The reason I don’t start with it, is because I don’t feel the need, when initially explaining the theory, to explain what ‘value’ is itself: I just use it. Every theory starts with something presupposed; and I find it satisfactory to start with ‘goodness is identical to “having value”’: this is generally, immediately understood by common folk. — Bob Ross

Bob, most philosophers are going to ask, "If good is what we're trying to define, and value it what is good, then what is value?" If you say you can't define it, then it means you can't define good either. Feel free to push that good is equal to value, but if you can't define value, then you have a subjective theory that depends on some amorphous poorly defined word.

I think we are referring to two different things by ‘value’ here. When I say ‘value’ is unanalyzable, I mean it is the sense of ‘what does it mean to be valued or have value?’ (i.e., what is value itself?); whereas you talking about ‘what has value, and how much?’. — Bob Ross

There are several definitions of value already in the philosophical space. If you're not going to use any of them, you'll have to explain why to your reader right? It just comes across as not having a fully fleshed out theory yet. Which its fine if its not, but its a key foundation of your theory and needs some type of explanation.

Comparing this to my own theory, I explain what morality is, and how to evaluate it. Meaning I have definitions of moral value and why there's moral value.

For example:
Value: A designation of importance. If quantified, this importance can be compared.
Moral value: A designation of moral importance. This can be quantified into existing and potential identities over time.

And when people ask, "Why are existing and potential identities valuable?" I can go back to demonstrating what rationally must be if objective good exists. Here of course is my assumption, "That objective good exists." But its clearly defined why its an assumption and why we've reached a limitation.

Since I have noted and backed definitions, and yours doesn't, why would anyone rationally choose the incomplete theory? You have too many competing definitions of value that already exist. If you state its unanalyzable, when several theories already have, its going to need to counter all those other theories that have analyzed it.

I think we can investigate intrinsic value, by means of the scientific method, as it would pertain to the study of discerning value which is derived from a person’s (conative or cognitive) dispositions vs. what mind-independently pressures, by its own nature, a person into valuing it. I think that answers your question pretty well. — Bob Ross

This means you don't currently have an answer for how we can objectively know intrinsic value. I'm not saying you're wrong, its just incomplete. If you want to use the scientific method, you'll need to generate an example of how we could go about determining the intrinsic value out of something using that method. There should be clear steps. As it is now, this is just an admittance that you don't know. Which is fine, it just needs improvement.

No. Take the same pain example, but imagine you genuinely believe, while in that state, that pain has no value — Bob Ross

Bob, one reason why you're having a hard time getting the answer you want is because you have no real definition of value. As such, mine and your definitions are personal, and thus probably don't line up. Do this with 100 people and you're going to get several different answers. Without a clear definition of value, this theory just won't work in a group setting.

I did review your second reply, but again, you're running into the same problem. Value is not objectively defined, therefore it is personally defined by whoever is using it. There's really no point in discussing value when its so subjective. Until that's fixed, this theory is dead.

Alright Bob, I've perused this whole thing. This is still one mess of a theory. If I had any suggestions it would be to go step by step in the proper order. For example you start with "goodness" before you define 'good'. Reverse that. Because if you do, you get this:

Good = value

What is value? Something primitive that cannot be analyzed.

Goodness = valuableness

What is valuableness? That which has value. So things can have goodness by having value. This order makes it much more clear what you're trying to say.

Second, you need to find and fix your contradictions.

But subjects are those that evaluate and determine value

Epistemically, of course we determine value: just like we determine truth, what exists, etc. The question is whether or not what we deem is valuable, actually is. And it only actually can be, if it is intrinsic. — Bob Ross

So value IS something that can be analyzed. It can be determined according to you in two ways:

1. By subjective human evaluation.
2. By something beyond human subjective evaluation.

And because there is a note that we can deem something valuable that actually isn't valuable, then real value is something beyond human subjective evaluation. To prove that such a thing exists, we must have an objective evaluation that proves what is valuable despite differences in subjective conclusions. Oh, and we'll make a phrase to shorten this. "Intrinsic value". So intrinsic value is objective value.

So the big question then is, "How do we objectively evaluate intrinsic value?" Your initial answer was by what the majority of us were compelled to do. But you made a clarification, which is fine, that

I am, and never was, claiming that what is intrinsically valuable—i.e., what is morally good—is contingent on our vote; I was saying that any institution we could create would preserve and gain knowledge of what is intrinsically valuable by way of convergence of experiences of states, as agreed upon by experts in the field. — Bob Ross

Ok, I can get behind this! But that leaves a massive question. How do our experts determine intrinsic value?

For example, the morality of the bible was once determined by a gathering of priests. They would hand out to the public how to interpret the bible, and what things were good and not good. The catholic church at one point sold indulgences, which let you pay money to be absolved of your sins. Now a person who studied the bible would wonder how they arrived at that conclusion when its clear that Jesus died to pay everyone's sin off. We could just go with the experts, but if we're going to be objective, we need to know how the experts arrived at their conclusion.

Philosophim, this is no different than science. Our institutions safeguard and declare scientific knowledge by way of expert consensus. As humans, we have no other way of doing it (institutionally). Does that mean what exists is subjective? Of course not! What nonsense! — Bob Ross

Yes, but we know science is objective because of the scientific method. What method are we using to find intrinsic value?

No, its pretty clear at this point that its value rests on minds and is absolutely subjective. I'm not seeing the case at all that it exists independently of people's judgements

Think of yourself in severe pain. Forget everything else.. Imagine you believe that the avoidance of pain is completely valueless: you will still behave like it has some value (in a negative sense). Why? Philosophim, if pain has no intrinsic value, then your belief or desire that it has no value should be enough to conclude it isn’t valuable; but it clearly isn’t enough, because pain, by its nature, compels you to value it. — Bob Ross

You are confusing the fact that I evaluate what to do about a state as if the state has value apart from my evaluation. Your insistence that I find value in it, is insistence that I evaluate it. That in no rational way, implies it has some innate value. If of course you're going to say that negative value exists, then everything that can be evaluated has value. This makes sense, because value is relative. But that's just noting conscious beings can evaluate any situation they're in. Of course. This isn't anything noteworthy. The question is how to objectively evaluate something and find its 'intrinsic value'. How much is it? How does it compare to other things of intrinsic value?

I think this is enough for now. Instead of going line by line I've tried to get the overall concept and issues I see.

I still think you are misunderstanding what the property of valuableness, in principle, is. It doesn’t reference how much value a thing has—only that it has value. That is the property we discussing: it is the very idea of ‘value’. — Bob Ross

Right, but value without any modifier means nothing. There's monetary value, moral value, emotional value, etc. Just saying 'value' has no reference as to what you mean.

For example:
value - the regard that something is held to deserve; the importance, worth, or usefulness of something.
"your support is of great value"

value -a person's principles or standards of behavior; one's judgment of what is important in life.
"they internalize their parents' rules and values"

My theory doesn’t have any notion or idea of ‘moral value’, because it is does not exist. — Bob Ross

Then you have no objective way of evaluating morality. If there is no moral value in anything, all is permitted.

Now, what I have not noted, is why it does not exist. If you reflect back on my definitions, you will notice that valuableness is more fundamental than goodness. — Bob Ross

According to you, there is no moral value. Meaning that goodness has no value. This, by consequence, means that value is not good either. They are two separate things here.

Where a ‘moral’ marker comes in, is when one denotes a specific type of value, that being intrinsic value, and this is called ‘good’ in a moral sense. — Bob Ross

So then there IS moral value. Intrinsic value is moral value, and moral value is good. Then we refer back to your definitions:

Goodness = ‘to have value’. So now that means that all value, is a value of goodness. Meaning that the value of a gem at $25 is more goodness than a gem valued at $30.

Moral goodness = ‘to have intrinsic value’. — Bob Ross

Here we have moral goodness, or moral 'to have value' (moral value) = intrinsic value. Except that anything which has value is goodness. So all value is goodness, but only moral value, which is moral goodness is intrinsic value. But since value is goodness, then intrinsic value is really intrinsic goodness. So somehow moral evaluation only applies to certain goodness, the intrinsic kind. Except that morality is an evaluation of what is good and not good. So how do we just dismiss some goodness, while other goodness is within morality? Your words don't fit Bob. You cannot have a segment of good that isn't within moral discussion. That's a violation of the term 'morality'.

In conclusion:
valuableness is more fundamental than goodness
Value = Goodness (What is goodness? Is value less fundamental than valuableness?)
Moral goodness = that which has intrinsic goodness.
Moral value = that which has intrinsic value.
Value = that which has extrinsic value

So extrinsic value is extrinsic goodness. Intrinsic value is intrinsic goodness. Yet moral value can only refer to intrinsic goodness, whereas references to extrinsic goodness do not involve moral valuation.
I THINK I get it. Please correct me where needed.

I think the real issue you are having, is that you don’t think intrinsic value, in the sense I am using it, exists; nor how it possibly could; nor how one could go about deciphering what has it, and to what degree. — Bob Ross

Correct.

So, let me try again. Intrinsic value is ‘value which is demanded by virtue of a thing’s nature’. — Bob Ross

This statement has unnecessary redundancy Bob. Lets simplify this to clearer language. Intrinsic value is what a thing demands. A things nature = a thing.

I blundered here before, by saying, at this point in my analysis, that only states which are associated with (sufficiently) living beings: I was confusing epistemology with ontology. — Bob Ross

No worry, you're with a friend. :) I'm not going for cheap gotchas. Feel free to correct, amend, or change anything at anytime, the issue is complicated.

A state which can demand (i.e., innately insistence on having) value is one which IF it were experienced by a subject, then it would compel that subject to value it to a degree equal to its insistence; but such a state could exist, of which no current subject has the capacity to experience it. — Bob Ross

How can a non-living state insist on having something? isn't that personification? I understand that you're talking about a state that could be experienced by a subject that subject has not yet experienced. But subjects are those that evaluate and determine value. Just because we evaluate something as positive, that does not mean the thing we are evaluating insisted on it. Our emotional initial judgement insisted on it. Same thing as if we judge something as not having value. Personifying states is just odd Bob, and I don't see the logic behind it. States simply are. At best you let living things decide their value.

So, how do we determine that a state has intrinsic value? By experience. — Bob Ross

We experience a state, such as pain, and it is clear (to any reasonably rational person with the proper capacities to produce pain [neurologically]) that it compels value in its avoidance. — Bob Ross

The state is not compelling anything. We are reacting to a state and have to make a decision. I don't understand the rationale behind the personification of states still.

Think about, Philosophim, from your own perspective: forget your parents, forget everyone else. Imagine you are in severe pain: you are seriously telling me you cannot fathom how the state of pain compels you to value its avoidance, all else being equal? — Bob Ross

First, the state of pain is a state of a living body. A living judgement allows the being to decide what to do about it. Normally, a moral decision would be, "How should I avoid the pain?" My father has constant back pain and was on opioids for pain relief for a time. He realized he was getting addicted to the pills, so stopped taking them despite having the back pain. Did my father make a moral decision? He accepted the pain despite his desire to avoid it. So in your view, it seems my Dad violated the intrinsic value of pain and committed an immoral act. And no, the 'insistence' to get off the pain pills was not stronger. He made a rational decision based on his experience with addiction to alcohol. So he worked through that stronger desire to pick the thing that 'insisted' he not pick, pain. Again, this is an odd way to speak as if states have demands. Its really just an emotional battle within an experience.

Second, "Imagine you are in severe anger: you are seriously telling me you cannot fathom how the state of anger compels you to value its acceptance, and stab that guy with a knife because he insulted you, all else being equal?" What you're doing here Bob is saying that whenever we are compelled to make a decision one way, that it is the state of the experience expressing its intrinsic value, or good. So whatever we are most compelled to do is good. Meaning if I'm strongly compelled to gas some people because I'm a Nazi and love my country, that's intrinsically good. There are some serious problems here.

Now, like all other empirical studies, our knowledge of intrinsic value as an institutionalized study would be a convergence of perspectives on empirical studies of states, such that we could sufficiently conclude that certain states do compel to be valued, and to a degree equal to its force of compelment. — Bob Ross

Yeah, that's kind of crazy Bob. You're saying that moral evaluation is to be done by majority vote of what people really want to do? We are compelled to make decisions when we are experiencing certain states of reality. Meaning that if the majority of people believe in Islam, Islam is intrinsically good while atheism is intrinsically bad. Meaning that killing the infidels is intrinsically good. Moral value is done by majority action, without question as to whether the majority is making the correct choices by rational analysis.

I don’t hold that valuableness, and subsequently goodness, is a natural property: you can’t scientifically investigate the property, because it is supervenient on the physical constitution of entities (viz., it is supervenient on the natural properties). — Bob Ross

But you basically say they're discovered by what people are most compelled to do. Isn't that in the realm of science? I can say, "70% of Americans are Christians, therefore being a Christian is intrinsic goodness while not being a Christian is intrinsic badness." Therefore science has discovered being a Christian is morally valuable while not being a Christian is not.

if it compels, simply from its own nature, to be valued (e.g., if I really like pizza being thrown across the room, that doesn’t make pizza being thrown across the room inrinsically valuable: whereas, whether I like it or not, being in pain, by its nature, compels me to avoid it — Bob Ross

But if 51% of people are really compelled to throw a pizza across the room, it is intrinsically valuable. Finally I can justify my secret urge! :D

Intrinsic value is factual, because it is value which is objective; and it is objective because its value is exists mind-independently and the truth of the matter whether it exists is stance-independent. — Bob Ross

No, its pretty clear at this point that its value rests on minds and is absolutely subjective. I'm not seeing the case at all that it exists independently of people's judgements. The matter whether moral value exists is very stance dependent. If I take 100 atheists and ask them if they are compelled not to believe in God, then not believing in God is intrinsically good. If we ask the majority of the world to prevent climate change and the majority say "No", then it is intrinsically good not to fight climate change.

Does that help? — Bob Ross

Its helped me to come to the above conclusions. Please correct me where I am wrong.

Goodness is ‘to have value’: so how can you say I haven’t answered what goodness is? You can disagree with what I claimed it was, but you certainly can’t say I didn’t answer. Likewise with valuableness: I said it is an unanalyzable property, like beingness, which is akin to beingness. That’s an answer. — Bob Ross

Because you basically said goodness is an unanalyzable property, then insisted that it could be objectively known, and as we discovered above, be analyzed. Further, you've said that some good is under moral consideration, while other good is not, which is again, a violation of the definition of morality.
I understand a bit better what you intended now, but it was was definitely confusing on a first pass.

Moral goodness? What would immoral goodness be then?

Ah, I am not intending to use ‘moral’, as the adjective here, in the sense of ‘being good’—as that is circular—but, instead, to denote a sub-type of goodness which pertains to morality. — Bob Ross

Per your defintions, moral goodness would be moral value. Goodness would be a value, just not a moral one unless its intrinsic. And again, morality is the study of what is good. What rational reason do you have to say, "Except that good over there." Generally that which is not considered in morality is neither good nor evil. So why do you construct a contradiction between your terms? If there is 'good' that cannot be discussed morally, its not really 'good', and needs another term to not be a contradiction.

Even if I didn’t, it would not follow (from what I said) that alive beings are intrinsically valuable (which is what you said here). Rather, the state, which only an alive being could experience, would be intrinsically valuable. — Bob Ross

Right, living things aren't intrinsically valuable, its living things that decide whether something has value or not when they come across an experience. And if the majority of living beings think a particular state of living/experience/state is more valuable, then it is intrinsically valuable.

No, Kant isn't confused here.

I think Kant is, but I don’t think this is very important to what I am saying. By noting that a thing has value in-itself, I am noting that it has value intrinsic to its nature. — Bob Ross

As long as you aren't saying that intrinsic value is a thing in-itself. Because that is incoherent. It has value in its representation that most people experience.

Alright, if I understand your moral theory here, this is morality through majority judgement. There are a ton of problems here. First, many of your identities for situations don't fit. Intrinsic and extrinsic value can more easily be replaced with Majority value and Minority value. This makes things much more clear. What is value? What states people decide to be in. What is moral? Majority value. Is minority value immoral? No, but it certainly not 'good' then, meaning that the majority can refer to that minority value as not being moral.

What is good? Things that people value. But somehow its only a moral consideration of goodness when the majority is involved. So, its at best a confusing descriptive sense of morality, not normative. And this descriptive morality is 100% subjective. Even if a state has not been experienced yet, its value will only be found by majority judgement. Not to mention that there's nothing which rationally compels anyone for lemming morality.

There are so many problems with this, as there are in every subjective morality. What do we do when there's a conflict of cultures? What happens when the majority changes over time? If what the majority decides is moral, then what justification is there for a minority to choose otherwise or try to change the majority? Am I evil for trying to educate an ignorant populace? If the majority of people used drugs and were addicted, that's moral? I'm not asking you to answer these, because I've had these debates before and already know potential solutions and problems. Overall, I find these theories lacking.

In addition, what you're trying to say here has been said much clearer elsewhere in philosophy. Your construction of this is confusing Bob. Its riddled with at best, odd, and at worst, contradiction or incoherent word choices for concepts. Things need to be simple and as clear as possible. In the end, this is a subjective moral majority philosophy. That's it. And that has no chance in challenging my theory in any rational sense. Your claim that it is objective does not fit. You cannot have a theory that is determined by majority subjectivism and call that rationally objective. I have no reason to buy into what the majority values as moral. That's just an insistence by the majority, and that is not considered a rational request by anyone.

Finally, the death knell of any theory is if its own theory can contradict itself. Bob, what happens if the majority of people don't choose your state of morality? As in we don't find any value in it? Doesn't that mean your moral theory, isn't really a moral theory by the arguments giving within? Since most don't value this theory, It would mean the state of your theory has no intrinsic value. So again, by your own theory, this theory has no intrinsic value or moral worth. Since it has no moral worth, we can just ignore it.

Alright, that's enough from me for now! I do appreciate the time that went into constructing this theory and attempting to clear it up, but as i currently understand it, its just not making any new claims or contributions that haven't already been long considered and disregarded by most people.

To evaluate whether something has the property of valuableness, is just to assess its worth — Bob Ross

I have no issue with this.

which is to say nothing beyond saying it has value. — Bob Ross

So then value is simply a synonym of worth. I have no issue with this. Now you have to identify worth though. None of my questions have changed, just replace my points about 'value' to 'worth' now.

How much value is not something determinable from the (general) property of valuableness itself: if that were the case, then we would have to posit an infinite amount of properties to account for each value—which is clearly misguided. — Bob Ross

This makes no sense. I have a gem worth 25$ and a gem worth 30$. We can both clearly see how much value each gem has. Is it the case that we have to put value into a phrase like 'monetary value'? If you're just saying 'value' alone has no sense of 'valuableness', sure, that's a given. We're talking about value in terms of moral value. How do we objectively determine moral value?

So, how one can determined the exact value of something, which is an ‘evaluation’ in the sense that you implied, has no bearing on whether or not the property of ‘having value’ is primitive or not because the property will necessarily, even if it could be defined, not contain a means of evaluation but rather is the mere idea of ‘worth’ in general. — Bob Ross

Its moral value or moral worth. How do you determine it? If you just say, "It intrinsically has it", then this is saying nothing Bob.

I'm skipping the "Good" analysis for now for my theory as I agree we should focus on what you mean by value first.

Goodness = ‘to have value’. — Bob Ross

This still doesn't answer what value or goodness is. This doesn't answer what good is, or how we can objectively evaluate it.

Moral goodness = ‘to have intrinsic value’. — Bob Ross

Moral goodness? What would immoral goodness be then? Again, I have no idea what value is, or how we know its intrinsic.

This is ‘to have worth’, and this is just to reiterate ‘to have value’ with a synonym. The property itself is primitive, and unanalyzable. — Bob Ross

It is when you put it into a phrase 'moral value'. If you say you can't define it Bob, then its a unicorn word and isn't real.

Likewise, why you should care about intrinsic value, is that it is morally good; and if you are a virtuous person of morally good character, then you will. — Bob Ross

Why is it morally good? Value? What is value? Morally good? Bob, you must see that you're saying a lot of nothing right now right? I feel like you're twisting yourself in avoiding the straight forward question of, "What constitutes moral value? How do we objectively determine it?"

There is nothing that forces, per se, anyone to value anything—but this does not takeaway from the fact that there are moral facts. — Bob Ross

Ok, there's no one that forces somebody to value, then how is value determined? If there are moral facts, how do we determine they are moral facts and not people just saying, "Its moral because it is."

Whether or not someone should care about what has intrinsic value, does not in takeaway from the fact that it has intrinsic value. — Bob Ross

How do I know this is a fact? If someone told me the Earth circled around the Sun, they would need to give me reasons why that is when I can look up into the sky and clearly see that it circles around us.

All you are noting, by asking why anyone should care, is that people can devalue (or not value at all) facts. — Bob Ross

That's to lead up to the question, "How do we objectively know what a thing's value is as a fact?"

I wasn’t using ‘state’ this generically, but that is fine. It is fine to think of states as ‘states of being’, for all intents and purposes, and, to that, I would then clarify that the state of being that a rock has does not have intrinsic value because that state is incapable of any innate insistence/demand (of value). — Bob Ross

Ok, so then a state that can have intrinsic value must be something that is alive.

Under your theory, its fine to destroy matter as we wish as long as it does not affect life.

Correct. This is because the states which have intrinsic value, are only possible for beings which are sufficiently alive.

If only states of life can have value, why?

No. States which are not attributable to beings that are alive can have value—it just isn’t intrinsic. — Bob Ross

There's a bit of a contradiction here. Are you trying to say, "Those with intrinsic value cannot be outright destroyed, but those with value can?" If so, once again, how do we determine value objectively?

Intrinsic value, is value which is demanded in virtue of the nature of the state: that is a very clear definition — Bob Ross

To be clearer, it is demanded in virtue of the nature of a living state. Implicit value is only in living things according to you, so could we address that explicitly so there's no confusion? How does a living thing demand implicit value? Does it ask? Does it yell? How does this word have any meaning an actual example?

The chief mistake Kant made, is thinking that because a thing-in-itself is not directly experienced that it cannot be known at all—which is clearly false. — Bob Ross

Ok, as long as you understand what Kant was stating. If you disagree with him, that's fine.

In a sentence, he is confusing absolute knowledge with things-in-themselves: no one has to concede that they have absolute knowledge of a thing-in-itself to say they have conditional knowledge of it, by way of theirs senses. — Bob Ross

No, Kant isn't confused here. Unless you're referring to something I'm not aware of in Kant elsewhere, here he introduced the concept of 'thing in-itself' to avoid an accusation of being an idealist. If all that exists is phenomenal existence, then there is nothing concrete underneath that we are representing on. The simple point he was making was that we are representers, and there is something that we are representing. As we can only express that something as a representation, it will never capture the essence of what it is in-iteself that we are representing on.

that doesn’t takeaway from the fact that we have good conditional knowledge to claim that the apple itself, which is to immediately discuss as it is in-itself, has mass. — Bob Ross

The 'itself' of the apple is not referring to the 'thing in itself' that we're looking at to represent the apple. It means the representation of the apple itself. Same with mass in itself. Or any 'representation' itself. Referring to the representation itself is not a reference to the thing in-itself that is underlying the representation.

For example, let’s take your reasoning seriously that a thing-in-itself is unknowable because we only every directly experience a representation of it. Ok. Take an apple, for example: does it have mass in-itself? It seems like it does: every bit of evidence points to that conclusion—but, Kant will insist that we can’t absolutely know it is true, because we only have representations to go off of. — Bob Ross

Kant will say it can be reasonably concluded within our representation. But despite this, we still don't know what thing in-itself that we're placing the representation of apple and mass on is. And he's right. We'll never know the truth. But you and I have had enough knowledge discussion in the past to know that what is true is outside of the grasp of humanity. All we have is knowledge.

To Kant's point, he would be ok with saying, "We know that our representation of mass fits within the rational representation of the apple, but we cannot know the truth of the thing in-itself that our representations rest on." Back to my theory of knowledge, "We can construct discrete experiences and apply them. As long as 'reality' (the thing in-itself) does not contradict this identity and its application, we can know it. But knowing it does not make it true, only just that our applied identity is not in contradiction with reality.

So, I have no problem analyzing the nature, the essences, of things—which you cannot do if you take your position seriously because the essence doesn’t pertain to mere appearances but, rather, what a thing’s actual properties are as it is in-itself—while conceding I have only conditional knowledge of it. — Bob Ross

If you want to create a definition of value and demonstrate it objectively exists, that's fine. If you want to refer to living things, as definitions, and refer to that definition by saying, "That living thing itself," that's fine. If you want to create a definition of value, then say its a 'thing in itself' that cannot be represented, then its a unicorn that cannot be sensed and outside of any rational consideration. I have an actual objective definition and application of moral value, and will rationally be able to dismiss yours outright. If you want to propose a serious position of ethics that can counter this, you must clearly define what moral value is, and how we can evaluate it. If you cannot, then by every rational measure your theory falls apart.

I am not referring to absolute knowledge of the nature of a thing, but, rather, conditional knowledge of the nature of a thing. I doubt you deny we can evaluate the natures of things. — Bob Ross

If you claim this, please show this. Define moral value. Demonstrate how we can evaluate it. I've given clear ways to do so on my end. If you put forward a definition of moral value that cannot be evaluated, while I have, then your theory fails.

Even if I were claiming that healthy and rational people always recognize intrinsic value 100% of the time (which I am not) — Bob Ross

Then how do we objectively evaluate intrinsic value? The point that people can decide to choose states that have high or low value is irrelevant if you're not going to give an objective way they can measure and decide.

99.99% of the time a rational + healthy person would behave as if it had value when put in that state—and that is what I mean by “they can only superficially deny its value”. — Bob Ross

This is not a real number. All we can really state is that you believe people usually choose better states than not. I have no problem agreeing with that. But we're discussing an objective morality. What objectively is a better state? How can a person evaluate objectively which state is better?

and that is what I mean by “they can only superficially deny its value”. — Bob Ross

Its superficial merely because they're in the minority? That's not what superficial means. It would be a superficial decision if they only glanced at it and didn't think deeper about it. If you're going to say they need to think deeper about it, how should they objectively do so?

Whether they recognize the value, cognitively their faculty of reason, is a separate question; and the answer is the vast majority probably wouldn’t conclude it has intrinsic value; because they don’t know what that means. — Bob Ross

Yes! I still don't know what intrinsic value means! :D I don't know how they could cognitively evaluate a situation and determine which situation has more intrinsic value than the other. This is a very real problem with your theory so far Bob. I've harped on it enough for now, but you'll need to give an objective definition of moral value, how we can evaluate moral value, and what intrinsic value is and how we can evaluate it objectively as well.

Not a problem Bob!

Lets start with taking your theory and addressing my criticisms with your current definition of value not quite working. Once we can establish a solution there, we can go back to your criticisms of how my theory approaches 'the Good'.

alan1000, this is the second over 6 month old necropost I've seen you resurrect. Is this accidental or on purpose? Check to see how old these are next time.

Yes. A better word then 'sense' is 'context'. This makes it fairly straight forward as we understand many words meaning change within different contexts.

Externalised expressions convey concepts as independent of the speaker, while Non-Externalised expressions rely on the speaker's personal factors. — Judaka

I would say this isn't quite right. What about this?

Externalized expressions convey concepts based on the observable actions of the speaker, while non-externalized expressions rely on the unobserved personal experience of the speaker.

I say this because I don't think actions are independent of the speaker. I may feel sad for example but force a smile and active activity to mask my internal feelings. Actions can be externally observed and interpreted while internal feelings cannot.

Externalised expression presents concepts as objective, introducing them independently of personal criteria. — Judaka

I would argue they are not objective. They are ways for the speaker to convey what they want others to believe about their feelings. "You may be smiling, but objectively you're still sad."

In contrast, Non-Externalised expression, such as "I don't like the pacing of country music because I prefer a faster tempo," removes this ambiguity. Preferences do not qualify as objective reasoning. — Judaka

Agreed.

Externalised expression inherently carries a stronger force due to its establishment of concepts as potentially objective. — Judaka

I think they carry a stronger force with other people as other people cannot see into a person's internal feelings. But we're all aware that people can lie with their external expressions. The key is that a lie of external expressions requires a lot more effort and control. Meaning that extended period of conversation will result in slip ups or inconsistencies.

Other than my slight offered tweak, I like your thoughts overall. =)

Great discussion! — Bob Ross

Absolutely! And yes, its great for us to condense these down every once in a while so they don't become reams of papyrus scrolls. :)

Valuableness in an unanalyzable, primitive property: all that can be described of it is with synonyms (e.g., ‘to be of value is to have worth’, etc.). — Bob Ross

I'm surprised you're going this route. First, I was able to point out what value meant, and a concrete example of value in my theory. I'll address it again towards the end of this post. Second, it still means you then have to point out what the synonym for value is, and then explain what that means. It just kicks the ball over a notch at best.

With respect to #1, it is obvious that valuableness is not identical to ‘to ought to be’ by way of examples (of its valid use). For example, when one says “that diamond is worth $1500”, they are not commenting on whether it should exist per se but, rather, that it has a specific, quantitative worth. In short, it is impossible to convert quantitative values to the property of ‘to ought to be’. — Bob Ross

That is because you are comparing two types of values. There's monetary value and moral value. If I state that $1500 has more value than $750, this is an example of comparative monetary value. If I say one state of existence is 20 ex(existence), and another state of existence is 25 ex, the one at 25 ex has more moral value. If existence is 'what should be' and explicated and identified good is what is how we establish moral value, then there is nothing wrong with me pointing out moral value.

With respect to #2, a great example of an unanalyzable and primitive property is ‘beingness’. It is impossible to explain ‘beingness’ without circular reference — Bob Ross

Certainly, but that doesn't mean we don't have a meaning within that circularity that we can point to. We all know what existence is as a concept. Beingness is pointing to a slice of existence and noting that it is existing. It is embodying 'being'. Its primitive because we cannot go deeper than that. The problem is I have no idea what you're pointing to by saying a thing has value within your theory. I don't know how to evaluate it. And 'value' by definition, is used for evaluation.

Value is a an implication of worth generally. Implicit in using value is the understanding that some things have more worth than others. In implicit speech, when we say, "I value that," we're also saying, "...more than these other things.". If everything has the same value, value loses meaning. Value is generally used as a relational measurement of worth. Even then, value is not a primitive because there's a question of 'evaluation'. How do we determine something has value? Why is X valued more than Y?

I absolutely agree that our moral principles cannot be absolute; but what it is a right, for it to be a right in the traditional sense, requires that it is irrevocable but does not require us to posit an absolute principle — Bob Ross

Irrevocable and absolute are the same in our analysis though. If I say, "I have the right to life," and its irrevocable, that means that in no way is it ever right for me to be killed. That's absolute. The moment we say, "Except for the case when its war," then our right is no longer irrevocable. An absolute principle is one which does not change no matter the context. Relativistic principles can. If the right has an "Except" clause, its relativistic.

Of course, I also agree that we refurbish them; but this is not because the fact of the matter about what is a right has changed but, rather, our understanding of it. — Bob Ross

Sure, I can get behind this. For example if we said, "Every life has the right to life," but then later said, "Actually, only every human has the right to life," we're still saying the right is absolute, its just we were wrong the first time around. Of course, the question then comes into play, "How do we know if our claims of an absolute right are correct?" How do we prove this absolute under your theory? I can show there are a few absolute moral guidelines that work because a violation of them always results in less existence under my theory. Its just there are fewer absolute rules that I can prove then I think you would like. Can you prove the same under your theory?

When you relativize rights, you mask mere privileges under the name of something with much more vigor to its name. — Bob Ross

I will state once more that an allowance is not the same as a self-restriction. Your real issue is that I state society determines both. But can we both agree that a privilege is an allowance by a society, while a right is a restriction on a society? I think are real argument is that I say such a restriction is established by a society, while you believe such restrictions are not established by societies. Is this fair to say?

Regardless, how do you answer questions of conflicting rights? How do we manage exceptions like stealing for food?

Thirdly, you ask for evidence of intrinsic value. I have already given it, but there are some things worth clarifying: — Bob Ross

I have not understood this evidence Bob. Please point it out again.

2. When I say a thing demands value, I mean it in the sense of innate insistence. — Bob Ross

This still doesn't mean anything. If I insist that I'm worth 10 million dollars and society should give it to me, society is not obligated to do so. Why should anyone care about what I insist my intrinsic value is? And again, how is this intrinsic value determined? This doesn't make sense.

3. One thing I have failed to mention, is that intrinsic value is only possible for states; because nothing else can provide innate insistence on value. Thusly, to take your rock example, a rock can’t have intrinsic value, simply because it cannot innately compel whatsoever. However, the state of pain can. — Bob Ross

A rock can have a state of being. I'm going to infer what you mean is intrinsic value is the state of a living being. According to your theory then, non-living things have no value. In my theory, they do. If in the future we come up with a matter destroying ray, I can argue why such a thing would be immoral, and that we should only focus on matter deconstruction rays. Under your theory, its fine to destroy matter as we wish as long as it does not affect life.

If only states of life can have value, why? What determined that? Why is life special when it is clearly made up of non-life? The state of pain is a physical process of electrical impulses traveling down nerves. If the state of pain has value, but we eliminate the non-life of those electrical impulses, it would destroy pain. But then doesn't this mean the non-life part of pain, the electrical impulse, now has value as well?

Is the state of pain only valuable if we're conscious of it? Pain inhibitors don't block the initial signals of pain being sent by areas of the body, only the end receptors to the pain message. Is the pain now valueless because the receptors don't fire? Or what if the receptors do fire, but the brain cannot interpret the message into the qualia of pain? Or is the 'state of pain' simply the conscious qualia of it to begin with?

My theory of pain looks at the entire thing. The physical and the qualia. We can evaluate moral pain blocking techniques. Lets say we had different pain blockers that affected different parts of the body. The cells firing, the receptors, and the brain's qualia. We would want to do the least amount of disruption to the system, so a targeted effort to the area that caused the least disruption would be the most moral pain blocker to use.

I answer, to your dissatisfaction, that a rational and healthy person would only be able to superficially deny its value when in that state. This does not beg the question, because I am not presupposing the truth of the conclusion in an (implicit) premise; and it is not confirmation bias because I am not saying that a person is definitely unhealthy or irrational if they deny it in a non-superficial sense: I am saying that, based off of the empirical knowledge on rational + healthy people in such states, it is sufficiently proven that they confirm the value of such states. — Bob Ross

Bob, its not sufficiently proven at all. Rational and healthy people choose lower states of being without question.

1. You have not given a way for us to evaluate the intrinsic value of a state extrinsically, yet base it off of people's extrinsic evaluations in a contradiction.

2. Your only counter thus far to people who choose states of lower value are that they are unhealthy or irrational. Which implies that healthy rational people automatically choose better states. This absolutely begs the question: "Why are healthy and rational people always able to evaluate higher value states 100% of the time?" We still haven't been given the criterion for evaluating innate value yet. What is the rational process they use? How does health contribute to this? Is an unhealthy rational person incapable of choosing a state of higher value?

Fourthly, you noted the Kantian position on things-in-themselves again; and I wanted to briefly note that I deny that altogether. I think you are conflating absolute truth with things-in-themselves: the former is what you are really arguing is unobtainable (by my lights). — Bob Ross

"In his doctrine of transcendental idealism, Kant argued the sum of all objects, the empirical world, is a complex of appearances whose existence and connection occur only in our representations.[2] Kant introduces the thing-in-itself as follows:

'And we indeed, rightly considering objects of sense as mere appearances, confess thereby that they are based upon a thing in itself, though we know not this thing as it is in itself, but only know its appearances, viz., the way in which our senses are affected by this unknown something.'"

— Prolegomena, § 32

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thing-in-itself#:~:text=In%20Kantian%20philosophy%2C%20the%20thing,independent%20of%20representation%20and%20observation.

In very simple terms, we have a 'thing in-itself' vs a 'thing as-ascribed'. If you ascribe anything to a 'thing in-itself' you are confused and actually creating a 'thing as-ascribed'. You cannot ever give any type of identity to things in themselves. It is merely a base philosophical concept to demonstrate there is something upon which we are representing, but that we can never in our representing, what that thing in itself as it is. Thus there is no 'value' as a thing in itself. That's an ascription. A representation of something which cannot be identified or known.

Fifthly:

"Goodness" is a state of reality with the embodiment of "What should be" as "What is".

“what should be” and “what is” are both not properties. — Bob Ross

I don't understand why this matters. The definitions of good and goodness are what they are. If they aren't properties to you, then they aren't properties. You'll have to explain to me the importance of this because I just don't understand.

Sixthly:

Explicated and identified Good = moral value

&

I have the answer of what a value is (what should be)

I am not following. First, I thought you were saying ‘goodness’ is ‘to ought to be’; now you seem to be agreeing with me it is ‘to have value’. You have also said — Bob Ross

You are the one who put it as 'to ought to be', not me. I'm trying to show you what value means here, but it seems I dropped the ball. Let me try again.

Moral value is the evaluation of total good in any one scenario. Just like monetary value is defined by an explicated and identified price, so moral value is defined by an explicated and identified value of goodness. The explicated and identified way we evaluate good is through the expression of identities and potential through time. Thus we can tally this up in any scenario, and that is its moral value. In scenario 1 there is a moral value of 20, and in scenario there is a moral value of 25. Thus I have clearly laid out what value means and demonstrated an example of its existence and how we use it. Can your theory do the same?

Then, to make matters more confusing, you have also said that
To know what ought to be, you have to know the value of what is
: that implies you need to determine the value of a thing before you can determine whether it ought to be, — Bob Ross

If I give you the choice of a green jewel vs a red jewel, but you don't know the monetary value of each jewel, can you make a knowledgeable decision to choose the jewel with the most value? No. You must know the value of each before you can make a correct monetary decision. The same goes with moral decisions. We need to know the value of the potential states before we can make the correct decision.

Seventhly, morality does not boil down to the question of “should there be existence?”, nor is that a moral foundation. — Bob Ross

You've said this in the past and that's fine for now. Lets see where your moral theory takes you.

A moral foundation is the core of an ethical theory, and that is going to be, in any good theory, an outline of the hierarchy (i.e., the ontology) of things with intrinsic value. — Bob Ross

And what determines intrinsic value? Alright, that's it for now Bob!

Cool discussion on rights to start with! I still feel like we're not terribly off from one another. The difference is the lens approach from our different theories. As such I'm going to start with your theory, then address rights after.

By ‘objective value’, I am assuming you mean value which is objective; and this is not synonymous with intrinsic value per se. Any value which is objective, is just any value which exists mind-independently and the truth of the matter (whether it has such value) is stance-independent. — Bob Ross

This is a description of something that is objective, but not a concrete proven example of an objective value. In other words, I'm asking for a knowable value that cannot be easily denied using rational thought. So far all you've effectively stated is that a value is a value, and its objective because its mind-independent. What is a value? What reasons, evidence, etc. point to a value being something which exists independently from an opinion or mere belief?

Where intrinsic value ties in, is that it is the only possible form of ‘objective value’ because it is the only type of value which is inscribed, so to speak, on the thing per its nature: it is the only form of value that is of the thing in-itself. — Bob Ross

This also doesn't answer anything Bob. First, what is a value? Second, how is it inscribed? There needs to be a clear definition, and then an example of clear application. Third, if value is a 'thing in-itself', then it is unknowable. As a callback to previous conversations, a thing-in itself can never be labeled or ascribed. It exists only as a reminder to us that everything we speak about is an interpretation of some 'thing'. What that thing is, we can never know.

I should be more clear as well when say 'objective morality' When we're talking about morality, we're talking really about an objective foundation. To my mind, there is not a moral theory out there besides this one that uses an objective foundation. Moral foundations vary from deism, societal stability, hierarchy dominance, and idealism. But the foundations themselves are questionable. If for example a moral theory is based on there being a God, I would ask, "Can you prove God exists? What is God?" and so on. For your value based theory, I'm asking you to objectively show what 'value' means. Can you prove values exist? What is a value?"

Its important to do so because we want to avoid what I call "Gandalfian Philosophy" (Or Phictional Philosophy for fun). Gandalf is a character in the Lord of The Rings series of books by JRR Tolkien. He has a particular personality and way of working. We can debate what he would do in a particular situation. If the Hobbits were misbehaving would he turn them into toads or berate them? "Oh, he would berate them of course, Gandalf isn't the type to use his magic to punish and intimidate friends!" And of course, we come to some lovely conclusions that make logical sense that everyone agrees with. There's just one problem. Gandalf is a fictional character. The foundation destroys any semblence of the theory meaning any more than a fictional game.

So, does intrinsic value exist, or is it a fictional invention? You get the idea.

A useful way of thinking about intrinsic value, by my lights, is that the thing which has it demands recognition as valuable; and that is how one can decipher whether or not one simply values the thing because of their own (cognitive or conative) disposition, or whether it has actual value. I do not mean ‘demands’ in a personified sense. — Bob Ross

A demand is a personified meaning. At best we can apply it to an animals stubbornness. How does a rock demand? And even if it does demand, why do I have to care? Why should I listen to its demands? "Because its innate" is not an answer. We're missing some logic here.

A great example is the pain example, but I have already explicated that one; so I will leave it there. — Bob Ross

I thought I addressed it but I'll point it out again.

I agree that pain has value in the fact that its purpose is to ensure the living being stops injuring itself and gives itself time to heal. However, pain has no intrinsic value in itself. If I'm going to get surgery, feeling the pain from the knife serves no purpose at that point. Something that has intrinsic value means that it has value in itself. But in this instance, it does not. — Philosophim

In an abstract armchair sense of 'people will always choose the more positive state', it sounds good. In reality, people aren't like that. Many people choose the state that we we would consider less valuable.

This isn’t a contention with anything I said, and I wholly agree. Some people simply lack the cognitive ability, or the wisdom, to see that the state is better; and some are so defective or damaged that they no longer can recognize it, even though they could have earlier in their life. — Bob Ross

Then I misunderstood your intention with the example. I asked for an objective example of being able to know intrinsic value. My understanding was that when faced with a choice between two value outcomes, we will always choose the higher value outcome. Because we do this, it proves one is the intrinsically higher value outcome. My problem with this was two fold:

1. This is an extrinsic judgement with no proof of intrinsic value.
2. People choose the 'wrong' value outcome.

These two points combine leave too many questions. How does an extrinsic value evaluation which can be disagreed upon by multiple people prove objective intrinsic value to a particular state? Even if the majority choose state 1, does that prove that state one is the state with more intrinsic value?

My point was that, in isolation, and reasonably healthy and intelligent person will not be able to deny the value of a state that has (negative or positive) intrinsic value if put in that state. Of course, if you put a defective person, a damaged person, a really cognitively impaired person, in such a state, then we would not expect them to fully grasp that state properly (due to their condition). — Bob Ross

This is a nice thought, but begging the question.

1. A healthy person will always choose the right value state.
Q: But what about people who don't choose the right value state?
A: Its because they aren't healthy.

The question being begged is the proof that a healthy person always chooses the right value state. You're assuming this, not proving this.

“Good” is not a property. Your definition needs to of the form “goodness is <insert-definition-here>”. Likewise, “what should be” is not a property. Thusly, you have not analyzed the property of goodness whatsoever in making this remark. — Bob Ross

Bob, I noted the word "Good" not goodness here. I wasn't trying to describe goodness with the word good. Your criticism is about goodness in regards to the word Good, when I describe goodness earlier. I think it was forgotten in the long post, all good. :) Here it is below:

I believe I've answered that question though. Good is "What should be." "Goodness" is a state of reality with the embodiment of "What should be" as "What is". — Philosophim

As for debating whether Good as a property, I'm not claiming it is or isn't a property. I'm just giving you the definition.

To know what ought to be, you have to know the value of what is

If:

1. the property of goodness is not ‘being valuable’; and
2. one needs to know the value of what is to know what to predicate as ‘”oughting” to exist’; and
3. you reject the idea of intrinsic value

Then what can be predicated as good under your view is dependent on subjective dispositions because what is valuable is always extrinsic. — Bob Ross

I've never claimed point one. Goodness is what should be. If we can determine the value of existence in two scenarios, then the scenario with the most value is what should be.

Point two, we determine value by material existence, expressions of identity, and potential expressions of identity.

Point 3, I do not reject the idea of intrinsic value. I'm asking you to demonstrate what intrinsic value is. I can clearly point out intrinsic value in my theory. Its existence. Why? Because existence is good, and we have a rationale for why its good. There is intrinsic value in a thing's existence. The question is whether that value in tandem with other values, produces greater, equivalent, or lesser value overall.

So you see, I don't disagree with an idea of intrinsic value, but I have the answer of what a value is (what should be), I explain why something should be, and build from there. You don't have an answer yet as to what a value is. You don't have an example of how we can objectively know what an intrinsic value is. I'm noting that in your theory, you need something else that explains questions in your foundation.

Then what can be predicated as good under your view is dependent on subjective dispositions because what is valuable is always extrinsic. — Bob Ross

Extrinsic evaluations can be subjective or objective. Objective evaluations of value can be determined by observations and calculations.

The second problem with this is that, on a similar note, what we determine as good is relative to what is valuable; and it seems incorrect to posit vice-versa (or something else entirely). — Bob Ross

How is it incoherent to say "What is not valuable is not good?" Because what is valuable is good. Explicated and identified Good = moral value.

The third problem is that by ‘goodness’ I am assuming you mean ‘moral goodness’ with your definition, and the property of ‘to ought to be’ is not a purely objective analysis and, consequently, your view of moral goodness is not solely about what might be objective. — Bob Ross

As a reminder (its been a while) we worked back that all moral questions will inevitably boil down to the foundation of, "Should there be existence?". Assuming there is an objective morality leads us to the conclusion "Yes." because the opposite leads to a contradiction in itself. Of course, if there is no objective morality, its moot. But if there is, this is the basic answer it must start with.

With mine, on the other hand, moral goodness is ‘to have intrinsic value’, and so it is always an objective matter of dispute what is morally good; with respect to how you defined it, that is not the case. — Bob Ross

Its not because you have no way of demonstrating what intrinsic value is besides just stating the phrase. Ironically, you need my theory to make your theory work. I'm not saying you need to make value the same definition as myself, but it still needs further explication on your end.

Disputes about what ought to be by means of subjective dispositions are still about what is morally good under your metaethical view of ‘goodness’. — Bob Ross

My moral theory can involve subjectivity and subjects. But the means of evaluation are objectively the same. What creates more overall existence over time. In cases where we do not have all the information, we can then result to the induction hierarchy based off of what can be objectively evaluated.

Ok, I think addressing anything else in this section will just be repeating myself more, so back to rights!

This gets you out of the first objection, but not the second: a right is something which cannot be violated in any circumstances. — Bob Ross

True, but that's a necessary consequence of the theory in general. I think that's a strength, not a weakness. In America, rights are regulated and negotiated all the time. One common instance is when a conflict of rights arises. The supreme court ultimately debates the resolution to these conflicts.

Rights as inalienable absolutes are fine in theory, but impractical in practice. A right being negotiable on dependent circumstances also doesn't mean those circumstances happen often, but having an objective evaluation tool when they do happen is much more useful than an insistence that they are non-negotiable. An insistence of inviolable rights when this has never existed in practice is an ideal against the real.

We don't exactly get to tell a hungry lion, "I have a right to life." No one is there to care.

That one has a right, is different than whether anyone else recognizes it. — Bob Ross

I wouldn't call that a right, just a moral outcome. It is more moral for you to continue living then not in most circumstances.

I believe your real issue is that in both cases, these things are determined by societies and not any one individual

It is more than that though: if the society needs to violate one citizen’s rights to save itself, then, unless I am misunderstanding, in your view that is morally permissible (at best) and obligatory (at worst). It is not a right if it can be taken away: that’s a privilege. — Bob Ross

Lets look at it this way. I restrict myself from eating ice cream. I remove that restriction from myself. A restriction being taken away does not make it a privilege. Again, depending on the calculus, yes, it absolutely should violate the rights of one individual to save the entire society. Depending on the calculus, no, they absolutely should not violate the rights of one individual to save the entire society. The only absolute is that the scenario which generates the most existence should be chosen. Moral precepts are digests for normative situations.

In most normal situations, a government's violation of a citizen's rights for its personal benefit will not result in greater overall existence. In extreme circumstances, things can change. But noting that in extreme circumstances things can change does not allow us to disregard the 99% of cases where we have a different answer. The fact my theory can explain extremes instead of insisting on answers that don't make sense is a strength. Absolute moral theories without a strong objective foundation always choke on exceptions. Mine has a path forward to handle the exceptions that do not invalidate normal moral circumstances.

robbing someone is generally bad because of the expected outcome.

Then, under your view, robbing someone isn’t wrong in-itself; because you are not looking at the nature of the action but, instead, looking at its consequences. — Bob Ross

Correct. Lets say a person is starving, has no means to pay anyone for food, and requests for food are refused. Should the man starve? Or are they justified in robbing someone for food in this instance?

Lets say a spy has a cypher in their pockets they use to decode messages. If the spy is in my country, is it immoral to rob the spy of their cypher?

Absolutism would always say 'no' or end up compromising on rights due to rights conflict.

My overall point is that if intentions are good in themselves regardless of the outcome, then logically we can create a situation in which an intention always has a negative outcome and yet it would be considered moral.

I didn’t understand this part. An intention can be bad, and its nuanced consequences good; and vice-versa. This makes sense to me: are you contending with that? — Bob Ross

I'm pointing out that logically, if intentions do not care about results, then in theory we can create a good intention that always ends in terrible results. How do we justify such an intention as moral?

Ok, these are getting long again! Feel free to collapse some concepts as I think there's a bit of repeat on my end.

In one of my recent classes, we discussed the famous "inverted qualia" argument against physicalism about consciousness. For those unfamiliar, it posits a scenario where two individuals (Alice and Mark) have qualitative experiences that are systematically inverted relative to each other (e.g. what feels like "red" to Alice feels like "green" to Mark), despite being physical/functional duplicates. — Matripsa

I wouldn't call it an argument against physicalism, just a fun thought experiment. Physicalism would simply point out that they see different colors by subjective experience due to physical differences in their brains. Its a much greater leap of belief to assume you can get a completely different outcome from an identical physical process.

So Alice and Mark both experience the same qualia of "green", but Alice has a different label for it, so when they look at "green", Mark says that's green, Alice says that's blue, and yet they both see the same color and are having the same qualia experience. — Matripsa

Sure, this seems very possible in theory. One thing that helps with discussions like this is to find something objective that doesn't change despite a person's experience. The color 'red' objectively is a wavelength of light. How our brains process and produce the interpretation of that wavelength could very well differ. We already know this is possible through color blindness.

So if there can be different ways people interpret the wavelength, its very plausible that some people have a different qualitative experience of your interpretation of 'red'.

Agreed. But that philosophy should be provided by the scientists. — jgill

I understand what you're stating in a general sense. I think good philosophy should use as many facts and hew as close to current scientific understanding as possible.

I still think there are some cases where we need strong philosophy and where philosophers can help science. Knowledge, morality, and 'God' (or the nature of origin) are the few that come to my mind. However, other philosophy like "Philosophy of mind" is pretty much dead as an independent philosophical field and should be kept in the realm of science as much as possible.

Basically prior to there being a science, philosophy is our necessary start. Once there is an established science, philosophy must use that science as a basis.

So, it appears that you, like me, see the two disciplines connected within a bi-conditional relationship. — ucarr

Yes, that's correct. :)

Here is how I view it in extremely simple terms Ucarr. Philosophy is a hypothesis. Science is its application.

Philosophy is concerned with constructing ideas into language that makes sense logically. You can use this logic and attempt to apply it. So for example, lets say I create a definition of good which is built up from the ground logically. It seems good right? The next step is to apply it. That's science.

In another case, science can test something and find an outcome that no one thought possible. No one knows what this outcome means. Philosophy tries to capture that outcome into a language that is consistently logical and can then be tested against again.

I do not think the complete scientific method can exist without philosophy. I do not think a completely philosophical exploration can be complete without science. But, the fields can be separated enough at times where there is viable work to be done on the hypothesis alone vs work on the application alone. Thus the division of study.

I need to define society. A society occurs when there is more than one person involved.

Ok, I was using society in the sense of an institutionalized state. — Bob Ross

That one's on me, I didn't define it ahead of time.

Rights only come about with the interplay of the individual and societies

They are only explicated in societies. You still have a right to life even if you are the only human left. — Bob Ross

I think we're more in a semantics disagreement here than an disagreement of underlying concepts. My point is that if there are no other human beings, there are no rights. We don't exactly get to tell a hungry lion, "I have a right to life." No one is there to care. Is it more moral for you to live instead of die? In almost all cases, yes. If you want to call it a right its fine. Its the right of a society of 1. I just prefer to note that a society has a minimum of 2.

If we are talking universal rights, yes. Because what we also must consider is the interplay between societies.

The interplay of societies doesn’t imply rights in the sense that you have set up: if the societies determine rights, then two societies which are not subsumed under another, larger society would have no way to resolve any disputes between society members of one vs. the other. — Bob Ross

If rights are societally subjective, then yes. But if they are societally objective, as in these rights to individuals improve and strengthen societies more than those who do not have them by fact, then there is data for one society to point to.

Privileges are permissions from society. Rights are restrictions on society.

If society is making up rights, then they are also permissions. — Bob Ross

I think my above definition gives a clear enough demarcation between the two to denote two separate words. I believe your real issue is that in both cases, these things are determined by societies and not any one individual. If it makes it easier, we can say an individual can give a permission to itself vs a restriction to itself. I think you would agree with this. As to whether a right or permission has any import in a society of 1, I leave that up to you. Its not that important as long as the difference between permission vs restriction is understood and accepted.

Correct. A ‘right’ in the traditional sense of the word does not exist in your view — Bob Ross

How would you define a right then? You have to understand that in 'the traditional sense' we have not had an objective morality. There are going to be a lot of things an objective morality challenges. The question is whether the subjective challenge holds when looked at in its reasoning.

It is bad because it violates a general moral principle that robbery is (generally) wrong. It is generally wrong, because it is morally bad, when analyzed in isolation, to rob someone. Why this is the case will depend on the ethical theory in play. — Bob Ross

Right, and according to my ethical theory which attempts to be objective, robbing someone is generally bad because of the expected outcome. A belief that the moral theory is 'wrong' only works with subjective moral theories. But with an objective basis, I am rationally permitted to dismiss such opinions if they don't clearly demonstrate why my conclusion is wrong. Objectively why is another moral theory right, and why is the one I've proposed wrong?

If robbery is bad in-itself, then an intention to do it is bad. — Bob Ross

True, but it must be objectively demonstrated why robbery is bad in itself. I haven't seen that yet in a way that isn't subjective. I can objectively conclude robbing others is generally bad due to probability.

When they get angry and explain that it is also an insult, I insist that I will continue to the use the word as my principle demands that I use 'sir' when talking to people

This is just a conflation of words, and not an absurd insistence on one’s duty to a principle. The principle would be ‘one should be polite’, not ‘one should say the word ‘sir’, specifically in English’. — Bob Ross

Fair, I used a poor example. My overall point is that if intentions are good in themselves regardless of the outcome, then logically we can create a situation in which an intention always has a negative outcome and yet it would be considered moral.

To be objective, you need a solid foundation. What is objective value? What determines value?

Not at all. To be objective, is to exist mind-independently. Goodness is identical to ‘having value’ because that is, at its core, what the ‘being good’ is about. — Bob Ross

But what is objectively 'having value'? Living things value situations. Unliving things don't have a concept of value. Why is what one person values suddenly objective? If value does not involve a living thing, what is determining value at that point?

An easy way to demonstrate this, is to think of what ethics, axiology, and pragmatism would be if it had nothing to do with value: it would be merely about what is and not what ought to be—and this is a fundamental shift from what the studies traditionally are about. — Bob Ross

To know what ought to be, you have to know the value of what is. This doesn't answer the question though. What is an objective definition of value, and why is it good beyond it being an apparent synonym?

When you say “existence is good”, you are saying “one can validly predicate ‘existence’ with the property of ‘goodness’”. It is still an entirely valid question to ask: “what is ‘goodness’?”. — Bob Ross

I believe I've answered that question though. Good is "What should be." "Goodness" is a state of reality with the embodiment of "What should be" as "What is".

“Objective value” is just intrinsic value; for it is the only type of value which a thing can have in-itself. — Bob Ross

The problem again is 'intrinsic value'. A thing without a mind cannot value itself. And you've noted that extrinsic value doesn't count either. If so, what is 'intrinsic value' then? Is this a real phrase? Is it just a combination of words that doesn't represent anything in reality?

The fact that someone can be motivated to value or not value it, is not relevant itself to whether the thing demands to be value because it has intrinsic worth. — Bob Ross

Right, so you're saying something has value for existing. Why Bob? Why is there intrinsic value in existence?

Why is flourishing valuable?

It is intrinsically valuable, because, as per its nature, it demands value. Which can be easily understood when one is in such a state. — Bob Ross

If intrinsic value doesn't care about our opinion of it, being in a state of higher value, and making a judgement about it, is irrelevant. Because one can be in an objectively higher value state, but subjectively believe they aren't. Let me explain as I've had two alcoholics in the family. My father recovered, my mother never did.

My father went to AA. He's known tons of addicts over the years. There are plenty of people who choose that lower state of existence. They know what its like to be sober, and they despise it. For the first year or two of my father quitting, he hated it. Its why so many can't quit Bob. Its why so many become alcoholics or druggies in the first place. For them, there is more value in being hopped up than not.

The way Alcoholics Anonymous works is to emphasize a higher power. The point is to get the addict thinking outside of their own state. In psychology, getting the patient to realize their choices impact more than themselves is a key of getting someone out of their addiction. Addicts are inherently selfish individuals who gain immense pleasure and satisfaction out of their state of being. My dad once told me, "You get F'd up because you don't want to feel normal."

In an abstract armchair sense of 'people will always choose the more positive state', it sounds good. In reality, people aren't like that. Many people choose the state that we we would consider less valuable. And that lends doubt to the idea of states being 'intrinsically good'. If people don't choose them when given a choice, why are they intrinsically good?

Imagine two states that your mother could be in. The first is constant pleasure obtained by being an alcoholic. The second is a persistent state of flourishing, happiness, and prosperity. — Bob Ross

My mother has repeatedly chosen the first one. She is able to hold her job, makes enough money, and is able to do what she wants with her life. And she drinks half a bottle of wine each night and becomes intolerable to talk to. She does not care. She chooses alcohol and being drunk or buzzed every time.

Intrinsic value is objective. She does not determine whether or not a state of flourishing has intrinsic value nor how much. — Bob Ross

I can agree with the second statement. But how is intrinsic value objective? But at this point I'm repeating myself.

That's a fine opinion, but not an objective argument.

I don’t see how it isn’t an objective argument; insofar as the argument demonstrates (to my satisfaction) that morality is objective, and The Good is universal flourishing. — Bob Ross

Because an objective argument does not care about our satisfaction. Objectivity persists despite our opinions or feelings about it. You have not clearly defined value in an objective manner. You've stated good = value, but without a clear definition of value, its just dodged the definition by synonym.

“Objective value” is another phrase for ‘intrinsically valuable’; and flourishing has intrinsic value because the state demands to be valued in virtue of its nature, and this is hard to demonstrate if you haven’t experienced it—this is an empirical claim, and not something abstract. — Bob Ross

A few counter points of issue to sum:

Objective value = intrinsic value is a synonym, not a demonstration of meaning. First you need to objectively define 'value'.

If intrinsic value does is not determined by extrinsic opinion, it does not demand to be valued, it just has value. There is nothing which objectively demands I care about something's intrinsic value as an extrinsic evaluator.

Intrinsic value by your definition, is an abstract value. To empirically experience it, we must know what that abstract is, and give objective examples of that abstract. For example, I have an abstract definition of the color red, then an empirical experience of the color red. How can I, and extrinsic evaluator, empirically experience the intrinsic value of something else in an objective manner? Its already been shown that sometimes people will willingly pick lower states of value when given the choice. Objectively, why are they wrong to do so? How do we prove it a lower state despite their happiness in picking it?

Your theory presupposes a property of goodness, of which your analysis (so far) is the discovery of what can be predicated to have such a property, but, interestingly, doesn't give any analysis of the property itself--it is merely a presupposed, notional, property that is utilized for the rest of the analysis. — Bob Ross

I don't see how I've done this. Let me explain why.

1. Good = "what should be" A clear definition.
2. Existence should be is logically concluded as being the most reasonable conclusion when faced with our limitations. So existence has the property of being good.
3. Existence is quantified. This lets us show how existence can express itself, and also show us there are scenarios that decrease or increase overall existence based on how it all interacts with itself.

Now, instead of meaning "more existence is good" in an analogous sense to "this car is red", you may mean it as an identity relation---that 'is good' here refers to "goodness is identical to the property of 'having more existence' [or something like that]" (i.e., goodness = having more existence). I think there are good reasons to believe that goodness cannot be reduced to such a claim. — Bob Ross

I'm just noting that if existence is good, more existence is "gooder" :D. Its just a logical step after the first claim.

Firstly, goodness, then, would not be normative; because it only refers to whether something has or does not have 'more existence' than some other possibility. — Bob Ross

Not at all. If existence is "What should be" then to determine "What should be" we should know "what it is". How can I evaluate two scenarios if I don't know what those two scenarios entail? If I can calculate one scenario results in more existence than a second scenario, only then can we know the first scenario is better right? I'm a little confused how you think being able to evaluate the goodness of a situation removes it from comparative evaluation with another potential scenario?

Secondly, it doesn't seem correct that "having more existence [than ...] is to have more existence [than ...]" is identical in meaning to "to be good is to have more existence [than ...]": the latter seems to add something extra, in meaning, by denoting what is good as opposed to expressing a tautology. — Bob Ross

I don't understand what you're trying to say here. What does [than ...] mean? I'm just noting that if we have two potential scenarios, the one with the most existence is what should be.

Great discussion, I look forward to your replies!

I've read it. I guess I was wondering if you were interested in considering a different perspective. — wonderer1

Always! I was just giving my answer in the most accurate way I could. Since you've already read it, I will answer your question with that in mind.

It's not rare for me to accept that I know things, based on my intuition having been highly trained and tested in some fairly specific areas. Is there some reason I should accept your definition? — wonderer1

Yes, because my definition allows an objective statement of knowledge. This further allows an evaluation of inductions, which we can place into a hierarchy of cogency. Probability, possibility, plausibility, and irrational. Thus we can be more confident even in the inductions we make by evaluating them against other competing inductions in that hierarchy.

If we trace your logic back to its roots, we are going to find intuitions anyway, don't you think? — wonderer1

No. At its root, "I discretely experience." is proven and not an intuition.

Under your definition, then, people who are not a part of a society do not have the right to life nor bodily autonomy. — Bob Ross

I need to define society. A society occurs when there is more than one person involved. If there is no society, there are no other people. Meaning there is nothing else outside of yourself to dictate what you can and cannot do.

I would say that rights are innate. It is a mistake to think of rights as relative to societies, because they are then subject to the whims of the society and not subject to what is good (morals). — Bob Ross

Rights only come about with the interplay of the individual and societies. While yes, it is relevant to the society, it is factual to the well being or detriment of the society. In cases where we could document that individuals having rights benefitted all societies, we could call these universal rights. In other societies and cultures, people having a 'right' may benefit that particular culture, but not others. But, a right should be based on concrete and provable benefits, not simply societal opinions. For example, some people argue that universal health care is a right, despite costs. Perhaps in a wealthy society, it can be. In a society with limited resources, it could bankrupt it.

It may be for the benefit of one society to persecute and enslave outside members, whether they be a member of another society or not, and I would say that this still violates their rights. — Bob Ross

If we are talking universal rights, yes. Because what we also must consider is the interplay between societies. If one society starts enslaving another population, that other society may ban together with others and overthrow the enslaving society. Not to mention trade and interchange of culture between the two is likely going to be stifled. Its been found slavery tends to hold societies back as well. My favorite reference to this is that the American economy improved more after slavery was eliminated. https://www.econlib.org/archives/2014/09/ending_slavery.html#:~:text=Former%20slaves%20would%20now%20be,productive%2C%20and%20hence%20richer%20country.

Also, I would consider your definition to be a form of privileges — Bob Ross

There is a very key difference though. Privileges are permissions from society. Rights are restrictions on society. Privileges can be granted or taken away without a large impact on a societies health. People generally don't foment revolution because of them. Adding or taking away rights directly benefit or hurt a society in a large way.

I think your main issue is that I've noted society is the one that grants rights, and you see that no different than granting privileges except by degree. The point I'm trying to make is a right is a restriction on society that provably benefits it overall. So even if a society does not grant free speech for example, it would be better overall if it did grant such a right. Might makes 'what is granted'. Might does not make 'right'.

I think that, still your view also agrees (along with what you said here above) that all else being equal it is better to save the 5 by sacrificing the 1. — Bob Ross

What do you mean 'all else being equal'? That doesn't convey anything to me in this sentence. If we remove society, like in the case of the lizards, then yes. But we just can't remove society from human kind. So no, generally its wrong to sacrifice someone against their will to save 1. "All else being equal" doesn't address the calculus going on.

Whether the intention is good or bad is completely despite any consequences that my be brought about.

For example, if I intend to rob someone and end up accidentally saving their life, then my intention was bad and the consequences of my actions was good. — Bob Ross

Right, but why was your intention bad? With my answer, its easy to understand. Lets say that 99% of attempted robberies result in harm. Just because this 1% resulted in something good, doesn't suddenly make attempting to rob people a good intention. This is about expected results.

To make it clearer, let us say that in a culture I call people 'sir' as I am intending to be polite. Now in another culture, the word 'sir' is actually slang for an insult. When I use the word, I'm intending to convey politeness. When they get angry and explain that it is also an insult, I insist that I will continue to the use the word as my principle demands that I use 'sir' when talking to people. I have all intention that I will change their ways, that I'm really being polite and civilized, and I must do this to stay virtuous. Yet, the reality is I'm just making a lot of people angry at me and being rude.

Without outcomes to measure intentions, there's nothing to back 'what is virtuous' besides subjective op
inion. But with an objective measurement that 'greater existence is better', we have an outcome that we can measure our intentions by. This allows us to say with objective confidence what 'virtues' are generally more good or bad within a society.

The intentions and consequences matter — Bob Ross

Correct. My only point is that to have meaningful and objectively evaluated intentions, it must be based on meaningful and objective expected outcomes.

If whether it is immoral to torture billy is undefined without explicating all possible skills Dave could be acquiring instead, then something is very wrong with your theory. — Bob Ross

Or something is wrong with your example in addressing the theory. Lets move on from this until later however. I think we're having much more productive conversations in the other areas and you're getting a better understanding of what the theory means through these more basic examples.

You conclude: “Nah, it seems like, given my experience and knowledge, I am not in a simulation, although it is actually and logically possible.”. This abduction is your reasoning, sherlock-holmes style, about the information you have that makes you conclude that your aren’t in a simulation; and the seeming is that you find the abduction valid and correct: it seems right that this abduction demonstrates that you are not in a simulation. — Bob Ross

I still see this as no different than inductive reasoning.

For example, I, with all due respect, consider your theory to be making such a mistake (of skipping #1): when you declare, even if I were to grant it as true, that “existence is good” — Bob Ross

Such a statement says nothing about what goodness actually is, but rather what can be said to ultimately be good. Yours is missing an analysis of the nature of goodness: it only covers, at best, The Good. — Bob Ross

I admit to a little confusion. How is pointing out "The Good" missing an analysis of The Good? Don't I go immediately afterward and examine how we measure existence, and how we can create states of optimal goodness? This is a little too abstract for me. Could you point out where my logic or examples miss this?

For me, I will briefly say that goodness, in my theory, is identical to ‘having value’ and moral goodness is identical to ‘having intrinsic value’. — Bob Ross

To be objective, you need a solid foundation. What is objective value? What determines value?

To keep things brief, I consider ‘intrinsic value’ to be value which is demanded by the ‘thing’ in virtue of its nature — Bob Ross

To keep things brief, I consider ‘intrinsic value’ to be value which is demanded by the ‘thing’ in virtue of its nature: it is value which can be ignored or denied, but only superficially. A great example (to initially convey the point) is pain: pain has intrinsic value (in the sense of avoiding it) insofar as one can superficially say or feel that “avoiding pain is not valuable” but when put in a state of serious pain it is undeniable that it there is value (all else being equal) in avoiding it — Bob Ross

I agree that pain has value in the fact that its purpose is to ensure the living being stops injuring itself and gives itself time to heal. However, pain has no intrinsic value in itself. If I'm going to get surgery, feeling the pain from the knife serves no purpose at that point. Something that has intrinsic value means that it has value in itself. But in this instance, it does not.

Lets compare this to my theory. I would note that as long as pain helps a living being preserve itself and ultimately live longer more intact, then it is an incentive that helps extend the existence of a life. But if we can obtain the same outcome of existent life without pain, there is no harm in using pain relief medication. Pain is good within the greater context of its impact on a life.

There are states which demand more value which, if grasped by the person, can lead one to overcome (some or even all) pain or pleasure to acquire it; and the end result is far better than mere avoidance of pain and pursuit of pleasure. — Bob Ross

But this is not intrinsic value, but extrinsic value. If something motivates you to do something that is good, it is good in virtue of its ultimate outcome, not good merely in itself.

An easy example of this is Aristotle’s eudamonia (i.e., ‘flourshing’ or ‘happiness’, as roughly translated): for one to truly flourish, they must overcome and even volunteer to be in pain or give up pleasure. — Bob Ross

Why is flourishing valuable?

Just like how it may be hard to understand how more demanding (of value) flourishing is over pursuing pleasure but, nevertheless, if one were placed in such a state their denial (of the supremacy of such a state) would be superficial — Bob Ross

I grew up with a family of alcoholics. My mother desires pleasure far more than flourishing. This is not superficial, but a real choice. Are we saying my mother determines value? Or is there a value beyond a person's personal desires? If so, what objectively determines that value?

if one who has achieved an optimal state of flourishing must relinquish or sacrifice some of it, or even most of it, to help them and another achieve mutually beneficial flourishing, then this will be an undeniably better state than the first. — Bob Ross

How is it undeniable? Where is the proof?

The Good, in my theory, is thusly universal flourishing (which relates very closely to universal harmony). — Bob Ross

That's a fine opinion, but not an objective argument. There are a lot of assumptions here that need clear answers.

This theory, since it posits the The Good as universal flourishing, is not subjective: whether or not a ‘thing’ is flourishing is not stance-dependent—it is not dependent on conative nor cognitive dispositions. — Bob Ross

Oh, I'm not arguing that your definition of flourishing and the criteria to meet flourishing are not objective. My question is what is objective value, and why is flourishing part of that objective value?

In your view, whether or not it is immoral to torture Billy to acquire the skill of torturing is undefined — Bob Ross

No, its not undefined. You simply haven't given a thought experiment which can be accurately evaluated. I've asked you to provide aspects to make it complete. Do so, and you'll have your answer.

in mine, it is immoral, because torturing a person for the sake of acquiring a skill does not uphold nor progress towards a state of mutual flourishing between them. — Bob Ross

Of course, because your criteria for goodness is mutual flourishing. But you haven't given any objective reasons why mutual flourishing is good. My criteria for goodness is relative outcomes of existence. This is objectively concluded. To evaluate a moral outcome, you need a thought experiment that compares relative outcomes of existence.

This is getting long, so I will stop here (; — Bob Ross

Honestly I was worried it was going to be a lot longer than this. :D Well done Bob, I'm enjoying digging into these ideas.

Is there some reason I should accept your definition? — wonderer1

Feel free to read my link and work. If its a little intimidating, read the summary from Cerulea Lawrence as the next post after mine.

Belief is an assertation of identity. Knowledge is an assertation of identity backed by deductive reasoning.

Here's a summary of my knowledge theory I've worked on for years. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14044/knowledge-and-induction-within-your-self-context/p1

Feel free to scroll down to the first follow up post by Cerulia Lawrence for a fantastic summary.

I would like to ask a quick question: are you a moral particularist? — Bob Ross

All I'm doing is thinking through the consequences of this theory to arrive at what seems most logical. I have no commitment to anything but that. :) Lets review:

1. We determine that if there is an objective morality the least contradictory conclusion to the base moral question of whether there should be existence, is that there should be.

2. If there should be existence, then to make a theory or morality that can be evaluated, we need a way to measure existence. Thus, material existence, its identity expression, and its potential existence all over time.

3. It is discovered that some combinations of expressed existence lower potential existence, and in the future, would destroy expressed existence as well. For example, everything joins together permanently into a ball or spreads out into the vacuum of space forever isolated. Thus we want to create states that preserve or increase existence, not diminish.

4. In any calculation, the goal is the same: Find a situation in which there is equal or more existence. From this, we can find a few patterns. First, homeostasis. 10 existence over millennia is greater than 1,000,000 existence over one second that then burns out to nothing. At this point we have proof of patterns that can help us shortcut tedious measurement and work on calculating things beyond just 'atoms'.

So what then would be a 'principle"? Calculating morality, like any science or rigorous proof, requires a lot of effort and work. There will be many times in our lives where we will not have the skill or capability to calculate out how the situation will unfold. Principles should be based on a data driven hierarchy of induction, probabilities, and possibilities.

First there are probabilities ascertained by data. For example, the majority of smokers get lung cancer, therefore it is better not to smoke. If we could calculate your DNA and body perfectly, perhaps we would see that you are one of the exceptional bodies that would not get cancer from smoking. But because we do not know this, the proper moral principle would be not to smoke to begin with. This again is not based on subjective opinion, but objective data.

Second, possibilities should be considered. Its possible that if we spy a wild bear in the woods, it won't maul us. We don't have probabilities in front of us, but we can consider the possibility that it does, vs the possibility that it doesn't. In the case that it does not, we could have a delightful interaction with a bear that could very well create more actual and potential existence then if not. But, if we're wrong, we die. That's an end to our lives, a counter to the pattern of homeostasis and a potentially tragic loss of existence compared to what little bump we would have gained by 'petting a wild bear'. Thus we should take the principle of not approaching wild bears in the woods.

Where you begin to disagree, and correct me if I am wrong, is when it comes to humans specifically because they are a part of a society and that society cannot function properly if there is no reassurance of at least basic rights. — Bob Ross

1. I don’t see how sacrificing one to save five, even if it were institutionalized, would result in overall less potential and actual concrete entities; and so I think you are miscalculating by your own theory’s standards. — Bob Ross

It would help if you could point out how it does not create less existence overall, but I also understand I did not go too far in specifics. Here are a few considerations to start. Everyone is someone's son/daughter. How many parents would want justice or revenge? Society runs on trust. If I went to the hospital for cancer treatment, and it was found my body could be harvested against my will to save 5 people, how many people would go to the hospital? How many people would simply suffer or die from lack of treatment because of this? This would cascade into an avoidance of medicine in general, destroying or diminishing an entire industry and service. At the point we say, "You can be sacrificed against your will at any time," you create far more problems in society than solutions.

If I were to grant that when one includes society into the calculations that it maximizes potential and actual concrete entities, then it does not (still) follow from that that people should be granted rights. — Bob Ross

Lets define rights first under this theory. As we know, there is an interplay between individuals and society. Societies are 'more existence' than an individual alone. But, just because something is more existence overall than something else, it doesn't meant it can go on a purely destructive rampage for its own temporary gain. Society can only function because it has the trust/compliance of individuals within it. Thus a society which has maximum trust/compliance for its goals can be the most successful.

A 'right' would be a limitation on society that has been deemed to be of greater benefit for the individual to have for the benefit of society. Looking at the writing and reasoning behind the bill of rights, this is easy to see. Free speech is important for the exchange of thought and ideas for a productive society. Rights are not 'innate'. They are limitations on society that society has put into place for its overall benefit.

So, if #2 is right, then your justification only gets us to privileges — Bob Ross

A privilege is different from a right. A right is a self-constraint on society over the individual. A privilege is a societal allowance to the individual. For example, free speech is a right, speaking at a closed venue is a privilege. Voting is a right, mail in voting is a privilege.

I completely disagree. The intention is valuable if the intention is for doing good — Bob Ross

Why is the intention, not the result, good? Can this be proven?

it does not matter if the foreseeable or actual consequences when actualizing the intention turn out to be good. — Bob Ross

How so? We have all had situations in our lives where our intentions did not align with reality through ignorance. "How is an intention good in itself?" is the key here and I won't comment more until that's explored.

the intention is good because it is meaning to perform an action which would, if it actualized correctly, produce more potential and actual concrete entities. — Bob Ross

The intention is good if it is a principle. If applied correctly through probability or possibility, then it is reasonable. For example, if I picked a result that had a 70% chance of happening, but it didn't happen, no one would fault my intention.

They have a choice to torture or not torture Billy; but the reason Dave should not torture billy is certainly should not be relative to what else they could be doing — Bob Ross

Under this theory, it certainly is. Can you explain in this moral theory why its not?

I indicated that you should exclude from consideration the other possible skill Dave could accomplish instead of the skill of torture. — Bob Ross

And I've let you know that this theory must consider the alternative. Refusal to give an alternative is an incomplete moral quandery under this theory.

I apologize, that was supposed to say “the end justifies the means”, and you are certainly affirming that. — Bob Ross

All good! Yes, this is correct.

The end is ‘maximizing potential and actual concrete entities’ and the means is whatever is needed to achieve it. — Bob Ross

Here's the difference. We do not disregard the means for the ends. The means ARE part of the ends. Every part is meaningful.

Firstly, I mention that most moral realists disagree fervently about some of your conclusions, and so does the vast majority of the west (at least), simply to demonstrate that it goes completely against the predominant moral intuitions. this does not mean that your conclusions are false. — Bob Ross

Which is fine. If these are offered as points to ask me how my theory would handle this, its a great starter.

Secondly, I say, and many others, that some of your conclusions are objectively wrong because they are incoherent with the moral facts. However, I cannot substantiate this claim without importing my own ethical (moral realist) theory—so I refrain for now, unless you want me to. — Bob Ross

Oh, please do! I understand the respect here, and yes, feel free to give your own moral conclusions and why you believe they are objectively true.

A desire, a gut-feeling, an emotion, is conative and unreliable; whereas an intellectual seeming is cognitive and reliable. — Bob Ross

The word 'seeming' implies its an inductive reason. I would rather we use that because then we can classify whether the induction is based off of probability, possibility, or plausibility.

I can feel very strongly that 1+3=1, but, upon intellectually grasping the proposition ‘1+3=1’ (which requires me to contemplate it as unbiased as possible), it does not (intellectually) seem right that 1+3=1; — Bob Ross

I don't think there's any 'seeming' to it. 1+3=1 is just objectively wrong. This phrase seems confusing at best and unnecessary at worst. Is there anything this phrase serves that cannot be conveyed using common language?

[1] you concede it is infinite in "what caused there to be an infinite set of all causes?" — Bob Ross

No, I'm noting that we can take a group of infinite causes but still ask one more question. What caused that set of infinite causes? My point is that an infinite set of causes cannot fully explain the entirety of all causes. It must logically rest with this question.

[2] you are asking presupposing that a cause could exist which is not a member of a set of all causes — Bob Ross

Its not a presupposition, its a proof. We can take any set of infinite series, then ask what caused that set. I've done nothing outside the realm of mathematics or logic.

I think it is best we agree to disagree at this point — Bob Ross

Understood! Sometimes that's all we can arrive at in a conversation. Full respect and thanks for you points Bob.

The toe is not a 'life' but composed of several cellular lives. Same with the foot. The consciousness of the brain is the combination of cellular lives that creates something more than just a mere coexistence of life, but a mind.

I was referring to a person by ‘life’, not something that is merely alive. — Bob Ross

Understandable, but in my example, I am referring to a life as something which is merely alive. Anytime I state 'life' that is what I mean in this theory, and I don't believe I've implied anything else.

I fully accept that there is a desire to say its immoral

It is not a desire, it is an intellectual seeming. — Bob Ross

Without a rationale, I don't see the difference.

It would be helpful if you could explain why its immoral either within the theory, or somehow contradicts the theory.

As external coherence goes, even within moral realist circles, it goes against common intuitions—and I mean that in the sense of an intellectual seeming, not a desire or gut-feeling. Most moral realists will completely disagree with you that it is morally good to, all else being equal, sacrifice the one for the many (even though it would increase the actual and potential concrete entities). — Bob Ross

Understood, but why? What is the reasoning and rationale that lead to that conclusion, why does it conflict with the reasoning and rationale of this theory, and why is that superior? I know there are outside theories of morality that would both conflict and agree with what I've noted here. If I'm claiming that this is an objective morality, then is falsifiable. It can be wrong. I'm looking for chinks in the theory that another moral take could point out or demonstrate is a weakness.

Since we have no objective means of morality to measure, any outside subjective opinion of its immorality can be considered, but ultimately boils down to an opinion.

That is irrelevant to my external critique: I am saying that it is objectively wrong to sacrifice one for the many, all else being equal. — Bob Ross

While you are claiming this is objective, I have not seen on objective reason given so far. What leads us to an inevitable rational conclusion that it is objectively wrong to sacrifice one for the many in any circumstance?

But this is not a principle according to this theory.

You affirmed it in your justification: you said you should absolutely sacrifice the one to save the many because it increases, all else being equal, potential and actual concrete entities (e.g., cut of the arm to save the body); and I am absolutely inclined to agree with you that your theory would need to conclude this. — Bob Ross

Bob, I'm feeling you're being very straw man here. I've clearly stated several times that this is a contextual theory. I noted that based on the context, sometimes its wrong to kill one for the many, and sometimes its right. Further, I've the said that the only hard principle is, "More existence is good." "Killing one to save five" is not a principle, I've never claimed its a principle, and I've even demonstrated its not. Please review or ask questions if there is any confusion.

The outcome of the example is based on particular circumstances and context.

With all due respect, I don’t think you know what ‘all else being equal’ means. Here’s a link to a blog post about it. — Bob Ross

Bob, equal respect back, but your example isn't very good, and you're not using the phrase 'all else being equal' correctly for this theory either. I feel like you're constructing a view of my theory that is principled despite me telling you its contextual. And despite me telling you your examples need to be contextual and pointing out where they need improvements, you keep insisting they're good enough. They're not. If you cannot agree with me on this, then we throw the example away and go to tried and true methods that have existed for decades. We should not be debating examples, we should be debating the outcomes of good solid examples.

In a theoretically objective morality, consequentialism is the only real conclusion.

Absolutely not. If you affirm this, then you are disregarding duty and principles—which are entirely deontological. — Bob Ross

If it is objectively true that duty and principles were real moral precepts, there would be an objective consequence to demonstrate why that is. For example, 1+1=2. That is an objective conclusion. Lets say I claim that 1+2=2, which is wrong. However, I use have principles, or techniques like showing my work, and working proofs out when challenged. Because of this, I'm able to go back through my work and find my error. The 'intention' has value because it allows me to more easily catch my mistakes and come to the right conclusion. Its the consequence of having the intention that makes the intention valuable, not simply the fact of having the intention itself.

I have no issue with claiming duties and principles could be objective, but this would need to be proven. And I currently don't see in any possible objective attempt at arguing for duties and principles that there would not be some objective consequence, or outcome, that is behind the objective reason for holding them. Maybe you see one, and if so I would like to hear and think about it.

Some actions are wrong merely because they violate an ethical principle, and not because the action’s consequences do not maximize what is good. — Bob Ross

Which is fine, but what is the objective foundation for this ethical principle? Is it the opinion of people, or is there a solid rational argument behind that principle that can hold up?

Can you imagine an objective morality that is not consequentialist?

Yes, many. Kantianism, Aristotelianism, mine, etc.

The problem with consequentialism is that it makes the evaluation of right and wrong solely a matter of analyzing the consequences of actions; which precludes intentions, duty, principles, etc. — Bob Ross

Don't take the general philosophical summary of 'consequentialism' in subjective moral theories and apply it to this theory. This theory does not exclude intentions, duties, principles, etc. All of that is existence. The consequence that we are shooting for is to create more existence. Thus nothing that exists is excluded.

Likewise, it has absurd results in some cases (e.g., utilitarianism’s enslavement of 1% of the population, sacrificing one for the many, etc.). — Bob Ross

This is because these consequentialist theories are top down. They don't rely on a foundation and work up, they rely on subjective isolated outcomes that don't work when you take it down to a foundational level.

As a very clean example, take the 1 vs. 5 trolly problem (we discussed before). A consequentalist is usually inclined to say “sacrifice the one for the five”; and a deontoligist is inclined usually to say “do not pull the lever”. — Bob Ross

I understand this. But why is the deontologist objectively correct in relation to the theory I've proposed?

Ok, this means that Dave could not have been doing anything else but torturing.

This is so irrelevant. The question is if Dave is right to torture Billy to acquire the skill of torturing. You are misunderstanding what ‘all else being equal’ is and constantly sidestepping the hypothetical by importing new variables that don’t matter. — Bob Ross

What is the choice the person has Bob?

The choice is whether or not to torture Billy to acquire a new skill (of torturing people aptly). — Bob Ross

Do you see the contradiction I'm seeing here? I'm asking you what the person could do except torture Billy, and you tell me they have a choice. But then in the following you say its a question of whether they should or should not torture Billy. If they do not torture Billy, that means he does something else. This is a contextual comparative existence theory of morality. There has to be another option. Within my theory, you're telling me this guy is on a train about to hit five people, and there's no lever to push. That's not a moral question, that's a bad example. This isn't working Bob. Lets drop the example for now and go to traditional moral examples. We need as little to debate over as possible, and this thought experiment isn't cutting it. We can revisit this down the road, but for now we need to debate outcomes, not thought experiment examples.

If only what is good is to maximize the number of concrete entities, then it will not always pan out such that societies which enact such policies (as you described) are morally better. — Bob Ross

Bob, either you are misunderstanding the theory despite my explaining, or have constructed a straw man in your head that you will not let go. I have said repeatedly, that it is actual and potential existence. It is not 'more concrete entities'. Concreate entities are a base material existence, and new identities can be created by their expressions. We evaluate not only the numerosity of the expressions, but how they can also potentially express with one another over time. We could create a million identities that permanently destroy themselves over 1 second, and the superior moral existence would be one entity that lasts for years. Look, I like when you bring attacks and critiques.

Second, once again this theory is contextual. If we're speaking 'generally' that means, 'not always, but most of the time'. History has shown that generally, Republicans have done better than monarchies, and this is because there are few, if any, modern day successful states that run on a classical monarchist system.

The point is that you are just thinking about it in terms of “the means justifies the ends”; and you have too, since you have committed yourself to consequentialism. I reject it. — Bob Ross

The entire theory is based on the one consequentialist point, "More existence is good." If you reject that, then there's no conversation. We have to assume that's true to discuss the theory as is. If you don't want to assume that, that's fine, but that's an end to the discussion, not a debate.

Also, once again, you're claiming things I have never stated nor implied. I have never claimed the means justify the ends. This is once again a contextual existential evaluation theory of morality. My theory claims, "The means are part of the ends." You need to analyze everything.

I feel you are looking to outside philosophies to understand this philosophy, instead of taking your understanding of this philosophy and comparing it to outside philosophies critically. We're exploring a theoretically objective morality Bob with a bottom up approach. This is new stuff. I enjoy your criticisms and points, but I feel this time you're not fully grasping the theory I'm showing you, and when I try to explain, you seem to dismiss or ignore points that I feel are key to the theory. Lets try again!

However, it cannot have a first cause if one understands properly what an infinite set of all causes is. It is logically necessary that it does not have a first cause, ironically. — Bob Ross

No, because I can ask, "What caused there to be an infinite set of all causes?" Its always finite. The very nature of causation logically always leads to this.

Thank you very much for the link. I had not read it before. How does this explain the incident where the patient knew what the doctor was thinking? — Truth Seeker

I have not watched the video so could not tell you. However, it appears the video is already circumspect and I would question the rigor of the studies. If the doctor was speaking his thoughts out loud and the patient heard when they were not at brain death, this is not remarkable. This field is rife with inaccurate reporting, stories, and unscientific claims, so extraordinary claims need very tight and clear evidence to be considered seriously.

The second you say that C is not the entire end to the chain of causality, is the second you conflate C with something else. C is the series of causes in total, so, by definition, you cannot be correct in that there is a cause which is not a member of C. — Bob Ross

Are you sure you're addressing the argument or a set? I'm noting that even if you create an infinitely regressive universe, the causality still boils down to the one question, "What caused the infinite regress?" "Nothing". Even if you have an infinite regresses within infinite regresses. Take the entirety of it, wrap it in a variable, then ask what caused it all to be. The answer is always the same, "Nothing".

The first cause is the most fundamental one, the cause that each effect depends on. Every other cause needs God. So if he didn't exist, neither would anyone nor anything else. — BillMcEnaney

First, there is at least one first cause, there could be more. Second, a first cause does not have to be a God.

You may want to read this review: https://awareofaware.co/2023/05/09/rethinking-death/#:~:text=I%20say%20it%20was%20excellent,a%20couple%20of%20the%20NDEs.

"I have a lot of respect for Parnia and everyone else involved in this, but I find it extremely frustrating that there is data from AWARE II that shows EEG activity consistent with consciousness during CA and CPR after up to an hour (something he alluded to in the panel discussion), and yet they have never stated whether or not any of these EEG events were in patients who reported NDEs. They know, they have the data, so why not share that? I suspect that they have no EEG data at all in those patients as only a small percentage of the entire cohort had EEG data, and most of those sadly did not survive. Why not say that?"

Videos are generally not the best ways of learning about science. Stick to papers if you really want good solid answers. So far my above claim is true: There is no case (to my knowledge) of 100% brain death and people returning with REDs.

How do you know that there is no consciousness after brain death? What about all the people who have Recalled Experience of Death (RED) and the stories they tell of visiting other places and the beings they meet there? — Truth Seeker

Very simply, there has never been a case of actual death in these scenarios. Coma or unconsciousness sure, but no one has had brain death, come back, and had an experience during that actual death. The brain is still hearing things around itself, and if the eyes are opened during surgery light is still streaming into the brain. Your ability to consciously realize it isn't fully there, but its still being processed.

Have you ever dreamt before? I've encountered giant gorillas, super natural horrors, and realms beyond normal experience. The brain when devoid of full consciousness still functions and sorts experiences. If it thinks its going to die, then its thoughts can become pre-occupied with that as it struggles to live. Ever had an emotional traumatic experience and dream about it in a way that ends well? Vividness of experience does not require full consciousness. So a vivid experience of an unconscious person is not evidence of an actual death experience.

If the toe had a mind of its own (and was a person), then, no, I don’t think it would be moral to cut it off to save the body. The problem with your analogy is that the toe is inert and lifeless; while the individual is a life. — Bob Ross

The toe is not a 'life' but composed of several cellular lives. Same with the foot. The consciousness of the brain is the combination of cellular lives that creates something more than just a mere coexistence of life, but a mind.

I understand, however, that, according to your view, sacrificing one for the sake of saving the many, all else being equal, is good (because it leads to a maximal quantity of the “entities”); but, as an external critique, that seems immoral (to me). — Bob Ross

I fully accept that there is a desire to say its immoral. It would be helpful if you could explain why its immoral either within the theory, or somehow contradicts the theory. Since we have no objective means of morality to measure, any outside subjective opinion of its immorality can be considered, but ultimately boils down to an opinion.

The problem is this word "universalization". The only universal is, "More existence is good"

All I meant, is that “one ought to sacrifice on to save five” as a principle is leads to a worse world (by my lights). — Bob Ross

But this is not a principle according to this theory. The outcome of the example is based on particular circumstances and context. In other circumstances and contexts, its immoral for one person to sacrifice to save five.

You are just too consequentialist for me (; — Bob Ross

I see no other way to judge morality. The problem with consequentialism within subjective morality is the consequent is subject to opinions. In a theoretically objective morality, consequentialism is the only real conclusion. With an objective base it doesn't matter what another person thinks. If true and reasoned through correctly, there should be a clear right or wrong answer. Or if one answer can be correctly concluded, we can use probability, statistics, and reasoned induction. Can you imagine an objective morality that is not consequentialist?

What could the person have been doing instead of torturing the victim?

Dave could not have been doing anything better: disregard it for the thought experiment. — Bob Ross

Ok, this means that Dave could not have been doing anything else but torturing. He couldn't just be thinking, meditating, talking with the person dying, he had to be torturing. Then there is no moral decision to make either. This is the opposite problem of derailment. You've taken the tracks and said, "This is going to hit five people no matter what you do, is this moral?" Morality has to involve some type of choice. What is the choice the person has Bob?

All else being equal, learning a skill increases the potential for concrete entities; and I don’t think you are denying that. — Bob Ross

Correct. My problem here is we can imagine alternative things the person could do to improve themselves besides torturing. For this to be a moral dilemma, there must be an alternative scenario.

That which creates better harmony, to use your terms, is going to be more existent that one which puts unnecessary stress on the body and lowers its health.

Yes, but how does it lower the potential or actual concrete entities? I don’t see a direct causal link between negative emotions and the decrease in potential/actual concrete entities. — Bob Ross

In the case of torture that should be clear. Cells are living things. Torture is putting undue stress or death to many cells of that body. This causes stress responses in the brain which put it in an emergency state of trying to avoid this, but powerless to do so.

"Long-term psychological problems reported by survivors of torture are usually classified as trauma, anxiety, depression, and, more rarely, problems of a psychotic nature, but health problems including pain are very frequent, and may include serious disease such as tuberculosis or human immunodeficiency virus with a background of poor nutrition and severe and immunocompromising stress."

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4590125/#:~:text=Long%2Dterm%20psychological%20problems%20reported,human%20immunodeficiency%20virus%20with%20a

Lowered health of a life is less actual and potential existence, not more. When you are pre-occupied with pain you cannot function at your best. You can't work at your job as well, your relationships suffer, and your thoughts are trapped by pain instead of creativity or solving other problems in life.

Wouldn't society have been better off if the kind enacted policies which grew and supported people?

No (if I view it through the lens of your theory). — Bob Ross

You're going to have to explain this in more detail. I've never claimed this in my theory and I don't understand how you would think this conclusion could come about.

We know that monarchies as a form of government do not create the kind of robust, wealthy, and happy societies like republics for example.

A monarchy could create, total net, more actual concrete entities than a republic. — Bob Ross

Yes, in specific circumstances I'm quite sure we can imagine a scenario, or even find one in history, where a monarchy was overall more prosperous to its people, rights, and culture than a particular republic elsewhere in the world. But this was speaking in generalities. Generally rule through inheritance by one individual does not create the type of freedoms and integration of its citizens into policies like America for example.

Take napoleon, for example: his dictatorship inflicted much suffering onto people and unnecessary conquest; but he furthered the society in ways, which would not have been done otherwise, by use of force—e.g., higher education, public roads, public sewer systems, central banks, etc. The man was not a good person, but incidentally did good things that were very impactful on society. Total net, he was good for humanity IF one only thinks about it in terms of the consequences of his actual total net; — Bob Ross

We need to make sure the scenario is crafted correctly. If Napoleon had the option of implementing all of these positives to society without the suffering and unnecessary conquest, that would be better correct?

You seem to be taking a principled approach to a calculated consequentialist morality that is based on context. In general some things are better than others for creating more existence. That's all we're talking about. In limited situations where these general things are not available, then of course we work with what we have.

Here’s another scenario for you to digest: — Bob Ross

Lets not. I can see these custom examples seem to miss a lot of what this theory is about show me that you don't quite understand it yet. And Bob, don't take this the wrong way but these are not tight examples. We're debating the examples as much or even more than the actual theory. We need something stable so we can focus what to debate on. Traditional moral examples are good stable examples that we can then debate and learn about the theory. Once we cover those and feel we have a good grasp on the theory, then we can go back to crafting a good custom scenarios.

Happy Easter by the way! Whether you celebrate it or not, I hope the holiday treats you well. I may be slow in replies this week.

If you don't like the idea of atemporal causes, then I am talking about an infinite series of temporal causes and there are no other causes that are not in that infinite series.

The series, conceptually, can be represented as a set which I will call C.

C itself has no cause, because it is the series of all causes.

You are claiming either the series C is not infinite, or that C itself leads to a first cause. Neither can be true, so I am not following your argument for this part. — Bob Ross

No, I am not claiming that C is finite. It however is not the entire end to the chain of causality. "What caused C to exist?" still exists, and the finale answer is, "Nothing". this one question and answer cannot be part of that particular infinite causal chain, because the question is about the entire causal set itself.

You end. No consciousness. No continuation. You're dead. Some might think this is terrifying or hurts your feelings. Don't. Understanding what death is, is one of the greatest gifts you can have to live life to its fullest.

If you're sacrificing today for a reward later, don't. Sacrifice because you believe it creates a better world for today and the future.

If you're afraid of trying new things you really want to because it might make life uncomfortable, overcome that fear.

You only live once. No one will ever know what you experience but you. No one will know your story fully but you. The last thing you want in your last dying moments is regret at not having done enough with the time you had.

Love it. Appreciate it. Because eventually it will be gone.

PS___I'm proposing a new thread with similar implications but different presumptions : a First Cause implies a Final Cause, produced by the operations of an Efficient Cause, working in the medium of a Material Cause. What could we call it? The First Concept? The god-who-shall-not-be-named inquiry? — Gnomon

I do like the idea of a first cause also being a final cause. There is no more to question after you arrive at it after all. But you know the crux of your discussion, so I'm sure it will be named appropriately. I'll keep an eye out for it Gnomon. Even if I don't contribute (as I don't want to derail or lead back to this thread) I'll at least give it a read. :)

The principle of parsimony seems like an Occum's Razor argument. Since God is an assumption, and naturalism makes less assumptions, this makes sense. The only way anyone could have a viable disagreement with this decision is if they could make God a provable entity, and not merely an assumption. I don't believe finding any phenomena that cannot be explained naturalistically matters to this fact. I think more importantly, there is no phenomena that necessarily requires a supernaturalistic explanation for its existence. Good post! :)

For the sake of the argument, I am going to step up and respond with "My 'crazy' idea of reality is that it is an infinite series of atemporal and temporal causes, and this doesn't lead to there being a first cause".

By your admission in the quote above, you are arguing that somehow my claim here does end with a first cause. So, how does it? — Bob Ross

Something detailed in the later discussions but not mentioned in the OP for brevity was that it is there is 'at least' one first cause. I'm assuming that your atemporal things are also not caused correct? Those are first causes. There is no limit that only one first cause happens. Its a first cause in a causal chain, not the first cause in a universe.

So I don't see anything against what I've said here. As you noted though, I might be missing what you're saying. Can you go into more detail if this did not cover it?

Mhmmm, “its just a theory” is a comment only a person who doesn’t know what a theory is says as a cop-out: not my forte. But I get your point. — Bob Ross

Good. Of course you aren't a cop-out person. It is just way way of saying I understand that you don't agree with some of the underlying premises and have great respect for your humoring me and going along as if they were viable. It is a great credit to your mind and character Bob.

There’s a clear distinction, but they are not distinguishable in the sense you want it to be. Induced, abduced, and deduced conclusions all rest on intuitions. You cannot escape intuitions epistemically: there’s no such distinction whereof one concludes something without the aid of an intuition. Again, I mean “intuition” in the sense of an “intellectual seeming” and not a “gut feeling”. — Bob Ross

I see. I feel we would need to get down into the brass tacks of the definition to use 'intuitions' as such here. We can table that for another topic for now and just understand that when I use the term 'intuitions' it means 'strong feeling that we are inclined to think is correct' :)

In terms of your theory, I see how sacrificing one for five overall increase “existences”. However, it seems very immoral, by way of an external critique based off of moral intuitions. — Bob Ross

And that's a very fair critique. As I've noted, anytime the theories conclusions go against our moral intuitions, it needs to have a very good reason why. Part of that why is to ask, "What leads you to that intuition?" So under what other moral precept is this wrong? It of course may be unanswerable or "Just a feeling." Even if we don't have an explicit answer for why this is, its something to keep in the back of our minds as we continue. I value these intuitions, and maybe it will become more clear why they exist as we keep looking at examples.

Also, I would like to mention that, if you accept it in the case of lizards, then I don’t see why you don’t accept it for humans: it is basic consequentialistic calculation you are making here. — Bob Ross

Because we have human society, and human society is a greater existence than the individual as I noted. Think analogously to your body. If we could destroy a toe to save a foot, that seems good on its own. But if a side effect of saving the foot by destroying the toe was that the person went into a life long coma, that wouldn't be the correct action. Yes, the foot survives, but the greater part of the body, the consciousness, dies.

In other words, the universalization of such a principle as “one ought to sacrifice one to save five” leads to an overall worse world (by way of external critique); but if it is a better world (according to your theory) then it simply seems as though you have blundered somewhere. — Bob Ross

The problem is this word "universalization". The only universal is, "More existence is good". Everything else is a calculation based on context. The only universal we can conclude is "Sometimes its better for one person to sacrifice for five people, sometimes its not." Its not a helpful universal, but that's about the best we can get.

There is no other value in honing a skill if one's goal is simply to hone a skill.

It increased potential existence, which, according to you, is a valid moral consideration. — Bob Ross

You must consider actual existence as well. What could the person have been doing instead of torturing the victim? They could have been improving their skill in comforting a dying person, or empathy. And considering they're going to need empathy a lot more in life then torturing, since they're torturing merely as a skill and not application, would be overall more applied existence in the future then now.

The problem again is this is not restrictive enough. You're still leaving answers which let us, "Derail the tracks" so to say.

Taken in comparison of emotion vs emotion alone

Firstly, as said above, it is not a comparison solely of the worth of emotions: it is a comparison of actual and potential existence in terms of the consequences of which action one takes. — Bob Ross

Of course. But this is still a consideration.

Secondly, emotions are irrelevant themselves to your theory: what is good, according to you, is “more concrete entities”. You evaluate this in terms of actual and potential concrete entities. — Bob Ross

No, I never said they were irrelevant. Recall I posted how they were relevant for inspiring actions. Take a look back again. Beyond this, even at a cellular level emotions result in bodily changes such as stress hormones, faster heart beats, etc. While it is a scope down from the conscious mind the body too is a living and existent entity. That which creates better harmony, to use your terms, is going to be more existent that one which puts unnecessary stress on the body and lowers its health.

Likewise, many kings historically have committed series atrocities, but total net increased “existence”. This is the problem with pure consequentalism: it only cares about maximizing the goal (in this case, goodness) by way of an outcome. — Bob Ross

Again, you're not seeing the full picture. Did they create more existence through those atrocities? Wouldn't society have been better off if the kind enacted policies which grew and supported people? We know that monarchies as a form of government do not create the kind of robust, wealthy, and happy societies like republics for example. A big thing to think about in your examples going forwards is to think, "Was this the only option?"

Is there no end to dialogs about First Cause? Can these threads become infinite? — Gnomon

Ha ha! Its good to have a sense of humor about this. Always appreciate your contributions Gnomon.

If these side-track questions are of interest to posters on this First Cause thread, I might be inspired to start a new thread on tracing Causation from First Spark down the evolutionary trail to the emergence of Inquiring Minds, who ask unverifiable open-ended questions ; taking the risk of sounding stupid or clever on a public forum. :smile: — Gnomon

If you feel like there's something valuable in doing so, why not? No one will reach cleverness without first finding their footing on the stumbling blocks of stupidity. Show your light to the world even if its an odd color. :D

You've been extraordinarily generous with your time, energy, and patience in the interest of the thoroughness of our dialogue. — ucarr

You as well Ucarr! You kept a level head, worked tirelessly, and really thought deeply about the issue. You have my full respect!

Your exertions herein have afforded me an ample supply of time and opportunity to practice and develop both my debate strategy and my execution. — ucarr

I am glad that you had a positive experience with the conversation and that you enjoyed it. At the end of the day it is merely an idea to discuss.

I'm now going to bow out from our dialogue. — ucarr

Well I bow back. :) You were a wonderful conversation partner Ucarr. I respect your intellect and honest engagement throughout the discussion. I look forward to further discussions with you in the future, and feel free to jump back in any time.

If by causality, you really mean temporal causality; then that needs to be clarified in the OP. Your OP clearly, taken literally, is discussing an infinite causality in 6 and not an infinite of temporal causality. — Bob Ross

I suppose I thought I didn't need to mention that an infinitely regressive or looped universe would be infinitely causal over time. I'll take a look at it again.

You have not negated the possibility of an infinite of causality which does not lead to a first cause; instead, you have now negated the possibility of an infinite of temporal causality not having itself a cause (at best). — Bob Ross

Not having BEEN caused. Meaning that the answer to "What caused an infinite universe?" is still "Nothing". Its the same answer as a finite universe.

First cause - The point in causality in which there is nothing which caused a set of existence

This isn’t proven, because you are now shifting your argument to discuss the impossibility of an infinite temporal causality having no cause; well, that’s simply not what one would argue if they are arguing that causality is infinite proper. — Bob Ross

To be clear, I'm not arguing that its impossible for an infinite temporal causality to have no cause. I'll note this again, if A is an infinite universe, and G (Whatever it is, a God, timey wimey, etc.) -> X, then G caused an infinite universe. Now, G -> X enters into the total causality set of, "What caused G -> X, nothing". But that doesn't deny that X could have incepted without any G either. Whether the time in X has a limit of zero or no limit at all, the logic doesn't change. We will inevitably get to a point in which we encapsulate all of causality into its totality, and we find there is nothing which caused that existence to be.

I would also like to mention, that one could also posit coherently that T is equal to C because all causes are temporal; and that C/T is eternal and that C/T is not a first cause. In other words, using T instead of C doesn’t help your case, because T being eternal doesn’t make it a first cause. — Bob Ross

Oh! This is good! :) Its not that T is eternal, T just represents the number of 'time ticks' that we place into the equation. Also, if G creates X, G creates X at a particular time (or continuous). G is not outside of time either.

Example : The below is the entirety of C, or the first cause.
"What caused an infinite eternal universe? Answer: An infinite universe was caused by a God at time tick 5.
G at T (where T = 5) -> 2T + infinity where T = sum of all Ts (infinity)

The major problem is we're talking about a situation in which practically anything is possible. Because we're in the realm of infinity and time being malleable, we can come up with some crazy stuff that may or may not be empirically true. The point of this argument is literally to note: "Come up with whatever crazy idea of universal origin you want. It doesn't matter. It will always inevitably end up here."

No matter what we create, we eventually always reach an end. Lets go with the craziest of crazy setups. There are an infinite of infinites causes which cause an infinite set of eternally existing universes. So infinity Y -> Infinity X -> (continues). At the end, we can still take that entire idea and pop it into a variable X then asked, "What caused X?" And the answer is: Nothing. That's the proof Bob. The specifics do not matter. It is impossible to create causality which never ceases because all of causality will arrive at the last question: "You've laid the entirety of causality out, but what caused that?" And the answer is always the same: Nothing.

Will do. However, if I interpret your idea of “first cause” as merely “something which is no cause”; then this is a vacuously true truth that no one, atheist nor theist, will deny — Bob Ross

It is not something which is no cause. No, a first cause is part of causality. It is the moment in the causal chain that will eventually be reached in which we ask, "What caused X?" and the answer will be nothing. It is logically necessary that all questions of causality will arrive at this point.

But whatever you are feeling about the situation, the feelings drive the thoughts. — Brendan Golledge

This is really more the essence of what drives thinking instead of being social alone. Its our emotions. Our desires. What we want. Most people are rationalizing beings, not rational beings. And this makes sense if you think about it. We have desires to get things that we want, and we use our thoughts to get what we want. We don't use our thoughts innately to deny what we want.

Being rational is not innate. I believe it is a skill. It requires effort, technique, honesty, and a willingness to objectively look at one's emotional tendencies and wants, and reasonably control them. Its extremely difficult and can take years to master.

You and I are not immune to this. I'm constantly tempted to let my emotions about a subject override the conversation. I want to be right in every discussion I'm in. But that HAS to be reigned in. It must be beaten into its proper corner and place. :) Its a hard ask for many people to do. Take a look at your own motivations for posting the topic. What ultimately do you want out of it? Is it to justify God? To imply that other people are stupid whereas you are mentally superior? I don't mean that you've done any of this intentionally or to hurt you. But examining oneself in an honest life can be painful. A true thinker whose honest about their own motivations and rationalizations will be willing to hurt themselves far more than anyone else can hurt them.

However, when it comes to anything new, for which no known social consensus exists, they show themselves to be very stupid. — Brendan Golledge

One way we can look at it is, "They're stupid, I'm not." Which trust me, we all have the thought that everyone else is stupid and we're smarter than everyone else. :) Truly rational people have to fight to avoid falling into this poisonous thinking. Another way we can look at it is, "Thinking about new things is hard for most people without motivation to." Its not stupidity. Its about what people want. Why should someone think about something completely new when what they hold in their thoughts functions perfectly fine? Ask yourself this: Are you willing to think about a logically viable world where a God does not exist? Or are you more concerned with getting other people to think of a logically viable world where a God must exist?

You're not stupid. Neither are (necessarily) the people replying. Its about what you're motivated to think about. Someone replying to you may not care about your point because their idea that "There is no God," serves them great and they see the tendency to push, "There is a God," as a negative in their or other people's lives. So they're not really interested in exploring your new tendency. They're not curious as to whether there really is a God, they just want to preserve the emotional comfort and benefit their worldview gives them.

A second thing to consider is that this a public forum. It is not limited to trained philosophers, academics, or those who have practice and training in rational thought. A lot of times its just people with opinions. "Oh hey, this guy is arguing for God. Yeah, that's no good, let me just post real quick to shut that down." Again, this is not explicitly thought by some, but definitely comes across in their posts. I understand your frustration, as I have spent many years trying to get people to engage with particular posts of mine, yet found most people lacked the patience or curiosity to explore them. Keep at it though, I found at least one person on these forums who is willing to engage, and its wonderful when you can find someone like that.

I was disappointed to find that most of the replies did not even attempt to address the content of what I said, but replied superficially to some tertiary thing. — Brendan Golledge

True. My advice is to attempt one time to redirect someone back to the larger point, or address it one time if you feel that's showing good faith in the other person's engagement. If someone continues to show no interest in the actual argument, just move on. Don't ever take personal offense unless a person is intentionally trying to offend you.

I have written several posts on several forums in the last several months, and typically I got very few replies (I suppose I didn't use any buzzwords that lit up people's social brains), or else I reliably got +3/4 of the replies only in response to a particular buzzword, like "God", and the topic I wanted to discuss was left mostly unaddressed. — Brendan Golledge

You have to get people emotionally invested to click on your topic. Keep experimenting in titles. It doesn't have to be 'click bait', but you should put your self in the shoes of a random bored person. "Would I want to click on this and read what this random person is saying?" Remember that you are a nobody online. You are part of "the stupid people" that most everyone thinks everyone else is. :)

Second, try to keep your topic focused. The values of necessary thought started with complaints about other people not reading or thinking about your topic, accusations that we're all cultists, and then a reference to fear of God. Its a bit all over the place right? And as you can tell from the replies that you got, people are going to take one or two salient points and address those.

You begin with "On the Values Necessary for Thought" and end with 3 paragraphs on "Fear of the Lord is the Beginning of Wisdom." And you raise many issues in between. I do not wish to discuss all the issues raised and I do not know which of the many issues raised is the one you wish most to discuss. — Arne

This was said better than I could.

I want to end this not with a sense of beration, but one of encouragement. We all feel frustrated at times on these forums. Its perfectly normal, and you're in good company. Just don't get caught in the trap of thinking "I'm better and smarter than all of these other people." Its too easy to do. If it ever helps tell yourself say, "The better and smarter person wouldn't need to view themselves as better and smarter, they would work tirelessly to learn how to connect and convey their ideas an interesting way with people of all types and backgrounds." Keep at it. Focus on the ideas, and how to connect with others on those ideas. You have things to say and I think a little more organization in how you say it combined with some well written titles to get people in may get you more engagement.

When you posit that C is the set containing all causes (i.e., contingent events) and that the universe has a cause (i.e., is a contingent event), then the universe is a member of C and NOT C. You are conflating them. — Bob Ross

I'll be more detailed. C = The set of all causes in an eternal universe over time
What Y -> C? Nothing. There is nothing. There is just C, uncaused by anything else.

Philosophim, you must remember that the stipulation you gave is that C, which can be whatever you want to call it, is a set of infinite elements containing every cause — Bob Ross

To be clear, "every cause over time". Once all of causality over time has been encapsulated in CT, there's still a question of causality that does not involve time. "What caused CT to be?" That question and answer is in C. As noted most simply, an eternal God could have caused an eternally existing universe. So C, all of causality, would be G -> CT. Does something eternal causing something eternal sound ridiculous? Sure, but so does an eternally existing universe. The point of the argument is not to point out what is viable as we have no empirical means of proving or disproving any of these proposals. Its to point out that no matter what someone comes up with, in the end we will reach a point in causality where there is nothing which caused the state we're looking at.

Now, I do want to go a little more meta into the phrase "First cause". When I originally wrote this paper two years ago, it was to gain traction and get the atheists and theists in here together. I was new to the forums, and I understood that taglines needed to be interesting enough to get people to go in and read them. Its a phrase that has a very particular meaning. First cause - The point in causality in which there is nothing which caused a set of existence. If I were to rewrite this today, I would not use the term "First cause", but I would still use the underlying concept. That there is a point in causality that is always reached in which there is no cause for that state in question.

I mention this, because you may be having an issue with the phrase. If you do, dismiss the phrase. Its the underlying concept that matters. And that if this is the case, we have an instance of true randomness as to why that state exists as there is nothing which would have caused it to be or not be besides the fact that it simply exists. Whether finite or infinite, conscious or unconscious, the inception of the universe 'just happened'.

Hello Ucarr, I've had some time to look over your reply and I'm going to try to parse down to what is relevant, and what I think has gotten too far off topic. I had planned to go line by line, but honestly a lot of these arguments just aren't important to the overall scope of the discussion, so I think its best to drop them.

Here are the things which I think are irrelevant to the topic:

Zero as representing nothing. This is a common understanding in math that we should not debate and I feel misses the true point you're trying to make. What I think you're trying to say is that "Nothing" cannot exist. My definition of nothing is "The absence of something". Feel free to take it from there.

Quantum mechanics. Your entire point in introducing quantum mechanics seems to be that it has some influence on true randomness. Let me be clear: True randomness cannot be influenced. Meaning no introduction of anything is going to influence it. What you want is to believe that true randomness is not possible. That we can argue. But you're going to have to argue against it from a logical position, as it is purely a logical conclusion, not an empirical one.

Multiplying null sets. I'm not multiplying a null set by anything in my example. I'm just using a set as an encapsulation of "All causality over time" into a variable. Then I include it in propositional logic. That's it. You seem to be debating that I can do this. I can. I will not be arguing this with you. This is basic logic. I am not going to debate you for pages about basic logic and math.

What you can argue about is, "If nothing caused an infinite universe to exist, what does that logically entail?" Because that is the scope of this conversation. If you agree an infinite universe is uncaused, which you did in your reply, then all of the above is moot.

Also a more interesting an viable discussion in my mind is Bob Ross's points. Take a read on those and see if you can back him up.

I picked a couple of other things out that I thought needed direct addressing. I'll cover these below. If you think I've avoided or missed something pertinent that you would like me to directly cover that doesn't fit into the summaries I've written above, just request it on your next reply and I'll go over them.

Firstly, infinite causal chains are central to your premise. Is this an admission your premise is therefore flawed? Secondly, I'd like to see you argue against the logical merit of infinity as a concept, thereby simultaneously arguing against the logical merit of your premise. — ucarr

I wanted to clear this up so you understand what's going on here. I'm not debating whether infinity can or cannot exist. You are saying, "Infinity exists" and I'm saying, "Lets say it does," then concluding if it does there must still be a first cause. Having infinity as a concept is the only conceivable way of denying a first cause. You HAVE to have infinity as a viable argument, or that's it, the discussion is a done deal. No one blinks an eye at a finite universe having a first cause. So it behooves you to go with the idea that infinity is a viable concept that can exist in reality.

I want you to understand, I could make this an argument against infinity being a viable existent reality. Its fairly easy to do. For example, if the universe has existed infinitely, then this means an infinite amount of time has passed before now. An infinite amount of time can never pass, because that would mean there's an end, and thus not an infinite amount of time. BUT, I'm not doing that. I'm saying, "Ok, lets go with it, it doesn't matter". Do you understand now?

I know you're not persuaded by my logic and I, likewise, am not persuaded by yours. I hope you don't feel obligated to refute my arguments here. — ucarr

This is not about your or my logic or arguments. Its about 'the logic". Your opinion and my opinion are irrelevant at the end of the day. We are nothing. Whether I or you believe in an argument is irrelevant. What we are trying to do is parse out what is logical in as objective a manner as we can. I am not trying to convince you, and you shouldn't be trying to convince me Ucarr. If you present an argument, I'm going to answer it if its relevant to the argument. Your job is to viably attack it without bias, and my job is to viably defend it without bias. And if we both do an honest job, maybe we'll hammer the logic clearly so there's no doubt objectively that it works or does not work. I'm not saying that you or I do not have bias, but we should both try and keep it in check where possible.

I’m arguing that nothingness cannot support an intersection with somethingness. — ucarr

This is an empirical claim, not a logical claim. There is nothing logical which negates the idea that there was nothing, then something. If an eternal universe is uncaused, then there was nothing which caused it. And if nothing caused it, then it was truly random. This is not a multiplication by zero event and insisting that it is, is a straw man. I would re-read Bob Ross's points again, as I think he has a much more viable argument then what has been listed so far.