Let me be blunt: if you think testimony isn’t evidence, then you’re not just wrong—you’re being selectively inconsistent. You accept testimony as evidence all the time: in courtrooms, in history books, in journalism, in scientific discovery. Much of what you believe about the world has been passed to you through other people’s words. Testimony is a fundamental mode of knowing. That’s not a fringe claim; that’s epistemology 101. — Sam26
Contrary to protestations and resentment from many, that's what Philosophy is. — Banno
Idealism is the predominant metaphysics in western society. Surprise, surprise! — Metaphysician Undercover
I have been arguing that the picture given by empiricism, the supposed "empirical reality", is incorrect, false and misleading. — Metaphysician Undercover
That, and that the OP was by Frank, who is at the least earnest in his posts. — Banno
It's "reliability" is relative, and context dependent, so your dismissal is just an attempt to avoid the reality that it answers your question, regardless of whether answering your question gets us anywhere or not. — Metaphysician Undercover
Hmm, seems like the same accusation was leveled against me. That indicates that the person making the accusation is really the one with the idiosyncratic definition. — Metaphysician Undercover
How can I perceive something that transcends the category of existence? It's hard enough to perceive things that don't exist! Unless -- as I was trying to suggest -- "the world" and "the in-itself" are not the same. This was the distinction I was drawing between "our world" and "the world of noumena." — J
I can give you a more common example. Suppose we can agree to "love and beauty cannot be explained by logic." It does not follow then that "love and beauty involve contradictions," or that "to say one is in love, one must affirm a contradiction." — Count Timothy von Icarus
To quote C.S. Lewis from The Problem of Pain: — Count Timothy von Icarus
But it's not a rebuttal to the philosophical question: what is the nature of the reality we claim to know? — Wayfarer
Experience is not a faculty. — Metaphysician Undercover
Maybe. Likewise, the four gospels correspond to the four elements. Matthew is earth, Mark is fire, Luke is air, and John is water. This, multiplied by the three states: mutable, fixed, and cardinal, equals the number of apostles, the number of the tribes of Israel, and of course, months of the year. There are numbers all over the place, such as the birthmark on my scalp: 666. :grin: — frank
This is factually incorrect. Charles Sanders Peirce's theory of signs is based explicitly on his study of scholastic theories of signs that were developed originally by Saint Augustine. — Count Timothy von Icarus
This definition is based in human experience. You define "exist" as what is not imaginary. So you base the definition in imagination, and say whatever is not imagination, exists. But that's self-refuting, because your definition is itself imaginary, you are imagining something which is not imaginary, i.e. exists, but by that very definition, it cannot exist. — Metaphysician Undercover
It means that we must go beyond experience if we desire to understand the nature of reality. Since many people believe that truth is limited to what can be known from experience (empiricism), but others do not believe this, then it is very important, and not pointless to note this distinction. — Metaphysician Undercover
Eventually I'll find the way out, through my trial and error, while you'd be still sitting there thinking everything's fine, until your dying day. — Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, I'm blowing very hard, just like the wind. — Metaphysician Undercover
Well sure, but my point is that the thing referred to here as "it" is a fiction. Therefore all that evidence does nothing for you. — Metaphysician Undercover
And if you neatly ignore all the logical arguments against "the universe", insisting that empirical evidence is more important then logical necessity, you'll be restricted to believing in your fictitious story because all the available evidence points that way. — Metaphysician Undercover
This definition is based in human experience. You define "exist" as what is not imaginary. So you base the definition in imagination, and say whatever is not imagination, exists. But that's self-refuting, because your definition is itself imaginary, you are imagining something which is not imaginary, i.e. exists, but by that very definition, it cannot exist. — Metaphysician Undercover
What I dispute is the truth of "the universe". — Metaphysician Undercover
There is much evidence like spatial expansion, and dark matter, to indicate that "the universe" is a failure as a concept. — Metaphysician Undercover
concepts like "existence", and "universe", are just constructs derived from our experience. They may be completely misleading in relation to the way reality actually is. — Metaphysician Undercover
I've just challenged anyone to provide a description or definition which isn't based in human experience, or simply begging the question, because i strongly believe that is impossible. — Metaphysician Undercover
Consistency doesn't imply truth. We can make very consistent fictions. And even when the story is consistent with empirical sensations, truth is not necessitated. — Metaphysician Undercover
Well then, give me an explanation of what it means to exist, which is not based in human experience, or simply begging the question. — Metaphysician Undercover
It's very clear to me, and it ought to be for you as well, that "existence" refers to the specific way that we perceive our environment, and nothing else. "Existence" is defined by experience. — Metaphysician Undercover
Don’t you mean perceived, rather than identified.
To be perceived, something merely needs to be witnessed, this does not require identification. — Punshhh
That also seems about right to me. The thing is, though, that identifying a difference is a rather different exercise from identifying an object. — Ludwig V
I can see how one might want to say that. But "different" is a relation, so it requires two objects to be compared. Of course, from another perspective, those objects might be dissolved into a bundle of differences, which then require a range of other objects to establish themselves. — Ludwig V
I think there is some ambiguity around the word perceived. (Which I realised after posting) I was thinking of it meaning something is noticed, but not identified. — Punshhh
But many aspects of that concept indicate to us that it is a misrepresentation of reality. — Metaphysician Undercover
This is highly doubtful. "To exist" is very clearly a concept structured around human experience. If you think otherwise, I'd be interested to see a good explanation of "existence" which wasn't based in human experience. And a simple definition which begs the question would not qualify as a good explanation. — Metaphysician Undercover
More precisely, there can be difference without a prior identity. So how does that work? — Joshs
I copied a couple of paragraphs from the original post, and then added commentary to the effect that it is not being argued that there was no universe prior to observers. — Wayfarer
The question I’m raising is not whether the universe existed, but what it means to say so. — Wayfarer
When you say “the cosmos was visible prior to the advent of percipients,” you're smuggling in a category — visibility — that only has meaning within the context of experience. That’s the point I keep returning to. — Wayfarer
It's about the conditions for meaningful discourse — the structure that allows us to form concepts like “universe,” “visibility,” or “existence” in the first place. I’m not making a deductive claim about what did or didn’t exist. I’m making a transcendental claim about what makes it possible to talk about existence at all. — Wayfarer
When we forget this distinction, we turn methodological naturalism into a metaphysical doctrine — and mistake the limits of our mode of knowing for the limits of what is. — Wayfarer
I don’t have the academic credentials to make the cut in a journal of that kind, but I’d suggest that the core argument of Mind-Created World would be regarded as fairly stock-in-trade in that context — not a mistake, but a well-recognized philosophical position. — Wayfarer
the meaning of philosophy proper, — Wayfarer
What I think I see is that conversations on the forum often get stuck around 1) the justification of axioms, 2) accusations of misunderstanding or bad faith, 3) acrimony. It’s as if we’re hard-wired for conflict over difference. The worst offenders seem to call others liars and sophists when they are challenged by difference. — Tom Storm
The urge to devour and assimilate what is not oneself. — Jamal
Don't feel bad. — Jamal
In answer to the second question, the short answer is no. In order to count something as visible it is only necessary to demonstrate that it is capable of being seen. However the best, and arguably only conclusive way to demonstrate that something is capable of being seen is to see it. — Ludwig V
On the assumption that "intelligible" means "capable of being understood", is the analogy a good one? Showing that one understands something is a good way of showing that it is capable of being understood; that's a parallel with "visible". But there is also a difference. Seeing something can be completed - one can reach a point at which one has actuallly seen whatever it is. But understanding is (usually) incomplete - there is almost always further that one could go. Usually, we settle for an understanding that is adequate for the context and do not worry about whether our understanding is complete.
So the answer is (as it usually is with analogies) the parallel is partial. Yet it is somewhat strange that we also use "see" to describe understanding as well as vision. So perhaps there is more to be said. — Ludwig V
Therefore the whole cannot be causal in its own creation. We can assume that something external puts the parts together, creating the whole, in a top-down fashion, but this would be nothing but what is called "external telos". — Metaphysician Undercover
I’m clear that intelligibility is something that is constituted (“created”?) in the interaction between mind and world. However, our understanding of the world tells us that it has not changed in any radical way since we appeared and that many of the processes now going on must have been going on long before any sentient or intelligent creatures appeared. So is it not reasonable to infer that the world would have been intelligible if there had been anyone around to understand it? (Note that this is a counter-factual, not a blunt assertion.) — Ludwig V
that gives us an easy way to measure bullshit in this thread. See which group is having an easier time defending their position - the group that's having a harder time of it must be right — flannel jesus
a world that is fully real and determinate independently of mind. — Wayfarer
To make this clearer, consider the example you cite of Neptune’s pre-discovery existence. The realist insists: “It existed all along—we simply didn’t know it.” But the claim I'm advancing would point out that what “it” was prior to its discovery is not just unknown, but indeterminate. — Wayfarer
And finally, the reason this matters is so we do not lose sight of the subject—the observer—for whom all of this is meaningful in the first place. The scientific, objective view is essentially from the outside: in that picture, we appear as one species among countless others, clinging to a pale blue dot, infinitesimal against the vast panorama that scientific cosmology has revealed. But it is to us that this panorama is real and meaningful. So far as we know, we are the only beings capable of grasping the astounding vistas disclosed by science. Let’s not forget our role in that. — Wayfarer
I've been reflecting on a thought: if people were given the chance to do things society and general are considered "bad" or "evil" with no one ever finding out, and with zero chance of anyone suspecting them, most would likely take it(correct me if i am wrong). — QuirkyZen
What might a Davidsonian aesthetic look like? — Banno
