less war > more peace > less money spent on ordnance > available to spend otherwise; eg food, schools — Vera Mont

Sorry, I got it backwards. Now I understand that you meant savings on ordnance and not on school lunches. :lol:

If it is in our nature to do bad, how can it at the same time not be in our nature to do good? — kudos

It is in the nature of one to do good and in the nature of the other to do bad; we're not all the same, are we?

What you say is that we should expect moral law, custom, and rule to be transgressed. — kudos

I am not saying that we should expect this, but rather that this has been observed many times throughout history.

Doesn’t this seem ridiculous to you? — kudos

No, it makes me rather sad. I would wish that all people were good, but unfortunately that is not the case. Do you disagree?

Think of the money we'd save for schools lunches - and schools to serve them in! — Vera Mont

I don't understand: more peace, less school? How come?

I feel like moral life is a difficult beast. It entangles us in words, representations, and ideas. But none of it makes sense unless one chooses to be moral. — kudos

I, too, was confused by the concepts of morality for a long time. But by now, my confusion has subsided. Morality is good at defining good and evil, i. e. what we would like others (and ourselves) to do. But it is bad at making people do good and avoid evil. (I am talking about adults.)

Many still believe that expressing our desire for people to be good is enough to get them to be good. It is not enough to say "Be good!" but that is essentially what moralists of all times have said. I think it's also what Tucholsky meant when he said:

"We ought to. But we don't."

Or Mark Twain:

"No creature can be honorably required to go counter to the law of his nature -- the Law of God."
- Mark Twain Letters from the Earth

It is true, it does no harm to say "Be good!" but it is also useless, at least in my opinion. People always do what is in accordance with their nature: good people do good and evil people do evil. Not even the threat of eternal hell punishments have stopped people from doing evil.

I would be happy if humanity were united under a single government. Then there would be no borders and no wars. No country would invade its neighbor for lack of neighbors. No one would build bombs, tanks, fighter jets or warships.

Nahhh….that’s not what he’s doing. He’s showing how the moral subject contradicts himself — Mww

Only the first sentence from the quote is indirect speech, but everything from "Now, although ..." onward represents Kant's own opinion as to why it is reasonable to obey the categorical imperative.

By the way, I have found a passage in the "Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals" that, in my opinion, can serve as evidence that Kant justifies the categorical imperative with self-interest, thus contradicting himself. Therefore, I would say that his "categorical imperative" reveals itself as a "hypothetical imperative" .

Here is the quote:

"Still another finds himself in comfortable circumstances while he sees others in great need (and he could easily help them too): What concern of mine is it? Let everyone be as happy as heaven wills or as he can make himself, I will take nothing from him nor even envy him; only I have no desire to contribute to his well-being or to assist him in his trouble! Now, although such an outlook might become a universal natural law, it is nevertheless impossible to will that a maxim of this kind should hold everywhere as a law of nature. For a will that resolved this would contradict itself, inasmuch as cases could often occur in which one would need the love and sympathy of others, and by such a law of nature, sprung from his own will, he would rob himself of all hope of the assistance he wishes for."

The justification for altruism is based on the consideration that one might also benefit from the altruism of others. The question of why one should act morally is thus answered by stating that this principle of altruism is beneficial to oneself.

Therefore, moral action serves a purpose (at least in this example, but it is only one of four), and is therefore not selfless but rather purpose-driven, and thus not "categorical" but "hypothetical" in Kant's own terminology.

Kant is still top of my list in this domain, nobody else I’ve encountered has dug deeper yet. — kudos

With Kant, I have my difficulties when he says:

"Being charitable wherever possible is a duty, and besides, there are some souls so disposed to empathy that they find inner pleasure in spreading joy around them, even without any other motivating factor of vanity or self-interest, and they can delight in the satisfaction of others, even if it is not their own achievement. But I maintain that in such a case, actions of this kind, as dutiful and amiable as they may be, still lack true moral value and are on par with other inclinations, such as the inclination for honor, which, if it fortunately aligns with what is genuinely beneficial and dutiful, is deserving of praise and encouragement but not esteem; for the maxim lacks moral content, namely, to perform such actions not out of inclination but out of duty."

Therefore, Friedrich Schiller made fun of him with the following satirical poem:

"Conscience Scruples:

I gladly serve my friends
but unfortunately, I do it with inclination
and so it often vexes me
that I am not virtuous.

Decisium:

There is no other advice
you must seek to despise them
and then with disgust, do
what duty commands you."

I really like this aphorism. — kudos

Me too. Unfortunately, I know too little about the author to know what exactly he was trying to say. Perhaps he wanted to express his disappointment with German society at the beginning of the 20th century.

I myself use it in the sense that all people, even the friendliest among them, invariably and at all times inevitably pursue their own interests and inclinations.

I really like this aphorism. I feel like moral life is a difficult beast. It entangles us in words, representations, and ideas. But none of it makes sense unless one chooses to be moral. This is why most famed philosophers utterly fail to write coherently about it. — kudos

What about John Leslie Mackie and his book "ETHICS Inventing Right and Wrong". His views seem fairly consistent to me.

My intuition says self-interest is probably inescapable, but this comes in soft and hard versions and we need to recognize that self-interest is not incompatible with altruism. — Tom Storm

Psychologists say that self-interest is indeed inescapable. As for the soft and hard versions, it is rather not about different versions but about different interests: Some people are more interested in universal harmony and cooperation, others only in loving their own family and perhaps their animals. Some love the money, others the feeling of being okay and helping others.

A little hint: even aid organizations recruit new members by emphasizing how much it gives you when you help others and experience gratitude, according to the motto "helping makes happy".

A second hint: In his "Faust" drama, Goethe has his hero exclaim, "Stay yet! you are so beautiful!" With this, he wants to stop the moment of supreme happiness he feels when helping the flood victims.

If you want to rant that everyone must be as selfish and run by emotions as you, then go ahead. There are plenty of us in life who work to overcome emotions because they understand that some outcomes are better for the world then their own pleasure or happiness. The fact that you don't believe it says everything about yourself. You need to go meet more people in the world. Go volunteer at a place you don't want to. Do something that you know is right, but makes you uncomfortable. Then think about it. You need to experience it for yourself before you start making judgement about other people. — Philosophim

I don't want to rant about anyone. I too do things that I know are right, but it doesn't make me uncomfortable - quite the opposite. I wasn't passing judgment on you or anyone else, instead I was talking about some basic psychological principles that you seem to be completely unfamiliar with. I am passionate about psychology and brain research and have read a few books about it, by Eric Kandel, David Eagleman, Daniel Dennett, Daniel Kahnemann, Oliver Sacks and others. I was just reflecting the state of the science. If you feel personally offended by that, I'm sorry.

By the way, try to remember when you were stuck in a traffic jam and were happy for the other side because they had a free ride. A true altruist in such a situation would say to himself, "I'm so glad it hit me and not them!"

I do not receive ANYTHING for giving my money away. This should be clear. — Philosophim

I believe that you get a good feeling about it, and a good feeling is more than NOTHING. It represents a value in itself, and not a small one.

This good feeling can be triggered from person to person by different things: for one person by money, for another by power, attention, love, gratitude, sociability, favorite pastime ... etc. — Jacques

People interpret some of these motivations as being selfless, but in truth there is no such thing as selfless motivation.

True, but meaningless. — Vera Mont

True, but not meaningless. Why should it be?

Its not for personal benefit like going to the movies or something. Trust me, I can find far more ways to enjoy the money and I wouldn't feel a twinge of guilt. Not everything is about personal benefit. — Philosophim

But then why did you contradict yourself by your previous assertions:

"I will never meet anyone who benefitted from it or gain anything more than a slight emotional satisfaction from it."

"It is better for me to donate, so I do."

Please decide whether you have benefited or not. You cannot have both at the same time.

No, that's not how morality works. When it works.
Who determines the "ought to"? Who obeys it, under what conditions? Who disobeys it, under what conditions? Human motivation is never, not even in the first five years of life, as simple as calculating benefit. — Vera Mont

If I interpret Tucholsky correctly, he does not want to show how morality works, but rather that it does not work at all, at least not for adult people. What we "ought to" is demanded by moralists, philosophers, theologians, teachers and parents. Who obeys it? I think children are the most likely to do it.

Human motivation is based on reward from the reward center in the brain rather than on calculation. In my opinion, the benefit is mainly a good feeling. This good feeling can be triggered from person to person by different things: for one person by money, for another by power, attention, love, gratitude, sociability, favorite pastime ... etc.

This statement can refer to anything, not to a moral issue in particular. — Alkis Piskas

You're right about that, but if it can refer to anything, it can also refer to morality.

As for the context, there is none, since it is an aphorism that stands alone. You can verify it here. It is the penultimate aphorism on that page.

It is better for me to donate, so I do. — Philosophim

Hi, Philosophim,

that's exactly what I meant: you donate because it's better for you.

I don't think that it's really accurate to say that Newton showed that Aristotle was wrong or that Einstein showed that Newton was wrong — Ludwig V

And I don't think it's accurate to say that Hume intended to show that Newton was wrong. I think that his intention was completely different.

I think things are simpler than they appear in this discussion. For my part, I believe that one can very well make predictions based on scientific calculations. The only thing we cannot say is why these principles must be valid tomorrow. We can only say that, as far as we know, they have held true without exception up to now, and that we hope they will hold true tomorrow.

I agree with Hume's criticism of induction, as indicated. I just don't agree with how he proceeds from there. That the problem exists is really quite evident, but I think that Hume moves in the wrong direction, toward portraying it as unresolvable rather than toward finding principles to resolve it. — Metaphysician Undercover

Hi, Undercover, I'm starting to get it. :smile: You agree with Hume about identifying the problem, but you believe there is a solution, now do I have it? I need to reread your previous posts to see if I get your solution and if I agree with it.

That things behaved in such and such a way in the past, is not sufficient to produce the necessity to imply that they will necessarily behave this way in the future. What is needed is another premise which states that the future will be similar to the past. But this again appears to be just a more general form of the same inductive principle, How things have been in the past, will continue to be how they are in the future. So we do not escape the trap of relying on induction, and this does not give us the desired necessity, or certainty. — Metaphysician Undercover

But that is word for word exactly what Hume says. I thought you were against Hume's thesis. :chin:

To better understand my point of view, I would like to give an example:

The electric attraction between an electron and a proton can be described by Coulomb's law, which is given by:

F = (k * q1 * q2) / r^2

This formula has worked brilliantly since its invention until today, but is there a formula that guarantees that Coulomb's law will still be valid tomorrow?

Hi @Count Timothy von Icarus, thank you for your very interesting post.

If anyone said that information about the past could not convince him that something would happen in the future, I should not understand him. One might ask him: what do you expect to be told, then? What sort of information do you call a ground for such a belief? … If these are not grounds, then what are grounds?—If you say these are not grounds, then you must surely be able to state what must be the case for us to have the right to say that there are grounds for our assumption….

-Wittgenstein

I am not the man to say that information about the past could not convince me that something similar will happen in the future. I would be confident that it will happen again in the same way, I just couldn't say what my confidence is based on. That is Hume's point.

Do you know of any law that guarantees the future will necessarily correspond to the past? I for one currently believe there is none. You named a few in your post and I will try to understand and address them soon.

@Metaphysician Undercover, @Ludwig V, @Count Timothy von Icarus

Please tell me what your rationale is for believing that the future will resemble the past.

I don't think you have this quite right. The point Hume makes is that the assumption that the future will be similar to the past cannot be justified by experience, — Metaphysician Undercover

You are right, the assumption about the future cannot be justified by experience either, it cannot be justified by anything.

@Count Timothy von Icarus @Metaphysician Undercover

I believe that Hume meant to say that in mathematics we can gain new knowledge by mere thinking, but in the natural sciences we cannot. For example, if we want to know how two balls will behave when they collide, without having observed a single collision of any objects before, we cannot find out by calculation or thinking.

So we have to do the experiment, we let the balls collide against each other more often from different directions and speeds and note the respective behavior.

Before the next collision, we can now calculate, based on our experience, what will happen, but only based on the assumption that the balls will behave as they did in the previous collisions. The assumption that the future will be similar to the past, however, cannot be justified by any calculation but only by experience.

@Metaphysician Undercover

Ok, let's suppose Hume is wrong. Then try to solve the following problem: A billiard ball rolls toward a second billiard ball. Try to figure out (before they meet) what will happen when the two balls meet and state what method you used to do it.

By what reasoning do you find out whether the balls will attract each other, whether they will bounce off each other and in what direction, whether they will penetrate each other, or disintegrate, or explode, or ... or ...?

@Metaphysician Undercover

Why do you have to keep clinging to single words like "reasoning"? Hume also uses other expressions for what he means, such as "scrutiny" and "examination". What is important is the meaning of these words, all three stand for thinking, reasoning, combining or whatever contributes to finding a solution to a question. Ultimately, he means an effort of the mind. And his thesis is that one cannot derive an effect from a cause by thinking alone. This is only possible by observation.

Please consider the following example of two billiard-balls used by Hume

to illustrate his thesis that cause and effect are entirely distinct events, where the idea of the latter is in no way contained in the idea of the former (EHU 4.9; SBN 29):

The mind can never possibly find the effect in the supposed cause, by the most accurate scrutiny and examination. For the effect is totally different from the cause, and consequently can never be discovered in it. Motion in the second billiard-ball is a quite distinct event from motion in the first; nor is there anything in the one to suggest the smallest hint of the other.

A few lines later Hume describes this example as follows (EHU 4.10; SBN 29):

When I see, for instance, a billiard-ball moving in a straight line towards another; even suppose motion in the second ball should by accident be suggested to me, as the result of their contact or impulse; may I not conceive, that a hundred different events might as well follow from the cause? … All these suppositions are consistent and conceivable. — Graciela De Pierris, Michael Friedman

What Hume

What Hume meant to say is this: when you observe an unknown process for the first time in your life, say the encounter between two unknown creatures from the deep sea, you cannot predict by any reasoning what will happen. The only way to find out is to observe what happens.

What you’re describing is a philosophical attitude, not a scientific hypothesis, known as brain-mind identify theory. There are many cogent arguments against brain-mind identity but I’m not going to bother thrashing that particular dead horse any longer. — Wayfarer

Indeed, I did not intend to describe brain-mind identity theory. I do not hold that brain and mind are identical, rather that mind is a function of the brain, just as digestion is not identical with stomach, but is its function.

@Metaphysician Undercover

Finally I understand that you are not criticizing my interpretation of Hume, but Hume himself. I am so relieved because I am sure he does not need my help. :smile:

I mean you provided the clinching quote from Hume himself, and you still don't understand the predicament which Hume put himself into.

The mind can never possibly find the effect in the supposed cause, by the most accurate scrutiny and examination
— David Hume An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

If that is not an inductive conclusion which asserts the exact form of certainty, (with "never possibly find..."), which Hume insists that inductive conclusions cannot provide, then how do you explain it? — Metaphysician Undercover

I do not find that it is an inductive inference, because it is not an inference from particular cases to the general case. It is more likely to be a case of analytical reasoning.

I have noticed that both right-wing and left-wing radicals get along very well when it comes to restricting citizens' freedoms and to support dictators.
— Jacques

Really? Like whom? — Isaac

Like indirectly supporting Putin. For example, right-wing and left-wing extremists are united in calling for an end to supporting the Ukrainians' struggle for freedom with weapons.

Yes, it has become very evident that your understanding of Hume is quite sorrowful. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is a pity that we cannot invite Hume for a talk, but fortunately he has given us his thoughts in writing. I quote from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy and leave it to everyone to draw his own conclusions:

Hume concludes that this inference [from cause to effect] has no foundation in the understanding—that is, no foundation in what he calls “reasoning”. How does Hume arrive at this position?

All our inductive inferences—our “conclusions from experience”—are founded on the supposition that the course of nature is sufficiently uniform so that the future will be conformable to the past (EHU 4.21; SBN 37–38):

"For all inferences from experience suppose, as their foundation, that the future will resemble the past …. If there be any suspicion, that the course of nature may change, and that the past may be no rule for the future, all experience becomes useless, and can give rise to no inference or conclusion."

Therefore, what Hume is now seeking, in turn, is the foundation in our reasoning for the supposition that nature is sufficiently uniform.

Section 4, part 1 of the Enquiry distinguishes (as we have seen) between reasoning concerning relations of ideas and reasoning concerning matters of fact and existence. Demonstrative reasoning (concerning relations of ideas) cannot establish the supposition in question,

"since it implies no contradiction, that the course of nature may change, and that an object, seemingly like those which we have experienced, may be attended with different or contrary effects." (EHU 4.18; SBN 35)

Moreover, reasoning concerning matters of fact and existence cannot establish it either, since such reasoning is always founded on the relation of cause and effect, the very relation we are now attempting to found in reasoning (EHU 4.19; SBN 35–36):

"We have said, that all arguments concerning existence are founded on the relation of cause and effect; that our knowledge of that relation is derived entirely from experience; and that all our experimental conclusions proceed upon the supposition, that the future will be conformable to the past. To endeavour, therefore, the proof of this last proposition by probable arguments, or arguments regarding existence, must be evidently going in a circle, and taking that for granted, which is the very point in question. — Graciela De Pierris, Michael Friedman

However, as is well known, correlation is not causation. It is obviously the case that a functioning brain is a requirement for consciousness, but the sense in which the brain ‘produces’ or ‘creates’ consciousness is what is at issue and remains an open question. — Wayfarer

There is consensus among brain researchers that the relationship between neuron activity and mental experiences is one that goes beyond casual correlation and has all the hallmarks of a causal relationship.

I don't see how the one follows from the other. It's perfectly possible for laws opposing civil liberties to receive sufficient support to be implemented in democracies.

There's nothing intrinsic about the method by which a government is chosen which prevents that government from restricting civil liberties. — Isaac

You are right. What I said is because I have noticed that both right-wing and left-wing radicals get along very well when it comes to restricting citizens' freedoms and to support dictators. So at some point, I stopped taking sides with the left or the right. Since then, the dividing line for me runs between those who support and those who fight freedom. In the meantime, left and right have lost their importance, I have nothing against conservatives or progressives as long as they are moderate and as long as they prioritize the preservation of civil liberties above all else.

I hope no one minds that I'm getting in late. I apologize if I repeat something already said.

I don't care about communism and capitalism as much as I care about democracy and autocracy. In other words, if someone acts against civil liberties, I don't care if he is left or right. One can observe that an alliance of right-wing and left-wing radicals is formed when it comes to supporting Putin. In this respect, I am in favor of all moderates who support freedom and solidarity and an enemy of all radicals who strive for the oppression and enslavement of the weaker, be they individuals or states.

@Metaphysician Undercover

I am sorry to say that I cannot see any connection between Hume's thesis on causality and your post. :sad: