Describe a situation in nature wherein necessity is important apart from sentients. — ucarr

Necessity is not important, its what is. I'll repeat the example I already gave: If a tree falls in a forest and no one is around, it still vibrates the air molecules.

All I got from this is the idea that our minds cannot perfectly be the world, but are abstract representations. That's fine. Causality doesn't care whether you observe it or not. When a tree falls in the forest and no one is around, it still vibrates air. This theory does not care about whether we are accurate in any particular causality, it is about causality as a necessary reality. Human minds are not required.

On what grounds do you assume "space-time" was "caused"? It seems to me, Philosophim, you're asking, in effect, "what caused causality?" :roll: — 180 Proof

I'm actually not. To break down the entire conversation into a better summary than the OP, what I'm claiming is that there must be at least one thing that is uncaused, which then causes other things to happen. The case of an 'infinitely eternally existing space-time' is in your mind, is uncaused. The OP notes that such a thing must necessarily exist, so your belief in this existence is in alignment with the OP, not against it.

No, not "first" but only: existence, being sui generis, is the only cause of everything – causality itself – which in Relativistic physics is often described as the "Block Universe" or in metaphysics, as Spinoza conceives of it sub specie aeternitatus, as "substance" (i.e. natura naturans³)⁴. — 180 Proof

My first thought when you explained this was, "That's basically God," I then read your links and saw that was what Spinoza was doing. Not in the Christian or deist sense of course, but describing a Godlike existence without the need for consciousness.

None of this contrasts with the point I'm making here. If you believe that a Spinozan type universe is possible, my points agree with this. The only difference is that any claim one makes to an 'uncaused substance' must offer proof that it is indeed uncaused. Otherwise, its an act of faith and just as possible as any other idea a person can come up with.

Perhaps now you can better appreciate my efforts towards independent inferential thinking in response to what you write. — ucarr

No, I really don't understand what you're trying to say or how this relates to the topic. Your writing is unclear and I am making a good faith effort to understand it. Please try again to make what you are saying more clear. Otherwise, no, I am not going to keep going.

If you introduce a new idea and people have questions about it, it is your job to do whatever you can to make it clear when reasonable inquiry is made. Just like I have done for you when you have had questions about my work. The person who is introducing an idea, you in this case, is doing so with the intent to impart value and possibly persuade someone else. It is not the responsibility of someone who reads it and engages with you to solve your riddles when they are simply trying to understand your initial points. I am currently unable to understand your ideas, and I am respectfully asking you to clarify them if you want me to remain engaged.

Are you saying that all a priori deductions don't take any time to realize?
— Philosophim

Do a priori deductions take time to be true? How much time does it take for two + two to equal four? — ucarr

Ucarr, I'm asking a question to understand what you're trying to say. Returning my question with a another question is just more confusing. :) In fact, all of my questions you just answered with questions. My questions are not statements, I'm just trying to figure out what you're saying.

Counter Premise: A priori deduction ≠ a posteriori deduction along the measurement axis of time. — ucarr

What does this mean Ucarr? Are you saying that all a priori deductions don't take any time to realize? And I'm further confused in how any of this addresses the issue of cause and effect.

Question A: Deduction can lead to knowledge only by empirical observation in time?

Deduction does not require empirical observation. But we need to think through it right? Are you saying time doesn't exist? I'm confused again.

Question B: Deduction can lead to knowledge both by observation in time and by abstract reasoning? — ucarr

Are you saying that abstract reasoning does not take time? Can we observe things outside of time? I'm not sure where you're going here.

I'll try to rephrase it. The effect comes from the cause (by definition), so the effect includes the cause. For example, the plant includes its seed, because the plant is the-seed-that-grew. The plant is the continuation of the seed. (This continuation already blurs the border between cause and effect, by the way). — LFranc

What you might be implying here can be easily captured by determinism. If A causes B, then necessarily along a timeline it was A which caused B to happen. Causality is capturing all of the aspects that are necessary for A or B to exist. If something could exist without something necessary besides itself, in other words, A simply existed because of its own undeniable existence, and nothing else, we would call A a 'first cause'. A 'first cause' is the only aspect of existence free from the determinism of its inception, or eternal existence (if that is how it exists).

if causality is necessary (like science and Spinoza say), then the cause has to produce this effect, in this specific way and at this specific moment. So, in a way the effect is already there in the cause, for nothing else can happen but this effect. — LFranc

Saying the effect is 'already there in the cause' is just a misuse of language. If the effect hasn't happened yet, its not there. We can say, "This cause will result in X effect in five seconds if nothing else enters the picture". That's fine. But that doesn't mean the cause and effect exist simultaneously. Determinism still requires time to unfold.

But humans can comprehend, with rationality, that, in a way, everything happens at once, which is what Spinoza calls "considering things sub specie aeternitatis", "under the aspect of eternity", as you probably know. — LFranc

Yeah, that's poetry, not anything based in actual fact. We can imagine a world without time, but we live in a world of time. You and I haven't already died right? So the notion that everything has happened all at once beyond flowery language and the imagination, is absurd in reality.

Science often thinks in terms of laws and not causes indeed. For example, law of gravitation: is it the Earth that attracts the moon or the other way around? The answer is: both, it's a law, a relationship, not a causality. — LFranc

Science often thinks in terms of causality as well. I've heard this claim that 'science doesn't like causality' and it turns out its only philosophers. Scientists use causality every single day as its core to science. "What causes gravity to exist?" is a great mystery scientists would love to solve.

my metaphysical position more or less agrees with Spinoza's: there is no "outside of space-time" (or "beyond" with "possibilities") insofar as nature is unbounded in all directions (i.e. natura naturans is eternal and infinite) — 180 Proof

I wanted to note that I have had no issue with this. My question to you is: "What caused space-time?" And to clarify how to think about this, take the idea that spacetime has always existed, and put it in a set. From spacetime is our ultimate cause for the existence of all other matter and phenomenon. This is still fine. So this set captures all of causality through infinite time.

Now the question: What caused this set? Was there anything necessary that lead to space-time existing, or does it just exist because it does? If there is nothing prior which explains why space-time had to have existed forever or exists as it does, then we have reached a first cause. It is the cause of all other things, yet has no cause for its own being besides its own existence.

The brain model applies to brains as emergent and affecting matter in the present.

The signal back propagation idea is speculative but if it exists could be relavent to a first cause.

For me it's something to keep in mind. — Mark Nyquist

Another form of retrocausality is information based. Our brains hold concepts of past, present and future so an anticipated future event can affect the physical present. For example we do things based on future projections like storing food, preparing for storms, launching space probes and preparing for wars. All things not possible without brains so brains can affect matter. Would it be relavent to a first cause? I don't know but it's a mechanism that appears to operate differently than lesser forms of physical matter are capable of. — Mark Nyquist

This has no relevancy to a first cause that I can see. What caused your brain to remember X? What caused your brain to be created? And so we go down a chain of causality.

Since the cause cannot not produce the effect, it means the effect already lies in the cause somehow (and it means that time is a kind of illusion for Spinoza but that's another matter).
But then: how can the cause produce an effect, since the effect already exists?
Therefore, nothing can really be produced, and this kills causality. — LFranc

Everything doesn't exist all at once, but over time. It doesn't matter if there is perfect determinism, we have to watch it unfold. So no, causality is fine.

Or rather, it shows that causality is contradictory: causality can exist thanks to the absence of causality, and vice versa. That, of course, is a very short presentation of this subject (source: Brief Solutions to Philosophical Problems Using a Hegelian Method, Solution 10) — LFranc

I think we need the larger presentation because I'm not sure you're conveying the nuance needed here. Without the context of the paper, what you said makes no sense.

Give me some example that makes humans magic then
— Philosophim

Show me where said that human beings are magic. — Wayfarer

I never did. This is pointless to engage anymore Wayfarer. Lets let the thread get back to its original topic.

Ah I see Patterner. I don't think we have any substantial disagreement then. :)

Whatever the gap between fly and bat is, I don't think it approaches the gap between bat and human. — Patterner

Its not about a specific measurement of the gap, its about the fact that the gap is a wide gulf between the two. A mammal can run intellectual circles around a bug. A human can run intellectual circles around a bat.

Humans intelligence goes indescribably far beyond that of any other species. We think about things no other species thinks about. Things no other species can think about. — Patterner

Right, that's the natural consequence of being the best. Just like an insect can't hope to think like a bat does, a bat can't hope to think like a human does. Are we indescribably different though? We see other forms of intelligence like apes and orangutangs. Its not like we come out of left field like its some form of magic. We're made out of DNA, we have brains that are similar to other mammals, etc.

I don't see a conflict between being the best in intellect, but also not being apart from nature and the rest of existence. A peregrine falcon can see small movement miles up the sky, and swoop up to 200 miles per hour, which seems impossible to me. Just because its the fastest animal in the world, that doesn't mean its a magical bird that's somehow separate from everything else. Nature is very weird, varied, and easily catalogued by DNA, bone structure, and clear patterns of life.

So I'll ask you, why do you think being the most intelligent being keeps us separate from nature? Why do you think it makes us anymore special then just "Being special in being the most intelligent being?"

Because it is what you're appealing to by declaring that humans are 'just another species' and that the differences between humans and other species is no more significant than the differences between species, generally. — Wayfarer

I'm feeling like you're really not committing to a discussion here, as you are disregarding all of my other points that lead to why I'm saying this. Give me some example that makes humans magic then. Are we composed of something other than DNA? Do we have some type of anatomy that seems completely alien to the planet? It has to be something more than just, "We're the most intelligent species". There is always going to be a most intelligent species, and because it is the most intelligent, it is going to be able to do things other species can't.

The definition I linked to was as follows — Wayfarer

Yes, I read the definition the first time you linked it and I still don't see how this applies. What specifically am I saying that ties in with that definition?

It has been a common assumption that descriptively moral behavior’s diversity, contradictions, and strangeness showed they were based on no unifying principles that explained them all. Advances in game theory in the last few decades reveals that to be a false assumption as I have described. — Mark S

Mind giving a few examples? Your conclusion that cooperation that does not exploit other people is moral does not come from descriptive morality. For example, if I believe exploiting others for my own gain, and I work with other people to profit is moral, that is descriptive. If you're going to conclude, "This person's reason why they think something is moral is wrong, while this other person's contrary reason is correct," you need something more than subjective justification.

What people believe is moral is a function of the biology underlying their moral sense and cultural moral norms. That biology and those cultural norms can be explained in terms of their evolutionary origins. — Mark S

No debate here, but this is ultimately meaningless. All of our actions come from biology. Its why a monkey cannot do what a human does. Its why a disabled person can't skip and jump like someone who can normally walk. Can we show definitively through science a morality that doesn't result in basic contradictions, handles edge cases, and is rationally consistent?

All these cultural norms and biology-based intuitions have a necessary tag that identifies them as “moral”. — Mark S

No. Cultural norms and biology based intuitions alone cannot be called moral. If I have a biological impetus to be a pedophile, its still wrong even if I have a group around me that supports and encourages it. Same with killing babies for sport. You have to explain why the biology and culture that is in conflict with this is correct/incorrect. That requires more than descriptive morality.

The law, and morality, are not the same. There are plenty of laws and cultures we would consider immoral. Descriptive morality takes any objective judgement away from morality, and simply equates it to what society encourages or enforces on others. You will find few adherents to that.

Finding underlying principles in chaotic data sets, such as descriptively moral behaviors, is science’s bread and butter (standard process and practice). — Mark S

No debate with that, but I'm not seeing that here.

The ingroup cooperation strategies that do not exploit those in the ingroup are the universal PART of all descriptively moral behaviors. Any exploiting or threatening to exploit others (outgroups) makes the totality of the behavior only descriptively moral. — Mark S

This makes no sense. Universal means 'across the board'. And yet in the same breath you have descriptive moral behavior that is not universal. Meaning that no, it is NOT universal. You need a clear reason why a group of serial killers who believe killing the weak in society is a moral good are wrong compared to groups of people who think we should support the weak in society with our resources. Descriptive morality alone cannot solve this. This is the inevitable conflict of "What is moral" that always pops up when you have different subjective viewpoints, and needs something outside of the subjective to solve it rationally.

No. There are behaviors that do not exploit or harm others that have nothing to do with morality. To be universally moral, the behaviors must do both, solve cooperation problems and not exploit others. — Mark S

So when I find a bug in my home and decide on my own to capture it in a cup and put it outside instead of stepping on it, that has nothing to do with morality? If someone in trouble tells me they don't need help, but I secretly slip them 20$ that can't be traced back to me, that's has nothing to do with morality? I could give tons more. Very few, if any people, are going to buy into the idea that morality must involve cooperation.

I don't see how any logic can be applied to the situation if we don't know the physics involved first. It's rather futile to try. Want are you doing? Applying a mental overlay to unknown physics?
It doesn't seem reasonable. — Mark Nyquist

Here's one. We don't know the exact nature of time. An interesting twist is the possibility of retrocausality or back propagation of signals. — Mark Nyquist

The OP covers this. Let me break it down for you as simply as possible.

Lets take the idea that the universe has a clear finite start. A -> B -> C with A being the start. What caused A, or the entire set to be? Nothing. There is no prior cause.

Now lets take a set of looped time. A -> B -> C -> A... What caused the entire set to be? In other words, why is there no D? Nothing. There is no prior cause.

Logically, whether infinite regress or finite regress, we will reach a point in causality in which there is no prior cause for its existence. Feel free to ask for more details if needed.

I did not include the derivation of what is universally moral by morality as cooperation in the OP to keep it short and because it was unnecessary to my points. I can’t say everything at once. — Mark S

Not a worry, I understand that.

“Descriptively moral behaviors solve cooperation problems in groups” is arguably scientifically true based on its explanatory power for past and present cultural moral norms and our moral sense. — Mark S

This is weirdly worded. A descriptive moral behavior is why someone does something they believe is moral. Meaning that someone could believe that cooperating with another has nothing to do with morality. Descriptive moral behavior is subjective, therefore more a study of sociology on unreliable narrators than objective science.

Yes, the ingroup cooperation strategies are universal even when used for purposes that exploit or harm others. — Mark S

No, this is not universal. Sometimes people cooperate due to threats or personal profit. They might not morally agree with the situation. For example, getting drafted into a war you think is wrong. Cooperating with a killer because they're threatening your life if you don't. Is this cooperation due to a sense of morality? Most would say no.

Hence, by morality as cooperation, “universally moral behaviors solve cooperation problems without exploiting or harming others”. — Mark S

Considering this could be applied to problems that don't require cooperation, isn't the real claim of morality more along the line of "Taking actions without exploiting or harming others?"

By the fact it is not the same material as a brain.
— Philosophim
So, what different material is mind of AI? In what sense is mind of AI different from human mind? — Corvus

For one its binary programming. It has different limitations and freedoms from neurological thinking. You can scale an AI to use far more energy than one human brain, as well as transfer information from one hardware station to another.

You can play the same melody on different instruments, but it will have its own sound and feel.
— Philosophim
I am not sure if this is a proper comparison. Mind has its own will, volition, intentions and desires as well as emotions, feelings, perceptions and reasonings. It is a totality of one's whole mental events and operations. — Corvus

Right, that's its own sound and feel. Is your brain the same as your friend's brain? No. You're each different people playing your own version of music or 'mind'.

We are more interested in finding out what is mind made of, if it is physical in its origin or something else in its origin? What is mind's scope and limitation? What is mind's capabilities? What can AI mind do where human minds cannot? and vice versa? Can mind see things beyond what is visible, hence extendable? — Corvus

We've had the solution for a while now. The animalistic mind is formed from neurons. I tell people this all the time: philosophy of the mind without neuroscience is worthless. Neuroscience has answered most of those questions for some time now. 'You' are and expression of your brain. Your feelings to the matter are irrelevant. If we damage your brain, we will damage your 'consciousness'. We can use drugs to inhibit and improve your mind. And if we kill your brain, your mind dies. Its incontrovertible at this point.

You may be confusing 'sight' by the way. Sight is always a construction of the brain. Did you know that when light enters your eyes the image is upside down? The brain corrects all of that. Again, do not study philosophy to learn about the mind. Study modern day neuroscience. Anyone who doesn't is going to be ignorant.

In this thread, I never got the impression that you were arguing for any specific kind of First Cause (What), but merely reasoning about the logical necessity for something to kick-start the chain of Causation (That). — Gnomon

Correct.

When ↪Philosophim says that there is "no limit" on what the Cause of Being might be {see PS below}, he's merely admitting that we are speculating about a state & event that is empirically unverifiable (no known rules), but logically plausible (rules of reasoning) — Gnomon

Also correct. Just one caveat for Ucarr. Currently we are unable to verify that something is a first cause, but we know what would be needed to do it. Thus any claim that "X" is a first cause would need to prove it.

Nevertheless, for the purposes of an amateur forum, we can reasonably conclude that a contingent world (big bang beginning) requires a prior Cause of some kind (infinite ; recursive?) — Gnomon

According to the OP, looking at just the big bang and nothing else, it is not rationally necessary that it requires a prior cause of some kind. However, if we are to empirically claim, "The big bang is the first cause of the universe", we must prove that it is so. Until its proven, the possibility that something prior caused the big bang must rationally be explored as well.

*3. "I'm a p-naturalist¹ and thereby speculatively assume that aspects of nature are only explained within – immanently to – nature itself by using other aspects of nature, which includes "consciousness" as an attribute of at least one natural species." ___180 Proof
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/867837
Note --- The First Cause speculation is not about any particular "aspect" of Nature, but about all aspects of Nature : the Cosmos as a whole living (dynamic, if you prefer) system that was born and is fated to die. — Gnomon

This is what I think 180 Proof failed to understand. He's an intelligent person, but I believe was convinced the argument was trying to say something it wasn't. The major struggle I've had in this OP was getting people break free of the "first cause is a God" argument that has been locked in debate for decades. It can be hard to shake for some. My hopes were to get both atheists and theists to see that we're missing an incredible point in the midst of the overwhelming concern about proving/disproving deities.

The point is that the logical conclusion results in there necessarily being one first cause, and that there was nothing prior which caused or limited what that first cause could have been prior to its inception. Thus sure, a God is possible, but not necessary. To claim, "A God is the first cause" requires proof, and cannot be logically concluded. On the flip side, I think its a fascinating point to consider that the inception of our universe logically required an unlimited potential. That there logically is a beginning to reason. Further, the idea that a first cause could happen at any time is a fascinating concept that should be considered as a possibility in any causal exploration. Understanding the nature of it, as well as expected patterns can be very useful in critically analyzing any claims that this "X" is a first cause. We can close the philosophical debate on the logical necessity of a God, and move instead of the empirical proof required to demonstrate if any one belief that "X" is a first cause can hold against scientific rigor.

Obviously, we are from there same planet. We're a result of a lot of the same materials and forces as every other animal and living thing. Our neo-cortex is not unique. All mammals have it. We share 98.8% of our DNA with chimpanzees. So I'm not sure what my point is. :lol: — Patterner

Ha ha! That's fair. I'm not sure where the disagreement was either. :D

What threshold is this that is unique to human beings?
— Philosophim

As I said - language, reason, technology, and so on. H. sapiens is able to interrogate the nature of meaning and being in a way that other species cannot. — Wayfarer

My point was there there are other thresholds in other living beings that biological science cannot fully explain at this time.

You're familiar with the term 'biological reductionism'? Definition here. — Wayfarer

No, and I'm not sure how it fits into the discussion.

That's not the point at issue, though. Obviously there is massive divergences between species, that is not at issue. I am protesting the tendency to overlook or deny what I see as an obvious fact about h. sapiens - language, reason, tool-making, and the implications of all of that. — Wayfarer

I don't believe I'm denying how unique we are, or that we are at the pinnacle of intelligence for living beings.

No, we're not 'an alien species', the biological descent of h. sapiens is abundantly obvious, but with the advent of those capacities, we crossed a threshold beyond what can be understood solely through the lens of biological science. — Wayfarer

What threshold is this that is unique to human beings? There are limits to our current understanding of many other beings through the lens of biological science as well. We can analyze the brain of a fly, but we can't duplicate it or have a full understanding of how it works. Then there's behavioral science for creatures as well that goes beyond biology.

I don't need to know much about the subject to know that the intellectual gap between humans and any other species may be of degree in some ways, but there is also a difference of type. — Patterner

Both the degree and type of intelligence shift between a dolphin and a plain fish is monumental.

No other species has the slightest clue about what stars are, ever wonders about it, or coyotes be educated aboutit. No other species wonders what fossils are, or would no matter how hard we tried to teach them. — Patterner

And nothing I've stated denies this.

There is no end to the examples of things we do easily that no other species any condition of. no, we are not from a different planet. But we are different. We are unique. — Patterner

Many species are different and unique. My point is that our differences and uniqueness do not set us apart from nature. We are just another species. We are not exempt from needing to eat, drink, reproduce, and die. We are made out of carbon and DNA. We are not the only beings with consciousness. We are mammals, and have mammalian brains. Being the pinnacle of something does not mean you are not built upon the things that let you rise to the top.

Yes, it is descriptively moral in human societies to solve cooperation problems that prevent the society from achieving its goals, for instance genocide or mass murder. — Mark S

Descriptive morality is just the study of people's opinions on morality. If you claim "Cooperation is moral," that's not descriptive. A study of descriptive ethics would be to ask, "Why do people consider cooperation moral?"

The science of morality tells us BOTH what is merely descriptively moral as well as what is universally moral. This is as it must be, because the science of morality must explain all of human morality, not just the parts we like. — Mark S

That's a fine thing to claim, but where is science in your example describing a universal morality?

Moral philosophers tend to focus only on what is universally moral. We have missed a lot by not being able to explain what is descriptively moral. — Mark S

I don't think that's the case at all. In attempting to discover a universal morality, oftentimes philosophers look to the reason behind why people take the actions that they claim are moral. For example, why was it considered moral to kill a deformed child in ancient times? Understanding why people believe actions are moral is fundamental to creating a rational universal morality, as it should explain why they have these intuitions, and if they are misguided, why they are misguided.

This is a very good start to a discussion and I think can highlight a key difference between philosophy and science. Science often times takes hypotheses and established definitions and uses them in identifying tests. Thus if we say 'morality is cooperation," then we observe where cooperation happens in animals and say, "That is morality."

Philosophy on the other hand is the logical establishment of "What does this definition mean?" which we can then test. You see, in the first case, there is no question as to what the definition of morality is. Its, "Cooperation". So we observe a few serial killers working together to mass murder people. "Ah, look at that morality in action!" we would say as scientists. But as philosophers we would take a step back and say, "Huh, cooperation as morality in this situation doesn't make sense. Maybe its not as simple as that."

I think any good philosopher must understand up to date facts and observations. You cannot create a reasonable definition without a strong foundation on what is already reasonable. But the creation of the definitions that we use can also color how we see facts. The goal is to create a definition that solves potential contradictions, emotional conflicts, and has universal rational agreement. When such a definition does contradict our emotional intuitions, it must provide rational points which can often explain why we feel that way, but also why that feeling is incorrect.

So, should we use observations of cooperative behavior? Yes. Should that be the only consideration in morality? No, because it leads to unintuitive contradictions to people sense of what morality is without adequately explaining why those contradictions to our intuitions are incorrect.

If you're interested, I'm exploring the idea of an objective morality here: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14834/a-measurable-morality/p1

Correct, because you cannot draw 'nothing'. This doesn't negate what I've stated. If you have limits, nothing must be beyond those limits. The only way to avoid there being 'nothing' is if everything is infinite and eternal.
— Philosophim
It negates what you have said. I am afraid that I don't see any point to repeat myself. — MoK

I disagree, but we've both said our piece now. :) Good chatting with you again MoK,

Look at the gulf between a bat and a fly.
— Philosophim

Neither a bat nor a fly will ever know that. — Wayfarer

But you understood the point that the intellectual gap between a bat and a fly is as wide as the intellectual gap of a human and a bat right? The point is that us being a 'different kind' from other animals is simply the same pattern repeated in nature again and again. Having an intellectual or consciousness gap between other animals does not mean we are separate from them. Some thing will be at the top in the animal kingdom, and it appears that its us.

I mean, have you ever seen the comparison between a human brain and other mammals? https://news.wisc.edu/study-shows-differences-between-brains-of-primates-humans-apes-and-monkeys-are-small-but-significant/ We're not an alien species to the planet by any means.

I think one of the unfortunate consequences of popular Darwinism is the myth of h. Sapiens being ‘just another species’. There’s a leap - an ontological gulf - between h. Sapiens and other species. We’re of a different kind. — Wayfarer

Look at the gulf between a bat and a fly. The gulf between an octopus and a platypus. A dolphin and a fish. We're all of different kinds.

A part of me leans a little more towards that side that plants have some type of consciousness, but not enough for me to say, "Definitely".
— Philosophim

I understand. Don't you think plant behaviors could be replicated by fairly simple machines (or a system of pretty simple machines)? — RogueAI

I don't know enough to make that judgment call. First, we're still learning so much about neurology and systems. I'm sure we can make a simulation, just like we can simulate human behavior. But to capture the actual full behavior of what a specific creature would do in every instance may still be beyond the limitations of hardware and software at this time.

Humans are not some separate and magical species that exists apart from all of nature.
— Philosophim

Try teaching the concept 'prime' to your dog. — Wayfarer

You may want to read the rest of what I wrote. I noted we are possibly the most conscious beings on the planet. What you are describing is advanced intelligence. That doesn't mean simple intelligence doesn't exist, just like simple consciousness doesn't exist. There are humans with enough cognitive impairment that they cannot learn what 'prime' is either. Same with young children until they reach a certain age. Does this mean they aren't conscious Wayfarer?

What behavior is the plant doing that would lead you to think it might be conscious? — RogueAI

Its a really good question. Right now, its a debate. And I think a better way to summarize it is not to give you a 'plants are conscious' argument, but an argument that they aren't.

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8052213/

At the least scroll down and check out table 1 for some arguments over the years. I have no skin in the game one way or another at this point. A part of me leans a little more towards that side that plants have some type of consciousness, but not enough for me to say, "Definitely".

By the fact it is not the same material as a brain. You can play the same melody on different instruments, but it will have its own sound and feel.
— Philosophim

Could a rock be conscious? A shifting sand dune? A car engine? — RogueAI

To our current knowledge, no. We really can only evaluate consciousness by behavior, not by subjective experience. To objective evaluations, rocks, sand dunes, nor car engines exhibit any behavior we would call conscious. Consciousness is generally viewed as the ability for something to be proactive, such as plan ahead or actively plot a future outcome.

Consciousness can of course have different degrees. A crow for example can think to put rocks into a beaker of water to make what's in the water move up higher until it can grab it. Dogs can be trained and understand commands. Humans are not some separate and magical species that exists apart from all of nature. We are part of nature, just possibly the most refined and successful consciousness on this planet.

I fully believe that AI will have consciousness as well. Will it be the same as a human brain? Likely not.
— Philosophim
How would AI consciousness be different from that of human consciousness? — Corvus

By the fact it is not the same material as a brain. You can play the same melody on different instruments, but it will have its own sound and feel.

I'm now expressing big gratitude to 180 Proof. He's done a superb job fulfilling my request. I now believe his statement above detects a fatal flaw in my argument. — ucarr

180 proof is a great person to ask Ucarr. :) I'm glad he was able to clear up the issue for you. Feel free to read his argument against the OP. I did not think it addressed the argument back then, but I would be happy to discuss it with you if you would like.

I believe that consciousness can express itself through different mediums. The consciousness of a plant for example, would not be the consciousness of a human. Same as the consciousness of a fly or a dog. Consciousness can only be identified by behaviors, as the internal experience of being consciousness is impossible for any other being to experience. As such, we can see several behaviors apart from human brains that convey consciousness.

I fully believe that AI will have consciousness as well. Will it be the same as a human brain? Likely not. As for consciousness existing outside of some physical medium, that is currently impossible. There has never been any evidence demonstrating consciousness existing apart from physical reality, only conjectures and imagination.

If it's true that: "before first cause, nothing," then a justification of this premise with a supporting premise that employs the material things of our everyday world as an example of first cause inception -- a rolling die with numbers on six sides -- cannot be a pertinent and probative example of first cause from nothing. — ucarr

Let me break this down because this is still a run on of a sentence.

1. Before a first cause, there was nothing. Assume true.
2. A rolling die with numbers on six sides -- cannot be a pertinent and probative example of first cause from nothing.

Sure, I never used this as an example of a first cause from nothing. Its an analogy to make it simpler to understand the abstract point we're discussing Ucarr, not an actual example. The 'die' is an example of potential randomness. The result of a 'six' is an example of potential being realized. Nothing more. There is not an actual six sided die. There is nothing being rolled. We've gone over this before.

The point is that prior to a first cause's inception, the potential is limitless. After its inception, the result is what is. Thus prior to the inception of a first cause, "It could be anything." After the inception of a first cause, and all the causality that follows from it, there is a definitive first cause and definitive caused objects and states.

Thus, if I'm looking at things that already exist, not everything I look at can be a first cause. In this case, it must be proven that something which exists, or existed, was a first cause. Just like we don't know what side a six sided die will come up before we roll it, but we have to demonstrate what side it showed after it was rolled. Its just an analogy, not literal dice Ucarr.

Ucarr, I read your reply twice and I don't understand what you're trying to say. Instead of asking me if I think my premise does something, just point out what you see and I'll respond once I understand.

I am not saying that anything which exists can be a first cause. — ucarr

There're no limitations on what a first cause can be — ucarr

When something exists, its potential is realized. If it is a first cause, it must be proven that it is a first cause.

Prior to a first cause's inception, there is no limit as to what can potentially be incepted.

Imagine a die with all possibilities. Now the die is rolled. Whatever lands is what is. If someone claims, "Its a six", we should be able to prove that it did roll a six. Once it is rolled we are out of the realm of possibility and in the realm of actuality.

As you can see, no contradiction.

My intention here is to understand that a first of all first causes, if it happens, holds no special status because first causes are independent. — ucarr

You are correct.

I've been striving to understand that the gist of your claim is to say each causal chain must have a first cause. In so stating, I understand you take no particular position on the ontic identity of a first cause and its following chain. — ucarr

This is also correct.

You've previously stated there're no limitations on what a first cause can be. Are you now presenting an elaboration that rejects the notion "there're no limitations on what a first cause can be and "anything that can exist might be a first cause"? are logically equivalent? — ucarr

No. Please explain how you came to this conclusion from what I wrote.

Are you allowing that "real" names a comprehensive set of things that funds first causes and that whether or not this set includes both material and immaterial things is irrelevant to your work in this conversation? — ucarr

Ucarr, you are overcomplicating things again. I told you, "I don't know what immaterial means. Its not something I brought up." If it exists, it doesn't matter if its material, immaterial, in immaterial, or bizantiane whibble material. :) Real is what exists.

You presume incorrectly my questions are darts aimed at your previous statements. I like to think I'm slowly improving my understanding of the intentions behind your words. — ucarr

I don't think they're darts, but you do seem to take strange leaps from what I'm saying. You read far too much into my words many times and often make conclusions I never assert.

Are you advising me to stop undertaking my own independent inferential thinking because you think it [sometimes] erroneous? — ucarr

No. This is what I mean by you reading into things that aren't there. Why do you think this? Where did I tell you to stop? If I had one piece of advice when reading my writing, read only what I write. If I don't outright say I intend something, I don't.

In a concomitant action, are you trying to restrict the range of actions, techniques and approaches I can use in my interactions with you? — ucarr

I don't think so. Why do you think that?

If you think you're repeating yourself in your responses, name the topic, tell me I'm repeating my questions thereof and I'll agree not to ask additional repeat questions on the topic. — ucarr

Sure. I'm just telling you that nothing has changed.

My mistake. I should've written: So, you're saying that even though a first cause is logically necessary, that doesn't necessarily imply the necessity of a first cause of all first causes? — ucarr

Correct only in the technical fact that it is possible there were two different 'firsts' that happened at the same time.

Are we looking at a concept of causation with an unlimited number of possible and independent first causes? — ucarr

Its been a while, so recall the 'chains'. The start of each chain is separate and independent, though they might cross paths. Nothing I've stated here has negated what I've stated before.

I'm saying I'm not claiming any one PARTICULAR thing is a first cause.
— Philosophim

So, you're saying anything that can exist might be a first cause? — ucarr

We're having a language barrier issue here. :) Think of it as a variable set Ucarr. I'm noting the variable of 'a first cause' is logically necessary. What's in that actual set, one or many more, is irrelevant. What actual first causes have happened over the lifetime in the universe is up for other people to prove. I am not saying that anything which exists can be a first cause. I'm just noting at least one first cause must exist. If you wish to claim that 'This thing right here is a first cause," you have to prove it.

By immaterial existence I mean an abstract concept -- or some such entity -- that inhabits the mind apart from matter. Have you not agreed with Gnomon (below) that concepts are immaterial and real? — ucarr

No. I don't care whether they're immaterial or not. Are they real? Yes. That's all that matters.

Have you not agreed with Gnomon (above) that immaterial yet real concepts -- as distinguished from matter -- are useful for correctly understanding your thesis, and therefore pertinent to it? — ucarr

I am speaking to Gnomon in the context that I know he understands, and only one aspect of it. That is not your context. I do not want to explain his full context and what parts I do and do not agree with, because I have already done that while speaking speaking to him. If he has questions, he can ask me. I can tell you that nothing has changed from our conversation in which I spoke to you Ucarr. So its best not to confuse yourself by trying to follow it. If you have questions from our previous conversations, please ask. Do not worry about Gnomon and myself.

So, you're saying that even though a first cause is logically necessary, that doesn't necessarily imply the necessity of a first cause of all first causes? — ucarr

Let me clear this up a bit.

First, if you remember a first cause cannot cause another first cause. That's just a first cause causing something else.

Second, its possible that there was a first cause that happened, then other first causes happened later. Or it could be that two or more first causes happened simultaneously.

I hope that answers the question.

Are we looking at a concept of causation with potentially unlimited number of first causes and yet no first cause for the set of first causes? — ucarr

Correct because a first cause cannot cause another first cause. If A causes B, B is not a first cause.

You've said you're not making a claim that a thing -- such as a God, or the Big Bang -- acts as the first cause. — ucarr

No Ucarr, I'm saying I'm not claiming any one PARTICULAR thing is a first cause. If the big bang is a first cause, then it is. I'm not claiming that it is. That's not what this is showing. I'm not saying "X" is a first cause. Just noting there must be at least one.

Also, you've clarified that your thesis only posits the logical necessity of a first cause. Now you say you don't know if immaterial existence is a thing. — ucarr

Right. Its not anything I cover in here, nor is necessary to do so. I don't even know what immaterial existence is. Let someone else prove that.

Is it pertinent to the content and intentions of your thesis to suppose you take no definitive position on the materiality or immateriality of the logically necessary first cause? — ucarr

Its completely irrelevant whether there is immaterial existence or not. I talk about existence, and the adjective does not change that. It doesn't matter what form it takes.

I just want to be clear that a first cause as proven here is not outside of our universe, but a necessary existent within our universe.
— Philosophim

Are you saying: a) the logical first cause has no material physicality; b) the logical first cause that has no material physicality exists within our universe? — ucarr

I'm not sure where you got that. I'll point out again: This is not a claim of any 'one thing' being a first cause. Its just a logical note that there must be a first cause, and that first cause has nothing prior that limits or influences what it should be.

To be clear on definitions, I define 'the universe' as 'all that exists'. Is immaterial existence even a thing? I don't know. If it exists, then its a thing. If not, then its not.

You cannot draw a figure in which the whole has a limit and there is nothing beyond its limit. — MoK

Correct, because you cannot draw 'nothing'. This doesn't negate what I've stated. If you have limits, nothing must be beyond those limits. The only way to avoid there being 'nothing' is if everything is infinite and eternal.

I know but the very existence of a limit means that there is nothing beyond it! What is beyond the end? It is either something or nothing. Take your pick. — MoK

If 'the whole' is everything and the whole has a limit, then by consequence there is nothing past that limit. If the whole is limitless, then there is no end, thus 'nothing' cannot exist. But one has to prove that the whole of existence is limitless, which we cannot do.

If by nothing you mean the black area then that cannot be nothing since nothing cannot have a geometry, property, and occupy room. — MoK

No, I'm not saying there exists a black area, I'm saying there's nothing. It is the logical consequence of there being a limit. To state there is a limit means there is an end. What is beyond the end? Nothing. The only way to avoid this is to state that the whole is limitless. But this has to be proven, and I'm not seeing anything but a conjecture here.

This was an answer to you when you asked whether the whole is infinite. I answered that the whole is bigger than any infinity you can imagine. — MoK

I understood that was your answer, but your answer doesn't explain itself well. I am familiar with Cantor's theory and I still don't see how this applies to what you stated.