I am going to be insistent. There are two sexes. Genetics do not determine sex. Genetics are variable within sex. — AmadeusD

If sex is biological there is no harm in attributing a new label to a different genetic structure. There is also no harm in your classification either. Let me explain.

There is a constant occurrence in language which comes up in which there is the question of whether a varient of a common definition deserves an adjective or its own word. For example some bushes could be labeled as 'short trees' while some trees could be labeled as 'tall bushes'. There should be a good reason to create a new word instead of an adjective, but sometimes there are issues where the line becomes blurry.

In the case of sex, I have no issue creating a new word within the moniker of sex as long as it does not divert out of pure biology. Further, this new sex must have something substantially and meaningfully different from another existent sex. In the case of XXY, there is a clear biological difference. Its called Klinefelter syndrome, is is most often a variant of maleness. Yet in some cases, it appears to be a variant of femaleness. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/15755052/#:~:text=Background%3A%20Males%20with%20a%2047,of%20this%20phenomenon%20is%20unclear.

So we could label it as 'female Klinefelter or male Klinefelter', or we could call it a new sex "Klinefelter" for example. Society can decide and to me, its practically irrelevant in the grand scheme of things. So if someone wants to label it a new sex, sure. If they want to adjective it, sure. As long as it is purely based on biology and not behavior, I don't believe it matters at all.

They do counter it. You keep referring to two sexes. Many within the transgender community no longer accept this binary, even if we treat it as two opposite poles of a spectrum. — Joshs

Then please indicate what this counter is. A counter is a reasoned set of facts, propositions, and logical conclusions. An opinion or desire is not a counter.

Also, I did note that XXY could easily be indicated as a different sex. So no, I have not been insistent that there are only two sexes. For the general discussion, we are using two sexes. If you wish to discuss exceptions by addressing XXY etc., I still do not see this in opposition to my points.

It a not a question of crossing from one sex to another, but of questioning the categorical purity of the concept of biological sex. — Joshs

I understand. My point doesn't change. If behavior is necessarily associated with one's biological sex, it must only exhibit in that sex. If the same behavior can be seen in both sexes, then it is not sexual behavior, but human behavior. Unless the transgender community can counter this, they do not have a valid argument.

Many in the transgender community believe that gender is intertwined in a hopelessly inseparable way not only with cultural influences, but interweaves culture and the biological sex just as inseparably — Joshs

A belief is fine if its backed by some legitimate reasoning. From my experience, its not. Sex is biology. Behaviors that necessarily require you to be a sex are the only behaviors that could be said to necessarily flow from sex. Makes sense right? Behaviors that can cross the sexes are not solely sexual behaviors. It may be a secondary effect from sex that certain behaviors are more likely to crop up, but obviously these behaviors would exist despite sex differences.

Its a contradiction to say that behaviors belong to one sex, but can cross into the other sex. Thus the transgender communities rationalization is not rational.

Would you agree that in humans and other mammals
there are sex-correlated differences in brain function that lead to the differences in behavior between males and females that allow, for instance, dog owners and trainers to quickly recognize males and females on the basis of these inborn brain differences and they are manifested in behavior? — Joshs

I would without any issue. But these are generalities. An aggressive or gay female does not mean they aren't female. A passive or gay male does not mean they are not male. And no male or female animal that we can tell desires to be the opposite sex. That's a human conscious decision. Motivation or desire to be the other sex doesn't mean you were born in the wrong body or aren't your natal sex. Just like the desire to be more intelligent or taller doesn't mean you were somehow denied an innate tallness or intelligence that you don't have. The brokenness is the desire to be the other sex to the point of thinking you can actually be the other sex. Its not that you were born in the wrong body.

I suppose theres a level of correctness in your title and I believe the immutable part of sex, as the discussion is pointing towards is the Gametes. That being said every pathos of distance has ranks of gradations between them. "Male," and "Female," is useful for clarity in spoken language. It doesn't really tell you much about a person. — Vaskane

I'm not arguing against sex variations. For example, if you're an XXY human, you're not exactly a common male. There is absolutely nothing wrong with defining this as a new sex. My point is only that it is immutable. What this tells us about a person is simply that, the fact they have XXY chromosomes and how that impacts their physical reality. This is still a separate discussion from gender.

"Nothing" in this context can be read in multiple ways: a) nothing as in no cause of space; b) nothing as in nothingness, a something that caused space, in which case the infinite regress towards a true first cause is under way; c) nothing as a category which includes logic, so first cause cannot be logically necessary. — ucarr

The intended way of reading it is a).

My central point continues to be the claim no causation precludes any type of sequence, including something from nothing. — ucarr

We're in agreement here then. I'm not claiming something comes from nothing. A first cause doesn't come from anything. I'm just noting that prior to a first causes inception, there is no prior causation or 'no thing'. Nothing is not a 'thing', but the absence of anything.

Also, it should be noted that a causal chain exemplifies logical continuity as expressed: A ⟹ ~A = False. In English this sentential logic statement translates to "An existing thing does not imply the negation of itself." Following from this, claiming causeless first cause tries to equate sequence with the negation of sequence, the definition of first cause. — ucarr

A first cause exists, it does not negate itself. If it did, it would be gone. I'm not understanding how you see a first cause implies its own negation.

I haven't forgotten your argument that before first cause a potential first cause can be anything, no restrictions and then, after inception of first cause, logical sequencing and its limitations are in effect.

This is an incomplete narrative of how first cause incepts because a declaration stating first cause can be anything in no way explains and justifies inception of first cause. — ucarr

You have my logic backwards. I'm not saying anything can be a first cause, thus justifying the inception of a first cause. I first establish what a first cause is, something which is not caused by anything prior or else. The consequence of this logically means that prior to the inception of a first cause, there was no reason why it should, or should not have formed. And if there is no reason why a first cause should or should not have formed, there is no limitations or rules that shape what a first cause should, or should not be.

If, as you say, even an infinitely regressive universe entails logical necessity of a first cause, that's merely saying in different words that: Everything, even an infinite universe, must have a beginning. In this situation of the causeless eternal universe, you're building a contradiction because there's no nothing for first cause to incept from. — ucarr

No, I am not saying everything needs a beginning. Again, we're taking the entire set of the eternal regressive universe and asking, "What caused this to exist?" The answer is nothing besides the fact that it exists. Thus a first cause.

If you're postulating an infinitely regressive universe that contains local first causes, then you're constructing a contradictory universe because if there comes into existence something causeless, then it's necessarily another, independent universe. — ucarr

No, its another separate causal chain inception. A first cause is the inception of a causal chain. When we're talking about 'the universe' we're implicitly talking about, "What caused the universe," What I'm noting is all causal chains have a point in which we reach an 'end', or the start of causation. When looking at a regressive infinite universe, we're going up the causal chain until we get to the point in the chain where we ask, "What caused an infinitely regressive universe to exist?" And the answer is, "Nothing, it exists without any prior causation." Thus the first cause.

Anything contained within the causeless universe cannot be first-caused because, being a part of a causeless universe, by definition it cannot be separate from said causeless universe. — ucarr

Anything within a causal chain caused by something prior cannot be a first cause. But this does not prevent something outside of that particular causal chain from appearing and starting its own causal chain.

Furthermore, the independent universe as first cause is building a contradiction because -- again -- in the situation of an eternal universe, there's no nothing for a first cause to incept from. — ucarr

The real contradiction is nothing that something else creates a first cause. It is completely in keeping with logic that the inception of a first cause entails nothing prior causes its inception. You're making the mistake of looking at the universe instead of the causal chain of that universe.

You still haven't addressed the issue of the paradox of an eternal existence being self-caused. If a thing causes itself, then simultaneously it is and is not itself. This is a logical argument against existence of first cause. — ucarr

Can you explain this? I'm not sure how you arrive at this conclusion. If something negates itself, its gone. A thing cannot both exist and not exist at the same time. How do you conclude what's being said here leads to this?

Also, in the situation of an eternal universe, the start point cannot be ascertained; it's impossible. Well, if a start point is impossible to ascertain, then logical necessity of a first cause it likewise impossible to ascertain. It can only be supposed axiomatically. — ucarr

You are confusing the "start of the universe" with the "start of the causal chain". The start of the causal chain is taking all the causation within that universe and putting it in a set. Then asking, "What caused this set?" Nothing. There is no prior cause.

Let me give you another example which might make this more clear. Lets say that there IS something which causes an eternally existing universe to be. There is an existence A which is able to retroactively cause an infinitely regressive universe B. Is this somehow less contradictory? And does it escape the inevitable question, "What caused A?" The answer is no to both. If you are stating that my conclusion is wrong, then you have to accept the alternative situation. This is what I'm trying to get you to see. All you're doing is noting, "A first cause cannot exist with an eternal universe," but you're not examining what that must necessarily entail if this is true either. Its why I'm asking you to give me an example of a universe without a first cause in its causation chain.

In the case of an eternal universe, you cannot talk rationally about nothing (or anything else) causing the universe to exist because it's impossible to ascertain any logical reason for its existence. This is so because reason_cause imply sequence, but infinite value cannot be specified and therefore cannot be sequenced. — ucarr

As I've noted, we can do this by taking the set of causation within the infinite universe and asking what caused the set.

Are you noticing how I always support my assertions with potentially falsifiable arguments? I never claim that such and such is so because my words say they are so. You do this over and over again. Your claims in this thesis always terminate in claiming it is so because the words you write say it is so. Your central claim is not potentially falsifiable — ucarr

Its very falsifiable. But I have yet to see its false. My arguments conclude it is true. That's very different from it not being falsifiable. As I've noted above, I've tried to say, "Assume it is false, what do we arrive at?" The frustration Ucarr is your inability to demonstrate it is false so far. Which is fine, keep trying. If it were clearly false, we would not be still having this discussion.

Why did one type of eternal universe exist, whereas another universe does not? There is no answer besides the fact one type of universe, space and matter, exists.
— Philosophim

It is not a presupposition, its a conclusion that we arrive at...
— Philosophim

In your example, there is no arrival and no conclusion; instead, there is an observation and a declaration without any reasoning toward it: — ucarr

You know this isn't correct at this point. This is frustration. Don't let that win. I've laid the reasoning out clearly at this point.

There is no answer besides the fact one type of universe, space and matter, exists.
— Philosophim — ucarr

You see Ucarr, the argument's conclusion is logically necessary.
— Philosophim

Don't confuse the logical decision to make an unexplainable observation axiomatically with logically explaining the content of that observation. You're doing the former, not the latter. — ucarr

If you're going to assert that, you need to demonstrate that. Otherwise this is just not wanting to accept a conclusion.

He [ucarr] doesn't like the idea that there was nothing, then something.
— Philosophim

I don't accept the claim: "Something from nothing" declared without explanation proves logical necessity of a first cause. — ucarr

Just to repeat, I am not claiming this. You have the order of logic backwards. First comes the logical necessity of a first cause, then comes the conclusion that this means the inception of a first cause cannot be explained by anything else, thus there is nothing prior which could cause a limit on what or would not incept as a first cause.

What I'm trying to show him is that an eternally self-existent thing is no different. There is nothing which explains its being.* No limitations on what could have been besides the fact of its existence.
— Philosophim

Generally, I accept all of this. Specifically, I don't accept an axiomatic declaration as a rational explanation of the logical necessity of first cause. — ucarr

Maybe you're right that its axiomatic, but can you break it down how you arrive that its merely a declaration? Let me give you an example. A declaration is "A". I could easily state, "Not A" and as far as declarations go, both are viable. But what I'm noting is that if you start with "Not A" it necessarily leads to "A", and if you declare "A", it necessarily leads to A. That's not a declaration, that's a proof where we conclude A must be true.

“When we say that a set is finite or infinite, we are referring to the number of elements in the set, not to the "extent" (putting it roughly) of those elements.” — ucarr

Correct.

The critical question pertinent to our debate is whether or not you can talk logically about the before or after of a bounded infinity. When talking logically about the start of a chain of causality, you’re talking about the beginning of a continuity. That’s talking about the extent of a series. Since the infinite number of elements populating the series precludes you from ascertaining a start point, you can’t claim logically that before the start point there were such and such necessary conditions because you cannot specify a start point. — ucarr

Your mistake is that you are looking inside the set for a start point. The start point is not inside the set. It is the question of what caused the entire set. If I have an infinite series of decimals vs an infinite series of whole numbers, they are separate infinites in what they express correct?

As an analogy, I'm asking, "What caused the universe to be a set of whole numbers vs a set of decimals?" The answer is again, nothing. There was no outside cause which necessitated it be whole numbers or decimals. There is no outside reason which caused an infinitely regressive eternal universe to be composed of space vs water. There is no outside reason for the eternal universe to exist in such a way where a big bang happened, vs none at all. And remember, if you deny it, give me the alternative Ucarr. If I'm wrong, what does that entail, and does that make any sense at all?

It's illegitimate to do so by simply making the declaration: "This is the start point, and before the start point there was nothing, thus the start point examples an uncaused start point, i.e., a first cause.” Doing this examples arbitrarily marking a start point by decree — ucarr

Again, the mistake here is only looking inside of the set for causality. The causal chain extends out to include the set itself. This is not by decree, but the natural next step in going through the chain of causality.

Your reply seems a little simplistic and not embracing the dilemmas of transgender individuals. I have worked with people who are transgender in mental healthcare and the nature of labels, what one is biologically and what what one wishes to become. It does involve ideas of the 'body'. — Jack Cummins

Sounds like you've worked with transexuals then. There are people who want to be transgender yet not change their physical bodies. One of my best friends of 20 years is flirting with transexualism right now. We discuss these issues regularly and both agree that the current vocabulary to talk about these issues is flat out awful and needs improvement.

While yes, individuals vary in their experiences, when we talk about words that apply to the broader culture we need to create words of proper scope with more details and less generalizations. An academic approach is very much needed in a broader social sense to have good and open discussions.

The division between sex and gender is complex because a person's identity as being male or female involves so much, including reproductive functions and sexual expression. — Jack Cummins

I don't think it has to be complex. Since gender is cultural, the cultural expectations for a man or woman in different cultures can differ. Its about the culture one wants to identify with, not the biology. If someone wants the biology of another sex, that's not transgender, that's transex. When trying to emulate another sex, you take on the gender of that sex you are emulating. Thus you are trying to use a gender that matches your sex, and really aren't transgender.

I appreciate it and agree. I suppose what I'm trying to do here is note that transgender and transex are not only not the same, they preclude one another. If you are transex, then you are not transgender as you are trying to take on gender aspects of the sex you are emulating and aspiring to be. Thus being transgender does not make one transex, and being transex does not make one transgender (unless of course a person who is transex tried to act like the gender of their original sex, but most won't)

Thus I don't believe there's any good reason at all to lump the meaning of these two words into one.

Sex isn't exactly binary either. — Vaskane

Which is fine. There are definite exceptions to the rule. I don't believe those exceptions change what I'm noting here for most people though.

Making the types of arguments we're making get people fired, in the real world. — AmadeusD

This is when we need to speak about it the most then. Philosophy often is dismissed as 'useless'. I think this is a good venue for it and philosophers need speak up.

I think Gender is merely a loose system of categorizing social roles and behaviours, and should be relegated to a nicety and nothing determinant of anything whatever in Law or elsewhere. — AmadeusD

I agree. Which is why using words that more clearly delineate between the two is important.

I do not think transexual people are transgendered. A transgendered person exhibits cultural actions that defy their sex. A transexual person is trying to act in a gendered way that fits the sex they want to be.
— Philosophim

I'm unsure whether you misspoke here, or are conflating the two ideas you're trying to prise apart. — AmadeusD

Yes, my mistake that I'll edit back in. I meant "defy the cultural expectations of their sex."

In a similar vein, the concept of 'transexual' makes only logical sense, and not practical sense. Sex can't be traversed. — AmadeusD

Sex cannot be transversed, its true. It can be emulated through hormones and surgery. Transexualism seems the easiest word for this, but if another word would fit it better, I would have no problem. Sex emulation? Feel free to contribute if you wish. :)

It is ill-defined, badly researched and reported even worse. If it were possible to eek out an exact notion of transgenderism, we could move forward - but those who use the term seem terminally incapable of doing so. — AmadeusD

I think trying to make a word better defined is a common pursuit in philosophy. If you wish to give up, that's fine. But I think its worth thinking about. I'm more interested in what you think about the underlying difference I've noted here. Do you think it works that transexual people (as defined here) are not actually transgendered, but sexual emulants trying to fit the gender of the sex they want to pass as?

↪ucarr seems to be reasoning from the assumption that the physical universe --- space-time, matter, energy --- could possibly be self-existent, hence no need for a First Cause or Creator. — Gnomon

A first cause is self-existent though. I think that's the problem he has. He doesn't like the idea that there was nothing, then something. What I'm trying to show him is that an eternally self-existent thing is no different. There is nothing which explains its being. No limitations on what could have been besides the fact of its existence.

Can you accept a paraphrase of: "A logical first cause is necessary" as follows: "Everything must have a beginning"? This is another way of examining logical necessity of first cause through the lens of an eternal existence. — ucarr

No, they're not the same thing. The point of the theory was to show that even in an infinitely regressive universe, a first cause is still logically necessary.

Let me give you an example. Lets say that space has always existed. What caused space to always exist? Nothing. Therefore space is a first cause. It is something within causality that itself was not caused. So no, an eternal universe does not preclude a first cause. Why is the universe eternal opposed to not? What caused it to be that way? Nothing.

*The incoherence of "A first cause is logically necessary" -- per your "argument" -- is the unexplained leap from nothing to something. — ucarr

There is nothing incoherent about it. Its simply the rational conclusion when thinking through the question of eternal versus finite regression. An eternal universe actually makes it even more obvious. In a finite universe there is at least still at least the question, "But maybe there was something prior?" An eternal universe has nothing prior. It has no prior cause for its existence.

Let me give you more examples. Lets imagine an eternal universe where water exists everywhere. It has always been, and will always be. Why? What caused the universe to exist in that way? Nothing. Now imagine its an eternal universe of just air. Same conclusion. Now an eternal universe of just space and matter. Same conclusion. Why did one type of eternal universe exist, whereas another universe does not? There is no answer besides the fact one type of universe, space and matter, exists.

It is not a presupposition, its a conclusion that we arrive at time and time again no matter how we tackle the problem. Assume "Finite universe exists" is false or true and we arrive at the same conclusion.

If we imagine a structure of existence featuring multi-verses, then I speculate that multi-verse, in parallel with the single universe structure, logically precludes a universal first cause for the totality of multi-verses, but not for independent universes with local first causes. — ucarr

Alright, lets imagine the multiverse. First, lets imagine a multiverse in which there is one universe that has eternally existed. What caused it? Nothing. Now lets imagine a multiverse where there are two separate universes that have always existed. What caused it? Nothing. And so on for infinity. Imagine that our multiverse is actually a set of eternally existent five universes. Why did a five universe exist instead of a one? Nothing. It exists because it does.

You see Ucarr, the argument's conclusion is logically necessary. There's no way to escape it. No matter what scenario you invent, the same question of, "What caused that to exist?" will always happen, and it will inevitably result in, "Nothing caused it to exist, it exists simply because it does." The idea that there is a way to escape this is what is incoherent. Try it. Give me an example of a universe that escapes this line of questioning and answers, and you'll have countered the argument. At least one first cause is the only coherent conclusion that can be reached. Maybe you can crack it, but I've been unable to.

‘Morality as Cooperation” as a hypothesis that explains past and present cultural moral norms and our moral sense has two parts — Mark S

Yes, its a hypothesis, not a confirmed scientific fact. I don't have a problem with examining the hypothesis. But if you're claiming its fact? There's a LOT that needs answering.

What people believe is moral is a function of the biology underlying their moral sense and cultural moral norms. That biology and those cultural norms can be explained in terms of their evolutionary origins. — Mark S

How do you explain someone who believes their cultural norms are immoral? For example, there is a culture in which a caste system exists and those on the lower end of the caste are said to deserve their lot. What if, as many have, find it immoral? Might of culture or law is often times not the same as morality, and yet you claim it is. You're only taking some people's viewpoint of the prescriptive morality in the culture, and not considering the other viewpoints of descriptive morality over the same rules and traditions in that culture. Descriptive morality is subjective to the people you select, but when you speak about universality, you need to address any and all discrepancies.

Like the rest of science, Morality as Cooperation will generally not have contradictions and is rationally consistent. (Any contradictions and irrationality in science indicate that the science needs more work.) However, our application of science could be irrational and inconsistent, just like people. Edge cases such as abortion, how much moral regard to give conscious creatures and ecosystems, and ethical concerns beyond interactions with other people are not necessarily handled at all. We might like for them to be, but that is not the case. — Mark S

This is a very unscientific set of thoughts.

1. I showed you quite a few contradictions and rational inconsistencies in your proposal that Morality is Cooperation.
2. Irrational application of science, is faulty science. Its not, "It could be faulty science." Demonstrate what is faulty or irrational.
3. Edge cases are NOT to be dismissed in science. Science constantly challenges its own conclusions, and if there is ANY discrepancy, that is swarmed over like flies until it is resolved.

Hand waving away anything that doesn't agree with the desired conclusion and telling people "It Doesn't matter if we don't like it" because 'science' says so, is not a good argument. A hypothesis that cannot answer discrepancies and offer concreate logical consistencies is a faulty hypothesis.

I assumed it was obvious that “moral” in quotes referred to descriptively moral. See my comment above about what is universally moral to all descriptively moral behaviors. What is universal to all descriptively moral behaviors is the ingroup morality that does not exploit others but is necessary to enforce moral norms that do exploit others. — Mark S

Many cultural norms or laws are exploitive or about co-option. How is dying for my country cooperation when I'm not going to receive one single benefit from dying for it? How is giving 10% of my money away to the church when I'm poor and need help cooperation? Often times morality has the threat of punishment or death if one does not follow it, such as following God's commands. Why would cooperation need threats if we both mutually benefit?

Thus your thesis that cooperation is universal conclusion we can take from all descriptive morality has a lot to answer before it can be claimed to be universal. Also, I think it would help at this point that you publish some of these scientific articles and conclusions you keep purporting. I'm curious at this point where you're getting this hypothesis from.

I appreciate you staying engaged with this and trying to answer the issues.

Ucarr, I know you don't like the conclusion here and are trying to demonstrate it is wrong. Lets go another route that might help more. Instead of trying to demonstrate why the conclusions here are false, try instead to prove that a first cause logically cannot exist. In other words, present to me a logical universe in which no first cause exists. If you can do that, then that's the same as countering the OP.

I keep coming up short, suggesting that an infinite past (duration) is not logically contradictory/impossible. Maybe "seemingly absurd" is more fitting? — jorndoe

The OP does not care if an infinite past is possible or not. The conclusion is the same.

Not a worry Bob!

I think it may be beneficial for us to distinguish the unit of measure from the unit being measured. A ‘liter’, ‘gram’, etc. are units of measure, whereas a ‘molecule’, ‘atom’, etc. are units being measured. — Bob Ross

It all depends on the context of measurement or 'scope'. A liter is fine when the substance is the same, but it is not if the substance is different. A liter of grape juice is more dense than a liter of water for example.

I think a way we can sidestep this whole issue of which unit to measure, is to only use discuss what unit of measure to use. The unit of measure does need to specify a unit being measured (viz., a gram of paper is a gram irregardless of one thinking of the paper as simply ‘a paper’ or ‘a glob of molecules’). — Bob Ross

This is fine by me in most cases.

However, the cost of this is that it also sidesteps most of your means of calculating ‘more existence’; as you have focused heavily on the (actual and potential) relationships between UCOM and very little has been said of UOM. — Bob Ross

Again, it depends on the context. If the scope of what we are examining is so large it doesn't require us to consider atoms or molecules as significant digits, then we don't. If however we create a situation where it is important, than we do.

If you still would like to evaluate ‘more existence’ in terms of UCOM, then I simply have failed to grasp why you insist on calculating in terms of ‘UCOMs one step down’ as opposed to uses the entity as a whole: why do you prefer calculating in terms of a thing’s composed parts instead of itself? — Bob Ross

In your specific instance your calculation was incorrect. You stated that two pieces of paper was more existence than one piece of paper, but these two pieces of paper were the result of dividing one piece of paper in half. In this case we must take the mass or molecules into consideration because those two pieces of paper are not double the amount of mass of the original piece of paper. That's all.

You seem to agree with me that there are some legitimate cases where one should use the thing instead of its parts (e.g., ‘one potato or two?’) but I failing to see why you keep insisting on using its parts in other cases (e.g., why use molecules instead of the paper?). If you could please elaborate on this, then that would be much appreciated. — Bob Ross

Certainly! The thing we are demonstrating is, "More existence is good." That's the gold standard that we have agreed upon. Our calculations and identities are all to meet that standard. If an example does not meet that standard, it does not mean the standard is wrong, it means the example or calculation is wrong. The calculations are just ways of measuring, and the question is whether they measure in such a way that serves this purpose, or if there is something incorrect in what they are capturing.

So, if we create an example that is faulty, or calculates incorrectly, it needs to be adjusted to the proper scope so that it never forgets its underlying purpose: A way to calculate existence correctly, logically, and consistently.

Necessity is not important...
— Philosophim

That's why you've been working your ass off with this conversation for months running? And by the way, who says "What is is not important?" Just because humans aren't necessary, that doesn't have to mean they aren't important. — ucarr

I think we're having a language issue again. Also, I've enjoyed the conversation. This is a hobby, not work. If I could make a living doing this, I would.

Describe a situation in nature wherein necessity is important apart from sentients — ucarr

Lets go over this again so you can better understand my answer. The word 'important', I read as 'important to some sentient'. Its important for a purpose. My answer, "Necessity is not important, its what is," means that necessity is a fact. Whether its important to someone or thing is irrelevant. 1+1 = 2 isn't important, its a fact. Do you understand the answer now?

If a tree falls in a forest and no one is around, it still vibrates the air molecules.
— Philosophim

So, you've been relaxing under island breezes.

Seems fitting after slaving in the trenches for a just cause. — ucarr

I don't understand your answer. Again, what exists does not need to be observed to exist. Causality does not need to be observed to be a fact of reality.

Describe a situation in nature wherein necessity is important apart from sentients. — ucarr

Necessity is not important, its what is. I'll repeat the example I already gave: If a tree falls in a forest and no one is around, it still vibrates the air molecules.

All I got from this is the idea that our minds cannot perfectly be the world, but are abstract representations. That's fine. Causality doesn't care whether you observe it or not. When a tree falls in the forest and no one is around, it still vibrates air. This theory does not care about whether we are accurate in any particular causality, it is about causality as a necessary reality. Human minds are not required.

On what grounds do you assume "space-time" was "caused"? It seems to me, Philosophim, you're asking, in effect, "what caused causality?" :roll: — 180 Proof

I'm actually not. To break down the entire conversation into a better summary than the OP, what I'm claiming is that there must be at least one thing that is uncaused, which then causes other things to happen. The case of an 'infinitely eternally existing space-time' is in your mind, is uncaused. The OP notes that such a thing must necessarily exist, so your belief in this existence is in alignment with the OP, not against it.

No, not "first" but only: existence, being sui generis, is the only cause of everything – causality itself – which in Relativistic physics is often described as the "Block Universe" or in metaphysics, as Spinoza conceives of it sub specie aeternitatus, as "substance" (i.e. natura naturans³)⁴. — 180 Proof

My first thought when you explained this was, "That's basically God," I then read your links and saw that was what Spinoza was doing. Not in the Christian or deist sense of course, but describing a Godlike existence without the need for consciousness.

None of this contrasts with the point I'm making here. If you believe that a Spinozan type universe is possible, my points agree with this. The only difference is that any claim one makes to an 'uncaused substance' must offer proof that it is indeed uncaused. Otherwise, its an act of faith and just as possible as any other idea a person can come up with.

Perhaps now you can better appreciate my efforts towards independent inferential thinking in response to what you write. — ucarr

No, I really don't understand what you're trying to say or how this relates to the topic. Your writing is unclear and I am making a good faith effort to understand it. Please try again to make what you are saying more clear. Otherwise, no, I am not going to keep going.

If you introduce a new idea and people have questions about it, it is your job to do whatever you can to make it clear when reasonable inquiry is made. Just like I have done for you when you have had questions about my work. The person who is introducing an idea, you in this case, is doing so with the intent to impart value and possibly persuade someone else. It is not the responsibility of someone who reads it and engages with you to solve your riddles when they are simply trying to understand your initial points. I am currently unable to understand your ideas, and I am respectfully asking you to clarify them if you want me to remain engaged.

Are you saying that all a priori deductions don't take any time to realize?
— Philosophim

Do a priori deductions take time to be true? How much time does it take for two + two to equal four? — ucarr

Ucarr, I'm asking a question to understand what you're trying to say. Returning my question with a another question is just more confusing. :) In fact, all of my questions you just answered with questions. My questions are not statements, I'm just trying to figure out what you're saying.

Counter Premise: A priori deduction ≠ a posteriori deduction along the measurement axis of time. — ucarr

What does this mean Ucarr? Are you saying that all a priori deductions don't take any time to realize? And I'm further confused in how any of this addresses the issue of cause and effect.

Question A: Deduction can lead to knowledge only by empirical observation in time?

Deduction does not require empirical observation. But we need to think through it right? Are you saying time doesn't exist? I'm confused again.

Question B: Deduction can lead to knowledge both by observation in time and by abstract reasoning? — ucarr

Are you saying that abstract reasoning does not take time? Can we observe things outside of time? I'm not sure where you're going here.

I'll try to rephrase it. The effect comes from the cause (by definition), so the effect includes the cause. For example, the plant includes its seed, because the plant is the-seed-that-grew. The plant is the continuation of the seed. (This continuation already blurs the border between cause and effect, by the way). — LFranc

What you might be implying here can be easily captured by determinism. If A causes B, then necessarily along a timeline it was A which caused B to happen. Causality is capturing all of the aspects that are necessary for A or B to exist. If something could exist without something necessary besides itself, in other words, A simply existed because of its own undeniable existence, and nothing else, we would call A a 'first cause'. A 'first cause' is the only aspect of existence free from the determinism of its inception, or eternal existence (if that is how it exists).

if causality is necessary (like science and Spinoza say), then the cause has to produce this effect, in this specific way and at this specific moment. So, in a way the effect is already there in the cause, for nothing else can happen but this effect. — LFranc

Saying the effect is 'already there in the cause' is just a misuse of language. If the effect hasn't happened yet, its not there. We can say, "This cause will result in X effect in five seconds if nothing else enters the picture". That's fine. But that doesn't mean the cause and effect exist simultaneously. Determinism still requires time to unfold.

But humans can comprehend, with rationality, that, in a way, everything happens at once, which is what Spinoza calls "considering things sub specie aeternitatis", "under the aspect of eternity", as you probably know. — LFranc

Yeah, that's poetry, not anything based in actual fact. We can imagine a world without time, but we live in a world of time. You and I haven't already died right? So the notion that everything has happened all at once beyond flowery language and the imagination, is absurd in reality.

Science often thinks in terms of laws and not causes indeed. For example, law of gravitation: is it the Earth that attracts the moon or the other way around? The answer is: both, it's a law, a relationship, not a causality. — LFranc

Science often thinks in terms of causality as well. I've heard this claim that 'science doesn't like causality' and it turns out its only philosophers. Scientists use causality every single day as its core to science. "What causes gravity to exist?" is a great mystery scientists would love to solve.

my metaphysical position more or less agrees with Spinoza's: there is no "outside of space-time" (or "beyond" with "possibilities") insofar as nature is unbounded in all directions (i.e. natura naturans is eternal and infinite) — 180 Proof

I wanted to note that I have had no issue with this. My question to you is: "What caused space-time?" And to clarify how to think about this, take the idea that spacetime has always existed, and put it in a set. From spacetime is our ultimate cause for the existence of all other matter and phenomenon. This is still fine. So this set captures all of causality through infinite time.

Now the question: What caused this set? Was there anything necessary that lead to space-time existing, or does it just exist because it does? If there is nothing prior which explains why space-time had to have existed forever or exists as it does, then we have reached a first cause. It is the cause of all other things, yet has no cause for its own being besides its own existence.

The brain model applies to brains as emergent and affecting matter in the present.

The signal back propagation idea is speculative but if it exists could be relavent to a first cause.

For me it's something to keep in mind. — Mark Nyquist

Another form of retrocausality is information based. Our brains hold concepts of past, present and future so an anticipated future event can affect the physical present. For example we do things based on future projections like storing food, preparing for storms, launching space probes and preparing for wars. All things not possible without brains so brains can affect matter. Would it be relavent to a first cause? I don't know but it's a mechanism that appears to operate differently than lesser forms of physical matter are capable of. — Mark Nyquist

This has no relevancy to a first cause that I can see. What caused your brain to remember X? What caused your brain to be created? And so we go down a chain of causality.

Since the cause cannot not produce the effect, it means the effect already lies in the cause somehow (and it means that time is a kind of illusion for Spinoza but that's another matter).
But then: how can the cause produce an effect, since the effect already exists?
Therefore, nothing can really be produced, and this kills causality. — LFranc

Everything doesn't exist all at once, but over time. It doesn't matter if there is perfect determinism, we have to watch it unfold. So no, causality is fine.

Or rather, it shows that causality is contradictory: causality can exist thanks to the absence of causality, and vice versa. That, of course, is a very short presentation of this subject (source: Brief Solutions to Philosophical Problems Using a Hegelian Method, Solution 10) — LFranc

I think we need the larger presentation because I'm not sure you're conveying the nuance needed here. Without the context of the paper, what you said makes no sense.

Give me some example that makes humans magic then
— Philosophim

Show me where said that human beings are magic. — Wayfarer

I never did. This is pointless to engage anymore Wayfarer. Lets let the thread get back to its original topic.

Ah I see Patterner. I don't think we have any substantial disagreement then. :)

Whatever the gap between fly and bat is, I don't think it approaches the gap between bat and human. — Patterner

Its not about a specific measurement of the gap, its about the fact that the gap is a wide gulf between the two. A mammal can run intellectual circles around a bug. A human can run intellectual circles around a bat.

Humans intelligence goes indescribably far beyond that of any other species. We think about things no other species thinks about. Things no other species can think about. — Patterner

Right, that's the natural consequence of being the best. Just like an insect can't hope to think like a bat does, a bat can't hope to think like a human does. Are we indescribably different though? We see other forms of intelligence like apes and orangutangs. Its not like we come out of left field like its some form of magic. We're made out of DNA, we have brains that are similar to other mammals, etc.

I don't see a conflict between being the best in intellect, but also not being apart from nature and the rest of existence. A peregrine falcon can see small movement miles up the sky, and swoop up to 200 miles per hour, which seems impossible to me. Just because its the fastest animal in the world, that doesn't mean its a magical bird that's somehow separate from everything else. Nature is very weird, varied, and easily catalogued by DNA, bone structure, and clear patterns of life.

So I'll ask you, why do you think being the most intelligent being keeps us separate from nature? Why do you think it makes us anymore special then just "Being special in being the most intelligent being?"

Because it is what you're appealing to by declaring that humans are 'just another species' and that the differences between humans and other species is no more significant than the differences between species, generally. — Wayfarer

I'm feeling like you're really not committing to a discussion here, as you are disregarding all of my other points that lead to why I'm saying this. Give me some example that makes humans magic then. Are we composed of something other than DNA? Do we have some type of anatomy that seems completely alien to the planet? It has to be something more than just, "We're the most intelligent species". There is always going to be a most intelligent species, and because it is the most intelligent, it is going to be able to do things other species can't.

The definition I linked to was as follows — Wayfarer

Yes, I read the definition the first time you linked it and I still don't see how this applies. What specifically am I saying that ties in with that definition?

It has been a common assumption that descriptively moral behavior’s diversity, contradictions, and strangeness showed they were based on no unifying principles that explained them all. Advances in game theory in the last few decades reveals that to be a false assumption as I have described. — Mark S

Mind giving a few examples? Your conclusion that cooperation that does not exploit other people is moral does not come from descriptive morality. For example, if I believe exploiting others for my own gain, and I work with other people to profit is moral, that is descriptive. If you're going to conclude, "This person's reason why they think something is moral is wrong, while this other person's contrary reason is correct," you need something more than subjective justification.

What people believe is moral is a function of the biology underlying their moral sense and cultural moral norms. That biology and those cultural norms can be explained in terms of their evolutionary origins. — Mark S

No debate here, but this is ultimately meaningless. All of our actions come from biology. Its why a monkey cannot do what a human does. Its why a disabled person can't skip and jump like someone who can normally walk. Can we show definitively through science a morality that doesn't result in basic contradictions, handles edge cases, and is rationally consistent?

All these cultural norms and biology-based intuitions have a necessary tag that identifies them as “moral”. — Mark S

No. Cultural norms and biology based intuitions alone cannot be called moral. If I have a biological impetus to be a pedophile, its still wrong even if I have a group around me that supports and encourages it. Same with killing babies for sport. You have to explain why the biology and culture that is in conflict with this is correct/incorrect. That requires more than descriptive morality.

The law, and morality, are not the same. There are plenty of laws and cultures we would consider immoral. Descriptive morality takes any objective judgement away from morality, and simply equates it to what society encourages or enforces on others. You will find few adherents to that.

Finding underlying principles in chaotic data sets, such as descriptively moral behaviors, is science’s bread and butter (standard process and practice). — Mark S

No debate with that, but I'm not seeing that here.

The ingroup cooperation strategies that do not exploit those in the ingroup are the universal PART of all descriptively moral behaviors. Any exploiting or threatening to exploit others (outgroups) makes the totality of the behavior only descriptively moral. — Mark S

This makes no sense. Universal means 'across the board'. And yet in the same breath you have descriptive moral behavior that is not universal. Meaning that no, it is NOT universal. You need a clear reason why a group of serial killers who believe killing the weak in society is a moral good are wrong compared to groups of people who think we should support the weak in society with our resources. Descriptive morality alone cannot solve this. This is the inevitable conflict of "What is moral" that always pops up when you have different subjective viewpoints, and needs something outside of the subjective to solve it rationally.

No. There are behaviors that do not exploit or harm others that have nothing to do with morality. To be universally moral, the behaviors must do both, solve cooperation problems and not exploit others. — Mark S

So when I find a bug in my home and decide on my own to capture it in a cup and put it outside instead of stepping on it, that has nothing to do with morality? If someone in trouble tells me they don't need help, but I secretly slip them 20$ that can't be traced back to me, that's has nothing to do with morality? I could give tons more. Very few, if any people, are going to buy into the idea that morality must involve cooperation.

I don't see how any logic can be applied to the situation if we don't know the physics involved first. It's rather futile to try. Want are you doing? Applying a mental overlay to unknown physics?
It doesn't seem reasonable. — Mark Nyquist

Here's one. We don't know the exact nature of time. An interesting twist is the possibility of retrocausality or back propagation of signals. — Mark Nyquist

The OP covers this. Let me break it down for you as simply as possible.

Lets take the idea that the universe has a clear finite start. A -> B -> C with A being the start. What caused A, or the entire set to be? Nothing. There is no prior cause.

Now lets take a set of looped time. A -> B -> C -> A... What caused the entire set to be? In other words, why is there no D? Nothing. There is no prior cause.

Logically, whether infinite regress or finite regress, we will reach a point in causality in which there is no prior cause for its existence. Feel free to ask for more details if needed.

I did not include the derivation of what is universally moral by morality as cooperation in the OP to keep it short and because it was unnecessary to my points. I can’t say everything at once. — Mark S

Not a worry, I understand that.

“Descriptively moral behaviors solve cooperation problems in groups” is arguably scientifically true based on its explanatory power for past and present cultural moral norms and our moral sense. — Mark S

This is weirdly worded. A descriptive moral behavior is why someone does something they believe is moral. Meaning that someone could believe that cooperating with another has nothing to do with morality. Descriptive moral behavior is subjective, therefore more a study of sociology on unreliable narrators than objective science.

Yes, the ingroup cooperation strategies are universal even when used for purposes that exploit or harm others. — Mark S

No, this is not universal. Sometimes people cooperate due to threats or personal profit. They might not morally agree with the situation. For example, getting drafted into a war you think is wrong. Cooperating with a killer because they're threatening your life if you don't. Is this cooperation due to a sense of morality? Most would say no.

Hence, by morality as cooperation, “universally moral behaviors solve cooperation problems without exploiting or harming others”. — Mark S

Considering this could be applied to problems that don't require cooperation, isn't the real claim of morality more along the line of "Taking actions without exploiting or harming others?"

By the fact it is not the same material as a brain.
— Philosophim
So, what different material is mind of AI? In what sense is mind of AI different from human mind? — Corvus

For one its binary programming. It has different limitations and freedoms from neurological thinking. You can scale an AI to use far more energy than one human brain, as well as transfer information from one hardware station to another.

You can play the same melody on different instruments, but it will have its own sound and feel.
— Philosophim
I am not sure if this is a proper comparison. Mind has its own will, volition, intentions and desires as well as emotions, feelings, perceptions and reasonings. It is a totality of one's whole mental events and operations. — Corvus

Right, that's its own sound and feel. Is your brain the same as your friend's brain? No. You're each different people playing your own version of music or 'mind'.

We are more interested in finding out what is mind made of, if it is physical in its origin or something else in its origin? What is mind's scope and limitation? What is mind's capabilities? What can AI mind do where human minds cannot? and vice versa? Can mind see things beyond what is visible, hence extendable? — Corvus

We've had the solution for a while now. The animalistic mind is formed from neurons. I tell people this all the time: philosophy of the mind without neuroscience is worthless. Neuroscience has answered most of those questions for some time now. 'You' are and expression of your brain. Your feelings to the matter are irrelevant. If we damage your brain, we will damage your 'consciousness'. We can use drugs to inhibit and improve your mind. And if we kill your brain, your mind dies. Its incontrovertible at this point.

You may be confusing 'sight' by the way. Sight is always a construction of the brain. Did you know that when light enters your eyes the image is upside down? The brain corrects all of that. Again, do not study philosophy to learn about the mind. Study modern day neuroscience. Anyone who doesn't is going to be ignorant.

In this thread, I never got the impression that you were arguing for any specific kind of First Cause (What), but merely reasoning about the logical necessity for something to kick-start the chain of Causation (That). — Gnomon

Correct.

When ↪Philosophim says that there is "no limit" on what the Cause of Being might be {see PS below}, he's merely admitting that we are speculating about a state & event that is empirically unverifiable (no known rules), but logically plausible (rules of reasoning) — Gnomon

Also correct. Just one caveat for Ucarr. Currently we are unable to verify that something is a first cause, but we know what would be needed to do it. Thus any claim that "X" is a first cause would need to prove it.

Nevertheless, for the purposes of an amateur forum, we can reasonably conclude that a contingent world (big bang beginning) requires a prior Cause of some kind (infinite ; recursive?) — Gnomon

According to the OP, looking at just the big bang and nothing else, it is not rationally necessary that it requires a prior cause of some kind. However, if we are to empirically claim, "The big bang is the first cause of the universe", we must prove that it is so. Until its proven, the possibility that something prior caused the big bang must rationally be explored as well.

*3. "I'm a p-naturalist¹ and thereby speculatively assume that aspects of nature are only explained within – immanently to – nature itself by using other aspects of nature, which includes "consciousness" as an attribute of at least one natural species." ___180 Proof
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/867837
Note --- The First Cause speculation is not about any particular "aspect" of Nature, but about all aspects of Nature : the Cosmos as a whole living (dynamic, if you prefer) system that was born and is fated to die. — Gnomon

This is what I think 180 Proof failed to understand. He's an intelligent person, but I believe was convinced the argument was trying to say something it wasn't. The major struggle I've had in this OP was getting people break free of the "first cause is a God" argument that has been locked in debate for decades. It can be hard to shake for some. My hopes were to get both atheists and theists to see that we're missing an incredible point in the midst of the overwhelming concern about proving/disproving deities.

The point is that the logical conclusion results in there necessarily being one first cause, and that there was nothing prior which caused or limited what that first cause could have been prior to its inception. Thus sure, a God is possible, but not necessary. To claim, "A God is the first cause" requires proof, and cannot be logically concluded. On the flip side, I think its a fascinating point to consider that the inception of our universe logically required an unlimited potential. That there logically is a beginning to reason. Further, the idea that a first cause could happen at any time is a fascinating concept that should be considered as a possibility in any causal exploration. Understanding the nature of it, as well as expected patterns can be very useful in critically analyzing any claims that this "X" is a first cause. We can close the philosophical debate on the logical necessity of a God, and move instead of the empirical proof required to demonstrate if any one belief that "X" is a first cause can hold against scientific rigor.

Obviously, we are from there same planet. We're a result of a lot of the same materials and forces as every other animal and living thing. Our neo-cortex is not unique. All mammals have it. We share 98.8% of our DNA with chimpanzees. So I'm not sure what my point is. :lol: — Patterner

Ha ha! That's fair. I'm not sure where the disagreement was either. :D

What threshold is this that is unique to human beings?
— Philosophim

As I said - language, reason, technology, and so on. H. sapiens is able to interrogate the nature of meaning and being in a way that other species cannot. — Wayfarer

My point was there there are other thresholds in other living beings that biological science cannot fully explain at this time.

You're familiar with the term 'biological reductionism'? Definition here. — Wayfarer

No, and I'm not sure how it fits into the discussion.

That's not the point at issue, though. Obviously there is massive divergences between species, that is not at issue. I am protesting the tendency to overlook or deny what I see as an obvious fact about h. sapiens - language, reason, tool-making, and the implications of all of that. — Wayfarer

I don't believe I'm denying how unique we are, or that we are at the pinnacle of intelligence for living beings.

No, we're not 'an alien species', the biological descent of h. sapiens is abundantly obvious, but with the advent of those capacities, we crossed a threshold beyond what can be understood solely through the lens of biological science. — Wayfarer

What threshold is this that is unique to human beings? There are limits to our current understanding of many other beings through the lens of biological science as well. We can analyze the brain of a fly, but we can't duplicate it or have a full understanding of how it works. Then there's behavioral science for creatures as well that goes beyond biology.

I don't need to know much about the subject to know that the intellectual gap between humans and any other species may be of degree in some ways, but there is also a difference of type. — Patterner

Both the degree and type of intelligence shift between a dolphin and a plain fish is monumental.

No other species has the slightest clue about what stars are, ever wonders about it, or coyotes be educated aboutit. No other species wonders what fossils are, or would no matter how hard we tried to teach them. — Patterner

And nothing I've stated denies this.

There is no end to the examples of things we do easily that no other species any condition of. no, we are not from a different planet. But we are different. We are unique. — Patterner

Many species are different and unique. My point is that our differences and uniqueness do not set us apart from nature. We are just another species. We are not exempt from needing to eat, drink, reproduce, and die. We are made out of carbon and DNA. We are not the only beings with consciousness. We are mammals, and have mammalian brains. Being the pinnacle of something does not mean you are not built upon the things that let you rise to the top.