While our process for obtaining knowledge can be defined by logic and avoiding contradictions, this does not necessitate that our knowledge is actual truth. — Philosophim
Yes, precisely so. Which now makes me wonder how we use our methodologies and to what end. Likewise, it makes me wonder exactly what the heuristic does...
There are at least two things that I would like to address in turn:
1. We have a set bound (we are certain of what we cannot know) and this tells us what must
not be true or, at least, what we
must be unable to know. Yet, once this bound is set, the question of absolute certainty/objectivity remains open.
2. The type of knowledge that we will find will depend on what we are trying to achieve. Therefore, we should be cognisant of our aims.
Let's start with the first point. What the heuristic does is it [hopefully] creates a bedrock that the
search for knowledge must be based on. We cannot seek to know a contradiction, nor can we know beyond the parameters of our aims - both positions are senseless and so, in effect, they set the boundary of our pursuit. However, this boundary alone does not determine that what we will come to know within these bounds will ever be certain or "objective" knowledge that aligns fully with the truth. Now, as you say, our beliefs or proposed knowledge may or may not align with the truth once we work within these bounds, but the question of how we would know whether this is the case appears to be the question at hand... we have the bedrock. Now, how would we build up to alignment with "truth" from that bedrock? Which requires a methodology or technique of building. I'm wondering whether the heuristic can lay the foundation
and build...
I think that's saying too much, strictly speaking. The heuristic contains a set of mutually-supporting axioms. The way that we would "build" knowledge with the heuristic alone would be by re-relating these axioms and drawing the relevant conclusions/deductions (which I may demonstrate with the "implications" of the heuristic). Otherwise, it does not so much "build" but sort and support our knowledge by showing us what the shape of our thinking is and what must be rejected. And so, let's consider your example:
Lets go back to the example of our person who traveled to the South pole while thinking that they were going to the North Pole. Recall the GPS knows they are actually at the South pole. Does the person who has traveled to the North pole know that they are at the South pole? — Philosophim
What's the relevance?
With nothing else to go on but the heuristic, all that we can know about the traveller's knowledge of his destination cannot be contradictory (he cannot know that he is at both poles at once) and that his criteria for knowing that it is true that he is at one pole or the other will determine his criteria for achieving that understanding. "Does the person who has traveled to the North pole know that they are at the South pole?" well, if he were the only man on earth, but what standard could he differentiate "North" from "South"? If his goal was simply "to take me where the GPS leads" the distinction would be arbitrary. Yet, if he had seen a globe, pointed to the top and thought "I wanted to go
there" that changes things. And then the man needs to ask himself "how will I know that I will get there?" of course, he chooses to use the GPS. Therefore, his goal and criteria: "I will travel North and judge that I have done so with the GPS"
And then, the GPS takes him South, lying that it is taking him North. Once he reaches the South Pole his belief is "I have used the GPS and this has taken me to the North Pole" - does he know this? Well, technically, whilst awaiting confirmation he only knows that he has followed his GPS and if to follow his GPS were his only criteria he would
know that he had followed it and that this were the end of the matter. However, once he employed a second source of information and found that the information of his GPS contradicted that of a map or a globe, he would conclude that he did not know "I have used the GPS and this has taken me to the North Pole" and that this belief was wrong: it did not fulfil his criteria; he could not put this belief into action for the end of achieving his goal. Now, if his goal was simply "To reach a place that
I have decided is North..." that would be a different matter.
I'm not sure if this is making sense - I'm thinking through this as I go. Yet, I suppose the point is that, the heuristic is effective but its application pushes us to fully examine exactly what goals we have and what they entail:
"Is my destination defined externally or individually?" etc. Or, if we were to unpack the traveller's goals, there might be two potential variations:
a) "To travel North, being a location seen on a map and agreed upon by my peers (that a GPS may or may not lead me to, but I will use as my indicator)", OR
b) "To travel North, being the location defined by my GPS"
Therefore, two goals that seem the same have different criteria and different standards by which one would know that they have fulfilled it.
Therefore, in answer to your question: "Does the person who has traveled to the North pole know that they are at the South pole?" The answer is: yes
if the goal is
"To travel North, being the location defined by my GPS"
but if the goal is "To travel North, being a location seen on a map and agreed upon by my peers (that a GPS may or may not lead me to, but I will use as my indicator)" - the man does not know using his GPS alone.
Great example to use - really interesting. I may return to this later.
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Anyway, let's get on to the second point; which is an extension of the first...
2. The type of knowledge that we will find will depend on what we are trying to achieve. Therefore, we should be cognisant of our aims...
Hopefully I've demonstrated how this applies in a practical case, but I wanted to loop it back on our general enquiry into epistemology. After all, we're asking questions such as "what is truth?" and "how do we know?" and it is worth considering: "by what point is our enquiry satisfied?"
I raise this point because I often see it as a mistake in philosophy to presume that the quest for "truth" is for "absolute certainty" or knowledge that cannot be doubted and this often seems to be an axiom that is tucked-into discussions of epistemology.
Consider this:
The heuristic holds that we measure knowledge in relation to our aims. But also note that it holds that we cannot simply have
any aim. As such, our limited aims appear to reveal what reality does or does not allow in the way of what our aims can be or what can or cannot be pursued.
Now, consider this...
What makes us presume that "absolute certainty" is something that can be pursued? That is, to nail-down what knowledge must be beyond doubt or to get our beliefs in perfect alignment with reality?
@Tim Wood and I touched on this topic above in relation to Godel et al. There is reason to believe that truth is like a bar of soap that, when we grip our hardest, slips right through our fingers. What I'm trying to get at is that it might be the case that reality as-such does not allow the goal of being "absolutely certain" to be fulfilled. Or, perhaps we could re-frame the issue... we need to define truth, but we can ask whether this definition is the "true" definition... how certain does reality allow us to be about our definitions? Indeed, how certain does it allow us to be about our knowledge and that it mirrors "the Truth"? If we presume that reality allows us to be completely certain, we might be functioning under a false-goal in the pursuit of truth and, therefore, would be no more be able to find the truth than we would be able to travel North and
not-North at the same time.
And so, to tie the two points together, the question for you to consider would be:
You are trying to find knowledge, but what exactly are your parameters for this?
What model or approach to epistemology can we actually pursue and actually live by?
I think we've already found some agreement here.
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Finally, sorry to give a short response to your extended discussion on definitions, but simply put: I agree.
To your point, we cannot have a relative methodology of applying our distinctions to reality, but we can have relative distinctions, or definitions. — Philosophim
Exactly. My only contention would be when you say:
I can define, and accept as a definition from others in my mind by my choice. There is nothing in reality that necessitates I do otherwise. — Philosophim
This is contingent. Reality appears to determine that you must unite your definitions with others
if you are to enter mutual understanding and dialogue with them.
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There's a lot more to say, but let's touch-base first. I'll jump into more of the implications once there's a bit more room to. It was a bit of a ramble tonight but hopefully there's a decent thread running through which is of some interest or value. Looking forward to hearing your thoughts.