Given that I am familiar enough with several afterlife/reincarnation/rebirth doctrines to the point that they all make sense to me, they very fact that this is so makes it impossible to prefer one over the other. They can't all be right, but how could one choose? — baker

I am familiar with them too, but I can't say they make sense to me beyond the fact that they are all logically possible in the sense of not being obviously self-contradictory. That said, I think the Buddhist concept on the face of it is the most incoherent. The Hindu notion of a reincarnating soul seems at first glance to make more sense to me, although that opens up all the problems associated with dualism. Resurrection is another can of worms because it involves positing an omnipotent God.

In my experience, this is not how religious/spiritual people think or approach discussion of religious/spiritual topics.

For example, for traditional Hindus, an outsider talking about reincarnation would be perceived as an idle intruder, someone who is thinking and talking about things they have no business talking about, being an outsider (although it would take the Hindus quite a bit to actually say so). — baker

I agree with this and often say that critical discussion has no place in the contexts of spiritual disciplines and religious practices, and even, as Hadot notes in the kinds of ancient philosophies which consisted of systems of metaphysical ideas meant to support "spiritual exercises". But tell that to the fundamentalists!

In any case, this is a philosophy forum where ideas and arguments are presented for critique, so if people want to present their beliefs and ideas here, they should expect questioning, criticism and disagreement.

But what about everything else? I agree that having imperfection seems to entail having the idea of perfection, but outside of isolated cases, I don't see why this apparent fact of our constitution is this way. — Manuel

I mentioned building before. When building it is desirable to get everything as level plumb and square as possible, otherwise errors compound and horrible difficulties arise if one's initial setting out has been too far from perfect. So, accuracy is a practical necessity and once understood the idea of perfect accuracy, although unattainable, follows.

The problem here, out of many which can be pointed to, is to so much what we add to things, but more so what the objects give to us. It's very obscure. Although no longer tenable, Locke's distinction of primary secondary qualities is a useful heuristic. — Manuel

I would say that following empirical investigation, scientific observation, analysis and theory, show us what objects appear to give us. Once it is realized that we are dealing with things only as they appear the idea of things as they are in themselves logically, dialectically, follows, it seems to me.

About that I think all we can say is that pre-cognitive processes give rise to a phenomenal world which appears the same to all of us. Our investigations are always already carried out from within the cognitively given shared world, and they can be our only guide. Whether or not they are a good guide is impossible to know with certainty, but it does seem plausible that they would be.

I agree that Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities is a valid one, as far as it goes; but it cannot get us beyond appearances. For me it seems that the most important thing for humans just is the world of appearances, it is the only real world for us. On the other hand I think the fcat that we conceive of the "in itself" has had huge consequences for the intellectual and imaginative life of humanity. So, the in itself may, as some say, "drop out of the conversation" but the fact that we can think the in itself as the idea of what we cannot think and can never know is a different matter.

Cool!

Sure, the emphasis I am making is one of objects being, strictly speaking, a mental construction on the occasion of sense. Both are necessary in practice. — Manuel

I agree in the sense that we never perceive the whole of any object; so the idea of a whole object or entity, its identity, is "constructed" from various views or touches of things as well as the fact that we all perceive the same things.

Which to me raises the question, then why the heck do we have the idea of perfection in objects at all? It's quite curious. — Manuel

As I said, it seems to me that the realization of imperfection or imperfect accuracy automatically entails the idea of perfect accuracy.

But faces on a wooden wall or interpreting perfect geometry when such things don't exist, seem to me to be the way we view the world, being the creatures that we are. — Manuel

Yes, I agree we contribute a conceptual element in order to see anything as something familiar. But I also think this must be constrained by the things we perceive as well as by our own natures. I think the same goes for animals too inasmuch as they are able to re-cognize familiar things. If this is right then it follows that there is more to "seeing as" than just acquisition of cultural conventions or symbolic language capability.

Yes, but it also depends on what is meant by "beyond one's control".

From that video 'nothing in the universe knows what our pre-determined choices are going to be'. 'The universe plays itself out in our actions' - much like something Alan Watts used to say. — Wayfarer

Yes, there is a sense in which we, as a more or less self-determining organism. determine our own actions, but those actions are determined by processes we cannot be conscious of. And we are not really separate from the rest of nature and its constant unfolding.

Libertarian free will presupposes a radically free soul, so it is a necessarily dualistic conception subject to the incomprehensibility of interaction.

That's plausible, though I would stress or emphasize that whatever pattern we perceive is internal, so the objects or us contrasting objects and things stimulates us to see a pattern. — Manuel

I tend to think the language of 'internal versus external' may not be helpful here. I would say both the objects and us (comparing and) contrasting objects pruduces the seeing of patterns.

This may be putting too much emphasis on a small point, nevertheless I'd argue that what we see are quite often very distorted examples of triangles or circles in experience, but that we interpret them as being perfect. We notice that our interpretation is mistaken when we go and check the triangle looking thing and see that a line is curved or not connecting, etc. — Manuel

I agree; the room looks perfectly square, the floor perfectly level and the wall perfectly plumb and so on, until we only find out the imperfections when we apply tape measure and spirit level (and even tape measure and spirit level are not accurate beyond certain tolerances.

It's somewhat akin to seeing a pattern on a wall or the floor, and seeing what looks like a face, when it's just certain points arranged in a certain manner. — Manuel

We do tend to see faces and bodily forms in natural patterns (especially when hallucinogens are involved) but I think the potential for interpreting such patterns in various ways is there in the objects as real configurations.

This is the issue of Platonism in mathematics, a topic I can barely cover. Maybe you are correct. I do find it somewhat puzzling that we have an idea of a perfect triangle or perfect square, when we know we won't find it in experience. — Manuel

As you say earlier classic geometric forms are rarely found in nature apart from the spherical dewdrops, the circular appearance of the moon, and the sun, hexagonal honeycombs, and so on. Some igneous rock forms are also quite geometric. And of course, then you have the advent of human land parceling and building. These natural and humanly produced phenomena, as you said, may appear perfect for all intents and purpose but on closer measuring and analysis reveal themselves to be imperfect. Once we have the concept of the imperfect its dialectical counterpart, the imperfect, naturally follows I would say.

This comment I made in another thread seems apropos:

I don't see it as a case of the "feeliness" of experience "affecting neurons", but since that would be to espouse dualism, I would rather say the felt quality of experience must be causal (if neuronal processes are) since it too would be a neuronal process. If the felt quality were not present then the neuronal processes would be different and thus different causally. That's why I think epiphenomenalism makes no sense.

The same goes for the p-zombie notion; the idea that our neuronal processes could be exactly as they are when felt experience is present and yet we could nonetheless have no felt experience seems completely absurd to me. Ironically it presupposes dualism, because it imagines the felt quality of experience as something "ghostly" that exists over and above the neuronal processes.

So, all the behavior can indeed "be accounted for by the low-level physical causes", but why should we think that the low-level physical processes should be the same regardless of whether they were associated with consciousness or not? And if they differ, why would they not differ causally?

It doesn't follow that the p-zombie is "inconceivable" merely that it is implausible, and even incoherent in the sense that we cannot find any cogent explanation for how it could be possible.

I get that. I can’t make rational sense of the obverse, although I’d never seek to persuade you or anyone else. — Wayfarer

I don't really seek to persuade either but to present and be presented with rational arguments for beliefs and standpoints, since this is a philosophy forum and I think that activity of presenting and being presented with (hopefully) rational argument is what the critical activity of philosophy is all about.

There are things I believe or at least tend to entertain that I would not try to argue for, because I realize they are merely personal articles of faith.

Not according to this article — Wayfarer

I don't think he is asserting the truth of the libertarian conception of free will. From the article you linked:

In Schopenhauer’s illuminating view of reality, the will is indeed free because it is all there ultimately is. Yet, its image is nature’s seemingly deterministic laws, which reflect the instinctual inner consistency of the will. Today, over 2000 years after he first published his groundbreaking ideas, Schopenhauer’s work can reconcile our innate intuition of free will with modern scientific determinism.

And from the horse's mouth:

As semiotics asserts information is neither energy nor matter. But it is not something independently of energy or matter either. So, we can say that we are caused to perceive objects on account of their material, energetic effects upon us, but when it comes to perceiving similarity, difference and number, this is not the case.

If you see a person or object in front of you, and then you see several persons or objects in front of you, there is a pattern to the difference and a different pattern for each number of objects. So, I think it is reasonable to say that number is perceived, and the pattern of small number allows us to see how many objects are there at a glance: perhaps up to ten or twelve (although this will likely vary with different individuals).

So, I agree with you that the idea of "one" or "many" is not cause by seeing one thing or many, but rather by the perceived contrast between them, which I think comes down to pattern recognition. It is pattern recognition, differences and similarities, that conveys perceptual information to us.

As to the slave recognizing squares, I think the etymology word geometry shows that it is likely that people saw actual rectangles, squares and circles as laid out in fencing of land and architecture, and that the idea of perfect geometric forms is abstracted from that experience.

I agree with you that there is a sense in which number and geometry "goes beyond" concrete particulars, but only insofar as it is abstracted from our perceptual experience of concrete particulars. In other words, I don't think there is any coherent sense in which number and geometry could be said to be completely transcendent of the phenomenal world.

And I think annihilation is considerably less frightening than the alternatives - it's comforting, in a way, because it zeroes out anything you might have done in your life. I mean, if you're a mass-shooter who kills a number of people then yourself, you would presumably believe that that act ends it all. If it turns out not to, then.. — Wayfarer

The flipside is the idea that everything you have learned throughout your life will die with you, apart from what you may have imparted to others or committed to writing, music or artwork. But then what value can any life lesson be but within life itself? Also, personal rebirth is not necessary to support the possibility that everything which is done and learned is somehow "recorded' as is conceived in the idea of the akashic records (which is not to say I believe in that either)

Spinoza was a strict determinist; he believed free will is an illusion based on the illusion of our separation from the cosmos. If this is right, then everything everyone does is a manifestation of the "will", of the inevitable unfolding of the cosmic process. Apropos this Kastrup also holds that free will is an illusion.

But the other point against the idea of rebirth, or at least against the idea that it could be a rationally motivating consideration for us, is that whatever suffering might be coming to the entity that is the reborn you on account of ill deeds done by you, that could, rationally speaking, have no more significance for you than the suffering of any being, past, present or future, given that this future 'you' will have no conscious connection with the present you whatsoever. So, if we are going to care about, and act to ameliorate the suffering of any beings it makes more sense, rationally speaking, to dedicate oneself to ameliorating the suffering of beings that we know exist and that we know are suffering.

Ultimately, both views (or dispositions) derive from either the desire to continue to be (eternalism) or the desire not to exist (nihilism. In other words, they're motivated by either greed or aversion. — Wayfarer

This makes no sense to me; I would love to live forever provided I am healthy and not suffering too much pain. But I am more inclined to believe that my personal self will end at death and that the constituents that make up what I am will continue on in other forms for as long as the universe exists. My reason for not believing in any form of personal rebirth or afterlife is not that there is any definitive evidence against it, but simply that I cannot make rational sense of the idea, and I cannot believe something I am incapable of even making coherent to myself. So, I can honestly say that my thoughts on this are not at all driven by wishful thinking.

I'm not sure. Perhaps mathematics is different, we don't encounter numbers in experience. — Manuel

We do, however, encounter number. Numerals are the names we give to the different numbers (of things) we encounter. Over there I see nine apples and somewhere else I see nine oranges; the objects are different, but the number of items is the same and we can recognize this and abstract that sameness to derive the idea of an entity we call 'nine'. But there is no entity 'nine' separate from its instantiations any more than there is an entity 'tree' separate from its instantiations.

Thanks for that, but I've decided not to try and assimilate Spinoza again. The Ethics reads like a 250 page insurance contract. After yesterday's conversation I did rather impulsively buy the kindle edition of the Claire Carlisle book Spinoza's Religion so will persist with reading that. — Wayfarer

As you know I am not against people believing in rebirth or whatever. Obviously there can be no definitve evidence either way. What I am curious about is why people care about it, since it obviously cannot be understood to personal survival of death. Is it an irrational fear of annihilation?

It seems to me that whatever the truth might be regarding rebirth, the most important thing is living the best life in terms of acceptance and love of oneself and others, equanimity and non-attachment to inconsequentials that we can. Worrying about what happens after death does not seem to be conducive or relevant to that task.

It cannot be said that what children do when they internalize the religious teachings of their parents and their community is an act of "choice" or conscious acceptance. Given that for children born and raised into a religion the exposure to religious teachings begins to take place even before the child's critical cognitive abilities have formed to the point of consciously being able to a make choices, to consciously accept or reject things, it's remiss to say that this is what is happening.

It's like with one's native language: it's not subject to one's choice, it "just happens". — baker

Right, I haven't said the child necessarily has any choice in what is accepted and introjected. I used the word "accepted" but that was not meant to suggest that the child necessarily had any choice in that acceptance, certainly not any choice in any libertarian-freewill or rationally chosen sense. But I would hesitate to claim that all children must acquiesce to what they are being taught. Humans are diverse.

Language does not strike me as a good analogy since it is a tool not a belief; one does not accept or reject it but rather one learns to use it.

On July 27, 1656, the Jewish community of Amsterdam expelled Baruch de Espinoza. As Josef Kaplan's work has shown, the community used ḥerem as a standard disciplinary instrument, usually on a temporary basis. In Spinoza's case, however, the Amsterdammers issued a fierce and permanent denunciation on grounds of “abominable heresies” and “monstrous deeds.” Speaking for the community, the rabbis “excommunicate, expel, curse and damn” him with formidable intensity. In addition to forbidding contact with Spinoza himself, the ḥerem concludes with a prohibition against reading “any treatise composed or written by him.” What were these heresies and deeds, and why was the ḥerem so harsh? Only twenty-three years of age, Spinoza had not yet, so far as we know, begun to write the philosophical works—the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (1670) and the Ethica (1677), the former published anonymously, the latter only posthumously—that would to make him notorious well beyond the domain of the Portuguese Jews. Looking at the later texts, it is not difficult to imagine the cause of the outrage: Spinoza denies creation and divine providence, individual or personal immortality (together with the doctrine of eternal reward and punishment), and the truth of the Torah. But what exactly was Spinoza doing in the mid-1650s, and why were his ideas and actions so offensive to the community? — Stephen Nadler

Remember where discussion of Spinoza started in this thread to which I responded, 'As I understand it, Spinoza said that the liberated soul had no reason to fear death and no fear of the afterlife, and I'm sure in that, he was in perfect accord with both the Hindu and Buddhist understanding of the matter.' I'll return to that, as it was the point at issue in respect of this OP. — Wayfarer

Spinoza said the free person thinks least of all death, he says nothing about fearing death or the afterlife.

In 1656, after being excommunicated from Amsterdam’s Portuguese-Jewish community for “abominable heresies” and “monstrous deeds,” the young Baruch Spinoza abandoned his family’s import business to dedicate his life to philosophy. He quickly became notorious across Europe for his views on God, the Bible, and miracles, as well as for his uncompromising defense of free thought. Yet the radicalism of Spinoza’s views has long obscured that his primary reason for turning to philosophy was to answer one of humanity’s most urgent questions: How can we lead a good life and enjoy happiness in a world without a providential God? In Think Least of Death, Pulitzer Prize–finalist Steven Nadler connects Spinoza’s ideas with his life and times to offer a compelling account of how the philosopher can provide a guide to living one’s best life.

In the Ethics, Spinoza presents his vision of the ideal human being, the “free person” who, motivated by reason, lives a life of joy devoted to what is most important—improving oneself and others. Untroubled by passions such as hate, greed, and envy, free people treat others with benevolence, justice, and charity. Focusing on the rewards of goodness, they enjoy the pleasures of this world, but in moderation. “The free person thinks least of all of death,” Spinoza writes, “and his wisdom is a meditation not on death but on life.”

An unmatched introduction to Spinoza’s moral philosophy, Think Least of Death shows how his ideas still provide valuable insights about how to live today.

Spinoza’s guide to life and death
A new way of life

From here

What is important is that, right or wrong, the epistemology shall be explicit. Equally explicit criticlsrn will then be possible.

This seems to be pointing to the religions mentioned in the previous sentence, the critique being that such religions od not possess explicit epistemologies. Making claims without being able to explain how you know, or at least believe, the claim is warranted. Claiming authority of scripture or church is not explicit epistemology because if the question "why believe authority or scripture" is asked, the only possible answers seem to be either "because it feels right to me" or "because the authority or scripture tells me to believe it". The first seems reasonable enough for the individual believer but cannot constitute a cogent argument for why others should believe likewise.

My central thesis can now be approached in words: The pattern which connects is a metapattern. It is a pattern of patterns. It is that metapattern which defines the vast generalization that, indeed, it is patterns which connect.

I warned some pages back that we would encounter emptiness, and indeed it is so. Mind is empty; it is nothing. It exists only in its ideas, and these again are no-things. Only the ideas are immanent, embodied in their examples. And the examples are, again, no-things. The claw, as an example, is not the Ding an sich; it is precisely not the "thing in itself." Rather, it is what mind makes of it, namely an example of something or other. — Introduction

Patterns do connect and they form the basis of taxonomy in science. Seeing the ways patterns relate to one another also enables the unfolding of the story of evolution. Similarities of morphology are things we can all recognize and generally do not need to be argued for because making oneself familiar enough with the morphologies should be sufficient to bring about seeing the connections. Among other things this seems prescient of chaos theory; commonalities of pattern at all levels of being and organization.

I'm thinking Bateson means that such examples are "no-things"_ in the sense that similarities and differences are not objects of the senses in the way things are. And yet we do perceive these "no-things" and without such perception no-thing coherent at all would be perceived.

Is nature not eternal?
— Janus

Definitely not. — Wayfarer

Things, beings, entities are not eternal, but nature itself is. Spinoza drew a distinction between natura naturata and natura naturans. The former is created nature, transient nature and the latter is the eternal active creative power which brings about created nature.

I provided my definition of the mystical above. — Wayfarer

I guess you might call Spinoza a "natural mystic', but there is nothing transcendent of supernatural in his philosophy; if you think there is then you simply don't understand his philosophy, and if you want to remedy that I would suggest reading his actual works.

What is the point of quoting Maritain in a discussion about Spinoza? The two could not be further apart, Maritain being the apologist for Catholicism that he was.

And this means what? Not 'seeking union with a transcendent being/reality' (because Spinoza, in effect, argues that 'transcendence' is incoherent, illusory or superstitious). — 180 Proof

:up:

Spinoza was a mystic. I disagree with both of you on that, and I'll leave it there. — Wayfarer

What do you mean by mystic, Wayfarer?

So how that translates to 'accepting things as they are' escapes me. What is 'a thing eternal an infinite' that 'feeds the mind wholly with joy'? There is a definite sense of turning away from, renouncing, the transitory, and contemplating the eternal. — Wayfarer

Is nature not eternal? Spinoza, as I read him, advocates loving and contemplating the eternal aspects of nature. For example, we don't understand a tree to be eternal, but transitory, but it is not as transitory as a passing breeze, and yet both are eternal aspects or possibilities of nature. What do we love about the tree? We love it's beauty, its livingness, no? Beauty and livingness are eternal, and we find them everywhere..

the fact that he designates it as 'God or nature' does not, in my view, entail that Spinoza was a naturalist in the sense of modern empiricism, restricting knowledge to what can be validated by sensory data. — Wayfarer

Spinoza is usually classed as a rationalist, and he did believe in the power of intellectual intuition. On the other hand, he saw all otherworldliness as superstition, as an illusion to be seen through, and this is simply undeniable.

But then, why bother with philosophy? For what reason was Spinoza exiled from the Jewish community? Why undertake the laborious task of composing such complex and lengthy philosophical works, and why read them? Why is not any man in the street equal to the wisest? — Wayfarer

It's simple; philosophy is about self-knowledge, about understanding the human condition, so as to be able to live the best possible life. He was exiled from the Jewish community for his immanentistic idea of God, his idea that God is Nature, and his denial that both we and God possess free will (Spinoza saw God as necessarily, deterministically acting according to his nature, just as we do).

The "man in the street" may or may not live life thoughtfully. As the saying goes "the unexamined life is not worth living". I don't Spinoza would agree wholly with that, but I think he would certainly say the examined life is better than the unexamined.

I can't see how the secularist reading of Spinoza, just more or less shrug and get on with life, comprehends his obviously spiritual message, the 'intellectual love of God', self-abnegation, the devotion to wisdom, the abandonment of worldly ambitions, which are central in his corpus. — Wayfarer

Spinoza denied that God can love us. The importance of loving God is the importance of loving Nature and loving Life, of accepting it wholeheartedly as it is. " Amor fati". That's why Nietzsche saw Spinoza as a kindred spirit. That's why he says, "the free mean never thinks of death" because the philosopher's concern should only be with this life, not some superstitiously imagined afterlife.

Spinoza advocates complete acceptance, because he was a determinist through and through, from which it follows that all things will be as they will be, necessarily. From this it follows that there is nothing beyond this life to strive for, and within this life only complete understanding and acceptance is worth pursuing. This can be compared to the non-attachment advocated by Buddhism, but none of the otherworldly stuff of the Eastern religions will be found in Spinoza.

Spinoza sees the problems of life as arising from the desire for “perishable things” which “can be reduced to these three headings: riches, honour, and sensual pleasure” (idem: para.3&9). As these things are “perishable”, they cannot afford lasting happiness; in fact, they worsen our lot, since craving for them often induces compromising behaviour and their consumption creates useless craving. “But love towards a thing eternal and infinite feeds the mind with joy alone, unmixed with any sadness.” (Idem: para.10) In the Ethics, Spinoza finds lasting happiness only in the “intellectual love of God”, which is the mystical, non-dual vision of the single “Substance” (or Being) underlying the phenomenal realm. The resonance with non-dualism becomes apparent when Spinoza says that “the mind’s intellectual love of God is the very love of God by which God loves himself” (Ethics, Part 5, Prop. 36; compare Meister Eckhardt, 'The eye through which I see God is the same eye through which God sees me'.) Since God is the Whole that includes everything, it also includes your love for God, and thus God can be said to love Itself through you. Iff you recognise it! — Wayfarer

I don't know where you got the above passage, but it seems to be full of inapt implication and association. Spinoza. like the "this-worldly" Epicureans, saw desire for things "perishable" as being corrosive of equanimity, personal peace of mind, and this is simply a practical realization.

Spinoza understands God or Nature (deus siva natura) as being eternal, and advocates contemplation and love of that nature, and this amounts to loving this life, yet being free of attachment to the temporal things of this life. This is really just commonsense. Spinoza is certainly not a mystic at all; there is nothing otherworldly in him. If we love this life, that amounts to God loving himself ("himself" is misleading here and should really be "itself") or Nature loving itself, but as I said earlier Spinoza stresses that God cannot love us, because God is not a personal conscious being, God is simply Nature being what it is, doing what it by necessity must.

If you want to understand Spinoza you need to actually read him.

:up:

The difference here would be that the neuronal processes associated with consciousness are causal, but the actual feeliness of the world is not. — Moliere

If you think consciousness (I read subjectivity) is real and is causal, and also that all causes are physical (I read objective), what does this mean? Isn't all the behavior fully accounted for by the low-level, non-conscious physical causes? Doesn't any appeal to any conscious causes amount to overdetermination? — petrichor

I don't see it as a case of the "feeliness" of experience "affecting neurons", but since that would be to espouse dualism, I would rather say the felt quality of experience must be causal (if neuronal processes are) since it too would be a neuronal process. If the felt quality were not present then the neuronal processes would be different and thus different causally. That's why I think epiphenomenalism makes no sense.

The same goes for the p-zombie notion; the idea that our neuronal processes could be exactly as they are when felt experience is present and yet we could nonetheless have no felt experience seems completely absurd to me. Ironically it presupposes dualism, because it imagines the felt quality of experience as something "ghostly" that exists over and above the neuronal processes.

So, all the behavior can indeed "be accounted for by the low-level physical causes", but why should we think that the low-level physical processes should be the same regardless of whether they were associated with consciousness or not? And if the differ, why would they not differ causally?

When I responded the passage about Ramana Maharshi was not there. Spinoza never said anything about reincarnation as far as I know, so I'm still not seeing the similarity. The idea that we exist, and everything that has ever been exists, in eternity says nothing about any personal survival, any more than saying the atoms that make up our bodies are eternal.

And Spinoza did not see it as something earned but as being the case, sub specie aetermitatis, for everyone and everything, as I read him. It has been a while since I read the Ethics so it's possible I'm misremembering the details but suffice to say there is nothing at all about rebirth, or concern about anything other than how to live in this world, in Spinoza.

@Mww has explained the point much better than I did. Patience is not always one of my virtues.

More distortions...you're doubling down on your ignorance, clutching at straws...time wasting.

Spinoza denies the idea of personal survival of death except that each individual and in fact each entity or thing could have an existence as an eternal idea of God or nature, or something along those lines, from memory.

:up:

Those who believe in reincarnation show it is not a taboo for them, and in the case of those who don't, the more likely explanation in many if not most cases in my view, is that they either haven't thought about, or find the idea unconvincing.

It seems likely to me that only those who have a firm belief in resurrection would consider the idea of reincarnation somehow "taboo", on account of it being counter to their own dogma. I think it pays to remember in regard to claims for which there can be no evidence that the default would be to simply believe in what is evident; that we simply die and cease to exist.

I think both Spinoza and Epicurus, neither of whom believed in an afterlife, had the most sensible attitudes towards death; simple acceptance and seeing that there is nothing to fear in death itself. Ironically it seems that attachment to the idea of rebirth is an egoic attachment counter to the central idea in the very religions who incorporate it into their system of beliefs.

It seems likely that the idea was incorporated to give motivation to those who are not inclined to think deeply about death.

Spinoza pointed out a similar dynamic with the "carrot and stick" of heaven and hell in Christianity, using desire and fear as motivators to believe.

:up: The best it can be is an intuitive belief that "somehow" we live on in the sense of being reborn in this realm or some imagined other. The part that escapes me is why, given that we don't remember who we purportedly were prior to this life. it is considered that it would be important, even if it were true. The same would seem to apply to Nietzsche's eternal recurrence idea, especially if the idea is that the recurring lives would be exactly the same.

Not from scratch, though. A person born and raised into a religion that teaches reincarnation will have internalized it even before their critical cognitive faculties have developed. So such a person doesn't actually "make stuff up". — baker

So, instead of making their own stuff up, they accept and introject the stuff that others have made up; stuff that has been canonized in their culture?

How can metaphysical statements or standpoints be truth-apt if their truth is undecidable? The only way I could parse that would be to say that they might be true even though we have no imaginable way of determining their truth.

Note, I'm not saying metaphysical statements or standpoints are incoherent. A good example is an argument I had recently with @plaque flag where he was claiming that the very idea of mind-independently existent objects is incoherent. We cannot determine whether objects exist in themselves or not, but we can perfectly coherently think that they might or might not even though there is no imaginable way to determine whether they do or not.

On the other hand, in some sense it seems reasonable to say that if we cannot imagine a way to determine whether ordinary objects are mind-dependent or not, then saying either that they are or are not mind-independent is both unwarranted and perhaps even incoherent, but I'm not sold on that. The biggest problem here seems to be the limitations of dualistic thought and language.

Who? You raised the issue. Who else? Yes, I was saying because you never added content to logic, maybe that is your point on logic? My use of Logic was always full of content. — Corvus

So what? Logic is about the form, not the content, but I haven't denied that thought processes and arguments, whether logically valid or not, have content. Try to address what I'm actually saying and not what you imagine I'm saying, and the conversation might improve

That is my own point on Philosophical methodology. If you want examples, read up on Philosophy of Language, or any Analytic Philosophy. — Corvus

If you cannot present your own ideas in your own words, and address what I'm actually saying instead of strawman versions, instead of giving me unwanted reading advice and misinterpreting, whether deliberately or not, my words, then responding to you is a waste of time and energy.

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I voted for '1' as the closest fit. I'm not too sure about the "epiphenomenal" part, though. I think all causes are physical and I think consciousness both evolved and is causal (or at least the neuronal processes associated with consciousness are).

Still, if there are no sound arguments, why should I try to escape responsibility for my decisions? — Dfpolis

I think it is inevitable that we will feel responsible for our decisions, even if we are not really responsible. Imagine you ask your teenage daughter to go to the corner shop for milk and she is run over and killed. Surely you will feel somehow responsible for her death, and this will add to your agony, even though you are not really responsible.

I feel perfectly free to choose what to do in most instances, but this just means that there are no abnormal external constraints on my actions, and I can act freely according to what I want to do. I will be constrained sometimes by empathy for others, but if I could feel no empathy then I might act on desires that hurt others, provided I was confident I would not be caught and held to account.

The point is we may know where our own self-control begins and ends, more or less, but it is not rational to project that same awareness and knowledge onto others or blame them when they fail to live up to our own standards.

That said, a functional and more or less harmonious society must restrain those who cannot but act in ways that transgress its foundational values.

I think determinism is compatible with the idea that I am free, absent external constraints, to, and inevitably will, choose whatever is determined by my nature.

I think it follows that blaming or praising others has no rational warrant, although of course if we are determined by our natures to blame and praise then of course we will do that. This can change, though, if we come to see that people are no more responsible for their actions in any libertarian moral sense, than are animals or the natural elements like rain, lightning, and fire.

Disagreement about non-trivial things is inevitable in a pluralistic society. There seems to be almost universal agreement about the most important moral injunctions, but when it comes to things like where should the funding be applied, disagreement is inevitable simply because different people value different things.

I agree that Spinoza wanted to refute any form of supernaturalism, but he also acknowledged that such beliefs may be necessary for those who don't want to think for themselves.

So, with that additional information, I have developed a PanEnDeistic worldview, that postulates some kind of Causal Power and Logical Laws that existed before the Big Bang beginning of our little bubble of space-time. — Gnomon

Sure, but this 'first cause' kind of argument is old stew reheated. I find no need to posit any such thing.

You can say that Jane (or John) excites you more than Mary (or Martin), but you cannot say that being with Jane or John is more valuable than 11 views of Yosemite Falls, but less than 12 views. To say that one is "more motivating" explains nothing. It just says the motive associated with the choice you actually make is more motivating -- rather like saying that this medicine makes you sleepy because it is a soporific. — Dfpolis

Being with someone I am sufficiently attracted to may indeed be more valuable to me that any number of views of Yosemite Falls. If am more motivated by one than the other then, absent addiction, the more motivating one is more valuable to me.

Of course, I am not claiming that what I or anyone values justifies claiming that those values are universal.

My point was only that whatever imagery is involved with and whatever is subsequently said about religious/ spiritual experiences is interpretive and usually culturally biased.

:up: This is the way I also see it.

Only that I cannot think of any such case, I mean where people have died --certainly not on a large scale-- because of lack of resources, those being water, oil, electric power or other public utility services. — Alkis Piskas

Also, lack of food, lack of adequate medical services. lack of access to education , contraceptives...

Then, what about the poor families all over the world, esp. in India, which is overpopulated), who are over-reproductive? Can they be considered as fittest, when they die from famine, diseases and all sort of things just because they are poor? — Alkis Piskas

This is a case in point. Of course, a society that becomes overpopulated and cannot provide for its people is not "fittest".

Here we need to bear in mind that people who are born and raised into a religion have their sense of self shaped by the religion. They have no sense of identity apart or outside of their religion. — baker

I have several friends who were very religious as children and into their teens, who in their later teens firmly rejected their religion.

I agree with you that the psychology of selfhood vis a vis introjected beliefs is complex.

But whence "mental representation" versus the prior "behavioral inputs/outputs"? How is it this difference in degree at least SEEMS to be a difference in kind? What is it, this change, this "mental representation"? — schopenhauer1

I'd say the difference is a function of memory; the ability to visualize what has been experienced but is no longer present. It seems to make sense that memory and the ability to visualize should be greatly enhanced by symbolic language capability. (By 'visualize' I mean not only recalling visual data but all sensory and somatosensory data: auditory, olfactory, gustatory, tactile, motoric and proprioceptive).

Well first you claimed that ends are subjective, and not intersubjective. I pointed out that some are intersubjective, and you responded by saying that that doesn't make them non-subjective. Again, if nothing is non-subjective then "subjective" has no meaning. — Leontiskos

You made an implicit argument with a crucial premise that ends are subjective and not intersubjective. You haven't spelled out what that argument actually is, but given that some ends are intersubjective, the argument must have failed. — Leontiskos

Individual ends are subjective, I haven't denied that there are collective ends. But even collective ends, insofar as they are desired by the individuals who form the collective, are also individual and thus subjective. I don't think it's hard to understand: intersubjective agreement relies on the agreement of individual subjects. There are things we can all agree about, things we all must agree about (absent perversity or gross stupidity) and things where there will inevitably be disagreement.

Sure, but we are discussing your argument for why we can't argue about ends. Your argument was something like, "Ends are like tastes. They are subjective, not intersubjective. Therefore they cannot be argued about." — Leontiskos

I have acknowledged that the consequences of holding particular ends can and should be discussed, and I would add with the majority ruling in a democracy. Nonetheless individuals may disagree about the ends that become mandated, as some significant proportion of the populace often, even usually, does. People are not often convinced by rational argument to change their opinions in my experience.

It seems like you're not quite sure whether your beliefs are rational. To be blunt and pithy, I would say that if your beliefs are rational then they can be argued about. If they are not rational then you should not believe them. — Leontiskos

I think we all believe many things which are not arrived at by rational argument. The foundational presuppositions and also just general beliefs about economics, politics, other people, religion, race, culture and so on that people commonly hold are very often rationally undecidable.

Rationality consists in consistency and coherency; the principle of valid argument that the conclusions should follow from the premises. It seems you continue to misunderstand what I am saying, the consequence being that I haven't found your objections and counterpoints to be relevant.