One helpful way of using the terms might be: an objective fact is one which others can verify, whereas "I'm having thought X at the moment" is a fact, but not objective. — J

It's like "I'm reading sentence X at the moment". I don't see the words 'objective' and 'subjective' as unambiguous. If I can only determine some fact on my own can I talk about it being objective? Looking out the window behind my laptop I saw a bird just now alighting for a moment in a tree near the creek and a leaf fall into the creek simultaneously. If you had been here you might have witnessed those two events, but they were so brief that chances are you would not have. Can we talk about those events as facts regardless, just on the basis that in principle it is possible you could have witnessed them?

The ambiguity here is the reason I prefer 'intersubjective' to 'objective'. The witnessing of the alighting bird and the falling leaf could in principle be shared. An experience of God, or the thought I am having right now cannot be, even in principle.

As above, the question is, Whose observation? I'm assuming you don't think we need objective confirmation of observations about what goes on in our minds (as a rule). — J

I don't count introspection as all that reliable. That said personally I tend to think in language...I can hear a 'silent' voice speaking my thoughts. so I am fairly confident that I know what I am thinking if I pay attention in the moment of thought.

Yeah, the more I think about Hick's idea, the less I like it. I suppose what he meant was, If you had an experience after death that checked all the boxes of what mystics claim God (and the afterlife) is like, and you in fact found yourself surviving death, as promised, you'd probably be convinced! But we're guessing about how reliable afterlife experiences are . . . — J

I agree and I think this points to the importance of faith in our lives. We all take many things on faith, and it pays to see ourselves doing that, and then from a critical mindset, deciding what to provisionally accept and what reject.

Many folk seem to be uncomfortable with uncertainty...but for me understanding uncertainty and the challenge of living with it is a major part of doing philosophy. So I don't have much time for the dogmatists who want to claim things like, for example, that we know, thanks to Kant, that space and time and all the categories are purely subjective or that intellectual intuition could be a reliable guide to the way things really are.

A holomorphic function is something else. It is a function that is "holistic" in the sense that it uses a number base that is more complex than the reals. Instead of counting points, you are counting something else like rotations. — apokrisis

Thanks for the interesting and allusive (not to mention elusive) explanation. 'Holographic' was either a typo or an outcome due to predictive text. And I'm afraid I don't at all understand imaginary numbers or the importance of counting rotations rather than points, beyond a vague feel.

Did you mean to use 'holographic' rather than 'holomorphic'? I understand the holographic idea to be that every part in some sense contains the whole. Do you think that could be related to quantum entanglement?

Anyway a good bit of it is somewhat over my head, and because of my mathematical shortcomings I have remained reluctant to enter into philosophical discussions involving QM and Relativity. At least I get the point about the liveness of relativistic spacetime, where space is not a mere container, but a real contributor to cosmic events.

I am drawn to the idea that science offers a pathway out of inveterate anthropomorphism, and that there is no better guide, even no other guide, to metaphysical speculation than science.

I wish I could offer a more adequate response.

Well, you've packed a lot into that question! To begin simply: "God exists" as a proposition is surely meant to state an objective fact, and that's really all I meant. (I'll say something below about why I think it may be inseparable from how we rate the plausibility of accounts of mystical experiences.) — J

This seems to be the central issue―what is a fact, and does the qualifier "objective" add anything? Obviously there are many facts in and about our everyday experiences. Facts are usually taken to be determinable by either observation or logic.

So, what is the role of "objective fact" in relation to the question of God's existence?

Your further qualifications seem extreme. "No possibility?" John Hick points out that, at the very least, claims about God may be "eschatologically verifiable" -- that is, we may find out when we die (or, of course, we'll cease to exist). — J

Say you die and you find you still exist―how will that confirm the existence of God? Say you have an after death experience that seems to you to be an experience of God―given that interpretations of experiences are not the same as the experiences, how will you know, any more than you would in this life, that an experience that you felt was of God is really a confirmation of said entity?

Surely in order to know that an experience is an experience of some particular entity, we need to know what the entity's characteristics are. Do we know what the characteristics of the hypothetical entity God are? Say we know that God possesses certain moral characteristics―perfect goodness and perfect love, say―how would we know that the experience we thought was of God showed us that he is perfectly good and loving? It doesn't seem analogous to being able to recognizing a physical entity on account of its physical characteristics.

As a pansemiotician, it is heartening that physics has arrived at this dichotomy of information-entropy. — apokrisis

As far as I understand in biosemiotics it is the membrane which is the basic interpretant. So, I wonder what serves as interpretant in the pansemiotic conception. Hoffmeyer seems to think of the evolution of the membrane as the origin of 'minding'.

I don't have any kind of grasp of holomorphic functions (my general understanding of mathematics leaves a lot to be desired). Is there any way you can make "Information is physical in being the global holographic horizon on the Cosmos" understandable to me despite my being math-challenged?

The idea of entropy as local material fluctuations or degrees of freedom is new to me. I think of entropy―the omnipresent tendency to dissipate― as the most universal global constraint.

The idea of information as substance has never made much sense to me―some like to think that information, since it can be manifested in different media, is independent of any substrate―but that seems to transform information into a ghost. Can we make sense of the notion of a ghost as substance―not the ghost in the machine, but the machine as ghost?

Are you familiar with any of the physicists who suggest that information is ontologically basic and that matter and energy emerge from it? — Count Timothy von Icarus

The idea makes no sense to me since information, as far as I know, is always carried by a material substrate. Also science informs that for the majority of its existence the universe contained no interpretants, which would mean that although there was a physically existent universe, there was no exchange of information. That said, some semioticians advocate for pansemiosis, and it really depends on how attenuated you are prepared to allow the concept of 'interpretant' (not to mention 'mind') to become.

That something can be a sign for something else is a process which cannot be modeled entirely in physical terms, but it does not follow that the processes involved are anything other than physical, it just follows that they cannot be a matter of mere efficient causation.

As @apokrisis often reminds us, there is an interplay in the physical world between global conditions and local causation, or in Aristotelian terms, final (and/or formal?) causation and efficient causation.

Yet physically, an optical disk is very different from paper which is very different from a sound wave, which is very different from sound waves. The physical substrate does not seem to matter much. It is the information (form) that matters, and arguably this is "immaterial" in a number of senses. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That there is always some form of physical substrate is the point. There is no "immaterial " information.

Information is like currency...fungible... in that it has to be in some form of physical substrate or other, but is endlessly interchangeable.

Yes, it wasn't very well put. I only meant that, in addition to the possible explanations you named, it's also possible that the universality of mystical intuitions is explained by their actually being what they claim to be, namely experiences of God or some transcendent consciousness. — J

That's true it is logically possible―given that no self-contradiction is involved in the idea. The problem is we have no way of determining whether mystical intuitions actually come to us from God or some transcendent consciousness.

This situation opens up the way for faith, as Kant said of his own critical project. Faith should never be conflated with knowledge, though―as I never tire of saying that way lies dogma and fundamentalism.

Unfortunately, some cannot accept that limitation of the human condition and would rather fantasize about there being the possibility of direct knowing of the absolute nature of reality or some such nonsense which simply cannot stand up to scrutiny.

I haven't followed every post between you and Wayfarer today, so I'll just speak for myself. I don't think a statement like "I have had an experience of the Godhead" or "My third eye opened" or "I encountered Jesus and was born again" or any of the countless variants of this should be presumed to be "demonstrably true." Nor are they demonstrably false. It's not clear to me that they can be separated from 3rd-person/objective claims such as "God exists". — J

I'm puzzled by your last sentence here. How can "god exists" be an objective claim if there is no possibility of confirming it such that anyone unbiased would have to acquiesce, or even at the very least the possibility of assessing it against our overall experience in terms of plausibility?

All I can say is, we're left with possible explanations, possible ways of assigning probability values to the statements under discussion. And we'll rate these probabilities differently, based on our own knowledge and experience -- just as we would for any topic that's tough to know about for sure. I see plenty of daylight between "My account of my mystical experience is demonstrably true" and "Here's what I think probably accounts for my experience." The latter seems unexceptionable to me.

I agree of course that subjective elements come into our assessments of metaphysical claims, but I also think that some metaphysical claims are far more consistent and coherent with the human store of knowledge and understanding than others.

Of course it is still up to the individual to make their own assessments. It's like aesthetics in a way―it cannot be definitively demonstrated that Shakespeare's or Dostoevsky's works are finer works of literature than Mills and Boone, or that Jacksons Pollock's 'drip' paintings could not have been executed by a monkey, but...

:up:

Consciousness does not have physical properties. — Patterner

And yet being conscious does have physical properties. So, I'll ask again―what is the difference between consciousness and being conscious?

Do any of these things, or combinations of them, explain how the physical subjectively experiences, and, in at least our case, can be aware and self-aware? — Patterner

Being conscious means being aware. But being aware as in being able to respond to signs does not necessarily entail being conscious. Awareness happens at all levels of life. In simple forms of life, the presence of different molecules at the the cell membrane elicit different responses inside the cell. Those processes cannot be entirely understood in mechanistic terms, they are understood to carry information to the cell, but they are nonetheless physical processes.

Stated in biosemiotic terms there are interpretants as all levels (of life at least), but it does not follow that there is consciousness at all levels. It is probably symbolic language that enables reflective self-awareness.

It is not! Verificationism is not specific to philosophy of science. — Wayfarer

That's strictly true―I misspoke. What I had in mind was that it is a thesis in epistemology., and it is commonly, as applied to scientific theories, compared to and contrasted with Popper's falsificationism. the Wiki entry says:
Verificationism, also known as the verification principle or the verifiability criterion of meaning, is a doctrine in philosophy which asserts that a statement is meaningful only if it is either empirically verifiable (can be confirmed through the senses) or a tautology (true by virtue of its own meaning or its own logical form). Verificationism rejects statements of metaphysics, theology, ethics and aesthetics as meaningless in conveying truth value or factual content, though they may be meaningful in influencing emotions or behavior.[1]
Scientific statements (in the broadest sense as statements of what is observed) are along with tautologous statements are taken to be the only kinds of statements which can be definitively verified.

I am not a positivist in that I don't believe non-verifiable statements are meaningless. Apart from the observational aspect, the other aspect of science―the theoretical is not itself strictly verifiable.

Then you're still saying the only criterion of factuality is science, again. — Wayfarer

No, I'm saying the criterion of factuality is observability. How can be sure that a statement is factual if what it asserts is not observable? Following that reasoning a statement is factuality-apt, i.e. could be either a fact or not, if what is proposes is, at least in principle, checkable by observation.

You keep summoning the positivist bogey man, but this is an evasive tactic designed to discredit your interlocutor. I've asked you to cite one fact or piece of knowledge that is not based in observations of or about this world; that is not, in other words, based in human cognition of the world. Apparently you are both incapable of that, and incapable of admitting that you are incapable of that.

How to test a 'metaphysical theory'? Just now Kastrup was interviewed by Robert Lawrence Kuhn, he suggests internal consistency, explanatory power, and parsimony would be good starting points. I would concur with that. — Wayfarer

Not "how to test", but "how to evaluate".

All true, if you mean "offer as possible explanations." But another way we can explain it is in the accuracy or correspondence-to-the-facts context -- that is, these intuitions are correct as to their source.

But . . . how do we determine which context, which putative explanation, is the right one? This is what you and Wayfarer are thrashing out. — J

Can you explain what you mean by "these intuitions are correct as to their source"? I'm trying to thrash out how we should categorize what is knowledge and what faith. Wayfarer is more just thrashing about, reacting emotionally to what he apparently sees as personal attacks, as attacks on his beliefs. I'm not attacking the beliefs, but the presumption that those beliefs are demonstrably true.

You think the Kant's description of the unknowability of the in itself is a religious dogma, because you don't understand it. — Wayfarer

There is nothing in the quoted passage there about Kant's description of the unknowability of the in itself being religious dogma. I haven't even used the words "religious dogma" there at all. What I have implied is that claiming what is accepted on faith is knowledge is to be asserting some religious dogma.

Meanwhile, 'the world', which you so confidently proclaim our knowledge of, is itself not the knowable, familiar and determinate realm which you so casually believe it to be.
— Wayfarer

Human knowledge of this world as it appears to be is vast and comprehensive. Can you cite even one piece of knowledge which is not of, about, or dependent upon this world of human experience? — Janus

Meanwhile, as expected, you make no attempt to address my refutation of your ridiculous and obviously false claim that we don't know much of and about the world. You make a lot of claims, but when they are challenged you deflect and hide behind strawmen.

You know, it's not a matter of "I'm right and you're wrong", but of "I think this" and "Oh, I disagree with that because..." You seem to think that your perspective is unimpeachably correct and that the reason people disagree is because they are mired in a kind of modernist forgetting of truths know to the ancients. Such a claim is unsupported, hopelessly underdetermined, that's why I don't share that view. You cannot even be confident that you really understand what the ancients thought, since you don't read ancient languages and you rely on translators, who each have their own take on ancient thought.

So, I don't say you are so much wrong as you are spinning a story that suits your wishes as to how the world should be. You are basically a dogmatic proselytizer.

You think the Kant's description of the unknowability of the in itself is a religious dogma, because you don't understand it. — Wayfarer

What a ridiculous statement―I never claimed it was a religious dogma.. The in itself is unknowable by mere definition/ stipulation―the in itself is also just another human idea. We see things as they appear to us, and we have a natural tendency to want to know of those things what the fundamental nature or existence independent of their appearances to us is, and we recognize that it is impossible to know that―we might even say that since it is impossible the very idea is irrelevant or even a nonsense.

It is also true that we can speculate about what seems to be the possible alternatives, and we can consider whether it seems more plausible to think that our cognition of things gives us some knowledge of them or not.

It is also a ridiculously presumptuous and petulant statement―as usual you claim that anyone who has a different take than you must therefore not understand.

Meanwhile, 'the world', which you so confidently proclaim our knowledge of, is itself not the knowable, familiar and determinate realm which you so casually believe it to be. — Wayfarer

Human knowledge of this world as it appears to be is vast and comprehensive. Can you cite even one piece of knowledge which is not of, about, or dependent upon this world of human experience?

I don't expect you to answer of course, because you apparently don't think it necessary to answer questions that present difficulties your dogma cannot handle.

Which is verificationism in a nutshell . — Wayfarer

No, it's not: verificationism is a theory in the philosophy of science. I've already said that scientific theories cannot be verified to be true, so I don't agree with verificationsim. I don't reject metaphysics; in fact I agree with Popper that, even thought the truth of metaphysical theses cannot be determined by either verification or falsification, they can provide a stimulus that may lead to important scientific results.

Popper himself acknowledges that scientific theories can only be definitively falsified, not verified. I don't believe they can even be definitively falsified. We believe they are true or not only on the grounds of predictive success and general plausibility. As to my attitude to metaphysics: metaphysical speculation is fun, and some of the idea can be inspiring for creative pursuits.

I keep asking you to explain how the truth of any metaphysical thesis could be determined, and you never even attempt to answer the question, which is telling; it seems to show that you are in a kind of denial...not wanting to abandon precious beliefs. It would help the discussion if you read more carefully, and curbed your tendency to jump to silly conclusions about what's being said.

We can verify simple everyday observations such as that plants usually grow better if you feed them with the appropriate fertilizer. There are millions of examples of such easily verified truths.

The four ways of knowing: — Wayfarer

Yes I was already familiar with those conceivable modes of knowing, I formulated them myself before I ever came across them in Vervaeke's lectures.

Truth and falsity, in the sense I intended in this discussion are properties of sentences, or assertions, or propositions. How would you determine the truth of "consciousness is fundamental to reality"? I am not even sure what it means, let alone how I could find out if it true or not. I think you need to open your mind a little.

You say this repeatedly, as if it were revealed truth, when in fact it’s simply the dogma of positivism: that only what can be scientifically validated can be stated definitively. — Wayfarer

Thanks for distorting what I've said yet again. I have never said that only what can be scientifically validated can be stated. It is obvious that we can state whatever we want to.

Instead I said that only in the case of statements whose assertions are either self-evident or demonstrable by observation can the truth or falsity be determined.

And Armstrong is wrong in my view...religious truth is not "a species of practical knowledge", it is religious practice which is a species of practical knowledge. There is no religious truth in any propositional sense.

Just as in science where the observed predictions of theories do not guarantee their truth, so it is with religious practice...that a practice may transform does not guarantee its truth. And further, the very notion of a true or false practice is inapt. Practices are efficacious or not, not true or false.

We know that such an intuition has been with humanity since there were civilizations, and no doubt before. Whether it's true or not, isn't really about one's predisposition to believe or disbelieve, wouldn't you agree? — J

The problem is that the truth (or falsity) of such intuitions is not in any way definitively decidable. We can explain the universality of such intuitions in the moral context, as I said, as stemming from a demand that there should be perfection and justice. We can explain it in the epistemological context as being due to not having scientific explanations for phenomena. And we can explain it in the existential context as being on account of a universal fear of death.

There are all kinds of things which are commonly referred to as 'things', and not all of them objects of the senses. A thing is simply something which stands out for us.

The title of the thread is* (in a nutshell), to tease out a blindness in the view that, supported by science etc. the physical world**is what exists and anything else is mere speculation. A view which is held by the majority of the population. That the overwhelming truth of this orthodoxy cannot in all seriousness be challenged, and that this (orthodoxy) results in a blinkered view. — Punshhh

It's not a blindness but a sensible intellectual humility. All we know is this world. We can have no way of knowing if there is more. I think your assertion that most of the population think this world is all there is unsupported by the data: It is estimated that more than 85 percent of the global population identifies with a religious group.

I'd say those who want to believe in something that cannot be known to be true are the ones wearing blinkers. They see only through their own confirmation bias. I have no problem with people believing whatever they like provided they can be honest that it is all about faith, not knowledge. Apparently to admit that would undermine their beliefs, though. People's priorities are pretty sad considering the state the world is in.

Yes, my comments about certainty were meant to cover both the occurrence of the experience and the interpretation of it. So I'd call it highly likely, but by no means certain, that such experiences are "genuine" in that they do give access to a divine reality. Even using such a phrase, of course, takes us outside of philosophy entirely, in my opinion, though I know Wayfarer thinks we can expand our understanding of what philosophy is and does so as to include it. — J

Would you say that it is likely, if someone believes that certain kinds of altered states of consciousness give us access to a divine reality, that they were already inclined, most likely by cultural influences during their upbringing, to believe in a divine reality, and that others who do not have such an enculturated belief might interpret the experience as being a function of brain chemistry?

In other words, is not this world marvelous enough, if seen through fresh eyes? Wherefore the intuition of another world? Is it not more likely on account of a demand for perfection, and the surcease of all suffering and injustice and the introjection of cultural tropes that seem to promise those, than it is an unmediated intuition?

My general idea is that it we shouldn't be surprised if our physical science can't examine something that does not have physical properties. So examine consciousness with tools that do not have physical properties. Ideally, with tools that have the same properties consciousness has. But there is often disagreement over what those properties are. — Patterner

You assume that consciousness does not have physical properties. Is consciousness something different than being conscious?

If yes, then what is the difference?

If no, does not being conscious have physical properties, and is it not those physical properties that allow us to tell that consciousness is present?

Yes to both. But we cannot hook them up to anything kind off detector and see the consciousness that their behavior suggests is present. We can see the physical correlates of consciousness, but not there consciousness. — Patterner

That might indicate that the idea of consciousness as something undetectable is a kind of reification, as distinct from simply being conscious, which is a detectable condition.

Veganism prevents harm and promotes the well-being of trillions of sentient organisms. Yet, more than 99% of the humans currently alive (8.24 billion) are not yet vegan. Non-vegans kill 80 billion land organisms and 1 to 3 trillion aquatic organisms per year. Why isn't veganism legally mandatory in all countries? — Truth Seeker

What, despite the vast habitat destruction necessary to install the huge acreages of monoculture sustained with petrochemical based fertilizers and toxic insecticides, weedicides and fungicides necessary to feed the human population with grains, fruits, nuts and vegetables?

To say that what exists must be subject to a perspective is not to deny its existence; it’s to say that “existence” is only ever intelligible to us under the conditions of possible experience. — Wayfarer

On one way of reading this: that 'existence' is only ever intelligible to us under the conditions of immediate experience, what you are saying is, firstly, a dogmatic statement, since you are only entitled to say what is intelligible to you.

Secondly saying that the idea of existence is unintelligible under said conditions just is to deny that anything can exist that is not presently subject to a perspective, or that it cannot be said to exist outside of that perspective.

It's true that we cannot think the existence of something, in the sense of thinking what the existence is like, without applying a perspective to it, that is to say we cannot imagine what a totally perspective-less existence could be like.

But that is not to say that we cannot coherently imagine that things can and do exist absent any perspective―that they can and do exist completely independently of us and our imaginings. It's all about nuance.

Another possible reading is more sensible: you could be saying that we cannot say that anything exists or has existed which in principle we could not possibly experience or perceive. If that is all you are saying then I don't think I disagree, although I might need to think some more on that. Dark matter and energy come to mind, although admittedly their existence is speculative, even if supported by the physics.

A tendentious "just-so" story if there ever was one! What you outline is merely one perspective of what happened historically among many others. Of course the dogmatist thinks their version is the one true account. :roll:

Vacuous question!

Anything that appears presumably exists somehow independently of appearing. You contradict yourself when you say that you don't deny the existence of the external world, and then claim that anything that exists must be subject to a perspective. That is to conflate perception of something with its actual existence.

If you want to get away from bare phenomenalism― the idea that all that exists are perceptions ―then you must allow that there is something, not generated by the percipient, that appears, whether it is actual existents or ideas in God's mind. Either way when it is not appearing it cannot be subject to any perspective unless in the "God's mind' scenario, God is held to have a perspective.

Your anthropomorphism lacks credulity.

Okely dokely...well done, medium, medium rare or rare?

I would say you could be fairly certain you had a mystical experience or not by comparing it to the quite substantial literature documenting reports of experiences which are classed as such. What I don't think anyone can be at all certain about is as to what could be the metaphysical implications of such experiences.

I've had quite a few such experiences, some of them under the influence of psychedelics, and some while meditating and some while listening to or playing music, painting or writing, and some while in wild surroundings. I don't interpret them to mean anything beyond themselves―of course for me they hold a great deal of emotional force and meaning in themselves, but that meaning is not discursive. If those experiences can be given voice at all, it would be via the allusive language of poetry.

I think it should have been obvious that I didn't mean to say the dog called it a wallaby―by "we" I meant to refer to English speakers. I'll grant the sentence on an immediate glance appears to be saying something absurd. The fact that it is absurd I think should have alerted you to look for alternative interpretations. That said, I acknowledge I should have been more careful with the wording.

You make it sound like my wording is generally obscure, but I think if it be compared with Kant's or even your own, I doubt it could be judged to be any more obscure, and if anything would probably be judged to be less obscure.

Anyway it's rare on these forums that anyone complains that they cannot understand what I've been saying.

I don't know if you're missing the point―which was just that the dog and I both see a wallaby, and judging by the dogs behavior towards it, he sees it as something to be eaten. I don't see wallabies as to be eaten but as to be preserved, but I have hit and killed one with my car ( on the road, not on the property I dwell on), which I subsequently ate (not my car, the wallaby, just in case I've been obscure again).

Unargued dismissal by labelling, pure and simple.

If you attained a radically altered state and felt absolutely convinced that you had insight into the true nature and meaning of "life, the universe and everything", you would no doubt think that was objective knowledge.

But when you tried to put it into words it would become just another culturally conditioned interpretation, an interpretation which could never capture, or be adequately true to, the wordless feeling of your insight.

But I'm not denying that there is an external world. What I'm denying is that knowledge of that world is purely objective, that we can see it as it is or as it would be absent any observer. — Wayfarer

The I have no idea what we have been disagreeing about, because it is true by mere definition that we cannot see the world as it would be absent any observer.

I had thought you took issue with the idea that we can speculate about what existed prior to humans, which just consists in imagining what we would have seen had we been there. The other point is that I don't accept the idea that things cannot exist outside of any perspective, and I'm pretty sure you disagree with that.

My point all along has been that there is no use in arguing about that because there can be no way of determining the truth regarding that. Of course take issue with any dogmatic assertions about it given that no one could know for certain.

So, I am not dogmatically asserting that things definitely existed prior to any percipients, or definitely exist absent any perception of them, but I do think that is the most plausible conclusion, most consistent and coherent with human experience and understanding of the world.

We designate it as truly existent, irrespective of and outside any knowledge of it. This gives rise to a kind of cognitive disorientation which underlies many current philosophical conundrums. — Wayfarer

I don't know what conundrums you are referring to. I see more potential for conundrums in denying that things can exist absent percipients.

Well, I think both Wayfarer and myself, in our different ways, are positing a non-mental self, a self that not only thinks but animates and, perhaps, connects with something larger. You're right about the cultural baggage, but as philosophers we can try to see beyond that. @Wayfarer is good at reminding us of the deeper, more thoughtful traditions of spirituality that were there long before some religions tried to codify and moralize spiritual experience. The words "spirit" or "soul" may not be helpful for a particular individual, but let's not rule out this aspect of being alive and human. — J

I have no argument with spiritual practices and faiths―I just don't like to see people interpreting such beliefs as objective knowledge, for that way lies dogma and fundamentalism. At their best, I see them as techniques for attaining altered states, even transforming the way of life.

If life were in truth "about something" which given its apparent nature seems highly unlikely, it remains that none of us know what that "something" could be.

We can believe or speculate that there have been sages who enjoyed such knowledge, but we don't know that. Those we think of as sages might have been deluding themselves for all we know, just as we might delude ourselves if we think that what might seem like profound insights are telling us anything real about anything real.

What I’m saying is that the frameworks through which we recognize “yellow, blue, green, red” are already the product of shared cognitive, biological, and cultural conditions. That explains the convergence without appealing to a “mind at large.” — Wayfarer

You are still missing the point. Due to the general structural and functional characteristics of the human eye most of us see the same range of colours. Humans don't see ultraviolet or infra-red. Dogs apparently only see in tones of blue and yellow. That has nothing to do with cultural conditioning. How we categorize and names the more than a million distinct colours we can detect is a function of both cultural conditioning and the similarities between the different hues and tones.

That we agree when I point to one particular coloured particle out of hundreds as to which colour it is is not at all a function of cultural conditioning. I point at a green one say, and that you also see me pointing at a green one shows that there must be something independent of both of us that explains that, provided we accept that our perceptual organs and minds are in no hidden way connected. This is my final attempt to explain it to you―if you still don't get it, then that's pretty incredible but just too bad.

Judgements about what is observed are interpretive and of course may differ―what is observed is not a matter of interpretation.
— Janus

The first is correct, the second is the contradiction of it, which makes it false. That there is a thing observed is not a matter of interpretation, corrects the contradiction.

You’re correct….or, I agree….that you and the dog see the same thing, whatever it may be. Of the two, only you represent the thing seen with a particular concept, but you would readily admit that you haven’t a clue what the dog’s doing with his perception, but you can be sure he isn’t representing it to himself with the same conceptual reference as you. — Mww

It is not merely that there is a thing observed, but that the fact that there is a particular kind of thing observed is also not a matter of subjective interpretation. We both see the dog there and we both class the thing as being a dog, so what you seem to be thinking of as the interpretation only relates to the classing, and the classing is not a subjective interpretation, but a shared practice of naming. If there was a cat or any other other object there neither of us would see a dog.

The dog and I both see something we call a wallaby. I know he sees an animal there and not a runaway trail bike, because if he catches what he sees, he may start to eat it. So, then I know he sees, just as I do, something suitable to be eaten.

I confess I don't understand what you or the quoted passage from Kant is attempting to convey. Can you explain?

The difference between the action of gravity on our experience and the action of a universal mind, for example, may be that one appears in the external world of appearances where we measure things and the other doesn’t. — Punshhh

I agree, and for me this means that gravity is a definite part of our experience whereas a universal mind is not―the latter is purely speculative.

I have an affinity with these concepts as I am concerned with realising our limitations and developing ways to view our limitations in the context of our lives (living a life), for example. — Punshhh

I have no argument with that―we each have affinities for different ideas.

You will agree with me as to whether it is yellow, blue, green or red, undoubtedly. Can you explain how your "common set of cognitve, cultural and linguistic practices" can account for that agreement? — Janus

Don't worry about the original post or QM, just answer the straightforward question above if you can. What is at issue is the explanatory power of your idealist thesis absent the inclusion of 'mind at large', collective mind, universal mind, God.

I just can't believe you don't see the problem.

It goes directly against your contention that every observer sees the same thing when the observations show they don’t. — Wayfarer

Are you saying that the fact that there are different conceptual interpretations of the experimental results goes against my claim that every observer sees the same thing? Well, it doesn't― just as it is possible that people can pass different judgements about anything that is seen doesn't entail that what has been seen is different.

It is not that different things are observed, but that the class that what has been observed should be placed in, or the explanation for what is observed, may differ from person to person. Judgements about what is observed are interpretive and of course may differ―what is observed is not a matter of interpretation.

As to that I meant that when the 'two slit experiment' is carried out every observer sees the inference pattern, and when they pass light through one slit every observer sees the accumulation of points on the photographic plate.

I don't think 'material cause' and 'formal cause' are particularly interesting, but I do think there is a valid distinction between proximate and global cause. I prefer to think of the latter as conditions rather than causes, as I said.

I think logical structure, linguistic and semantic relations, normative and evaluative judgements and so on all come into how our explanations are structured. However, I still think that when it comes to explaining any natural event, efficient cause and general conditions form the backbone that carries the flesh of "structure, linguistic and semantic relations".

Also I am addressing only explanations of natural non-living phenomena― I acknowledge that explanations of animal and human behavior may be given in terms of reasons instead of causes. The overall set of conditions under which actions are taken by animals and humans will also obviously come into play in any explanation. Reasons as well as causes are constrained by global conditions.

It's not dogmatic; it is a phenomenological reflection on our everyday experience. Our everyday experience shows us clearly that we live in a shared world. It can even be seen as an empirical fact, as it can be demonstrated so easily.

What you are gleaning from physics is just one interpretation―the one you resonate with―there is no solid consensus that your interpretation is the correct one. Also you are not an expert in that field, by any means, which gives you even less warrant to cite it.

The commonalities of our sensory organs and cognitve, cultural and linguistic practices cannot on their own explain the fact that we all see the same things at the same times and places. At most it can only explain what might tend to stand out for us, or the general form our perceptions take―for example in regard to the part of the electromagnetic spectrum we can detect, or the limitations on the acoustic frequencies we can detect―as well as the names we give to the things we encounter, and the we have conceptions of them, such as their purpose, place in human life and so on.

Even if it could explain how it is that humans see the same world, it cannot explain the fact that our observations show that our dogs see the same things we do, for example. I live on a fifteen acre property and there are many wallabies. When I walk the dogs I will often catch sight of a wallaby, and the dogs will also, and if I don't restrain them they will be off chasing it. Now the wallaby may look different to dogs than it does to us on account of the fact, among others, that when it comes to colours, they can apparently only see in blue and yellow, but it is undeniable that they see what I call "the wallaby".

I have asked you to explain how "a common set of cognitve, cultural and linguistic practices" could determine our seeing precisely the same things. Say, for example you and I have in front of us a white A4 sheet of paper covered with "hundreds and thousands" (I'm sure you are familiar with those little coloured sweet grains). I take a very sharp pencil and point precisely to just one of the hundreds of grains, and ask you what colour it is. You will agree with me as to whether it is yellow, blue, green or red, undoubtedly. Can you explain how your "common set of cognitve, cultural and linguistic practices" can account for that agreement?

Good comments. The key point is ‘participatory’ - not being a bystander. — Wayfarer

I'm not sure what you mean by "bystander". By "participatory" perhaps you mean something like "present"―that is, not "off in your head" all consumed by the "internal dialogue"? The alternative to being in the head would seem to be inhabiting the body, as aware as possible of all the sensory inputs and the spontaneous feelings they generate. Philosophy, on the other hand, is a cerebral activity.

↪Wayfarer ↪Ludwig V ↪Janus Didn't Aristotle say that the mind resided in the heart? — J

I seem to dimly remember reading something like that. Julian Jaynes has an interesting theory that Greek people in Homerian times did not identify thoughts as being their own, but as being the voices of the gods. (This is a simple characterization―I read his book decades ago). Presumably they would have assumed their sensations and emotions belonged to them.

I find that fascinating because, as y'all have pointed out, it seems irresistible to me to locate my self or "I" within my head. Or perhaps a better way to say it is: I can't help locating the part of consciousness which thinks, perceives, and imagines as being within my head; but that leaves open the possibility that spirit or soul should be identified with breath, heart, or guts. So a deeper or more cosmic "I" is not necessarily conceived as mental.

But then there's the Third Eye, which opens in . . . the head. — J

As I said earlier, I share your affliction. Jesper Hoffmeyer in Biosemiotics makes a case for locating the self in the skin, as it is by far the body's largest and most sensitive organ and is our primary interface with the world.

I don't know about "spirit" and "soul"―it seems very difficult to think in terms of those without carrying all the unacceptable cultural baggage that comes with them.

A speculative "cosmic" "self" such as Brahma or God is not necessarily thought as either mental or physical. In fact a universal cosmic being is not necessairly thought of even as a "self"―for example Spinoza conceives God as being synonymous with Nature, and the mental and the physical as being just two of its infinite attributes.

Madhyamaka philosophers say that ālaya-vijñāna risks reifying consciousness into a hidden essence or foundational mind. — Wayfarer

I guess I would agree with the Madhyamika philosophers. Because on the other hand without such a reification, it becomes merely an idea, and thus seems to lose all explanatory power.

I always comes back to this basic problem―experience shows us that we all see the same things at the same times and places is unquestionable that we live in a shared world. On the other hand there is no evidence that our minds are connected in any way such as to be able to explain that shared experience. The default assumption is that things we encounter are real existents that don't depend for their existence on our encountering them. So that model explain why we would experience a shared world. The idealist alternative would be to assume a hidden collective mind or consciousness, or a universal mind of which we are all manifestations, and that could be the Abrahamic God, Brahma, or some creator deity.

I don't see gravity as a good analogy because its effects are measurable. I believe that the idea of independently existing things makes sense―others see problems with it, but it seems those problems stem form assumptions that I don't share.

The idea of a shared or collective mind is not logically contradictory, so it makes sense in that sense, but I think the idea is extremely underdetermined by our everyday experience.

CPR, B311 — Paine

That's an interesting passage from Kant―I don't remember encountering it before. It seems to undercut any move towards dualism.

Some say that synthetic a priori knowledge is possible and that it has nothing to do with sense experience, but they seem to forget that Kant's categories were discovered by him by reflecting on perceptual experience and abstracting its general and necessary characteristics.

True, although it may be that there are elements of efficient causation in all those contexts, but that it is far from being the whole story.

OK. It's just that causal explanation, along with the metaphor of the machine, has been such an icon of what science is about that I find it hard to grasp the alternatives (apart from statistical explanations). — Ludwig V

That seems right. Efficient or proximal causation is the basis of mechanistic modeling. That kind of modeling tends to isolate the subject from its environment. For any event or change to occur there is presumably a whole network of conditions that constrain the ways in which that event or change can unfold. The most universal global condition seems to be entropy.

:up: Whenever you're ready...

I'm pretty sure that our phenomenological perspective on mental phenomena is heavily conditioned by our culture. For example, it is very difficult to answer the question where (in the body) the mind is to be found in ancient greek (or roman) culture. There are good grounds for answering that it is a distinct entity - a ghost - that survives death. There are also grounds for saying that it is the breath - an interesting choice, since it isn't quite clear where the breath is. I think the best answer is that the question where the mind is was not even formulated in that culture. It requires, I would say, a culture that has already problematized mental/physical relations, as happened in Western Europe in the 17th century or so. — Ludwig V

You make a good point. I was addressing just the 'thinking' aspect of mind. When I think, whether in language or images, the activity seems to be located in my head. Of course when it comes to emotions, they seem more closely located around the heart, and if sensations are thought to be activities of the mind they extend throughout the body. When it comes to seeing the awareness seems to be "out there' in the surrounding environment. Hearing mostly, but also to a lesser extent smelling and tasting seem to be a bit more ambiguous, for me at least.

Our organs of sight, hearing, smelling and tasting are all located in the head, and that may contribute to making it seem as though the mind is located there.

Perhaps the ancients were not as much "in their heads" and language oriented as we are today.

I was using the digestion analogy more to point to the idea that activities in general are not strictly objects of the senses, not to address the issue of whether the brain generates thought. And yes, 'being' is explicitly a verb, and seeing it that way instead of as a noun renders it as an activity not as any kind of object (except in the very general sense that thinking of it makes it an object of thought), Being or existing would be thought of the master or umbrella activity under which all other activities find their place.

Regarding the Ālaya-Vijñāna there is also a Theosophical idea designated the "Akashic Records", which I think bears some resemblance to the Buddhist idea. It seems that idealist thinkers have long recognized the explanatory need for some kind of collective consciousness as a substitute for the independent actuality of physical existents.

Do you have anything to say about my contention that the idea of storehouse consciousness is an idea of a collective consciousness or mind?

I address this in another Medium essay, Is there Mind at Large? This essay interogates Kastrup's expression and compares it with Berkeleyian idealism. But then it draws on Yogācāra Buddhism, the school colloquially known as 'mind-only', to argue that it is not necessary to posit any kind of super-mind or cosmic mind.

Although I also concede that if Kastrup simply means 'some mind' or 'mind in general', then I am in complete agreement with him. Why? I think the reification trap is associated with the tendency towards objectification, to try and consider anything real in terms of it being an object or an other. This is where Heidegger's criticism of onto-theology rings true. — Wayfarer

I read your essay, and I thought it was well-constructed and clearly expressed. However I remain unconvinced about the idea of a collective or universal mind being explanatorily unnecessary for an idealist thesis concerning the nature of the world and its relationship with human and animal experience.

You cite as an alternative the Ālaya-Vijñāna or storehouse consciousness of Yogācāra Buddhism, an idea I am fairly well acquainted with from my studies of Eastern philosophies and religions. I always thought of it as a kind of collective karmic storehouse, and it is explicitly doctrinally classed as a form of consciousness. So I'm not seeing how it is not an idea of collective consciousness or mind.

If the thought is that our individual minds are separate then what is posited, in the absence of also positing a collective mind that connects and/or coordinates them, is that, as far as minds go, it is only individual minds that exist. I don't see a "reification trap' in the sense of a 'tendency towards objectification' because neither individual minds nor collective minds are being posited as objects of the senses. I see mind as an activity of the body/brain, not as an object of the senses. It's maybe not the best analogy, but digestion is also an activity of the body, not an object of the senses.

:up: