No objection there. :D I had considered the very same thing before hitting the post button.

Most people do not understand that the English description of quantum mechanics is not the same as the mathematic description of quantum mechanics. Unless you are a scientist yourself and have a fundamental understanding of the math, and what this really means, you really have no business using it in any philosophy.

In sum, quantum mechanics is a math based on limitations in measurements and probability. As you noted a "field" or "wave" is a mathematical entity that is often confused with a physical reality. Its a metaphor in English. When examining the ocean, we don't calculate every single molecule of water. Its unnecessary. Does that mean that ocean waves are not made up of molecules? No. But for what we're calculating, its easier. This is the same thing as measuring light as a wave vs as a particle. For some experiments and circumstances, its better to calculate light as particles than waves. Are waves of life comprised of particles? Of course. But in those circumstances in math, its just better to calculate it as a wave.

If fundamental entities are morally relevant to calculations, then one must have knowledge of the specific ones at play within the context being morally evaluated; or if fundamental entities are not morally relevant to the calculations, then they are useless for making moral calculations. — Bob Ross

The later is true. Fundamental material reality cannot be created by us, so its not like we can create more. As such, all the pieces are in play outside of our control. It is more how those fundamental pieces express themselves that is important. You must have a fundamental to express, but we already have all of those and in current theories of science, they cannot be created or destroyed (at least by us).

In discussing with you and realizing I've been dong staging without thinking about it, my real approach should be to use the fundamental as an example, but then introduce staging to demonstrate how we can evaluate starter points, or origins of calculations depending on our needs.

To be charitable, I think what you are trying to convey is that what is morally relevant for moral calculations is expressions of fundamental entities but not the fundamental entities themselves. In other words, moral calculations are always about expressions, and not fundamental entities. If this is the case, then we are in agreement; and you have chosen the second line of thinking (above)(i.e., that they are useless themselves for moral calculations, since you need to know nothing about them to make the calculations). — Bob Ross

Your are correct Bob! Well said.

It is not at all clear to me within a ‘staging’ (i.e., a context) that calculating, for example, it in terms of molecules is better than calculating in terms of atoms; and it seems like which one a person chooses will have a huge impact on the results of those calculations. — Bob Ross

Context, scope, rounding, etc. are the only ways we are able to process the world in quantities. If you've ever had to calculate chemical compounds in a beaker you use moles for molecules. But if its factory processing you may be combining kiloliters where moles are a non-factor. Calculus does not evaluate infinity, it evaluates "the limit" in which an infinite calculation will always get smaller as time goes on but never pass a particular number. Even when stating, "I have three peppermints in front of me", each peppermint is not identical in size, weight, taste, or shape at when measured in detail. But its not needed depending on what we're doing.

And to measure morality, or existence, we need to follow the same pattern of manageability. Now, if the theory works at a general level, could someone sit down and measure the exact total existence of a particular combinatorial setup? Sure. Would that take a lot of time and math? Yes. We have to find a way to walk before we can run. Debating whether an exact chemical makeup is more moral than another in a very narrow and particular scope is only worth it as a stepping stone to patterns and higher moral issues. Is it worth pursing in some scenarios? Maybe. But for us in the nascent building of a theory? No.

We're primarily concerned about creating a blueprint for a way to take the idea "Existence should be," and find a way to reasonably measure and rationally demonstrate "This scenario in this context seems more moral than the other scenario." It should fit our general sensibilities of morality without compromising its core tenants, and if it does contradict them, it should be able to rationally demonstrate why. But, to establish patterns and a methodology at the level of humanity, we have to establish patterns and a methodology at the base existential level first. We are doing a bottom up approach, not a top down. This is where this differs from every other moral proposal that I know of currently.

This unique approach is why its also difficult to have discussions with other people on this as such a formulative level. People have a top down approach ingrained in them. Changing this thought process is difficult, and people generally shy away from difficult thinking. Not you though Bob, for which I am happy. :)

So, if I were to summarize the theory in a more palatable way at this point, I would write something like this to a person first thinking about the idea.

1. Material existence is the building block of existence. How they interact in relation to other existences is an expression, or how it exists. The addition of all possible expressions is potential existence. This is the sum total of any one fundamental existence.

2. I would then demonstrate the fundamental combination using Aristotelian atoms. I still think this is a good and relatable introduction, feel free to disagree if you think its not.

3. I would then explain how the creation of new identities acts like a new fundamental existence with its own expressions of existence which come about only in combination. These fundamental existences create new actual and potential expressions that their parts alone cannot do.

4. We establish the pattern that creating new fundamental identities results in more existence than base material 'bumping' and existing in isolation alone. We establish the pattern that the ability to combine and uncombine creates more potential existence than only combining into one big thing.

5. At that point we go one level higher into chemical reactions. Demonstrate that this changes the scope. When we're at the chemical reaction layer, the calculation of other atoms is not as much of a concentration of existence as the molecules. Thus we can start to establish staging, or steps of fundamental identities as contextual focus.

6. Demonstrate that life is a series of self-sustaining chemical reactions. Chemical reactions eventually burn out with the material there, but life seeks out its own homeostasis. In theory, effective life will extend its chemical reactions indefinitely which, molecule for molecule, will outlast any regular chemical reactions that are destined to burn out. This elevates life's existence into a whole other section of staging.

7. Finally introduce how intelligent life creates the most potential and actual expressions of existence out of individual lives, and introduce societies. At this point, we have the established building blocks and general patterns of existence to apply to the scope of humanity and society.

Implicit in my notion of identities is grouping. Every atom, even of the same element is different from another atom in some very small way. But I can't very well be looking over the minute individual make up, where each proton and neutron is located as well as the exact place of each electron in orbit can I? And for general discussion and physics, we don't. Hydrogen atoms in a general sense work a particular way. This is a change of staging. There is a limit down that we go in each stating to make calculations when we're talking about atoms in particular.

That’s why I went with pieces of paper, but you resorted to a much harder, smaller entity to calculate—namely, molecules. — Bob Ross

That is to make sure the scope did not involve the implicit human use for paper. That's what has you. You have to get rid of that to ensure we're on the very particular scope of, "Should the same type of molecules clumped into a group be divided? Does this create more existence?" That's just molecular separation, no more. If you want to talk about the scope of humanity, a question of molecular separation is completely out of scope. At that point its a much greater existence calculation as to what the person is doing, then the molecules themselves.

This becomes a new foundation, though not a material foundation, but a foundational identity. Now that I've worked through it, perhaps it needs to be pointed out with some name. So: Material foundation, expressions, material foundation combinations into new identities, and these new identities follow the pattern of material foundation by being foundational identities.

By ‘foundational identity’, are you referring here to just the smallest ‘building block’ one is willing to consider within the context? Otherwise, I didn’t really follow this part: a foundational entity is a material entity under your previous definitions. — Bob Ross

Yes, using a 'foundational identity' is a poor choice of words. I think a 'scope's origin', 'staging origin' etc. would be a much better way to describe it. I wanted to use a calculation of the foundation to establish a pattern of scope and origin, so these are much better words that describe what we're doing here. What do you think?

I'm not really favoring the molecules over the paper.

Yes, you absolutely are! You refuse to calculate it with pieces of paper; instead, you insist on using molecules. If you used pieces of paper, then my conclusion would inevitably follow. — Bob Ross

I'll clarify. If you had 10 sheets of equal sized paper, and you were wondering whether to destroy one sheet or add one sheet to it, that's a different scope. When you divide a sheet of paper in two, you are simply doing molecular separation. Same as if we could merge all ten sheets of paper into 1 large sheet. That's molecular bonding. And as noted, its the combination and separation of molecules at this scope.

All the things we can do with paper are out of the scope. "Paper" can simply be replaced with "Abstract molecule combination and bond breaking." We can replace "paper" with "water" for example as well. The separation and recombination of molecules in general is part of the potential expressions of existence, and should be allowed. When you split a piece of paper into two, what you're doing is dividing the molecular bonds in two. Meaning that now we have 20 molecules separated from 20 molecules where there used to be 40 bonded together. Taken alone in this scope, this is in essence the only meaning to "drop of water" or "piece of paper". Its basically, "Splitting the joining of the same types of molecules into different locations". A 40 bonded entity is not the same as two 20 bonded entities, but you seem to intend that a paper cut in half is the same identity of 'paper' as when its 40 molecules bonded together. They are not.

Hope that answers some points Bob!

I think that, when the dust settles, goodness does boil down to the two categories described in the OP. I think the 'highly contextual' aspect you are noting is really just due to people's hazy notions of what is good, and what goodness is, rather than a property of goodness itself. — Bob Ross

Fair enough, just my feedback. :)

I think the problem you might be running into here Bob is the fact that "good" is a broad word that is highly contextual. Its kind of like debating "tree". Good has multiple contextual meanings like: Happy, positive, perfection, not bad, moral connotations, etc. Perhaps a better focus to the thread would be harmony and unity. How are harmony and unity moral goals, and what is the difference between the ideal and real for example.

Agreed, nothing cannot create anything. Nothing is nothing. It is not a 'thing'. There is a question of whether something can be uncaused, a topic I cover here if you're interested. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/12098/a-first-cause-is-logically-necessary/p1

Firstly, we have no knowledge of fundamental entities; and stipulating something which is clearly not a fundamental entity, such as an atom, can help clarify what you would do to make moral calculations ideally but does not clarify how you are making the calculation in actuality. — Bob Ross

First, it is unnecessary to know specifically what a fundamental entity is, only that it is. Second, we know that fundamental entities must combine to make something more. Numbers are merely representatives of entities. Third, the existence of fundamentals is mostly as a concept to contrast with expression. To understand that molecules may form and break apart but atoms may remain.

We're more concerned with establishing a pattern of basic math in existence then ascertaining what any one particular fundamental is. This is a math of estimation and generality, not scientific precision. The idea is to see if a math of generality and estimation can result in overall patterns that are helpful, fit within our intuitions about morality while adding greater understanding. If it doesn't, then there should be a good reason why. As well, since this is exploratory and the first foray into this, I don't have all the answers. The question is whether the brain storming and propositions have something to them worth exploring, or are they completely off base? So it is good that you're coming up with examples, but understand that from my viewpoint, some have been incomplete.

To be honest, my understanding so far is that you are not using, in actuality (as opposed to ideally), fundamentaly entities to arrive at these general patterns because, by you own admission, you can’t. So, then, you are only using expression and potential entities—and, consequently, fundamental entities are useless for moral calculation in actuality. — Bob Ross

Fundamental entities are used for the initial understanding of the patterns and staging. What is staging? Its what I'm calling the reasonable scope of identities for a general calculation of existence. I touched on this last time to warrant its own word. Staging is the idea of setting up a scope of what is morally being calculated to simplify the situation for general moral inquiry.

Recall last time I noted that when smaller entities combine into a new type of identity, that typically results in a far greater amount of existence then if they stay the same entities and just move around. This is a new factor of existence, and to keep the scope manageable for our general purposes, we examine at maximum one stage higher and lower than our origin. We do this, because this should work for general purposes. Exceptions will of course happen, but we don't have the time, skill, or patience to calculate for 2 factors down. Its something to do once the basic theory is established, but too much to ask for now.

To be honest, my understanding so far is that you are not using, in actuality (as opposed to ideally), fundamentaly entities to arrive at these general patterns because, by you own admission, you can’t. So, then, you are only using expression and potential entities—and, consequently, fundamental entities are useless for moral calculation in actuality. — Bob Ross

They're a starting point, and an important part of the overall theory. Destroying expressions does not destroy the fundamental underneath it (so we assume). So destruction of expressions doesn't necessarily destroy the fundamental existence, and all of its potentials at that time. Whereas the destruction of a fundamental is one of the largest destructions of existence as this destroys all of its future expressions and potential. Generally the destruction of an identity does not destroy the key foundations of that identity, so such destruction is more palatable.

Ok, let’s start with expression entities: you seem to use molecules to represent this type, but how are you determining which expression entity to factor into the moral calculation? You seem to just arbitrarily pick one for the sake of example. — Bob Ross

I do. This is me figuring things out Bob. I'm glad we're finally at the point we can have this discussion as I've wanted to bounce it off of someone else who understands the basics of what's going on here. The goal was to find some way of measuring existence. The key for me is "What is an identity"? And I think its having attributes that have unique results when interacting with another existence.

Implicit in my notion of identities is grouping. Every atom, even of the same element is different from another atom in some very small way. But I can't very well be looking over the minute individual make up, where each proton and neutron is located as well as the exact place of each electron in orbit can I? And for general discussion and physics, we don't. Hydrogen atoms in a general sense work a particular way. This is a change of staging. There is a limit down that we go in each stating to make calculations when we're talking about atoms in particular.

So the same approach is brought here with measurements of existence. What then is a fundamental stage change for an existence? When the combination of two or more items results in something that is different than what their parts alone would express. The easiest example of this is atoms combining into molecules. Hydrogen and oxygen atoms are a gas at room temperature. Combined they become a liquid that is necessary for almost all life.

This becomes a new foundation, though not a material foundation, but a foundational identity. Now that I've worked through it, perhaps it needs to be pointed out with some name. So: Material foundation, expressions, material foundation combinations into new identities, and these new identities follow the pattern of material foundation by being foundational identities.

A new foundational identity (the name for now) is a new staging of existence in which an entirely new set of expressions has come out of the combination of other expressions. Can there be degrees? Yes. Two molecules of the same type combining together doesn't really generate that many extra potential expressions as a bond then becoming an entirely new substance.

Let’s take the paper example to illustrate the problem: a piece of paper and a molecule are both expression entities. By your own admission, anything comprised of, that originates out of, fundamental entities is an expression entity; so, by your own lights, the piece of paper is an expression entity, comprised of a bunch of smaller expression entities—namely molecules. You seem to arbitrarily favor the molecule over the paper itself; but the paper is an expression of molecules, among probably other expression entities, thusly making it also an expression entity. — Bob Ross

I'm not really favoring the molecules over the paper. Paper is the result of several molecules of the same type grouping into a bond. The overall foundational identity change is very small, as in considering only this scope, the behavior is very similar to the molecules that make it up. Its not enough to make an appreciable staging step. Now, if you introduce the human element into it, it enters into the human staging section only within regards to how humans use the paper. But the molecular size of the paper is irrelevant compared to the staging of what that human will do with that piece of paper. Per my previous example, if they need confetti, cut it. If they need to make functional paper airplanes, don't.

Hopefully it is clear that, as you have defined it, a piece of paper is an expression entity: it is comprised of, something that arises out of, fundamental entities: it is an expression of fundamental entities. A molecule is also just like it in that sense: the paper arises out of, is an emergent property of, the molecules. — Bob Ross

I hope this clears up the thought process a bit, explaining why a grouping of molecules isn't quite the foundational identity shift as a combination of molecules that react and produce an entirely different foundational identity with its own unique expressions that cannot be formed by the underlying molecules when alone.

A first cause is an uncaused existence, that then enters into causality.
— Philosophim

Is instantiation into existence instantaneous, or does the process necessitate elapsing of time? — ucarr

Hi ucarr, instantiation of a first cause is the moment of inception.

Hopefully that helps clarify, as I think we have derailed a bit into our differences in use of the term ‘thing-in-itself’. — Bob Ross

Yes, well done Bob! As I noted from the beginning, I did not have any real issue with the arguments, just the use of thing-in-itself.

All good!

So, you see, the conceptual framework that we apply to reality makes a difference to what reality we grasp. (I don't say it makes a difference to what is real. By definition, it doesn't.) — Ludwig V

Right. I'm not claiming that whether we can identify a first cause or not, it would still exist.

I didn't know about that. I'm not surprised. I have never believed that the Big Bang was the end of the story. It doesn't make any difference to our problem, does it? But it does confirm my view that the first cause is a moving target, not a fixed point. — Ludwig V

What we believe is a first cause is likely a moving target. If we can prove any one particular thing is a first cause, then it would be no more of a moving target than anything else we prove.

Well, of course it is a truth. By definition. But you have also specified conditions for its discovery that seem to exclude the possibility of ever discovering it, except as a temporary phenomenon of whatever theory we devise. — Ludwig V

No, not a temporary phenomenon, but a hard proof. The bar to reach this is of course, extremely high. In many cases of first causes, its impossible to prove. I do not view this as a bad thing.

I wonder if its been lost in the discussion, but I am not once claiming, "This X is a first cause." I'm just noting that it is logically necessary that at least one first cause exist.

Here's the summary of the argument again. If we don't know whether our universe has finite or infinite chains of causality A -> B -> C etc...

Lets say there's a finite chain of causality. What caused a finite causal chain to exist instead of something else? There is no prior reason, it simply is.

Lets say there's an infinite chain of causality. What caused an infinite causal chain to exist instead of something else? There is no prior reason, it simply is.

If anything is possible, then could some things be more possible than another?
— Philosophim

Yes. You're invoking probability. — ucarr

No. That was the entire point. You even thumbed up Lucas's quote which agreed with mine.

I realized I could imagine any situation with odds, and realize that all odds had the same chance of happening when anything can happen.
— Philosophim

I'll sound a note of doubt about this on the premise all odds on all things having equal chance of occurrence assumes unlimited time. — ucarr

Lets clarify a difference here. Given infinite time, all things that are possible WILL happen. That's not what I'm stating. I'm stating that there is no way to predict at any any particular moment in time if a first cause will incept, and what it will be.

True randomness' is uncaused.
— Philosophim

This implies randomness can be contemporary with the first of all first causes, and thus prior to all first causes subsequent to the first of all first causes. The effect of randomness being uncaused is that there are no first causes. — ucarr

This implies no such thing. I've mentioned several times randomness is not a cause. Its a descriptor to understand the inception of first causes entails. I feel like we're back sliding here. :) Remember, nothing causes a first cause. If you think I'm saying anything prior causes a first cause, know that I am not.

Also, if true randomness uncaused, as you claim, supports the prediction of certain outcomes, then it is -- your denials notwithstanding -- logical. — ucarr

Again, you're attributing randomness as some cause. Its not a cause. Its not a thing. Its a descriptor. Its a logical conclusion that we realize once we understand a first cause cannot be caused by anything prior.

Firstly, when you're propounding your conclusion -- that first cause is possible and logically necessary -- you demand it be understood: unexplainable nothing must be accepted prima facie. — ucarr

I don't demand it be accepted prima facie. I have an argument that leads to a conclusion. Go find the summary if you need. If you want to critique the argument, critique the argument. Please don't throw accusations without addressing the argument.

So far, your arguments beg the question: How is there not a chain of causation from nothing to something? — ucarr

There is no question begging. If we label an egg as "The first dinosaur egg", and it is true, can there be a dinosaur egg that exists prior to the first dinosaur egg? No. This is not begging the question, this is just a logical consequence of the term "first".

If its true that something is a first cause in a causation chain, then no prior cause can come before it. Nothing does not cause something, because nothing is...nothing. Its just a state prior to the first causes inception.

The point of disjunction happens when the causal chain reaches its last position prior to the location of first cause and the location of first cause. — ucarr

I don't understand this. Can you try a second pass on it?

The gap stands between first cause on one side of the disjunction and second cause on the other side of the disjunction. First cause is not connected to the causal chain you claim it causes. The gap separating the leader from its followers is the gap between no-physics and physics. — ucarr

I don't understand this either. Use the example I gave earlier. A -> B -> C. A is the first cause in the causal chain. Everything flows after. What is lacking in this example?

Since you're talking about first cause causing a causal chain following after it, you have to bridge across first cause to second cause that bridges across to third cause, etc. — ucarr

A first cause does not follow anything. Again, if you ever find yourself thinking, "This caused the first cause" stop. Nothing does. I don't imply anything ever does. Thinking that something can cause a first cause is a complete contradiction.

For this reason, whenever you attempt to talk logically about first cause causing second cause and so on, you have to covertly bring in logical connectors linking first cause to second cause. — ucarr

How is A -> B -> C covert? I don't quite understand your point here.

In your attempt to assert a no-logic realm as the start of a logical realm, you encounter the gnarly problem of explaining logically the non-logical inception of logic. Its easy to claim a no-logic realm causes a logic realm if you keep the two realms separated in a dualistic reality. — ucarr

There is no other realm ucarr. There is no "randomness" realm. There is no dualism. The conclusion that there is nothing to influence how, what, or when a first cause will incept is simply a logical conclusion we can reach once we realize there is no prior cause to it.

Please try again ucarr. Stop putting something into nothing. :) There is no prior cause to a first cause.

I did want to note that the conclusion applies to reality, not our knowledge or understanding of reality.
— Philosophim
That's a complicated statement. I'm not at all sure that I understand it. — Ludwig V

If a tree falls in a forest and no one is around to hear it, the air still vibrates with the fall. We don't need someone to hear the vibration of the air for the air to vibrate.

"First cause" does not mean, "The start of where we decide to look at the causal chain."
— Philosophim
Sometimes it means exactly that. When it doesn't, it means "the first cause so far as we can tell". — Ludwig V

No, a first cause is not an opinion. It is a truth. A first cause can have no prior cause for its existence. This is independent of whether we discover its existence or not. If we claim something is a first cause, it must be proven that there was no prior cause for its existence. It is not a belief. If for example we discovered something we had claimed was a first cause, did in fact have a prior cause, we would have been mistaken in calling it a first cause.

To know it is a first cause, we must prove that it is.
— Philosophim
Well, there's a scientific argument about that, so now the burden of proof is on you to prove that it isn't and to explain what would count as a proof. — Ludwig V

Sure. For something to be proven as a first cause, all other possible prior causality must be ruled out. One theory about the big bang is that prior to it, there existed the big crunch. Basically all matter was sucked into itself, then exploded out again. That possibility would need to be proven false to claim that the big bang was a first cause.

You need to assign a probability to all the "anythings" that you refer to in "if anything is possible". Unless you have a reason to assign different probabilities to different outcomes, you must assign the same probability to all outcomes. — Ludwig V

Correct. That's what I'm trying to say with the examples.

The actual causal chains that we formulate are constructed either in a practical context or in the context of a theory. They are limited in the first case by pragmatic considerations and in the second by the theories we have. So when we construct actual causal chains, there will always be a first cause and a last cause, and these will present themselves as brute facts - we discussed those a while ago. — Ludwig V

I did want to note that the conclusion applies to reality, not our knowledge or understanding of reality. "First cause" does not mean, "The start of where we decide to look at the causal chain." There is no human context. The big bang is not a known first cause, it is simply a proposed first cause. To know it is a first cause, we must prove that it is. So far, this has not been done. However, using the big bang as a 'fill in' first cause to get away from abstraction is very helpful and useful to do.

Fortunately for her, this is a very open ended question. Considering its only 1k words as well, this is more asking her to think through on the subject then generate any one right answer.

Considering its neuroscience, I would simply look at consciousness. We can perceive the brain's function, and even manipulate what the person is experiencing by stimulating certain areas of the brain. But do we know what its like to BE that consciousness? That is the unperceived. Good luck to her!

So this just depends on whether one believes one can have knowledge of the things-in-themselves or not; and I think we are basically saying the same thing—but our schemas are different. — Bob Ross

Things-in-themselves are not things-as-ascribed. As soon as you being to ascribe something to a thing-in-itself, it is now a thing-as-ascribed. The entire point about using the term thing-in-itself is to give an abstract of something as it exists apart from our ascription.

I would say we ascribe properties to the things-in-themselves conditionally [as conditioned by the human understanding]; whereas, you would say we ascribe properties to things and things-in-themselves are completely ineffable as a pure negative conception. — Bob Ross

This is true. I think your viewpoint is a mis-application of what a thing-in-itself is. We can never understand a thing-in-itself. If you think you can, then you're just using a thing-as-ascribed and losing the meaning of what a thing-in-itself is.

Let me tell you why this is an important distinction. What if all of reality is an illusion created by an evil demon Bob? As in, the thing itself which is unknowable. The illusion contradicts you when you deny space or time, but outside of the evil demon's illusions, space and time do not exist. A character in a 3D game will never know they are actually 2D, yet the rules of the world will make it think it is. A brain in a vat will never know that its a brain in a vat, yet the rules of the world will make it think its not. All the character has in each world is ascriptions. They are ascribing something, but what that something is, is forever unknowable.

And to clarify, these are examples of the abstract of, "That which can never be ascribed to." It is the forever unknowable underlying reality that exists in itself, not as any type of ascription or identity we can give it. We can interpret it through our perceptions and identities, but it will never capture the essence of what it is in itself, only as we ascribe it.

Either way, the OP is about whether or not space and time are properties of things or things-in-themselves (depending on which description you like best above) and what nature they would have. — Bob Ross

Right, space and time are properties of things. These are representations we view in reality that are not contradicted by the thing in itself, so it works for us. It is impossible to know if our representations capture the thing in itself, as that is something that is beyond ascription.

Its real because it affects us despite our perceptions. That's the 'drop a rock game' :D

There is nothing about space and time in terms of literal extension and temporality that affects you despite your perceptions: an object affects you despite your perceptions of it—not space nor time. — Bob Ross

Doesn't time have to pass for the rock to fall? Doesn't the rock have to have mass, and therefore space, to bonk me on the head? I'm not understanding your claim here.

You do not experience space and time: they are the forms of your experience. — Bob Ross

Since space and time are concepts that we create and experience, saying they are forms seems redundant. Otherwise you get into sentences like, "We experience this form of experience, which in this case is the form of space." Its much simpler to just note, "We experience space". Both say the same thing with a lot less unnecessary complication right?

at its core: there’s actual time and space that affect oneself (and one’s representative faculties are representing that) or one’s representative faculties represent things in space and time differently depending on what it is interpreting as there in reality). — Bob Ross

Right, space and time are not illusionary concepts. Despite our attempts to ascribe them as illusionary, they defy our beliefs by bonking us on the head. Does that mean we can every capture what the underlying 'thing in itself' that our ascription of space is allowed to coexist without contradiction? No.

Good. My only point is that that is incredibly counter-intuitive to predominant ethics: pretty much everyone who studies ethics will agree that trying to find a cure for cancer has more moral worth than working on model airplanes even if one is more productive at the latter than the former. — Bob Ross

Right, if you don't explicitly list out the examples I mentioned. As I've mentioned, morality is contextual. Without context you can create all sorts of unintuitive points. That's not using the theory, and not a knock against it. List out a contextual example like I did, and show that its unintuitive by its conclusion if you want to show something meaningful. I listed a few for you, and they are intuitive to ethics to me. Are they not to you? If not, let me know. :)

If our unit of measure is ‘a piece’ and ‘more pieces is better than less’, then two pieces of paper are better than two.

The only way for you to deny this, under your theory, is if you explicate clearly what unit of measure a person should be using to calculate “more existence is better”; and you have still as of yet to clarify it. — Bob Ross

Have I not listed the three unit types, fundamental, expression, and potential? I've also given quite a few examples of how to calculate them. I broke down the paper model for you as well. You haven't commented on it, so I assumed that meant it made sense.

"A piece" is not an accurate description of the existence. A piece is a generic summary which can vary in size and shape. Paper is an identity we give to a organized set of molecules that we use as a tool. Since we are removing the tool aspect, its just a conglomeration of molecules. So when you say we are taking a particular piece of paper, that's a set of existence. When we tear it, we are separating the molecules that bind it together.

My point was not that you need to calculate every minute detail: it was that, in principle, it is impossible for you to; and, thusly, your theory is useless if you insist on demanding these calculations to determine what is right or wrong. — Bob Ross

I have already done a few calculations through several examples. Feel free to point out where these examples are wrong. I assumed because you haven't addressed them so far, that they were acceptable. Lets go back there then as its a fundamental of the theory.

The second is: if the unit of measure is ‘material existence’ (which is whatever fundamental entities exist) and one cannot have knowledge of ‘material existences’ (which by your own concession in your conversation is true) and one needs to use those units to calculate what is right/wrong, then it is impossible for them to calculate what is right/wrong—full stop. — Bob Ross

First, the use of 'atoms' was as an Aristotelian abstract to demonstrate how it works. We don't need to know the exact form of a fundamental when math in this case, is a fundamental discrete identity. From there we build up complex models of expression and measure that. I feel like you completely missed this point from earlier, or have forgotten it.

Perhaps this entire discussion needs a summary again, as your latter points seem to wholly miss the mark. This is not normally like you, so I feel that the discussion needs a recentering if this is the case. Let me know.if this would be helpful! Oh, and if you have become disinterested in the conversation, that's perfectly fine as well. This does not reflect poorly on your points or you in anyway if this is the case. Sometimes we're just not interested in continuing a discussion, and I do not want you to feel obligated to do so if this is the case. :)

Please read my response to ucarr above as I go over 'true randomness' in more detail.

So, nothingness, and randomness join the list of excluded causal prior states. — ucarr

Correct.

I'm seeking clarification whether potential inhabits the list of the excluded. The simple answer is yes. However, your mentions of nothingness, randomness and now potential vaguely suggest they're subject to the gravitational pull of causal status due to our reasoning minds needing talking points to grasp nothing-then-something inception. — ucarr

Then that is not my intention. I was not aware it would come across like that. Thinking back to when I first fleshed it out, I haven't walked through my initial through process in concluding this, so let me do so now.

I remember at first thinking, "If anything is possible, then could some things be more possible than another? Not because of some prior cause, but because that's just the way the first cause played out?
(I know this doesn't make any sense, but just follow the example to see where I arrived in the end)

So I had a thought experiment. Lets say, if anything is possible, that there is a 40% chance of a universe forming from a big bang, and a 60% chance of a universe forming from a little whisper. I mean, its possible right? But what that also means is its equally possible that there's a 39% chance of a universe forming from a big bang, and a 61% of a big whisper. 38/62, 37/67...and so on.

In fact, I realized I could imagine any situation with odds, and realize that all odds had the same chance of happening when anything can happen. And if all odds for all possibilities are all possible...that means everything in the mathematical end has the same chance of happening.

That's one. I'll reiterate again another point I've made before as it was likely brushed over earlier. 'Randomness' as we know it is caused. 'True randomness' is uncaused. Randomness has limitations caused by other existential influences. We use randomness in situations where we have limits, but are missing some information that would lead us to predicting that absolutely necessary conclusion.

Again, I'll mention a die roll. The outcome of the die is predetermined by the forces that are already there. Unless a first cause happened to get in the way, a die roll will always land predetermined on a particular side. We'll say the one die. Your forces shaking the cup, gravity, friction, the surface of where it landed, and even the air resistance all cause the die to land on the one. We say, "It has a one out of six chance to land on the one," because we cannot measure it accurately ahead of time. But it was always going to land on the one.

When something has no prior cause for its existence, its actually truly unpredictable. Its inception is outside of determinism. There is nothing causing a big bang to form. There is nothing preventing a big bang from forming. There is nothing which would neither limit, cause, or incline a first cause to be. It simply is. And the logical consequence of this is that the inception of when, where, what, etc of a first cause is true randomness. Meaning anything is possible.

Your underlined fragment suggests randomness in the role of the trigger of the singularity's rapid expansion. — ucarr

No, that's not what I'm trying to suggest. I hope the above clarified, but I'll reiterate here. Randomness is not a role. It is a logical way to grasp that the inception of a first cause, what it is, where it forms, etc. are truly unpredictable, outside of determinism, and therefore truly random. Now, once its formed, it is no longer random in what it does. It is constrainted by what it is. But what it is, how it is, and why it is, is all truly random.

Another thought -- I know you've already addressed it -- is that the pre-big bang of no physics is an utterly different state not only from our world today, but utterly different from the start of the shortest time interval possible post-big bang. — ucarr

If there is something which caused the big bang, then the big bang is not a first cause. I'm only using the big bang as a hypothetical example of a first cause give a more concrete example to the abstract. My argument for "there must be a first cause" is the variable X. When I say, "a photon, the big bang, etc.", I'm just temporarily putting a number like 1 or 2 there so we don't have to keep talking in terms of X all the time. Sometimes this makes things more clear.

So its not relevant whether or not there is something that caused the big bang. We just keep working up the causal chain and will eventually arrive at a first cause. So to sum, the argument is not addressing any one particular first cause, it is addressing the logic of any first cause.

I'm still in arrears of understanding how randomness-into-big band is not a partitioning of reality into two utterly distinct states populating a dual reality. — ucarr

Because, and this is entirely understandable, you haven't let go of the need for prior causality. You haven't yet truly considered or understood the idea of what it means for there to be no prior cause. You keep inventing something that's a prior cause, and that's the wrong approach. And that's ok! :) Its a difficult shift. There is no prior cause, means no dualism, no God, no secret mechanism, no slot machine, no sub-quantum field that causes the quantum field, just...nothing. It just is.

You're speculating about reality having no boundary?
— ucarr

I'm just saying that the word 'reality' is really a word that represents all of 'what is'.
— Philosophim

You're not answering my question, please do so. I'm pressing this point because saying all of what exists equals reality allows for the logical inference reality so defined has no boundary. — ucarr

I'm not sure how this makes reality not have a boundary. Sum up everything that exists and that's the boundary.

Well, a reality with no boundary means the no-physics realm of nothing-then-something inhabits the same continuum inhabited by our everyday reality. — ucarr

I'll mention this again, but its not a 'no-physics' reality. Its not separate, its just a part of reality. If a first cause was empirically proven, it would simply become part of physics. Physics is an attempt to measure, predict, and understand how forces and matter impact each other. This would just be one extra rule added to it.

Nothing, then a change to space time, has spacetime.
— Philosophim
What do you mean? I believe something is missing in this statement. — MoK

Let me phrase it this way: Nothing to something involves spacetime. Spacetime is the result of nothing to something. Spacetime is there, so a change occurred. The only way I can see this not making sense if you want there to be spacetime before a change can happen. But that wasn't your premise. You can change it now if you would like, but then you have to prove that spacetime cannot come from nothing. And as I noted, I don't see either of us having any proof of this, and I think I put forward some decent logic why this doesn't fit with the rest of your premises either.

We have been through this. I disagree with C. — MoK

And that's fine. At this point you've made your points, I've made my counterpoints, and there is nothing left to add. Its been a nice discussion on this. :) But I think we've made up our own minds so all that's left is to agree to disagree. See you around elsewhere on the forums Mok!

The wording about physics is a little to vague for me
— Philosophim

You've been saying a principal first cause, although it can incept as anything, cannot violate the physical laws of the thing it incepts as, right? If I'm correct in thinking this, it seems to me also correct a principal first cause is constrained by the definition of the particular things it incepts as. — ucarr

If you're saying, "Once a first cause has incepted, it cannot be anything other than what it is," you are correct.

Again, lets change this to be a little more to the point. "However, if it is found logically that all instantiations of causation entail externals, logical antecedents and contemporaries, then its a correct inference there are no first causes."

This is a logical argument, so of course is there is a logical counter it fails.
— Philosophim

Do you agree making this determination is the heart and soul of our work in this discussion? — ucarr

I would say yes. This conclusion arises because of a logical argument which I have yet to see anyone disprove. It doesn't mean the argument can't be disproven, it just means no one has done it yet if this is the case. That's why I'm presenting it here. Let people stab at it, shake a stick at it, throw a pitchfork, anything to see if there's a weakness I'm not seeing.

Thank you for clarifying what was important to mereological to you.

According to mereological essentialism, objects have their parts necessarily. If an object were to lose or gain a part, it would cease to exist; it would no longer be the original object but a new and different one.

Wikipedia - Mereological essentialism

The last two sentences of the definition are especially important. If a first cause is a system, as is the case in your example of a first-cause hydrogen atom, then, as you've been saying, it cannot be a hydrogen atom if one of its necessary parts is missing. — ucarr

This is very similar, if not identical to what I've been saying. Though in hindsight I've phrased this differently depending on the context, so I'll be clear here. A first cause is at the moment of inception. The next tick of time is not the first cause. That is the first result of a first cause. In the past I've stated that a first cause could incept, then disappear moments later. This is taking the context of the first cause as the thing that forms and continues. While convenient to type a general idea more efficiently, this is not accurate in detail.

What I should have said is that the existence that proceeds from a first cause does not need to persist forever. As an example again, if what appears to be a photon appeared as a first cause, then disappeared five seconds later from existence, due to the rules and consequences of the first cause, that's possible. Technically a photon doesn't vanish in five seconds due to the consequence of its own existence. My apologies is my lack of specificity in this has caused any confusion, that would be on me. :)

So, if an electron is a thing-in-itself and its a necessary part of a hydrogen atom, then a hydrogen atom, even the first one, in order to exist, must contain an electron, another thing-in-itself like the hydrogen atom. Therefore, logically, we must conclude the electron is a contemporary of the hydrogen atom it inhabits, and thus the hydrogen atom cannot be itself and at the same time be a first cause. — ucarr

Correct. I stated this earlier in our discussion, though it would not be surprising if it was forgotten. Since a hydrogen atom is composed of other elements, the only way we could generalize the atom as a first cause if is all the elements of the hydrogen atom incepted in such a way as it would continue in the next moment like a regular hydrogen atom. It is the fundamental aspect which is a first cause. Only if several fundamentals incepted simultaneously and in a particular order could such a miracle occur. This is of course possible, but once again, must be proven that this occurred. I believe if such a rare instance were to happen, this is an instance in which it would likely be impossible to scientifically determine that it happened.

Maybe the question remains: Does a postulated realm of reality without physics and its laws violate the laws of physics? — ucarr

This is a broader question about understanding what the laws of physics are. They are tested aspects about known reality that so far, have not been disproven. If one day multi-verse theory was found to be real, it would be a part of physics. If we proved that a first cause existed, that would be part of physics. Physics is not an innate truth of reality, it is a discovered knowledge about reality that we have determined through careful testing, logic, and application.

You seem to be saying discovery of a first cause is unlikely. The unlikeliness of its discovery has no bearing on the radical impact of such a discovery. — ucarr

True.

Some might think I'm playing a language game when I reflect on a first cause that has no cause being illogical. I defend raising this question because the gist of your argument is that first causation is logically necessary. — ucarr

I think its reasonable for people to resist such a claim. Indeed, I want to hear people's arguments against it to see if they're right.

It's perhaps a weird argument, but I'm driving towards saying inception of first cause cancels definition of first cause as causeless. This in part is a denial that inception as a starting point can be causeless. — ucarr

One thing I point out is a first cause is that which exists without prior cause. Self identities or constituent parts are fine as long as they are not prior to what is incepted like the hydrogen atom I just covered a few paragraphs ago.

Trying to partition an interval of time to a nearly infinitesimally small duration such that there's a moment after inception wherein cause is first established doesn't work because in that short interval of time you're implying first cause is not really itself, a paradox. If that's not the case, then there can be no positive time interval during which incepted first cause isn't itself establishing causation. So, no temporal creation without causation. — ucarr

This is more of a problem with time partitioning than a first cause. This is exemplified by this problem. "I have to walk a distance of 10 feet. To walk a distance of ten feet, I must walk halfway there first. Then to walk a distance of 5 feet, I must walk halfway there first. This goes on for as long as we can invent halves of numbers, which is of course infinite. If this is the case, how do I ever arrive at the end of the initial ten feet?" The solution is that though our numbers can be reduced infinitely, there must be a fundamental minimum scale of distance. Same with time. Otherwise every second of time that has passed will have also crossed an infinity of halves.

Ha! But no. The logical argument has always been there ucarr. Try to show it to be wrong anytime.
— Philosophim

You're referring to your alpha logic in your OP? — ucarr

I have since summarized it for you better in a previous post. Hopefully that makes it easier to digest.

Please try to address the argument as I do specifically and counter what it and I have been saying, not what you believe I'm implying.
— Philosophim

You're saying I should only draw inferences strictly adherent to the precise sense in which you word your statements? — ucarr

Where possible, yes. Then if my vocabulary is incomplete or unclear, you can ask me to clarify or call me out on it. That puts the responsibility on me to clearly articulate my point instead of on you.

True randomness is merely a description to grasp potential.
— Philosophim

Must you exclude potential from the neighborhood of first cause? — ucarr

I'm not sure what you meant by this, could you clarify please ucarr?

Please take the argument I've presented for why a first cause is logically necessary and point out where it falls into ad absurdum reductio.
— Philosophim

You're saying you have reason to doubt your alpha logic can be reduced to ad absurdum reductio and, given this doubt, you want me to demonstrate such a reduction? — ucarr

Yes, please.

"Are you saying that a first cause is self-evident?" Because my answer is "No".
— Philosophim

You're saying "First causes simply are." is not a self-evident truth? — ucarr

No, they are a conclusion reasoned through by logic. If it was self-evident, there could be no discussion or debate. To my mind, nothing is self-evident. Feel free to argue against this, it only supports my point. :D

As to reality, if reality refers to everything, there isn't something that exists outside of that set. That's logical.
— Philosophim

You're speculating about reality having no boundary? — ucarr

I'm just saying that the word 'reality' is really a word that represents all of 'what is'.

As for my getting stuck at the outer boundary of causation and thereafter being unable to enter into examination of causeless things, I put my best spin on what I've been doing by thinking I've been running through my inventory of commitments to causation en route to deepening my understanding of what you're trying to communicate with respect to your posited causeless realm of first cause. I don't want to further aggravate your annoyance with fruitless repetitions. With that goal in mind, I'm ready to withdraw from our dialog in favor of study suggested by what I've been learning from it. — ucarr

Not a worry at all. You are not aggravating or annoying ucarr! I appreciate your thoroughness, curiosity, and respectful critiques and attacks on the theory. Ask as long as you have questions that need answering, its not a problem.

We need one thing in here, nothing to spacetime needs spacetime. We start from nothing and ask ourselves how we could have spacetime (let's call this spacetime ST1). This requires the existence of another spacetime (let's call this spacetime ST2) since we agreed that nothing to spacetime requires spacetime. So we cannot have ST1 without having ST2. In the same manner, we cannot have ST2 if we don't have ST3, etc. — MoK

Ah, ok. I think you missed this point I made before, so I'll point it out again.

You never said we need spacetime BEFORE a change can occur.
You said we need spacetime FOR a change to occur.

Nothing, then a change to space time, has spacetime.

Saying you need something before you have it is a contradiction. Cake must exist before cake can happen for example. :) I wish I could have my breakfast before I make it, but sadly, that is not life.

And if this is the case, then what was around if spacetime did not exist? Nothing.
— Philosophim
Yes, if we don't have spacetime we simply have nothing. Why? Because physical entities or things occupy space. — MoK

Then we've invalidated the conclusion that a change cannot happen from nothing. Let me break it down.

A. Spacetime has a beginning.
B. Spacetime is required for change
C. Since no change can happen if spacetime is not involved, there was nothing before spacetime.
Conclusion: A change in which there was nothing, then spacetime, had to have happened.

Right. I never agreed that we need spacetime before a change can happen. I agreed that we need spacetime for a change to happen.
— Philosophim
Correct. But the only thing that I need to show that nothing to spacetime is an infinite regress is that we need spacetime for any change to happen. — MoK

Where is the infinite regress? If we don't need spacetime before spacetime (as this sentence doesn't make any sense), and go from nothing to spacetime, how is that infinitely regressive?

Mok, go over the sentence again carefully. You're saying it cannot begin to exist, but it has a beginning. That doesn't make any sense. Can you get what you intend without making a contradiction like this?
— Philosophim
Well, I have to elaborate on what I mean by begin to exist then. By this, I mean that spacetime didn't exist and then exists. — MoK

And if this is the case, then what was around if spacetime did not exist? Nothing. Since you stated that you have to have spacetime for change to happen, there must have been nothing before spacetime.

Exactly, well said Ludwig!
— Philosophim
It's nice to agree on something, isn't it? I wasn't sure whether you would welcome the agreement or criticize the way I undermined it. — Ludwig V

I don't think an accurate assessment is undermining. Out of the people recently posting in this thread, I think you grasp the argument the best.

You agreed that nothing to spacetime is a change. Don't we need spacetime for this change? If yes, then we need spacetime for nothing to spacetime. This leads to infinite regress though. — MoK

Right. I never agreed that we need spacetime before a change can happen. I agreed that we need spacetime for a change to happen. The start of spacetime is a change because it involves spacetime.

Sure there is spacetime. Spacetime cannot begin to exist though. Spacetime simply exists, in this sense is fundamental, and has a beginning. — MoK

Mok, go over the sentence again carefully. You're saying it cannot begin to exist, but it has a beginning. That doesn't make any sense. Can you get what you intend without making a contradiction like this?

Anytime we try to define a 'thing in itself" beyond the barest logical necessity of its existence, we have to remember that we can't.

I think that our experience is an indirect window into reality and, as such, is indirect knowledge of the things in themselves; so we can say things about them beyond assigning them a giant question mark. — Bob Ross

Then you're ascribing an identity to a thing in itself. There is no indirect or direct knowledge of anything about a thing in itself besides the fact that it is logically necessary that there be something for us base our conceptions off of. Anything more is using our conceptions.

The objects, as they are in themselves, would exist without any literal motion, extension, or temporality; but, each object would be related to the other in such a way that they have temporal ordering, and spatial properties. — Bob Ross

Once again you're ascribing something to a thing in itself that is unknowable. Motion, extension, and temporality are all our personal conceptions we ascribe to things in themselves, but they are never knowledge of the thing in itself. The thing in itself is outside of knowledge. Using the term objects is fine. Ascribing anything to a thing in itself is impossible.

The game analogy doesn't work here either. There is no 3D in a video game. Its math combined with a spatial illusion.

Ah, that's your target. I don't think you need "a thing in itself" to prove this. All you have to note is that objects represent things in themselves, and that space is a property of objects

If space is only a property of objects, then space is not a substance and is not real; but, rather, the pure form of one’s experience. — Bob Ross

Its real because it affects us despite our perceptions. That's the 'drop a rock game' :D I can perceive all I want how things will be or turn out, but the result will happen anyway. That undeniable effect is caused by 'the thing in itself'. How we describe and see that thing in itself is everything Bob. The thing in itself is beyond human knowledge. Everything is our attempts at describing what is real, even the description of, "the thing in itself". That's why you only use the thing in itself as a logical necessary footnote. Anything else is overstepping what the concept is meant to be.

That's just silly then. A good ol' rousing game of "Drop the rock" will cure that.

Not at all. Neither nihilists nor transcendentalists deny that we experience objects in space and time. That’s not what is under contention here. — Bob Ross

We experience everything. If they mean the pure form of experience is something that does not represent reality, that's what empirical testing is for. They can claim space does not represent reality, but then we can test it and show that it is. If they're talking about something else, it sounds like its gobbledygook.

We can't know because we cannot identify or know a thing in itself beyond it correlation or violations of our perceptions and judgements.

We can nevertheless use our experience to ground sufficient justification for believing that space is a substance or not. Just because our knowledge is not 100% certain nor that it is contingent on our representative faculty, does not entail it is not knowledge. — Bob Ross

Absolutely, but knowledge is never about the thing in itself. Knowledge is our conception of reality that tries to not contradict whatever the thing in itself is. We can never know in any way, shape, or form, what a thing in itself is besides the fact that something must exist for us to perceive and make concepts about.

We can't ascribe properties to things in themselves. We can represent thing as having properties, and that may, or may not match a thing in itself

If we consistently and collectively experience an object with a property and we have no good reasons to doubt that object has the said property, then we are justified in believing the object in-itself has that property. — Bob Ross

No, we are not justified in believing a thing in itself has that property. Properties are our perception of a thing in itself. A thing in itself is what it is, regardless of our perception of it. Does our perception of the thing in itself align without being contradicted? Then it means, at the time, its viable to use as a concept without contradiction. That is all. A concept not being contradicted by the thing in itself does not mean that it in any way captures what the thing in itself, as the thing in itself is that which concepts are laid upon, but not what it is in itself.

↪Philosophim This question cannot be solved without first defining what an existence would be — LFranc

Sure. Lets go with, "That which has an identity. An identity is how it interacts with what is around itself" Basically anything that isn't nothing, as nothing as a concept is the absence of identity.

1. We have nothing, then spacetime.
— Philosophim
Yes, but you have to wait for it. I am trying to counter this simply by saying that nothing to spacetime is a change. — MoK

There is no waiting for it, as there is nothing doing the waiting.

Change happened with spacetime.
— Philosophim
Sure, but there is no spacetime in nothing therefore change from nothing is not possible. — MoK

No, but spacetime happened after there being nothing, so we have a change, and we have spacetime. In your case we have the start of spacetime.

2. There is nothing in your argument that proves nothing cannot come before spacetime.
— Philosophim
Sure there is. Nothing to spacetime is a change (you agree with this). Any change requires spacetime (you agree with this too). Therefore, we need spacetime to have nothing to spacetime. — MoK

But there is spacetime. Nothing, then spacetime. A change has occurred and it involves the start of spacetime. Unless you're saying spacetime cannot start? If spacetime cannot start, then it has always existed. But that contradicts your previous statement that an infinite amount of spacetime cannot have existed previously to our own time. How should we resolve this?

That point is a point in spacetime for two reasons: It is a point (point in a variable) and it is before the beginning of time. — MoK

Isn't this another contradiction? First, I've noticed a pattern. You keep using time independently of space. But very early on you noted that time could not be independent of space, that it was a property of a combination called spacetime. One thing we shouldn't do in a discussion is ascertain that a property cannot exist independently, then use it as if it is independent. Are you sure you want to keep time and space together? If so, lets stop using time independently.

Currently what should be said is: "That point is a point in spacetime for two reasons: It is a point (point in a variable) and it is before the beginning of spacetime."

As you can see, the above contradicts itself. I cannot be both a point in spacetime, and before spacetime.

This means what we call the beginning of time is not really the beginning of time but the point that we agree on its existence is the beginning of time. — MoK

This is a contradiction. Something cannot both be a beginning and not a beginning.

Keep trying! Lets see if these contradictions can be resolved.

I had to think about this one a while, as part of this conversation with you is learning what needs to be said and what is irrelevant in a discussion about this.

No worries: I can relate to having an idea and finding that it is harder to convey to the audience (or a specific audience or individual) than (originally) expected. — Bob Ross

Yes, this idea is in its exploratory phase, so these discussions are very helpful to see if there is any merit to the ideas here.

Also, I apologize for my belated response: I have been busy and am trying to catch up on my responses. — Bob Ross

Not a worry! Time is of no consideration to the argument. This is a hobby for us after all.

Productivity is being used in the sense of ‘having the quality or power of producing especially in abundance’; and the hypothetical is that IF a person is being more productive at creating model airplanes than finding a cure to cancer AND they can only do one or the other AND one is analyzing what is good in terms of the production of concrete entities in reality (such that more is better), then that person should (in a moral sense) choose to create model airplanes over finding a cure for cancer. — Bob Ross

That's fine then, yes. But as I've noted, make sure you make explicit the other outcomes as well. For example, if the person works on cancer and saves billions of lives, but is more productive working on model planes and saves no lives, this is not all else being equal.

All I am including is what I included. IF ‘more existence is better’ THEN it is better to have two pieces of paper rather than one. That’s it. In isolation, is two pieces of paper better than one in your view? — Bob Ross

Not necessarily. Its because we're tearing a piece of paper into two, not creating two equal sizes of paper.

You cannot think top down. You need to build up to complicated examples because it just causes confusion and a misunderstanding of how everything builds up otherwise.

I honestly can’t think of a simpler example than whether or not two pieces of paper is better than one, all else being equal. It cannot get simpler than that. — Bob Ross

Paper is made up of matter. So when tearing the paper in two, you are tearing its matter in half.

One pattern I see that I need to point out is the pattern of exploding complexity. when we upgrade to chemical reactions, then life, then people, then society. One point that might help you is you can think of each as a factorial explosion in math. An atom is 1X1. Multiple atoms are 2X1. A molecule is 3X2X1. By the time we get to something like life, molecular existence is such an irrelevant factor compared to factor results at the conscious level. When you're talking about a human decision being something like 20X19X18...including atoms as a consideration is insignificant.

This just entails that it is impossible to actually calculate what is better or worse in any practical sense; but I digress. — Bob Ross

I have not made this explicit enough. Working out the math from an atomic level all the way up to humanity is outside of my purview. I do not have the time, interest, or mathematical skill to calculate things to precision. But I do have enough skill to calculate things to general patterns of observation.

One of the key patterns is existential homeostasis, or the preservation of higher levels of existence over long term. This is why life in general is far more valuable than non-living chemical reactions. Homeostasis explodes past a limited quantity or event. And when we're up to the level of life, each moment of life is such a highly concentrated form of existence that when comparing something as simple as tearing a piece of paper in half, how it affects that life is going to generally be far more existentially impactful then whatever relatively minute existential difference results from tearing the paper in half.

Back to the cancer/plane example, or tearing a piece of paper, when you set up a situation in which we're talking about being 'productive' in general what we should be looking for is significant relative existential results. The new existence if a torn piece of paper is irrelevant compared to what tearing that piece of paper does in a human's life. Productivity in what one does is insignificant to the results that it has on that human's life and society. If a human's actions produce no less than 10,000,000 existence as long as they continue to live, we're much more concerned about the impact changing 1 existence elsewhere is going to have on that 10,000,000 result.

I think this is a good time to go into my views on the morality of art. I've often wondered why I've felt that art is generally good. The reason is that art bring an object which normally would only be of a minor existential consideration in its own hierarchy of existence, and elevates it to impact the hierarchy of intelligent life.

Take mount Rushmore for example. Before it was just a mountain. While now yes, it is not as mountainous as before, this is easily surpassed by the impact it has on human and societal thought. People gather from all over the world to see it and ponder it. Art has the ability to elevate human thought and emotion to higher levels, as well as convey messages that can impact a person's future decisions. This is why the base material of matter is mostly inconsequential compared to what it does to a person and society.

It is not molecular separation: it is one piece of paper vs. two. If you insist in that we must analyze it in terms of molecules, then I will insist that we must analyze it in the smallest possible ‘particle’, which is a ‘fundamental entity’ (i.e., material existence), — Bob Ross

Recall I noted that when thinking about existential value, generally we want to only go one factor up or down as any higher makes the base example a relatively insignificant digit, and any any lower is also relatively insignificant. In some cases, yes, it may be significant. But we do not have the math available to use to find those exceptions, so we must talk in general for now. So we could generally discuss multiple sheets of the same volume of paper up, a single sheet, or the components of a single sheet.

I used molecules because when you tear a sheet of paper in half, you're separating the molecules from being grouped together. You have to talk about this, because you're not creating two equal sizes of paper. You're taking one piece of paper, which is a conglomeration of molecules, and separating some. So the point is relevant.

Everything that we know of is expressed existence then, correct?

1. The foundation. This is the base thing in itself.

This is impossible for us to know. — Bob Ross

Correct, but it is not impossible to represent abstractly. This is why I started with "atoms". It represents the abstract fundamental. What we do know is that things combine together to create new identities. That pattern is repeated both up and down complexity. We're assuming that fundamental existence works like this, as there's really no other known alternative at this point. The "atoms" simply give focus and more relatability than complete abstraction.

2. The expression. This is how the foundation exhibits itself within reality at any one snapshot of time.

This is all of known reality, and always will be. — Bob Ross

Yes, but just like a hydrogen atom has a particular and limited number of ways of expressing itself, so does a fundamental. I don't believe you or I would say that any fundamental essence of existence can express itself without limitation, including being identical to another fundamental. There are limits by the fact that one fundamental of existence is in a different location than another fundamental of existence. And considering regular existence seems to have set patterns of expression and existence as well, we can assume the underlying fundamentals are also limited and pattern themselves too.

3. The potential. This is the combination of what types of expression are possible within the next shapshot of time.

How are you anchoring this part of the calculation though? Is it the very next snapshot, the foreseeable farthest snapshot, the total net, etc.? — Bob Ross

This is a good question. In abstraction, barring the existence of intelligent life, this would be the next time tick. As we work up the hierarchy, the question of time becomes more relevant to the level of existence we're working with, as well as the level of immediate impact. Will smoking a cigarette one time matter? Likely not. Will smoking a cigarette every day and getting cancer in your 40's matter? Absolutely.

If in the next second a life will end based on a decision, we need to act now on the general assumption that saving a life is good because we have no time to consider further ramifications. If we have a year to consider the long term ramifications of whether ending that life is good for society, we can take the time to consider if we should do so, as well as the long term affects.

Here's an example. Lets say that a suicide bomber is going to blow up in a store. One person has a split second to react. If they tackle the man, they can minimize the casualties to themself. There is no further time to think. In this moment the general rule of morality is that they should tackle the man to save everyone else. They do so. They are lauded on the news as a hero. They inspire people to be better. They discourage suicide bombers because they think their plan can easily be stopped by one person. Everything is good.

But lets say we have a crystal ball. We can predict the future and know everyone there. It turns out that everyone else in that store besides the savior themself are all horrible people who actively cause despair, misery, and bring down society. The savior is an upstanding person who brings goodness to the world wherever they go. Should the person save everyone else? In this case, objectively they should not.

Morality is contextual. However, calculating it, especially the future, is an exercise in probability, possibility, plausibility, and thus uncertainty. Remember this? :D Once again we're back to knowledge. We should decide to do what is moral based on what we can know with the time and resources we have at the moment. Are we deciding to open up a new factory? Spend some time studying what the effects of pollution on the populace would be over 20 years. Deciding to save some people in a spur of the moment decision? Best to go with the generality that saving more than one life is worth the expense of your own.

So, for the very simple answer Bob, when making day to day decisions, we should look at the general patterns of morality and act accordingly. Act with others in a way that preserves who they are, and potentially elevates their existence. Act in ways that preserve and elevate society without personal sacrifice where possible. Only sacrifice if there is absolutely no other choice.

When we have time to objectively study specific situations, and feel the energy and effort spent will be worth the opportunity cost elsewhere, then do so. Studying how the speed limit impacts fatalities over the lifetime of that road? A good use of time. Studying the impact of whether you should tear a piece of paper in half or quarters instead of what you are going to do with those pieces of paper? Not a good use of time. :D

I hope that answers some of your points and makes things clearer. Let me know Bob! Thank you again for staying with what I am sure is a difficult discussion to understand. There is nothing else like it, and such things are the most difficult subjects to think through.

This thread is like a causal chain. What would you say about its first cause(s)? — jgill

Good to see a little levity here! It all started when I read the Kalem cosmological argument long ago. Of course it was easy to see that the idea that a God had to be the start of the universe had no backing. But one thing I did think about was the idea of an origin. So I thought about it, figured others had come to the same conclusion but then realized they hadn't. Turns out people were so obsessed with proving or disproving a God that they missed the logic that remained in front of them.

It is my firm opinion after speaking with many people, that a major and fatal error many people do in discussions is view the end as the means, and the argument as the secondary. It should be switched. People shouldn't give a crap about the end. They should care about the argument and where it logically ends. Not where they want it to end.

Is the following rephrasing acceptable: At least one cause and its causal chain are necessary. — ucarr

No, it is specifically a first cause, not just any cause.

Is this interpretation correct: The definition of a first cause and whatever that entails is an acceptable object of examination within this conversation. — ucarr

Perfect!

Is this a reasonable conclusion: A self-organizing, complex system is an acceptable object of examination within this conversation if it is not logically excluded from the definition of first cause. — ucarr

Correct.

Is this interpretation correct: A principal first cause constrained by the laws of physics cannot imply anything external, antecedent or contemporary with itself. — ucarr

The wording about physics is a little to vague for me. "A principal first cause cannot imply anything external, antecedent or contemporary with itself." Is simple and clear.

However, if the laws of physics logically necessitate all instantiations of causation entail externals, logical antecedents and contemporaries, then its a correct inference there are no first causes. — ucarr

Again, lets change this to be a little more to the point. "However, if it is found logically that all instantiations of causation entail externals, logical antecedents and contemporaries, then its a correct inference there are no first causes."

This is a logical argument, so of course is there is a logical counter it fails.

Is this interpretation correct: The above claim ignores mereological issues associated with the work of defining a first cause. — ucarr

Too vague. What do you specifically mean by mereological. The flat definition doesn't mean that that is how you understand the definition. Since I'm talking to you, I want to hear how you view this specifically.

First causes inhabit the phenomenal universe and create consequential phenomena in the form of causal chains, and yet the examination of causation as a whole comes to a dead end at its phenomenal starting point. — ucarr

Add, "It is possible" to the start of the above sentence and its good.

The implication is that either within or beyond the phenomenal universe lies something extant but unexplainable.* Is this a case of finding the boundary of scientific investigation, or is it a case of halting scientific investigation and philosophical rumination by decree. — ucarr

A logical boundary of scientific investigation. In no way should we stop science or philosophy.

The notion of total randomness causing something-from-nothing-creations suggests a partitioned and dual reality. The attribution of dualism to this concept rests upon the premise that total randomness cannot share space with an ordered universe without fatally infecting it. — ucarr

No dualism. Dualism implies the presence of two separate things. There is not a separate thing. There is simply a first cause's inception. Let me give you an example of total randomness that you may not be realizing. It can be completely random that the universe has one first cause, the big bang, and never has one again. There are an infinite number of possible universes where there is only one first cause. There are an infinite number of universes with 2 first causes. And so on.

Given QM entanglement, it may be the case that what can incept is limited by what exists. An everyday parallel is the fact that certain microbes don't spawn and proliferate in liquid solutions with a pH above a certain level. — ucarr

Ah, now this is interesting! There is nothing to prevent a first cause from happening, but if a first cause occurs in an already existent universe, it is possible that the first cause cannot coexist with what already exists and breaks down. Of course, its equally likely that it can coexist.

Something-from-spontaneously-occurring-self-organization preserves the laws of physics; something from nothing seems to violate physical laws — ucarr

If a first cause can be anything, and it is found to be true, that would not violate physical laws, that would simply become part of them.

...a small adjustment to physics is not a reason to deny a logical conclusion
— Philosophim

You think it reasonable to characterize something-from-nothing as "... a small adjustment to physics..."? — ucarr

Yes because like Newton's laws to Einstein's relativity, most of the time Newton's laws is good enough. Most of the time in physics a first cause would never be considered as a case would have to factually present a case in which there could be no prior causality. That's a ridiculously high bar to clear.

And again, the impact to physics is irrelevant to the logical argument itself. We don't argue against a logical argument because we like or don't like where it leads. This is a mistake theists and atheists have been doing for centuries or they would have figured out what I did long ago. We argue against a logical argument based on its logical premises and conclusion.

I've been examining your definition of first cause as something-from-nothing within a closed system wherein matter-mass-energy are conserved. Again, I ask if you think it reasonable to characterize something-from-nothing as a small adjustment. — ucarr

No, because I have had to repeatedly and tirelessly explain to people that there is nothing prior that is 'making' something. Its nothing, then something. Inception works much better. "nothing to something' will make me have to write 50 more responses to people explaining that no, nothing is not some thing that causes something. :)

It's your job to explain logically how something-from-nothing happens. — ucarr

See? You think there's a cause that explains how it happens. There IS NO CAUSE ucarr. =D Do I need to type this 50 more times? I do say this with a smile on my face, but please, understand this basic point.

Merely stating that inception of a first cause is a case of: "It is what it is." amounts to a case of you dodging behind axiomatic jargon amounts to a case of you dodging behind axiomatic jargon that's first cousin to street vernacular: "Hey, man. I don't know what else I can tell ya. It is what it is." — ucarr

Ha! But no. The logical argument has always been there ucarr. Try to show it to be wrong anytime.

Here's the dodge: You claim a priori knowledge of the reality of first causes, then evade the work of empirical investigation by claiming the just-ising of first causes into our phenomenal universe. — ucarr

1. I already told you I don't believe in a priori knowledge.
2. I note that at least one first cause is logically necessary wherever causality exists.
3. I have never claimed this was an empirical conclusion, and have constantly stated that if one is to claim any one thing in this universe is a first cause, they must prove it.

So the rest of your argument is moot. Please try to address the argument as I do specifically and counter what it and I have been saying, not what you believe I'm implying.

You can't establish it as a logical consequence if you can't show and explain how randomness morphs into a dynamic organizer of something. You're hiding another homunculus. It's the homunculus that confers onto randomness organizational powers. — ucarr

No, you are attributing there being something else behind the first cause. You can't help it. =) There is nothing Ucarr. Nothing. There is no organizer. There is no existent 'randomness' behind the scenes that's shuffling through like a slot machine. True randomness is merely a description to grasp potential. That is all.

Also, you need to argue why something-from-nothing as a logical consequence is not an ad absurdum reductio. If you can't defend against such a conclusion, then first cause is non-existent. — ucarr

Please take the argument I've presented for why a first cause is logically necessary and point out where it falls into ad absurdum reductio.

Your conclusion is not a self-evident truth -- since you claim to disavow self-evident truths, why are you claiming one here? Also, don't jump to the conclusion something outside of reality is self-evidently absurd: √−1=i — ucarr

I am not claiming a self-evident truth. Ucarr, you have a bad habit of using terminology that I don't use as if I am using that terminology. I don't use that terminology intentionally. If you're going to introduce something, ask me like you've been doing, "Are you saying that a first cause is self-evident?" Because my answer is "No".

As to reality, if reality refers to everything, there isn't something that exists outside of that set. That's logical.

It seems likely your use of randomness facilitates circular reasoning within your head.
— ucarr

I don't see how this is circular. Please explain.
— Philosophim

There's no organized run-up to the just-ising of first causes, so they are because they are. Your tautology is your shield. — ucarr

1. This is not circular.
2. I have a clear argument that leads to the conclusion. I'm not saying, "There is at least one first cause because I say so." I gave you a summary of the argument already if you need to reference it.

Ucarr, something I've noticed is you say I'm implying or asserting things that I have not implied or asserted.
— Philosophim

It's your job to refute my interpretations of what you write with cogent arguments. — ucarr

Ok, and one of the ways I do so is by asking you to focus on what's actually being stated instead of what you imagine is being stated. That's a fair request for a good discussion right? I don't want to continue to address straw man's. Please ask if you believe I'm intending something first before accusing me of it.

Can you explain how first cause -- sourced in nothing -- and causing subsequent causal chain which cannot exist without its sourced-in-nothing first cause, can spawn anything other than nothingness?
— ucarr

Sure. Because there is no constraint as to what a first cause can be.
— Philosophim

So, first cause, like a deity, can create anything. Also, first cause, like a deity, cannot be explained causally. Instead, first causes and deities just are. — ucarr

I've already explained this several times, so please listen. It is possible. Possible. Not certain. Not is. Not necessarily. It is possible, that a first cause could create anything. However, it would cause what it created, those things would not be first causes themselves.

Sure, a deity is possible, but so is anything else. Meaning a deity is not necessary to explain anything. A deity could exist for five minutes and vanish. A deity could be good, bad, sad, mad, rad, etc. Or it could be some rocks appeared. Or a demonic unicorn. Or simply a photon. You are still narrowing your scope of true randomness, which is to be expected. All of our notions of randomness are really limits on what we can measure. In this case, its truly unlimited randomness.

If the source of something is nothing, how can it cause anything other than what caused it, nothingness?
— ucarr

Because that's what it is.
— Philosophim

You don't need an argument to support this because its nature is by definition, right? — ucarr

Correct. This is required for the definition of a 'first cause' to be logically consistent.

A first cause is simply the start of all other causation in that chain. You're over complicating it again. A -> B -> C Nothing caused A. Keep it simple Ucarr.
— Philosophim

You're the one suggesting randomness caused first cause. You're the one suggesting the questionable equation between randomness and nothingness. — ucarr

You are the one overcomplicating it. :)

This again doesn't explain anything to me. What specifically in Wittgenstein's silent vigil is being evoked as you see it? Lots of people have very different opinions on what Wittgenstein was referring to. So I'll need your particular take to understand what you mean.
— Philosophim

I'm speculating about your first causes just-ising into being as examples of ineffable creation. — ucarr

Inception, not creation.

Ok, all done replying! Ucarr, we're sort of narrowing down the point to one major thing I see now. You're having a difficult time letting go of there being something that causes a first cause. Be it implicit, its still there. I am trying to be clear with my language, so please use the arguments and language that I give instead of attributing ideas that I am not intending, as If I'm intending them. Just check with me first if you think I'm implying more than I've written.

And thank you for being very discerning and thinking about this at length. I don't want to come across as if I think you're not doing a fantastic job. You are. I'm enjoying the discussion.

I already argue that spacetime is needed for any change and you agreed with it. — MoK

Yes, and I made two points you'll have to consider.

1. We have nothing, then spacetime. Change happened with spacetime.
2. There is nothing in your argument that proves nothing cannot come before spacetime.

Could we agree that there is no point before the beginning of time? Yes or no. — MoK

Before the beginning of spacetime? Lets assume yes for the argument. In which case, nothing came before spacetime. Its either nothing, or something. There are no other options.

In the case of first causes, the evidential bar is so high, that it is more plausible by far to believe that it will never be met, except in the context of a specific theory, which is far from conclusive. — Ludwig V

Exactly, well said Ludwig!

You're saying the domain of this conversation is a logical examination of what follows within a causal chain in the wake of its first cause? — ucarr

I'm saying at least one first cause is logically necessary, and the consequences of that being so.

There is no prior or external cause. Typically saying, "self-cause" implies that there is first a self, then a cause. That's not what I'm intending. There is no conscious or outside intent.
— Philosophim

I'm guessing you're excluding consideration of self-organizing, complex systems that are not conscious. — ucarr

I'm not including or excluding anything but defining what a first cause is, and what that means for us.

I'm guessing you're saying first causes can only be interacted with as givens. There's no way to approach a first cause mentally. The only mental reaction possible to the existence of a first cause is acceptance of it as a given, as an unsearchable fact. — ucarr

If you have discovered and proven something is a first cause, then yes. There's nothing else to consider about what caused it to exist.

Its illogical to claim that something which has nothing prior that caused its existence, has nothing prior that caused its existence.
— Philosophim

Is this your description of circular reasoning? — ucarr

No. If there is a first X in a causal chain, there cannot be something prior which causes that first X.
A -> B -> C A is the first. You can't then say 1 -> A because then A was never the first, 1 was. This is about discovery, this is about what actually is first, whether we know that its first or not.

If just-ising is the dead-end of physics and its examinations, then, yes, the domain of causality post-first-cause suspports science. However, the fundamentals as first causes are beyond reach of science. This renders post-causality science permanently incomplete. — ucarr

Correct on the first part, but it doesn't render it permanently incomplete. Finding limits is part of completeness. Science is just as often about asserting what we cannot know as much as what we can know.

Are you sure an unsearchable beginning doesn't dovetail with eternal existence? — ucarr

Positive. Our ability to know it is irrelevant to what it is. Its entirely possible a first cause could start to exist at any time. That would be its beginning. If one does, has, or will, whether we discover it or not does not deny its logical possibility and then existent reality.

Something happening by just-ising from nothing seems to preclude energy, animation, forces and material, not to mention an environment of similar composition. — ucarr

Correct. Its not that all of these things can't incept, its just that nothing else causes them to incept.

When you exhort the reader to instantaneously accept the just-ising into being as a something divorced from everything save nothing, you're cryptically doing away with physics-yet-magically-assuming-it because you present without explanation some means of a human perceiving this change out of nothingness with his/her powers of perception intact, or is QM entanglement of observer/object not in effect with observation of a first cause aborning? — ucarr

In my many replies I've been very consistent about this. Remember when you asked me, "Can there be a hydrogen atom that can do things that a hydrogen atom can't?" Recall what I said. I noted that a hydrogen atom is defined as having particular properties. If it doesn't have those properties, its not a hydrogen atom, its something else by our definitions.

Physics is a tool of definitions and measurements that are consistently applied to the world. The possibility of first causes does not destroy what physics is. It may amend it, as all discoveries do. Yes, a first cause is a logical consideration. But it must be proven. We can't just go about saying, "That's a first cause because we don't understand it." Not understanding it means it might be a first cause, but only after exhausting all possible causal influences which could have caused that thing to exist.

Regardless, a small adjustment to physics is not a reason to deny a logical conclusion. A logical conclusion is what it is. We don't deny it simply because we don't like what results from it. We have to deny it by showing there's a flaw in the logic, or accepting it and adapting.

You seem to be implying a priori knowledge permanently partitioned from empirical experience of ultimate causes and therefore uncorroborated independently are sufficient for belief in unsearchable first causes. — ucarr

Can you break this up a bit so I can understand this better? I'm not quite sure what you're saying here.

It sounds like a hypothetical conjecture that excludes physics. If true randomness has no relationship with first causes, why do you even mention it? — ucarr

Because its the logical consequence of nothing coming from something. There is nothing to push, or restrict anything which is not caused by anything else. A restriction is an outside cause. Same with a push. Lets look at it this way. If a first cause was 60% likely to be an atom, and 40% likely to be a photon, there would be the question, "What causes these odds?" Meaning we're not really looking at a first cause.

Since a first cause has no prior cause, there is no outside cause that states, "This is more likely/less likely to appear. This must exist at this time." There are not outside causes, so no outside rules that shape or limit what a first cause can be.

Think about it another way Ucarr. Why does reality exist at all? Was there anything outside of reality which caused reality? Of course not. Meaning there was nothing that ruled that it had to be this way.

It seems likely your use of randomness facilitates circular reasoning within your head. — ucarr

I don't see how this is circular. Please explain.

Now, you're going to say first causes might govern our lives through the causal chains they author. — ucarr

Ucarr, something I've noticed is you say I'm implying or asserting things that I have not implied or asserted. Try to avoid this in the future please. If you believe my logic leads somewhere, just point out how you think it leads there.

Since first causes just-is their way into our world, there's no physics -- time, matter or vectors -- attached to their arrival. Sounds like a priori speculation without possibility of corroboration. — ucarr

Its just a logical conclusion, not an empirical assertion. Just like Einstein hypothesized the theory of relativity and his math checked out, it wasn't until they could test it that it could be considered empirically verified. I have never claimed this has been empirically verified, only logically necessary.

Now, if a first cause is ever empirically verified, it would then be a theory in physics. Right now its just a logical assertion. That's pretty much what philosophy does.

Can you explain how first cause -- sourced in nothing -- and causing subsequent causal chain which cannot exist without its sourced-in-nothing first cause, can spawn anything other than nothingness? — ucarr

Sure. Because there is no constraint as to what a first cause can be.

If the source of something is nothing, how can it cause anything other than what caused it, nothingness? — ucarr

Because that's what it is.

To continue, if nothing becomes something and causes subsequent somethings, how can you claim causal supervenience across a causal chain? Don't you have to maintain that original nothingness in order to claim supervenience? If so, then causal chains are really nothing — ucarr

A first cause is simply the start of all other causation in that chain. You're over complicating it again. A -> B -> C Nothing caused A. Keep it simple Ucarr. :)

I'm not sure what you're trying to say here either, could you go into more detail ucarr? Thanks.
— Philosophim

Your first causes from nothing might be invoking Wittgenstein's silent vigil over what cannot be spoken of. — ucarr

This again doesn't explain anything to me. What specifically in Wittgenstein's silent vigil is being evoked as you see it? Lots of people have very different opinions on what Wittgenstein was referring to. So I'll need your particular take to understand what you mean.

On the contrary, I'm suggesting true randomness cannot be contemplated because it deranges the foundational order of thinking. — ucarr

It simply causes us to consider something we have not considered before. This does not disrupt thinking or logic. Its merely a continuation and updating of what we can consider.

...there is something prior that exists within the causal chain of the first cause up to the first cause itself.
— ucarr

Okay, for the record, this isn't you intending to say something exists prior to the first cause? Can you restate your intended meaning; I don't know how to read your above quote except as you saying something exists prior to the first cause. — ucarr

Ucarr, the context of the statement is implying the first cause of that specific chain. Not the 'first' first cause ever. Let me be clear and unambiguous. A first cause cannot be caused by something prior. So if you ever think I'm saying that, know that I'm not and you've misread the intent.

A causes B causes C is a causal chain. Every point within that chain has a prior point except the first cause.
— Philosophim

I don't know how to read this except as a contradiction to the statement I addressed directly above. — ucarr

If the start of a causal chain is a first cause A, the following results are caused by the previous set of existence. Potentially we could have many first causes, chain 1, 2, 3, etc. and they would all follow this pattern.

The logical conclusion is that there must be at least one first cause.
— Philosophim

How can you justify logically the existence of a first cause that simply is? — ucarr

That's the entire point of the post. :D I thought you assumed the logic leading to this conclusion was correct, then asking about the consequences of it. I'll summarize it again.

If we don't know whether our universe has finite or infinite chains of causality A -> B -> C etc...

Lets say there's a finite chain of causality. What caused a finite causal chain to exist instead of something else? There is no prior reason, it simply is.

Lets say there's an infinite chain of causality. What caused an infinite causal chain to exist instead of something else? There is no prior reason, it simply is.

It is impossible for there to not be at least one first cause. Therefore we know that first causes are possible, and have no reason for their existence besides the fact they exist.

I think you imply self-causation in the case of a first cause. Since, by definition, nothing causal leads to a first cause, it follows implicitly that a first cause, if not eternal and uncaused, causes the inception of itself. — ucarr

This may just be a language issue. There is no prior or external cause. Typically saying, "self-cause" implies that there is first a self, then a cause. That's not what I'm intending. There is no conscious or outside intent. It just is. That is the answer. Nothing more.

What about a first-cause hydrogen atom? Doesn't it have to incept ex nihilo? — ucarr

Yes.

Let me repeat my earlier question in a different way: Doesn't every first-cause entity have to self-incept ex nihilo? — ucarr

Yes.

a) not self-caused; b) not caused by anything else; c) possibly extant, it follows logically that your first-cause entities, if they exist, have always existed. — ucarr

It is possible that a first cause has always existed, yes.

Given your limitations, can you name any other possibilities? — ucarr

Yes. A first cause may have existed for five minutes and vanished, however its causal influence persists to today. Perhaps a first cause appeared as a big bang, and the result is a universe. Perhaps a first cause will appear for a nanosecond then disappear. There are no limitations.

Let's look at your first-cause entities from a slightly different angle: with your description, they're not eternal, and thus they must begin. — ucarr

No. They can be eternal. Nothing external caused their existence.

If there's a point where something doesn't exist, and then a later point when it does exist, its logically necessary that this something began to exist by some means. How else can we understand the transition from nothing to something? — ucarr

Its illogical to claim that something which has nothing prior that caused its existence, has nothing prior that caused its existence. Only the minds rebellion based on previous experience thinks otherwise. You understand the transition because it happened. That's it. That's the start of causality and the end of our questions up the causal chain.

If you say first-cause entities have no causation whatsoever, and yet are not eternal, then you're positing a universe wherein science is not possible. — ucarr

Incorrect. We just have to keep open that possibility that a first cause could happen. As I've mentioned, proving that any particular one thing is a first cause is a very high bar to reach. As soon as one proven element of external causality comes into play, what we're looking at can't be a first cause.

We both know that's not our universe. — ucarr

No we don't.

Finally, by the two previous arguments, first cause as you define it is self-contradictory: not caused means no beginning; no beginning but not always existing means not beginning to exist, so existing means not not beginning to exist, which means not not caused... — ucarr

Not caused doesn't mean a first cause doesn't have a beginning. The beginning is the first cause itself. Two seconds from now a first cause atom could potentially appear then disappear. It had a beginning, a middle, and an end.

Why is true randomness -- completely unpredictable and unlimited, but active -- not the cause of what you call first cause? — ucarr

True randomness is a description to understand the possibilities of a first cause. It is not a thing that exists that causes first causes. Just like saying a dice has a 1/6 chance of landing on one side, does not mean our created odds caused it to land on that side.

How can you perceive nothing then something with nothing temporal or existential or directional? If time is not essential then: Nothing then something is the cheating liar homunculus in the randomness. — ucarr

I did not understand this question, could you clarify please?

Since every link in a causal chain is sourced in nothing, there's ultimately no distinction between first cause and links in a causal chain. — ucarr

I don't see how you conclude this. If a causal chain is A -> B -> C, B causes C, A causes B, but nothing causes A. That's a clear distinction.

There are no constraints in nothing, so constraint and causality cannot erase the signature of nothing stamped upon them.

Randomness won't countenance links in a causal chain, so talk of links in causal chains is distraction which cannot distract from Wittegenstein's silence. — ucarr

I'm not sure what you're trying to say here either, could you go into more detail ucarr? Thanks.

Seems like we're going round and round here at this point. Which is fine, it just means its likely time to end it.

Well, if nothing to spacetime is a change then we need spacetime for it! That is true since spacetime is necessary for any change. — MoK

But if spacetime appears, we have spacetime. If you're saying we need spacetime before spacetime, that doesn't make any sense. The only thing you've noted is that we need spacetime for other changes besides spacetime itself. You have not proven, only asserted, that spacetime cannot come from nothing. That doesn't work. Prove it, and you have an argument. If not, you're stuck.

But spacetime is a substance, and has the property of time. You can't say spacetime existed before time.
— Philosophim
True, and that is the problem. Saying that nothing exists before the beginning of time assumes that there is a point at which nothing exists at that point. — MoK

Its not an assumption, its a logical conclusion based on your point. If you say spacetime has a beginning, and spacetime is the only way for other things to change, there can only have been nothing before spacetime. You can't win on this one Mok. If you say, "Begin" that implies there was something before. If there was not something before, then nothing was before. And if you say something was before, then it looks like something can cause spacetime to appear. And if that's the case, what is that something? So either way, you cannot prove that something cannot come from nothing with your current set up.

We have to agree whether nothing to spacetime is a change or not. Yes or no? — MoK

Yes. :) And the above still applies.

(1) There is no point before the beginning of time. — MoK

If there is no point prior to spacetime (remember, you noted earlier time cannot exist alone, its a property of spacetime) then there is nothing.

If there was such a point then it means that spacetime exists before the beginning of time so what we assume as the beginning of time is not the beginning of time — MoK

But spacetime is a substance, and has the property of time. You can't say spacetime existed before time. That would be like saying my red hat existed before red. Its not about what we assume to be the beginning of time, its about if there is something before time.

(2) Nothing to something is impossible which is the subject of discussion. — MoK

Right, but as its been noted, that's your conclusion. If you assume the conclusion is true, you haven't proven the conclusion is true. Its just a belief at that point.

With how you've defined everything, you've worked yourself into a corner. You can't have something before spacetime, which means that nothing was before spacetime. And you can't have infinite amount of time that has passed prior to now, which means spacetime couldn't have always existed. But keep trying!

Ok, I can simplify this even further. I think we can agree that spacetime is necessary for change. I think we can agree that nothing to spacetime is a change as well. This means that we need spacetime for this change, nothing to spacetime. — MoK

No, I don't think so because what you've concluded is that we need spacetime for other changes besides spacetime. You haven't proven that spacetime itself cannot come from nothing. We could also say change must involve spacetime. Nothing to something is a change, and it involves spacetime.

So if we agree that nothing to something is not possible then it follows that it is improper to say that there was nothing before the beginning of time. — MoK

This is assuming the conclusion is assuming the conclusion is true. This is classical logical fallacy called "Begging the question". If the only way your premises work is if you assume the conclusion is true, then nothing has been proven.

I think it was a good start, but you've reached the logical end with the premises and definitions you've put forth. I'm not saying you shouldn't keep trying, but at this point you'll need a new tact. Either new definitions, or a revision of premises is required.

I could easily deal with 3. as well, but that takes the thread away from the spectacular leap from a first cause being something imaginable to an existential realm. — jgill

Does it? What caused 3? What caused the line to be drawn that particular way instead of any other way? And if there is nothing that caused it to be drawn that particular way, then what prevents another line from being drawn a different way?

At any moment in time, there is something prior that exists within the causal chain of the first cause up to the first cause itself.
— Philosophim

With this claim how are you not deconstructing the central premise of your thesis? — ucarr

A causes B causes C is a causal chain. Every point within that chain has a prior point except the first cause.

To specifically state, "This first cause must have happened" requires us to prove it exists/existed.
— Philosophim

Are you saying knowledge of a first cause can only be empirical, not a priori? So, this gives your claim the status of a proposition made as a basis for reasoning, without any assumption of truth? — ucarr

The logical conclusion is that there must be at least one first cause. But if I'm going to claim, "This X is a first cause", it must be proven empirically, or with unwavering evidence. Meaning if I claimed "This atom is a first cause", I would need to prove it.

This is correct reasoning, but it suggests your claim needs to be altered to: Any logical first cause is possible — ucarr

A fine suggestion, but I'm not going to change it to that because I don't think its necessary and it would confuse other people. Sometimes you can't win with phrasing alone, you just have to walk through what things mean.

A first cause does not need to have any imposition, consciousness, or awareness of itself. It simply is.
— Philosophim

Again, this is either self-causation or eternal existence without creation. — ucarr

I don't use the term self-causation because that can convey the intent that the first cause actively caused itself. That's not what I'm saying here. Second, a first cause does not need to be eternal. As I mentioned before, a first cause could appear and dissipate later. Its best to keep it simple. It just is. It exists without prior cause.

.we do not identify a hydrogen atom as being able to create ex nihilo.
— ucarr

You're not talking about causation of something within an established causal chain, such as our sun assembling hydrogen atoms within its elements-generating furnace. If you were, you wouldn't have used the verb: create. — ucarr

I am talking about causation of something within an established causal chain. If I recall you were using the word create, so I followed suit. Creation is one form of causation. Just use causation if you don't like creation.

The first cause is not free of causal logic either, it is the start.
— Philosophim

This is more evidence you imply first causes are self-caused. — ucarr

Again, this is not what is intended. A first cause does not cause itself. A first cause is not caused by anything. Its just there. Its extremely simple, don't overcomplicate it by adding in the term 'self'. :)

A first cause does not necessitate that it be able to do anything.
— Philosophim

No, can you add a little more to what you mean here?
— Philosophim

You've saying a cause, first or otherwise, must act causally. So why do you also say (per the above quote) that it isn't necessary that a cause be able to to anything, which is a way of saying it's not compelled to act causally. — ucarr

Ucarr, you keep pulling this sentence out of context. Let me clarify the context so you understand what this is referring to.

You said: "Why do you say above statement is not knowledge of the identity of the first cause? I ask this question because you identify first cause as what acts without limitation in causing the inception of creation."

You were implying that a first cause had to be the inception of all creation. You were implying to me that it had to be a particular way.

I replied with:
"No, I did not claim a first cause is the inception of all creation. A first cause is the inception of a causality chain. The entirety of our universe may very well be explained by several first causes over time culminating in today. A first cause does not necessitate that it be able to do anything."

The "anything" just meant that it did not have to be anything in particular like the inception of all creation.

So no, I'm not saying that its not compelled to act causally or anything else outside of the context of the above subject.

When describing these phenomena, you say vague things such as: a hydrogen atom forms ex nihilo, or you say even vaguer things such as: a hydrogen atom as first cause simply is, or There is no prior imposition. — ucarr

This is not vague. This is what it is. Nothing then something. There's nothing else. Vagueness would assume I'm implying something else right? I'm not.

Does an atom will itself to exist? It is by the forces outside of its control. — ucarr

No. No will. No self. No other. Nothing then something. That's it.

This is axiomatic jargon, not science. — ucarr

This is a logical conclusion, not jargon. Jargon would imply I'm just throwing words together without thought care, or definitions. There may be a little language barrier between us that we're working out Ucarr, so don't get frustrated yet. :)

Its also never purported to be science. Its logically necessary there be at least one first cause. I'm not claiming any empirical fact of "X (Insert whatever variable you want) is the/a first cause". I'm not saying the big bang is or isn't a first cause for example. I'm just noting what a first cause is, that one is logically necessary, and what we can conclude from that being true.

I believe it may be possible in some instances for us to find a first cause scientifically.
— Philosophim

Can you elaborate some specific details pertaining to how cosmologists can go about finding a first cause? — ucarr

Certainly.

1. All forms of prior causality must be ruled out. This is extremely demanding.
2. To rule out all forms of prior causality, all prior events to the first cause should indicate that X should not happen, and yet it does.

Can you provide a proof for:
truth is what it is
— Philosophim — ucarr

Sure. A man believes to the point that he knows he can fly if he jumps off a 50 story building. He jumps. The truth is, he cannot. To not detract from what we're doing here however, you may want to visit my other work on knowledge. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14044/knowledge-and-induction-within-your-self-context/p1

As for axioms, I believe axioms must be proven, not 'given'.
— Philosophim

You should consult your dictionary, unless you want to start a conversation explaining how you're redefining "axiom." — ucarr

I did not introduce the word axiom in the discussion. You brought it up and I was just noting I believe that nothing is self-evident but must be worked through. I'm not sure this line of thinking is anything more important than an aside, though, so may be an irrelevant to the scope of the discussion.

Since you think first causes are logically necessary, why do you say they're possible instead of saying they're necessary? — ucarr

No, I think it is necessary there is at least one first cause. Its possible that there are more. I think your confusion is you think I'm ascribing something like a self, or a will, or something else that causes the first cause to first be. There is nothing prior. Without any prior cause for a first cause to exist, there can be no predetermination or influence. It is the definition of real chaos. Not limited randomness. Absolute, unpredictable, anything goes randomness.

To clarify, "randomness" is just a mathematical approach we take when we are limited in our ability to measure or observe all the causes that go into an outcome until after the outcome is finished. A die roll is not 'truly random'. It has sides and obeys the physics and forces upon it. If we could dissect and observe every bit of force that would impact the object ahead of time, we would always know the outcome of the die. We say "1 in six" chance of any side popping up only because we can't know ahead of time what will pop up. But its all causal.

True randomness has nothing to measure. There are no prior constraints. There's no set up. There's nothing, then something. That's a first cause. Completely unpredictable and unlimited as what it could be before it happens.