Cheers Ludwig such details are easily missed. I do it all the time.

So how does it cause a decision to act? Do chemicals also ‘decide to act’? You’ve said many times that the material universe is devoid of intention. — Wayfarer

It's not controversial that electrochemical processes cause us to decide to act. Do you really believe that when you decide to act or simply act that there have been no prior neural processes (that you have obviously not been aware of) which give rise to that decision or action?

It's uncontroversial that the brain responds to stimuli and orchestrates all bodily processes and actions. That's what I mean. I've already said that I'm referring to that as modeling but am not suggesting it is any more than a physical process. Take it as a metaphor.

i No, I'm not attributing agency in any other sense than action. In the kind of sense that the chemist speaks of chemical agents.

if you posit that the brain has to carry out some process - call it modelling - that has to be executed before any action can be carried out - it seems to me that you have created an infinite regress. — Ludwig V

I don't see why you would think that if the brain is constantly modeling all experience and action that it would imply dualism, a homunculus or an infinite regress.

I'm not saying the process of 'modeling" is anything other than a physical process,

I'm not claiming that there is somehow a kind of theatre with a little watcher in the brain which is prior to our experience, thoughts and actions. Think of a computer program that generates novel ways of articulating ideas. The processes that do that we could refer to as a kind of modeling constituted by the electronic switching that gives rise to the program.

I can't see why an infinite regress would be involved. You haven't actually explained your reasons for those three claims.

:cool:

Even something as abstract as a "view from anywhere" implies that someone, some consciousness, is going to step into that place and attain the view. — J

The God's eye view is sometimes referred to as the view from nowhere. I think it would be more aptly understood as the view from everywhere (and everywhen). I also like the relativistic non-omniscient notion of a view from anywhere. It could also be called 'the view from nowhere in particular'.

while the view from nowhere solipsisticly centres on the self, the view from anywhere is eccentric, looking to account for what others say they see, while seeking broad consensus. — Banno

I don't see it that way. The self-centred view is the view from somewhere, not the view from nowhere.

Do you need prior modelling of the modelling? No? Then why do you need to model the action in the first place? — Ludwig V

It seems reasonable to me to think that for everything we think and do there is a corresponding neural network of activity. That is what I mean by 'modeling'. As I already said although we think of it as modeling a conceptual or semantic process, we also think of what the brain does as a physical process. In any case, why would we need modeling of the modeling?

Is the brain part of the self or not? Assuming it is, then it has to model itself, including a model of its modelling. !?
Can you tell me the difference between my "self" and "Ludwig" and "I"? I don't perceive any. — Ludwig V

Are you denying that it most plausible to think that the brain evolves a model of our overall being we refer to as 'the self'? Of course that model includes the brain and the body. The brain that models is conceptually the central part of that model, but it is not an experiential part at all. Apparently the brain lacks any sensation. It is the one part of our bodies we cannot feel.

Yes. Exactly. So how do you know the brain is modelling anything?

It may be that I simply don't understand what you mean by "model" and "modelling". — Ludwig V

I'm saying that the brain's inscrutable neural processes we can only conceive as 'modeling'. What could it mean to say that conception is wrong when we cannot directly observe or even feel what the living brain is doing?

Tell me about it. There's no hurry. It's just that it might be interesting to swop notes as and when. Up to you. — Ludwig V

I agree it would be interesting to compare notes. I'll certainly let you know if I start reading Groundless Grounds. I'm enjoying our conversation. :cool:

"nothing at all happens without the brain" is not helpful. Nothing at all happens without the legs, heart, etc. — Ludwig V

Of course it's the whole system working together. However the brain is the central processing unit so I think it is important to emphasize that nothing happens without the brain.

If the brain tells the heart to beat and the lungs to breathe and processes and renders intelligible all sensory input and tells our limbs how to move when performing actions both simple and complex how would all this be possible without prior modeling?

Apart from all the autonomic functions the brain gives rise to consciousness and creates an overarching model we refer to as the "self".

Preparation is concept that links preparatory activities to the activity, so it is conceptually, not merely causally, linked to the activity. — Ludwig V

We understand and experience neural activity only as affect, percept and concept. We can say the brain must model all our bodily functions and actions and all its sensory input, but its true we don't know exactly what all those neuronal processes and networks are doing simply because they cannot be directly observed in vivo.

I should hope not. It's meant to be a foundation, not the actual activity. It certainly represents a big change in the concept if you are a platonist. — Ludwig V

Right. Luckily I am no platonist. I find the very idea that numbers are somehow real apart from their instantiations and our generalizing concepts of them to be incoherent.

I shall be very interested to know what you make of the book. I'm very sympathetic to the project. — Ludwig V

Cheers. I do have quite a lot on my 'to read' list and nowhere near as much time to read as I would like so there may be a fair bit of time before I can get to it.

-Robots do not have any subjective experiences of the electrical activity within them by which they detect sensory input, discriminate this input from that input, and act based on what they are currently detecting. We do. Why don't they? Why do we? — Patterner

I think the answer is quite simple. We are complex multidimensional evolved organisms, and they are not. Also we do not have any subjective experience of the workings of the brain and the CNS, we only experience the sensations, affects, thoughts and actions that manifest on account of those workings.

Right. But, if all is physical determinism, then why would we experience the wanting? A robot that is programmed to fill a cup with water when its sensors detect it is empty doed not "want" water. — Patterner

Why would we not experience wanting? Why compare us to robots? We are not robots we are evolved organisms.

And, advantage or not, how is the subjective experience accomplished? — Patterner

We don't know, and may never know, how it is accomplished. I say we may never know, because even the neural processes cannot be directly observed in vivo. But we have no evidence to suggest that neural activity could not possibly be accompanied by conscious experience. We understand physical processes in causal terms by directly observing them and in the case of neural processes this is just not possible.

Even if we could observe in living detail the neural processes we cannot observe conscious experience, so establishing the link between the two would still seem to be impossible, as far as I can imagine. Of course I might be mistaken, I won't deny that.

I guess there are those who say the neural activity isn't experienced as wanting to have milk. Rather, the neutral activity is wanting to have milk. Experiencing the neural activity vs. the neural activity being the experience. The latter being the case if we are ruled by physical determinism. In which case, the "wanting to have milk" is, I guess, epiphenomenal, and serves no purpose. — Patterner

I don't see the 'wanting to have milk' as epiphenomenal but as a necessary part of the associated neural activity. We certainly don't experience the neural activity as such.

Without wanting to nit pick, I don’t think that’s quite right. The stock example I’ve always read is, the answer to ‘why is the kettle boiling? — Wayfarer

There is no essential difference I can see between the example I gave and your "stock example". If you see a difference perhaps you could highlight it.

You have arithmetic as soon as you can do that, but for true mathematics, you really need to go in for more elaborate calculations, such as algebraic ones and recognize "0". That changes the concept of number, but still grounds it in the relevant activities, not in any objects, physical or abstract. — Ludwig V

Thanks, but I'm not seeing how it changes the concept of number beyond just extending the basic concept inherent in counting.

There's an entry in the index for "rational reconstruction". You may have to read around the actual passages a bit to see what is going on. If you do read it and want to ask me questions by private message, I would be happy to answer - not that I can answer all the questions, by any means. It's all about the role of articulation (in language or talking to oneself) in thinking and action. So relevant to animals. — Ludwig V

Thanks I'll check it out. By the way I'm not averse to Heidegger. I have read some of his work including Being and Time, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology and secondary sources such as Dreyfus, Malpas and Blattner, listened to Dreyfus' lectures and attended a couple of undergraduate units dealing with his early work and I found it all quite rewarding. It was my interest in Heidegger more than my interest in Wittgenstein that led me to buy the Braver books.

You are quite right. My problem with your way of putting it is that the cause is a different entity or event from the effect. That's why I want to say that my going to the shops consists of my moving my legs, etc and the neural activity (which, after all, is involved throughout by controlling the movement of my legs. — Ludwig V

Yes I agree we must include the whole system of causes and conditions. That said nothing at all happens without the brain and the neuroscientists tell us that the neural networks in the brain model everything we think and do just prior to our thinking and doing.

That still doesn't show that rationality is contingent on being correct or knowing the truth. — night912

I agree. The larger part of rational thinking consists in inductive and abductive reasoning which is inherently defeasible.

As explanations they are incompatible in the sense that they cannot be combined into a 'master' explanation that incorporates them. That is not to say that being caused and intentional behavior cannot both exist in the same universe or being.

Say I go to the shops for milk. If someone asks why I went to the shops I'll say it was to buy milk. That's one explanation. On the other hand, I could say I went to the shops because the neural activity which is experienced as realizing I was out of milk and neural activity which is experienced as wanting to have milk led to neural activity which led me to go to the shop.

The reason I went to the shops was to buy milk. The cause of my going to the shops was neural activity. The two explanations do not rule each other out they are just two different ways of understanding the same event. Their incompatibility consists in their different ways of understanding. It doesn't follow that one is right and the other wrong,

If those two kinds of explanations cannot be unified into a single paradigm, then one or both of those kinds of explanations need to be modified or discarded. Because, since everything exists in this one universe, there must be a single paradigm that explains it all.

But perhaps there is a paradigm that they both fit within. As opposed to melding the two. — Patterner

I don't see why there must be a "single paradigm that explains it all". Those two modes of explanation are both essential to human life. For the modern mind explanations of phenomena as intentional cannot carry any weight because they are justified neither by observation nor logic.

When it comes to explanations of human and some animal behavior the notion of acting for intelligently formulated reasons would seem to be indispensable so I can't see a possibility of discarding either one. As to "modifying" them or finding a "master" paradigm within which they would both fit I cannot even begin to imagine what those would look like.

Of course that doesn't mean it is impossible, but it certainly seems impossible from where I sit. The logics of intentional behavior on the one hand and being constrained to act by external causes on the other just seem incompatible.

Number being physically instantiated begs the question as to just what about physical existents exists.

I think abstract objects are products of analysis. — frank

It seems to me rather that abstract objects as artefacts of generalization are products of recognition and synthesis.

OK, that makes sense. I also think of being or existing as a verb. Being can also be thought of as a noun, but then it is an abstraction. It's interesting that existing cannot be thought of as a noun, for that the word gets changed to existence, which is also an abstraction.

Looked at from either the perspective of being as a verb or as a noun we cannot conceive of there being real being without there being real beings.

No it doesn't. It may be pragmatic to be an oppressive fascist dictator as its a very effective way of exerting your will and getting things done. Doesn't mean that it's moral despite how effective it might be on paper.

Morality is not about pragmatism, its about empathy. Its being able to "walk in the shoes" of another and see why your actions may harm them. — Benj96

I wasn't talking about what is pragmatic for individuals, but for societies. I think you'll find that theft, rape, assault and murder are illegal even in fascist dictatorships. The fact that those in power can sometimes get away with these acts doesn't change the fact that they are generally unacceptable to people. Imagine a society in which there was no punishment, other than other individuals taking revenge, for those who committed such acts. It would be anything but a harmonious society. There is honour even among thieves

Religions are what happen when a significant truth is appointed deep and enduring value to a group such that a lifestyle and culture grows around it. — Benj96

Religions only flourish when they satisfy, or seem to satisfy, social needs. Of course, that includes the need for the authorities to exercise their power. How long do you think a religion that promoted free-for-all theft, deception of others, assault, rape and murder would last?

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Then what is missing exactly if we know the way they see the world? — Harry Hindu

We infer the way they see the world. It doesn't follow that we can see the world that way.

But I asked what a "thing in itself" even means. It sounds like a misuse of language. Does it mean to BE the thing in itself? If so, is there a BEING to a chair, table, house, car, or rock? If not then there is nothing missing. — Harry Hindu

We don't know what things are apart from how they appear to us. Once that is realized it is possible to make the logical distinction between how things are for us, how they are for other animals and how they are in themselves. Some believe that physics shows us how things are in themselves, but the problem is there is no way to know if that is true, and anyway even the quantum physicists say that they can form no coherent picture of the quantum world and that understanding it is only possible via mathematics. What QM does seem to show is that things are not what they seem.

I'm intrigued. I have no idea what you mean unless you are thinking of counting as an act.

In this context, perhaps there is room for a question I mostly shelve, about whether the difference between reasons and causes is also discovered or created. Mostly, philosophers treat it as a given, though explaining it to people learning philosophy or reluctant to recognize it can be difficult. (It's not intuitive). I don't have a crisp answer. It could be either or some combination. — Ludwig V

I've thought about this question in regard to mathematics. I think it's fair to say it's both. Thinking about reasons and causes we discover a valid distinction in our thinking between them in that we consider acting for reasons to be self-generated, intentional. Being caused to act is thought in terms of being pushed by an external agent. There are many ways in which the two notions bleed into one another, so there is no absolutely clearcut distinction.

Yes. Indeed, with some reservations, it would not be wrong to say that for them, teleological explanations were dominant. Which suggests that explanation by causes was developed later, by distinguishing it from the teleological. (Though it would be more accurate to say that it was developed from Aristotle's account of explanation, which gives one model for everything.) It's curious that the non-teleological explanation has taken over and nearly ejected teleological explanations altogether - like a cuckoo. — Ludwig V

Is it curious or is it because in the development of our investigations and understandings of the world we have come to see that there is no need for imaginary entities to explain natural phenomena?

I like the concept of a rational reconstruction for this. (I found it recently in Lee Braver's "Groundless Grounds".) — Ludwig V

By "rational reconstruction" do you mean something along the lines of 'thinking about how things seems to us and then imputing it (in some kind of suitably modified form) to animals' or something else? I have that Braver book on my shelves somewhere, but I've never gotten around to reading it. Would you recommend it?

I like this. It helps to bridge the gap between counting (as the ground in our practices) and arithmetic. — Ludwig V

Would you be able to elaborate on this a little?

Nice!

Frege believed that number is real in the sense that it is quite independent of thought: 'thought content exists independently of thinking "in the same way", he says "that a pencil exists independently of grasping it. — Frege on Knowing the Third Realm, Tyler Burge

Note that Burge writes "number" not 'numbers'. I find it to be an important distinction because the quality of number is of course present wherever there is diversity whereas numbers as entities are not. To put it another way, say there are four objects—it seems to me to make sense that the quality or pattern of four, that is fourness, is present, but not the number four as a separate entity.

To say that animals see things differently than we do implies that we know something about how they see things. We sense things differently using different senses. Seeing a surface and feeling a surface provides us the same information in different forms. If we can be informed of the same thing via different methods then it seems to me that there isn't much more, if any, to the thing in itself. If there is then we'd never know it and wouldn't even be able to use it as evidence that we don't experience things as they are.

Do we experience our mind as the thing in itself? Is that what one means by the thing in itself is that you have to BE the thing? — Harry Hindu

We infer that they see things differently on the basis of observation and analysis of their different sensory setups. We can infer that they see different ranges of colour, or even only in black and white for example.

It's true that we can get the same or similar information from different sensory modalities, but the sensations themselves are different. All of that information falls inot the category of 'how things appear or present themselves to us'. It seems natural to think that there must be more to things than just how they appear or seem to be. Of course we can never know more than that, but the fact that we are compelled to think of the 'in itself' has many ramifications for human life. Not in terms of something we know, but in terms of what we can never know. The knowledge here is just self-knowledge.

As to our experience of mind I think this is a real minefield. If mind consists only in our experience and judgements would it follow that we know all there is to know about it? Psychedelics and altered states in general show that we have the potential for very different experiences, so it would seem presumptuous to imagine that we have explored all there is to know about what it is possible to experience.

t does not follow that if there is a god and that god holds the truth that this truth is ipso facto beneficial. — Tom Storm

Yes, that's true. But this would only be a problem if we could somehow infallibly know the awful truth and would then be left with the choice of either rejecting the demand for worship and accepting whatever punishment that would entail or accepting the unacceptable out of the desire to avoid punishment.

You may have a point. I think the two are different articulations of the same problem. Which I agree is a pseudo-problem, except that I can't spot how the illusion is created - yet. — Ludwig V

What springs to mind is that they are two different articulations of the human all too human need to explain. The need to explain is the problem. We have to explain our behavior to others and we do so mostly in terms of reasons, although sometimes in terms of causes. We have to explain the behavior of animals and we do this sometimes in terms of (imagined and projected) reasons and sometimes in terms of causes and we have to explain natural phenomena and we do so in terms of mechanism, forces and causes. In regard to the last in ancient times some explanations of the natural were also in terms of reasons.

How complex do you want morality to be? Would you like it obscure, esoteric, out of reach, unintuitive?

I think you'll find most religions are -at their core - when removing all the arbitrary fluff/tripe and dogma, about doing right by one another. — Benj96

I don't believe morality is either complex or dependent on religion. At least when it comes to the most significant moral issues. Those regarding theft, assault, rape, murder, child abuse and so on. Morality grows out of pragmatic social necessity.

So, I see the religious aspects as being unnecessary to morality, rationally speaking. Although it could be argued that they are emotionally or psychologically necessary for some people.

How do we rule out a god (if one exists) who is also an intolerant pissant? What if the truth is horrible? — Tom Storm

You mean the God of the Old Testament? The Gnostics believed that God was a flawed, self-important lesser deity. On the other hand, I think each, the approval and the disapproval of Yahweh, are just one story among meany others. Humans seem to need to select one story and declare it the literal truth. What if it's stories all the way down?

Then we don't have to rule out a god or any particular god, and nor do we have to rule one in. We just need to recognize they are all just stories, and that no one knows the absolute truth or for that matter any truth beyond what is observed and what is tautologously so.

Might it be an even bigger problem, to label oneself with a philosophical label at all? — wonderer1

:up: The direct/ indirect polemic seems to me to thrive on the failure to recognize that the two ways of thinking about our experience are just two different perspectives. It doesn't have to be an absolute either/ or but is rather just a matter of different ways of thinking in different contexts.

How do we know that we have incomplete knowledge if we didn't already know what was missing? If we come to the conclusion that something is missing then how did we do that, and does that really mean that we have incomplete knowledge if we know what is missing? — Harry Hindu

I don't know if this was meant to be addressed to me since I didn't say we have incomplete knowledge of things in themselves. That said I agree with the idea. Just as an example we have good reason to think other animals see things differently than we do. We can't see things as they do so there way of seeing things is a different kind of knowledge of things than ours. There for we can say that our knowledge of things is incomplete. We also seem to necessarily think that things must have an inherent existence that is not (fully, at least) apprehended in their appearances to us, or even the totality of all their appearances to all the creatures they appear to.

Sure, humans decide what is deemed "Word of God". Is that neccessarily opposed to what inspires them? Why so? Must they be in opposition, at odds? — Benj96

"As opposed" in the way I used it means "as distinct from" not "opposed to". Its common parlance. If something inspires me, I do not have to conclude that it therefore must inspire others.

If someone was willing to put their own wellbeing on the line to spread knowledge/truth and foster good intentions, and gave you a choice to agree with this agenda, ignore it or oppose it, what would you choose? — Benj96

That a simplistic picture in my view. If the person was merely saying "we should be good to one another" then that would be hard to argue with. But its not as simple as that when it comes to religion.

What you say here is not relevant to the point. It is always humans that decide whether something is the "word of God", as opposed to being something that just personally inspires them.

I fail to see how they decide for "everyone" beyond themselves specifically, the only thing they decide is who they tell in their immediate circle. After all they're only responsible for their own actions. — Benj96

I see evangelism as being essential to Christianity. "The Word" is understood to be the word of God, and it is believed that those who accept it will be saved and those who don't will be damned. So those who accept the Word accept that it is the ultimate truth for all, and that the "good news" should be spread so that everyone has access to it.

I don't think that what I'm proposing is a new paradigm. It's just a different way of looking at an old paradigm, which better reflects the questions that we ask and dissolves some of the puzzles that the old paradigm seems to generate. — Ludwig V

It seems to be that there is an inherent incommensurability and thus incompatibility between our two paradigms of explanation—the one in terms of experiences and reasons and the other in terms of mechanisms and causes. It's that inherent incompatibility that leads me to believe that the so-called "Hard Problem" is a pseudo-problem that comes with failing to recognize this fundamental incommensurability.

And who propagates it? — Benj96

Anyone who decides to take it upon themselves to decide for everyone that it ought to be spread.

And no one has done that. — Benj96

Of course someone has done that. The so-called "Word" would not have gotten out there in the first place if no one had done that.

Therefore, I don't see how any one individual should take it upon themselves to decide for everyone else that it ought not be spread. — Benj96

Accepting that principle, it follows that no one should take it upon themselves to decide for everyone that it ought to be spread.

Well, I thought you might find my suggestion interesting. — Ludwig V

I didn't mean to be dismissive. I have to acknowledge that a new paradigm of explanation is possible, I guess I just don't see it as a likelihood.

Also, I think it's fairly easy to see the adaptive and survival advantage that reason possesses. Perhaps that is (pragmatic) justification enough. I think the advanced capacity for reasoning that symbolic language brings with it has enabled humans to successfully adapt to almost any environment and to consequently strain the planet's resources, destroy vast areas of habitat and pollute the natural world. It's reason that should let us collectively understand this, and maybe it has, but the problem now seems so vast and intractable, given the cultural impediments to harmonious global planning and action that reason alone is insufficient. Will is also needed.

One step that may be useful is to escape from "gives rise to" or "causes". — Ludwig V

All our explanations are in terms of either causes or reasons. It might be imagined that some completely new paradigm of explanation will be found, but I see no reason to think so.

Yet it is, I believe, common knowledge that Wittgenstein's approach to justifying reason grounds it in our human way of life, our practices, our language-games. If one accepts that, the idea of evolution presents itself as a way of deepening his gestural account and explaining why our way of life and practices are what they are. — Ludwig V

The fact that we have developed the capacity for reason evolutionarily does not "justify" reason. Reason needs no justification. No justification of reason that doesn't use reason is possible, and this circularity ensures that justifying reason is an incoherent, an impossible, fantasy..

No, it asks a very good question which draws attention to the incoherence of physicalism and the inability of it to explain the process which you say is ‘fairly well understood.’ — Wayfarer

I haven't said that the factor or mechanism or whatever you might want to call it in the neural processes that gives rise to conscious self-awareness is well understood. I would say it never will be because consciousness cannot be directly observed, and because the kinds of explanations we have for intentional behavior are given in terms of reasons, not causes, and the two kinds of explanations cannot be unified into a single paradigm.

It's a pure prejudice on your part that says that because we can give explanations in terms of reason that physicalism or strong emergentism must be false. It's merely an argument from incredulity.

Physicalism cannot explain subjective feelings obviously, but it doesn't follow that it is false, merely that it is limited in its scope. There is no reason to believe that we should be able to explain or understand everything. The fact that we cannot does not indicate that there must be a transcendent realm or a divine mystery. That is just wishful thinking.

By some process yet to be understood….. — Wayfarer

Neural processes are fairly well understood. The difficulty is with explaining how physical processes can give rise to consciously experienced feelings. I don't believe the question is answerable because it comes from trying to combine two incommensurable accounts. So the "hard problem" is based on an incoherent question.

God forbid that we should even contemplate the possibility that the sun's burning should be dependent on our senses. That's pure Berkeley!
But it is perfectly true that the study of physics is dependent on human senses. That's what I meant to say. — Ludwig V

:up:

... and yet, here we are, doing exactly that. Not well, but at least trying to work it out. — Ludwig V

Here we are talking about doing it. I don't believe we've made even the first step, and I see no reason to believe we ever will for the reason I gave in my response to Wayfer above.

Physics has no conceptual space for them - yet physics is utterly dependent on them. — Ludwig V

The study of physics is dependent on human senses, but I think we have little reason to say that physical processes in general are. Human senses and brain activity are certainly dependent on physical processes.

From one perspective we can say that thoughts are physical processes, presumably causally related to one another. From another perspective thoughts may not seem like physical processes at all. This reminds me of Sellar's "space of causes" and "space of reasons". The two ways of thinking do not seem to be possible to combine into a single discourse.

And yet, one feels that there must be some relationship. — Ludwig V

I think it's just a case of looking at thinking from two perspectives. I certainly don't buy the argument that says that if thought is determined by neural activity, then thoughts could not rightly be said to have logical, as well as causal, connections with one another. It's merely an argument from incredulity.

How do we reconcile these problems as indirect realists that accept that our conscious experience is representational? If we do trust our conscious experience to tell us about the things-in-themselves to some extent (as a necessity and way out), then how do we determine the limits of what we can know about the things-in-themselves? — Bob Ross

I don't see any puzzle. It comes down to what is meant by saying we don't know things in themselves. Insofar as they are thought as what gives rise to our experience of a world of things, then of course we can say we do know them. But it can also obviously be said that we only know them as they appear to us.