Ah,yes. I misunderstood. Even if infinite spatiotemporally, it has to come from somewhere? It all just is there? — Raymond

Yes. The end result to all causality, according to the OP, is there must come a time when there is no prior explanation or cause. It exists, simply because it does.

If a big bang is happening time after time, every time from s fresh state behind the bang preceding it, how can there be a first cause? — Raymond

Why caused the big bang to happen infinitely, and not just once, twice, or any other number? And if you have an answer, what caused that? And if you have an infinite number of answers, why caused there to be an infinite number of answers, instead of just one, two, or any other number? Eventually, "It just is."

God(s) aused the universe. Who else? — Raymond

Can we prove this? Why couldn't the big bang just happen? After all, if God is the first cause, why couldn't something else be?

But in the realm of causal relations, the first cause of each new big bang is a causeless state — Raymond

That would be the definition of a first cause, which would not negate the OP. I'm not stating whether that is, or is not the first cause, but I am saying there must be one.

I agree with you here, but my point was that it is an inapplicable plausibility (which means we are on the same page now I think). A couple posts back, you were defining "plausibility" as "the belief that distinctive knowledge that has never been applicably known, can be applicably known", which I am saying that is an "applicable plausibility", not "plausibility". I am now a bit confused, because your response to that was "In both cases, the person believes that the plausibility can be applicably known", which that is why I stated people can have plausibilities that they don't think can be applicably known. — Bob Ross

Fantastic point. I need to revise what an inapplicable plausibility is. What would be more accurate is the belief that something exists that cannot be applicably known. Would we call this faith? I'm hesitant to use that word, as it is loaded with a lot of other emotions. But I think you are right. An inapplicable plausibility is different enough from a plausibility to warrant a separate identity in the heirarchy. That would leave us with probability, possibility, plausibility, faith, and irrational inductions.

Upon further reflection, I think that if we define every "plausibility" that has no potential as an "irrational induction" — Bob Ross

This is correct. An irrational induction is a belief that something exists, despite applicable knowledge showing it does not exist.

This is true, but also notice that no one has ever applicably known a situation in which, in the absence of direct observation, something necessarily was not both itself and its own negation. — Bob Ross

As you are aware, this would be an induction then.

Firstly, I could apply both of these indirectly to reality without any contradiction because, using the law of noncontradiction, I can create situations where the law of noncontradiction doesn't necessarily have to occur (mainly absent of sentient beings). — Bob Ross

What does indirect application to reality mean? I only see that as an inductive belief about reality. This isn't an applicable knowledge claim, so there is no application to reality. If there are no sentient beings, then there is no possibility of application knowledge.

Don't get me wrong, I agree with you in the sense that both are inapplicable plausibilities, but that is with respect to direct application. — Bob Ross

Can you describe what an indirect application to reality would be?

I may decide, upon assessing the state of a currently unobserved thing, to decide that the outcome should calculated as if they are superpositioned (this is how a lot of the quantum realm is generally understood). This can be indirectly applied to reality without any contradiction. — Bob Ross

Superpositioning, to my understanding, is essentially probability. There are X number of possible states, but we won't know what state it will be until we measure it. The measurement affects the position itself, which is why measuring one way prevents us from measuring the other way. You won't applicably know the state until you apply that measurement, so the belief in any particular outcome prior to the measurement would be an induction.

I agree with you here, but now we are getting into another fundamental problem (I would say) with your terminology: if a "possibility" is what one has experienced once before, then virtually nothing is a possibility. — Bob Ross

Great! We might be nearing a limitation for where I've thought on this. Just as we can construct detailed contexts to the point we could hardly claim applicable knowledge on anything, we can do so with inductive cogency. For example, I could state that to know a particular car is mine, it needs to be identical to the atomic level. Once I've measured that, I could say, "The quantum level". Of course, elections are moving around constantly, so from one moment to the next, I would say I had a brand new car.

The point of identity, the ability to discretely experience in a meaningful way, is to construct limitations of context that allow us to understand and interact with the world in an accurate and helpful way to us. This can be called, "rational". If I construct a context that is so detailed, it takes years to conclude even one discrete claim of knowledge, or the requirements are impossible to apply, what use is it?

I can identify a field of grass, a blade of grass, a piece of grass, ad infinitum. The point is to define it in such a way and context, as to be useful. The same goes with inductions. If I define a car as X, know that an attribute of a car is that it starts, I can say it is possible that a car can start. If I define what a car is as needing 10 hours of poking prodding, and dismantling to applicably know it, the distinctive knowledge useless in my every day application. If I define each car as separate entities, and only insist I know it is possible for this car to start, but not possible for any other car to start, then I make it a plausibility.

Is that useful to me? Depends on my context, but for most context of every day use, probably not. At that point I remove a hierarchy. So everything I have left over at that point is comparative plausiblities. Even though its a car, I'm trapped in my inability to analyze plausibilities. Maybe the car doesn't turn on. Maybe it turns into a demon. Maybe the ignition is actually in a hidden panel undeneath the floor board. Without a possibility comparison, I'm rationally trapped in my inability to justify one plausibility as being more cogent than another.

The addition of the hierarchy of induction is not to state, "This is true." Its the introduction of distinctive definitions, that have examples of being applied to reality without contradiction. To my mind, this distinction is useful. To another, perhaps it is not. Perhaps there are better words and phrases depending on your context that would be more useful to you. This is how all new claims work. A new distinctive knowledge is introduced that can be applicably known. Do we amend our context to use it, or reject it? You cannot force an individual to accept or reject it. You must show them it is a tool that can be useful.

I think there is rigidity within your epistemology that mine lacks, as I see it more as an elastic continuum of sureness. I don't know if that makes any sense or not. — Bob Ross

No, this makes perfect sense, and I hope you see that I agree with you that distinctive knowledge is infinitely elastic. There are infinite possibilities of how to define the world. Infinite contexts. Infinite sounds, language, etc. The question is, can you construct something that is useful? That fits the needs of your context at the time? Can it be used between more than one person? There is no reason the word "sheep" has to mean anything. There is nothing in reality that necessitates it. It just just an agreement we hold, because the word "sheep" has a use to us that we can use in our own lives, and in communicating to others.

"Hard consciousness", as you put it, is exactly what I am trying to convey here in conjunction with your "possibility" term: by definition, I can never claim it is "possible" for someone else to have internal monologue. Even if you knew that the person could not physically lie about it, you would never be able to claim it is "possible" because you have never experienced it yourself (even if you have experienced internal monologue, you haven't experienced it particularly within them). — Bob Ross

Full agreement. I do not think there is anything wrong with applicably knowing the limits of what you can applicably know. I find it a strength of the theory.

We cannot, under your terms, claim that a "bat can think", only that it is a plausibility. Even if we scanned their brains and it turns out the necessary, similar to ours, faculty exists for thought, we would never be able to label it as a "possibility" because we have not experience a bat thinking. — Bob Ross

Again, this depends upon your context. I could state that thinking is not just brain activity, but the ability to react to stimuli in a way that does not kill the creature. So I could place a bad smelling and rotten piece of fruit next to a fresh piece of fruit, and see what the bat does. If we state "thinking" is having the ability to reason at the level of an average human, than a bat will never be applicably known as thinking.

Again, fantastic assessment. I think you understand the theory pretty well now. The question to you is, is it useful for you? Is it logically consistent? Can it solve problems that other theories of knowledge cannot? And is it contradicted by reality, or is it internally consistent? Thanks again, I look forward to hearing from you.

I see. That's just an invention of your mind though. Regardless, that doesn't negate the OP. What caused the charge? What caused the singularity? If you say, "Nothing" then it is self-explained as I conclude in the OP.

What first cause are you looking for? — Raymond

None, that's not the focus. Its just noting it is logical that a first cause must exist. See Bob's discussion for details.

The end of our universe, at infinity, may cause a new bang at the singularity. — Raymond

That's a prediction, not the question of prior causation.

At the singularity time is present in a sense that there is no begin point 0, which causes the difficulty. The paradox is that time was there but without direction. — Raymond

How does this apply to the OP?

OK. At the present time we have a result of causation from an event having taken place 1/2 a year ago. At that time a previous event caused that result, the previous event having taken place 1/4 of a year prior to that event. Keep going back in time in this manner and you never reach an origin for this causation sequence, although the causation sequence started no further back in time than one year ago. — jgill

That didn't really answer the question. What caused it to be that way?

Read the OP. I would ask, "Why is the causation 1/2^n power? The answer is, "Something else" in which case you would need to provide that, or "There is no prior reason," In which case we have our first cause.

How do you prove Socrates' (paradoxical) statement? — Agent Smith

Hello Agent Smith. I appreciate your contribution, I just had not gotten around to it yet. For this forum post, I would be glad to answer your question, but you need to understand the knowledge theory first. Have you read the papers? I could give you an answer, but if you haven't read the papers yet, you will not understand it. If you are against reading the papers at first, feel free to start with Bob's posts. We cover a lot of questions and answers, and it may help you. Thanks!

I don't think this is necessarily true. It depends on what you mean by "applicably known": lots of people believe in things that they claim cannot be "applicably known". For example, there are ample amounts of people that believe in an omnipotent, omniscient, etc (I call it the "omni" for short) God and actively claim that these traits they believe in are necessarily outside of the scope of what we can "applicably" know. — Bob Ross

Then what they are describing is an inapplicable plausibility. It is when you believe that something that exists, but have constructed it in such a way that it cannot be applicably tested. I can see though that my language is not clear, so I understand where you're coming from. Applicable knowledge is when you apply a belief to reality that is not contradicted. All inductions are a belief in something that exists in reality. The type of induction is measured by its ability to be applicably applied or known.

So people believe that God exists in reality, like all inductions. The type of induction is an inapplicable plausibility, because the essential properties of God are things that cannot be applied to reality. There is no way to discover if a God outside of space and time exists, because we cannot go outside of space and time.

Another, non-religious, example is a priori knowledge: most people that claim their are a priori knowledge also actively accept that you necessarily cannot applicable (directly) know the components of it. At its most generic form, they would claim that we there is something that is required for experience to happen in the first place, for differentiation to occur, but you definitely will never be able to directly "applicably" know that. I guess you could say that they are indirectly "applying" it to reality without contradiction, which I would be fine with. — Bob Ross

I think this is largely ok. Maybe a more specific example would help me to determine if you have the right of it. As I noted earlier, a priori knowledge doesn't really exist under this theory. There is distinctive knowledge, and there is applicable knowledge. You cannot have applicable knowledge, without first applying distinctive knowledge. You can create whatever distinctive knowledge you want, but it is not applicable knowledge until it is tested against reality.

I think that, because the law of noncontradiction is one of the (if not the) fundamental axiom there is, it is easy to consider it irrelevant to the comparison of two different plausibilities; however, nevertheless, I think that it plays a huge, more fundamental, factor in the consideration of them. For example, if my knowledge of physics (or any other relevant subject matter) that makes it "impossible" (aka has no potential to occur) for green cheese to be able to make up a moon, then, before I have even started thinking about hierarchical inductions, I have exhausted the idea to its full capacity — Bob Ross

Even though you did not actively think about hierarchial induction, you practicied it implictly. You noted that on the chain of reasoning, the law of non-contradiction proves that the moon is not made of green cheese. Therefore, you have no need to continue that chain of reasoning. No one has ever applicably known a situation in which the something was both itself, and its negation. Further, its definition makes a contradiction impossible. If you define something as one way, then define it as its negation, you have created a situation that can never be applied to reality.

That is because it is impossible even as distinctive knowledge. Recall that distinctive knowledge is what is held within a particular context that is not contradictory. I cannot claim that "A" is not "A" when I mean A and not A within the same context of equality. Something provably impossible ends any further thinking along the lines of it being possible.

Moreover, with the stipulation that there are no observers, even if I have solid evidence that green cheese can't make up a planet, the planet could be made of green cheese and green cheese can't "possibly" makeup a planet at the same time. — Bob Ross

If we cannot observe it, we cannot apply this to reality. Therefore it is an inapplicable plausibility. It is something we can consider, but it will fail in an inductive hierarchy test against something possible, probable or even applicably plausible.

That being said, you can compare the belief in the law of non-contradiction, versus the belief of its denial. If you hold the law of non-contradiction as applied knowledge, or an induction that you believe in, you can evaluate an inductions chain, and reject any inductions that relay on the law of non-contradiction being false within its chain.

This is, essentially, what I am trying to convey. That would be a consideration prior to hierarchical inductions and would provide an underlying basis to compare two different plausibilities. — Bob Ross

Again, you are doing the practice of hierarchial induction here, whether you are aware of it or not. I don't think its a consideration prior, but a consideration of it.

Correct me if I am wrong, but I think that you are trying to convey that, once all the underlying beliefs are evaluated and coincide with the given belief in question, you can't compare two different contexts' hierarchical induction chains. — Bob Ross

This is correct.

I can soundly believe that one claim is more cogent than the other because one aligns with my current knowledge while the other does not. If we were to put them both as plausibilities — Bob Ross

This is essentially what the hierarchy does. In one case of your induction, you founded it upon applicable knowledge. In another, you did not.

Chain one: Applicable knowledge => plausibilty
Chain two: Possibliity => plausibility.

It is more cogent to believe in the first plausibility, then the second. We can do a little math to prove it.

Lets say that applicable knowledge counts as 100% being an accurate assessment of reality without contradiction. An induction is less than 100 percent. When you have a chain of beliefs, you can multiply the percentage chance of the beliefs together. For example, getting one result out of a roll of six dice is 1/6* 1/6 or 1/36 chance (individual values for each die, so five on die one is different from 5 on die two).

Every induction is either 1, not contradicted by reality, or 0, contradicted by reality. We do not applicably know whether it is a 1, or a 0, we we will make it a binary variable with 1 as true, and 0 as false.

So the first chain is:
1 * X
The second chain is:
X * Y

The first chain's chance of being correct using probability, is 50% The second chains chance is .5*.5 or .25% chance of being correct.

A probability and possibillity are more cogent, because they are really a chain based off of applicable knowledge. There is only one binary uncertainty, will what was applicably known be applicably known again.

Possibility chain:
Applicable knowledge => induction that it will still be applicably known

Plausibility chain:

Take something possible (For example, the moon will still exist when I look for it) => create induction (It is made out of green cheese) => Can be applied v Can't be applied

A possibility is essentially always 1* X of it still being applicably known.
A plausibility is essentially always predicting another induction off of what is possible, or X * Y

If I continue and say, The moon is made of green cheese, and this green cheese has green bacteria, then my induction of green bacteria can be seen as:

X * Y * Z or .125 chance of not being contradicted by reality.

For example, I have internal monologue. I think that it is "possible" (in accordance with my use of the terms) that other people have internal monoloqes too; however, I have never experienced someone else having an internal monologue, therefore it isn't a "possibility" in accordance with your terms. — Bob Ross

Correct, depending on the context. You do not know if people have internal monologues in their head like yourself. Fun fact, there are people who cannot visualize inside of their head. They literally cannot imagine a vision of anything when they close their eyes. So what do we do here? Do we fall into solipsism? No, we simply adjust the context of what it means to have internal monologues between two different people.

First, we can determine a conclusion or experience that could only happen if one had an internal monologue. For example, I could ask a person, "Can you invent a story of two people talking to each other in your head?" A person who can internally monologue, can create a conversation of two people talking in their mind. A person who could not understand the question, or was unable to fulfil the request (with the possibility that they were telling the truth depending on how deep we want to go) would not be able to have an inner monologue in their head. If however, they could fulfil the request, then they must be able to have an inner monologue in their head.

Do we know what that inner monologue sounds or looks like in their head? No. We likely never will. This is the "hard problem" of consciousness. We can determine a bat can think, but we can never have the experience of thinking like a bat.

Finally, also recall that cogency is the highest level of induction we can make. Imagining what it is like to have the experience of being a bat is an inapplicable plausibility, and there is no real alternative. There is no confirmation or denial of applicable knowledge, no probability or even possibility beyond the idea that it is possible brains can have consciousness. Perhaps as we improve the science of the mind, this will change, but for now, this is what we have.

This brings up a more fundamental issue (I think): the colloquial term "possibility" is utterly ambiguous. When someone says "it is possible", they may be claiming that "it can occur" or that "it can potentially occur", which aren't necessarily synonymous. — Bob Ross

Agreed. Colloquially, the term possiblity is a bad term, because we have not had a viable means of assessing knowledge. This colloquial term of "possibility" causes confusion, and ambiguous arguments that those without this method of knowledge, are not equipped to handle.

To say something "can occur", as you rightly point out, is only truly known if the individual has experienced it before, however to say something "can potentially occur" simply points out that the claim doesn't violate any underlying principles and beliefs. I think this is a meaningful distinction. If I claim that it is "possible" (in my terms) for a rock to fall if someone drops from a mountain top, it depends on if I have directly experienced it or not whether I am implicitly claiming that it "can occur" (because I've experienced it) or that it "can potentially occur" (because, even though I haven't experienced it before, my experiences, which are not direct nor exact matches of the given claim, align with the idea that it could occur). I think this can get a bit confusing as "can" and "can potentially" could mean the same thing definitions wise, but I can't think of a better term yet: it's the underlying meaningful distinction here that I want to retain. — Bob Ross

I think you've nailed it. This is really the separation between what is possible, and what is plausible. It takes time to wrap your head around it. Perhaps an applicable plausibility is better described as "an inductive claim of potentiality". That seems to clash with "probability" though, and honestly, all inductions could be argued as "potential". So I'm not sure the generic term of potential works well anymore either. But the underlying meaningful distinction you are describing, is the difference between what is possible, and what is plausible. It is a distinction we have not had in epistemology until now, and I believe the introduction of this distinction is a real key in unlocking some of the problems epistemology has had over the years.

Also, as a side note, I like your response to the object rolling off hills example, however this is getting entirely too long, so I will refrain from elaborating further. — Bob Ross

Not a worry. I was sick, and having difficulty finding the time and effort to cover larger posts. I am feeling much better now, and more energized! My apologies if I was not able to drill down or cover ideas as much as I normally would. Please continue to drill into every nook and cranny.

Consciousness=charge.
Virtual charge= Virtual Consciousness
Virtual charges=negative curvature
Negative curvature=Causing power — Raymond

None of this makes sense. Flesh out what your words mean please.

All subjective experience is caused by consciousness, but consciousness does not give birth to itself (not an illusion). Does this make consciousness the first cause? — pfirefry

You have to prove that nothing causes consciousness. That's a very tall order. Proving that any one thing is self-explained has an incredibly high burden of proof, and arguably may be impossible. I will flesh this out more if needed. First, try to show that consciousness is uncaused. We'll discuss more in depth after.

The real perfect reversible clock at the singularity (when the irreversible didn't exist yet) doesn’t need a first cause. Causes are radiating from it, thereby causing it to turn into the irreversible where the real clock has turned imaginary. The effect causes the cause. — Raymond

Can you clarify this? I don't know what a reversible clock is, or what you mean by a singularity.

Mind describing what you personally mean by causa sui? A wikipedia article doesn't flesh out what you intended by it,

What we perceive, feel, and think is experienced from a unique internal perspective. According to the ‘hard problem of consciousness' some of these mental states are separate to and not reducible to physical systems in the human body — Brock Harding

I do not believe this is the hard problem. We know that all experiences of ourselves reduce to the brain. That's really not in question. The hard problem is understanding exactly what a person feels when a certain brain state triggers.

For example, I'm imagining a field of grass. We can see the brain states that trigger. But we can't see the image of me imagining the field of grass. I can tell you what I feel. I can tell you what I image. But there's no objective way to measure this, it is purely from my subjective communication. We can't say, "Brain state X for certain causes every person to objectively imagine a field of grass. We know there IS a brain state that is doing it. We know its a physical response. But because we don't have the "image" ourselves in front of us, we can't really objectively test or reproduce it. We have to rely on your personal communication, which might be wrong, biased, or not descriptive enough.

To help think this through further, imagine the color green. How do I know that the thing you call green is the same image in my head? Its basically that sort of problem. We need some objective measurement, like "light wavelength" to determine what "green" really is between you and I both. Until we discover some outside way of measuring thoughts besides personal subjective experience, we cannot duplicate the issue.

But it is not, at all, ever, a denial that our brain is what makes us think.

Thanks for the well wishes Bob. I almost feel like my normal self again today.

This is all and well, but I think you defined "plausibility" (in your previous post) as exactly what you just defined as an "applicable plausibility"--and that was all I have trying to point out. You defined "plausibility" as "the belief that distinctive knowledge that has never been applicably known, can be applicably known". A "plausibility", under your terms (I would say), is not restricted to what "can be applicably known" (that is a subcategory called "applicable plausibilities"), whereas "plausibility" is a much more generic term than that (as far as I understand your terms). — Bob Ross

In both cases, the person believes that the plausibility can be applicably known. The difference between an applicable, and inapplicable plausibility, is whether it is designed so that it can be applied to reality. You can craft a belief about reality that can never be actually applied to reality. Its plausible, but inapplicable. It doesn't mean that the plausibility isn't true either. All of these labels are for inductions, which by nature, may or may not be true. The goal is to find which inductions are most rational to hold. An inapplicable plausibility is pretty low on the hierarchy, as it is a claim to what is real when you can never actually apply it to reality.

I agree in that two contexts can be dissimilar and still have commonalities, but those commonalities are more fundamental aspects to those contexts and, therefore, although they are dissimilar, they are not separate. Even the most distinct contexts share some sort of dependency (or dependencies). An induction (within a context) that contradicts a parent context is less cogent than an induction (within a different context) that doesn't. — Bob Ross

If you have two identical underlying building blocks between two compounded inductions, then you can compare those. But if you add anything else on top to make them different, they are no longer fair comparisons.

For example, I hold the law of non-contradiction as true. From this I believe it is plausible that the moon is made out of green cheese. Separately from this, I believe it is plausible that the sun is really run by a giant lightbulb at its core. The basis of the law of contradiction between them has no bearing on the evaluation of comparing the plausibilities.

That being said, you can compare the belief in the law of non-contradiction, versus the belief of its denial. If you hold the law of non-contradiction as applied knowledge, or an induction that you believe in, you can evaluate an inductions chain, and reject any inductions that relay on the law of non-contradiction being false within its chain.

I "think" this is what you are going for. If so, yes, you can determine which inductions are more cogent by looking in its links, and rejecting links that you do not know, or believe in. But this is much clearer if you are trying to decide whether the moon is plausibly made out of green cheese, or something else, then trying to compare the moon and the sun. Does that make sense?

When I say something can potentially exists, or happen, it means that it does not violate any of my parental contexts (any underlying principles that would be required for the concept to align with my knowledge as it is now). Hitherto, your epistemology eliminates this altogether: you either have a possibility or plausibility (probability encompasses the idea of a possibility) and you can't preliminarily determine whether one plausibility has the potential to occur or not. — Bob Ross

You can't preliminarily determine whether one plausibility has the potential to occur or not, because it is an induction. And an induction is when we conclude a result that does not necessarily stem from the premises. Any prediction about the future for example, can always be wrong. Hypotheses, even the most educated ones, about what will happen in a science experiment can also be wrong. Holding to a cogent induction does not guarantee it will actually happen either. Cogency is simply deciding which induction is more reasonable to hold. The nature of holding an induction is always a gamble, no matter how much you might rationalize prior to holding one.

That isn't limited to the epistemology proposed here either. At least this epistemology has a way of rationally measuring inductions. Prior to this, I don't believe there is any epistemology that can claim which inductions are more rational to hold. So if I believe the bird in front of me can fly, because I have applicably known things with wings can fly, its more cogent then stating that the bird in front of me could plausibly levitate off the ground with psychic powers. That being said, if I'm looking at a penguin, my induction will be wrong once applied. With inductions, nothing is certain.

If I have witnessed a "thing" fly and roll off of a hill, but the "things" that I have seen fly look less similar to the "thing" on the hill now and the "thing" looks more similar to the "things" that I have seen roll down a hill, then I might determine one context more cogent than the other based off of the fact that I accept the law of similarity as an underlying principle that engulfs both the contexts in question. — Bob Ross

We can break the chain down as follows.
Thing X which has Y traits I have seen fly off of hills.
Thing A which has B traits I have seen roll off of hills before.

(These are both based on our contexts of what we have applicably known)
It is possible that a thing with B traits can roll off of hills.
It is possible that a thing with Y traits can fly off of hills.
I have never seen a thing with B traits fly, and I have never seen a thing with Y traits that can roll.
It is plausible that a thing with B traits can roll, and plausible that a thing with Y traits can fly.

Since it is possible that a thing with B traits can roll, but only plausible that a thing with B traits can fly, it is more cogent to assume the thing with B traits, will likely fly.
Apply the same reasoning to Y.

I don't think there is a law of simularity, but there is a chain of probabilities and possibilities within this context. And with this context, we can conclude certain beliefs would be more cogent. Does that mean the thing with B traits will roll and the thing with Y traits will fly? No. We can only applicably know the answer by applying our induction to reality without contradiction.

I hope that clears up the process a bit more! Let me know what you think.

reply="Bob Ross;638715"]

Great response Bob, my apologies for the delay. I caught "The Covid," and have been fairly sick. Fortunately I'm vaccinated, so recovery is going steady so far.

With respect to "plausibility", I think you just defined, in accordance with your essays, an "applicable plausibility", contrary to an "inapplicable plausibility", which is not just a "plausibility". You defined it in the quote that it "can be applicably known", which is what I thought an "applicable plausibility" was. Maybe I am just misremembering. — Bob Ross

An applicable plausibility is something which can be applied to reality if we so choose. For example, "If I go outside within five minutes, it will rain on me as soon as I step outside of the door." I do not know if it is raining, nor can I figure it out from within the house. There is nothing preventing me from going outside within the next five minutes. Its an applicable plausibility that I will be rained on, because I can test it.

An inapplicable plausibility is a plausibility that either cannot be tested, or is designed not to be able to be tested. If for example I state, "There is a unicorn that exists that cannot be sensed by any means," this is inapplicable. There is nothing to apply to reality with this idea, as it is undetectable within reality. Perhaps there is a unicorn that exists that cannot be sensed in reality. But we will never be able to apply it, therefore it is something that cannot be applicably known.

Therefore, in the abstract, if context A and B reside within the law of noncontradiction context, and A does not abide by the law of noncontraction while B does, then A is less cogent than B on a more fundamental contextual plane--regardless of the fact that their hierarchical inductions are considered separately. — Bob Ross

Just because two built contexts are dissimilar, it doesn't mean they cannot have commonalities. But commonalities do not mean they can necessarily be evaluated against the different inductions within their independent contexts. The human eye and iron floating on water with butter are just too disparate to compare. The law of non-contradiction simply means you have an irrational inductive belief, which is completely divorced from rationality. I suppose if there's nothing stopping a person from placing comparative contexts in planes, but I would think the end result would be the same.

To add, the comparison is about finding the best induction to take within that context. So if my only recourse in one instance, lets say iron floating on water, is a plausibility over an irrational induction, its more cogent to choose the plausibility. If in the case of an eye, I have a probability vs a possibility, its more cogent to take the probability. But there's really no comparing the probability of improving the eye, the the options of plausibility vs irrationality with iron floating on water with butter. We could state that within the context of the eye, we have more cogent inductions to select from than in the context of iron floating on water, but that's really about it.

I applicably know what two "things" are.
I applicably know what three "things" are.
I applicably know that the underlying meaning of "two" and "three" are not synonymous.
Therefore, "two" "things" and "three" "things" are synonymous. — Bob Ross

Can you clarify this? I interpreted this as follows.

I applicably know A and B.
I applicably know C, D, and E.
I applicably know that the numbers two and three are not synonymous.
Therefore A and B, and C,D, and E are synonymous.

I don't believe that's what you're trying to state, but I could not see what you were intending.

For conclusion 1:
I applicably know that some "things" can fly off of hills.
I applicably know that this round-object is a "thing".
Therefore, the round-object will fly off the hill.
I can apply this belief to reality to see if it holds.
Therefore, I am holding an "applicable plausibility" based off of two possibilities.

For conclusion 2:
I applicably know that some round-like objects, such as a log, can roll down a hill.
I applicably know that some round-like objects, such as a log, will roll down a hill in windy climates.
Therefore, the round-like object will roll down the hill.
I can apply this belief to reality to see if it holds.
Therefore, I am holding an "applicable plausibility" based off of two possibilities. — Bob Ross

I still wasn't quite sure what you meant by parent contexts in these examples. I think what you mean is the broader context of "things" versus "round objects". Please correct me here. For my part, it depends on how we cut hairs so to speak. If the first person does not applicably know that things can roll down a hill as well, then neither statement is more cogent than the other. If the first person knows that "things" can also roll down hill, then there's no cogent reason why they would conclude the "thing" would fly off the hill over roll down the hill.

What might help is to first come up with a comparison of cogency for a person within a particular context first. Including two people complicates comparing inductions greatly, but generally follows the same rules as a person comparing several inductive options they are considering within their own context.

You may be on to something by the way. You're the first person I've had the opportunity to really dig in with the inductive hierarchy, and I will be the first to say it is only a foundation. I just want to make sure the foundation is understood first. While I feel the hierarchy chain is a good start, the second step, which is much more difficult to establish, is comparing two inductions of the same hierarchy and determining which one is more cogent. I think there is something that might be needed beyond the hierarchy chains, such as a further subdivision of the base four inductions. I'm eager to hear more of your ideas!

I still think we're a bit apart on the terms. Let me see if I can define them more clearly.

Firstly, the use of "possibility" and "plausibility" in the sense that you have defined it seems, to me, to not account for certain meaningful distinctions. — Bob Ross

The meaningful distinctions should be:

Possibility - the belief that because distinctive knowledge has been applicably known at least once, it can be known again.

Plausibility- the belief that distinctive knowledge that has never been applicably known, can be applicably known.

In an earlier post, I mentioned knowledge chains. I believe this was before we had clarified the distinction between the two inductions. Lets take your example here:

For example,let's consider two scenarios: person one claims that a new color could be sensed by humans if their eyes are augmented, while person two claims that iron can float on water if you rub butter all over the iron block. I would ask you, within your use of the terms, which is more cogent? — Bob Ross

First, we cannot compare cogency between different branches of claims. This is because cogency takes context into account as well, and the difference between evaluating the human eye, and an floating iron block, are two fairly separate contexts. Recall that inductions are cogent when we reach the limit of what can be applicably known, so we could have a situation in which a plausibility is the most cogent conclusion within that context, while in another context, a possibility is the most cogent.

The more important question, is how can we determine what is most cogent in the belief of what will happen in an attempted application, with a claim within the same context? This is where knowledge chains, and their comparisons come into play.

What we know or believe often times implicitly relies on prior beliefs or applicable knowledge. If I am making a judgement about the human eye, then I am taking my knowledge and inductions about the eye into my assessment.

I applicably know the eye can see X colors.
I applicably know we can improve the eye's ability to see with greater focus.
Therefore I believe we can improve the eye to see greater than X colors.

We have 2 knowledge claims, then we leap to a plausibility. We don't know if its possible yet, as we haven't tried applying it to reality. But we believe that if we attempt to, we will discover that we can improve the eye to see more than X colors.

Now, lets think prior to the availability of eye surgery.

I applicably know the eye can see X colors.
I think its plausible we can improve the eye's ability to see with greater focus.
Therefore I believe we can improve the eye to see greater than X colors.

Here we have 1 knowledge claim, a plausibility, then another plausibility built on the first plausibility. Comparing the two chains, the first chain is more cogent than the second chain. Even though the conclusions are the same, it is the chain of logic that determines our conclusion, which determines which end statement is more cogent than the other.

This is valuable, because this destroys the Getter problem. It doesn't matter if either claim happens to be true or not. We could of course refine the context. Perhaps include some prior statements that we are implicitly glossing over. But it is about taking a belief, thinking about all of the alternative ways we can arrive at that belief (or the negation of that belief), and taking the most rational logic chain of events.

I believe the above should cover what you meant by "qualitative likelihood". Hierarchial induction determines which of the inductions within consideration of a conclusion is most rational. And it is more rational to consider outcomes that involve possibilities, over outcomes that involve plausibilities. But more importantly, we need to examine the chain of rationality one took to arrive at one's induction as well. This should provide all that's needed for a strong and measurable basis of cogency.

Moreover, there is knowledge that we have that we cannot physically directly experience, which I am sure you are acquainted with as a priori, that must precede the subject altogether. I haven't, and won't ever, experience directly the processes that allow me to experience in the first place, but I can hold it as not only a "possibility" (in my sense of the term) but also a "highly plausible" "truth" of my existence. — Bob Ross

According to this, there is no apriori. Everything is distinctively or applicably known by our experience. I you believe there is something that must exist prior to your current existence, then like every other other induction, it must be some variation on probability, possibility, plausibility, or an irrational belief.

I would say that this reveals what I think lacks in your terminology: we can't determine what is more cogent to pursue. In my terminology, I would be able to pursue trying to augment the eye to see more shades of colors because it is "possible". — Bob Ross

Under the old terminology, you wouldn't be able to state it was possible either. It may very well be that we cannot modify a human eye to see greater color, because it ends up that color is observed in the brain, and we would have to rewire that as well. As such someone would ask, "How do you know that is possible?"

With the chain of reasoning comparisons I noted above, we can definitely determine which is most cogent to pursue. In fact, it might help us realize we have underlying assumptions that we need to discover first.

I understand what you mean to a certain degree, but I think that it isn't fallacious to say that something could potentially occur: I think it becomes fallacious if the subject thereafter concludes that because it could occur it does occur. — Bob Ross

Every induction is a claim that something might be. An induction, by definition, is a conclusion that is not necessarily concluded from the premises involved. If I'm going to predict the sun will rise tomorrow, because its risen several times, I know that it is possible. If I say the sun will not rise tomorrow, that is plausible, as the sun has always risen. My plausibility might be correct, and my possibility might be incorrect. The point of cogency is to evaluate the inductions, and evaluate which one is more reasonable to hold to when you are deciding what will happen in the future.

There was a lot that went in many directions on your post. I couldn't cover it all in one post, but I thought if I tried to direct back to the meaning of the terms, and answer some of the repeating themes, it would clarify most of the issues.

I think the true issue here, is a difference in our use of terms between plausibility and possibility. Lets see if we can come to the same context.

I am repurposing the terms of probability, possibility, and plausibility after redefining knowledge into distinctive and applicable knowledge. The reason is, the terms original use was for the old debated generic knowledge. As they were, they do not work anymore. However, they are great words, and honestly only needed some slight modifications. If you think I should invent new terms for these words I will. The words themselves aren't as important as the underlying meaning.

At each step of the inductive hierarchy, it is a comparative state of deductive knowledge, versus applicable knowledge.

Possibility is a state in which an applied bit of distinctive knowledge has been applicably known. At that point in time, a belief that the applicably knowledge could be obtained again, is the belief that it is "possible".

Plausibility is distinctive knowledge that has not been applicably tested, but we have a belief as to the applicable outcome.

You noted,

Logically, what is plausible is not yet possible

I don't agree with this, but I am open to hearing why you think this is the case. — Bob Ross

The reason something plausible is not yet possible, is because once something plausible has been applicably known one time, it is now possible. It is an essential property to the meaning of plausibility, that it is exclusionary from what is possible.

As such, many times you were comparing to possibilities together, instead of a plausibility and a possibility.

However, I think that to say something is "possible" is to admit that it doesn't directly contradict reality in any way (i.e. our immediate forms of knowledge) and has nothing directly to do with whether I have ever experienced it before. For example, given our knowledge of colors and the human eye, I can state that it is possible that there are other shades of colors that we can't see (but with better eyes we could) without ever experiencing any new shades of colors. — Bob Ross

We say something is possible if it has been applicably known at least once. To applicably know something, you must experience it at least once. We cannot state that it is possible that there are other shades of color that humanity could see if we improved the human eye, because no one has yet improved the human eye to see currently unseeable colors.

What you've done is taken distinctive knowledge, that is built on other applicable knowledge, and said, "Well its "likely" there are other colors". But what does "likely" mean in terms of the knowledge theory we have? Its not a probability, or a possibility, because the distinctive knowledge of "I think there are other colors the human eye could see if we could make it better." has never been applicably known.

We could one day try improving the human eye genetically. Maybe we would succeed. Then we would know its possible. But until we succeed in applicably knowing once, it is only plausible.

I feel that "Plausibility" one of the greatest missing links in epistemology. Once I understood it, it explained many of the problems in philosophy, religion, and fallacious thinking in general. I understand your initial difficulty in separating plausibilities and possibilities. Plausibilities are compelling! They make sense in our own head. They are the things that propel us forward to think on new experiences in life. Because we have not had this distinction in language before, we have tied plausibilities and possibilities into the same word of "possibility" in the old context of language. That has created a massive headache in epistemology.

But when we separate the two, so many things make sense. If you start looking for it, you'll see many arguments of "possibility" in the old context of "knowledge", are actually talking about plausibilities. When you see that, the fault in the argument becomes obvious.

With this in mind, re-read the points I make about immediateness, and how that can only apply to possibility. Plausbilities cannot have immediateness, because they are only the imaginations of what could be within our mind, and have not been applied to reality without contradiction yet.

I would say that someone doesn't have to witness a horned, winged horse to know that it is possible because it doesn't contradict any immediate forms of knowledge — Bob Ross

As one last attempt to clarify, when you state it doesn't contradict any immediate forms of knowledge, do you mean distinctive knowledge, or applicable knowledge? I agree that it does not contradict our distinctive knowledge. I can imagine a horse flying in the air with a horn on its head. It has not been applied to reality however. If I believe it may exist somewhere in reality, reality has "contradicted" this distinctive knowledge, by the fact that it has not revealed it exists. If I believe something exists in reality, but I have not found it yet, my current application to reality shows it does not exist.

Plausibilities drive us to keep looking in the face of realities denial. They are very useful. The powerful drivers of imagination and creativity. But they are not confirmations of what is real, only the hopes and dreams of what we want to be real.

I hope that clears up the issue. Fortunately, this may be the final issue! Great discussion as always.

Lets say there is no free will. If accountability, which is a pressure for a person to go against their unimpeded free will, gives them a better outcome in theirs and other's lives, then yes. If accountability is meant to merely shame, cause suffering, or revenge, then no. If one is truly a moral person, and one's influence causes yourself and others to live better lives, I don't think there's anything wrong with holding people accountable when they do not live their life in a positive way.

Hello Bob! I'm back from vacation. I hope the holidays found you well.

Your immediateness section is spot on! Our chain of "trusting" memories is the evaluation of possibilities and plausible beliefs. Having a memory of something doesn't necessarily mean that memory is of something we applicably knew. Many times, its plausible beliefs that have not been applicably tested. While I agree that immediateness is an evaluative tool of possibilities (that which has been applicably known at least once), an old possibility is still more cogent than a newer plausibility.

Plausibility does not use immediateness for evaluation, because immediateness is based on the time from which the applicable knowledge was first gained. Something plausible has never been applicably known, so there is no time from from which we can state it is relevent.

Moreover, I would say that immediateness, in a general sense, is "reasonableness". — Bob Ross

The reasonableness is because it is something we have applicably known, and recently applicably known. I say this, because it is easy to confuse plausibilities and possibilities together. Especially when examining the string of chained memories, it is important to realize which are plausibilities, and which are possibilities. If you have a base possibility that chains into a plausibility, you might believe the end result is something possible, when it is merely plausible.

So taking your example of a person who has lived with different memories (A fantastic example) we can detail it to understand why immediateness is important. It is not that the memories are old. It is that that which was once possible, is now no longer possible when you apply your distinctive knowledge to your current situation.

We don't even have to imagine the fantastical to evaluate this. We can look at science. At one time, what was determined as physics is different than what scientists have discovered about physics today. We can look back into the past, and see that many experiments revealed what was possible, while many theories, or plausibilities were floating around intellectual circles, like string theory.

However, as pluasibilities are applied to reality, the rejects are thrown away, and the accepted become possibilities. Sometimes these possibilities require us to work back up the chain of our previous possibilities, and evaluate them with our new context. Sometimes, this revokes what was previously possible, or it could be said forces us to switch context. That which was once known within a previous context of time and space, can no longer be known within this context.

With this clarified, this will allow me to address your second part about plausibility.

Take that tree example from a couple of posts ago: we may never be able to applicably test to see if the tree is there, but I can rationally hold that it is highly plausible that it is. — Bob Ross

Is it possible that the tree is not there anymore, or is it plausible? If you applicably know that trees can cease to be then you know it is possible that a tree can cease to be. It is plausible that the tree no longer exists, but this plausibility is based on a possibility. The devil is in the details, and the devil understand that the best way to convince someone of a lie, is to mix in a little truth.

The reality, is this is a plausibility based off of a possibility. Intuitively, this is more reasonable then a plausibility based off of a plausibility. For example, its plausible that trees have gained immortality, therefore the tree is still there. This intuitively seems less cogent, and I believe the reason why, is because of the chain of comparative logic that its built off of.

But the end claim, that one particular tree is standing, vs not still standing, is a plausibility. You can rationally hold that it is plausible that it is still standing, but how do we determine if one plausibility is more rational than another? How do we determine if one possibility, or even one's applicable knowledge is more cogent than another? I believe it is by looking at the logic chain that the plausibility is linked from.

The validity of a plausibility claim is not about if it is directly applicable to reality or not, it is about (1) how well it aligns with our immediate knowledge (our discrete experiences, memories, discrete knowledge, and applicable knowledge) and (2) its relevancy to the subject. For this reason, I don't think the claim that unicorns exist can be effectively negated by claiming that it is not possible that they exist. — Bob Ross

I think the comparative chains of logic describes how (1) it aligns with our immediate knowledge and inductive hierarchies. I believe (2) relevancy to the subject can be seen as making our distinctive knowledge more accurate.

Going to your unicorn example, you may say its possible for an animal to have a horn, possible for an animal to have wings, therefore it is plausible that a unicorn exists. But someone might come along with a little more detail and state, while its possible that animals can have horns on their head, so far, no one has discovered that its possible for a horse to. Therefore, its only plausible that a horse would have wings or a horn, therefore it is only plausible that a unicorn exists. In this case, our more detailed context allows us to establish that a unicorn is a concluded plausibility, based off of 2 pluasibilities within this more specific context.

Logically, what is pluasible is not yet possible. Therefore I can counter by stating, "It is not possible for a horse to have wings or horns grow from its head. Therefore it is not possible that a unicorn exists in the world."

I am a firm believer in defaulting to not believing something until it is proven to be true, and so, naturally, I don’t believe unicorns exist until we have evidence for them — Bob Ross

I think this fits with your intuition then. What is plausible is something that has no applicable knowledge. It is more rational to believe something which has had applicable knowledge, the possible, over what has not, the plausible.

Now, I think this gets a bit tricky because someone could claim that their belief in a unicorn existing makes them happier and, thereby, it is relevant to them. — Bob Ross

Hopefully the above points have shown why a belief in their existence, based on their happiness of having that belief, does not negate the hierarchy of deductive application and induction. Recall that to applicably know something, they must have a definition, and must show that definition can exist in the world without contradiction. If they give essential properties, such as a horse with a horn from its head and wings, they must find such a creature to say they have applicable knowledge of it.

Insisting it exists without applying that belief to reality, is simply the belief in a plausibility. Happiness may be a justification for why they believe that plausibility, but it is never applicable knowledge.
Happiness of the self does not fulfill the discovery of the essential properties of a horn and wings on a horse in the world.

I would, personally, rephrase “Despite a person’s choice, it does not negate that certain inductions are more rational” to “Despite a person’s choice, it does not negate that certain inductions are more rational within a fundamentally shared subjective experience”. — Bob Ross

I agree with the spirit of this, but want to be specific on the chain comparison within a context. What is applicable, and the hierarchy of inductions never changes. What one deduces or induces is based upon the context one is in. Something that is possible in a specific context, may only be plausible in a more detailed one as noted earlier. But, what is possible in that context, is always more rational then what is plausible in that context.

For example, your #3 (degree of harm) principle doesn’t really address two ideas: (1) the subject may not share your belief that one ought to strive to minimize the degree of harm and (2) the subject may not care about the degree of harm pertaining to other subjects due to their actions (i.e. psychopaths). — Bob Ross

I agree here, because no matter what formula or rationale I set up for a person to enter into a particular context, they must decide to enter in that particular content of that formula or rationale! This means that yes, there will be creatures that are not able to grasp certain contexts, or simply decide not to agree with them. This is a fundamental freedom of every thinking thing.

So then, there is one last thing to cover: morality. You hit the nail on the head. We need reasons why choosing to harm other people for self gain is wrong. I wrote a paper on morality long ago, and got the basic premises down. The problem was, I was getting burned out of philosophy. I couldn't get people to discuss my knowledge theory with me, and I felt like I needed that to be established first. How can we know what morality is if we cannot know knowledge?

Finally, it honestly scared me. I felt that if someone could take the fundamental tenants of morality I had made, they could twist it into a half truth to manipulate people. If you're interested in hearing my take on morality, I can write it up again. Perhaps my years of experience since then will make me see it differently. Of course lets finish here first.

That would be my main point: it is not really about what is "true", but what is "useful" (or relevant). — Bob Ross

I just wanted to emphasize this point. Applicable knowledge cannot claim it is true. Applicable knowledge can only claim that it is reasonable.

And with that, another examination done! Fantastic points and thoughts as always.

I believe what you are describing is more epistemology, the study of knowledge, then it is metaphysics. I'm in a great discussion with Bob here https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/9015/a-methodology-of-knowledge if you want to look at an epistemology that takes certainty and attempts to apply it rationally to an uncertain world.

Not quite. So in blindsight, your eyes work fine. This means the light is traveling to your eyes, and up to your brain. The problem is the brain's processing is damaged. Meaning that there is some level of processing inside, but not enough to get up to building a visual picture in your head. Likely there are still cells that can process something to an effect, and send that limited effect up the pipeline. There's probably not enough to get up to the "Display Monitor" of your mind, but you're probably still getting some types of signals that your mind interprets prior to it being placed on your inner display monitor.

I've never understood this idea personally. We see, "things" and we assume there is space between them. There is space between atoms, between quarks, between everything. Something exists within the space of nothingness always seemed more reasonable to me, then the idea that something could cease to be.

So how is your conclusion of whether there could be nothing, or whether there must always be something, is more of an emotional argument than one of proof. Do you have a motivation for wanting something to always be, or is it just something you feel is right?

The left has gotten carried away — Hanover

My BS propaganda radar goes off whenever I see, "The left" or "The right". Those are lazy labels filled with bias, and generally do not lead to good thoughts. I recall reading a study years ago that stated people think critically about their opposing party, identifying all of their negatives, but gloss over their own. Conclusion: Identifying with a "left" or a "right" makes you stupid.

There are people that tried to stop the certification of an election. Violence was made. I blame those people, no one else. I blame those who lie that nothing bad happened because they are worried that those individuals actions, will somehow rub off on them. That's cowardice. I respect people who speak up for what is right, even if someone might try to smear them for it.

You concern about who gets the blame beyond those involved is entirely misplaced. It causes you to lie, and make excuses for those who committed violence, and attempted to stop the peaceful transfer of power. Remove "the left" and "the right" from your brain, it is poison. If you excuse evil, because you are worried that punishing it will harm you, you are complicit.

There really is no rational debate over what happened. Its an open and shut case that people tried to overturn the election through violent means. It was foolish, stupid, traitorous, and should never be supported or excused. All decent people should be coming out to condemn it instead of being worried about the utter irrelevancy and pathetic priority of tribal politics.

:100: Feyerabend couldn't have said this any better. — 180 Proof

Thank you for the kind words 180 Proof.

What you're noting is that most people are rationalizing, and not rational creatures. Philosophy attempts to address that rational beyond the rationalizing. And if practiced well, I believe it does its job well. Will many people reject rationality in favor of their own personal feelings and biases? Of course. You can't make a person change their mind, and many are much happier in their own bubble of belief then actively challenging and thinking about what they believe.

Science is not intended to be persuasive to people. Science is intended to be the most rational way to evaluate the world. People at their core are not rational, they are rationalizing. Rationalizing is the act of forming some type of explanation that justifies your own personal emotions and beliefs. Being rational requires effort, training, and character. Further, being rational is inefficient in most of your day to day living, so even rational people aren't going to be rational all the time.

You can lead a person to science, but it doesn't mean they'll accept it. Generally to persuade people, you have to use rationality in combination with addressing their emotional feelings. Many people will often times reject rational arguments in favor of their own personal feelings, but that doesn't mean science is currently one of the most valuable tools we have to accurately assess the world.

So I do agree that science alone will not persuade or motivate most people. It it wants to do so, it must make great efforts at creating the positive emotions in people that will make them open to accepting the rationality that science has to offer.

That's my issue with liberals: they care about 'ideas', and not one bit about reality. — StreetlightX

Both liberal and conservative Americans hold that a peaceful transfer of power is something we aspire towards. You are using "the liberals" as some boogeyman. Maybe you don't realize it, but its clouding your judgement and causing you to make logical fallacies left and right.

Who is getting murdered on election day? None of those rioters was concerned about needing to eat or pay their bills because of an election. America is not a regime that tortures its citizens, or where people disappear in the night for having opinions the government doesn't like. I think it way outside of anything reasonable to think that.

Streetlight, before you cast that others are being emotional, maybe examine yourself first. Its late on my end, so lets sleep on it. Have a good night.

People who systematically extra-judicially murder citizens on a regular basis are an "other". — StreetlightX

You've been on these boards for a long time StreetlightX. A major goal of philosophy is to carefully examine our own presumptions and prejudices about the world, and see if they hold up in the light of rationality.

Can you say your words do? Were the defenders at the capitol riot who got beaten, feared for their life, and put into the hospital extra-judicially murdering citizens on a regular basis? Are they really an "other", or are they human beings like you and me?

Never seen so many people driven into collective hysteria on the basis of a glorified cosplay convention gone awry. — StreetlightX

One of the prides of America is that we have peaceful transitions of power. You vote your guy, they vote their guy, and whoever wins at the end of the day, wins. This was an attack on that pride. Don't you think some people have a right to be offended and outraged?

People who didn't like losing the vote, decided to act like spoiled punks. People got hurt. A few died. Was it a coordinated take over with law rockets, bombs, and tanks? No. But it was an attack on the idea that we can have a peaceful transfer of power. That we can work out our differences through discussion, reason, and voting.

As a person who enjoys philosophy, don't you find that offensive? Isn't that the antithesis to free thought, speech, and handling matters without violence? Are you being rational, or are you rationalizing your own emotions and biases?

I couldn't care less. What happened to some pig somewhere is not a systemic problem. — StreetlightX

I am incredibly disappointed and disheartened to hear this. I feel you have made people into "the other". This is what allows racism, sexism, and hate to foster in people's hearts. You should actively seek out an opportunity to talk with a police officer, or interact with some liberals in your community. They are not "some pigs". They are people in your community just trying to make a living like you do.

I would say its our inability to escape from primitive status. Did you know fruit flies will flip each other over to assert dominance? It takes the brain power of a fruit fly. We unfortunately have many people who have the brain power of a fruit fly when it comes to status.

Don't get me wrong. Status can be a very important thing if its used as as tool to see who should be in charge for the good of everyone around them. But that's many times not the case. People don't want to give up power, or perceived status in society, even if it would make the world a better place. As long as we care more about status than the people around us, we will keep making the same primitive mistakes that lead to many of the world's preventable ills.

Oh no they damaged property and hurt some pigs for a process which is meaningless how sad :( — StreetlightX

Maybe you don't understand that those pigs were men with families doing their job to protect the people in the capitol.

Here's testimony from Michael Fannon, one of the police officers that was beaten during the riot.

"Fanon delivered emotional opening remarks criticizing those who downplayed the assault in the weeks since January 6.

“What makes the struggle more difficult and more painful is knowing so many of my fellow citizens, including so many people I risked my life to defend, downplaying or outright denying what happened,” he told the nine lawmakers. face. “I feel like I went to hell and came back to protect them and the people in this room, but many now tell me that hell doesn’t exist – or that hell wasn’t actually that bad.”

Footage from Fanon’s body camera was shown during the hearing, showing him and other officers trying to fend off the rioters as they attempted to storm the Capitol, and Fanon carried inside by fellow officers after he was injured.

In the footage, an officer holding a fanon shouts, “We need a paramedic. We need EMTs now!” While another implored him to “stay there, my friend.”

In May, Fanon wrote a letter describing the emotional toll of the January 6 attack, telling CBS News last month that he had been “tortured,” dragged into a crowd, shocked and beaten by a mob of former President Donald Trump’s supporters. He told the House Select Committee on Tuesday that he lost consciousness during the Capitol attack and suffered a mild heart attack and brain injury. "
-https://tittlepress.com/latest/1012027/

There was nothing innocent, or light about that. If these men had not held off the rioters until congress was able to evacuate, who knows what else might have happened. Its like saying a person who went into your house with a machete, stole some of your stuff and left isn't a big deal because you weren't home and he didn't have the opportunity to kill you.

Jan 6 was a minor kerfuffle but because liberals are literally incapable of systemic analysis — StreetlightX

This has nothing to do with liberals. Any systematic analysis should reveal that. People busted windows, beat up police officers, destroyed and took things like podium's out of the house, and all with the aim to stop the election from being certified. Thank goodness people in congress got out. Can you imagine what would have happened if they had been caught? Can you imagine if someone had brought bombs, or a foreign spy had tagged along and found this to be his opportunity?

Conservative, liberal, or independent, it should be condemned by everyone.

The retired Obama and Clinton-supporting generals weave media articles with their own fears in order to knit an anti-Trump narrative, which will surely become another self-fulfilling prophesy, like the Russia hoax and the insurrection hoax. — NOS4A2

Since we're on a board where we do a little more thinking than others, I want you to consider this. The person with insight never worries about the other party. Your party will shower you with reasons to dislike the other party, and will always fight them. The insightful person worries about their OWN party. No one on the other side is going to get a one up on you. But your own leaders will always attempt to get a one up on you to stay in power.

Anyone who defends their own party from clear evil needs to take a re-examination of their self. Not for others, but for their own sake. A party that can lie to you that easily for power, will see you as a convenient tool to be used. This is not anything I say from an armchair either, but something I practice as well. I'm more interested in the lies the party I support tells me, then the party I don't. I would assume your own party is lying to you in regards to January 6th, and look for information that supports that. Only after you do that, then you should make a judgement.

You'll never be fooled by the other party. Don't be the one fooled by your own.

According to one view in this thread, no, 1 cannot both equal and not equal 1. But one particle can both be and not be in the same place at the same time. That's because LNC applies to arithmetic but (as it happens) not to superposition. So the theory goes. — Cuthbert

I think this is misunderstood. Superposition can only occur when the particle is not observed. This doesn't mean observation from humans fyi, but observed by anything, like what we use for measurements. For math purposes, we state they are in simultaneous positions when we have no way of measuring which specific position its in.

Setting limits on our knowledge, and consequences of them, is a common practice in math, like in calculus. If I wanted to tell a layman how calculus works in a mysterious fashion, I could state, "Calculus brings limits where they do not exist. The math itself creates limits out of infinity. This is only due to the existence of human brains however. Without them, the reality is there is no limit, but the conclusions of the equation extend into infinity".

Quantum mechanics is really understood at a mathematical level, and people make mistakes in applying that math to reality beyond what is intended. Just like calculus does not magically create a finite solution out of the infinite, quantum mechanics does not prove that a particle can exist in two places simultaneously, beyond the mathematical limitations it works with. In practice, testing, and application, a particle cannot exist in two places at once.

Why should the universe (1) make sense (2) to us? — Agent Smith

There is no reason why the universe should, or should not make sense. The point of knowledge is to attempt to make sense of the universe for our survival and proper use of it. The struggle of epistemology is to come up with a tool that can enable us to do this in the most rational manner possible.

Logic is the tool we use for rational thought. Rational thought eliminates as much uncertainty as possible, but also recognizes its limits. Calculus for example is a form of logic that evaluates limits to never ending equations. When we apply that tool, we are able to get consistent enough results about reality to use it to our ends.

Logically in the classical sense (categorical, sentential, predicate logic), the key premise being the law of noncontradiction (LNC) can't be violated! — Agent Smith

As for this, try to disprove the law of non-contradiction yourself. Can 1 equal, and not equal 1 at the same time? And by equality, I mean down to the smallest scale of measurement you can imagine, that 1 is both equal, and not equal to 1 at the same time.

Equality is a term we've invented, so of course its impossible for something to be a contradiction. Something cannot be both equal, and not equal to itself. At that point, we need a refinement of words or measurements. And that is partly what logic is. An invention of terms and words that consistently work with each other, and apply to reality without contradiction.

As I have said many times in this thread: I do agree that people should be polite and respectful and such, when they discuss controversial issues. I don't think "free for all freedom of speech" where everything should be allowed to be said in any way, works or even is true freedom of speech, since then only those who are the loudest and most abusive of such freedom would be heard.

I quite simply think that the subject of equality has become such a taboo topic nowadays, that it distorts the public and scientific discourse on the subject. And that such is harmful, whether it's called freedom of speech or not. I don't even care what results the scientific or public discourse on equality end up with... I just care that the discourse is done with good methodology. — Qmeri

I agree that we should be polite and discuss even controversial topics. Perhaps the reason others are suspicious of your motives, is it seems one sided. Not that I think you're trying to be, but I do feel your are unconsciously biased. This is not meant to be offensive, we all have them. Let me point out what I mean.

For those against the equality movement, do you feel most people are willing to sit down with a nice debate and explain in rational terms, without retaliation, why a colored person is inferior to a white person? No. The same "intolerance" applies to both sides. Rational debate requires both sides be willing to calmly discuss the issue, and that requires both sides have a belief the other side will be fair and trustworthy.

People are not saints, even when they are on the side of "good". They will be messy arguers, impassioned, make illogical points, and generally type things they don't intend to convey. That doesn't mean their side is wrong, it just means people are messy everywhere. With that in mind, the fact that you've only picked out the messy people on one side, while not seeing the messy people on the other side, makes people suspicious that you're not being honest. Further, you seem to not be seeking out the people who are willing to debate, and have painted the whole movement with a negative brush. Of course, that doesn't mean you're not being honest, maybe you just don't realize you've been unfair.

If you still believe that perhaps the equality movement is special, or particularly rude or dangerous to society in its behavior, it would help to point out specific examples, and compare them to the anti-equality movement. And if you want to debate not the tactics, but the conclusions of some in the equality debate, feel free to make another thread on those topics. Many will not treat you fairly, but I'm sure that some will. Just be sure you're up for the task, as well as up for many people who will be very impassioned and not respect your viewpoint.

I think there's a bit of a difference between pretending that I'm a super hero saving the world, vs wondering about the meaning of life. Play is purely for entertainment, while thinking is about solving real questions about life. Can some people approach philosophy as entertainment? Certainly. But the core of philosophy is thinking.

Personally I've likened philosophy to figuring out detailed and rational definitions to what we already use daily. What is "good"? What is "meaning"? It asks us to examine the words we've been using without thinking about them, and finally thinking about them.

The process of thinking involves imagination, and thought experiments. How else would a hypothesis be formed in science? The same goes for a premise in philosophy. A fine philosophical question by the way!

Those calling for a Civil War are spoiled children. No one is enslaved, starving, or lacking of a future because of an oppressive tyrannical government. Its petty differences. None of those advocating for Civil war understand the death, the disease, the loss of electricity, water, services, comforts, and economic crash such a thing would entail. Not to mention opening us up to enemy infiltration from abroad.

No, we should not have a civil war. It is a dream of the brain-addled and foolishly ignorant.

Nowadays, the modern equality movement does not respect the freedom of speech too much… At least where I live, arguing against people being genetically equal is pretty much a taboo and you get almost immediate social repercussions for it — Qmeri

I think you might misunderstand what freedom of speech means. Freedom of speech, at least in America, is the idea that the government cannot make a law restricting what you say. Freedom of speech has nothing to do with what other groups of people do. If you walk into a crowd of people and start telling them they're a bunch of losers, they are allowed to pressure you to stop speaking, and may voice their opinion in kind.

The right to free speech does not mean you are free from social repercussions. You may be hated, scorned, lose your job, your respect, and your social dignity. The only thing you are free from, is being thrown in jail because you said something the government didn't like.

Perhaps what you are referring to is that you believe the modern equality movement is not open to debate. Perhaps it is, and perhaps it isn't. Have you asked someone in the modern equality movement to debate you? To discuss the pros and cons of positions? While many people are not open to debate in any movement, I find if you ask and search, there are usually some who will.

If you are perhaps referring to "the internet", it depends on where you go, and of course how you approach the subject. When you approach any people who hold an ideology to debate it, it must be done with respect, humbleness, careful wording, insight, and possibly one of the most important, being open to also having your mind changed as well. If not, you can come across as offensive, rude, or someone who isn't open to debate yourself. Why should anyone give their time to someone like that?