It seems like you are saying that the best action to take is the one that maximizes material and expressive existences in the longest foreseeable future, is that right? — Bob Ross
Spikes of existence that don't negatively impact steady and constant sets of existence. Explained above with the murderer. But if I want to go have a party with friends, the existence spikes up and is a good thing.
I don’t understand this one. So if I go in my garage and do a whole bunch of useless nonsense but technically it produces expressive existences and I don’t harm anyone doing it, then that is better than if I had done one productive thing that produced less expressive existences? — Bob Ross
Assuming my responses here are accurate (to what you are conveying), then, yes, I think I understand and still think this is going to lead to all sorts of counter-intuitive conclusions; but I am waiting until we get to your analysis of a reality with life in it first (; — Bob Ross
It sounds like you are holding straight up act-consequentialism, but I could be wrong. — Bob Ross
There are no constraints prior to it coming into being, there are constraints after it comes into being.
— Philosophim
This is incorrect, as demonstrated by my argument, there necessarily is constraints prior to its coming into being. "Constraints after it comes into being" doesn't even make sense. If the constraints only exist after the cause, then they have no capacity to act as constraints on the cause. — Metaphysician Undercover
In other words, your idea of an absolutely unconstrained "cause" is self-contradicting, because the concept of "cause" has constraints inherent within it. if you want to talk about a completely, or absolutely, unconstrained act, this act cannot be known as a "cause" in the common sense which relates "cause" to "effect", because that completely unconstrained act could not be said to have an "effect", effect being described in terms of "change". — Metaphysician Undercover
Your proposal of things to imagine as examples of first cause are all constrained by what is described in the terms of the examples, therefore those proposed "first causes" are actually constrained. In reality, if you can imagine it, then what you are imagining is the effects of the supposed "first cause" on the preexisting constraints, therefore constraint is implied by the image. So your requirement of no constraints is nonsense. This is what makes "first cause" as you propose, completely unimaginable, incomprehensible, unintelligible, and self-refuting nonsense. — Metaphysician Undercover
Careful, now. If you say the Big Bang is the known starting-point of universal creation, you are saying, not only that it is the starting-point of universal creation, but that we know that it is. — Ludwig V
There is an issue with your theory. You sweep everything up into one classification, and brush aside the variety and difference in the concepts of causation under one term.
But it is no more significant that the conclusion that something exists, which neglects the differences between rainbows and trees, numbers and lines, arguments and theories, myths and fables, and all the rest of the many different kinds of object - and hence different kinds of existence (and of logic) that also exist. We have Aristotelian causes, Newtonian causes, Einsteinian causes, Quantum causes, not mention reasons for action, premises and conclusions in mathematical arguments. — Ludwig V
to be giving Philosophim some difficulty, the relationship between the first cause, and the resulting causal chain. In the descriptions, or definitions which Philosophim provides, there appears to be some ambiguity as to whether the first cause is part of the chain, or something separate from the chain. — Metaphysician Undercover
These are the principles laid out by Aristotle in the cosmological argument. A "cause" (in the modern sense which corresponds with Aristotelian efficient cause) is a contingent event. This means that it consists of two parts, the temporally prior potential for the event, and the posterior actuality, after the event. The "contingency" is due to the fact that the prior potential is always a potential for a multitude of possible events, and the resulting actuality is the one particular event which actually occurs. — Metaphysician Undercover
Now, if we ignore the "contingency" aspect and represent the causal chain as a simple cause precedes effect model, in a determinist way, then we effectively remove the "potential" from the model. One actual state precedes another actual state, and this determinist representation provides no real principle whereby we could say that the potential for an event precedes its actual occurrence, all there is is another actual event as cause. — Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, I agree. But that means whenever we think we have found a first cause, we must ask ourselves whether that is due to the limitations of our tools and evidence or to it really being a first cause. I would always bet on the former. Under what circumstances could I confidently bet on the latter? Given the ingenuity and determination human beings have displayed over the last 400 or 500 years, I can't imagine any. — Ludwig V
My point was that every time something like a first cause or brute fact has been found, we have redefined (or perhaps better "re-invented") the concept of "cause" and carried on. — Ludwig V
So it is not that the soul is a first cause, nor strictly speaking, is free will itself the first cause, but there are first causes, and the soul is able to utilize them for its purposes toward effecting change in the world. The reality of the free will is what provides us evidence that there are first causes, and the evidence is that the soul is using first causes toward its goals. The soul itself is not a first cause, but the soul has free will, and the free will requires first causes for its existence. — Metaphysician Undercover
So the issue of constraints is not relevant, as I said above. The soul has free will, and it is free because of the reality of uncaused causes which are happening within the living body, but the soul is still constrained by the physical reality of that body at the same time. — Metaphysician Undercover
I've read similar articles already. The point I made about reflex was to demonstrate your illogical use of that article. That some human actions are reflex, does not mean that all human actions are reflex. That is my analogous example. Likewise, that some decisions occur in the way indicated in the article, does not imply that all decision occur in this way. So the article doesn't provide any point to argue, it's like someone arguing that since some human actions are by reflex, therefore free will is not real. — Metaphysician Undercover
I don't see any relevance here. We are talking about the free will act which rolls the die, and how this act utilizes first causes, we are not talking about the action of the die rolling after being thrown. — Metaphysician Undercover
I don't agree with this. I do not think that you understand the relationship between first causes and constraints.
The first cause comes into being without any reason for its existence, as you say, but it comes into being into an already existing environment. It is not caused by that environment, nevertheless it comes into being in that environment. Therefore there are constraints which are prior to it, which necessarily limit (constrain) its coming into being as it does so, specifically the effect it will have. There are no constraints as to why it exists, but there are constraints as to what effect it will have. — Metaphysician Undercover
I think the existence of free will provides very good evidence of the reality of first causes. Look at all the causal chains which must come to an end within us, much of the energy we eat gets stored, so it turns passive. And all the causal chains of all information we absorb through sensation must come to an end if they do not cause a reflex. — Metaphysician Undercover
Again, you are misrepresenting the role of constraints. The uncaused cause comes into being without a cause, in the middle of preexisting constraints. The limitations, are not causal, they are only restrictions to the cause. So it is incorrect to say that the uncaused cause has no restraint on it. — Metaphysician Undercover
It's simple logic. The uncaused caused cannot have an effect (therefore it cannot be "a cause") unless there is something already existing which it will have an effect on. Therefore it necessarily comes into an existing environment. And the already existing thing which the uncaused cause has an effect on, will be a constraint to the uncaused cause. Therefore the uncaused cause will necessarily be constrained. — Metaphysician Undercover
A hypothetical chain going back to infinity doesn't have to have a first cause. — jgill
I would prefer more emphasis on the chain itself and its origin than on what comes before its origin. — jgill
The first cause must have an effect on the causal chain it initiates. Therefore, by definition, it is an element of that chain and not something prior and abstract. — jgill
Although you are not being theological here, your assertion is equivalent to the existence of God. — jgill
I only wish this thread wasn't ultimately so existential and debatable. — jgill
From the free will perspective, such a relationship cannot be established, because there is another active force involved, that of the soul, and this active force actually ends and begins causal chains. — Metaphysician Undercover
OK then, by your definition, "a first cause" is "truly random", not even omniscience could predict it. So, what I am arguing is that this is consistent with "free will" as a first cause, not even omniscience could predict it. — Metaphysician Undercover
Its actually been determined that people can make unconscious decisions up to 11 second prior to them being aware of it. https://qz.com/1569158/neuroscientists-read-unconscious-brain-activity-to-predict-decisions
— Philosophim
I don't see how this is relevant. If a type of decision can be made in this way, it does not imply that all decisions are made in this way. Many human acts for example, are shown to be simply reflexive, but this does not mean that all human acts are reflexive. — Metaphysician Undercover
Constraints do not necessarily lead to "a particular outcome", constraints limit the possibilities. Therefore your appeal to constraints in this context does nothing to imply that a free will act does not produce a first cause. — Metaphysician Undercover
As mentioned above, in my reply to Ludwig, I think this idea of "a sense of timing" is from a naive form of scientism, based in determinism. In reality there is probably thousands, or millions, of causally chains occurring in the brain at the same time, extremely rapidly, far beyond the brain's capacity to understand its own mechanics. — Metaphysician Undercover
We don't get to create the chain.
— Philosophim
As explained above, this is an unsound premise. You insist that the idea of a free will act being an uncaused cause cannot be accepted without prove, but the inverse principle holds just as well. — Metaphysician Undercover
And the vast multitude of causal chains which are active within the brain, in an extremely rapid way, make it very difficult to understand with any degree of certainty, whether some are actually beginning and ending there. If the causal chains are beginning within the brain, then we cannot say "we don't get to create the chain". — Metaphysician Undercover
Few folk have ever held justified true belief to be both sufficient and necessary conditions for knowledge. Not even Socrates thought it adequate, and he is the fellow who developed it - describing it as a "wind-egg". Gettier just presented examples that undergraduates could understand. — Banno
Of course not. Suppose instead we observe such a chain in nature, imbedding it in our minds. It now exists in two realms. — jgill
Does an act of "measurement" affect FC? — jgill
Suppose I create the chain. Am I the FC? Or are electro-chemical processes in the brain FCs? — jgill
Suppose it is possible to describe each link in the chain. Is this description a first cause of the chain? It coincides with existence. Precedes it, actually. — jgill
If a well-defined causal chain extending back in time has no beginning or has arbitrary beginnings, does it have a first cause? — jgill
Would you say the definitions constitute a first cause? — jgill
I must have missed something. I thought you were saying that while first causes must exist, there were no existing examples. — Ludwig V
I accept that there are first causes in pragmatic applications of an existing causal framework. Call them pragmatic. — Ludwig V
But the concept of a cause outside a framework of definition and explanation, is meaningless. — Ludwig V
there is too much internal energy within an atom due to a proton, electron imbalance, there is not enough force to keep the atom together.
— Philosophim
This describes the necessary conditions for decay to occur, but what is the specific event/cause X that causes the specific Y at that specific time? — EricH
Could a quark simply appear somewhere in the universe than vanish out five seconds later, all without a prior cause?
— Philosophim
What's your answer? Yes or no? — EricH
I asked you this before and never got a response, so I'll try again. Using your terminology from the OP, let Y be an atom radioactively decaying into another atom. Is there an X that caused this Y? — EricH
There's a puzzle. I don't think that idea of a cause that is self-explanatory makes much sense. It doesn't seem to fit with your idea of causality. Is that meant to be an example of a first cause? — Ludwig V
So finding a first cause is just a reason for developing new ideas. It has happened before and no doubt it will happen again Whether one calls them causal or not really seems much less important. — Ludwig V
Yes, I take the point that there is a difference between the Big Bang and an arbitrarily chosen starting-point. The Big Bang is implicit in the framework of explanation. But then, there are these pesky people who ask questions which do not go away. And so we start developing new ideas, based on what we already know, but also going beyond them. Whether you call them causal or not is not really very interesting. — Ludwig V
I don't quite understand this. An event which cannot be predicted is not necessarily purely random. I understand a freely willed event to be like this, it cannot be predicted yet it is not random. — Metaphysician Undercover
The drop cannot be predicted, not even by the person dropping it or else that person does not adhere to the principles of the experiment. — Metaphysician Undercover
That an event occurs within constraints does not necessitate the conclusion that it is a caused event. — Metaphysician Undercover
There could be uncaused events occurring all the time, at a small level, and as they occur they are constrained by surrounding caused events. The point, is that there clearly is prior causality to the brain, as you say, but this does not rule out uncaused events within the brain, which make us feel like we have free will. — Metaphysician Undercover
This freely willed decision is the cause of that chain of events in the brain and nervous system which causes the ball to drop, but there is no cause of that decision of "now", at that point in time. — Metaphysician Undercover
Doesn't my example of dropping the ball serve as proof. The act is either random or caused by free will. You showed how it is not truly random, so we can conclude free will. — Metaphysician Undercover
Your argument's conclusion is that there has to be a first cause, which is only one interpretation in physics. — Christoffer
And through the explanations given, your logic of causality as a framework for beyond our reality does not function or becomes inconclusive since your reasoning is bound to this reality and do not compute with quantum mechanics. — Christoffer
And seen as causality itself is in question even in our reality and isn't a defined constant, other than on the scales in which determinism operates, you cannot conclude your conclusions through the reasoning you provide. — Christoffer
But the key point is that the density of the universe right at the event of Big Bang would mean dimensions having no meaning, therefor no causality can occur in that state. It is fundamentally random and therefor you cannot apply a deterministic causality logic to it. — Christoffer
The first cause in that scenario is the first causal event to form out of the state in which causality has no meaning, which is a state that has mathematical and theoretical support in physics. But if your point is that "aha! see there's a first cause!" then you are just stating the obvious here and I don't know what your point really is? — Christoffer
But it isn't conclusive. You still have the Penrose theories, and other cyclic interpretations that do not have a first cause as it's circular. There's no need for a first cause as the cycle, the loop causes itself. — Christoffer
So I question the reason for this argument as physics already provide one with more actual physics-based math behind it and I question the singular conclusion of first cause as it doesn't counter the other interpretations that exist. — Christoffer
I recognize Christoffer as having a lot of insight that can be learned from. — wonderer1
Of course, I may have seen too many OPs claiming I was in league with the devil, and so it is just me thinking you are kind of control freaky. — wonderer1
Again, projecting by describing yourself. You fail to simply understand that your argument of a first cause is just empty dislocated logic in face of the science actually decoding reality into a complexity beyond that use of logic. — Christoffer
I've countered your argument, I've engaged in further explanations for the objections you raised and yet you still act as if no one has countered your OP. — Christoffer
The vagueness of first cause is troubling for me. It seems like category confusion — jgill
Instead, a first cause is the existence of the regression or causal chain. In fact, no matter which kind of causal chain we consider, its first cause is always its existence. — jgill
So a first cause is a metaphysical notion, not something specific to the chain or regression. — jgill
You are not engaging with his objections with replies like this. You are claiming he doesn't understand - which is also what he is saying to you. Surely, you can understand that if he has the same notion you do, there might be something in it (might be on your side too!!) — AmadeusD
If someone repeatedly speaks past you, ignoring what you're saying, you wouldn't be partial to spending more time nutting out their problem for them. — AmadeusD
You've (imo, very condescendingly) asserted that he's using a Straw man (I can't see where) and then not dealt with his clear, precise objections. — AmadeusD
Just try to go into future threads with the intent to understand first before you critique.
— Philosophim
I don't have to, I understand the physics instead. — Christoffer
Don't try to address fifty things in a post. Pick one thing and press him on it, if that's the issue. If you're willing to engage ad infinitum, respect. But be reasonable about what you're engaging - particularly if you see his responses as scatter-shot straw men :) — AmadeusD
For now, that is all I have; as the rest of your response is about things you asked me not to indulge in yet (; — Bob Ross
I don't know nearly enough to know whcih side is closer to 'correct' or whatever the actual case is - I'm just saying how it appears to someone in that position. — AmadeusD
I would suggest that your 'Baffle Them....' assertion is likely unconscious projection. — AmadeusD
I have had to accept (with Banno, particularly) that I just dont get it — AmadeusD
I think the humility to accept that someone in that kind of position is probably on to something is reasonably helpful. — AmadeusD
I am only speaking about your conduct, not your arguments. I simply do not see you addressing hte objections — AmadeusD
Fwiw, I agree entirely with Christoffer. Do what you will with the information, but it seems patently clear you are not engaging with the objections and instead just rejecting that the person objecting understands you. — AmadeusD
But the key point is that the density of the universe right at the event of Big Bang would mean dimensions having no meaning, therefor no causality can occur in that state. It is fundamentally random and therefor you cannot apply a deterministic causality logic to it. — Christoffer
You still have the Penrose theories, and other cyclic interpretations that do not have a first cause as it's circular. There's no need for a first cause as the cycle, the loop causes itself. — Christoffer
You get so hung up on forcing people to understand you that you use others rejection of your argument as some evidence that you are right. But in doing so you ignore the objections being raised. — Christoffer
Just try to go into future threads with the intent to understand first before you critique.
— Philosophim
I don't have to, I understand the physics instead. — Christoffer
OK. If the chain goes back to an origin lying outside of spacetime, that may be its first cause. If it continues back unbounded, possibly going outside spacetime, then the existence of the chain is its first cause. It looks like you cannot lose here. — jgill
Proving a negative like that is indeed difficult to impossible. So it looks as if your concept of the first cause is empty. It seems that it must take care of itself, without any assistance from us. There's not much fun in that. — Ludwig V
It's your "line", not mine. I am happy to say causal chains have a first cause. But more on intuition than logic. — jgill
If we don't know whether our universe has finite or infinite chains of causality A -> B -> C etc...
What caused a finite causal chain to exist instead of something else? There is no prior reason.
What caused an infinite causal chain to exist instead of something else? There is no prior reason. — Philosophim
Now we are considering a causal chain having an uncountable number of links. Even between two points close together on the line, an uncountable number of links. — jgill
Its a shame philosophy is so riddled with sloppiness of language that sometimes arguments are sabotaged by examples to clarify. But that's life. — jgill
But that's stretching the meaning of "first" to the point of vacuity, for the concept of "first" is only meaningful in relation to a recognizable order with a distinguished bottom element. — sime
In the absence of a well-defined order, the concept makes little sense, especially considering that a rejection of the causal order doesn't entail that postulated "first" causes can't have explanations in terms of other causes, but only that such explanations are incomplete, vague, ever changing, etc. — sime
It depends what you mean by "true first cause". In certain traditions of philosophy, free will is the traditional cause of actions (as distinct from events); it is traditionally regarded as special - either as an uncaused cause or causa sui. — Ludwig V
Indeed. Just as there must be a first cause, even if we don't know what it is yet (although the Big Bang occupied that space for a while), so there must be some brute facts. But that may only mean that we haven't formulated the question yet. — Ludwig V
So we formulate a different, and incommensurable, theory which reaches past that point. But the concept of causality is changed in the process. Newton and others, redefined the subject matter of physics in order to mathematize it and introduced the concept of gravity because it was needed (a brute fact, if you like). That concept of time and space was undermined by relativity and quantum physics. Now, physicist/mathematicians are reaching past the Big Bang. But any explanation will involve changing the rules, since "before" the Big Bang, neither time nor space existed. "First cause" will change its meaning. — Ludwig V
So, let me make sure I am understanding: ‘material existence’ is really just ‘fundamental entities’. As an entity could exist ‘materially’ (in your sense of the term) but not materially (in the standard sense of being tangible), correct? E.g., a wave could exist ‘materially’. — Bob Ross
My point in bringing it up was that you seem to imply that existence was a separate category altogether from material existence, but I think, if I am understanding correctly, it is just a broader type: a generic type. — Bob Ross
I think you are trying to inadvertently drown me in calculations, when it is perfectly reasonable to infer the calculations generally from the example. Philosophim, no one can count the exact atoms in a mountain vs. a baby. — Bob Ross
Philosophim, you’ve twisted the example in your favor! (: I was talking about all else being equal. If we are factoring in, like you said, (1) the quantity of material existences, (2) the quantity of expressive existences, and (3) the total net potential for both; then a highly complex robot (like terminator) is factually morally better, and thusly preserved over, a 2 month-old (human) baby. No extra factors: all else being equal. — Bob Ross
It loses it’s moral meaningfulness and potency if we are talking about a mountain vs. a rock. — Bob Ross
The only thing I will say about this is that you are admitting the theory is counter-intuitive. This doesn’t mean it is wrong, just that virtually no one is going to agree that you should save a robot over a (human) baby. People generally hold life to be more sacred than non-life. — Bob Ross
Do you disagree with this as a function of measurement?
I believe you stated before that we use whatever time frame we want: I disagree with that. If you aren’t saying that, then what time frame, in your calculations (for whatever it is you are contemplating), are you using? You can’t seem to give a definite answer to that. This is not contingent on analyzing the moral worth of life. — Bob Ross
Correct. My point is you just bit a bullet. No one is going to agree with you that we should preserve a hurricane over saving someone’s life; let alone that we should preserve a hurricane at all. — Bob Ross
The difference is that hurricanes are always bad, and there is no reasonably foreseeable consequence that would make keeping a hurricane good. — Bob Ross
You are saying that in the case that the hurricane has significantly more material and expressive existence, as well as more potential for both, than the two people; then, all else being, equal, the hurricane should be preserved. — Bob Ross
You need to clearly distinguish spatio-temporal causality from your murkier concept of meta-causality. — sime
Another possibility you are overlooking, is the possibility that the very existence of the past and its historical content might not transcend the ever-changing state of the present. In which case, the past is open and indeterminate like the future and there isn't a universal causal order. — sime
The catch is that whatever caused the Big Bang (or whatever else you identify as a first cause) requires that you think differently. — Ludwig V
We can attribute a starting point anywhere in a chain of causality.
— Philosophim
That's why I call it contextual. — Ludwig V
BTW. Don't you think that the idea of the chain of causality is a bit misleading? We can identify many chains of causality, depending on what questions we are asking, and we see those chains intersecting and overlapping. Wouldn't it be better to think of causality as a web, from which we can select specific chains depending on our needs at the time? — Ludwig V