Apart from any conception of it, it neither exists nor doesn't exist. Both existence and non-existence are concepts. — Wayfarer

To say it neither exists nor doesn't exist is meaningless. Existence is actuality, 'existence' is a concept and non-existence is a concept only, simply because it cannot be an actuality.

That the world is not seen is not that it ceases to exist or even to be invisible.

Whatever 'particles' are, they are not defineable until they are measured. — Wayfarer

You mean they are not defined until they are measured, which is tautologically true. We can only define them by measuring them, (or their effects, since we cannot see them). They must be definable else they could never be measured in the first place.

In any case our inability to intuitively grasp what is going on in the microworld lends no credence to mysticism or spiritualism, which seems to be what you and many others seem to want to find there.

What their existence might be outside of any perspective is meaningless and unintelligible, as a matter of both fact and principle. — Wayfarer

Of course, but the same applies to the things of this world. If the "in itself" is "meaningless and unintelligible, as a matter of both fact and principle", that fact does not give any grounds for thinking it is mind-dependent.

So you have experience which can be said to be mind-dependent, and you have all that lies beyond possible experience about which we can know and say nothing at all based on anything other than what we are capable of imagining.

All that said, if we know nothing at all about the in itself then we don't know that it is not spatiotemporal or that it is not differentiated in ways isomorphic with our experience. We ourselves are after all, on that view, as noumenal as the rest of reality.

Physics has demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that the purported fundamental constituents of material reality do not have a meaningful existence outside the act of measurement which specifies them. — Wayfarer

How can you justifiably claim this when you also claim that the in itself is "meaningless and unintelligible, as a matter of both fact and principle"? Physics itself is a part of human experience and by your own argument could only tell us how things are for us. So, if that is true it is by definition and thus trivially true that for us "the purported material constituents of material reality do not have a meaningful existence outside the act of measurement which specifies them". But it certainly does not follow that they have no existence outside of our measurements. and in any case to say that would be to contradict yourself.

You really don't believe there are uncountable things happening in other galaxies despite our knowing and being able to know nothing about them?

This has more to do with the sort of skepticism inspired by Descartes which desires a certain foundation. — Moliere

The idea that doubt can, dialectically so to speak, lead to certainty, is dependent on a pre-established conceptual context, which is historically, culturally mediated, and is thus itself open to doubt. hence the importance of the past. And the possibility that the said conceptual paradigm might one day be completely supplanted brings the future into play.

A limping authority that derives from pop physics. — Banno

I tend to agree. I see no reason to think that the apparent paradoxes in QM, which I believe come from attempting to understand it in terms of macro-world concepts, have any metaphysical implications, other than that the micro nature of things is not what we might intuitively expect it to be.

You'd do well not to be too proud of it as well. That a view is radical (in your case I would rather say "eccentric" since your views are quite conventional in the ancient context) is not necessarily a point in its favour.

And I missed this:

But one may be an empirical, without being a metaphysical, realist. — Wayfarer

I used to accept that distinction, but when I came to question what it really means I realized I could not see any cogent sense in which it is coherent and valid.

reputable popular books on the subject — Wayfarer

there are powerful trends within both physics and cognitive science that undermine scientific realism — Wayfarer

Why must you always argue from authority?

Consciousness in that sense is collective. — Wayfarer

To be conscious is to be aware. So we can say that if anything is conscious it must be aware. Individuals are aware and are hence counted as conscious. How can there be a collective consciousness unless there is a collective entity that is aware. Its awareness would have to encompass not only human but all animal consciousness. You are talking about an omni-aware god. I see no reason to believe there is a such an entity.

The fourth thing, albeit directed at Janus, is that it is not obviously wrong. — Michael

There are obviously questions which cannot even in principle be answered. So we do know there are unknowable truths. Your strategy is to tendentiously define truth such that to be true is to be knowable, thus ruling out the possibility of unknowable truths. This is an eccentric notion of truth and therefore not to be taken seriously.

Even if you're an astrophysicist aware of the vastness of the Universe, you are providing the perspective within which that is meaningful. — Wayfarer

Sure, but that doesn't entail that the existence of the universe depends on a perspective. You seem to be confusing or conflating two different things.

Similarly, in phenomenology (e.g., Heidegger or Merleau-Ponty), the world is not an objective domain "out there" but is always encountered through the structures of embodied, situated being. — Wayfarer

For the "world" yes but for the Universe, no—as far as I know this is not correct for Heidegger at least (who I studied extensively at one time).I believe that Heidegger acknowledges the existence of the extra-human universe, but that is not what he is concerned with when he deals with being (being-in-the-world) or Dasein.

I mean you can define existence in an eccentric way to mean something perceived, but that is not what Heidegger is doing. I doubt it is what Merleau-Ponty is doing either, but I can't be sure of that as I have not read much of his work.

For Heidegger the world is neither "out there" nor "in here". That is a false dichotomy.

But there's also the philosophical understanding of the role of the mind in constructing the world. — Wayfarer

The body/ mind doesn't construct the world it participates in co-constructing the world of human experience and judgement. there is a very great deal of the world (in the sense of the universe) that has nothing to do with the human.

This sort of question is risible. The Orion Nebula is not dependent on you, nor are trilobites. But your saying anything (thinking, believing, doubting...) about them is dependent on you. — Banno

You're just basically repeating what I said in slightly different words. So it seems you are agreeing with me despite your boredom.

My take is that when Wittgenstein refers to the world he is referring to the world of human experience and judgement. He's not referring to the extra-human Universe.

Neither of those is quite right. It's a silly argument. — Banno

I agree it is a silly argument in the sense that it really doesn't matter. However, for the sake of clarity, how could it not be right to say that the prebiotic Universe was not dependent on mind? Granted the saying of it is dependent on mind, but to say the Universe was dependent on mind prior to the existence of any mind is tantamount to saying that it either didn't exist or that it is fundamentally mental in nature..

Everything human could be said to be mind-dependent (not that I am enamoured of the terminology).

If things existed prior to humans or any other percipient, there is no sense in which the Universe could be said to be mind-dependent (unless you posit panpsychism).

Ok. I'm not a science guy but I am reminded of the famous Feynman quote, "I think I can safely say that nobody understands quantum mechanics."

Is there not also a difference between science's predictive success versus knowing why? — Tom Storm

Right, quantum mechanics is not intelligible if we try to understand it in macro-world terms and scientific explanations can never be certainties in any case.

Yes, I suppose this works. I'm curious what others might say. It seems to be a tendentious area. — Tom Storm

I agree it is a tendentious area because there are many who purport to use QM to support dubious metaphysical speculations, and this is only possible because in macro-world terms we really don't know what is going on and I think that is what Feynman was getting at. Different paradigms.

Give it time and it might explain these phenomena.
— jgill

Is that a faith based position? :wink: — Tom Storm

I think they already do explain their respective phenomenal fields, although perhaps not to the satisfaction of some who demand total unity and comprehensiveness.

That they might achieve comprehensiveness and unity in the future doesn't seem to be a faith-based position but merely an acknowledgement that we don't know what the future possibilities are.

On the other hand it seems unlikely that we will ever have an explanation that will satisfy everyone.

Interesting. Does nature include quantum mechanics and consciousness? — Tom Storm

Quantum mechanics seems to be intelligible via mathematics and it certainly seems to be based on observations of phenomena. The fact that we cannot apply intuitive macroworld generated concepts in order to get a satisfying picture of what is going on in the microworld should come as no surprise. In fact it is a human metaphysical presumption that there should be one overarching explanatory paradigm which could explain everything.

Consciousness, not being an empirical object, can only be studied by observing behavior and by listening to subjective reports along with brain-imaging. We have intuitive notions of consciousness which cannot be (presently at least) explained or confirmed or disconfirmed by science. Again, I don't see why that should surprise us.

Doesn't it rest upon a metaphysical presupposition that reality can be understood? — Tom Storm

I don't see why it needs such a presupposition. Humans have found that nature is intelligible. Science has yielded a vast and coherent body of understanding which is both comprehensively internally consistent and coherent and is confirmed to work insofar as it has yielded countless technologies which obviously work.

Philosophy on the other hand has traditionally been faith-based, since no empirical confirmations are possible. Modern philosophy has two other faces though—those of philosophy as description and philosophy as critique or conceptual clarification and extension.

If you're familiar with philosophy of science, E A Burtt's Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science, in particular, you will see that this is completely mistaken. The 'metaphysical belief' in question being early modern science's division of primary and secondary attributes, overlaid on the Cartesian separation of mind and matter. — Wayfarer

You are addressing a different point. It may well be historically true that the genesis and pre-modern rise of science was accompanied by metaphysical beliefs. It does not follow that those beliefs are necessary for the continued practice of science.

For other examples astronomy arguably grew out of astrological presuppositions and chemistry our of alchemy, but those earlier ideas have been left behind without any detriment to the practices of astronomy and chemistry.

Unless he means that we can't take our seriousness seriously? — J

This.

The unity of thinking and being described by Plotinus challenges the prevailing view that knowledge is a sequential accumulation of information. — Wayfarer

The problem is that such a form of knowing cannot ever be discursively justified. So it remains ever a matter of faith, even for the supposedly enlightened ones.

As regards its modus operandi, then, all analysis is metaphysical analysis; and, since analysis is what gives its scientific character to science, science and metaphysics are inextricably united, and stand or fall together.
~R.G. Collingwood, Essay on Metaphysics — Pantagruel

This seems nonsensical to me. Science is justified only insofar as it is known to work. The same cannot be said for metaphysics. Science relies for its practice on no particular metaphysical beliefs.

Yet it falls into the common trap of: "wow, philosophy is hard and we don't get the same sort of certainty the early moderns decided should be the gold standard, thus nothing really matters." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I read the paper and I don't agree that it falls into that at all. The point as I read it is that if we stand apart from our lives and look at them in the abstract, so to speak, it appears as though our concerns are trivial. But he also makes the point that the 'mattering' of our lives needs no external justification, and that in fact, such justification could never work in any case.

Right, I had in mind conjectures like 'QM correctly models reality'. Or 'reality is mind-dependent' or 'reality is mind-independent'.

As to your example finding life on Pluto would prove there is life on Pluto, but finding no life on Pluto cannot prove there is no life on Pluto.

In any case according to the anti-realist of your account any conjecture which cannot be known to be true or false is neither true nor false. That seems to be an inadequate account of truth.

Also you haven't addressed the 'God' and 'multiverse' examples. Leaving aside God (since the idea could be argued to be incoherent) what about the multiverse? We could never even in principle prove there is or is not a multiverse. Would the anti-realist claim there is no fact of the matter?

1. If “God exists” is true then it is possible to prove that it is true
2. If “God exists” is false then it is possible to prove that it is false
3. If it is not possible to prove that “God exists” is true and not possible to prove that “God exists” is false then “God exists” is neither true nor false — Michael

The problem is that no conjecture can be proven to be true or false, so on the antirealist view, assuming you have correctly outlined it, no conjecture could be either true or false.

It's not obvious to the anti-realist.

If you're only "argument" against anti-realism is that it's "obviously" wrong then it's not an argument, just a denial. — Michael

If the antirealist says we can know whether or not there is a god or a multiverse then they should be able to give an account of how that would be possible. There is no such account that I know of and absent such an account they are not to be taken seriously.

If God exists then we can know that God exists, and if God doesn't exist then we can know that God doesn't exist. — Michael

And yet we obviously cannot know either of those. We cannot know whether there are multiple universes. Would you think a claim that our inability to know whether there are rules out the possibility that there are multiple universes is reasonable?

In any case it seems like the disagreement merely comes down to the definition of truth. Is there any way to know which definition of truth is correct? is there any truth as to whether one or other definition of truth is correct?

The antirealists must be wrong though because they cannot rule out the possibility that unbeknownst to us there might be unknowable truths. Just stipulating that truths are only truths if they are known seems obviously wrong as it does not accord with the common notion of truth. Is there any way they could know rather than merely opine that the common notion of truth is incoherent?

What if the question is changed to whether there are unknowable actualities instead? What about, for example, the question regarding the existence of God? We know we cannot know the answer to that, no matter how plausible or implausible the existence of God might seem. Would you say there cannot be a truth about whether or not God exists, despite that fact that it is obviously impossible to know?

This seems right to me.

There seems to be some sort of self-reference paradox going on here. So let's reframe the question in the hope of gaining more clarity. We know it is impossible to answer the question as to whether there is more than one unknowable truth. We might have an opinion either way but we cannot know. But the very fact that it is impossible to answer the question shows that there is at least one unknowable truth.

Please explain how it could be possible to know whether there is more than one unknowable truth.

The anti-realist will say that it is knowable that "there are unknowable truths" is false. — Michael

But that has been shown to be false, so the anti-realist is wrong.

There are really only two options. Try this:

1. The truth or falsity regarding "there are unknowable truths" is knowable
2. The truth or falsity regarding "there are unknowable truths" is unknowable

2. leads to a contradiction so 1. must be true.

3. and 4. are redundant because being able to or not being able to know the falsity is logically equivalent to being able to or not being able to know the truth

You assume "there are unknowable truths" is unknowable and then conclude "there are unknowable truths is knowable". — Michael

I provisionally assume that "there are unknowable truths" is unknowable and then show that this leads to a contradiction, which shows it must be false.

I edited it while you were replying to avoid the contradiction. The first is merely a starting assumption which proves to be false. The point is only that we can show that we know there is at least one unknowable truth. We cannot know whether there are others perhaps, I don't know.

What about all the truths regarding what happened in the pre-human past? Are they unknowable? You might say they are not unknowable in principle.

Whether there are other unknowable truths may be unknowable but that doesn't contradict the fact that we know there is at least one. In fact it is the very fact that we can know whether there are other unknowable truths which proves that we can know that there is at least one.

Perhaps I should have simplified by saying that the claim that there are no unknowable truths is knowably false because we know there is at least that one.

You go from a) "there are unknowable truths" is unknowably true to b) "there are unknowable truths" is knowably true. This is a contradiction. If (a) is true then (b) is false and if (b) is true then (a) is false. — Michael

You are not addressing the argument, I don't say as a starting premise that it is unknowably true that there are unknowable truths I say that at first glance it simply appears to be unknowable—that is it could be true or false and we have no way of knowing which. However if the starting assumption is that the truth or falsity regarding the existence of unknowable truths is unknowable then we know that there is at least one unknowable truth. We don't have to know if there are others because one is enough. There is no contradiction

It is obviously impossible even in principle. because no matter how many truths we know there could always be an unknowable truth.
— Janus

This is begging the question. — Michael

What question is it begging?

1. "there are unknowable truths" is knowably true — Michael

I have shown that we know there is at least one unknowable truth. The question is are there unknowable truths apart from the unknowable truth about whether there are other unknowable truths. If there is a truth as to whether there are unknowable truths, then that truth is an unknowable truth. So we know there is at least one unknowable truth. If you think there is something wrong with the reasoning, then say what it is.

I have no doubt there are other unknowable truths, but all that needs to be shown is that there is at least one.

So pragmatically that leaves us with (4) and (5). How do we decide between them without knowing any unknown truths? — Michael

1. “All truths are knowable” is knowably true
2. “All truths are knowable” is false — Michael

Answer the question I posed:

Do you think it is possible to know whether the claim that there are unknowable truths is true? — Janus

It is obviously impossible even in principle. because no matter how many truths we know there could always be an unknowable truth.

But then if the truth as to whether there are unknowable truths is known to be unknowable, then we know that there is at least one unknowable truth. Address that and stop with the red herrings.

Do you think it is possible to know whether the claim that there are unknowable truths is true?

I am only concerned with refuting the claim that all truths are knowable. As I've shown we know there is at least one unknowable truth.

↪Janus what I said. — Wayfarer

Sorry, I have no idea why you think what you said has any bearing on the question at hand.

. "some truths are unknowable" is true and knowable — Michael

That's the right one.

We know that we can't know the truth as to whether all truths are knowable because no matter how many truths we know we have no way of knowing whether there are further truths that are unknowable. But then the unknowability of the truth about whether all truths are knowable shows there is at least one unknowable truth.

And as mentioned before, the antirealist rejects the conclusion. They might claim that every truth is knowable but that some truths are unknown. — Michael

How can the anti-realist justify the claim that all unknown truths are knowable? You would have to know them to know they are knowable, no?

“It” here being observation, and observation is pre-cognitive? — Mww

"It" denotes how the body/ brain is apparently affected by the environment to produce perceptual experiences. We can tell the scientific story about how that happens, but that account is post hoc. If you would call that pre-cognitive affection "observation' then we would be talking about the same thing.

I would agree with this as well, iff interpretation here is meant as judgement. Experience is the common character of already interpreted perceptions, but not all perceptions result in determined experience, so always interpreted cannot be imposed on experience. Judgement fits both always and already, and….added bonus…judgement is the very epitome of conceptual apparatuses’ functionality. — Mww

I guess it depends on how you intend the word "experience" to be taken. We can say the organism experiences the pre-cognitve affect of the environment and we can refer to the already interpreted perceptions as experiences. It seems to be the "seeing as" which I refer to as "interpretation" that you denote by "judgement"?

Language can be problematic. Meaning is not as transparently obvious as we would like it to be.

If you think Socrates' example shows that philosophy is not about how best to live then we are so far from being on the same page as to make responding pointless.

:up:

I suppose I'm speaking in favor of philosophy so I really do mean it the other way about: that philosophy doesn't influence but is the beginning of those thoughts, and so metaphysics and all the rest cannot be dismissed as a game else all the rest is a game. — Moliere

The difference I see is that ecology, economics and politics all necessarily have real world consequences. As I've acknowledged I see that metaphysics can have such consequences, but I think it does not necessarily. I guess it could be said that the way the significance of ecology etc is seen is a metaphysical matter right from the start, but again I don't see what necessary difference to those seminal views the differences between idealism and physicalism or realism, for example, could have.

If people think this world doesn't matter then of course that is a problem. They could arrive at that view by thinking there is a spiritual realm and that's all that matters, or alternatively they could think that since it's all just mindless atoms in the void nothing matters. Any such views would be dogmatic ideologies though, and I've already acknowledged that they are deeply problematic.

I'm not sure what you mean here. If you mean that metaphysical attitudes can influence how folk think about ecological, economic and political issues then i agree.

What I don't believe is that there is any inherent or logically necessary relevance of for example questions like 'materialism versus idealism' for human life. Even religious views like belief in an afterlife or divine order can certainly influence how people think about earthly matters, but I think it can go either way.

The idea that God created the world for man, for example could lead to the idea that we can do whatever we want to nature with impunity or it could lead to the idea of us being charged with the role of guardians and protectors of the environment.