Do we know for a fact that there is no moral fact? Do we even need such a claim in your argument?

For example, lets say that God did exist and knew all moral facts. First, we don't know if humans have the intelligence to comprehend something that is omniscient, because we're not. Second, belief in a God that does know all moral facts, does not give us any tools to understand or resolve those facts. So we can conclude as a starting argument that belief in a God that does understand all moral facts does not mean we are able to comprehend them, or have the tools and knowledge to resolve them.

I'm just noting that to reach your conclusion you're adding a lot of other unproven assumptions in there (barring the 'if God exists' assumption of course :) ).

Let me give you an example to see if we can agree with the definitions: A Bulldog is ugly but one can like it. The ugliness is intrinsic and the like is extrinsic. — MoK

Sounds good to me. We can like things even if they're ugly.

To summarize I think your answer is about the extrinsic features of an object rather than the intrinsic features so I think your answer does not address why an object is intrinsically beautiful. — MoK

I see, so you think there is something apart from what causes the emotion of beauty, to instead believe that beauty is something as a property which exists independent of our emotions. To me, this is mostly a semantic difference, but an important one.

I believe that what a person interprets as healthy or conducive to health is objectively what causes the emotion of beauty. But if there were no living beings to experience beauty, the emotion wouldn't exist. Its not that things healthy to life wouldn't exist, and we as feeling beings could ascribe beauty as, 'that which is healthy and conducive to life." But the objective part is the definition, which doesn't need the identity of the word 'beauty' attached.

So what I'm saying is that beauty being intrinsic or extrinsic I don't feel quite captures what beauty is. Beauty yes can have an underlying objective definition, but it is mostly known as a subjective emotional experience. You could use the word beauty with an alien race that doesn't have the emotion, and they would understand objectively what you mean when you use the term 'beauty'. To them, its just a word with an objective definition. To you, it also contains the subjective emotional experience.

So, if we wanted to use the terms 'intrinsic or extrinsic', I think more accurately we're defining beauty as "beauty without the emotional component," and "beauty with the emotional component". Does that make sense?

That is an excellent question that made me think for a while! — MoK

I'm glad! I find that whether I arrive at an answer or not, the thinking about it is sometimes the best part of the process. I've give my answer, though it doesn't mean its necessarily right. See if it sparks something new in your own mind.

There is at least one common marker, at least in evaluating biological creatures, that seems to overlap with beauty. Symmetry. Think of a person with a symmetrical face versus one with their left eye drooping an inch lower than their right eye. Why do we value symmetry in creatures? because it turns out symmetry aligns with health. Health is strength, survival, capability, and energy.

Sexually, beautiful people signal health, which means they can spend the energy and resources to have, raise, and protect a child. Beauty may very in sexual interactions as what is 'healthy' can change based on genetics, culture, or environment. In a culture where food is scarce, heavier people may be seen as more beautiful because it indicates they are capable of getting more resources. In a resource abundant culture, thin people may be more beautiful as it demonstrates their ability to use resources responsibly, will power, and an active amount of work on their appearance.

In nature, beauty may signify a healthy environment. Again, this may be based on what one needs. If you desire little interaction with other living things, a remote area may be beautiful. A lush healthy forest means there's plentiful water and food nearby.

We want to be around beautiful things because we hope to share in that health. If a beautiful person likes us, it means a healthy person with resources is on our side. Being in a beautiful environment gives us what we need and want. Ugly things and places indicate to us a lack of resources, sickness, or possible problems we might have to deal with. Ugly people may look to us to help fix their loneliness, health, or other issues. Ugly places are harsh to survive in. Beauty indicates an easy life, ugliness indicates a hard one.

What do you think?

I think it is a mixture of properties of an object, like symmetry, curvature, color, and the like. — MoK

Fantastic! Can you delve further? Why would symmetry, curvature, etc be beautiful? Is there a combination of object, color and the like which would not be beautiful? Is there a common theme between them?

I think beauty and ugliness are universal features of the experience, whether humans' experience, aliens', or animals'. Something beautiful is beautiful in the eyes of anybody. — MoK

No disagreement here, but what is the underlying aspect that makes something beautiful? My apologies if I'm not volunteering my own thoughts, its more of a primer to take the subject and really philosophically examine it. I want to hear your thoughts.

I think beauty and ugliness are innate parts of a healthy human experience. The more interesting question in my mind is, "What do they mean?" While someone might have subjective views of what is beautiful and ugly, is there there some underlying objective meaning behind those words that transcends subjectivity?

Flat earthers don't often like to prove anything. I'm not that concerned with their psychology to be honest, I'm more concerned with honest thinking peoples approaches to how they'd demonstrate it. — flannel jesus

For the actually honest person without psychological issues that wishes to prove the world is round, there are a host of resources to do so. The people who insist the Earth is flat are mostly deluded people who elevate what they want to believe over truth and facts. Most people do this to a certain extent, but are eventually willing to bend once the evidence clearly shows their belief is wrong. These people are so deep into this that they are unwilling to bend to any evidence that is contrary to their beliefs.

Its mental illness at that point. You cannot reason with mental illness, nor can you reason with someone who refuses to enter into reasonable discourse.

If you went in not knowing about refraction, you would think you've just proven that the earth is flat. — flannel jesus

No, you would have proven that the world is less round then the experts listed. Again, proven off of incomplete information. Testing refraction is the same. Look up how the experts proved refraction, then test yourself.

There is also one other thing you're forgetting. Flat Earthers would also need to prove the Earth is flat. If they are discounting experts due to a lack of physical evidence, they have to discount their own claims due to a lack of physical evidence as well. Deciding, "I don't trust the scientists, but its flat because I say so," is just ignorance masquerading as skepticism.

Absolutely. It's just interesting that, if the earth were the size generally claimed, you would actually expect to see less than you do - that's something that a lot of flat earthers notice, it gives them ammo. "I can see more of chicago than I geometrically should if you were right". They're actually right about that. — flannel jesus

Ever heard of the saying, "Enough knowledge to be dangerous?" The problem with the flat Earthers is they're only taking one part of the equation and not factoring in refraction. Here's an example:

I believe I can't survive under water for more than 10 minutes. I go to a deep diving class and read up to the point that says, "Deep sea divers can survive anywhere from 30-60 minutes underwater..." "Rubbish!" I say. I hold my breath until I pass out. I cite scientific information about brain damage from patients who lack oxygen for 15 minutes. But what I didn't do was continue to read the rest of the sentence on the scuba diving page. "...with a working air tank and diving gear."

Yes, I'm right that people cannot survive 60 minutes without air. But I'm not right people with proper air tanks can't survive underwater for 60 minutes. So again, the flat Earthers are either being willfully ignorant, or refusing to understand the entire justification of the argument for why the Earth is round when observed from X distance away.

Have you heard of this? — flannel jesus

Sure, I'm quite sure the specifics of it are going to be slightly different from my example. My point is the same: Look at how the experts formed their answer, then try it yourself.

First, we can take the claim of scientists and experts and test them ourselves. We can test with measuring shadows like in ancient Rome. We can test by finding flat land and assessing when the visibility of distant objects should vanish according to predicted angles. We can attempt to travel around the world ourselves.

The question of "Pondering flat Earthers" can be more abstractly applied to, "How can we verify our trust in authority?" Good authority will tell you how they arrived at their conclusions and let you test it yourself. Bad authority will refuse to divulge their methods, or proper testing will reveal flawed results.

You shouldn't expect kids with no education and no development in the intelligence to the adult level to be able to tell the analytic truth. — Corvus

That didn't answer my question. Which means you know the answer, but were unwilling to admit it. Of course what the kid states is true, even if they don't know what they're talking about. But if you're starting to avoid direct answers and coming up with odd asides, we've probably reached the end of a decent conversation. Have a good day.

It seems to be getting more unclear. One thing clear with truth is, if one doesn't know what he is talking about, then he cannot be telling truth. — Corvus

What specifically is unclear? Let us say that I tell a young kid, "1+1=2". The kid doesn't know what any of it means. They go up to an adult and say, "1+1=2!" They don't know what they're talking about, but is what the kid said untrue?

Truth is about something concrete, and corresponds to the reality, which all intelligible can witness, verify, understand, share and agree in their minds. — Corvus

Truth is about something concrete, and corresponds to reality. Let me fix this for you:

"A true statement is about something concrete, and corresponds to reality." But that is not the definition of the word 'truth'. Truth is, 'what is'. "A statement about something concrete and corresponds with reality is true, or accruately captures 'what is'.

Truth applied to statements is not the full meaning of truth. Truth does not require statements. Truth does not require your observation. Truth is what is.

(True Statements) are those which all intelligible can witness, verify, understand, share and agree in their minds.

Let me refine this as well. What is true may not necessarily be intelligible. Generally we call these statements "Knowledge". What is known is that which all intelligible can witness, verify, understand, share, and agree in their minds. Even then, there are some things such as subjective experience which can only be known to the individual.

What is the point of saying something is truth, when you don't know anything about it? Isn't it a senseless absurdity? — Corvus

No, its simply noting that things exist apart from what we know or believe.

You seemed to be confusing some mundane unobserved events with truth. — Corvus

Truth is what is whether its observed or not. Whether its mundane or not.

Unobserved events or existence is not in the category of truth. — Corvus

Unobserved events or existence is not in the category of what is known, or knowledge. Unobserved events are true existences despite our knowledge of them.

Truth means statements or propositions which corresponds to the existence or events in reality. — Corvus

We can ascribe statements as being true, but truth is not only ascribed to the realm of statements. Truth is 'what is', and 'what is' exists does not rely on our statements.

Isn't truth property of our judgement on the world? — Corvus

No. Truth is what simply is. Whether you know it or not is irrelevant. Again, you're confusing truth with knowledge. Knowledge is a tool; a logical process by which we encapsulate what is into something meaningful and useable. We do not determine truth, we determine knowledge. And what can hold as knowledge is that which is logically determined to not contradicted by the truth.

Throw a ball in the air, and it returns to the Earth. Knowing gravity is irrelevant. Knowing some languages call it 'a ball' is irrelevant. Believing it won't come back to Earth is irrelevant. Reality, or truth, is that the ball comes back to Earth. It doesn't matter if you're there to witness it or not. Truth is what is, and it is what is regardless of what you know or believe.

You're making a classic mistake in conflating two separate labels. "Knowledge" and "Truth". What is known is determined through a series of logical deductions that leads to one outcome. What is true is 'what is'. Knowledge is a logical attempt to understand 'what is' in a way that we can use to accomplish our goals.

Suddenly knowing that black holes exist doesn't mean that it wasn't true that they existed before. Suddenly knowing you're sick when you cough doesn't mean you weren't sick prior to your coughing. We do not determine reality, we interpret reality in an attempt to understand it in a meaningful way.

Science is looking at a situation, coming up with a hypotheses, then testing it. But in this case, most of the words are all clearly defined.

Philosophy is looking at words we use in our daily lives and trying to figure out their definitions. Words like 'knowledge' for example. What is it really? How do we know? What is 'good'? Its not that we couldn't create definitions that then could be scientifically tested, its the creation and refinement of the definitions to be logical and detailed.

The type of person who questions why they do what they do is most likely to be attracted to philosophy. The type of person who cannot simply exist as part of a cultural process in both language and behavior is most likely to be attracted to philosophy. They do not have to be weird or lonely individuals, only those who suddenly look at what they're doing and ask, "Why?"

First, we need to define 'science'. Science does not claim "x is true". Science claims, "We have a hypothesis that X is true, and every attempt to prove X is false hasn't worked." Then that paper is read by hundreds of other scientists, and other scientists decide to test it too. "Oh, you didn't try THIS method to see if X is false. Also this second technique you tried sounds suspicious."

"Science" is a process and not the citation of one paper. It is multiple papers and attempts to tear down a claim. So it doesn't matter what your initial outlook is. In fact, having an initial outlook to challenge it is the point. If however we challenge it no matter our outlook, and the fact remains that X is true, then x is true.

So what is realism vs anti-realism? Its not as solipsistic as you think. :) One way to really see it is imagine a truck. Well, what is a truck? Its a combination of parts, which is a combination of molecules, atoms, quarks, etc. If we were using realism, we would want to know every single detail of that truck down to its atomic level. Anti-realism allows us to take higher level properties such as, "I press the pedal and it go zoom." as a 'truck'. Notice that anti-realism does not mean a labeling system that is at odds with reality. It just means constructing a notion of reality that does not necessarily involve all of the specifics.

Realism: I speak into my phone and it transmits a microwave radiation out to a cell tower which interprets it, sends it out to be captured by another phone which creates a series of electrical impulses into speakers that emulate my voice.

Anti-realism: I'm talking on the phone with my friend.

Notice that anti-realism does not state, "My cell phone can be used to create a magical unicorn." Its about internal logic and context that fits within the reality a person is currently experiencing. Its useful for summaries, quicker judgements, and surface level communication. The 'depth' that we need about a subject to communicate accurately is variable based on our tools and needs. But we communicate at that depth with logic at that depth, it is not a 'whatever goes' assessment.

Any examples come to mind? — Wayfarer

Sure, insects like an ant. They can think, but I'm pretty sure one has never realized its an 'I'. Thinking does not presume one has ever thought of the self. The phrase is not "think, therefore attempt X for goal" The phrase is "I think, therefore I am". It is the proof of the self which can only be done by the self if that self exists.

He calls this a confusion arising from our notation, and suggests, not entirely seriously, that we could devise a more accurate notation “that makes I think internal to p: we may form the letter p by writing, in the shape of a p, the words I think.” He interprets Kant as saying the same thing: for Kant, “the I think is not something thought alongside the thought that it accompanies, but internal to what is thought as such.” — J

This would be incorrect, as there are thinking things that do not have a sense of self. Kant really means, "I think, therefore I am." If one realizes they have a sense of self through thought, that is the very definition of self. Kant is not saying, "I think p, therefore p". He is stating "I think, therefore I am".

You can't know the truth about reality, but you can have knowledge. Read here if you're interested. There's a fantastic summary of the post from the next person who posted if you're interested. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14044/knowledge-and-induction-within-your-self-context/p1

I think the word you're looking for is 'pre-requisite', not cause. I can have a 1 and a 1 next to each other and never think of the idea of '2'. The idea of 2 is saying, "I can group 1 and 1 into another type of 1'. 1 does not therefore cause 2 to come into being, its a prerequisite for its being.

I believe beauty is the impression of a being or place which is conducive to existence. Existence being a conglomeration of balanced differences, existence being conducive to healthy life, and existence being triggering healthy and deep thoughts.

I like this. I think it's a useful way of looking at the issue. I hadn't thought of it in these terms before. — T Clark

Thank you, I'm glad its something new to think about.

Truth must exist first for reason to matter.
— Philosophim

Hmmm... I wonder if I agree with this. — T Clark

That statement only makes sense in relation to the sentence prior.

The mistake is thinking that if one has created a framework that leads to a conclusion through reason alone, that this necessarily makes the conclusion true. Truth must exist first for reason to matter. — Philosophim

We can come to reasonable conclusions that are not true, and that was all that was intended by that last sentence. There is of course value alone in reason even if it does not sometimes lead to the truth, as reason is our best tool to find out what actually is true. But if there were no truth that we were actually mulling on, such reason would be no more useful than a flight of fancy.

Too bad, that's the definition of good.
— Philosophim

Nah my guy. The definitions of good vary between 'that which is desired', 'that which is required' and ; 'that which is morally right'. — AmadeusD

No moral good is ever about what people simply want. If I desire to murder a person, no one sane would call that 'good'. "Desire" in this case is, "What should be." That which is required is "What should be." And "That which is morally right" is "What should be." If you have a definition of good that doesn't include "What should be", then you're not talking about a moral good.

To be clear, this doesn't define "where, what, why, how, or who determines" what should be. Its just that the common kernel of every viable definition of moral good entails, "What should be".

Why should one do that which is good? No, I don't think that good is synonymous with, "something one ought to do". — Hyper

Too bad, that's the definition of good. What you're really asking is, "How do I know if I ought to do this?" In which you can discuss and debate trying to find some objective solution, descend into the idiocy that is subjective morality, or give up because its too hard but you can't admit that and say, 'There is no morality.'

If you are genuinely interested in the subject, you may be interested here: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14044/knowledge-and-induction-within-your-self-context/p1 I've spent years considering it. There's a summary after the initial OP from the next poster that breaks it down nicely.

A few things to add to this:

Reason is simply identifying something logically. A leads to be, or A sometimes leads to B for example. Sufficient reason is that there is a logical descriptor that correctly identifies what is true.

In other words, what exists, exists. Reason is the way we interpret that existence in a way that fits in with a logical framework. As an example: The big bang appeared from nothing. If that is true, then the sufficient reason for that happening is simply a logical framework that accurately leads to this result.

In other words: Everything can be sufficiently reasoned to if one knows what is true. This is purely through the invention of a human framework that can result in the correct conclusion. The mistake is thinking that if one has created a framework that leads to a conclusion through reason alone, that this necessarily makes the conclusion true. Truth must exist first for reason to matter.

Would this mean, then, that true evil is impossible, per Law of Conservation of Mass? — Outlander

It means that the worst case evil scenario is impossible IF we are correct about the Conservation of Mass. Evil and good are relative quantifications. Meaning we can still have some serious evil like human life being wiped out.

Does that mean if we disallow cruel or violent (albeit new) interactions, inventions, ideas, and existences we are evil? Surely not? — Outlander

Lets translate it to, "Does that mean if we disallow evil interactions we are evil?" No. What we have to be careful is what we ascribe as 'evil'. For example, what if I say, "Trans women are not actual women?" Some might consider that idea cruel. Objectively though, its simply a thought that is needed to have a conversation. "Killing all trans people" is objectively evil, but talking about them is not. Even someone saying, "We should kill all trans people" is not necessarily evil, just repugnant. But if they kept those feelings to themselves, we wouldn't know about it and have the attempt to change their mind to be better.

An evil interaction is defined as something that lowers the totality of existence overall. There's no real benefit to it. For example, I decide to nuke a city for fun. The existence of one person's fun is objectively much less than the destruction of an entire city and its people, just from the basic standpoint of you are removing the fun from potentially thousands of people vs one.

Example. Going with the premise. Say, in the not too distant future, man has advanced in warfare and weaponry birthing the existence of a bomb whose yield would destroy the entire planet. Say it is somehow known, this weapon would inevitably be used. Would a hypothetical contagion that wipes out 99.9% of life on Earth thus preventing said weapon from ever being used not be 'good' in such a scenario under the above circumstances? According to this premise, it would, as it prevents a larger decrease in quantitative existence. — Outlander

Correct. But you know what would be even better? Having humanity not use the weapon and they all live. We can invent strange and horrific scenarios, but just because we get a better outcome in a very specific set of circumstances it does not eliminate that there are potentially better solutions if we expand the totality of the thought experiment to what is more realistic.

Even in this scenario, the optimal choices would be to either destroy the weapon, or convince the side that would use it to not do so. The optimal choice in almost all circumstances is to allow the most existence in harmony with other existences as much as possible.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/15203/in-any-objective-morality-existence-is-inherently-good/p1

This is if you're interested for an argument and breakdown. In short: Existence. In long? Existences that keep a level of quantitative existence at a set level, or higher. Bad existences would decrease the overall quantitative existence. For example, matter being completely destroyed would be evil. But an atom breaking into electrons, that then interact with other atoms to create something more than an atom alone, is a greater existence and therefore more good.

Taken in human existence, it is about how we exist and interact with others. Do we allow the same existence? Do we allow new interactions, inventions, ideas, and existences? Then we are good. Do we murder, steal, inhibit creativity, destroy with abandon, and only allow a few select existences to flourish? Then we are evil.

I don't have a lot of time to dive into what you're saying, but you might find this post of mine links into yours. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/15203/in-any-objective-morality-existence-is-inherently-good/p1

Sorry for the delay Bob, my work and life have recently picked up quite a bit, and I have not had enough time recently to sit down and address your post in full. The conversation seems to be continuing on with others at least, so keep examining apriori and aposteriori with them. I'll see you in another post when my time becomes more available again.

If you want to use ‘real’ in your more generic sense, then that is fine: it does not avoid the issue that the a priori preconditions for that experience are not a part of reality—they are, rather, the epistemic ‘tools’ which human cognition has for cognizing reality. Do you see this difference I am noting (irregardless of the semantics)? — Bob Ross

I think so, but this is usually handled with the terms empirical and non-empirical. Both experiences of the empirical and non-empirical are real. The only question is when we state that our conclusions of the experience are not contradicted by reality. I may experience a tree, but if I then claim, "That tree exists as an entity, not only in my experience, then we are making claims about reality that extend beyond our experience. To claim it exists as a tree is to claim that it exists independently of me.

So for example, if I experience a tree in a forest, that's real. But if I say, "I know that tree exists as a real entity apart from me," then we are applying our discrete experiences in ways beyond the experience itself. This is where the terms belief and knowledge come into play. Deductively I can know its a tree by going over a careful process. Inductively I can believe the tree will still be there when I shut my eyes. Empirical experiences are experiences that are assumed to be sensations that represent things outside of myself. Non-empirical sensations are those which are generated inside of myself. But they're all sensations, and they're all real.

The term real simply means, 'what exists'. I feel the above terms are clear and largely unambiguous, which is important for any model and discussion of knowledge. My issues is, "What is apriori"? Its not clear, and its not unambiguous. And if we can't make it clear and unambiguous, then maybe its not a great term to use. In the above two paragraphs, what would you consider apriori? What clarity and accuracy would the term add?

My point is, is that any discrete experience is real.

It is not a part of reality, though. Do you agree with that? — Bob Ross

No, your discrete experiences exist. They are real. It is our interpretation of those existences when we start to claim, "Because I experience X, I know that X exists apart from myself," that we get into beliefs and knowledge.

“discrete” is a word which references an idea engrained, fundamentally, in space. You may say that ‘space’ is not conceptually known, self-reflectively, by merely discretely experiencing, but do you agree that, at least, space is the ingrained form of that experience in virtue of which it is discrete? — Bob Ross

No, I can't agree that the term 'discrete' references space in some way. I feel like you're confusing 'living in space' with 'knowing space'. Because we live in space, we will act and sense things from space. Again, my reference to an amoeba. All things act as if they live in space, because they are beings that live in space. There is a basic instinct and capability to come to terms with this, and to learn how to ambulate, eat, and live in space. But no living thing has knowledge prior to interacting with space. Go one further. An electron circles around a hydrogen atom. Does it do this because it knows space and time apriori? When it is flooded with energy and separates, does it do this because it innately knows how? This is just the way its being reacts to stimulus. So too with living beings.

The way a being lives, even a conscious one, is to have experiences. These discrete experiences become memories, and beliefs can form about them. Only a process of deductive justification can result in knowledge of whether those beliefs are true or not. As such, no knowledge is innate, because all knowledge is born of experience.

I need clarification: are you asking for an example of a prior vs. a posteriori aspects of experience OR a priori vs. a posteriori knowledge? — Bob Ross

I don't know myself. What do you see as 'apriori'? What does the word mean without ambiguity? Does it need to have another term tied to it like experience or knowledge? If so, give both.

My point is that I am unable to see your division between aprior space and aposteriori space.

There is no a posteriori space—it is pure intuition. What I think you are confusing is self-reflective knowledge with transcendental knowledge (and innate capacities, as you would put it). — Bob Ross

Apriori and aposteriori are often seen as divisions between 'knowledge apart from experience (I generously say "apart from the empirical"' to fix this, and "Knowledge from experience (or the empirical). So there should be an aposteriori conception of space. If I measure the table as being 1 meter long, isn't that an aposteriori conception of space? If that's not, what is it? Further, what is a clear term of 'transcendental knowledge' vs 'self-reflective knowledge'? How are these different from beliefs?

1. Babies experience (outer objects) in space.
2. Babies do not have any self-reflective conceptual capacities (through reason) that they experience (outer objects) in space nor what ‘space’ is as ‘extension’.
3. A child can, at some stage of development, understand notionally what space is without being about to apply language to explain it.
4. Adults have a self-reflective understanding of what space is, and can apply language to explain it. — Bob Ross

Translated:
1. Babies have discrete experiences. Some of these are empirical, or through the senses.
2. Babies do not express apparent knowledge beyond instinct that there is a thing that exists outside of themselves that we identify as 'space'.
3. A child eventually comes to realize that there is an outside reality apart from itself.
4. Adults can create an identity for the idea that there is something outside of one's own consciousness called 'space'.

No, we are continually experiencing. Then, we create discrete experiences

Hmmm, maybe I am misremembering your theory: I thought you agreed with me that our experience is inherently, innately, discrete; which implies that space and time are the forms, even if you don’t think they are pure a priori, of that experience. — Bob Ross

No, my point is that we experience, then we focus on parts of that experience. Over time we refine this. Thus a child has the experience of living, but the discrete identity of 'space' is not formed yet. It is like looking out into the vast ocean for the first time, then realizing there's waves, and that patch over there is a different color. We can also go reverse. Experience the parts, then then expand to a whole. But as a new being, there can only be the flood of sensations that we slowly part and parcel over time. I have a theory that shrooms diminish or shut off this discrete experience aspect for a time based on testimony of people saying they stopped seeing divisions and saw everything as one. (Just a fun aside)

Here’s one of the roots of our confusion: you are failing to recognize that cognition has a dual meaning on english—it can refer to our self-reflective cognition (e.g., thinking about our experience) or our transcendental cognition (e.g., our brains thinking about how to construct experience). I would like you to address this distinction, because you keep equivocating them throughout your posts. — Bob Ross

I see no difference between these two definitions. Empirical and non-empirical are clear and distinct. I don't see how these definitions are clear or add anything to the discussion. What is the difference between thinking about the experience and how to construct it?

If I see red and think, "That's red" how is that different from I see red and "That' red, and I want to imagine red"? In both cases, we observe red, so that seems self-reflective. But what thought that we are conscious of is not self-reflective? Experiences are by nature, conscious. How is that conscious thought any different from saying, 'that red, and..."?

For the senses:

"But your body also has receptors for events occurring inside you, such as your beating heart, expanding lungs, gurgling stomach and many other movements that you’re completely unaware of. They’re traditionally grouped together as another sense, called ‘interoception’."

All of this can simply be summed up as, "empirical sensations". Non-empirical thoughts are things like imagination. They aren't instantly deemed to represent something outside of our internal consciousness in reality. We can invent a thing like a unicorn and say, "Maybe that exists." But that's not the same as getting the image of a horse with a horn from our sight. Analyzing our thoughts is not a sense, because senses are empirical. This makes a nice and clear division which allows logical discussion. The less muddy the terms, the better.

Your thoughts are not represented to you. You experience them

Do you deny that your brain is organizing your thoughts in time to construct your experience of them (of which you can introspect)? — Bob Ross

No, your brain organizes information and gives it to you, the conscious part. And that conscious part of you is the brain as well. Its been long known that certain portions of the brain process different sensory areas and allow us certain functions. Damage the sight part of your brain for example, and you can no longer see or visualize. "You" are the conscious entity that is able to discretely experience. To focus on certain aspects, refine, and make judgement calls that the rest of the brain must follow. But I don't see how this processing has anything to do with apriori or aposteriori.

Ok, good discussion again Bob! I think I've addressed everything and made my position more clear. Can you make a clear and unambiguous distinctions between apriori and apoteriori for both being and knowledge? I look forward to your thoughts.

it suggests that experience is structured by inherent cognitive faculties that synthesize sensations into a unified whole, making perception itself possible. — Wayfarer

Understood. But this is a different claim then, "Innate knowledge apart from experience". Its not knowledge. Its instinct and being. We do not have to have ever thought of the concepts time or space, and we would still function because we are beings of time and space. The argument that our ability to function is innate knowledge, means that even a single cell amoeba has an innate knowledge of time and space. That's absurd. It is a being in time and space. That doesn't mean it has innate knowledge of it apart from experience.

That process is what is described as 'transcendental' - not in the sense of 'beyond experience' but implicit in the nature of experience. It is 'transcendental' in the sense that it refers to the conditions that are always operative within experience, shaping it from within, not transcending it in a mystical or otherworldly sense. The transcendental conditions Kant describes, which Brook highlights, operate in a way that is fundamentally invisible to direct introspection. They’re not accessible through casual reflection or even careful self-observation, because they are so ingrained in the structure of experience that we can’t “see” them directly. They function as the very backdrop against which experience is possible, like the frame of a picture that remains unseen because our attention is always focused on the content within. — Wayfarer

Yes, this is my point. There is experience, and there are innate ways of experiencing dependent on your being. But this is not 'knowledge'. Knowledge is a process that concludes an interpretation of experience is not contradictory to reality. So the reality of the experience itself is known as one experiences. If I see a pink elephant, it is a real experience that I know I'm having. If I take an extra step and state, "My experience is an accurate representation that there is an actual pink elephant apart from my experience," then we run into beliefs, and must find a way to ascertain whether we can know that it is so. My point has been that 'apriori knowledge' is a misnomer. The definition of knowledge itself does not allow it to exist apart from experience.

One of Brook’s focal points is Kant’s idea of the “transcendental unity of apperception,” which describes the self’s role in providing coherence to experience. Brook interprets this as a fundamental cognitive function: the capacity to unify various sensory inputs and thoughts under a consistent self-conscious perspective. He connects this to modern discussions on self-awareness, suggesting that understanding the self’s role in cognition is critical to grasping how mental states are integrated. Brook also argues that cognitive science benefits from a Kantian perspective in addressing issues like consciousness, self-reference, and the structured nature of perception, showing that Kant’s insights help bridge philosophical inquiry and empirical study, while deepening our grasp of the mind’s foundational structures. — Wayfarer

I have no disagreement with this. But that does not mean 'apriori knowledge' is a term that holds up under scrutiny. Kant is not describing knowledge, he is describing being.

In all these approaches, Kant’s idea that our minds contribute fundamental structures to experience remains a guiding principle. Each tradition takes up Kant’s insight in its own way, exploring how knowledge, perception, and meaning arise through active engagement with the world, rather than as direct imprints of objective reality. — Wayfarer

I agree that Kant's influence on philosophy and its evolution are phenomenal. My disagreement is not with Kant, or to imply he is a bad philosopher in any way. My point is that the apriori and aposteriori distinction has serious problems with it that can be resolved with a much better model of 'being' and 'knowledge'.

The a priori aspects of your experience exist (viz., ‘there are these a priori aspects to your experience) but they are not real (viz., ‘these a priori aspects of your experience are not in reality but, rather, modes of cognizing reality). — Bob Ross

How is it not real? Its a real experience. Its our interpretation by noting whether our real experience can be accurately applied beyond the current experience we are having. So, I can discretely experience what I call a 'tree', and that discrete experience is real. But is my belief that it is a tree something that I know, or something that I believe? That's when we apply. If we have to have two definitions of 'real', perhaps we should re-examine how we're putting our model together.

Space, as a pure intuition, is not in reality nor it is a property sensed of the objects that are in reality: it is the way that your brain is pre-structured to intuit phenomena; and so space, as a pure form of sensibility, is not real (because it is not of reality) but certainly exists (as a pre-structured way for your brain to represent and intuit sensations). — Bob Ross

My point is, is that any discrete experience is real. You experience space. Then, when you apply that belief about space by reaching out to grab something, you apply that belief accurately and are able to retrieve that cup. But we have all misjudged space before in application. I've reached out to grab something and missed. Thought I would catch a ball when I opened my hand and didn't. But I don't know 'space' as a discrete experience apart from experience. Knowledge cannot be gained without experience.

Perhaps what would help is to clearly show a non-empirical aposteriori example and an empirical apriori example?

I did that with space: what did you disagree with there? — Bob Ross

You need to be extremely clear. If I judge space as catching a ball, what part is apriori, what is aposteriori? If babies cannot grasp spatial relations prior to six months, what do they know about space apriori?

The scientific fact you pointed to was whether a young person knows what space is; and not if it transcendentally uses it to intuit and cognize objects for its conscious experience; nor if it transcendentally uses it with its self-reflective reason to understand its own conscious experience of things. — Bob Ross

My point is that I am unable to see your division between aprior space and aposteriori space. Philosophy should always side with what is currently known, and the solid science of spatial awareness development in kids is something we should not dismiss. Otherwise we're debating fiction.

Space and time are identities we create to label experiences

Then, you must believe that you aren’t consciously experiencing in space and time before you conceptually understood that you were; which is nonsense. — Bob Ross

No, we are continually experiencing. Then, we create discrete experiences. Two of those are 'space' and 'time'. We then apply these identities to the reality we experience to make it to work on time by driving a car to another location. Just because we use the concepts of space and time without thinking, does not mean that these concepts and their application was done apart from the experience we built from our first moments out of the womb (Possibly within too).

Space and time are pure a priori, because they are not based off of sensations at all. — Bob Ross

No. This is just wrong. It is a fact that the concepts of space and time are developed over time. It is on you to show proof that space and time are concepts apart from experience. I'm siding with science on this one.

How is this different from any other identity like 'red', 'giraffe' or 'Bob'? :)

It depends on what you mean. If you mean an concept which we self-reflective deploy for our conscious experience, then it is no different. — Bob Ross

Correct. Then everything is apriori. Because we experience everything by discrete experiences. But that isn't knowledge. That's just the ability to sort our experience into 'pieces' or 'identities'. Creating an identity is distinctive knowledge. It is not applicable knowledge. But no distinctive knowledge is gained apart from experience. There is no innate knowledge. Just the innate capability to discretely experience.

No, reason does not fundamentally think in terms of space. It thinks in terms of discrete experience.

That’s what conceptual space is! It is transcendental, because it is necessary precondition for the possibility of using self-reflective reason. Therefore, I am right in concluding, even in your terminology, that we must already use space even when we don’t know what space is. — Bob Ross

Incorrect. Space is a concept we learn by bodily extension. Discrete experience comes first, the concept of 'space' comes after. Discrete experience happens whether we come up with the concept of space or not. Lets take your point in another way. "I breath, therefore I must already know what breathing is before I've ever breathed." No, you don't know what its like to breath before you breath. You have the potential and capability to. But it is not 'innate knowledge'. Existing and living in space, and learning that and adapting to it, does not mean you have innate knowledge of time and space.

There are only five of them.

We already agreed this is false; and scientifically it is utterly false. — Bob Ross

No, I did not agree to this. Please link to a scientific reference to senses beyond the five.

Let’s take the simplest example of inner sense: thoughts about thoughts. I can introspectively analyze my own thinking about other things, and this is because my inner thoughts are presented to me in time. If my inner thoughts were not presented to me, if they were not represented to me, then they would not be formulated experientially, consciously, in succession. — Bob Ross

Your thoughts are not represented to you. You experience them. There is really one thing in itself that we know of. Your experience. The act of 'experiencing' is the subjective reality that is, and there is nothing more that it represents. We can think about it. We can wonder how its put together. Adding an extra layer of 'represents' doesn't mean anything. We have thoughts, and we have thoughts on thoughts. But those thoughts on thoughts are still thoughts. They are experiences. We can know them as we have them. But we do not know them before we have them.

I can know I discretely experience. But I don't have to know what I discretely experience to discretely experience. The act itself is not knowledge. Knowledge comes after/during the act. We can exist in time and space without knowing about time and space. It doesn't mean we innately know about time and space. This false conclusion you are drawing is that because we exist in time and space, that we must have innate knowledge about time and space. No. Knowledge is learned by experience. Knowledge by definition, cannot be innate.

there's a current philosopher, Lawrence BonJour, who writes about role of a priori knowledge and philosophical rationalism. As it happens, I've found a rather good and quite brief video on BonJour's ideas, by a professor of philosophy, which you can review here. — Wayfarer

That's nice of Wayfarer, thank you.

I was using my terminology too loosely and that is my fault: what I should have said is “<…> independently of our experience of reality”, as that denotes the aspects of experience which are a posteriori—i.e., empirical. — Bob Ross

If reality is 'what is', then isn't anything we experience reality? Again, what it seems you want to say is there is a distinction between the classic empirical and non-empirical modes of experience.

By “experience”, I just generically mean the conscious awareness of which one is having; so why would I say there’s an a priori and a posteriori aspect to that experience? Because, simply put, there are things which my brain is adding into the mix (i.e., are synthetical) which are not actually of the sensations (of objects in reality) in order for it to represent them in the conscious experience which I will have of them. — Bob Ross

Again, this seems to be an empirical and non-empirical distinction. Perhaps what would help is to clearly show a non-empirical aposteriori example and an empirical apriori example?

If the sensations are intuited in space and time, then space and time are not contained themselves in the sensations; and it is even clearer when you realize that your brain cannot possibly learn how to represent things with extension nor succession to do it in the first place. — Bob Ross

But this is just wrong. Modern day neuroscience and understanding of brain development shows this is a learned process. I get what Kant was saying hundreds of years ago, but we've learned much more about the brain since then. Again, I will note what is possible is that we have the capacity to understand space and time through our being. But that is not knowledge that we already know without experience. Space and time are identities we create to label experiences. But we don't know these identities before we encounter them.

So, e.g., space and time are forms in and of which your brain represents things and are not properties of the things-in-themselves (whatever they may be). — Bob Ross

But this is everything, and not exclusive to space and time. Any identity attributed as a representation is not the property of the thing in itself. The thing in itself is the logical layer of the unknown upon which all representations rest. And that's it. There's nothing that can ever be concluded from it besides that.

in which the content of experience is placed; and this is just a simplified way of saying that they are a priori and used to represent a posteriori content.[/quote]

How is this different from any other identity like 'red', 'giraffe' or 'Bob'? :)

— Bob Ross

No. I think that there’s a difference between the self-reflective reason—i.e., meta-cognition and self-consciousness—and non-self-reflective reason (i.e., cognition and consciousness). My brain has the “capacity”, as you put it, to represent in space and this extensional representation is not a reflection of any extension, per se, that an object itself actually has; but I must come to know, by experience, that I can extract out one of the forms of my experience as spatiality and that is is a priori. — Bob Ross

you cannot have thoughts without separation of objects/concepts/abstractions. This requires a spatial aspect not deduced frmo the objects/concepts/abstractions. — AmadeusD

Bob, are you talking about the ability to discretely experience? This requires no innate understanding of space, just the ability to separate what one experiences into identities. "Space" is a very particular identity that assumes depth and location. We can learn this, but its not innate knowledge. Having experience, then being able to focus and divide that experience into 'experiences' is innate. We can also know the division of these experiences once we have make them. This division of experiences at its base, does not necessitate space or any form of empiricism. That is developed later.

It was an catchy way of saying “not all knowledge is acquired and grounded in empirical data—a posteriori data”: there are certain ways we are pre-structured to perceive which necessarily are not reflections of anything in reality. — Bob Ross

The problem is this assumes that experiences apart from the empirical are not reality. Every experience you have is part of reality. The question of whether your interpretation of that experience represents aspects of reality beyond the experience itself (I see water, therefore water is a X location in space and not a mirage) is correct when applied beyond the inductive.

How is knowledge gained apriori?

Through experience, but not through empirical data. It is a transcendental investigation into how our cognition represents things, independently of what is being represented, in pre-structured ways. — Bob Ross

Again, there are problems here because you note that empirical data is reality, while non-empirical data is not.

I was entertaining your idea that someone could be thinking, self-reflectively, without ever having an inner or outer sense of space. If that is true, then they still would implicitly being using the concept of space, because reason fundamentally thinks in terms of space. — Bob Ross

No, reason does not fundamentally think in terms of space. It thinks in terms of discrete experience. It thinks in terms of inductions and deductions based off of this discrete experience. I see water over there, when I normally see water, in my past experience this means there is water over there. I go over there, and the water vanishes. It was a mirage. Distinctive knowledge, beliefs, and the application of those beliefs. Empirical experiences are merely one subset of discrete experiences. "Space" is one such concept that is formed and reasoned on. It is not known innately.

Of course there are inner senses: they are senses of oneself or, more broadly, any sense capable of sensing the being which has those senses. — Bob Ross

Senses refer to the empirical. There are only five of them. Using the term, 'inner sense' as if it means 'one of the five senses' is a misnomer. Self-reflection is a type of thought, not a sense. If you start blending sense into internal thoughts, then the this easily makes every experience a sense. Its good to have tight separations of terms at times or else you run into making it too generic. Self-reflection after all is simply conscious awareness. Which means non-self-reflective awareness can also be a sense...and now the term 'sense' doesn't really mean much anymore beyond 'experience'.

There’s so much densely packed into section 4, of which you wanted me to read, that I am clueless as to what you are wanting to discuss about it. — Bob Ross

It was more to note the point between apriori as 'without experience' vs aposteriori as 'with experience' and your note that there is a difference between empirical and non-empirical experience. My point is that finding that dividing line between what is gained with empirical experience, vs none at all, doesn't leave us with anything we could commonly call knowledge.

Isn't how we perceive reality also how we empirically experience reality? A color blind person would have a different empirical experience then a normal color sighted person. Is that experience apriori or aposteriori?

“empirically experience” doesn’t make sense, and is the source of your confusion: like I said before, ‘experience’ is both in part a priori and a posteriori; and it necessarily must be that way. — Bob Ross

Then I need a little clarification as to what you mean by this below:

How can one have experience and also not have experience?

I was noting that not all aspects of experience are empirical; — Bob Ross

I interpreted this to mean we can have empirical experience, and non-empirical experience. What is the difference between apriori and aposteriori experience in your view then?

We do not have five senses: any pre-structured means of receptivity of objects (which includes ourselves) is form of sensibility. So, introspection, proprioception, echolocation, and electrolocation are straightforwardly senses; — Bob Ross

I'll agree that proprioception and echolocation are definitely senses, but introspection? There's no reading of the outside world in this case. So if I'm thinking about the outside world, its not a sense, but if I'm thinking about myself, its a sense?

memory is just the reinvocation of previous experience and so is has both a priori and a posteriori aspects to it; and hallucination, although they didn’t mention it, has for its a posteriori aspects fabricated data. — Bob Ross

And where is this distinct separation in memory? If an illusion, which is a misinterpretation of empirical sense data is aposteriori, is any misinterpretation of anything aposteriori? The point here is its difficult to see the dividing line.

What truly separates the two?

I’ve made it clear what separates them: what are you contending is wrong with my distinction? — Bob Ross

If it was clear, I would not be asking again. :) I'm noting that in practice, giving an example of how one can have knowledge apart from experience doesn't make any sense. Apriori knowledge is often understood as understanding something independently from experience. You noted earlier that apriori does involve experience, but you seemed to divide this experience between the empirical and non-empirical. This is where I'm confused.

a priori justification is linked closely to knowledge: it would be evidence grounded in the way we experience as opposed to what we experience if we take the Kantian use of the terms, and more broadly it would be any evidence grounded in the way we think about reality as opposed anything about reality itself (e.g., law of identity as a logical law by which we self-reflectively reason about our experience). — Bob Ross

See this is generally not seen as knowledge. If I have the capability to see red, that's just an innate part of my being. Its not something I 'know'. If I've never seen red before, I can have the capacity to know what it is when I see it, but I don't know what red is apart from experience.

In principle, there can be a human which lacks the faculty of understand and reason such that there is no space in which objects are being represented, because there’s nothing being represented (from the outer senses) at all. — Bob Ross

Right, they don't know what space is in that sense, because they've never encountered it before. They have the capacity to understand what space is, but no experience to know what space is in that way. What you seem to be claiming, and correct me if I'm wrong, is that someone knows what space is before they've experienced it. Even under the JTB, knowledge is a 'justified true belief'. Where is the justification, or the belief in something one has never experienced?

As I've noted, there really is no mental difference between the empirical and non-empirical. To me, the true difference is in 'application' or 'assertion'. The empirical asserts that one's mental constructs represent an intake of something independent of oneself, while 'mental' aspects, such as thoughts and memory, are taken to be something that is dependent on oneself. Or maybe a better phrasing is, "of the self". But they are both experiences. — Philosophim

Then I'm not sure you're actually using apriori correctly. I agree with this notion, but I'm not sure that's what Kant actually believes. We seem to have a notion of 'without experience, but experience'. There's a lack of a terminology that doesn't devolve into contradictions here.

Not everything you said is rooted in the empirical aspect of experience; and that’s what you are equivocating. That a person could think without experiencing anything in space and, let’s grant for your point, which I highly doubt is possible, who lacks a concept of space does not lack it because of lacking empirical data—they lack it because one of the a priori pure forms of sensibility, space, was never used by the brain (because perhaps their brain is damaged and cannot do it). They lack the concept of space self-reflectively because they’ve never had an outer experience (which would include that a priori form). — Bob Ross

Breaking this down, you're pointing out what I am. You can't reflect on space if you've never experienced space. Meaning that any knowledge gained from this would come from experience. How is knowledge gained? How is knowledge gained apriori? How is this 'apriori knowledge' a JTB?

On a separate note, this hypothetical is impossible in actuality; for one cannot think, self-reflectively, through reason without using the concept of space—even if they have never experienced it. — Bob Ross

This makes no sense. If you've never experienced space or its concepts, you don't know it. Moving your fingers and coming up with an idea or notion of space is learned by experience, not apart from it.

How does a person who has no senses understand space?

Assuming you mean that they have no outer or inner senses; then they cannot understand space, because they lack the ability to understand anything—what you are describing is a dead person. — Bob Ross

I'm just talking about lacking the five senses. "Inner senses" is a misnomer. Senses refer to the five ways we are able to gain information from the outside world.

Babies from birth represent objects in space, but they do not from birth know that in which the objects are represented is space; but once they have the sufficient self-reflective cognitive abilities, they can know it and it is a priori knowledge because it is not justified by any empirical data—it is justified by the non-empirical way that their brain is representing. — Bob Ross

But it is justified by the experience of space. Again, I agree that babies have an innate capacity to come to certain conclusions about space, but that knowledge is learned by experience. Where is the knowledge of space without experience, which is the idea of 'apriori knowledge'? The ability to see red, does not mean one knows what red is before one has experienced it. Do we have apriori knowledge of red? No. Because apriori knowledge doesn't make sense as Kant defined it.