understand where you are coming from.

Your statement above (coupled with others) seems to imply that ‘existence’, reality, or something at least, suddenly was, uncaused, when before that there wasn’t existence, reality, or anything. — noAxioms

Can you coach this in terms of points 1, 2 and 3 in the OP? Where is this implication coming from in those steps? Or is it elsewhere in the OP?

You say ‘there is an existence’, like this first cause thing still is around, and didn’t disappear like all the other causes. — noAxioms

Where do I say that in the OP? I'm just looking at the chain of causality. I don't believe I ever insinuated the first cause needed to continue to exist.

You seem to define ‘first cause’ as any event lacking a direct cause, and not ‘comes earlier than the others’. — noAxioms

Correct.

Also, don't forget the very important part, "at least one".
A bunch happen at the same time, or a bunch of them happen after a while, but with only one earliest one? — noAxioms

Could be any of them. I don't claim any one limitation in the OP.

Further, this is not an argument about "the formation of the universe". The argument is that in any chain of causality, a first cause is logically necessary.
There are circular solutions, so this logic doesn’t follow. The infinite regress is also a valid solution, but you conclude otherwise. — noAxioms

Please point out where in the OP the there is a circular solution. I'm not sure what you mean by the infinite regress was a valid solution, but I conclude otherwise. Where in the OP did I do that? Please site the specific sentences.

Hence 180’s trivial retort (first reply) about the first integer. Yes, they can be counted, but they can’t be counted in order. — noAxioms

I love 180 as a poster. I find him generally witty, knowledgeable, and was thrilled to have him in my thread. He also stuck to a straw man despite my repeated attempts to get him to cite the actual argument instead of what he had invented in his own mind. I only note this, because a person of his learning and intellect should have known better, and I have rarely been more disappointed in a person. Not a good reference to use in this thread.

The problem is, I have a lot of people who come in here thinking they know the argument by glancing at it, but don't actually understand it. I don't mind that as long as they are willing to look at it again, ask follow ups, and try to understand it once I point out they don't have it quite right. If you're curious about a good poster to cite, look up Bob Ross's responses and my conversation with him in this thread. If I remember correctly, I conceded to him on his points. It might give you a better understanding of the OP.

Either all things have a prior cause for their existence, or there is at least one first cause of existence from which a chain of events follows.
This seem to allow only infinite regress, causal-turtles all the way down. There cannot be a first cause of existence (your definition) since existence would be the effect, meaning that which caused it was something that didn’t exist, being prior to existence. And the eternal (cyclic say) models of the universe make different empirical predictions than those we see. — noAxioms

Ok, this is good. But what about the second part of the sentence, "Or there is at least one first cause of existence from which a chain of events follows". We had this exchange here:

I do not state the universe needs to be caused.
But that’s how I read the above quote. Either the universe has a prior cause for its existence, or there is one first cause of existence, which sounds like the same thing: existence being caused, but perhaps that cause is not ‘prior’. — noAxioms

I think you misunderstand. A first cause means there is an existence which can cause others, but has no cause itself. That is why it is a "first cause". Also, don't forget the very important part, "at least one". Not "only one". I've had quite a few people miss that.

Further, this is not an argument about "the formation of the universe". The argument is that in any chain of causality, a first cause is logically necessary. For all I know, the formation of the universe happened over several first causes. I have no clue. I don't pretend to even make a claim. If anything, this is just a claim of what ultimately results if we are to examine the principal of sufficient reason.

In the end, I basically conclude that there cannot logically be an infinite regress of causality. That's really it.

Re-read the argument in its entirety again please.

They might both describe causality to your satisfaction, but that isn’t sufficient for the two interpretations to not be mutually exclusive. — noAxioms

I don't see how they are mutually exclusive based on how I describe state relations in the OP. Feel free to point out where this exclusion exists.

B theory indeed does not eliminate time, since it is essentially a dimension in that view. It does explicitly deny past, present and future state, so that assertion about it is wrong. — noAxioms

If I understand correctly, its the elimination of past, present, and future as a non-relative view point. If you have time, you have a prior state, a current state, and a potential future state, which is in line with the OP. Time as relativity does not counter the state relation. If I'm using the words, past, present, and future, note it is for ease of understanding in a state relation argument on a forum, not a science article. If I posted a B series interpretation, this topic wouldn't have reached many people. That's not the goal here.

If you see me use past, present, and future, just replace it in your head with prior, current, and post in a relative sense. This shouldn't be difficult. And if you insist on removing past, present, and future, or time itself, then just state "X" is the immediate influence or cause on "Y". Again, this doesn't affect the OP. If it does, please specifically point out using citation, where it does.

There is only the relation of one event being prior to another, or ambiguously ordered. If two events are ambiguously ordered (frame dependent ordering), then the principle of locality says that neither event can be the cause of the other. — noAxioms

I'm replying to you today because of something you posted earlier. There is no ambiguity here. Same with you. You replied to one of my prior responses. We don't have any ambiguity here. We're not describing two states that aren't in contact with one another.

I'm not talking about a butterfly flapping its wings in Africa is the cause of our conversation today. I've mentioned in the OP "causal chains". Meaning more than one. Meaning, different chains of causality. There is no claim that everything interacts with everything and everything is the cause of everything else. You need to directly show how your argument applies to the OP.

If you set up two separate causal chains and state, "They don't have any relation to each other," its irrelevant to the OP. "I have a state Y. Does it have an X, or not? What is the logical result in any chain of causality?" Again, I'm not seeing the connection between the OP and your arguments.

The scenario shows how two events, say months apart but in the same approximate location, are nevertheless both simultaneous to this one event on Earth (the event of my greeting my friend in passing). There cannot be two present moments a month apart in Andromeda, so it is contradictory if both my friend and I are correct about what’s going on over there currently. — noAxioms

In the OP I would simply take the entire state of Andromeda and Earth and ask, "What caused this?" Again, I'm failing to see how these criticisms apply to the OP. What would help is if you use the OP's argument, and show how it cannot apply with these interpretations. That's the main problem with your criticisms. I'm trying to show you why they don't apply to the OP, but you're not using the logic of the OP to explain why they do. I'm not saying you're wrong, I'm just saying you need to use examples that apply, not vague assertions.

It was brought up to a different post of yours in this topic. It is relevant to the OP, because according to A theory, the universe itself, or at least the initial state, needs to be caused, which is the something-from-nothing connundrum. What caused the rules by which uncaused events are legal in the first place? — noAxioms

You need to re-read the OP then. I do not state the universe needs to be caused. Please cite in the OP the point you are criticizing. I'm getting more and more in our conversation that you don't understand the argument. Prior to doing more criticism, perhaps seek clarification as to what the argument is stating first. I believe you're using a straw man here without realizing it.

— noAxioms
Reading up on B theory again, I did not see how B theory ignored parts of spacetime.
— Philosophim
It doesn’t. It’s A theory that cannot handle this problem. That’s why I posted it when you asked me why B is better.[/quote]

Ok, how does this apply to the OP? And this time, please cite the OP itself. More and more as we're chatting, I'm realizing you don't understand the OP. I keep trying to bring you back to making the point about the OP. At this point, please explicitly cite the sections, or I think we're going to keep talking past each other.

It doesn’t. It’s A theory that cannot handle this problem. That’s why I posted it when you asked me why B is better. — noAxioms

Again, where in my OP am I explicitly demanding A theory? This is the unintentional straw man. I've already told you several times I don't care if you use A or B theory, because it doesn't matter. If it does matter, you need to show me how with citations at this point.

All the prior cause did was change the arrangement of the coins over time. I don’t consider that a change to anything’s existence
— noAxioms
I do. That is a change in spatial location. When one state is different from the next, that is change.
— Philosophim
I’d have said change over time, but that’s not the point. — noAxioms

Its not important what you would have said, its important what I've said right? You have to first understand the OP before you can criticize it.

If you read the comment, it was non-existence to existence that I was discussing. Then again, it very much depends on one’s definition of ‘exists’, which in turn is dependent on ones interpretation of time. So the time discussion really turns out to be relevant.

B-theory says the coin-smiley exists. The rearrangement of the coins over time doesn’t affect that at all since all events (coins in smiley pattern, coins in different pattern) all exist equally. So the change over time was caused, but the existence wasn’t affected. And that’s not even using my relational definition of ‘exists’. — noAxioms

This was mostly nonsense to me and shows no understanding of the OP. Look, there's a difference between presenting alternative definitions and view points to the OP, and just presenting alternative view points that don't clearly show how they criticize the OP, and yet you use them to criticize what you think the OP is saying. I think at this point we've gone back and forth enough, that you don't understand the OP. I'm the guy who wrote it, so I'm a fairly good authority on it. :)

Please use the OP to cite your issues directly. No more abstracts, because you either don't understand the OP, or I don't understand the criticism against the OP, because you're not being specific. Once you do that, I think we'll be able to get a resolution on this discussion.

That sounds pretty contradictory to me, despite the lack of an empirical test to directly falsify either. — noAxioms

It doesn't to me. Neither eliminates causality, which is all I care about. B theory also does not eliminate time. There is still clearly a past state, present state, and future state. The past state causes the present state, and the present state causes the future state. To counter the argument you have to eliminate causality, and I don't see B theory doing that. If you think it does, please point out how.

There’s no time dilation in the Andromda example. It is an example of relativity of simultaneity. — noAxioms

Sorry, its been a while since I've read the specific vocabulary of relativity. I generally remember relativity from years ago and many of the consequences of it. But I did not see how it countered the OP's points.

The Andromeda argument has nothing to do with Y, or anything measured or caused for that matter. Do you understand what is being illustrated by the example? — noAxioms

No. If it doesn't have anything to do with the OP, I'm not concerned. That's been my point. I don't see how it counters the arguments of the OP.

My argument against that is that there is no coordinate system that meets the requirements, forcing the interpretation to deny the existence of parts of spacetime. — noAxioms

Reading up on B theory again, I did not see how B theory ignored parts of spacetime.

All the prior cause did was change the arrangement of the coins over time. I don’t consider that a change to anything’s existence — noAxioms

I do. That is a change in spatial location. When one state is different from the next, that is change. And a change in state either has a prior cause, or does not. Regardless, even if there was not a change over time, there is still a cause of why the state did not change either. Again, it is about states. Why does Y state exist?

Either an infinite number of events has occurred or there's a first cause.

An infinite number of events hasn't occured (proof?) — Agent Smith

I never claimed that in the OP. Please re-read again, or check some of the better follow up comments. I stated even if an infinite number of prior events occur, that there is still the question of, "Why is the universe set up in a way to have infinite regress? The answer is, "It just is."

Good responses! Let me follow up.

These are not claims in a vacuum, they are claims that are a counter to my claims.
Are you claiming that your premises are in fact correct or at least better? — noAxioms

Lets say, "Yes". I believe they are correct. Better? Maybe not. If you're claiming your premises contradict mine, I don't think they do. Meaning, they might be able to co-exist without issue. When you first introduced it, I was trying to figure this out. Typically in a reply to the OP, an alternative is mentioned as a challenge, or direct conflict to the initial argument. If that was the intention, its why I've asked for clarification on why you believe this to be more valid than mine. Lets go over that.

I greet Bob as we walk past each other. Relative to me, the Andromeda generals have currently (as of the present) not yet decided to launch a war fleet. Relative to Bob, the war fleet is currently in flight, having already been launched. If there is a current moment over there at Andromeda, then the fleet cannot be in a current state of having been launched and not launched. — noAxioms

Basically Einstein's time dilation. No, I don't think this counters the OP. Y is simply the current state we are looking at. Perhaps current is a poor choice of words. Y is the state we are looking at relative to a prior and post state. Lets call it the 0,0 on an x, y axis, what is called the origin. Origins give us a baseline for measurements and comprehending concepts. A starting point helps us think about relations in a coherent manner.

So, relative to a Z, a Y is an X. Relative to an X, a Y is a Z. We are simply using a Y as what we are currently looking at, even if that was 1000 years in the past. Taking your time dilation example, we just have to examine the state properly. In isolation to each other, each state does not consider the other state. Which is perfectly fine if the other state is unimportant to what we are considering. If however, we took the state of both together in relation to each other, then the state must be described as such. Meaning we would say on Earth, the time is 2 hours behind the time on Andromeda. No contradiction there, just a measurement of state that notes the relative time difference.

That doesn't seem to contradict the OP. I could still ask, "What caused this current state to be?" Does it have an "X", a prior explanation, or is it a "first cause", or explained without an X, and simply exists because it does?

There is no coordinate system that foliates all events in all of spacetime, which means that there are events that are not ordered (are neither past, present nor future) relative to any time say here on Earth. — noAxioms

Fortunately, I'm not using a coordinate system. I'm using a state system in a set model. Describe the state however you want. The question still remains, "What caused the current state to be what it is?"

Thirdly, and most importantly, how did time get going, and if it was always going, how did the universe suddenly ‘happen’ when there wasn’t anything before it. How does one explain the reality of whatever one asserts to be real? — noAxioms

That would be subsumed in the OP. Lets call the existence of time Y. If there was something that caused Y, that answer would be X. And of course we could examine that X, make it a Y, and repeat the question. An alternative to the original Y of time, is that it has no X. It is a first cause, or a self-explained entity by its own existence.

Why can self-explained states exist? There is no answer, because they have no reason to exist. If there is no reason why they should, or should not exist, then there is no explanation for why they should, or should not exist. They just do. The OP concludes that inevitably in any chain of state causality, there will come a time when you find a Y that has no X. This is the "first cause" within the chain of causality you are looking at.

Lets minimize what is extra, and only focus on what is necessary for the discussion please.
But you asked quite a few questions in your last post that are a response to my comments, and not directly related to the OP, such as why I suspect the A interpretation of time is questionably valid. — noAxioms

Understandable. I didn't fully understand the points you were trying to make. I assumed it was against the OP, and so I ask questions and make points to see if I understand, or to seek clarification in a counter response. Generally it is safe to assume that another person, even very intelligent and rational ones, are not going to fully understand your meaning and intentions on a complex reply. That applies to me as well. In my head, the OP is clear as day, but I understand that's because I've thought about it a long time, and I have implicit biases and knowledge that I may not have conveyed to another person accurately.

Every person reads and can interpret writing differently as well. But generally it is safe to assume that if there is writing that implies some contradiction to the OP, the OP is going to assume that route first when trying to understand a response. This doesn't mean the OP is correct of course, but when trying to understand and figure out where another person is coming from, guidelines like this are often followed.

I said pretty early on that I have no problem with uncaused events. You speak of chains like a given occurrence has but a single linear set of causes before it, when in actuality there are probably countless factors that came together to cause the occurrence in question. — noAxioms

Let me quote a line another poster missed the first time around as well.

1. Either all things have a prior cause for their existence, or there is at least one first cause of existence from which a chain of events follows. — Philosophim

Notice I say, "At least one". No, the OP in no way implies it is only one. I've followed up with a few people who have thought the same and pointed out that it would seem by odds to be much more likely that there are several "first causes" that might interact through causal chains. People I think have a bias that they bring to the argument as well. Several people have thought this was a "God" argument, which its clearly not. Its normal for things like this to happen, which is why we discuss, ask each other what we meant, and have follow ups.

I feel like I understood your points much more this time, and I hope I followed up adequately in my answers.

That's what I'm saying -- my justification for the truth of my dream is your own experience, and vice versa. Are you not seeing the issue with this? There is no group of anti-dreams who calls us out on our bullshit dreams. No one. — L'éléphant

Probably because whether you dream or not has very little impact on yours and other's lives. I stir my coffee clockwise with a spoon. There aren't any "anti-clockwise" people at my door asking me to stop because it affects no one.

Why can't belief in god work the same way? Many people claim they have experienced the divinity or holy ghost. But we do not readily accept their account. — L'éléphant

Because such a belief has a fundamental way of altering that person, and other people's lives. Internally, we feel a lot of things as human beings that cause us to make mistakes and do actions that are harmful to us and other people. While belief in a God has caused people to do great things, it has also caused people to live irrationally, and justify some terrible decisions.

When you believe God told you to do something, there is no possibility of you being wrong anymore. Every action should always be open to being "wrong" in hindsight. Its the only way we learn and grow as people. When you have divine guidance, there is no possibility of thinking, amending, or improving. If "Gays are evil" for example, you can't have a rational discussion with that person, as they feel like they are divinely correct, thus your mortal arguments are against God, ignorant, and sinful. This stunts people's growth and makes them emotional animals. Satisfying for the person, but can potentially be terrible for themselves and society.

But lets get out of that for a second. If you notice, I've mentioned evidence of such things existing beyond the experience of the personal account. In other words, there is more than just the personal experience, there are physical and external results of such experiences.

Communication with God should light up the brain, which it does by the way. Here's a great study on the neuroscience of it, which every believer should read. https://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/322539#:~:text=The%20researcher%2C%20who%20literally%20%E2%80%9Cwrote,frontal%20lobes%20of%20the%20brain.

I myself am not anti-God or anti-religion. The only thing I honestly am completely against, is the belief in immortality or life after death. That to me, is complete and utter evil.

This is not a proof. Doctors could only infer from our reports of pain -- but there's no thing that is called pain. It's not like a tumor, where there is concrete evidence of it. Medications work on pain, through trials and studies of subjects who report which pain medication eases their pain the best. Evidence is what you're thinking of. Trial and error is not proof. And so on. — L'éléphant

I'm going to disagree with you here. Trial and error to figure out what works is also evidence, its just evidence and proof obtained the hard way. If you don't agree that's fine, we'll just have to accept each other's view points here.

"The thing is, we both reference the same color, and don't have a debate as to whether it is labeled "red"

Again - I agree with you. But this go against Wittgenstein's notion that there is NO WAY of knowing what colour different minds are seeing. — GLEN willows

You don't need Wittgenstein, any first year philosophy student knows this! If you read again, I'm agreeing with you to a point. We can know certain things like whether a person consistently sees a wavelength as a certain color. Do you see red for what I call blue? Very possibly. Do you see a new and different color every time I see what I call blue? No.

Finally, there's likely a limit to the color spectrum as well. A bright color is likely not seen as a dark color. So if I saw a light blue, you might see red, but it would also be a light red.

The standard philosophical agreement is that it's impossible to say that the colour red that I see isn't the colour blue to you. Yet doesn't this clash with the descriptors we use for different colours? — GLEN willows

There is not necessarily a clash here. We know the wavelength of light is how colors are seen. We know the eye takes in colors and the brain interprets them. So there is some objective measurable qualities.

Further, most people seem to internally experience the wavelengths consistently. So lets say for example that when I saw what you consider red, I would see it as what you would consider blue. The thing is, we both reference the same color, and don't have a debate as to whether it is labeled "red". Meaning we're consistently seeing our same internal color for the same wavelength, and can both apply the external label of "red" to it.

Perhaps this is why we have different "favorite colors". Who knows, maybe we all like similar colors internally, and its the external names that differ. As long as we can both identify a color as "red", it doesn't matter if we internally see it as a different color, like blue or green. When there is an issue, we usually call this "color blindness". Color blind people internally see colors in such a way as to not distinctively see certain wavelengths like the rest of the population. Red and green for example can blend internally. But for the rest of us, as long as we consistently see X wavelength a particular way, and can tell the difference between the different wavelengths, how we internally see colors isn't all that important to function in society without disruption.

1. Dreams – Almost everyone, if not all, claims that they dream. We accept this claim without requiring proof. We use our own experience of dreaming to validate the other person’s claim of dream. — L'éléphant

How is this not proof? If I stated, "When I sleep, I have experiences", then if I others say, "Oh yeah, I have that too", that's proof/evidence. If not one but one person in the world had experiences when they slept, then I think you would be right. Even then, brains have been scanned during sleep, and a lot of activity is found in there.

To be fair to your argument, perhaps what you meant was more along the lines of "What we specifically dreamed of". To narrow this down further to keep it simple, "How do you know that the color red you see, is the same hue and look as what someone else sees when they also see "red"? This we currently have no proof for, and indeed, color blindness suggests it is very possible that the colors your mind visualizes for you, are not necessarily the same as another person's.

2. Pain – We do not have proof of pain except our own complaint and expression of pain. Doctors have to ask where it hurts because there isn’t a proof that they could point to. — L'éléphant

We do actually. https://www.mydr.com.au/pain-and-how-you-sense-it/#:~:text=When%20we%20feel%20pain%2C%20such,and%20the%20pain%20is%20perceived.
Further, we have medication that eases pain. If we didn't have evidence or proof of pain, then pain medication would be no better than a placebo.

Perhaps again, we don't have proof of your personal experience of what pain feels like. But that doesn't negate the proof that pain exists in people, and has very real physical impact on the brain and body.

3. Fear –It’s a very subjective feeling that has side effects such as sweating, fast heart-beat, sweaty palms, but fear cannot be proven by pointing to these outward signs because these signs can also be present for reasons other than fear. — L'éléphant

What you might be thinking is that some of those side affects can indicate other things. But taken together, including an analysis of hormones circulating throughout the body, we can positively identify fear. Can I know what the personal, conscious experience of feeling fear is like in another body besides myself? No, I can give you that.

4. Floaters—these are what you see in front of you when you experience “floaters” small dark shapes that float across your vision. There is no proof of their existence except for what you report to other people. — L'éléphant

https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/eye-floaters/symptoms-causes/syc-20372346#:~:text=Eye%20floaters%20are%20spots%20in,to%20look%20at%20them%20directly . We know what these are. Can science currently pinpoint where the floater exists in your personal vision? No if its based on something like a detatched retina. But people have the experience of floaters, and treatment can assist in removing them. Once again, I think you're conflating the idea that because we can't experience what a person's personal conscious experience is, that we can't know that the experience exists in reality.

It is appealing to define the world in such a way that all definitions and assumptions are valid, because then you feel like you can never be wrong.
— Philosophim
Assumptions are not right just because they’re valid. — noAxioms

No, my point is that just because you make an assumption, it doesn't make them valid or right. If you target the OP by saying, "Well I could have made other assumptions and the argument wouldn't stand", then you are implying that my assumptions are not good enough, and that these others might be better. These are not claims in a vacuum, they are claims that are a counter to my claims. If you think other assumptions are better than the OP's, then you need to show why. If you think that all assumptions are equally valid and logically and factually correct, then I already mentioned that leaves my viewpoint standing.

That sounds hokey. Assumptions are valid or they are not. There’s not much more-or-less to it. You might make an argument about more or less likely to be true. Apparently the flying spaghetti monster is a valid argument, but not likely a true one. — noAxioms

If one assumes that X is true, and one assumes that X is false, only one can hold. If you are holding assumptions contrary to the OP's, then only one of us can be right. Again, if you believe it is perfectly fine for a person to hold X as true and X as false can coexist without a contradiction, that's fine by me.
Also, you did note here,

I’m just saying it isn’t knowledge because there’s an equally valid (and likely more valid) alternative view. — noAxioms

so you have the concept in your head about something "likely more valid".

just because you can propose an alternative definition or assumption, it in no way means its existence challenges or defeats another definition or assumption.
I would say that the existence of a valid alternate view very much poses a challenge to what might otherwise be an unchallenged view. — noAxioms

And here you agree with me. To challenge, it must contradict the other. My point has been that my "assumptions" are solid, well known, and generally accepted. Your assumptions are currently not. Meaning you need to raise the bar by showing why your claims, which challenge mine, are superior. You assume they are valid and right, but you must demonstrate they are valid and right.

If not, mine stand. If you're ok with mine standing, then there is no issue.

You need to re-read the OP. The entire OP is about relational existence.
Funny, because the word ‘relation’ or ‘relative’ does not appear anywhere in the OP. It seems instead to be about first cause. — noAxioms

We have a different view of definitions here. To me, the entire abstract is about selecting a state, and noting that a prior state could exist for the current state to be. In my view, this is a relative state comparison of causality. Why does state Y exist? Because of a prior state X, or Y has no prior state X and exists without any prior explanation. A state, relative to others in a chain of causality, which has no X to explain it, is labeled a "first cause".

If this does not fit relational to you, please clarify

Sorry, but I only remember one sentence, which was:
If you don't exist, you won't type a reply. — noAxioms

True, my mistake, that was one sentence, not two. Despite this, I made no logical fallacies in concluding you, who has typed a reply, exist. I'm of course using the "street term" as it is assumed so until someone specifically wants to redefine it in a special way. If you are going to type, "I don't exist", that's a contradiction because a non-existent being cannot type, "I don't exist".

If we're to discuss and have a good conversation, its important that you just say, "Ok", on something very basic like this that honestly has little to do with the OP, which is the focus on the discussion. It shows me our debate isn't an ego thing, and isn't going to stray too far from the topic. I won't think any less of you for just conceding this basic point.

… I don't understand how the B series revokes the OP
It wasn’t a comment about the OP, something to which I agreed if you remember. — noAxioms

If you agree with the OP, great. If you don't agree with the OP, please only introduce criticisms that directly deal with the OP. When I am trying to understand your meaning and intentions, I am going to assume your points are to the OP, and not extra asides. Lets minimize what is extra, and only focus on what is necessary for the discussion please.

I think a softer version of Wayfarer's point would be something like: our world is intelligible. We can talk about stuff. — lll

Which is fine, I have no issue with that. My point is matter and energy is able to interplay in such a way as to create a thinking human being. Its incredible honestly. If he wants to think its something else, that's fine. But when I ask for evidence, the honest thing to reply is, "I don't have any, its just a belief of mine," I would accept that. It is when he refuses to answer or divert, which is lying by omission, I see a problem.

Not a paradox at all. I go over this here. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/12098/a-first-cause-is-logically-necessary/p1

Yes, it is logically the case that there is a "first cause" or something that has no reason for its existence, besides the fact that it exists. That doesn't mean everything else can't exist. The problem he doesn't realize is that a self-explained existence's reason for existing, is simply the fact that it exists.

Bob, I admit, this tripped me up at first. I had to think a while on your post, to try to get to what felt like was missing. Maybe I'm generalizing too broadly the difference between distinctive and applicable, and need to narrow down more. Lets see if we can figure this out.

I was never under the impression anything was related to a "will" in your epistemology, albeit I understand the general relation to the principle of noncontradiction. — Bob Ross

Not a worry! Its in the first paragraph of the entire paper which you read one time many months ago at this point.

I think I would need a bit more explication into your idea of "will" to properly address it.

The only reason we have a definition of reality, is that there are some things that go against our will.

Reality is the totality of existence that is in accordance with our will, and contrary to our will.

I think you aren't using "reality" synonymously throughout your post. The first statement seems to contradict the second. You first claim that we only can define "reality" as that which goes against our "will", yet then, in the second, claim that "reality" is both what goes against and what aligns with our "will"--I don't see how these are reconcilable statements — Bob Ross

Certainly, that was poor language on my part. What I meant to convey was the only reason we can have a concept of reality as something separate from ourselves, is because there are things that go against our will. If everything went in accordance to our will, there would be no need for the term "reality". There would just be whatever we willed would happen.

So no, I am not saying reality is what contradicts our will. Just noting that because everything we will does not come to pass, we realize there is something besides our will. No, I define reality as what is. Sometimes "what is" is when our will happens. Sometimes "what is" is when it does not happen.

A "will", in my head, has a motive, which is not implied at all (to me) with "discrete experience" — Bob Ross

A "will" like everything really, is a discrete experience. At a very basic level, I think we would both agree it is an intent of action. I will to wave my hand, and reality does not contradict that will. I will to fly by my mind alone, and reality contradicts this.

I was misunderstanding you: distinctive knowledge is what you are claiming is given because it is simply discrete experience, whereas applicable could be within the mind or the external world — Bob Ross

Yes, this is it. To clarify, distinctive knowledge is the knowledge of the discrete experience itself. Applicable knowledge is when we claim the distinctive knowledge we have applies to something besides its immediate self, and its immediate self is not enough to state with rational certainty that it is not contradicted by reality

"Reason" is simply that ever continuing process of conclusions, which is the bedrock of all derivation. 1 + 1 = 3 (without refurbishing the underlying meaning) is an exposition of "reason", albeit not determined to be "rational". If, in that moment, the subject legitimately concluded 1 + 1 = 3, then thereby "reason" was invoked. — Bob Ross

I believe I understand a bit. In that case, would every living thing reason? At the most fundamental level, an organism must decide whether X is food, or not food. I'm not saying its advanced reason, but reason at its most fundamental?

(Philosophim) "Distinctive knowledge comes about by the realization that what we discretely experience, the act itself, is known."

I think this is false. The act itself is not just known (as in given), it is determined by means of recursive analysis of reason. You and I determined that we discretely experience. — Bob Ross

Correct in a way. When I introduced the idea of discrete experience to you, you had to distinctively know what I meant first. Then, you tried to show it could be contradicted through application. I created the abstract with the conclusion that it could not be contradicted. But if it is ever contradicted in application, while we will still have the distinctive knowledge of "distinctive knowledge", we would applicably know that it was contradicted in its application to reality, not contradicted distinctively.

The line however, is incredibly fine between distinctive, and applicable. More on this later.

And, if I may be so bold, the act of discretely experiencing does not precede reason: it becomes a logical necessity of reason (i.e. reason determines it must be discretely experiencing multiplicity to even determine in the first place--but this is all dependent on reason). — Bob Ross

Agreed based on my understanding of your definition of reason. I think this is semantical however. By being a logical necessity for reason to exist, this is similar to what I meant by, "Before reason can form".

Anything we ever do is concluded, to some degree or another, which utilizes reason, and any conclusion pertaining to reason or discrete experience is application. — Bob Ross

If you mean "conclusion pertaining to application" as "application", yes, I think this fits. Do we need application to distinctively know things? No, distinctive knowledge it what we use to find if we can applicably know it. We can reason using distinctive knowledge to create a set of concepts. But distinctively knowing concepts does not mean we can know them in application.

The only reason this is true is because you have realized that it would be a contradiction to hold that the contents of the thoughts of a mind can suffice pertaining to what the mind deems objects. This is all from reason and, depending on what is considered rationality, rational. — Bob Ross

No disagreement here either. But it is an abstract invention. I have simply shown that to claim I know I do not discretely experience is irrational. That does not mean I could suddenly lose the capability to discretely experience 2 years from now for some time due to something like a disease or death. In such a case, the application that I discretely experience, would be contradicted by reality.

We can define a meaningful distinction between "distinctive" (that which is discrete experience) and "applicable" (that which isn't), — Bob Ross

Almost, but not quite. A discrete experience is anything that is separate from something else in your viewpoint. That is any identity, and essentially every "thing" that you experience. Distinctive knowledge and applicable knowledge are both discrete experiences as is any "thing". It is the type of knowledge that we are discretely experiencing where the difference comes in.

No matter how swift, I conclude that I just imagined an elephant--I am not synonymous with the discrete experience of an elephant (I am the reason). — Bob Ross

Considering you have stated that discrete experience is a logically necessary part of reason, I think this follows. I stated "I am the discrete experiencer," and you have stated, "I am the reasoner". If my understanding of reason is something that every being would have, then I can agree.

We know we discretely experience because it is a deduction that is not contradicted by reality.

Your using reason here. You applied this to then claim we have distinctive knowledge that is not applied, but there was never anything that wasn't applied. In other words, you, by application, determined some concepts to be unapplied: given. That which you determined was given, was not given to you, it was obtained by you via application. Nothing is given to you without reason. — Bob Ross

Yes, I think you have it! But to clarify again, there is a separation between the distinctive obtainment of knowledge, and the applicable obtainment of knowledge. One if the abstract concept and logical rules. The other is the application of those rules to something without contradiction.

However, I've noted that "reason" is an option. It is not a necessary condition of being human.

For me, reason is a necessary condition of being human. Not "rationality", but reason. — Bob Ross

Yes, with your definition as I understand it, I agree. But, I will add again based on your definition that reason at its most fundamental is a necessary condition for any living being, not confined to humanity.

I think we applicably know math. Reason derives what is mathematical and what doesn't abide by it. Solving x = y + 1 for y is application, not distinction. Even the understanding that there's one distinct thing and another one is application (of pon). What exactly is purely distinctive about this? Of course, we can applicably know that there's discrete experience and that we could label discrete experience as "distinctive knowledge", but all that is application. There's never a point at which we rest and just simply know something without application. Is there? — Bob Ross

There is never a point that you applicably know math without application. Distinctive and applicable knowledge are simply subdivisions of "Deductions that do not lead to contradiction by reality. We can applicably know math, and distinctively know math. Keeping it simple, I can distinctively know that 1 is an identity. Then I encounter an identity, and say, "that is 1 identity". But I could just distinctively know that 1+1=2 purely as a set of symbols. If later I see that set of symbols and state, "Ah yes, that is 1+1=2", then I applicably know that math if my claim is not contradicted.

Perhaps a better way to break down the distinction is by what is implied by our discrete experiences. Distinctive is simply knowing we have every logical reason to believe that we are experiencing the discrete experience itself. If however, the discrete experience implies something beyond the act of having the experience itself, this is when application occurs.

Of course, how do we have the knowledge that what we are discretely experiencing, is what we are discretely experiencing? At first, it is because we claim it is a contradiction. So is this an application? Or is this what is needed before one can apply? Essentially, distinctive knowledge is the rational conclusion that what we experience, is what we experience. And we conclude that because logically, any other alternative is inapplicable. It is when we apply this distinctive knowledge to something else, for example "I distinctively know 1 banana +1 banana =2 bananas, and I'm going to apply it to those two bananas over there," you can see this dividing line.

when do I ever not apply anything? — Bob Ross

If I conclude that I discretely experience, it is not by application to something beyond itself. Because it is not a question that it can be contradicted by reality. It is a logical conclusion. And logic on its own, is a set of rules we construct. If we apply it and its not contradicted, then we applicably know it. But that doesn't deny the distinctive knowledge of it before the application. So we are not applying discrete experiences, when we are recognizing that we know we have discrete experiences in themselves. When we are trying to assert more than the experience itself, such as applying the experience to another that we say results in X, we are applying.

A question for you Bob, is can you see this dividing line? Do you think there are better words for it?
Do you think there is a better way to explain it?

My question essentially pertained to when something is considered a "historical fact", considering most historical facts are speculations, when we are simply determining which induction is most cogent. I think you answer it here: seems that you think that it isn't a base concern of the epistemology. I think this is a major concern people will have with it. Everyone is so used to our current scientific, historic, etc institutions with their thresholds of when something is validated that I envision this eroding pretty much society's fundamental of how knowledge works. It isn't an issue that it erodes the fundamentals of "knowledge" hitherto, but not addressing it is. You don't have to address it now if you don't want to, but feel free to if you want. — Bob Ross

People used to think the Earth was the center of the universe. From their perspective, it was understandable. Some people didn't like it when it was pointed out that the Sun was the center. "How could that be possible? Its obvious the Sun circles us!" People's uncomfortableness with something new isn't an argument against proposing something new.

I think the emotional problem you are noting, is that people will be uncomfortable with the idea that many of the things we purport to know are inductions. Given the idea that inductions have been seen as "irrational", I can see this dislike. But what I am trying to show is that certain inductions are more rational than others. Inductions can be a rational tool of the mind when it reaches limitations. I originally had a few pages added to the induction hierarchy demonstrating when each type of induction was actually very invaluable, even irrational inductions. I can go into that, but I feel like I should address these other points first.

Explicitly, what you are stating is, "I believe Jones could have 5 coins in his pocket." But what is the reasoning of "could have" based on? A probability, possibility, speculation, or irrational induction?

The point is that it isn't based off of any of them. And it isn't simply using a different epistemology, it is that your epistemology completely lacks the category. — Bob Ross

I believe it does. What you term the "colloquial" use of possible is what I divided into possible and plausible(speculation as we've been calling it now).

However, I think I may be understanding what you are saying now: potentiality isn't really inducing an affirmation. It is more like "I cannot contradict the idea, therefore it may be possible". — Bob Ross

What I'm claiming is that potentiality is simply an induction without the distinction of the hierarchy. An induction is not inducing affirmation. An induction is always a prediction, and we can never know if a prediction is correct until we apply that prediction. The hierarchy recognizes this, but also recognizes that some inductions are more rational than others. Without the hierarchy, how could you tell which induction is more useful Bob? How can we tell if something has actual potential if there is no subdivision of inductions? Perhaps this will help us resolve the issue of potentiality, and why you believe it to be more useful.

"There's a difference between claiming there is colloquially a possibility that something can occur and that you actually believe that it occurred." -- Bob

Just to ensure the point is clear, both situations exist in the epistemology.

I'm not sure if they both do. You do have "something can occur" in the sense of experienced before, but is "something can occur due to no contradictions" simply a speculation without affirmation? — Bob Ross

Lets really break down what you mean by this sentence. "Something can occur due to no contradictions". I think this lacks clarity, and a lack of clarity is not something we should consider. What type of contradictions is this referencing? Is it referencing contradictions of an abstract logic? Or is it the contradiction of reality against my will?

For example, I can construct a set of abstract rules that work by allowing an object to appear at two places at once. I distinctively know this. In my set of rules of the discrete experiences themselves, there is no contradiction if a thing can be in two places at once. In your terms, this would be potential. In my terms, this would be an abstraction, or a context of distinctive knowledge.

Now, if we apply that set to reality, we find that an object cannot be in two places at once, no matter how much we try. This is a contradiction of the context when applied to reality, but not a contradiction within the context itself. Just because the person cannot prove that two things can exist in one spot, it does not mean their entire system of logic based on two things existing at once suddenly had contradictions within it. If his assumption was true, the logic would hold. But something being logical within the abstract does not necessarily hold true when applied.

To put it in terms of logic
A -> B
A exists.
Therefore B

But what if A does not exist? A -> B is a distinctive knowledge, a logic. But it is not applied to anything in particular. If I say, "If Santa exists, it will rain" for A and B, I have to apply this logic and show that Santa exists for the logic to be true in application. If I find there is no Santa, I can still distinctively know the logical statement I just made, I just cannot know that it applies without contradiction.

As I have proposed it, inapplicable speculations do not exist: they have been transformed into irrational inductions. Speculations entail that it is applicable. Therefore, this is not an appropriate antonym to potentiality. The antonym is "that which is contradicted". — Bob Ross

Again, contradicted based on one's own distinctive context, or contradicted based on application? It seemed to me potentiality was an induction. Is that induction free of contradictions distinctively, or applicably. An irrational induction in this case, is a distinctive contradiction, not an applicable contradiction. An induction is not an assertion of certainty. Even irrational inductions have the potential of being contradicted in application. They are simply the least rational induction a person can make distinctively, not an assertion of applicable knowledge.

Exactly. So Jones is claiming, "I have an induction but I'm not going to use the hierarchy to break down what type of induction I'm using".

Leaving the individual voiceless in a perfectly valid context is not purposely not using the epistemology: it is the absence of a meaningful distinction that is causing the issue. — Bob Ross

You can have a perfectly valid context that does not use the epistemology. If you don't want to use the hierarchy in your distinctive context, you don't have to. I'm just trying to point out it is more beneficial to.

There is a meaningful distinction, as you noted, between asserting affirmation, and simply asserting that it isn't contradicted. — Bob Ross

I think this is where you've missed what I've been stating. There are distinctive and applicable views. You can be contradicted distinctively, and you can be contradicted applicably. They aren't the same thing. When you use "contradiction" without clarifying what type of contradiction, distinctive or applicable, then you aren't using the epistemology.

That was one heck of a write up! Fantastic points which made me really dig deep and make sure I was being consistent, and conveying my intentions correctly. Let me know what you think Bob.

I've never implied that potential to be false is the same as falsity and I've clarified this an awful amount of times in my earlier post once again... you're beating the same strawman that I clarified isn't my position. — Kuro

I think we might be talking past one another unintentionally. I think you misunderstand that I am not referring to falsification as a logic chart. You're missing what I'm trying to communicate.

And by the way, it is very lovely and a massive credit to you for spending the time to clearly write those logic charts. I did read all the information, and was not dismissive of it. Lets use your chart as an example.

In the case that p -> p, the result is always true. Yes, I understand this. This isn't targeting what I'm trying to tell you however. I can falsify that by positing that p -> ~p. If p -> ~p exists, then p->p is false. It doesn't mean p->~p exists. It means it a clear counter condition that would show p->p doesn't exist. The topic we are talking about is whether non-physicalism exists. The falsification of that ideal, is that non-physicalism does not exist.

I am talking about falsification for evidence. The only pre-requisite for something that is falsifiable is that it has a clear and distinct definition. That's really it. Because if you claim "x exists" then the alternative, "x doesn't exist" is always a falsification that can be considered.

It would be a counterexample to the proposition "God exists and made the world" because that proposition is not a tautology. But "God is God" or "Making the world is making the world" is a tautology that is always true regardless of whether God existed or not. In the same fashion that "Santa is Santa" is a tautology with no falsity conditions. — Kuro

Santa doesn't exist. I'm asking for evidence that Santa exists. We are not talking about tautologies. And to do that, I need something falsifiable. What is Santa? What are the traits? How can I tell Santa exists? There needs to be something that would indicate a reality in which Santa did not exist.

So for example, "Santa exists in the North pole in a factory where he makes toys all day". So all I have to do is go up to the North pole and look for a factory where some guy is making toys all day. If I go up to the North pole and don't find any factories, then I know Santa doesn't exist.

Now, lets apply this to non-physicalism. I've asked Wayfarer to give me evidence of non-physicalism, and he has tried in every conceivable way to avoid doing this. That is because he knows he doesn't have any. And he knows if he admits that, his entire world view crumbles. Non-physicalism only works as something you can possible consider if it has no traits one could look for.

I've even made it easy for him. Physicalism is simply the analysis of the rules of matter and energy. I've asked him to show me one instance in which matter and energy wasn't involved in consciousness. He can't do it. That's because he can't assert non-physicalism as anything, because then people could actually look for it, and find that it isn't there. That's the whole goal of holding non-falsifiable ideals. Its a self-gratifying ideal that people hold precious to their chest, terrified that others might point out its flaws. If you can avoid having to think about it too much, or present it in a way that makes it real, then you can lie to yourself and tell yourself you're holding to something that is true. I am very familiar with this myself, and see it clear as day in other people.

Wayfarer is literally telling me Santa exists, and when I persist on a definition of who Santa is and how I can know he exists, he can't. That's non-falsifiable, and I am valid in asking for falsifiable evidence. It is also quite telling that when I asked for evidence that could be falsified, I've spent more time explaining falsification then hearing evidence. Now perhaps Kuro that's because you're more interested in the perceived logic. And that's fine, but its distracted from the point long enough. People don't have to do large debates about falsification for things that are easy to show are real.

Suffice to say, I am completely unconvinced that I am wrong to ask for evidence that is falsifiable, so I will. If you don't understand that, so be it. If you can give me evidence that the non-physical exists, feel free to reply. I don't want to hear anything more about falsification, as this distraction has gone on long enough. Give me your evidence, and I'll be the judge.

I agree. I'm personally interested in celebrating how 'miraculous' the so-called ordinary already is. — lll

Sometimes I think on the fact that I exist at all, and am filled with absolute wonder. It is truly astounding that existence "is", and that I am one of the lucky few bits of material existence to realize it all.

I'm a longtime atheist, and it'd be quite an inconvenience for me if I had to rewire myself to take god chatter seriously again (as I did when exposed as a child to it.) — lll

I would not have a problem with it. I did not leave Christianity in anger, I simply left because I couldn't rationally accept it anymore. As such, my actions honestly haven't changed very much from where I was a Christian except for going to Church.

Again - the reason that Popper devised the falsification criterion, was to differentiate scientific from non-scientific theories. So, what you're asking for is a scientific theory. — Wayfarer

Wayfarer, I'm not Karl Popper. I don't care why he wanted to use falsification. I'm not asking you for the standard of a scientific theory, which is MUCH more than falsification.

If you think you can explain maths in a couple of paragraphs, that it's 'obvious' and 'natural' what maths is, what numbers are, then you need to do more reading. — Wayfarer

Irrelevant as I already noted. I showed you where falsification can be applied to Platonism. Ignore my points on math if you like, that was an aside. Stop saying I'm asking for a scientific theory, and please explain to me why I can't use falsification as a requirement for viable evidence.

Wayfarer, this is the problem when you debate other people, and not the people you are talking to. I'm not asking you to use the scientific method. I'm asking you to provide something that has falsification.
You said I shouldn't use falsification. None of what you wrote, shows me that I shouldn't use falsification as my criterion for evidence.

Look, math is real easy. Its about our ability to identify. I can look at "1" field of grass, and "1" blade of grass, and "1" piece of grass. 1 identity and another 1 identity together are the identity we call 2. As we observe the world with identities, or discrete experiences, it follows the logic of our capability to do so.

Notice how we say 1 blade of grass and 1 blade of grass are two? That's because its how we make sense of the world. Is 1 blade of grass exactly the same as the other? No. Its the notion of combining 2 things together for us to convey an idea.

If humanity did not exist, it doesn't mean the world would go away. It doesn't mean that something else that could create identities, couldn't create an identity that would work out for them in the same way. But does the concept of "1" exist apart from our invention of that identity? Of course not. There's no evidence of that at all. Just like the concept of "embigination" doesn't exist without me in the world. It doesn't mean that what I am describing as "embigination" doesn't exist, it means my concept of it would not exist.

But regardless of all that, we're looking for a reason why I can't use falsification right? If you want to discuss what I just mentioned we can, but I don't want to get off topic.

Lets see, for the Platonic theory. If they propose that numbers exist apart from human concepts, lets first get them to clearly define that. Do they mean a floating symbol? Probably not, but feel free to interject. They probably mean that "oneness" itself would still exist. In other words, if we didn't know what the symbology of "1" is, what the symbology of 1 describes would1 still exist even apart from our ability to understand this. So, its falsification would be if we should show that oneness did not exist apart from our ability to conceive of the concept.

So all we would need then is a rational agent that did not understand or know about numbers, and then see if they acted as if "oneness" existed right? Turns out, you take kids and even animals, and they can construct and understand "whole identities" (What 1 is). Now perhaps you would like another go at the definition of what they mean by math existing apart from human understanding. That's fine. But this number concept of Platonism can clearly be falsified.

As such, I'm not seeing why this article implies I cannot use falsification as a criterion. And the point is not whether I'm correct or not about Platonism. The entire true point, the heart of it, is that I can create a claim using Platonism that can be falsified.

The argument is, on the one side, that numbers are real, independently of anyone who is aware of them - which is generally known as mathematical realism or mathematical platonism. It grants mathematical objects reality, albeit of a different order to empirical objects. — Wayfarer

I thought we had already resolved falsifiability and were simply talking about evidence of something non-physical at this point. But ok, if that is your problem, I read it. Its a debate I'm well aware of. Where is the evidence against falsifiability? I have no idea what you're trying to show with this article on an age old problem.

If you believe falsifiability is not a criterian I should hold, please explain to me what in this article backs that.