But I suspect that you are only referring to the comparison of plausibilities that relate to one another, so I would like to explicitly state that I am claiming that one can compare all plausibilities to one another in this manner. — Bob Ross

Yes, if you're just comparing the fundamental building blocks of different plausibilities, you can determine plausibility A is more cogent than plausibility B. The problem is, if they aren't within the same context, how useful is that analysis?

Recall that inductions are made because we have limitations in what we applicably know. Further, less cogent inductions are used to compare what belief you should make about a particular situation. Its about comparing your options. If I'm talking about subject X, and I have two plausibilities, going through the chain of rationality to discover which plausibility is more rational, is useful. If I have a plausibility about subject X, and a plausibility about subject A, what does comparing the cogency get me?

It may be that the plausibility about subject X is more rational than the plausibility about subject A, but when considering subject A, I have no alternative belief about A, but that plausibility. In that case, the most cogent thing is to choose to act, or not act on that one plausibility I have. This is the point I wanted to emphasize first, though I'm thinking I should have emphasized the technical comparison, then explained when and what context you should compare.

I think that, in light of us agreement on potentiality, we can finally prove that actual infinites are irrational inductions. — Bob Ross

Your two examples are great. Unlimited infinities are irrational. But some limited infinities may be inapplicable plausibilities. Perhaps there is no limit to space for example. Its plausible. But it is currently inapplicable. When considering the limits of space, we have no viable inductions we can make, so we must remain in the realm of inapplicable plausibility.

I think, as you may already be inferring, that this actually have heavy implications with respect to your idea of a "first cause" — Bob Ross

Yes. Stating that everything which has a cause, must have a cause, is an unlimited infinity. It breaks down if you examine it in the argument. All that is left, is that there must be a first cause. BUT, this is still either an applicable or inapplicable plausibility at best. It is simply more cogent to believe that there is a first cause, then not. Since we do not have any higher induction we can make in regards to the a first cause within the context of that argument, it is more cogent to conclude there is a first cause.

I know we had a lot of disputes about mathematical inductions, and so I wanted to briefly continue that conversation with the idea that mathematical inductions do not require another term, contrary to what I was claiming, because they are possibilities. — Bob Ross

Yes, this seems correct. There is a fine dividing line between possibility and applicable knowledge. To say something is possible, is to say the applicable knowledge you just obtained, will be able to be applied again. But this is if we apply that math to reality by actively putting a number within the equation. The logic of the equation itself, is distinctive knowledge based on the rules we have constructed.

I think that it would be beneficial to really hone in on what it means to have "experienced something before". Where are we drawing the line? Is there a rational line to be drawn? — Bob Ross

It is when you have concluded applicable knowledge within your context. You can experience something, but not have applicable knowledge of it. Lets say you're in a field with a horned goat and ram. When gazing with the animals behind your back, you get head butted from behind. When you gather yourself off the ground and look behind you, you realize the horns are very similar, and you can't tell which one head butt you.

The thing you can applicably know by going through your distinctive knowledge, is that you were hit by something. There is a bruise on your back in the imprint of a horn, and it is not possible that you could fall down from an impact that bruises you without that being "something". But was it the ram or the goat? Its plausible it was something you weren't aware of at all, but you believe its possible both goats and rams can head butt a person, and it seems more cogent to believe one of them did it.

But will you ever applicably know which one head butt you? No. Its plausible to believe it was only the sheep, or only the ram. But couldn't we say it was possible that it was either the sheep or the ram because we know it is possible for sheep and rams to head butt people? The care is in the intent of the induction. If I say, "I believe it was the sheep, and not the ram," that is the plausibility. If I say, "I believe it was either the sheep or the ram", this is a possibility.

I'm not sure if that answered the question, but I felt this was a good example to show the fine line between what can be applicably known, possibility, and plausibility. Feel free to dig in deeper.

I think that your epistemology, at its core, rests on assumptions. Now, I don't mean this is a severe blow to the your views: I agree with them. What I mean is that, as far as I am understanding, your epistemology really "kicks in" after the subject assumes that perception, thought, and emotion are valid sources of knowledge. — Bob Ross

I don't believe I make those assumptions at all. Its been a while since we visited the building blocks of the paper on page one to determine the difference between distinctive knowledge, and applicable knowledge. I do not claim that perception, thoughts, and emotions are valid sources of knowledge. I claim they are things we know, due to the basis of proving, and thus knowing, that I can discretely experience.

The discrete experience you have, the separation of the sea of existence into parts and parcels, is not an assumption, or a belief. It is your direct experience, your distinctive knowledge. I form the discrete experience of thoughts as a very low set of essential properties in the beginning, so that I can get to the basic idea of the theory. But now that you have it, go back to the beginning. Use the theory on the formulation of the theory itself. Does it still hold? I think you'll find it will.

You create an idea of a thought, and you confirm it without contradiction immediately, because it is a discrete experience. Later, you can go back and ask, "Can I refine what a thought is? Could I redefine it? What is the difference between a thought and an emotion? Can I find essential properties that differ, and apply this to myself?"

Or back to your original issue, "What is an "I"? Can I define it as more than simply that which discretely experiences? Perhaps other creatures discretely experience, but they obviously do it differently from humans?" The doors are open now that you understand the theory. Tackle mind, tackle ethics, tackle God itself. The system of distinctive knowledge, applicable knowledge, and the inductive hierarchy can be applied to it all.

Will this refine the system itself? Almost certainly. I am under no illusions it is complete, because the reality is, as contexts change, and as more people use it, there are bound to be refinements, and even different contexts of applying the theory itself. But is it a fundamental base that you can retreat to? A base that is consistently logical in its own formation, as well as its application? I believe so. I use it in my own life, which I think adds to the strength of its use as a tool.

If only I could ever get the idea out there in the philosophical community at large. I have tried publication to no avail. Honestly, I don't even care about credit. Perhaps someone on these forums will read it, understand it, and be able to do what I was unable to. Or perhaps someone will come along and finally disprove it. Either way, it would make me happy to have some resolution for it.

But back to your questions and detailed drilling. I feel we are coming to an end of the questions about understanding the theory itself, but let us resolve any remaining ones. If you are satisfied, feel free to test the theory in action. We can use it to address epistemology issues or questions you may have had, like thoughts or "I". Since we understand the theory, honestly the best critique of it is to use it. And what better test of a theory of knowledge then to see if it can know itself?

Thanks again Bob. It has been very gratifying to have someone seriously read and understand the theory up to this point. Whether the theory continues to hold, or crashes and burns, this has been enough.

I finally think I see what you have been trying to tell me about "potential". I knew you saw something there that I was unable to grasp, but I think I at last understand what it is.

The point I am trying to make is that "irrational induction" is not just what is contradicted by direct experience but, rather, it is also about whether it is contradicted in the abstract. — Bob Ross

Yes, I think this works nicely! I think potentiality nicely describes process of creating the useful distinctive knowledge we come up with. Anything which we come up with in our minds that contradicts our other distinctive knowledge, could be said to lack "potential". As long as potential is not used, or is clarified into something like "applicable potential" when being applied to reality, I think we have a clearly defined word that does not have a synonym, and can be applicably known. Do I have the right of it? Feel free to clarify further, but I think I'm seeing the spark you've been thinking about.

Your analysis of the hierarchy is spot on. This is what I've been trying to communicate for a while as well. A great breakdown and example!

At first, I thought I could utilize the sheer quantity to determine the cogencies with respect to one another. I was wrong, it gets trickier than that because the components themselves are also subject to an induction hierarchy within themselves. — Bob Ross

Correct.

[horses, horns] - evolution -> unicorn: (horned {possible characteristic} horse)
[horses, horns] - evolution -> unicorn: (horned {ditto} horse, invisibility {plausible characteristic} capabilities)

Therefore, #1 is more cogent than #2, not due to the sheer consideration of quantities of components, but the quantity in relation to an induction hierarchy within the component itself. In other words, a plausibility that has one component which is based off of a possible characteristic is more cogent (doesn't mean it is cogent) than one that has component which is based off of a plausible characteristic. — Bob Ross

Perfect! Yes, this is the conclusion I was hoping you would reach. Its not necessarily quantity we even have to consider. Its just that we have to consider all the essential properties of the grounding inductions (Good phrase!) that build up that induction. Each must be considered within the hierarchy as well. So if you conclude that an induction is built up of two essential properties, one having a direct grounds off of applicable knowledge, while the other has grounds on plausibilities, you can rationally reject the second essential property, but keep the first.

However, it isn't just about the relation to an induction hierarchy within the component itself: it is also about the quantity, but the quantity is always second (subordinate) to the consideration of the relation. — Bob Ross

You are right on target. Another way to think about it is a chain is built of links. But each link has a chain as well. When I state, distinctive knowledge -> possibility -> plausibility, the chain of reasoning also applies to each base. How did I arrive at that distinctive knowledge? How did I arrive at that possibility? I think you have it.

I hope that serves as a basic exposition into what I mean by "comparing plausibilities". — Bob Ross

Yes, this is clear, and always what I intended, but did not communicate clearly. When I spoke that you could not compare plausibilities directly, I meant that you could not do so without analyzing the chain of reasoning behind them. But I never described sub chains directly like you did. You have written this much clearer and with greater focus than I have, and it is a wonderful and excellent break down!

And, as you can see, I like to converse with you! — Alkis Piskas

Thanks for the contribution to the OP! I'll see you around.

But I always stop reading something when it starts and is based on a wrong assumption. Well, this is me! :smile: — Alkis Piskas

Fair. :smile:

I would say though that sureness is not the same as certainty. The intention is to use a word that conveys some conviction, assumption, or emotional indicator that compels a person that they believe X is worth holding. I even posted the word "will" next to it, so you would understand the context of what I was trying to convey.

Look at it this way, what makes you believe anything? For most beliefs, there is some type of conviction behind it. Regardless, you may not like the essay, because you have a prescriptive outlook on what I should be saying, instead of trying to understand what I'm intending to say. As this is an exploratory essay, and not a repeat of what is already known as fact, the latter intention is what is needed when approaching the paper. I do appreciate your comment, and your polite follow up!

I'm sorry for not being able to go further in this topic, because it starts and is based on a wrong assumption. I only wanted to point this out. — Alkis Piskas

That's a fairly dishonest reading. I never claimed beliefs were knowledge. I claimed that before we start with knowledge, we had to start by looking at beliefs. Its just an introduction to a paper, not the claim you're presupposing. Knowledge indeed consists of facts, information, and skills acquired through experience. If you had read just until the end of the page, I think you would have understood where this was going.

Potentiality is "what is not contradicted in the abstract", whereas possibility is "what has been experienced before". — Bob Ross

I rather like your definition of potentiality here. I think it hammers home what we've been trying to get to. However, I think we can also see the problem with it. Almost every single belief of induction is not contradicted in the abstract. Meaning at best we describe all inductions besides irrational induction. Which, an irrational induction, is something that is not rational. This in turn implies that potentiality is a subset of rationality, "That which is not contradicted in the abstract."

It is not the identity I am critiquing, it is the word. Potentiality as a word, because it also implies something beyond this strict reading. Potentiality seems to also go along with "What is possible". What is not contradicted in the abstract, is not necessarily possible as we've discussed. The division between possibility and plausibility has been the focus of the last several posts of discussion. That is because there is an innate human desire to believe that if there is no contradiction in the mind, it must be possible in reality.

But that is a belief, and not rational. Rationally, something that is not contradicted in the mind may have no bearing as to wheather it is contradicted when applied to reality. But, perhaps we can create two identities that try to contain what you are saying while being consistent with the theory. As you can note, I have constantly divided beliefs into two camps, distinctive, and applicable. There are two identities that we could examine then.

1. A belief which is not contradicted by other beliefs.
2. Distinctive knowledge applied to reality which is not contradicted by other distinctive knowledge.

In the second case, this is a different way of describing applicable knowledge. The first case, is distinctive knowledge. Distinctive knowledge is exactly what you describe. When we create distinctive knowledge, we then have to have a reason to attempt to apply that to reality. Rationally, we would want to apply something that we believe to have no contradiction to reality, over a series of contradictory thoughts to reality.

Recall that to know something, there must be an application of essential properties. To apply our distinctive knowledge to reality while expecting an outcome, is always an induction; its always a belief. While it is more cogent, and arguably "safer" to stay within the higher tiers of inductions such as probability and possibility, you will never find new possibilities in the world if you do not explore plausibilities. When we explore plausibilities, we believe there is a chance they are real. But we must also temper our mind with the understanding that there is an equally unspecified chance that they are not real.

Perhaps "potentiality" could be used to describe the drive that pushes humanity forward to extend outside of its comfort zone of distinctive knowledge, and make the push for applicable knowledge. The drive to act on beliefs in reality. But what I think you want, some way to measure the potential accuracy of beliefs, is something that cannot be given. There is no way to measure whether one plausibility is more likely than another in reality, only measure whether one plausibility is more rational than another, but examining the chain of reason its built on.

This is because the nature of induction makes evaluation of its likelihood impossible by definition. An induction is a conclusion that does not necessarily follow the premises. As we've seen with probability, coming up with odds requires defined limits. An induction may be built upon deductions, which have defined limits, but there comes a part of the claim which is not defined by limits. Without limits, we cannot evaluate whether if it is more likely to pass than another claim which is not defined by limits. The only way to know, is to take that chance, that risk, and apply it to reality and see what happens.

"I've experienced a cup holding water, therefore it is possible for a cup to hold water"
"I'm now experiencing cups not being able to hold water, therefore it is impossible for them to hold water"
"The most recent experience out of the two takes precedence" — Bob Ross

For clarification, if you recall the second paper (Its been a while now!) when we are faced with a contradiction of our applicable knowledge with new applicable knowledge, we have several options of dealing with it. We could create a new term. Adjust our context, which essentially modifies the knowledge we use to avoid the contradiction. Or we can just state that one of the things we applicably knew, is wrong and can no longer be applicably known.

So while I could conclude that it is impossible for a cup to hold water, that is now a new belief that must be applicably known, not just concluded in your mind. What are the essential properties of a cup? Can you find objects that have those properties, but some hold water, and some don't? Do you need to adjust what you define by a cup? Perhaps the essential property of holding water, should become a non-essential property. There are lots of ways to approach it.

It is not that the most recent experience of the two takes precedence, it is that the most recent experience of a cup challenges your applicable knowledge. Right now you are making an induction as to what that means. You can induce, "It is impossible for a cup to hold water now," but is that applicable knowledge? You must apply that belief to reality, and see if it "holds water".

What I am understand you to hold here, is that you can hold that it is impossible to fit 7,000 2 in long candy bars, side by side long ways, within 1,000 feet because you have abstractly considered its lack of potential. — Bob Ross

If you are stating that the conclusion through distinctive knowledge is that you can't fit X > Y feet into Y feet is impossible, than yes. If you apply this to reality, you must be very specific with the properties of the material in use. A lack of known applicable knowledge in its application means you are working with a plausibility. Since candy bars are malleable, I very well could jam that many candy bars together. If I note I can only use material that is not malleable, then I would be creating a belief that is a possibility.

Since it is possible to find material that is not malleable, and can be stacked or lined together, then I know it is not possible to jam more of those material into a space that is smaller than the entire measurement of those materials. The possibility in this instance, is that it will not fit. We have never experienced in reality, a situation in which unmalleable material can fit in a space smaller than its dimensions.

I am stating "I've experienced X before, and the extrapolation of X contradicts Y in the abstract". — Bob Ross

You are stating a possibility or plausibility depending on how you word it. If you are combining two possibilities to show that a plausibility cannot occur, you have stated something distinctively impossible. If you are using a possibility to construct a plausibility, or something that is not contradicted by other possibilities in your mind, then you are not stating an impossibility, only a plausibility. Holding to a distinctive impossibility and applying it to reality, is an irrational belief.

But, what is impossible in our distinctive knowledge, may not be impossible when applied to reality. Because inductions are again, beliefs. We may believe something to be impossible, but it may not be impossible when applied to reality.

So, I think the difficulty is in separating the two types of knowledge. Impossibility, is no longer a general word that dictates what can, and cannot be. There is an impossibility within distinctive knowledge, and there is an impossibility within applicable knowledge.

With ALL of this covered, lets go to your break down of potentiality.

"what is not contradicted in the abstract"

Although I don't think abstraction has to be directly applicably known (like I would have to go test, every time, the usage of mathematical operations passed what has been previously experienced) — Bob Ross

You are correct. Distinctive knowledge does not have to be applicably known. Applicable knowledge is a claim that what we distinctively know, can be applied to reality without contradiction. But we can hold any distinctive knowledge as long as we don't assume it can be applied to reality without contradiction.

but I think B is:

Abstraction is the distinctive knowledge, which is applicably known to a certain degree (i.e. I applicably know that my perceptions pertain to impenetrability and cohesion, etc), that is inductively utilized to determine potentiality. — Bob Ross

There is no requirement of applicable knowledge for distinctive knowledge. Distinctive knowledge is what we use as a basis for our inductions about reality. But it can exist without such application.

C is:

The defining of "possibility" as "I've experienced X before, because I've experienced X IFF X==X" removes the capability for the subject to make any abstract determinations, therefore potentiality is a meaningful distinction not implemented already in possibility (and likewise for impossibility). — Bob Ross

I do not see this. Possibilities do not remove the capability of making abstract determinations. I can create the image of a unicorn in my head by taking the distinctive knowledge of a horn, and putting it on the distinctive knowledge of a horse. I can have it run around in my head casting magic and flying through the air leaving a rainbow behind it.

If I think I can find such a thing in reality, I just have to realize its not a possibility, just a plausibility. The hierarchy of inductions is all about assessing which are the more cogent beliefs about reality. It does not say we cannot use them.

I am out of time this morning, but I want to post this to you while it is fresh in my mind. Please feel free to follow up on this!

Thank you! No, I have not read it. Due to time this morning, I got some general concepts. While we may have some similar beginnings, I believe we diverge. The first part of the epistemology I've proposed here is very similar to many other theories of epistemology. But, where people build from that tends to diverge. Have you read all four parts? I'm quite certain I take a few turns from Rand.

Genius is a relative term. I like _db's reply of people who usher in a "paradigm shift". Intelligent and smart people come to the conclusions of generally smart people in a society. Geniuses can understand how people arrived at that conclusion, but also see something that the rest of society missed. Their revelation of what was missed then convinces and shapes how society views things in the future.

If you are interested in a serious discussion of epistemology that follows what you consider pragmatic, you can join Bob Ross and I here. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/9015/a-methodology-of-knowledge/p1 The first two pages of responses are primarily junk, but when Bob Ross joins, we have a serious discussion.

I agree, I definitely need to define it more descriptively. However, with that being said, at a deeper level, the term possibility is also like the word "big": it is contingent on a subjective threshold just like potentiality. — Bob Ross

All distinctive knowledge is formed subjectively. Why I think possibility is more clear and useful than potential as a discrete experience, is I have a clear definition that can be applied to reality without contradiction. How do I apply the definition of potential to applicably know it?

I agree, I think potentiality is an aspect of rationality. If it has no potential, just like if it isn't possible, then it is irrational. Potentiality isn't separate from rationality (it is apart of rational thinking). — Bob Ross

I think here we're along the same intuition. Intuitively, potentiality seems like a word that would be used to describe the likelihood of an induction being correct. But how do I determine that? How do I applicably know that? With probability, I have clear limitations in what can potentially be drawn. If I know the cards are set, but I don't know the outcome, I could say, "Potentially, I could draw a jack." Perhaps we could state potentiality is a description of the possible outcomes of a probability? Its clearly defined, and can be applicably known.

Perhaps with possibility, "potential" could be used as well. "Because the bear was here yesterday, its potentially here today." The only issue here is the word has changed meaning. What we're really stating in this instance is, "Its possible the bear is here today, because we applicably knew the bear was here yesterday. At that point, the word really is no different from "possibility".

I think that sums up my issues with the word. It needs a clear definition that can be applicably known. In regards to potentiality, it seems to be the same as the word possibility. So perhaps, we could call potential a synonym of possibility? Potential = possible?

I suppose I should also address why potential cannot work with plausibility at all. A plausibility has no means to evaluate its potential, because I believe potential evaluates a strong sense of what we believe can be real. A plausibility is almost an abandonment of potentiality as an evaluation, because the only way to know if a plausibility is possible/potential, is to applicably apply it to reality.

For example, although this may be a controversial example as we haven't hashed out math yet, I can hold that, even though I haven't experienced it, lining up (side by side) 2 in long candy bars for 3,000 feet has the potential to occur because it aligns with my knowledge (i.e. I do applicably know that there is 3,000 feet available to lay things and I do applicably know there are 2 in long candy bars); however, most importantly, according to your terminology, this is not possible since I haven't experienced it before. — Bob Ross

It is plausible. Its a claim about reality that has not been applicably tested yet. Maybe you aren't able to do it when you try. When applying a plausibility to reality, details come up that we haven't thought about. For example, what type of candy bar? Are we standing them vertically, or laterally? What is the surface, something inclined, rough, or flat? A possibility already has those answers. If you stand a candy bar, you can evaluate that candy bar and glean all the necessary information to show how it is applicably known.

So, if you have all of those answers, then you can state, since it is possible to line up a candy bar in X manner, then it is possible that a candy bar will be able to be lined up if X manner is repeated. Because there is no claim that the candy bar should not be able to stand if X manner is repeated, it stands to reason that if we could duplicate X manner many times, 3000 per say, the candy bars would stand aligned. But, if we've never aligned a candy bar one time, we don't applicably know if its possible.

Math alone does not evaluate the details of whether something is possible or plausible. For example, I can state 1 unicorn + 1 unicorn is 2 unicorns. That is distinctively known. But if I go looking for unicorns in reality, the fantastical magical horse kind, I do not know if its possible. The hierarchy of inductions is in relation to a beliefs application to reality. It is not a question of the distinctive knowledge that leads up to the belief itself.

Likewise, without ever experiencing it, I can hold that it is irrational to believe that one can fit 7,000 2 in long candy bars, side by side long ways, within 1,000 feet (because, abstractly, 1,000 feet can only potentially hold 6,000 2 inch candy bars side by side).

You can calculate that it is implausible abstractly. Lets even say we add details to make sure its impossible, such as ensuring the candy bars cannot be squished together. This again, is just like showing that just as a candy bar with X properties can stand, some object of unchangeable X dimensionality cannot fit into another area of X unchangeable dimensionality. But, we need to experience the possibility of two unchangeable dimensionalities, where one can fit inside of the other. Set it up correctly, and you are describing what is possible (or impossible in this case).

Just as an aside, it might be beneficial to describe what I consider distinctively impossible. What is distinctively impossible, is a plausibility that takes two possibilities, and results in a contradiction of at least one possibility. A plausibility, cannot claim a possibility is incorrect, as it is a lower level on the hierarchy due to its level of applicable knowledge relation. Applicable impossibility, is found when new applicable knowledge contradicts our previous possibilities.

Something can't be plausible if it can be proven to have no potential (and it doesn't necessarily have to be "I've experienced the exact, contradictory, event to this claim, therefore it is an irrational induction": — Bob Ross

So to adjust this sentence with the defined terms we have so far, "Something can't be plausible if it can be proven to be impossible (distinctive or applicable). Something can't be plausible if is contradicts what is possible both in our distinctive and applicable knowledge.

I could make subjective thresholds for what constitutes "experiencing something before" that renders possibilities utterly meaningless. — Bob Ross

True of everything. But can we turn it the other way, and make a threshold of what constitutes "experiencing something before" that renders possibilities meaningful when applied to reality. Yes. Can we do the same with potentiality? So far, I don't believe a definition of the word has been created so far that can be applied to reality consistently, clearly, and in a way that cannot be replaced by another word.

Potentiality doesn't pertain to the "truth" of the matter, just a requisite to what one should rationally not pursue. It is a deeper level, so to speak, of analysis that can meaningfully allow subjects to reject other peoples' claims just like what you are describing. — Bob Ross

Perhaps potentiality describes the hierarchy of induction itself then? In essence, the hierarchy allows us to rationally dismiss beliefs of a lower hierarchy that compete with ours. If I believe I have a 1/52 chance of pulling an ace of spades, and someone says, "Well its possible you could not pull an ace of spades," its not going to change the odds. The idea that an evil demon could change the result of the card, destroying my odds, is a plausibility that can be dismissed as well. And someone coming up with the idea that its actually 1/53 cards is an irrationality I can outright dismiss.

That being said, I do believe the level difference in the hierarchy should temper how quickly you dismiss a counter belief. One removed should always be considered to ensure your currently held belief is correct. But if you find upon re-evaluation that your level of hierarchy still holds, you may dismiss it. Perhaps this is what you mean by "potential"? The difference of the level of the hierarchy determines how much consideration you should give to it when rationally thinking about it?

I think I'm going to stick with evaluating inductions in terms of rationality, instead of potentiality.

That is absolutely fine! My intention is not to pressure you into reforming it, but I do think this is a false dichotomy: this assumes potentiality is a separate option from rationality. — Bob Ross

Please continue to defend your viewpoints on potentiality. I have not thought on it at length until now, and I may have mentioned that the hierarchy is a baseline that can be used to build something more. I think at this point to construct potentiality as a viable term it will need to

a. Have a clear definition of what it is to be applicably known.
b. It must have an example of being applicably known.
c. Serve a purpose that another applicably known term cannot.

I can say it is possible to perform addition because I have experienced it before, I cannot say that it is possible to add 3 trillion + 3 trillion because I haven't experienced doing that before with those particular numbers: I am inducing that it still holds based off of the possibility of the operation of addition. — Bob Ross

To clarify again, the process of addition is distinctive knowledge. Adding the abstract of 3 trillion identities to 3 trillion identities will always result in 6 trillion identities, because that is the logic of discrete experience. Induction only occurs when we apply this to reality. What essential properties make up each identity of the the first 3 trillion in reality? The second 3 trillion? What counts as adding them to become the new 6 trillion identity? It is their proximity? Ownership? Time and place? If we can applicably know these identities, then we can apply the logic of identities, math, and applicably know the outcome.

I agree, but this doesn't mean it holds for all numbers. We induce that it does, but it isn't necessarily the case. We assume that when we take the limit of 1/infinity that it equals 0, but we don't know if that is really even possible to actually approach the limit infinitely to achieve 0. — Bob Ross

In this case, we distinctively know the answer. A limit means that the calculation will never result in 0. It is not ascertaining specifically how small that calculation can get. Its just a deduction that it will never arrive at 0. An induction would be, "If I apply the calculation with X numbers, I will get the result .0000000124. You'll have to actually do the calculation to applicably know whether that belief is true or not.

Likewise, we know that if there are N distinct things that N + 1 will hold, but we don't if N distinct things are actually possible (that is the induction aspect, which I think you agree with me on that, although I could be wrong). — Bob Ross

This is correct. We distinctively know the abstraction of N identities plus one more will always result in F(N). But if we apply this math to reality, to see if there are actually N identities in existence, we are using an induction that must be verified.

Yes, I may need a bit more clarification on this to properly assess what is going on. Your example of the pink elephant is sort of implying to me something different than what I was trying to address. I was asking about the fundamental belief that you think and not a particular knowledge derived from that thought (in terms of a pink elephant). I feel like, so far, you are mainly just stating essentially that you just think, therefore you think. I'm trying to assess deeper than that in terms of your epistemology with respect to this concept, but I will refrain as I have a feeling I am just simply not understanding you correctly. — Bob Ross

I distinctively know that I think of a pink elephant. If I believe that a pink elephant exists in the next room, I have to go through the steps of applying that to reality to applicably know if that's true or not. This is just like math. I distinctively know N+1=F(N), but when I apply that to reality, I have to go through the steps that show it can be applied without contradiction by fleshing out exactly what it is I'm adding.

Yes, but your essays made it sound like probability is its own separate thing and then you can mix them within chains of inductions. On the contrary, I think that "probability" itself is actually, at a more fundamental level, contingent on possibility and plausibility for it to occur in the first place. — Bob Ross

Lets see if we can break this down. If I applicably know the cards in a deck, and applicably know I cannot know the order of shuffling, nor can the person doing the shuffling, then I can claim probability directly based upon applicable knowledge. Possibility is underneath probability in the fact that a probability is a calculated possibility with limits. A possibility alone has no assessment of calculated limitations. Its possible that I can draw a card. Its probable that its a 4/52 chance of being a jack.

Another great deep dive Bob! I hope that clarified numbers a bit, and also gave you a set of points you could use to define potential in a way that fits within the epistemology. I look forward to your responses as well!

The story of Phineas Gage is in all likelihood a popular delusion, repeated endlessly, including within the neuroscience community, which should know better. — Torbill

Though your assertion is questionable, Gage was only used as a popular reference. His contribution to our understanding that the brain is who you are is so insignificant, it doesn't matter whether you doubt the account or not. Here's a link that covers a brief history of lobotomies since the 1880's.
https://www.livescience.com/42199-lobotomy-definition.html

Here's a quote from it:
While a small percentage of people supposedly showed improved mental conditions or no change at all, for many patients, lobotomy had negative effects on their personality, initiative, inhibitions, empathy and ability to function on their own, according to Lerner.

"The main long-term side effect was mental dullness," Lerner said. People could no longer live independently, and they lost their personalities, he added.

Although I understand what you are saying, and I agree with you in a sense, potentiality is not based off of hindsight but, rather, the exact same principle as everything else: what you applicably know at the time. — Bob Ross

I have been thinking about this for some time. I like the word "potential". I think its a great word. The problem is, it comes from a time prior to having an assessment of inductions. Much of what you are describing as potential, are a level of cogency that occurs in both probability, and possibility. The word potential in this context, is like the word "big". Its a nice general word, but isn't very specific, and is used primarily as something relative within a context.

Perhaps this is why I'm shying away from implementing it as something measurable within the hierarchy. Logically, I can only say inductions are more cogent, or rational than another. I have absolutely no basis to measure the potential of an induction's capability of accurately assessing reality. At the most, I suppose I would be comfortable with stating that "potential" is anything that is the realm of probability or possibility, as these directly rely on claims of applicable knowledge in their chain of rationality, but I cannot use it as anything more than that before it turns into an amorphous general word that people use to describe what they are feeling at the time.

Potentiality is the first (or at least one of the first) considerations when attempting to determine knowledge. If the subject determines there is no potential, then they constitute any further extrapolations as irrational and thereby disband from it. — Bob Ross

This is what I mean by saying the word begins to morph into something too general. Now a word which could describe a state of probability or possibility, becomes an emotional driving force for why we seek to do anything. I could hold an irrational belief, and say its because its potentially true. Potential in this case more describes, "I believe something, because I believe something (It has potential). Its not that potential is a poor word, its just as its been used, its too poorly defined and amorphous. Without concrete measurement, it can be used to state that any belief in reality could be true. So until a more concrete and defined use of the word can be created, I think I'm going to stick with evaluating inductions in terms of rationality, instead of potentiality.

If I induce something based off of F(N), this is no different than inducing something off of 1/N chances, except that, I would say, anything induced from the former is more cogent. — Bob Ross

But I think the problem remains: where does mathematical inductions fit into the hierarchy? — Bob Ross

So earlier, I was trying to explain that math was the logical conclusions of being able to discretely experience. I remember when I learned about mathematical inductions, I thought to myself, "That's not really an induction." The conclusion necessarily follows from the premises of a mathematical induction. I checked on this to be sure.

"Although its name may suggest otherwise, mathematical induction should not be confused with inductive reasoning as used in philosophy (see Problem of induction). The mathematical method examines infinitely many cases to prove a general statement, but does so by a finite chain of deductive reasoning involving the variable n, which can take infinitely many values."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mathematical_induction

N + 1 = F(N) is a logical process, or rule that we've created. Adding one more identity to any number of identities, can result in a new identity that describes the total number of identities. It is not a statement of any specific identity, only the abstract concept of identities within our discrete experience. Because this is the logic of a being that can discretely experience, it is something we can discretely experience.

We could also state N+1= N depending on context. For example, I could say N = one field of grass. Actual numbers are the blades of grass. Therefore no matter how many blades of grass I add into one field of grass, it will still be a field of grass. I know this isn't real math, but I wanted to show that we can create concepts that can be internally consistent within a context. That is distinctive knowledge. "Math" is a methodology of symbols and consistent logic that have been developed over thousands of years, and works in extremely broad contexts.

My intention is not to try and put words in your mouth, but I think you are, if you think this, obliged to admit that you and thought are distinct then. I don't think you can hold the position that we discretely experience them without acknowledging this, but correct me if I am wrong. If you do think they are separate, then I agree, as I think that your assessment is quite accurate: we do apply our belief that we have thoughts to reality, because the process of thinking is apart of experience (reality). It is just the most immediate form of knowledge you have (I would say): rudimentary reason. — Bob Ross

I don't believe you did in this case. If you recall, thoughts come after the realization we discretely experience. The term "thought" is a label of a type of discrete experience. I believe I defined it in the general sense of what you could discretely experience even when your senses were shut off. And yes, you distinctively know what you think. If I think that a pink elephant would be cool, I distinctively know this. If I find a pink elephant in reality, this may, or may not be applicably known. Now that you understand the theory in full, the idea of thoughts could be re-examined for greater clarity, definition, and context. I only used it in the most generic sense to get an understanding of the theory as a whole.

Two separate probabilities, with the same chances, could be unequal in terms of sureness (and cogency I would say). You could have a 33% chance in scenario 1 and 2, but 1 is more sure of a claim than 2. This would occur if scenario 1 is X/Y where X and Y are possible numbers and scenario 2 is X/Y where X and Y are plausible numbers (meaning they have the potential to exist, but aren't possible because you haven't experienced them before). My main point was that there is a hierarchy within probabilities (honestly all math) as well. — Bob Ross

I think again this is still the chain of rationality. A probability based upon a plausibility, is less cogent than a probability based on a possibility.

Back to your idea of using math inductively.

For example, if I induce that I should go 30 miles per hour in my car to get to may destination, which is 60 miles away, in 2 hours, that is calculated with numbers that are a possibility or plausibility (the mathematical operations are possible, but not necessarily the use of those operations on those particular numbers in practicality). But this is more cogent than an induction that I should bet on picking a number card out of a deck (no matter how high the chances of picking it) because the former is a more concrete calculation to base things off of (it isn't "chances", in the sense that that term is used for probability). — Bob Ross

You distinctively know that if you travel 30 miles per hour to get to a destination 60 miles away, in 2 hours you will arrive there. Now, if you get in your vehicle, can you consistently travel 30 miles per hour? Is the destination exactly 60 miles away, or is it 60 and some change? If say that any decimals are insignificant digits, and you can travel exactly 20 miles per hour, and the distance is exactly 60 miles away, then you will arrive in exactly two hours, because we have defined distance and time and applied it to reality to work that way without contradiction.

A probability is not a deduction, but an induction based upon the limitations of the deductions we have. Probability notes there are aspects of the situation that we lack knowledge over. As noted earlier, a randomly shuffled deck of cards is not really random. We call it "random" because we distinctively and applicably know that we lack the ability to observe the order it was shuffled in. We induce what is rationally most likely when we lack this information, based on the other information we do know.

As such, the first case is actually a deduction, the second is an induction.

This may be me just being nit picky, but none of those were probable (they are not quantitative likelihoods, they are qualitative likelihoods). — Bob Ross

You are correct! I was being sloppy. I was more interested in conveying the idea of chains of rationality. Instead of average, I should have said "median". In that case we know we have a majority of spots on one side that would be above or below the temperature of the other side, and could create a probability.

But my main point is there is a 4th option you left out: if I can create a mathematical equation that predicts the heat of a surface based off of it's exposure to light, then it would be more cogent than a probability (it is a mathematical induction based on a more concrete function than probability) but, yet, mathematical inductions aren't a category. — Bob Ross

I think most of the conversation has boiled down to induction vs deductions with math. Math is a tool that can be used to create deductions, or inductions, just like distinctive knowledge. Looking at distinctive knowledge, everything inside of itself that is internally consistent is deduced. But I can induce something. I can state, "This distinctive knowledge applies to reality without contradiction, even though I haven't applied it to reality yet." This is the impetus of all beliefs. Trying to find a way to measure more rationally which beliefs we should spend the time and effort pursing is why we develop a system of knowledge, and use the inductive hierarchy.

Math is merely the logic of discrete experience. Meaning you can use math deductively, and also use some of those deductions to make predictions about reality. These aren't mathematical inductions, these are inductions based on math within its chain of rationality. Does this make sense?

Absolutely fantastic deep dive here Bob. I've wanted to so long to discuss how the knowledge theory applies to math, and its been a joy to do so. I also really want to credit your desire for "potentiality" to fit in the theory. Its not that I don't think it can, I just think it needs to be more carefully defined, and serve a purpose that cannot be gleaned with the terms we already have in the theory. Thank you again for the points, you are a keen philosopher!

I'm not really seeing clear cases of morality here. When I think about morality, I think about 10 commandment stuff. Lying, cheating, stealing, murder, etc. Do you believe that women on average view these things as any less or more moral than men on average?

This chance is almost certainly zero. Even if the universe happens again, even a slight fluctuation would result in a different outcome. You only happen once. You will never happen again. Embrace that.

I'm more interested in the quality of the classes. If you're poor, and live in homeless squalor because of it, I think there's an issue. I'm also not worried about the middle class. There will always be different reward structures for different jobs. The question is the floor. What I want is for anyone who is able to work 40 hours a week should be able to afford a basic life with water, electricity, and internet without need for government assistance. That is not middle class. But it is a minimum standard I would like the world to live by.

Perhaps instead of saying something comes from nothing, how about instead you say, "Something that has no prior explanation for its formed existence." Nothing can't do anything. But perhaps there is something that exists that does not have a prior cause.

While it can be fun to speculate about what happens after death, without some rational basis, its just a supposition, not really philosophy.

From everything we know, you are a physical entity. If we damage the brain in particular areas, you will lose capabilities. There are several examples. Phineus Gage had a complete personality change when a rebar shot through his skull. There are people who cannot remember longer than a few minutes, which of course limits who they are. There is an example of a man who had brain damage and could no longer see colors, everything was black and white.

Barring extremes, diet and proper firing of the brain result in a happier and different person. A person without depression is very different from a person with depression. When you get drunk, your brain hinders your ability to think. That isn't your soul being affected by alcohol.

Finally, there's death. We have countless cases. In every case of a person dying, they've remained dead. The brain is gone, and so is the person. There is no field of consciousness. No electromagnetic transportation of our consciousness. There is only the belief and desire that such things will occur.

I am not trying to be mean, or get you down. On the contrary, understanding the truth of your own inevitable death can help you in how you approach life. Make sure you make the best of it, one day it will be gone forever.

It is completely up to you, but I think that inapplicable plausibilities should be a plausibility; It is just that, in order to avoid contradictions, "plausibility" shouldn't be defined as what can be applicably known, just what one believes is "true" — Bob Ross

I agree with this! I got caught up in my own verbiage, and need to separate the inductions by the ability to apply applicable knowledge, that I forgot one does not believe one can applicably know something to believe it is real.

On a separate note, the potentiality of a belief would be differentiated between irrational inductions and all other forms (as in it is irrational if it has no potential). — Bob Ross

Here, I am very careful to not use the word potentiality, because I think it loses meaning as an evaluative tool in the inductive hierarchy. Colloquially, I think its fine. I understand what you mean. But the reason why I don't think it works in the hierarchy is because the inductive hierarchy is not trying to assert what has more potential of being true, only which induction is more rational.

I believe this is a very important distinction. Recall that what is applicably known is based upon our context as well. A very narrow context might lead us to some strange probabilities and possibilities. It doesn't mean they are potential, as reality may very well defy them. They are simply rational inductions based on the applicable knowledge we have at the time.

Further, potentiality is not something the hierarchy can objectively measure. Let say that in a deck of 52 cards, you can choose either a face card, or a number card will be drawn next. You have three guesses. Saying number cards is more rational going by the odds. But the next three cards drawn are face cards. The deck was already shuffled prior to your guess. The reality was the face cards were always going to be drawn next, there was actually zero potential that any number cards were going to be pulled in the next three draws. What you made was the most rational decision even though it had zero potential of actually happening.

Lets go one more step. Same scenario. Only this time, I didn't put any number cards in the deck, and didn't tell you. You believe I made an honest deck of cards, when I did not. You had no reason to believe I would be dishonest in this instance, and decided to be efficient, and assume the possibility I was honest. With this induction, I rationally again choose number cards. Again however, the potential for number cards to be drawn was zero.

An induction cannot predict potentiality, because an induction is a guess about reality. The conclusion is not necessarily drawn from the premises. Some guesses can be more rational than another, but what is rational within our context, may have zero potential of actually being. That being said, generally acting rationally is a good idea, because it is based on what we do applicably know about the world, versus what we do not. It is less uncertainty, but has no guarantee.

So, I do understand your intention behind using potentiality, and in the end, it might boil down to semantics and context. For the purposes of trying to provide a clear and rational hierarchy, I'm just not sure whether potentiality is something that would assist, or cloud the intention and use of the tool.

Whereas, on the contrary, electrons can have two spin states: up or down. However, unlike the previous 6-sided die example, the subject, if they are quantum inclined (:, will assume the electron is equally likely in both positions (thus, not assuming the law of noncontradiction in the same sense as before). — Bob Ross

Not to get too off on a tangent here, but I believe the only reason we calculate it as having both, is because it is equally likely they could be either prior to measurement. It is like calculating what would happen for each side of a six sided die prior to rolling the die. But perhaps we shouldn't wade into quantum physics for examples, as I believe it mostly to be a field of conceptual land mines in any conversation, much less while addressing a new theory of knowledge!

To say that the probability of 1/52 is more cogent than a possibility seems wrong to me, as I am extrapolating that from the possibility of there being 52 cards. — Bob Ross

Probability does not assert there are possibly 52 cards, it asserts that there are 52 cards, whether this be based on applicable knowledge or belief. Of course, what if I'm having a thought experiment? This is a great time to get into math.

Math is the language of discrete experience, and distinctive knowledge. 1, is "a discrete experience" One blade of grass. A field of grass. One piece of grass. It is the abstraction of our ability to discretely experience "a" thing. "Two" is the idea that we can create 1 discrete experience, and another discrete experience. The discrete experience of both together as one identity, is two.

Math is the logic of discrete experience. It is why it fits so well into our world view, because it is an abstraction of how we view the world. When I say, "two blades of grass," this relies on a context of two identities that are similar enough to be labeled "blades of grass". It does not assert their equality on a mass or atomic level. This is because it is an abstraction of our ability to contextualize identities down to their essential properties for the purposes of addition and subtraction, while throwing out all non-essential properties.

The proofs of math work, because they can be confirmed by our discrete experience being actively applied. Therefore I can abstract that if I have 20 bushels of hay, and take away 2 bushels of hay, I have 18 bushels of hay. I can discretely experience that in my head right now. I'm not claiming what constitutes a bushel. I have no need for the weight of each bushel down to the ounce, its color, smell, etc. I just need a discrete experience of a bushel, and this is enough to abstract something useful for reality.

Even so, just like language, math must be applied to reality without contradiction to be applicably known. I can predict that a feather will fall at 9.8 meters a second, but may find in my measurements it does not . I might state that my 5 bushels of hay at 20 pounds each will result in 100 pounds of hay, but upon actual measurement, I find they only weigh 98 pounds.

For example, if I have a function F(N) = N + 1, this is a mathematical induction but not a probability. So, is it a plausibility? Is it a possibility? — Bob Ross

This is a known function. This is an observation of our own discrete experience. If I take N identities, and add one more, then this will equal the identities added together. So, 2+1 are the same as the identity of 3. This applies to the abstract of discrete experience, which when applied to reality could specifically be bushels of hay, sheep, etc. As it is in its functional form, it is only a descriptive logic of discrete experiencing.

This leads to,

Thirdly, it also depends on how you define "apply to reality" whether that holds true. Consider the belief that you have thoughts: is your confirmation of that ever applied to "reality"? — Bob Ross

This goes back to the beginning of the essay. Recall that what we discretely experience, we know. That is because it is impossible to deny that we discretely experience. When I discretely experience something that I label as "thoughts" in my head, I distinctively know I have them. Applicable knowledge is when we apply our distinctive knowledge outside of our own ability to create identity as we wish. I might believe that the apple in front of me is healthy for me, but when I bite into it, I find it rotten. The apple is something apart from my own identifiable control in this way. Your thoughts are also reality.

Distinctive knowledge occurs, because the existence of having thoughts is not contradicted. The existence of discretely experiencing cannot be contradicted. Therefore it is knowledge. I label this special type of knowledge distinctive, because it is something within our control. I can create a world of magic and unicorns distinctively, but there is a limit when applied to that which I do not have control over, reality.

So, going back again to abstracting the idea of 1/52 playing cards, I can distinctively create the limitation in my head that there are 52 playing cards, that they are randomly shuffled, and 1 is pulled without applicably knowing which card it is. I can then establish the limitations of what the necessary possibilities are knowing what each card is within the deck. But, if I applicably apply this probability to any one particular deck in reality, what actually happens is what actually happens.

Perhaps some of the cards were not all the same weight or smoothness, and it causes some of them to stick in the shuffle. Perhaps there is some strange law of physics we didn't know about in reality that causes the Ace of spades to come up more frequently. Math is the ideal of distinctive knowledge, but it must still be applied to reality when it makes a prediction about a particular reality to see if it is applicably known.

Secondly, it seems a bit wrong to me to grant probabilities their own category when there can be plausible probability claims and possible probability claims. — Bob Ross

We cannot meaningfully understand what plausible probability is, without first distinctively and applicably knowing what plausibility, and probability are first. Recall then, that a plausible probability is a chain of reasoning. I have a plausibility, and from that plausibility, I assert a probability. I have a possibility, and from that I assert a probability. I have applicable knowledge, and from that applicable knowledge, I assert a probability.

If I could compare all three inductions, it would be most rational to use the one that has applicable knowledge as its base.

1. Its plausible the dark side of the moon is on average hotter than the light side of the moon, therefore it is probable any point on the dark side of the moon will be hotter than any point on the light side of the moon.
2. Its possible the side of the moon facing away from Earth is on average colder than the light side of the moon, therefore it is probable any point on the dark side of the moon will be colder than any point on the light side of the moon.
3. The dark side of the moon has been measured on average to be cooler than the light side of the moon at this moment, therefore it is probable any point on the dark side of the moon will be colder than any point on the light side of the moon.

As you can see, intuitively, and rationally, it would seem the close the base of the chain is to applicable knowledge, the more cogent the induction.

I think that it is an absolutely brilliant assessment! Well done! However, I think, although we have similar views, that there's still a bit to hash out. — Bob Ross

Thank you! Yes, please continue to drill into the theory as much as you can. Its usefulness is only as good as its ability to withstand critiques. Again, greatly enjoying the conversation, and my thanks for your pointed assessment and crticism!

One objection - I think I did note a bit of the lack of respect for gun rights supporters that is the source of a lot of the political problems with this issue. — T Clark

I appreciate the feedback, and did not mean to come across that way. I will be more careful of attitude going forward. Funny enough, I own a gun, I support owning a gun, and like the second amendment.

What an amazing job you have! Thanks for taking the fight. If no one does, it will never get done.

First, people are not rational. They are rationalizing. This means people have a certain outcome they want, and will grab justifications for it. When someone is excessively emotionally invested in an outcome, they will not budge, and hold justifications that are easily disproven without question.

I believe gun laws (and more and more, politics) are mostly a highly emotional rationalization for people. You can cite statistics until you're blue in the face, and it won't matter. While that is the seemingly depressing part, it doesn't mean you can't persuade someone. You must first persuade someone emotionally, then give the justification of those statistics to solidify it against competing emotional pulls.

To do so, you have to find the root emotions of why a person holds certain beliefs. You then have to provide an equal, or greater emotional reason for them to leave, then apply justifications that make them feel like they are also justified in leaving their own position.

For gun owners, the emotional appeals seem primarily to me to be the feeling of self-empowerment. You can subdivide this into safety, respect, feeling awesome, etc. If you provide a solution erases the emotion of self-empowerment, many people will resist you no matter what you do. That is because many people like feeling self-empowered, and guns may be one of the few avenues they feel so.

So how can you persuade someone that regulating guns does not give up self-empowerment, or even enhances it? One brain storm idea is the notion of personal responsibility. Personal responsibility is part of self-empowerment. One, it takes the notion that not only do you have power, you are wise enough to use it correctly. Personal responsibility uses the lure of status. "I'm better than others because not only do I use guns, I use them responsibly". Just look at the posts after Baldwin accidently shot his coworkers. I went on Fox news and found page after page of,

"The first rule of gun ownership is to never point a gun at someone without checking if it was loaded." This was repeated on mantra, with self-pride and superiority. Of course its completely ridiculous to apply to the situation of being handed a prop gun by people you pay to check them for you. But it doesn't matter. Its about the emotional self-satisfaction first, rational argument second.

If you can persuade the populace emotionally, that non killing someone is a form of superiority and self-empowerment, then provide justification for that emotion, then you can get people away from irresponsible use, and create a culture of responsible gun use.

That of course may not require legislation. Legislation that is about control is almost always about taking away empowerment from one group of society. It doesn't matter if its rational to do so, would save lives, or even save the world. That group will have a significant portion who will defend the emotion of their self-empowerment at the cost of a nuke going off. So I believe you need to start small. Target certain areas. Slowly integrate a better culture of personal responsibility. Seek to persuade people on an emotional level first, then only implement legislation on the minority who do not have the ethics or capability to advance to that level. If you've persuaded enough people to be more personally responsible, they will back you in stopping the people that they now deem inferior, from being irresponsible.

Laozi said that, so I guess he doesn't know? — Daemon

Its a lousy (Laozi) statement after all! I'm sorry, I couldn't resist the pun, :D

Ah,yes. I misunderstood. Even if infinite spatiotemporally, it has to come from somewhere? It all just is there? — Raymond

Yes. The end result to all causality, according to the OP, is there must come a time when there is no prior explanation or cause. It exists, simply because it does.

If a big bang is happening time after time, every time from s fresh state behind the bang preceding it, how can there be a first cause? — Raymond

Why caused the big bang to happen infinitely, and not just once, twice, or any other number? And if you have an answer, what caused that? And if you have an infinite number of answers, why caused there to be an infinite number of answers, instead of just one, two, or any other number? Eventually, "It just is."

God(s) aused the universe. Who else? — Raymond

Can we prove this? Why couldn't the big bang just happen? After all, if God is the first cause, why couldn't something else be?

But in the realm of causal relations, the first cause of each new big bang is a causeless state — Raymond

That would be the definition of a first cause, which would not negate the OP. I'm not stating whether that is, or is not the first cause, but I am saying there must be one.

I agree with you here, but my point was that it is an inapplicable plausibility (which means we are on the same page now I think). A couple posts back, you were defining "plausibility" as "the belief that distinctive knowledge that has never been applicably known, can be applicably known", which I am saying that is an "applicable plausibility", not "plausibility". I am now a bit confused, because your response to that was "In both cases, the person believes that the plausibility can be applicably known", which that is why I stated people can have plausibilities that they don't think can be applicably known. — Bob Ross

Fantastic point. I need to revise what an inapplicable plausibility is. What would be more accurate is the belief that something exists that cannot be applicably known. Would we call this faith? I'm hesitant to use that word, as it is loaded with a lot of other emotions. But I think you are right. An inapplicable plausibility is different enough from a plausibility to warrant a separate identity in the heirarchy. That would leave us with probability, possibility, plausibility, faith, and irrational inductions.

Upon further reflection, I think that if we define every "plausibility" that has no potential as an "irrational induction" — Bob Ross

This is correct. An irrational induction is a belief that something exists, despite applicable knowledge showing it does not exist.

This is true, but also notice that no one has ever applicably known a situation in which, in the absence of direct observation, something necessarily was not both itself and its own negation. — Bob Ross

As you are aware, this would be an induction then.

Firstly, I could apply both of these indirectly to reality without any contradiction because, using the law of noncontradiction, I can create situations where the law of noncontradiction doesn't necessarily have to occur (mainly absent of sentient beings). — Bob Ross

What does indirect application to reality mean? I only see that as an inductive belief about reality. This isn't an applicable knowledge claim, so there is no application to reality. If there are no sentient beings, then there is no possibility of application knowledge.

Don't get me wrong, I agree with you in the sense that both are inapplicable plausibilities, but that is with respect to direct application. — Bob Ross

Can you describe what an indirect application to reality would be?

I may decide, upon assessing the state of a currently unobserved thing, to decide that the outcome should calculated as if they are superpositioned (this is how a lot of the quantum realm is generally understood). This can be indirectly applied to reality without any contradiction. — Bob Ross

Superpositioning, to my understanding, is essentially probability. There are X number of possible states, but we won't know what state it will be until we measure it. The measurement affects the position itself, which is why measuring one way prevents us from measuring the other way. You won't applicably know the state until you apply that measurement, so the belief in any particular outcome prior to the measurement would be an induction.

I agree with you here, but now we are getting into another fundamental problem (I would say) with your terminology: if a "possibility" is what one has experienced once before, then virtually nothing is a possibility. — Bob Ross

Great! We might be nearing a limitation for where I've thought on this. Just as we can construct detailed contexts to the point we could hardly claim applicable knowledge on anything, we can do so with inductive cogency. For example, I could state that to know a particular car is mine, it needs to be identical to the atomic level. Once I've measured that, I could say, "The quantum level". Of course, elections are moving around constantly, so from one moment to the next, I would say I had a brand new car.

The point of identity, the ability to discretely experience in a meaningful way, is to construct limitations of context that allow us to understand and interact with the world in an accurate and helpful way to us. This can be called, "rational". If I construct a context that is so detailed, it takes years to conclude even one discrete claim of knowledge, or the requirements are impossible to apply, what use is it?

I can identify a field of grass, a blade of grass, a piece of grass, ad infinitum. The point is to define it in such a way and context, as to be useful. The same goes with inductions. If I define a car as X, know that an attribute of a car is that it starts, I can say it is possible that a car can start. If I define what a car is as needing 10 hours of poking prodding, and dismantling to applicably know it, the distinctive knowledge useless in my every day application. If I define each car as separate entities, and only insist I know it is possible for this car to start, but not possible for any other car to start, then I make it a plausibility.

Is that useful to me? Depends on my context, but for most context of every day use, probably not. At that point I remove a hierarchy. So everything I have left over at that point is comparative plausiblities. Even though its a car, I'm trapped in my inability to analyze plausibilities. Maybe the car doesn't turn on. Maybe it turns into a demon. Maybe the ignition is actually in a hidden panel undeneath the floor board. Without a possibility comparison, I'm rationally trapped in my inability to justify one plausibility as being more cogent than another.

The addition of the hierarchy of induction is not to state, "This is true." Its the introduction of distinctive definitions, that have examples of being applied to reality without contradiction. To my mind, this distinction is useful. To another, perhaps it is not. Perhaps there are better words and phrases depending on your context that would be more useful to you. This is how all new claims work. A new distinctive knowledge is introduced that can be applicably known. Do we amend our context to use it, or reject it? You cannot force an individual to accept or reject it. You must show them it is a tool that can be useful.

I think there is rigidity within your epistemology that mine lacks, as I see it more as an elastic continuum of sureness. I don't know if that makes any sense or not. — Bob Ross

No, this makes perfect sense, and I hope you see that I agree with you that distinctive knowledge is infinitely elastic. There are infinite possibilities of how to define the world. Infinite contexts. Infinite sounds, language, etc. The question is, can you construct something that is useful? That fits the needs of your context at the time? Can it be used between more than one person? There is no reason the word "sheep" has to mean anything. There is nothing in reality that necessitates it. It just just an agreement we hold, because the word "sheep" has a use to us that we can use in our own lives, and in communicating to others.

"Hard consciousness", as you put it, is exactly what I am trying to convey here in conjunction with your "possibility" term: by definition, I can never claim it is "possible" for someone else to have internal monologue. Even if you knew that the person could not physically lie about it, you would never be able to claim it is "possible" because you have never experienced it yourself (even if you have experienced internal monologue, you haven't experienced it particularly within them). — Bob Ross

Full agreement. I do not think there is anything wrong with applicably knowing the limits of what you can applicably know. I find it a strength of the theory.

We cannot, under your terms, claim that a "bat can think", only that it is a plausibility. Even if we scanned their brains and it turns out the necessary, similar to ours, faculty exists for thought, we would never be able to label it as a "possibility" because we have not experience a bat thinking. — Bob Ross

Again, this depends upon your context. I could state that thinking is not just brain activity, but the ability to react to stimuli in a way that does not kill the creature. So I could place a bad smelling and rotten piece of fruit next to a fresh piece of fruit, and see what the bat does. If we state "thinking" is having the ability to reason at the level of an average human, than a bat will never be applicably known as thinking.

Again, fantastic assessment. I think you understand the theory pretty well now. The question to you is, is it useful for you? Is it logically consistent? Can it solve problems that other theories of knowledge cannot? And is it contradicted by reality, or is it internally consistent? Thanks again, I look forward to hearing from you.

I see. That's just an invention of your mind though. Regardless, that doesn't negate the OP. What caused the charge? What caused the singularity? If you say, "Nothing" then it is self-explained as I conclude in the OP.

What first cause are you looking for? — Raymond

None, that's not the focus. Its just noting it is logical that a first cause must exist. See Bob's discussion for details.

The end of our universe, at infinity, may cause a new bang at the singularity. — Raymond

That's a prediction, not the question of prior causation.

At the singularity time is present in a sense that there is no begin point 0, which causes the difficulty. The paradox is that time was there but without direction. — Raymond

How does this apply to the OP?

OK. At the present time we have a result of causation from an event having taken place 1/2 a year ago. At that time a previous event caused that result, the previous event having taken place 1/4 of a year prior to that event. Keep going back in time in this manner and you never reach an origin for this causation sequence, although the causation sequence started no further back in time than one year ago. — jgill

That didn't really answer the question. What caused it to be that way?

Read the OP. I would ask, "Why is the causation 1/2^n power? The answer is, "Something else" in which case you would need to provide that, or "There is no prior reason," In which case we have our first cause.

How do you prove Socrates' (paradoxical) statement? — Agent Smith

Hello Agent Smith. I appreciate your contribution, I just had not gotten around to it yet. For this forum post, I would be glad to answer your question, but you need to understand the knowledge theory first. Have you read the papers? I could give you an answer, but if you haven't read the papers yet, you will not understand it. If you are against reading the papers at first, feel free to start with Bob's posts. We cover a lot of questions and answers, and it may help you. Thanks!

I don't think this is necessarily true. It depends on what you mean by "applicably known": lots of people believe in things that they claim cannot be "applicably known". For example, there are ample amounts of people that believe in an omnipotent, omniscient, etc (I call it the "omni" for short) God and actively claim that these traits they believe in are necessarily outside of the scope of what we can "applicably" know. — Bob Ross

Then what they are describing is an inapplicable plausibility. It is when you believe that something that exists, but have constructed it in such a way that it cannot be applicably tested. I can see though that my language is not clear, so I understand where you're coming from. Applicable knowledge is when you apply a belief to reality that is not contradicted. All inductions are a belief in something that exists in reality. The type of induction is measured by its ability to be applicably applied or known.

So people believe that God exists in reality, like all inductions. The type of induction is an inapplicable plausibility, because the essential properties of God are things that cannot be applied to reality. There is no way to discover if a God outside of space and time exists, because we cannot go outside of space and time.

Another, non-religious, example is a priori knowledge: most people that claim their are a priori knowledge also actively accept that you necessarily cannot applicable (directly) know the components of it. At its most generic form, they would claim that we there is something that is required for experience to happen in the first place, for differentiation to occur, but you definitely will never be able to directly "applicably" know that. I guess you could say that they are indirectly "applying" it to reality without contradiction, which I would be fine with. — Bob Ross

I think this is largely ok. Maybe a more specific example would help me to determine if you have the right of it. As I noted earlier, a priori knowledge doesn't really exist under this theory. There is distinctive knowledge, and there is applicable knowledge. You cannot have applicable knowledge, without first applying distinctive knowledge. You can create whatever distinctive knowledge you want, but it is not applicable knowledge until it is tested against reality.

I think that, because the law of noncontradiction is one of the (if not the) fundamental axiom there is, it is easy to consider it irrelevant to the comparison of two different plausibilities; however, nevertheless, I think that it plays a huge, more fundamental, factor in the consideration of them. For example, if my knowledge of physics (or any other relevant subject matter) that makes it "impossible" (aka has no potential to occur) for green cheese to be able to make up a moon, then, before I have even started thinking about hierarchical inductions, I have exhausted the idea to its full capacity — Bob Ross

Even though you did not actively think about hierarchial induction, you practicied it implictly. You noted that on the chain of reasoning, the law of non-contradiction proves that the moon is not made of green cheese. Therefore, you have no need to continue that chain of reasoning. No one has ever applicably known a situation in which the something was both itself, and its negation. Further, its definition makes a contradiction impossible. If you define something as one way, then define it as its negation, you have created a situation that can never be applied to reality.

That is because it is impossible even as distinctive knowledge. Recall that distinctive knowledge is what is held within a particular context that is not contradictory. I cannot claim that "A" is not "A" when I mean A and not A within the same context of equality. Something provably impossible ends any further thinking along the lines of it being possible.

Moreover, with the stipulation that there are no observers, even if I have solid evidence that green cheese can't make up a planet, the planet could be made of green cheese and green cheese can't "possibly" makeup a planet at the same time. — Bob Ross

If we cannot observe it, we cannot apply this to reality. Therefore it is an inapplicable plausibility. It is something we can consider, but it will fail in an inductive hierarchy test against something possible, probable or even applicably plausible.

That being said, you can compare the belief in the law of non-contradiction, versus the belief of its denial. If you hold the law of non-contradiction as applied knowledge, or an induction that you believe in, you can evaluate an inductions chain, and reject any inductions that relay on the law of non-contradiction being false within its chain.

This is, essentially, what I am trying to convey. That would be a consideration prior to hierarchical inductions and would provide an underlying basis to compare two different plausibilities. — Bob Ross

Again, you are doing the practice of hierarchial induction here, whether you are aware of it or not. I don't think its a consideration prior, but a consideration of it.

Correct me if I am wrong, but I think that you are trying to convey that, once all the underlying beliefs are evaluated and coincide with the given belief in question, you can't compare two different contexts' hierarchical induction chains. — Bob Ross

This is correct.

I can soundly believe that one claim is more cogent than the other because one aligns with my current knowledge while the other does not. If we were to put them both as plausibilities — Bob Ross

This is essentially what the hierarchy does. In one case of your induction, you founded it upon applicable knowledge. In another, you did not.

Chain one: Applicable knowledge => plausibilty
Chain two: Possibliity => plausibility.

It is more cogent to believe in the first plausibility, then the second. We can do a little math to prove it.

Lets say that applicable knowledge counts as 100% being an accurate assessment of reality without contradiction. An induction is less than 100 percent. When you have a chain of beliefs, you can multiply the percentage chance of the beliefs together. For example, getting one result out of a roll of six dice is 1/6* 1/6 or 1/36 chance (individual values for each die, so five on die one is different from 5 on die two).

Every induction is either 1, not contradicted by reality, or 0, contradicted by reality. We do not applicably know whether it is a 1, or a 0, we we will make it a binary variable with 1 as true, and 0 as false.

So the first chain is:
1 * X
The second chain is:
X * Y

The first chain's chance of being correct using probability, is 50% The second chains chance is .5*.5 or .25% chance of being correct.

A probability and possibillity are more cogent, because they are really a chain based off of applicable knowledge. There is only one binary uncertainty, will what was applicably known be applicably known again.

Possibility chain:
Applicable knowledge => induction that it will still be applicably known

Plausibility chain:

Take something possible (For example, the moon will still exist when I look for it) => create induction (It is made out of green cheese) => Can be applied v Can't be applied

A possibility is essentially always 1* X of it still being applicably known.
A plausibility is essentially always predicting another induction off of what is possible, or X * Y

If I continue and say, The moon is made of green cheese, and this green cheese has green bacteria, then my induction of green bacteria can be seen as:

X * Y * Z or .125 chance of not being contradicted by reality.

For example, I have internal monologue. I think that it is "possible" (in accordance with my use of the terms) that other people have internal monoloqes too; however, I have never experienced someone else having an internal monologue, therefore it isn't a "possibility" in accordance with your terms. — Bob Ross

Correct, depending on the context. You do not know if people have internal monologues in their head like yourself. Fun fact, there are people who cannot visualize inside of their head. They literally cannot imagine a vision of anything when they close their eyes. So what do we do here? Do we fall into solipsism? No, we simply adjust the context of what it means to have internal monologues between two different people.

First, we can determine a conclusion or experience that could only happen if one had an internal monologue. For example, I could ask a person, "Can you invent a story of two people talking to each other in your head?" A person who can internally monologue, can create a conversation of two people talking in their mind. A person who could not understand the question, or was unable to fulfil the request (with the possibility that they were telling the truth depending on how deep we want to go) would not be able to have an inner monologue in their head. If however, they could fulfil the request, then they must be able to have an inner monologue in their head.

Do we know what that inner monologue sounds or looks like in their head? No. We likely never will. This is the "hard problem" of consciousness. We can determine a bat can think, but we can never have the experience of thinking like a bat.

Finally, also recall that cogency is the highest level of induction we can make. Imagining what it is like to have the experience of being a bat is an inapplicable plausibility, and there is no real alternative. There is no confirmation or denial of applicable knowledge, no probability or even possibility beyond the idea that it is possible brains can have consciousness. Perhaps as we improve the science of the mind, this will change, but for now, this is what we have.

This brings up a more fundamental issue (I think): the colloquial term "possibility" is utterly ambiguous. When someone says "it is possible", they may be claiming that "it can occur" or that "it can potentially occur", which aren't necessarily synonymous. — Bob Ross

Agreed. Colloquially, the term possiblity is a bad term, because we have not had a viable means of assessing knowledge. This colloquial term of "possibility" causes confusion, and ambiguous arguments that those without this method of knowledge, are not equipped to handle.

To say something "can occur", as you rightly point out, is only truly known if the individual has experienced it before, however to say something "can potentially occur" simply points out that the claim doesn't violate any underlying principles and beliefs. I think this is a meaningful distinction. If I claim that it is "possible" (in my terms) for a rock to fall if someone drops from a mountain top, it depends on if I have directly experienced it or not whether I am implicitly claiming that it "can occur" (because I've experienced it) or that it "can potentially occur" (because, even though I haven't experienced it before, my experiences, which are not direct nor exact matches of the given claim, align with the idea that it could occur). I think this can get a bit confusing as "can" and "can potentially" could mean the same thing definitions wise, but I can't think of a better term yet: it's the underlying meaningful distinction here that I want to retain. — Bob Ross

I think you've nailed it. This is really the separation between what is possible, and what is plausible. It takes time to wrap your head around it. Perhaps an applicable plausibility is better described as "an inductive claim of potentiality". That seems to clash with "probability" though, and honestly, all inductions could be argued as "potential". So I'm not sure the generic term of potential works well anymore either. But the underlying meaningful distinction you are describing, is the difference between what is possible, and what is plausible. It is a distinction we have not had in epistemology until now, and I believe the introduction of this distinction is a real key in unlocking some of the problems epistemology has had over the years.

Also, as a side note, I like your response to the object rolling off hills example, however this is getting entirely too long, so I will refrain from elaborating further. — Bob Ross

Not a worry. I was sick, and having difficulty finding the time and effort to cover larger posts. I am feeling much better now, and more energized! My apologies if I was not able to drill down or cover ideas as much as I normally would. Please continue to drill into every nook and cranny.

Consciousness=charge.
Virtual charge= Virtual Consciousness
Virtual charges=negative curvature
Negative curvature=Causing power — Raymond

None of this makes sense. Flesh out what your words mean please.

All subjective experience is caused by consciousness, but consciousness does not give birth to itself (not an illusion). Does this make consciousness the first cause? — pfirefry

You have to prove that nothing causes consciousness. That's a very tall order. Proving that any one thing is self-explained has an incredibly high burden of proof, and arguably may be impossible. I will flesh this out more if needed. First, try to show that consciousness is uncaused. We'll discuss more in depth after.

The real perfect reversible clock at the singularity (when the irreversible didn't exist yet) doesn’t need a first cause. Causes are radiating from it, thereby causing it to turn into the irreversible where the real clock has turned imaginary. The effect causes the cause. — Raymond

Can you clarify this? I don't know what a reversible clock is, or what you mean by a singularity.

Mind describing what you personally mean by causa sui? A wikipedia article doesn't flesh out what you intended by it,

What we perceive, feel, and think is experienced from a unique internal perspective. According to the ‘hard problem of consciousness' some of these mental states are separate to and not reducible to physical systems in the human body — Brock Harding

I do not believe this is the hard problem. We know that all experiences of ourselves reduce to the brain. That's really not in question. The hard problem is understanding exactly what a person feels when a certain brain state triggers.

For example, I'm imagining a field of grass. We can see the brain states that trigger. But we can't see the image of me imagining the field of grass. I can tell you what I feel. I can tell you what I image. But there's no objective way to measure this, it is purely from my subjective communication. We can't say, "Brain state X for certain causes every person to objectively imagine a field of grass. We know there IS a brain state that is doing it. We know its a physical response. But because we don't have the "image" ourselves in front of us, we can't really objectively test or reproduce it. We have to rely on your personal communication, which might be wrong, biased, or not descriptive enough.

To help think this through further, imagine the color green. How do I know that the thing you call green is the same image in my head? Its basically that sort of problem. We need some objective measurement, like "light wavelength" to determine what "green" really is between you and I both. Until we discover some outside way of measuring thoughts besides personal subjective experience, we cannot duplicate the issue.

But it is not, at all, ever, a denial that our brain is what makes us think.

Thanks for the well wishes Bob. I almost feel like my normal self again today.

This is all and well, but I think you defined "plausibility" (in your previous post) as exactly what you just defined as an "applicable plausibility"--and that was all I have trying to point out. You defined "plausibility" as "the belief that distinctive knowledge that has never been applicably known, can be applicably known". A "plausibility", under your terms (I would say), is not restricted to what "can be applicably known" (that is a subcategory called "applicable plausibilities"), whereas "plausibility" is a much more generic term than that (as far as I understand your terms). — Bob Ross

In both cases, the person believes that the plausibility can be applicably known. The difference between an applicable, and inapplicable plausibility, is whether it is designed so that it can be applied to reality. You can craft a belief about reality that can never be actually applied to reality. Its plausible, but inapplicable. It doesn't mean that the plausibility isn't true either. All of these labels are for inductions, which by nature, may or may not be true. The goal is to find which inductions are most rational to hold. An inapplicable plausibility is pretty low on the hierarchy, as it is a claim to what is real when you can never actually apply it to reality.

I agree in that two contexts can be dissimilar and still have commonalities, but those commonalities are more fundamental aspects to those contexts and, therefore, although they are dissimilar, they are not separate. Even the most distinct contexts share some sort of dependency (or dependencies). An induction (within a context) that contradicts a parent context is less cogent than an induction (within a different context) that doesn't. — Bob Ross

If you have two identical underlying building blocks between two compounded inductions, then you can compare those. But if you add anything else on top to make them different, they are no longer fair comparisons.

For example, I hold the law of non-contradiction as true. From this I believe it is plausible that the moon is made out of green cheese. Separately from this, I believe it is plausible that the sun is really run by a giant lightbulb at its core. The basis of the law of contradiction between them has no bearing on the evaluation of comparing the plausibilities.

That being said, you can compare the belief in the law of non-contradiction, versus the belief of its denial. If you hold the law of non-contradiction as applied knowledge, or an induction that you believe in, you can evaluate an inductions chain, and reject any inductions that relay on the law of non-contradiction being false within its chain.

I "think" this is what you are going for. If so, yes, you can determine which inductions are more cogent by looking in its links, and rejecting links that you do not know, or believe in. But this is much clearer if you are trying to decide whether the moon is plausibly made out of green cheese, or something else, then trying to compare the moon and the sun. Does that make sense?

When I say something can potentially exists, or happen, it means that it does not violate any of my parental contexts (any underlying principles that would be required for the concept to align with my knowledge as it is now). Hitherto, your epistemology eliminates this altogether: you either have a possibility or plausibility (probability encompasses the idea of a possibility) and you can't preliminarily determine whether one plausibility has the potential to occur or not. — Bob Ross

You can't preliminarily determine whether one plausibility has the potential to occur or not, because it is an induction. And an induction is when we conclude a result that does not necessarily stem from the premises. Any prediction about the future for example, can always be wrong. Hypotheses, even the most educated ones, about what will happen in a science experiment can also be wrong. Holding to a cogent induction does not guarantee it will actually happen either. Cogency is simply deciding which induction is more reasonable to hold. The nature of holding an induction is always a gamble, no matter how much you might rationalize prior to holding one.

That isn't limited to the epistemology proposed here either. At least this epistemology has a way of rationally measuring inductions. Prior to this, I don't believe there is any epistemology that can claim which inductions are more rational to hold. So if I believe the bird in front of me can fly, because I have applicably known things with wings can fly, its more cogent then stating that the bird in front of me could plausibly levitate off the ground with psychic powers. That being said, if I'm looking at a penguin, my induction will be wrong once applied. With inductions, nothing is certain.

If I have witnessed a "thing" fly and roll off of a hill, but the "things" that I have seen fly look less similar to the "thing" on the hill now and the "thing" looks more similar to the "things" that I have seen roll down a hill, then I might determine one context more cogent than the other based off of the fact that I accept the law of similarity as an underlying principle that engulfs both the contexts in question. — Bob Ross

We can break the chain down as follows.
Thing X which has Y traits I have seen fly off of hills.
Thing A which has B traits I have seen roll off of hills before.

(These are both based on our contexts of what we have applicably known)
It is possible that a thing with B traits can roll off of hills.
It is possible that a thing with Y traits can fly off of hills.
I have never seen a thing with B traits fly, and I have never seen a thing with Y traits that can roll.
It is plausible that a thing with B traits can roll, and plausible that a thing with Y traits can fly.

Since it is possible that a thing with B traits can roll, but only plausible that a thing with B traits can fly, it is more cogent to assume the thing with B traits, will likely fly.
Apply the same reasoning to Y.

I don't think there is a law of simularity, but there is a chain of probabilities and possibilities within this context. And with this context, we can conclude certain beliefs would be more cogent. Does that mean the thing with B traits will roll and the thing with Y traits will fly? No. We can only applicably know the answer by applying our induction to reality without contradiction.

I hope that clears up the process a bit more! Let me know what you think.

reply="Bob Ross;638715"]

Great response Bob, my apologies for the delay. I caught "The Covid," and have been fairly sick. Fortunately I'm vaccinated, so recovery is going steady so far.

With respect to "plausibility", I think you just defined, in accordance with your essays, an "applicable plausibility", contrary to an "inapplicable plausibility", which is not just a "plausibility". You defined it in the quote that it "can be applicably known", which is what I thought an "applicable plausibility" was. Maybe I am just misremembering. — Bob Ross

An applicable plausibility is something which can be applied to reality if we so choose. For example, "If I go outside within five minutes, it will rain on me as soon as I step outside of the door." I do not know if it is raining, nor can I figure it out from within the house. There is nothing preventing me from going outside within the next five minutes. Its an applicable plausibility that I will be rained on, because I can test it.

An inapplicable plausibility is a plausibility that either cannot be tested, or is designed not to be able to be tested. If for example I state, "There is a unicorn that exists that cannot be sensed by any means," this is inapplicable. There is nothing to apply to reality with this idea, as it is undetectable within reality. Perhaps there is a unicorn that exists that cannot be sensed in reality. But we will never be able to apply it, therefore it is something that cannot be applicably known.

Therefore, in the abstract, if context A and B reside within the law of noncontradiction context, and A does not abide by the law of noncontraction while B does, then A is less cogent than B on a more fundamental contextual plane--regardless of the fact that their hierarchical inductions are considered separately. — Bob Ross

Just because two built contexts are dissimilar, it doesn't mean they cannot have commonalities. But commonalities do not mean they can necessarily be evaluated against the different inductions within their independent contexts. The human eye and iron floating on water with butter are just too disparate to compare. The law of non-contradiction simply means you have an irrational inductive belief, which is completely divorced from rationality. I suppose if there's nothing stopping a person from placing comparative contexts in planes, but I would think the end result would be the same.

To add, the comparison is about finding the best induction to take within that context. So if my only recourse in one instance, lets say iron floating on water, is a plausibility over an irrational induction, its more cogent to choose the plausibility. If in the case of an eye, I have a probability vs a possibility, its more cogent to take the probability. But there's really no comparing the probability of improving the eye, the the options of plausibility vs irrationality with iron floating on water with butter. We could state that within the context of the eye, we have more cogent inductions to select from than in the context of iron floating on water, but that's really about it.

I applicably know what two "things" are.
I applicably know what three "things" are.
I applicably know that the underlying meaning of "two" and "three" are not synonymous.
Therefore, "two" "things" and "three" "things" are synonymous. — Bob Ross

Can you clarify this? I interpreted this as follows.

I applicably know A and B.
I applicably know C, D, and E.
I applicably know that the numbers two and three are not synonymous.
Therefore A and B, and C,D, and E are synonymous.

I don't believe that's what you're trying to state, but I could not see what you were intending.

For conclusion 1:
I applicably know that some "things" can fly off of hills.
I applicably know that this round-object is a "thing".
Therefore, the round-object will fly off the hill.
I can apply this belief to reality to see if it holds.
Therefore, I am holding an "applicable plausibility" based off of two possibilities.

For conclusion 2:
I applicably know that some round-like objects, such as a log, can roll down a hill.
I applicably know that some round-like objects, such as a log, will roll down a hill in windy climates.
Therefore, the round-like object will roll down the hill.
I can apply this belief to reality to see if it holds.
Therefore, I am holding an "applicable plausibility" based off of two possibilities. — Bob Ross

I still wasn't quite sure what you meant by parent contexts in these examples. I think what you mean is the broader context of "things" versus "round objects". Please correct me here. For my part, it depends on how we cut hairs so to speak. If the first person does not applicably know that things can roll down a hill as well, then neither statement is more cogent than the other. If the first person knows that "things" can also roll down hill, then there's no cogent reason why they would conclude the "thing" would fly off the hill over roll down the hill.

What might help is to first come up with a comparison of cogency for a person within a particular context first. Including two people complicates comparing inductions greatly, but generally follows the same rules as a person comparing several inductive options they are considering within their own context.

You may be on to something by the way. You're the first person I've had the opportunity to really dig in with the inductive hierarchy, and I will be the first to say it is only a foundation. I just want to make sure the foundation is understood first. While I feel the hierarchy chain is a good start, the second step, which is much more difficult to establish, is comparing two inductions of the same hierarchy and determining which one is more cogent. I think there is something that might be needed beyond the hierarchy chains, such as a further subdivision of the base four inductions. I'm eager to hear more of your ideas!

I still think we're a bit apart on the terms. Let me see if I can define them more clearly.

Firstly, the use of "possibility" and "plausibility" in the sense that you have defined it seems, to me, to not account for certain meaningful distinctions. — Bob Ross

The meaningful distinctions should be:

Possibility - the belief that because distinctive knowledge has been applicably known at least once, it can be known again.

Plausibility- the belief that distinctive knowledge that has never been applicably known, can be applicably known.

In an earlier post, I mentioned knowledge chains. I believe this was before we had clarified the distinction between the two inductions. Lets take your example here:

For example,let's consider two scenarios: person one claims that a new color could be sensed by humans if their eyes are augmented, while person two claims that iron can float on water if you rub butter all over the iron block. I would ask you, within your use of the terms, which is more cogent? — Bob Ross

First, we cannot compare cogency between different branches of claims. This is because cogency takes context into account as well, and the difference between evaluating the human eye, and an floating iron block, are two fairly separate contexts. Recall that inductions are cogent when we reach the limit of what can be applicably known, so we could have a situation in which a plausibility is the most cogent conclusion within that context, while in another context, a possibility is the most cogent.

The more important question, is how can we determine what is most cogent in the belief of what will happen in an attempted application, with a claim within the same context? This is where knowledge chains, and their comparisons come into play.

What we know or believe often times implicitly relies on prior beliefs or applicable knowledge. If I am making a judgement about the human eye, then I am taking my knowledge and inductions about the eye into my assessment.

I applicably know the eye can see X colors.
I applicably know we can improve the eye's ability to see with greater focus.
Therefore I believe we can improve the eye to see greater than X colors.

We have 2 knowledge claims, then we leap to a plausibility. We don't know if its possible yet, as we haven't tried applying it to reality. But we believe that if we attempt to, we will discover that we can improve the eye to see more than X colors.

Now, lets think prior to the availability of eye surgery.

I applicably know the eye can see X colors.
I think its plausible we can improve the eye's ability to see with greater focus.
Therefore I believe we can improve the eye to see greater than X colors.

Here we have 1 knowledge claim, a plausibility, then another plausibility built on the first plausibility. Comparing the two chains, the first chain is more cogent than the second chain. Even though the conclusions are the same, it is the chain of logic that determines our conclusion, which determines which end statement is more cogent than the other.

This is valuable, because this destroys the Getter problem. It doesn't matter if either claim happens to be true or not. We could of course refine the context. Perhaps include some prior statements that we are implicitly glossing over. But it is about taking a belief, thinking about all of the alternative ways we can arrive at that belief (or the negation of that belief), and taking the most rational logic chain of events.

I believe the above should cover what you meant by "qualitative likelihood". Hierarchial induction determines which of the inductions within consideration of a conclusion is most rational. And it is more rational to consider outcomes that involve possibilities, over outcomes that involve plausibilities. But more importantly, we need to examine the chain of rationality one took to arrive at one's induction as well. This should provide all that's needed for a strong and measurable basis of cogency.

Moreover, there is knowledge that we have that we cannot physically directly experience, which I am sure you are acquainted with as a priori, that must precede the subject altogether. I haven't, and won't ever, experience directly the processes that allow me to experience in the first place, but I can hold it as not only a "possibility" (in my sense of the term) but also a "highly plausible" "truth" of my existence. — Bob Ross

According to this, there is no apriori. Everything is distinctively or applicably known by our experience. I you believe there is something that must exist prior to your current existence, then like every other other induction, it must be some variation on probability, possibility, plausibility, or an irrational belief.

I would say that this reveals what I think lacks in your terminology: we can't determine what is more cogent to pursue. In my terminology, I would be able to pursue trying to augment the eye to see more shades of colors because it is "possible". — Bob Ross

Under the old terminology, you wouldn't be able to state it was possible either. It may very well be that we cannot modify a human eye to see greater color, because it ends up that color is observed in the brain, and we would have to rewire that as well. As such someone would ask, "How do you know that is possible?"

With the chain of reasoning comparisons I noted above, we can definitely determine which is most cogent to pursue. In fact, it might help us realize we have underlying assumptions that we need to discover first.

I understand what you mean to a certain degree, but I think that it isn't fallacious to say that something could potentially occur: I think it becomes fallacious if the subject thereafter concludes that because it could occur it does occur. — Bob Ross

Every induction is a claim that something might be. An induction, by definition, is a conclusion that is not necessarily concluded from the premises involved. If I'm going to predict the sun will rise tomorrow, because its risen several times, I know that it is possible. If I say the sun will not rise tomorrow, that is plausible, as the sun has always risen. My plausibility might be correct, and my possibility might be incorrect. The point of cogency is to evaluate the inductions, and evaluate which one is more reasonable to hold to when you are deciding what will happen in the future.

There was a lot that went in many directions on your post. I couldn't cover it all in one post, but I thought if I tried to direct back to the meaning of the terms, and answer some of the repeating themes, it would clarify most of the issues.

I think the true issue here, is a difference in our use of terms between plausibility and possibility. Lets see if we can come to the same context.

I am repurposing the terms of probability, possibility, and plausibility after redefining knowledge into distinctive and applicable knowledge. The reason is, the terms original use was for the old debated generic knowledge. As they were, they do not work anymore. However, they are great words, and honestly only needed some slight modifications. If you think I should invent new terms for these words I will. The words themselves aren't as important as the underlying meaning.

At each step of the inductive hierarchy, it is a comparative state of deductive knowledge, versus applicable knowledge.

Possibility is a state in which an applied bit of distinctive knowledge has been applicably known. At that point in time, a belief that the applicably knowledge could be obtained again, is the belief that it is "possible".

Plausibility is distinctive knowledge that has not been applicably tested, but we have a belief as to the applicable outcome.

You noted,

Logically, what is plausible is not yet possible

I don't agree with this, but I am open to hearing why you think this is the case. — Bob Ross

The reason something plausible is not yet possible, is because once something plausible has been applicably known one time, it is now possible. It is an essential property to the meaning of plausibility, that it is exclusionary from what is possible.

As such, many times you were comparing to possibilities together, instead of a plausibility and a possibility.

However, I think that to say something is "possible" is to admit that it doesn't directly contradict reality in any way (i.e. our immediate forms of knowledge) and has nothing directly to do with whether I have ever experienced it before. For example, given our knowledge of colors and the human eye, I can state that it is possible that there are other shades of colors that we can't see (but with better eyes we could) without ever experiencing any new shades of colors. — Bob Ross

We say something is possible if it has been applicably known at least once. To applicably know something, you must experience it at least once. We cannot state that it is possible that there are other shades of color that humanity could see if we improved the human eye, because no one has yet improved the human eye to see currently unseeable colors.

What you've done is taken distinctive knowledge, that is built on other applicable knowledge, and said, "Well its "likely" there are other colors". But what does "likely" mean in terms of the knowledge theory we have? Its not a probability, or a possibility, because the distinctive knowledge of "I think there are other colors the human eye could see if we could make it better." has never been applicably known.

We could one day try improving the human eye genetically. Maybe we would succeed. Then we would know its possible. But until we succeed in applicably knowing once, it is only plausible.

I feel that "Plausibility" one of the greatest missing links in epistemology. Once I understood it, it explained many of the problems in philosophy, religion, and fallacious thinking in general. I understand your initial difficulty in separating plausibilities and possibilities. Plausibilities are compelling! They make sense in our own head. They are the things that propel us forward to think on new experiences in life. Because we have not had this distinction in language before, we have tied plausibilities and possibilities into the same word of "possibility" in the old context of language. That has created a massive headache in epistemology.

But when we separate the two, so many things make sense. If you start looking for it, you'll see many arguments of "possibility" in the old context of "knowledge", are actually talking about plausibilities. When you see that, the fault in the argument becomes obvious.

With this in mind, re-read the points I make about immediateness, and how that can only apply to possibility. Plausbilities cannot have immediateness, because they are only the imaginations of what could be within our mind, and have not been applied to reality without contradiction yet.

I would say that someone doesn't have to witness a horned, winged horse to know that it is possible because it doesn't contradict any immediate forms of knowledge — Bob Ross

As one last attempt to clarify, when you state it doesn't contradict any immediate forms of knowledge, do you mean distinctive knowledge, or applicable knowledge? I agree that it does not contradict our distinctive knowledge. I can imagine a horse flying in the air with a horn on its head. It has not been applied to reality however. If I believe it may exist somewhere in reality, reality has "contradicted" this distinctive knowledge, by the fact that it has not revealed it exists. If I believe something exists in reality, but I have not found it yet, my current application to reality shows it does not exist.

Plausibilities drive us to keep looking in the face of realities denial. They are very useful. The powerful drivers of imagination and creativity. But they are not confirmations of what is real, only the hopes and dreams of what we want to be real.

I hope that clears up the issue. Fortunately, this may be the final issue! Great discussion as always.

Lets say there is no free will. If accountability, which is a pressure for a person to go against their unimpeded free will, gives them a better outcome in theirs and other's lives, then yes. If accountability is meant to merely shame, cause suffering, or revenge, then no. If one is truly a moral person, and one's influence causes yourself and others to live better lives, I don't think there's anything wrong with holding people accountable when they do not live their life in a positive way.