... and a great response. Thank you, there is some helpful stuff here.
To begin my response I will start by stating that I understand where you are coming from when you suggest the distinction between the goal and its hypothesis. On the one hand, I agree that the distinction will be useful in clarifying my approach and use this when re-writing the argument. On the other, it appears that your rationale for suggesting the distinction may misunderstand the argument and so allow me to address this...
When you speak about goals, you imply that it is how we approach the goal which is just as important. If I want to fly by using my arms, then it would be silly to approach that goal without using my arms. — Philosophim
I'm not sure where this implication came from (not that it wasn't present), but in response to it, allow me to make my position on goals clear...
In the scheme of epistemology, the goal is defined as "the end" as this is primary because it lays out the criteria by which a given enquiry (including the search for knowledge itself) will be satisfied. If this were not the case we would have to posit a search for knowledge that does not reference a goal which appears to be impossible because the search itself is a goal. This would be so even if the parameters of the goal are yet to be explicit. Indeed, it appears that much of the work of the last few posts has been to say "Okay, we know that there
must be a goal and that it sets parameters, but what exactly is the goal and, therefore, what are these parameters?"
The approach to the goal is secondary. The approach is a question of testing what works within the parameters. This is why I would contend with the arms example. There is nothing in my approach that determines how this goal should be approached. We presume the use of arms but the reasons for this remain un-demonstrated. Instead, once the goal is set we have multiple options for the approach. E.g. "I want to fly by using my arms..."
We [can] test what works in relation to this goal by:
a) ... by using my feet
b) ... by using my nose
c) ... by using my arms
As odd as it sounds, there is nothing in the argument itself to say that one cannot fly by using their arms
by using their feet. This is absurd, but the reason that we find it to be absurd is that we find that we cannot put this approach into practice for the achievement of the goal.
If we could achieve the goal by using our feet it would, in fact, not be absurd. Of course, this is a special case because the various approaches appear to present a contradiction, which reveals the place of logic in the scheme more than it does the importance of the approach... if the goal is meant exactly how it is stated with no room for contradiction, then we can exclude all approaches that are illogical because we are unable to posit them, let alone put them into effect.
Hopefully this explains why I will take your advice and use the term "hypothesis" but I will use this to refer to the
approach, but not the goal itself. Goals hold a primary position in the epistemology precisely because they set "the end" of the endeavour (and all of its component parts).
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Now this assumes that knowledge is something which could be changed at a later time if new information arises that contradicts your claims. That is fine, but that would be knowledge itself, not provisional. — Philosophim
A point well made and taken. You're right - this is what the approach entails. Perhaps when I come to clarify this work I will make a point of stating that the knowledge gleaned by the point is "knowledge" but is uncertain or open to future revision or possibly not Truth etc.
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If we do not have this restriction, then someone could introduce a non-falsifiable belief, and state because it is not contradicted by reality, it is therefore provisional knowledge per your definition. — Philosophim
I'm fine with this, and this may actually speak to the difference between our approaches too. Let me explain...
One
could claim that about an unfalsifiable belief, but to what extent? If a belief is divorced from its effects and the belief is unfalsifiable, it
is [provisional] knowledge.
However, any belief that has an effect is falsifiable because the test for the belief the relation of the effect to an aim and we see this once the effect comes up against reality.
Sophists can pick us up on this point, but I don't mind. One thing that I would like to do with my approach is is this: instead of fighting the sophists, I would like to leave them to it. If they do not follow the argument or want to slip out of it, they can. But in so doing it would seem that they are left with islands of knowledge which are entirely within their own heads.
Consider this discussion:
Sophist: "Due to your argument, I am a Marxist; true Marxism has never been proven not to work. Therefore, I provisionally know that Marxism works."
Response: "
Provisional indeed. Until such such a time that it is put into effect... so long as it remains a mere idea in your head, it remains unfalsifiable and is provisional knowledge. However, at the point when it is put into effect, or a component part can be, we will discover what reality does or does not allow and it will become falsifiable."
The takeaway is that all kinds of beliefs can be unfalsifiable if we divorce beliefs from their effects. In relation to this, there may be two kinds of philosophers: those who do philosophy with a kind of solipsism such that their ideas are always divorced from their applications and decisions, and those who do it with sophistry such that they can always find a loop-hole or clause that allows them to slip through an argument. Such people could treat the argument like so:
Me: "
If we search for knowledge, all else follows..."
Sophist: "Ah! But what if we don't search?"
Me: "This word is defined like so..."
Sophist: "Ah! But how do we know that the word is so defined? Because you define it with other words? What about them?"
Me: "Beliefs not contradicted by reality are provisional knowledge."
Sophist: "Ah! And so I have removed my beliefs from their effects and made them unfalsifiable, and I have provisional knowledge."
My overall strategy in dealing with these people or approaches is not to fight them; not to guarantee, beyond doubt that such-and-such must be accepted. Instead, it is to recognise that contingencies are always left open. I make necessary deductions and arguments but hopefully this explains why I use so many contingencies in my work
before moving to necessities (and, in all fairness, this is not merely a preference - this appears to be how we have to approach epistemology). Incorporating the contingencies into the structure appear to be required to give it enough "flex" to stand the storms of madness... other approaches that attempt to do away with all contingency and have only necessity appear to be more airtight and rigid, but also more brittle. Doing epistemology is like holding a bar of soap; if held with too firm a grip, it slips away... and so, perhaps it is best to make that grip firm, whilst allowing for the gaps around the edges...
This is
not a criticism of a single argument that you have presented . Your observations about definitions are a case in point; the choice of words and approach to how we understand them really is important for developing an argument. The difference would be between yourself, who understands that there is a reasonable point at which the demand for definitions ceases and one who would push that demand in order to break the argument. You approach this in a spirit of constructive criticism.
Likewise, you're doing your own thing with your approach. I understand that we have our different approach to different ends, but if my discussion here would say anything to you I might use it as a word of caution against seeking knowledge structures that are perfectly "airtight". Within my own schema, this might be revealed as a "false goal" depending upon how you seek to pursue it.