So, I would like to point out this is just an empirical question about what exactly has a mind, whereas my theory is simply proving that if it does have one — Bob Ross

That's fair. So then if someone found an insect to be an end in itself, it would be needed to be treated as such.

Where does a mind begin and end?

I definitely can’t answer that, and, quite frankly, no one can. — Bob Ross

I see that as a problem considering that minds and their status are the fundamental lynch pin of your argument. Perhaps this could be answered if you define whether it is possible for something that is not a mind to be an end in itself.

Why are animals and insects ends in themselves but clearly have less value compared to people?

They don’t have less value than humans: they are prioritized lower in the case of moral antinomies, which is most of practical life, than humans. — Bob Ross

I understand you don't want to use the word value, but almost anyone using the theory will. In the case of choosing what must be sacrificed for another species to live, there must be a rationale behind it. In your case if you want to avoid value, you may just want to say, "Whatever is stronger." So if an insect ate a human being, it would be merely due to capability and not that one is more valuable than the other.

The only issue is that P2: Person's are ends in themselves isn't proven, its more of a given assumption.

I added more sections that pertain to ends vs. means; and there is an explanation below the argument of why P2 is true. They are ends in themselves because they are the only beings with a nature such that they are an absolute end. — Bob Ross

I'm not seeing why that matters though. All this seems to imply is that minds are beings that are ends in themselves. It doesn't prove why anyone should value this, its just a claim.

Which premise do you disagree with? — Bob Ross

Just why ends in themselves should matter beyond our desire or opinion that they should matter. I have a feeling reading Mww's response, that this is covered more thoroughly by Kant. He may be better to consult going forward. :)

The reasoning demonstrates that even an infinite regress falls into a finite regress of causality.
— Philosophim

Why is that? I'm a little slow today — jgill

That's the OP. Basically if you state that everything has a cause, you either get to the point where you you have the potential for a finite chain of causality, or an infinite regress. The point is that if you take the entire set of the infinite regress and ask, "What caused it to be an infinite regress?" you realize that's the finite end. It simply is, there's no prior explanation for its being.

Meh. Causality is not found in formal logic.

Certainly not in modal logic.

A first cause is not logically necessary. — Banno

Its found in the logic of the OP. And yes, its concluded that if causality exists, there is a first cause. Feel free to show why its wrong, I would be happy to see if someone can poke a hole in it! I summed it above to jgill. Feel free to ask any questions for clarity on the OP.

We know some things don't (have causality). That ought be enough to put this to rest. — Banno

That would confirm my point actually. Something that does not have a prior cause is a first cause. What examples were you thinking about?

I've answered on a number of occasions, the subject is philosophy of mathematics, and you haven't responded, other than repeating your point. — Wayfarer

The point being you haven't indicated where they exist if not in the brain.

I've said that numbers and other mathematical concepts are abstractions, to which your reply has been 'what are they made from'? But it is absurd to claim that mathematical concepts are physical. They solely comprise relations of ideas. — Wayfarer

Why is it absurd? If the brain is physical, and it can relate ideas, math is a physical result of this relation. I've noted before a rock can't create math. Nor can I fish through the air and math appears. Its not located on any other plane of existence, and it surely don't come from 'nothing'. If you can't tell me where its located apart from the physical realm of brains, which clearly makes sense to me, the absurdity is your claim, not mine.

It's certainly true that the h. sapien brain is uniquely equipped to discern these relations, but that no way proves that they are the product of hominid neurophysiology. At best it shows that the brain has evolved in such a way that it has attained the ability to understand such things. — Wayfarer

I much prefer this discussion then passive aggressive insults when there's disagreement. I view math as a construction of the brain to represent its ability to create discrete experiences, or what might also be called 'identities'. 'An' identity, is one. Take another one and put them in what we call a 'group', and its two. Math is the language and logic of our ability to identify. It does not exist in the universe separate from ourselves. It only exists and makes sense to that which can identify and reason though the logical results of having that capability.

I acknowledge this a contested subject. There is no settled answer — Wayfarer

Which is fine. Admitting that my approach had some validity, but you believe because its unproven you would rather view it the other way has my respect.

So, a platonist answer is that numbers are not to empirical objects, but are objects of reason. — Wayfarer

As I've noted, reason is a physical process that brains do. Reason again does not exist in a separate dimension. This is why I keep coming back to this. I'm trying to point out that stating something comes from reason isn't an argument that its not physical, if reason itself is physical. Our ability to imagine that reason is not physical, does not make it so. I understand the ideas behind Platonism, but I personally do not find it carries any evidential weight. I see it as a unicorn argument. A very clear and distinct identity, but ultimately fiction.

The demand to prove 'what numbers are made of' and 'where they exist' only illustrates the failure to understand this point, not an argument against it. — Wayfarer

The point I'm making is that all of human reason is physical as it comes from the brain, and the brain is physical. I have science backing me up on this. There is evidence that points to this conclusion. I am very open to seeing evidence that this is not the case. But stating, "Reason dictates its not physical" misses my point. If reason is physical, anything concluded by reason is physical as well. If reason is not physical, what is it? Where is it? Can we point some evidence of reason existing apart from the creation of a human brain?

You have failed to do so, and are instead doing me a favor by not calling me a name. How noble and strong you are!
— Philosophim

You will notice that I edited out that remark a long time before your reply appeared, but as you've brought it up, the description I had in mind was 'scientism'. And I'm not the least concerned with your 'tongue lashing', only the tedium of having to deal with it. — Wayfarer

If you edited that out, thank you. I much prefer polite conversation with you. If you don't want to deal with the tedium of my tongue lashing, keep personal insults out of it. We'll be fine then.

Your entire ouvre rests of just one claim: science proves consciousness is the product of the brain and that all that is unknown is how. But that was just the subject of the bet:

Back to the bet between Koch and Chalmers: They agreed that, for Koch to win, the evidence for a neural signature of consciousness must be “clear.” That word “clear” doomed Koch. — Wayfarer

The bet was that we would find the direct mechanical brain correlation to consciousness in 25 years. The bet was not that consciousness does not come from the brain.

to say that "logic" necessitates a first cause is not the same as saying the "nature of existence" (whatever that means) necessitates a first cause. Being is not required to conform to our understanding of either logic or the nature of existence. Only we are. — Arne

True. But logic in general is our best tool to analyze whether ideas fit in with the nature of existence as we know it. In this particular case however, logic is all we need. Its a binary question. Infinite regress, or finite regress. The reasoning demonstrates that even an infinite regress falls into a finite regress of causality. Considering I can think of no option besides this binary, its the most reasonable conclusion we can reach with what we know.

And this is good, sensible place to leave it. — J

Yeah, good conversation J! I'll catch you around in another thread.

We simply have the true definition of unicorn that already exists in the verbal model of the actual world. — PL Olcott

Right. But that verbal model always boils down to needing something synthetic to understand the terminology at the end of the day. Further, what if you have two different sets of people who have different ideas of what a true unicorn is? That's the problem when you note analytic is 'true'. Its not really true.

My purpose in this post is to unequivocally divide analytic from synthetic even if this requires defining analytic(olcott) and synthetic(olcott). — PL Olcott

I get that. The point I'm making is you haven't unequivocally done so. Look into the history of philosophy about the terms. Its centuries of bickering back and forth with no agreement. My former advice still stands. Let the words die. Indicate the concepts you want in an argument without using the words.

That brains create consciousness? We've figured that out.
— Philosophim

Did we figure it out in the sense of figuring out the truth of a proposition — sime

According to modern day science, it has been concluded that the brain that causes consciousness. Just like an engine runs a car. The question is figuring out how the engine runs.

I think the problem is something like this: You want to say that “Consciousness can only be identified through behaviors” and also “Therefore, anything with certain specified behaviors is conscious.” I’m not persuaded by the idea that “being alive” consists of behaviors, but let’s grant it. — J

That's fair and kind. My question really is, "If consciousness cannot be measured by the subjects experience, how else have we measured it over the years?" To my mind, we have to observe that a being is aware of their environment and can adapt to it. This applies to beings such as animals as well. Sometimes consciousness bounces around back only to people, so just clarifying from my end.

The argument is still shaky. The fact that (at the moment) we can only identify consciousness through behaviors doesn’t mean that all things that exhibit those behaviors must be conscious. Compare: Some Xs are Y; a is an X; therefore a is Y. This doesn’t follow. — J

Let me clarify what I think works here. If our definition of objective consciousness is measured through behaviors, that doesn't mean something that would fit the criteria of objective consciousness has subjective consciousness. And I agree. In fact, I believe it is currently impossible to know another's subjective consciousness, so we can't use it as an objective measurement.

Wouldn’t it be prudent, then, to assume that our current reliance on behavioral markers to identify consciousness is an unfortunate crutch, and that there is no important connection between the two? After all, we know that behaviors don’t cause consciousness, but something does. When we learn what that something is, we may be able to abandon functional “explanations” entirely. — J

Its an unfortunate limitation in objectivity. We cannot objectively know what a subjective consciousness is beyond our own experiences. Did you know that there are people who have no inner monologue? They cannot imagine speaking to themselves. Same with visual. There are some people who cannot visualize things. I can do both. How can I relate to and understand that at a subjective level? Its as impossible for me as it is impossible for them to have any notion of what it is like to have an inner monologue or envision something when they close their eyes. Its like if I claimed, "Yeah, I have psychic powers and can read minds." None of us would ever understand that subjective experience. We would prove it through tests and behavior.

A final thought: Perhaps all you’re saying is that AIs and robots and other artifacts might be conscious, for all we know. — J

If AIs meet the behavioral definition of consciousness, then they are objectively conscious. Remember, even a dog can show consciousness. It doesn't mean they have a human subjective conscious experience. Its beyond our knowing. The point I'm ultimately making is that we never have been able to objectively judge consciousness through knowing the beings subjective experience. Further, logically with the technology we have, we will not be able to in the near future, if ever.

If there are no brains in the universe, there is no math
— Philosophim

There is a long history of the ‘maths is discovered, not invented’ school of thought which says numbers are not produced by the brain but discerned by rational insight. But this is nowadays considered controversial because it appears to undercut materialism. — Wayfarer

Oh, who considers it controversial? You? I consider your idea that consciousness does not come from the brain as controversial, as do many other philosophers. But that's not a very good argument isn't it? In fact, that's not an argument at all.

The brain produces or is involved in producing neurochemicals, endocrines and so on, but it doesn’t produce numbers or words. Your ontology is simply that because matter is fundamental, the brain is material then it must be the case. — Wayfarer

I've been asking for some time now, if the brain doesn't produce them, where are they? What material are they made out of? I've clearly pointed out that the brain, which is physical, can retain information, make judgements, etc. This includes numbers.

IN fact most of what you write comprises what you think must obviously be true, because 'science shows it'. There's rather derogatory term in philosophy for that attitude but I'll refrain from using it. — Wayfarer

Yes, and I've asked you to give me an example where science demonstrates that its wrong, or give me philosophical examples that would give evidential weight to consciousness not coming from the brain. You have failed to do so, and are instead doing me a favor by not calling me a name. How noble and strong you are!

Concepts are not physical things. Find me one reputable philosopher who says otherwise. — Wayfarer

Appeal to authority now? I laid out clear points with clear falsifiability and asked you to provide examples of it being false. You cannot. That is why you retreat to this.

That brains create consciousness? We've figured that out.
— Philosophim

This again demonstrates that you're not 'facing up to the problem of consciousness'. — Wayfarer

I'm not the one running away here. Your inability to actually show why I'm not facing up to the problem of consciousness is your problem, then magically declaring it as such, is your problem.

I'll bow out — Wayfarer

You know, you could have avoided embarrassing yourself and getting a tongue lashing from me if you had just done this at the start. "Well Philosophim, we've been going back and forth for a while now, and I think we'll have to agree to disagree. Appreciate the conversation, I'll catch you another time."

Because it was a nice conversation up until now and I had a lot of respect for your engagements and attempt to defend your position. Next time you feel like a conversation is going nowhere, just politely end it.

But these atoms in my brain produce consciousness," I think to myself. And I wonder, "why are these brain atoms producing consciousness? What is special about them?" "Well maybe when you arrange atoms in that way they are conscious?" "But Not Aristotle," I say to myself, "that is entirely an ad hoc explanation and besides, why would the arrangement of the atoms matter?" And I am unable to answer. And that's the hard problem as I understand it. If you have an answer to that problem, I would be happy to hear it. — NotAristotle

Sure, on the question of how brains create consciousness, we're still trying to figure it out. That brains create consciousness? We've figured that out. Why do brains create consciousness? Its the same as asking why do two gases at room temperature combine together to form a liquid that we need to drink to live. Existence is magical and fascinating. What matter and energy can do is astonishing. Why can it do that? Why isn't everything just a bunch of rocks? The fact that there exists anything instead of just 'nothing' amazes me. Why does it? A question for humanity that may never be answered.

We're just going around in circles Patterner, and I don't think we're reaching each other here. Lets agree to disagree. Good conversation.

‘In our brains’ is another reification. It has no location, it isn’t in any place. If an intelligent creature were to evolve by a completely separate biological pathway, they would discover the concept of equals, But it’s a concept, an idea, it is not a physical thing. — Wayfarer

What I'm trying to note is that abstract concepts do not exist apart from brains. If there are no brains in the universe, there is no math. Your brain stores memories. https://www.livescience.com/how-the-brain-stores-memories#:~:text=The%20most%20important%20is%20the,storage%20to%20long%2Dterm%20storage.

We know that people who have brain damage in the hypocampus can no longer make new memories. Anteriograde Amnesia. https://my.clevelandclinic.org/health/diseases/23221-anterograde-amnesia

Your brain stores the memory of math. Your brain can plan, judge, and create abstractions. All of this is a physical process. We can create communication and transfer this information to other brains. Tell the sky and it does nothing. Tell a rock and it does not care. Tell a brain and you have the continuation of math.

Something which has no location, no place, it is nothing. Concepts and ideas are physical things that we think about and can communicate to each other over physical mediums. Is there some science that demonstrates that I'm wrong?

Being alive is not a behavior, it’s a state or condition. This allows us to say things like, “I don’t care how ‛lifelike’ the behavior of X is, the fact remains that it’s not alive.” — J

Something being life-like means that it fulfills some of the behaviors of a life, but not all of the behaviors of a life. Think of it this way. Do you know what any other person's subjective experience is like? No, you don't. You have behaviors. We have never objectively defined consciousness through subjective experiences, because its impossible to know what anyone else's subjective experience is but our own.

So no, the only way we do identify consciousness is through behavior. You can't define it based on someone's subjective experience, because its impossible to know what someone's else's subjective experience is right?

The Oxford Living Dictionary defines consciousness as "The state of being aware of and responsive to one's surroundings.", "A person's awareness or perception of something." and "The fact of awareness by the mind of itself and the world." This "awareness" can be tested by behavior. For example, we are not aware of our 500th's cell in our left leg. We are not conscious of it.

You can do tests to see if a person is aware and responsive to their surroundings. What you cannot test is their subjective experience while they do so. We never have been able to. Consciousness has never been objectively defined by it. So its always been irrelevant what the subject experiences in identifying consciousness from an objective standpoint.

No, it’s an intellectual process. 2+2=4 is an intellectual operation. There is no such thing as ‘=‘ in the physical world, it is an abstraction. — Wayfarer

It does exist in the physical world. It exists in our physical brains. Right? If it doesn't exist there, where does it exist?

That is the Hard Problem. "Through our physical brain" is a where, not a how. "In the sky" does not tell us how flight is accomplished. "In our legs" does not tell us how walking is accomplished. "In our brain" does not tell us how consciousness is accomplished. The details are not insignificant. They are remarkably important. And they are unknown. — Patterner

Sure, but its not the hard problem. Its just a problem. We learn more every day how the brain works in both medicine and science. All of this was done going with the knowledge that consciousness comes from the brain, and waiting to be proven wrong. So far, its not wrong. Its a problem to map our behaviors of consciousness to the brain for sure. But that's easy and we set out with confidence that it will be solved one day. The hard problem, the problem that in all likelihood will never be solved, is an objective science that can determine the subjective experience of a consciousness.

But I think we're repeating at this point. I've noted my stance, and you've noted yours. If we disagree still at this point, I think we can both agree that's just going to be the way it is.

But the existence of 'an immaterial entity' was not the point at issue. The claim being considered was this:

It (the act of typing) is physical in some respects, but the salient point, our understanding of what is being said, the expression of intentional meaning - that is not a physical process.

What is the non-physical part? A sub-space where my consciousness resides?
— Philosophim

The interpretation of meaning. The constant, underlying, subliminal processes of 'this means that', 'this is that', 'this word has that meaning' - otherwise known as judgement. That is not a physical process. — Wayfarer

Yes, judgement is a physical process by your brain. Rocks don't do that right? Brains do. Just a cursory examination of chemistry and physics demonstrates impossibilities right before our eyes. To an ignorant mind, none of these wonders should happen. Fire is a thing of magic. Water is two gases at room temperature, yet becomes liquid when they join. Why then is it suddenly odd that brains have consciousness? There is nothing in matter and energy that notes that this cannot be. Further, there is nothing outside of matter and energy that shows this to be. The only logical conclusion is that matter and energy in the right form can create consciousness. This shouldn't be shocking or a revelation either. Its just one more magical piece of physics and chemistry.

It is a philosophical argument: that the act of rational judgement is not reducible to the physical or explainable in physical terms. — Wayfarer

That is not a philosophical argument. That is a claim of fact or science. If you state, "I believe that one day we will find that consciousness exists outside of the physical", that's philosophy. Philosophy is 'maybe', science and facts assert. And science and facts clearly assert that consciousness, as measured by behavior, is physical. If you want to claim that's false, it must be a scientific assertion, not a philosophical supposition. We can suppose the facts are wrong or incomplete, but we cannot philosophically assert that it is proven that this incompleteness indicates consciousness is not physical.

Consider what is involved in judgement - every time you make an argument, you're inferring causal relations and equivalences, saying that 'this means that....' or 'because of this, then....'. These processes inhere entirely in the relations of ideas. And evidence for that claim has already been given, which is that the same ideas can be expressed in an endless variety of physical forms whilst still retaining their meaning. — Wayfarer

I can play a song on a piano, and then play it on a harp. Does that make the song immaterial? No. The song, as played, is physical. The song as notes, are a physical record. The song as thought of, is retained through the physical brain. The expression of that song is unique in each way. It is NOT the same thing to play a song through a harp as it is through a piano. It is a different and unique physical expression which evokes similarities within one another. We construct a notation that represents sound wave frequencies, which are then played through different physical mediums for a different color of that sound wave.

Remove the physical air, and the sound does not exist. Remove the physical page and it ceases to be a record. Remove the brain that remembers it, and the music is gone forever. It does not go to a special place or is remembered in the either. Its simply gone. Can you show me where judgements go without brains? Or where judgements are made apart from brains? No. Thus the idea that our judgements and ideas are somehow not physical is merely an idea, not a confirmed reality.

Humans are metaphysical beings because they can see meaning above and beyond the sensory. They seek to understand principles and causes. — Wayfarer

That's not metaphysical, that's just another aspect of the physical. Your senses are not the same physical part of your body that processes those senses. You can have brain blindness for example. Your eyes see fine, but your brain cannot process the information. This is all physical. Many animals can take meaning above and beyond the sensory to plan. Crows for example can solve basic puzzles. Do we look at them and find anything more than neurons? No. We're simply a more advanced neuronal system that's built upon the other basic brain systems that we need to function. Do you think the lower brain which regulates your breathing and digestion is something other than physical? Your autonomous nervous system? The veins which help regulate and coax blood throughout your body? Life is full of amazing physical reactions and adaptations to different stimuli. Again, why balk at consciousness as a building upon that?

As far as the effects of drugs and inebriants on the brain, it is obvious that this is so. But it does not establish that consciousness is a product of the brain. It is still quite feasible that the brain as a central organ behaves in the sense of a receiver — Wayfarer

Taken alone, no drugs and inebrient alone determine consciousness is a product of the brain. But taken together withe years of neuroscience and study, there comes a point where its the only thing that makes sense at this time. Its not 'feasible' that the brain is simply a receiver, its 'pluasible'. Just like its plausible that all of our actions are controlled by some evil demon entity out there. 'plausiblity' is just an imaginative idea that seems like it could work in reality, yet has never been demonstrated to be true in reality. We have no evidence of the brain being a receiver to something outside of matter and energy. So its a fun idea, but fun ideas are beyond counting. An idea without anything to demonstrate it has legs in reality, is a unicorn. The idea that consciousness does not come from brains is a unicorn. It is nothing but a hope and a wish based on there being some gaps in our complete understanding of how the brain functions.

As Patterner pointed out, consciousness is not empirically observable. — NotAristotle

Subjective consciousness is not empirically observable. Behavioral consciousness is. That is the only objective way any of us will, or likely ever, know consciousness within another being.

Or perhaps to put the question more precisely: How is the brain different from non-conscious physical stuff? My answer is that it's not different and that's the mystery. — NotAristotle

The brain and neurons are very different. That, so far is where we've encountered all kinds of natural bug, animal, and human consciousness. Its not like we've ever gone up to a rock and had it behave consciously. The only reason its a mystery is you think that its impossible for consciousness to come out of physical matter and energy. Why? It clearly does. Is it some necessary desire that we want ourselves to be above physical reality? Because if you eliminate that desire, its clear as day that consciousness is physical by even a cursory glance into medicine and brain research. I just don't get the mystery or the resistance.

I understand. But that is not what the Hard Problem is. The Hard Problem is explaining how subjective experience exists at all. — Patterner

Lets break it down carefully. When you say, "How subjective experience exists at all", its important to clarify what this means. The "at all" seems to imply its more of a "Why?" then "How?" Because how subjective experience exists in a broad sense is through our physical brains. This is without question. All we're worried about is the details in how the brain generates it.

If you mean, "Why?", no one knows. Just like no one knows why anything exists. Its an unanswerable question.

I can see the why part being part of the hard problem, but not the how part. Its just like answering how water and hydrogen combine to create water. The how isn't hard. Why does water exist at all? That's hard.

Although the verbal model of the actual world already exists it may take millions of labor years to write this all down. — PL Olcott

Then it sounds like we don't have a true definition of a fictional unicorn without a lot of work. In which case, is it analytic or synthetic?

It still wouldn't be time travel. It would be recreating the past in the future. Just like recreating a natural diamond perfectly in a lab, doesn't make another natural diamond, rather it is a natural appearing lab grown diamond. — LuckyR

This. You can't go to the past. You can only recreate a setup of matter and energy that existed in the past. Once you did, it would then continue identically as it did in the past unless any specific alterations were made.

The axioms of the verbal model of the actual world stipulates that unicorns are fictional. — PL Olcott

I understand that. But what is the true definition of a fictional unicorn?

While I can’t know what the subjective experience of a given something is, it seems probable that most things don’t have any. I assume you agree with this. So we’re just trying to draw the most likely line as to consciousness. You say with some assurance that AI programs already have limited consciousness. Is there any evidence for this beyond their behaviors? A purely functionalist argument can’t resolve this, since it begs the question. — J

It all boils down to understanding how we know about consciousness today. Its not through the subjective experience of something. Its through its behavior. There is a thought experiment called a philosophical zombie that has the behavior of consciousness, yet lacks the subjective experience that we would associate with consciousness. The hard problem shows that its irrelevant. Since we cannot know the subjective experience of anything, we can only go by behavior. The subjective experience of something that behaves consciously is currently outside of our reach.

Not quite sure why the hard problem rules out denying consciousness to computers at some future date, or why you describe the hard problem as “true.” — J

Mostly because I don't give weight to what 'may' happen. Ask someone 30 years ago what they thought 2024 would be like and they wouldn't even be close. So all we have to go on is today. Today, we do not have the scientific means to experience another consciously behaving entities' subjective experience. Meaning that if we have an AI that ticks all the behaviors of consciousness, we cannot claim that it does, or does not have a subjective experience. Its impossible for us to know. Since we cannot objectively evaluate a subjective experience, all we can do to measure consciousness is through another being's behavior.

Do I think that any non-living thing can be conscious? No, I’m strongly inclined, on the evidence, to believe that consciousness is exclusively a biological property. — J

How about we reword this a bit? Can a non-biological entity have the subjective experience of a biological entity? No. They are two different physical mediums. I can play a song on a harp or a keyboard, and the fundamental experience will have an inseparable difference in physical expression. So if an AI is conscious, its subjective experience is that of a non-biological being, not a biological being.

Unicorns are fictional animals that are {horses} with {horns}. — PL Olcott

Sure. Replace all I said with actual encounters in the world with people's drawings. Is there a degree of bending we can do with a fictional creature and still keep its identity? When is a unicorn not a unicorn, especially if its a made up creature?

Life/biology is the measure and meaning of all things. — boagie

That's nice, but how does that tie into the OP?

I am merely trying to define the term {analytic truthmaker} on the basis of the conventional meaning of those two terms. I can perfectly specify exactly what is and what is not {analytic} for all those people that have made up their minds that they don't believe in the analytic / synthetic distinction. — PL Olcott

Alright, I warned you. :)

Is this statement analytic or synthetic?

"Unicorns are horses with horns on their head"

Lets say you say yes. Now imagine that I go to a ranch where a man has glued a curled goat horn on a horse and is calling it a unicorn. Of course, none of us call it a unicorn. Which means are analytic statement wasn't actually true. But maybe we can go back and fix it.

"Unicorns are horses with straight horns on their head that have grown from their body."

Later we find a horse in the wild that has the Shope papilloma virus and it has caused a straight horn to grow out of the back of its head. Since this fits our true analytic definition, its a unicorn right? Well, no. So lets go back again.

"Unicorns are horses with straight horns coming out of their center of their forehead (Does the the angle of the horn matter? What material is the horn made out of?) which is a non-cancerous growth out of their body."

As you can see, for our analytic statement to be 'true', it needs to be based off of actual sense experience. But aren't things that require us to have sense experience to confirm that they are true make it a synthetic statement?

Lets go even simpler with math. 1+1=2. That's analytic right?

Well what is a 1? How do I tell from that sentence alone what one is? Same with two? Don't I have to actually experience what a '1' is first? But if I have to experience what a '1' is, isn't that synthetic?

Its really a question about knowledge. If you're interested, I have a paper I've worked on for years here. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14044/knowledge-and-induction-within-your-self-context/p1 There's a summary from the first person besides me who posted that breaks it down perfectly. If you're interested in exploring the details from that summary, feel free to read the rest.

She was a neuroscientist involved in brain-mapping who suffered a major stroke, which resulted in her attaining an insight into what she descibed as 'Nirvāṇa' (her 'stroke of insight') due to the left hemisphere of the brain shutting down. But note that this was a first-person experience - there would have been no way for her to tell, as a neuroscientist, what that experience might be in another subject, without having undergone it. — Wayfarer

And I agree with this. We can objectively map physical processes to behavior, and even map physical processes to someone's claimed subjective experience, but we will never know what its like to be the subject experiencing. Its very similar to the thought experiment where someone reads all about an apple, but has never seen one. We can describe the apple in excruciating detail, but you won't know the experience of seeing, feeling, or tasting an apple until you actually see, feel, and taste it.

That being said, she had a physical stroke and a physical reaction to it. The inability to know what it is like to be a physical entity having an experience does not negate the fact that certain physical entities can have experiences.

Rationality is a capturing and understanding of the world that allows planning and use of that reality accurately.
— Philosophim

No, that is described in critical philosophy as the instrumentalisation of reason, although I'm guessing that won't of interest to those here. — Wayfarer

Yeah, sounds like we're getting off topic here. Maybe something to explore in another thread.

I'm questioning what you regard as obvious. What imparts that order? If you zero out the HD it is physically the same matter, it weighs the same, has all the same physical constituents, but it contains no information. The information is conveyed by the arrangement of matter. What arranges it? I mean, computers don't emerge spontaneously from the sky, they're the product of human intelligence. — Wayfarer

True. And modern day computers were built up over over a century of work at this point. Basic computers start out as a switch board, which is just a bunch of electrical gates that you turn off and on to set up results based on the combination of those on and off gates. Who would have guessed from such a simple premise we would build the modern world of information, movies, and games?

Now of course a computer did not spontaneously create itself. But we've created computers to the point that when you hook electricity to them and turn them on, they run themselves. In fact, there are whole computers that take very little, if any human input and run whole systems. In general when you send a message to the computer, you're not sending it to the hardware, but the software. That software converts and organizes your input to interface with the hardware, manipulating the gates to open and close as needed. These signals are then converted back into instructions that are passed up to display a result that is understandable to people. Its really quite magical and awe inspiring when you realize what is produced from the machine.

However, the question of who created the computer and its software does not deny that it is purely physical. AI has learning models now that garner new information and come up with new results based purely on its own failures. Here's a summary of AI and machine learning if you're interested. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4RixMPF4xis

And that is the key difference between a computer and a human. For a computer, there's nothing more the file could be. It isn't "like anything" to be a computer. But we have a different experience, which gives rise to all of the problems discussed on this thread. — J

Are you sure? That's a VERY important part of the hard problem. You can't claim to know what the subjective experience is of something. We can claim that something does not have consciousness only by its behavior. We cannot make any claims to its subjective experience. With AI we already have programs that have limited types of consciousness. We have autonomous drones that automate reactions based on information. Yes, it is not human consciousness, but it is at the very least beyond the consciousness of a bug like a roach.

You have to understand, if you accept the hard problem as true, you can NEVER state, "Computers do not have a subjective experience." You don't know. Can you be a computer processing AI algorithms? Nope. So if we create a machine and program that exhibits all the basic behaviors of consciousness, you have no idea if it has a subjective experience or not.

Incidentally, what would constitute evidence of this claim? What would you be looking for? — Wayfarer

Outstanding question. I did a summary of three points for someone else who asked the same question earlier in this thread. Of course, its not limited to that. Let me find and repaste them here.

1. Consciousness is able to exist despite a lack of physical capability to do so.

For example, move your consciousness apart from your head where it sits into the next room that you cannot currently see.

2. Demonstrate a conscious entity that has no physical or energetic correlation.

For example, prove that a completely brain dead body is conscious. Or Inebriate someone to a high blood alcohol level and demonstrate that their consciousness is completely unaffected.

3. If consciousness is not matter and/or energy, please demonstrate evidence of its existence without using a God of the Gaps approach.

An inability to pinpoint the exact physical workings of consciousness does not negate that it is physical. We understand that a car needs an engine to run like a body needs a brain to be conscious. I don't have to understand electromagnetism to understand that a car needs an engine to run, and I don't need to understand the full mechanics of how the brain works to understand you need a brain to be conscious (in humans at least).

It is because he considers only rational agents to have the sufficient freedom to obey their own representational laws as opposed to the laws of nature.

I say all minds have sufficient freedom to do it, we just don’t have the same amount each. — Bob Ross

That's fair. The only potential problem I see is how to justify eating or using animals for materials or labor. Beyond animals, there's now also the question of insects. Do they have minds? Where does a mind begin and end? If we can't treat them as solely means, then do we have a right to eat them?

Of course, this has been answered in other cultures. Jainism preaches that we should never kill animals. I suppose the FIS can note its a necessary evil, but that still leads to points of comparison. Why are animals and insects ends in themselves but clearly have less value compared to people? Its an assumption we all agree upon, but I don't know if there's a clear explanation from the FET and FIS alone.

#1 is proven by the argument for FET: if one is rational, then they cannot treat a mind as solely a means towards an end without conceding a contradiction. — Bob Ross

The only issue is that P2: Person's are ends in themselves isn't proven, its more of a given assumption. Which is fine when you're trying to prove a point. If minds are ends in themselves, then we can say x,y,z. But it all hinges on the reader accepting that a mind is an end in itself and that ends in themselves matter. For a person who already agrees or does not want to question this, it can work. This is more of an apologetics philosophy for morality then a paper of proof.

Apologetics in Christianity is an approach of the religion to the common moral person. Its target audience is a person who wants to believe in God, or has a few upper level hang ups about God. Generally apologetics make a lot of assumptions and don't worry about proving a lot of their premises, only drawing conclusions from these assumptions. I think apologetics serve a very good purpose. They get a person who doesn't need or want to think too deeply about the topic to more easily make better decisions in their lives. Same with the paper you've put here. For someone who already believes in morality and wants to be moral, its a rationale to continue to do so. Not all of us are crazy people who want to dive headlong into writing and questioning the nature of "what is" for days on end. :D

Do you agree, Philosophim, with FET and FIS? Or are you just granting them as internally coherent? — Bob Ross

I'm granting them as acceptably internally coherent. For me, its not enough to state that FET and FIS are 'the' moral theory. Its not that I don't think minds are the greatest things that can be, its the 'end in themselves' argument that isn't enough for me. Why is it important to be a end in itself? What does that even mean? (I know you've answered this, just showing my thought process) Why is it that we have value and morality at all? I'm the type of person that can accept a set of assumptions that lead to a conclusion, but then I have to question the assumptions after. I have to know Bob. And its not that I can't be moral in the meantime or hold a set of values until I find out more. It just has to go deeper.

We've been discussing the objective morality proposal in another thread, so you can see how deep this goes for me. That being said, I want to emphasize again that I find value in these topics. We have all levels of different people in life, and a theory like this could fit someone's personality to give a little justification and happiness in being moral. If it is this or being thrown into moral nihilism, its better to have this any day!

I take a much more naturalistic approach: I say nature, especially evolution, makes no leaps. It is clear to me that the vast majority of animals (although I don’t know about literally all of them) have sufficient freedom to set out a means towards their end, even if they lack the highly rational capacities we humans have. My dog clearly is not rational, but she has her moments: if the matt is wet outside, then she will wait farther back for me to let her in so that her feet don’t get wet. That’s a deliberate action sparked by her making a free choice to not get her feet wet and trying to actualize that prevention by setting out waiting farther back as a means towards that end. Anyways, I am a compatiblist when it comes to free will and don’t believe in souls. — Bob Ross

These are my thoughts as well. Kant came from an era where it was still too easy to dismiss animals as having any worth, and I believe he's a victim of that culture. I often wonder how the culture I've been raised to think in affects my own outlook, and if in a few generations from now they will look back on my thoughts as barbaric or hopelessly naive. :) Anyway, good discussion Bob! I hope Mww comes along and gives it a good read.

It's physical in some respects, but the salient point, our understanding of what is being said, the expression of intentional meaning - that is not a physical process. — Wayfarer

But where is the evidence that its not? I don't mind the declaration, but there has to be evidence. If my brain bleeds do I not have a stroke? If I'm the part of my brain that processes sight is damage, my eyes work, but I cannot see anymore. If I drink alcohol, won't my words start slurring and I start thinking that the jerk to my left is really "A schtand up guy?"

The interpretation of meaning. The constant, underlying, subliminal processes of 'this means that', 'this is that', 'this word has that meaning' - otherwise known as judgement. That is not a physical process. — Wayfarer

But we can take things that impair our judgement, and this is because these substances affect the brain. If judgement was not a physical process, then nothing physical should be able to affect the process correct? Now I could grant that perhaps there is a third non-physical component that could act with the physical brain. I can get behind the idea. But do we have any evidence of this third non-physical component? If it interacts with the physical, then we can get evidence of it.

That is why Thomist philosophy (and Christianity generally) sees the human as a compound of body and soul (or psyche). Not that the soul exists objectively, but as the animating intelligence which makes the grasp of meaning possible. — Wayfarer

Again, this is a wonderful idea. But it has no evidence. I don't mind someone stating, "Its possible this idea is true, and we may find evidence for it in the future." But until evidence is found, it can make no factual declarations of its own, only suppositions.

I can have no justification for trusting a reasoning capacity I have as a consequence of natural selection, unless I am justified in trusting it simply in itself -- that is, believing what it tells me, in virtue of the content of the arguments it delivers. — Thomas Nagel, op cit

Then Nagel misunderstands natural selection. Natural selection is merely a note that species which survive in the world to the point of procreation continue on their genes. Rationality is a capturing and understanding of the world that allows planning and use of that reality accurately. Those that are not rational do not accurately capture reality, and if this inaccuracy is too high they would not be able to handle the dangers reality throws at them.

But the recognition of logical arguments as independently valid is a precondition of the acceptability of an evolutionary story about the source of that recognition. This means that the evolutionary hypothesis is acceptable only if reason does not need its support. At most it may show why the existence of reason need not be biologically mysterious. — Thomas Nagel, op cit

Again, he's missing the point. If we evolved to survive in reality, then logic necessarily reflects reality in the most accurate way we know. It all starts with, "Assume A" Can A be not A at the same time? No. And reality matches that. Logic is not an innate thing floating around existence. Its a well proven tool to accurately evaluate our ideas in a way that intends to match reality.

That's fine, but I'm not seeing why that denies the foundational question of all 'should's' "Should there be existence or not?"

(Me) It is because the very nature of objective morality contradicts your position, unless you are contending with my outline of its nature.

(You) I already outlined it, and you dismissed it as “abstract”; but that is not a valid counter. Either objective morality is like I described or I am misunderstanding it and you have a different view of it. — Bob Ross

How does it contradict it Bob? I missed or misunderstood what you were saying then.

Sure, if that is what you mean by “foundation”, but moral judgments are made true by a state-of-affairs which exist mind-independently; and this contradicts your position that the chain of reasoning boils down to the Hamlet question because, like I said, any given moral judgment will be grounded in the morally relevant state-of-affairs that make them true, which would never be existence itself. — Bob Ross

Ok, noting that moral judgements are true, and the definition of truth, doesn't deny the point I'm making. That's just a description of what is true. The contradiction that I point out in the binary demonstrates that within the state of affairs in which we choose between there should, or should not be existence, we are left with the only logical option being, "It should exist".

and this contradicts your position that the chain of reasoning boils down to the Hamlet question because, like I said, any given moral judgment will be grounded in the morally relevant state-of-affairs that make them true, which would never be existence itself. — Bob Ross

Why is it that the state of existence can never be a moral judgement grounded in the relevant state of affairs between existence and nothing existing? I mean, we're here, and we have to make a moral judgement. The objective judgement would be the true decision between whether there should be existence or not right?

Hypotheticals are a disengagement from the discussion that will go nowhere.

This makes no sense to me. If you claim that every moral claim boils down to the Hamlet question and I explain that your assumption of objective morality entails that it boils down to a state-of-affairs (that exists mind-independently) (as per the nature of morality being objective), then I have demonstrated your claim to be false. — Bob Ross

I'm not saying that particular claim is a hypothetical, just when you were noting "If someone did x". The problem is I'm not seeing how the foundation of all true moral judgements negates the ultimate moral question of, "Should there be existence?"

So I would simply ask, "Why is this proven objectively?" Then they would need to give me a foundational reason why

That reason is that it corresponds with a state-of-affairs that exists mind-independently in reality—that’s where the foundation of the justification of the moral claim would come from, which can’t ever be existence itself: a state-of-affairs is an arrangement of existent things. — Bob Ross

And we're talking about the arrangement in which there is at least one existence, or no existence. To first speak about whether existence should be arranged a certain way we must first answer why there should be existence at all. This is the state of affairs. I'm not seeing the issue.

If morality is objective, then it is necessarily the case that “why should babies even exist?” is completely irrelevant to the truth that “one should not torture babies” as a moral fact. — Bob Ross

Why is it necessarily the case? I don't see that at all. I would think that a key building block to demonstrate why one shouldn't torture babies is that they should exist? After all, one could say, "Fine, I'll end the baby without pain then." You didn't torture a baby, but you thought it didn't deserve to exist. We're looking for the objective why behind that. We can't just claim something necessarily is known, it must be proven.

I am not arguing against moral realism, we are presupposing it. That’s what it means for morality to be objective: moral realism is true. If you don’t want to import that term, then just swap out ‘moral realism’ in my responses for ‘objective morality’: I am using them interchangeably. — Bob Ross

There's a very good reason I'm not using the term moral realism. It might not be true. At least, many of the tenants and contexts of it. When speaking about a foundation we should not be concerned where we are going. We're just concerned about noting the foundation first. If that is solid, we build from there. We might end up in moral realism, or not. We're starting super small first, so we assume nothing beyond it.

Your claim is that there is a contradiction with this, and there isn’t. I am using a hypothetical because that’s the game we are currently playing: if I grant moral is objective and reality has an objective moral judgment such that “nothing should exist”, then nothing should exist. This hypothetical invalidates your claim that “nothing should exist” results in a contradiction. I don’t need to go beyond the hypothetical to prove that. — Bob Ross

Lets take it in the reverse case. "if I grant morality is objective and reality has an objective moral judgment such that “something should exist”, then something should exist." That has the same weight and backing as your argument. Basically the hypothetical is equivalent to, "Maybe there's something objective that notes that reality should or shouldn't exist." Your hypothetical is the question Bob. This isn't an answer or counter. Its the same exact question just using different words. "Should there be existence, or shouldn't there?"

So if you believe there is an objective reason why there shouldn't be existence, you can't 'presuppose it exists'. Just like I can't presuppose there's a reason why there 'should be existence'. We're proving it. So far I've presented that its logically impossible for a reason to exist that existence should not exist. If you think this is wrong, then you must prove that there exists a reason that existence should not exist. If you can't, then we go by what we have remaining: logic.

But they're not. A sentence or a proposition is not a physical thing which is not meaningfully explicable in terms of physical laws. Language, for instance, is the subject of semiotics, linguistics, and other disciplines, but nothing within physics addresses any of that. — Wayfarer

There may be a difference in definition between what we're intending. "Physics" is one aspect of the physical world. Language is another. It is the complex interplay using vibrations through the air to communicate an idea within a brain to another brain in such a way as both brains can share a context. This can further be expressed as physical scribbles on a piece of paper, or electronic pixels on a monitor.

When you read these words, you will interpret their meaning and compose a reaction (or not). That reaction has some physical elements - like the keys you depress to type, the appearance of letters on the screen - but the core is negotiating meanings, and that is not a physical process. — Wayfarer

Of course its a physical process. You are physically typing, the physical transfer of binary information across the internet to my TV hooked up to my computer. I will read it with my physical eyes, my physical brain will process the information, and I'll type a physical reply. If I'm wrong, where am I wrong? What is the non-physical part? A sub-space where my consciousness resides? You don't blink at the idea of a computer physically processing ideas, why do you blink at a physical human brain doing that?

Even if we allow that "a physical thought" isn't question-begging (it seems so to me), we still have to explain how an idea that depends on no particular brain for its instantiation can be called physical. — J

First, the default from all the evidence we have is that thoughts are physical. There is zero evidence that they are something different from matter and energy. You only feel that way. Second, are computers not physical then? I can send a file from my computer to another. Does that mean the file isn't a set of physical 1's and zeros on my hard drive? Of course it is. Its obvious.

However, physical studies of the brain invariably fail to capture the subjective dimension of existence. In other words, this claim entirely overlooks the original point of this thread. — Wayfarer

No, I'm not contrasting what I stated earlier. I agree. It is impossible to objectively capture subjective experience.

Likewise, thought-contents, such as the meaning of propositions, can be represented in many different languages, systems, configurations of ideas, all the while retaining their meaning, — Wayfarer

And all of these are physical things. "Hi" and "Olah" both mean a greeting with the physical difference of intonation and spelling. They do not exists as some platonic form out there in a sub-space. I can translate base ten into base 2, and it exists in base 2 with its own set of particular laws. It is equivalent in many ways, but different in the physical implementation of the system.

↪Philosophim To assume that I am both conscious and just a physical thing and then to conclude that consciousness is just a physical thing would surely be begging the question. — NotAristotle

In classical rhetoric and logic, begging the question or assuming the conclusion (Latin: petītiō principiī) is an informal fallacy that occurs when an argument's premises assume the truth of the conclusion. -https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Begging_the_question

I have presented clear evidence and asked you to address one of three points that would bring some evidence for your claim that consciousness is not a physical thing. I am not begging the question, you are. If you believe it is true that consciousness is not physical, please demonstrate it.

I too think that consciousness is likely a physical (specifically, biological) phenomenon, but we're being awfully sloppy here, in our talk about what "makes" a physical thing. Consider: Is Sherlock Holmes a physical thing? Everything that could possibly be said to comprise him is physical, but what about SH himself? I find it bizarre and counter-intuitive to say that SH, and any other World 3* phenomenon, must be called physical simply because a physical system produces it. — J

Fantastic point. The definition of "What is physical" is paramount for any discussion, and can lead to disagreements of context instead of intent" I consider the physical universe to be matter and energy. Thoughts are physical, and this is backed by studies of the brain. Remove the neurons and the chemical communication; you can't have thought.

"What is Sherlock Holmes?" is a question loaded with implicit details. So we make it simple and state, "What is Sherlock Holmes as an idea?" Its a physical thought that describes a fictional brilliant detective who has some drug and anti-social issues. We have the capability as intelligent beings to create a imagined scenario within the world. Its very similar to your computer code processing things, then ultimately displaying a process on your monitor. The code can process things that could not be displayed on the TV (reality), but when it wants to display on the TV it has to follow the physical limitations of the monitor. All of it is physical.

I am talking about minds, as ‘persons’ to me is a ‘being with personhood’ which, in turns, just entails that the being ‘has a mind’. I did re-google of the term ‘person’ and it seems to exclusively tend to pertain to humans, so I will rewrite the argument with ‘mind’ instead of ‘person’ to more clearly convey the point. — Bob Ross

Seems fine to me. Since this is based off of Kant, it might help to contrast your reasoning with why Kant chose rational minds. I explored Kant years ago and do not remember much at this point.

So, I got rid of that ‘value’ language in the argument because I don’t think it really matters. If you can’t treat an end as merely a means, then it doesn’t matter if you find it invaluable or not: you will treat it as though it is anyways.

So the argument is just FET, which is just that one cannot use a mind as solely a means towards an end but also must treat it simultaneously as an end in itself; and this is demonstrated in the (new) proof by teasing out a contradiction. — Bob Ross

This is also fine. You're taking Kant's stance with a change in detail about minds. Its well documented enough you don't have to go into the justification of the FET unless someone has a problem with Kant.

Can we justify killing an animal to eat it and survive if they are a means to us and an end to themself? If ends to themselves are invaluable, how do we justify killing and eating cows over killing and eating other humans?

This is also addressed in the OP: my answer is yes if it is for the reason of nourishment, not things like taste. I can go through the argument if you would like for why that would be the case. This is another distinguishing factor between me and Kant. — Bob Ross

I think this fits in fine with the FIS. The FIS nicely follows if the FES holds up. Also, an animal is not a person. So no need to go into any more detail for me. :)

The problem with removing value entirely is that questions of relative sacrifice no longer have any justification.
— Bob Ross

If one is really taking FET seriously, then even in situations where they must violate it they should still be considering FIS which is a pragmatic formula that is centered around sanctity of minds, and it is a simple question: what action can I perform that would progress best towards a world with maximal sovereignty of minds (persons)? — Bob Ross

I think this solves the majority of the issues I mentioned. Any mind which took away sovereignty from other minds would be less valuable in a relative forced moral decision.

Anytime we run into a case that conflicts with what most people would innately feel is a simple moral choice and conclusion, the theory needs to clearly and persuasively explain why we should logically dismiss that conclusion.

I don’t think we should dismiss that conclusion at all. — Bob Ross

Sorry, I should have been more clear. Only if your moral decision contrasts with the general expected outcome, then one should explain why the theory necessitates the dismissal of the general expected outcome. I agree that if the proposed moral theory coincides with the expected outcome, its great to walk through it.

I don’t understand the first question, but my answer to the second is that they would be violating FET if they did all else being equal. If it is a moral antinomy, then they may be right depending on the facts in relation to FIS (in principle); but I would intuit that we would be regressing my removing human beings inalienable rights, so I would say in the case of humans we are best off (for the sake of getting to a maximal sovereignty state) to keep rights inalienable. — Bob Ross

Basically I was asking how do we tell a person who rationally justifies murdering another person that they're wrong? As to your second point, the problem really comes into play with justifying the FET's fundamental point that minds are ends in themselves. Why is this necessarily so? How do you demonstrate that a person who rationally justifies that they don't care about ends to themselves and thus don't care about how minds are treated?

So I think this is in a lot better place, I just noted two questions to consider.

1. Can you prove that any of us should care about people as ends in themselves?
2. Can you make a clear contrast with how Kant determines its rational beings to consider in the FET with your line of reasoning that it should be minds?

Other then that, I think its just Kant stuff, and I'm sure a Kantian will come along and be able to provide more feedback. Nicely done Bob!

I am saying that one could decide that they should do something without any reason to do it. — Bob Ross

The reason they decide they should do something then is because they want to. Which is fine. That would be a subjective morality. 'Should' means there is a consideration between at least two options. When you say, "I should choose A' you implicitly mean, "I should not choose B". If there is no option, there is no should, and there is no morality.

I'm not stating that one has to use the objective morality I'm proposing. I'm just noting that if there is an objective morality, this is what it must logically be. Just because a tool exists, doesn't mean you have to use it.

My point is not that Platonism is true, my point is that moral facts are true in virtue of them corresponding to a state-of-affairs that exist mind-independently — Bob Ross

That's fine, but I'm not seeing why that denies the foundational question of all 'should's' "Should there be existence or not?"

And this I think is the true disagreement: the chain of reasoning ends once sufficient reasons are provided for justifying the claim, not when one gets to a foundation. — Bob Ross

That's the definition of a foundation Bob. When there are no more questions and reasons to be given, you have a foundation. That must be proved.

“one ought not torture babies” is that there is a mind-independently existing state-of-affairs which makes that sentence true. Therefore, if they demonstrate sufficiently that there is such a state-of-affairs, then thereby the statement is true and that is the end of the reasoning and justification for that claim. — Bob Ross

Again, this is all abstract. You keep presenting, "But if they demonstrate sufficiently..." as an argument against what I'm noting. Prove it. Hypotheticals are a disengagement from the discussion that will go nowhere. Give me the justified state of affairs that answers questions all the way to the foundation why one "ought not to torture babies," without demonstrating why we don't need to answer the question of why babies should exist in the first place. You can say, "I can't prove it at this time, so I'll go with what you have for now. It doesn't mean I like it though." That's fine. But if you don't have something concrete, let it go so we can move onto more important parts.

There’s no need to ask “but should I exist?”. As a moral realist would put by denoting sentences in quotes vs. states-of-affairs in non-quotes, if one ought not torture babies, then “one ought not torture babies”. — Bob Ross

But we're talking about objective morality. So I would simply ask, "Why is this proven objectively?" Then they would need to give me a foundational reason why. If I asked, "Why should babies even exist? If they don't exist, they can't be tortured." what would be the answer? You cannot give a subjective answer to a question about objective morality. If we're talking with the assumption that an objective morality exists to find what it would necessarily have to be, you must give me an objective answer. We are not debating at this moment whether there is objective morality. Subjective morality is not in the in the discussion. Within the chain of 'should's' when examining an objective morality, indicate to me why objectively it cannot boil down to the fundamental question I've noted.

Yeah, I see what you mean, but that has nothing to do with any chain of reasoning, from a moral realists’ perspective, for why one ought to do anything. — Bob Ross

We're not talking about moral realism. We're talking about the logical conclusions one has to reach if an objective morality exists.

I get that you are conveying that we can ask further morally loaded questions beyond “should I torture babies?” and if they are more fundamental than “should I torture babies?” and they conflict, then we would presumably go with the more fundamental one. — Bob Ross

Not quite. The fundamental answer to, "Why should humans exist?" Doesn't on its own explain why we should help someone who's sick. But that answer is part of the necessary building blocks to objectively build up to the final question. So lets say someone gave an answer why you shouldn't torture babies, but that answer conflicted with why people should exist. Yes, that particular answer would be contradicted. It doesn't mean that there isn't an answer to why we shouldn't torture babies, its just that answer must not contradict the fundamental answer to why babies should exist.

So if ‘I shouldn’t exist’ is true and ‘I should go stop that person from torturing babies’, then perhaps I would just kill myself instead of stopping them; and you seem to be just trying to ask “what’s the most fundamental question of morality?” and concluding: “it is to be or not to be”. Is that what you are saying? — Bob Ross

No, its more like the question about torturing babies is algebra, but we haven't analyzed the nature of what the number 1 is yet. When talking about morality without the fundamentals, we're students being taught advanced math without understanding the why behind it. The point is to find the fundamental. The fundamental in itself will not lead to the answer in algebra, but it will lead to why we do algebra and give us an understanding of why the question is right, not just because we followed a series of instructions we did not fully understand.

So it seems like you are presupposing that there must exist something, which is implied by morality being objective — Bob Ross

Not quite. I am noting that there if there is an objective morality, there is a fundamental 'should' of what should be. There are two options. Either existence should not be, or it should be. The contradiction comes in when I claim that the should, is that existence should not be. But if I claim, "Existence should not be," then the existence of, "Existence should not be," should not be. Meaning all we are logically left with is, "Existence should be".

If I am even remotely close here to the argument, then I would say that the flaw is that the current reality is what dictates what is objectively wrong, and so if there was a state-of-affairs such that there should be nothing, then “there should be nothing” would be true and there would be no contradiction. — Bob Ross

I don't understand what you mean by 'current reality'. There is either existence, or there is not. The question is should there be existence, or should there not. To say something should, is to have a reason why A is preferable to B.

You note here, "...if there was a state-of-affairs such that..." This is a hypothetical again. No if. Is there, or is there not a state of affairs in which there should be nothing? Remember, we're at the last question. Its do or die! What I show is that if we choose, "There should not be" it leads to a contradiction in which the only remaining option is that there should be existence.

Because, again, consciousness is not a physical thing. I am happy to grant that, physically speaking, there are entire organisms, there are atoms, there are neurons and brains, etc. But where in the physical world is consciousness? Answer: it's not there, it is nowhere to be found in the physical world. — NotAristotle

Of course its a physical thing. You're conscious right? Are you a physical thing? I honestly find it bizarre that people think otherwise, and I don't quite understand it. The water analogy is EXACTLY the same thing. You not wanting to believe it does not deny the three points I wrote. Answer at least one of those and you have a point. Otherwise, its just a wish or desire, not a fact.

I think the hard problem is not answering why consciousness is a physical manifestation, but why a physical manifestation should result in consciousness. — NotAristotle

Written this way, I can accept that as well. For example, why does oxygen and hydrogen make water? Why is there existence at all? These are hard problems that may not have an answer besides, "It just does."

The consciousness cannot be accounted for in physical terms because consciousness is not a physical thing. — NotAristotle

Your former point does not lead to the later. That would be like me saying that water is not a physical thing because I don't understand why the combination of hydrogen and oxygen make it happen. That's ridiculous. Consciousness is clearly a physical thing. Please show me an example of consciousness that can arise without any matter or energy involved. Here are some examples that could work.

1. Consciousness able to exist despite a lack of physical capability to do so.

For example, move your consciousness apart from your head where it sits into the next room that you cannot currently see. I am unable to do so.

2. Demonstrate a conscious entity that has no physical or energetic correlation.

For example, prove that a completely brain dead body is conscious. Or Inebriate someone to a high blood alcohol level and demonstrate that their consciousness is completely unaffected.

3. If consciousness is not matter and/or energy, please demonstrate evidence of its existence without using a God of the Gaps approach.

An inability to pinpoint the exact physical workings of consciousness does not negate that it is physical. We understand that a car needs an engine to run like a body needs a brain to be conscious. I don't have to understand electromagnetism to understand that a car needs an engine to run, and I don't need to understand the full mechanics of how the brain works to understand you need a brain to be conscious (in humans at least).

Our inability to understand how an engine works or how a brain works does not give us justification to claim, "A car or a brain running is not physical".

What I meant is that without defining what a non-simulated world is
— Philosophim

But I just did this? A world is a set of objects in a space. The question is whether it emerges from information processing or not. — Hallucinogen

My apologies then, I misunderstood or misread your intentions. I'll give it another read.

1. Any simulation of a world either operates mechanically in physical space (e.g., in a computer) or is the result of information processing in a mind (e.g., a programmer’s mind). — Hallucinogen

A non-simulated world is a set of objects in space. But if that's the case, then a simulated world is not a set of objects in space. Seems clear. But premise one doesn't address this. It notes that a simulation runs in either a non-simulated world, or a mind. These really aren't separate issues though. A mind is not itself a simulation right? Meaning that it is a non-simulated bit of reality that simulations can run in. Is this what you intended, or did you intend for minds to be simulations themselves?

2. The success of digital physics and the holographic principle imply that physical space is an emergent 3D representation of information processing. — Hallucinogen

It doesn't imply that the world is not a set of objects in space however. The simulations we run result in simulated outcomes. An accurate simulation of a non-simulated world can be applied to a non-simulated world without difficulty. I can simulate what will happen to an apple if I drop it using equations, then actually drop the apple. If the simulation is accurate, the apple will drop within a small margin of error of the simulation. That doesn't mean the world is simulated, it just means that simulation of the actual world is accurate. This same point applies to point 3.

4. From (2) and (3), the information processing from which physical space is emergent is scientifically indistinguishable from the information processing that occurs in a mind. — Hallucinogen

All that we can conclude from this is that our simulations of the world accurately reflect how our minds function. I suppose it really depends on your definition of mind. Are minds part of a non-simulated world, or are minds simulated themselves?

5. Restating (1) in terms of (4), our world is either scientifically indistinguishable from the result of information processing in a mind, or it is the result of information processing in a mind. — Hallucinogen

I'll repeat what I noted earlier. The only way you can validly claim 4 is based on one is to state, "A simulated world is either..." Because that's what you stated in 1. An accurate simulation of a world will accurately portray how the non-simulated world functions. There has to be something non-simulated to simulate right? Otherwise there isn't a non-simulated world, and thus the simulation cannot be accurate or inaccurate, it just is. But if it is an accurate simulation, it is not indistinguishible because it lacks the key property that you defined a non-simulated world as being: A set of objects in space. If a simulated world is a set of objects in space, then it is not a simulated world.

I hope this better reflects what you were trying to state. Please correct me where I've misinterpreted the issue.

My advice is to drop the terminology entirely. Some words and concepts become so overloaded by debate, nitpicks, and lack of consensus that they're impossible to make head roads with and become worthless in discussion. You can convey your ideas that you want in an argument without using the terminology, so that's what I would do.

I am noting that one could, which is what I thought your claim was: are you just saying that the word explodes into triviality if we do? Because I agree with that. — Bob Ross

One can do anything. But should they? Once again though, we're really not talking about what a person can or should do yet. We're talking about the simple question of whether there should be existence or not.

If there is no objective morality, then there is no 'should' for anything. If there is, then there must exist a 'should'. The assumption here is that there is an objective morality, because we're trying to work out what that would entail if there was. After all, we can't argue for or against an objective morality if we don't know what it would actually be first.

But this isn’t relevant to your claim: it was that all chains of reasoning biol down to “to be or not to be?”, which is clearly false if the chain of reasoning about “should I torture babies?” bottoms out at a platonic form. — Bob Ross

Can you prove that it is?

I understand, but your argument claimed in one of its points that all chains of reasoning go back to “to be or not to be?”, but if “one should help the sick” is true then it would follow from that that “one should exist” which means that the former is more foundational in this example than the latter (morally: obviously not ontologically). — Bob Ross

You're making an abstract thought experiment into a concrete proof. Unless you can prove that Platonism is the end all be all foundation of what should be, this is not a valid point. If you believe that all questions of 'should' do not boil down to the question of whether existence should be or not, please put forward a proof, not a "But what if".

Sure, you can then start a new chain of reasoning by questioning why that platonic form should exist, but this example violates your claim, no? — Bob Ross

If I can continue to ask why should Platonic forms exist, and that reason lies beyond Platonic forms, that is the continuation of the chain, not a new chain. A chain only ends when you arrive at a foundation. A foundation has no prior explanation for its being, it simply exists. When you find a foundation in the line of 'should' questioning, there will be no prior reason to its foundation.

I understand, but your argument claimed in one of its points that all chains of reasoning go back to “to be or not to be?”, but if “one should help the sick” is true then it would follow from that that “one should exist” which means that the former is more foundational in this example than the latter (morally: obviously not ontologically). — Bob Ross

This is the intention I'm trying to convey. If "One should help the sick, one should exist." "Well why should the sick be helped?" Because they should live. "Why should a person live?" And to answer that you must answer the question of, "Why should anything live?" And to answer that you must answer the question of "Why should anything exist?" You're looking up higher for the answers to the questions of why a castle should be built a certain way without first asking the question of why a castle should be built at all.

You said that “there should be nothing” entails a contradiction, and you presented that ABC argument for it; and I was noting that your argument did not succeed in demonstrating a logical contradiction in positing “there should be nothing”. — Bob Ross

I did not read that from your initial post as you seemed to agree with the propositions and conclusion I had put forward. I'll go back to it again.

A. There exists a reason that nothing should exist.
B. If that is the case, then the reason that nothing should exist, should not exist.
Therefore, there should not exist a reason that justifies non-existence.

There’s no logical contradiction in that syllogism, and I wholly agree with its form. — Bob Ross

You may have forgotten the assumption that we're currently making. That is that an objective morality exists. This means that there is some foundation for 'should'.

After noting point A as a proposition, we go to B. So if it is the case that nothing should exist, it requires that there be a reason that exists. The reason that exists is, "Nothing should exist". If it is the case that nothing should exist, then the reason, "Nothing should exist" should not exist. Thus the conclusion. It is a contradiction for there exist the reason, "Nothing should exist". For if the reason is to exist, there should must be existence.

Since we are assuming that there is an objective existence and that there is a 'should', this leaves us with the only other option in our binary, that existence should be. I hope that clears it up Bob.

Thanks for the answers Bob! I think you tightened up the argument a bit, I'll point out the remaining issues I see.

That’s fair. It opens up the discussion back to metaethics; but I just wanted to make it clear that this theory was building off of the previous one, so one has to subjectively affirm ‘one ought to be rational’—there is not moral fact which makes it so. — Bob Ross

I understand from your point of view, but for the reader, its not relevant what your argument is here. I've found philosophical arguments can, and must, be treated as 'chunks'. Partly this helps keep focus on what is important to the current argument. The idea, "People ought to be rational" is really the only part we need to know to examine the argument you've presented here. Whether that conclusion is subjective or objective is irrelevant and can distract from the point you want to make.

You've probably seen me do this multiple times in our discussions. You'll be talking about something farther down the line of the argument I'm making, or questioning things that are not yet relevant to the argument at hand. When that happens, I try to bring you back to the chunk we're on first. First let people see the argument you want to discuss, not the one you don't want to discuss yet. If your argument works, then you can go back and address whether "We ought to be rational" is subjective or objective.

This lets us 'chunk' the discussions into manageable bits. When you bring in another pre-chunk, you'll find people will ignore the main point you're trying to make here and drag in, "Well why should we be rational?" That's not the point here. I only say this from the bruises I have from my own experience. =)

Persons are ends in themselves because they have the capacity to set out means towards ultimately themselves as the end; thusly, they are ends in themselves. — Bob Ross

I could agree with you if you stated minds, which would include insects, animals, and potentially plants. From animals at least we have clear evidence that animals such as crows and dogs for example, can have ends in mind that they set out towards. I think this is in line with what you want to say, but correct me if I'm wrong here.

If you don’t believe that persons are ends in themselves, then, of course, the conclusion will not follow. — Bob Ross

Ok, I am more than willing to state that minds are beings that can plan means for ends in themselves and see where this goes. After all, a rock has no plan for its own ends; it simply exists.

Firstly, I would just like to note again that I am not arguing that only rational agents have value, because I don not consider all minds to even have the capacity to be rational (in any meaningful sense); or, if they do, it is a stretch. — Bob Ross

I thought that was what you were going for, I just couldn't see how that fit at the time.

Finally, the term 'invaluable' means that it has so much value, it cannot be quantified into one number. It doesn't mean it has no value at all.

That’s fair. I just mean by “we can’t value it” that we cannot put a price on it. — Bob Ross

If that's your intent, all good. The only problem in the theory is proving why minds are invaluable. I happen to agree that minds are the highest values in existence, but for the theory to hold you'll need to prove why minds, even irrational ones, are priced right out of quantification.

That’s fair, and this is why I revised the argument. Hopefully it is a bit clearer now what it is arguing. — Bob Ross

I think it is now.

I am trying to convey that persons are ends in themselves because their nature is such that they are the creators of values (they set out things as means towards their own ends, making them the end ultimately); and if we treat them solely as a means towards an end then we are implicitly conceding the contradiction that they are and are not an end in themselves. So if we are to be rational, then we cannot solely treat someone as means towards an end, but always simultaneously an end in themselves—hence FET. — Bob Ross

Ok, I think this is more clear to me now. There are a few things to tackle to separate yourself from Kant.

1. Minds vs persons. If you want to apply it to all minds, you'll need to place the emphasis on minds instead of persons. As I mentioned earlier, this at the very least means animals. Can we justify killing an animal to eat it and survive if they are a means to us and an end to themself? If ends to themselves are invaluable, how do we justify killing and eating cows over killing and eating other humans?

2. The problem with removing value entirely is that questions of relative sacrifice no longer have any justification. Beyond the animal question, consider this. We have a room with 3 people. An unapologetic murderer, an unapologetic saint, and a regular person. They all must choose one of them to die for the other 2 to live. Currently, your theory has no means of stating that the murderer should be the one to die. Anytime we run into a case that conflicts with what most people would innately feel is a simple moral choice and conclusion, the theory needs to clearly and persuasively explain why we should logically dismiss that conclusion.

3. How do we treat minds that believe the best end to itself, is to end other ends in themselves? Or believes it is rational that the worth of other minds can be quantified as less than its own mind? What I'm noting is that your claim that minds are invaluable is not proven, only claimed. Anytime we claim something without proof, we must immediately realize that someone can claim the opposite to our claim and be just as justified as we are. That makes the argument an opinion, and not an airtight rationale.

Finally, after fully establishing how it minds and not persons that this theory applies to, I would study the general criticisms that people lobby against Kant and see if an how your theory answers or dodges those criticisms.

The bet you referred to, as I understood it, was about the Easy problem.
— Philosophim

Not so. The byline of the article you cite says 'Christof Koch wagered David Chalmers 25 years ago that researchers would learn how the brain achieves consciousness by now.' The bet was lost. — Wayfarer

As I noted, I was a bit uncertain as to my claim. Thank you for the correction.

the neuroscientist believed they would have a neuronal explanation of what causes consciousness. This is the easy problem.
— Philosophim

No, it's not. That is just the problem that hasn't been solved. Again, look at the reference I provided upthread on the neural binding problen. — Wayfarer

Fantastic article, thank you for the reference! They noted there was nothing in the visual part of the brain that could map to a very specific subjective experience of consciousness, namely why we see things in high resolution. This is not the same as not finding neuronal mapping to all subjective experiences.

"There is now overwhelming biological and behavioral evidence that the brain contains no stable, high-resolution, full field representation of a visual scene, even though that is what we subjectively experience (Martinez-Conde et al. 2008). The structure of the primate visual system has been mapped in detail (Kaas and Collins 2003) and there is no area that could encode this detailed information. "

Reading this carefully, there are a few things to note. First, he can say that there is currently no area in the visual system that has been found to encode this detailed information from a book written in 2003. That is true, but not the hard problem. I also did not find a valid reference to his second claim from Martinez-Conde. I looked at his article and found this in the available abstract (I could not find the full article):

"Because all of our visual experience occurs in conjunction with eye movements, understanding their perceptual and physiological effects is critical to understanding vision in general. Moreover, the neural mechanisms underlying perceptual suppression during eye movements may be very important towards narrowing down the neural bases of visual awareness."

"Recent developments have led to new insights through a combination of behavioral, psychophysical, computational and neurophysiological research carried out under conditions that increasingly approach the complex conditions of the natural retinal environment. Among these, fixational eye movement studies comprise a promising and fast-moving field of research. This special issue of Journal of Vision offers a broad compilation of recent discoveries concerning the perceptual consequences of eye movements in vision, as well as the mechanisms responsible for producing stable perception from unstable oculomotor behavior. "

So I'm having a difficult time finding out how the author of the primary article can validly claim his conclusions. I still see the idea of mapping neuronal states to consciousness as the easy problem while being able to scientifically objectify the subjective state of consciousness as the easy problem.

I don't think that there is as strong a correlation as you're claiming. Certainly all of those influences affect the brain, and the state of the brain then affects the nature of conscious experience. But that doesn't amount to proving that consciousness is physical, as it's still not clear what consciousness actually is, other than it is something that, for organisms such as ourselves, requires a functioning brain in order to interact with the sensory domain. — Wayfarer

You and I have touched on this a bit in the past, and I'll refrain from going over them again. To sum, its a difference in approach towards knowledge that you and I take. I'm actually very open to there being alternative reasons for consciousness besides the brain. The thing is, I need evidence. Currently I have found no evidence that provides any indication of consciousness, in humans, without the brain. What would consciousness be if not matter and energy from a neuronal system? Without something concrete to examine, we have an unfalsifiable God of the Gaps consciousness, which I am not interested in. Do we need people like yourself who keep looking for some other evidence of consciousness besides the brain while science grapples with its problems? Absolutely. But until the day something is found, what we can safely claim knowledge to is that consciousness is caused by the brain.

There are also many hugely anomalous cases of subjects with grossly abnormal brains who seem to be able to function (see Man with tiny brain shocks doctors). — Wayfarer

He functions with an IQ of 84. That's the 'normal range' but hardly normal or Einstein. There are brains besides animals that are much smaller than ours, but still conscious. Show me a man without a brain who is conscious and you'll have something.

There is the case of psycho-somatic medicine and the placebo effect, wherein subjects beliefs and emotional states have physical consequences. They can be regarded as being 'top-down causation', in that the effects of beliefs and mental states operate 'downward' on the physical brain. — Wayfarer

Right, but where do beliefs and emotional states come from? The brain. The brain affecting the brain is a well known event. Show me something entirely outside of the physical realm that affects consciousness, and that will be something.

And finally the claim that 'consciousness is physical' is the very subject of the entire argument, and your claims in this regard still suggest, to me at least, that you're not seeing the point of the argument. — Wayfarer

No, the point of the argument is the hard problem. The hard problem has never claimed that consciousness is not physical, if we are regarding physical as matter and energy. Matter and energy has the capability to be conscious if organized right, just like water and hydrogen has the capability to be water if organized right. That's the point of the easy problem, to show that yes, they understand that consciousness is a physical manifestation of the brain. But will we ever be able to map consciousness objectively to what it is like to subjectively be conscious? That seems impossible.