I believe that not all intuition is equal. For example, when I interview people for jobs, I often have a strong sense about whether they’re going to be the right fit or not. This isn’t just a vague feeling; it’s based on a kind of digested, accumulated experience that I’ve built up over time. But it can't be put into words.

But my intuitions about whether someone is guilty of a crime or whether gods are real are far more speculative - rooted not in experience or repeated exposure, but in emotion, upbringing, and the general atmosphere of ideas I've been exposed to. I tend to believe there's a distinction between intuition that’s grounded in accumulated, tacit knowledge and intuition that is more reflective of personal background and impressionistic feeling. — Tom Storm

That's an important distinction. Intuitions which are based on accumulated experiences and prior processes of reasoning are different than intuitions about gods or metaphysical ideas. Intuitions about people such as your example of intuitions about whether someone is guilty of a crime, can be based on sub-conscious attitudes about their appearance. Do they have a hard face or a kind face? Do they look like a criminal? Do they look shifty or trustworthy?

So, you have rightly drawn attention to the fact that intuition is not one simple kind of thing at all.

Indeed, I am somewhat surprised to see them being used at all, given their poor track record.

So if you were to disagree with someone's intuition, not to share their intuition, they have no comeback. It's difficult to see how not having an intuition is something you can be wrong or mistaken about. i think we agree on this. It's a pretty poor grounding for the whole of rationality. — Banno

Yesd, it seems we can only be wrong about intuitions which predict something which fails to occur or judge something to be so which turns out to fail to be the case. If someone, for example, has an intuition that God or something divine exists and that its qualities are beyond human understanding they can never be shown to be wrong...or right.

They may feel that they understand something which others don't, that they have a special kind of sense that is generaly lacking, and so they are bound to be misunderstood. They may even feel that what they intutively know is an absolute or objective truth, but none of this can be anything more than faith-based, and as such not susceptible of rational justifiaction. This seems to be very hard to accept for those who think thius way.

I agree with you that intuition plays no justificatory part in logic. The LNC is just a necessary rule we must adhere to if we wish others to be able to make sense of what we say. That said, I think it also reflects our experience as @J alluded to before with the example that things are never all one colour and all another colour all over.

Am I right in thinking that this means you trust them to be accurate, all things equal, but wouldn't claim knowledge about their objects? — J

It's not so much that but that if I feel something is most likely the case in conditions where I have no way of knowing for sure, then I trust that feeling provisionally and act accordingly. I guess you could say I treat the intuition as though it is accurate, but I don't at all believe it must be accurate.

You rightly contrast this with trying to convince someone else to accept what you intuit, but is there ever a case when you do know, for yourself, that something you've intuited is true? — J

I'm trying to think of an example which fits this question. Do you mean are there any cases where I feel absolutely certain that something I intuit to be true, but which cannot in any way be tested, is really the case? If so, I think I'd have to say no.

I think there are such cases, in my own experience, and that they carry some intersubjective weight. I'll try to get back to this soon. . . a long day away from the computer lies ahead. — J

I'd be interested to hear about such a case, and how you think they might carry some intersubjective weight.

What is meant by this? Kind of like a rock 10 km deep experiencing heat and pressure, all sans any cognition to mentally experience those things? That was my guess. — noAxioms

Yes what the body experiences pre-cognitively is unknown to us in vivo. Of course we can study it after the fact so to speak. But the critics will say the knowledge we get via such study is cognition based, which of course it is, and as such cannot tell us anything about what "really" goes on pre-cognitively.

Of the 9 types of multiverses listed by Greene: Brane, Cyclic, Holographic, Inflationary, Landscape, Quantum, Quilted, Simulated, Ultimate, only Quilted, Quantum, and arguably Brane share the same spacetime as us (the same big bang, same constants). Of the 9, only Ultimate can claim 'no possible relation'. The rest are all related, but by definition of an alternate universe/world, they might have no direct causal effect on us. Exceptions: Holographic and Simulation.

I have very limited knowledge of string theory, so some details (inclusions and exclusions from lists) may be off. — noAxioms

Okay I had thought that anything posited as another Universe would be by definition another spacetime, but you seem to have explored this more than I have, so I will take your word for it.

Part of the problem is that we lack a decent vocabulary for intuitions, and so we range from the cozy ("feelings", "ring true") to the theoretical ("noetic understanding", "direct intelligibility"). And naturally this makes us wonder whether there's really anything to it at all, if clear descriptions are so hard to come up with. — J

This is a really good point; it focuses the issue nicely. I would say that intuitions are certainly feelings and the question would be as to whether they are anything more than that. We think an intuition is true if it "feels right". I wonder how else we could gauge its seeming truth. We can theorize further and posit noesis, direct knowledge, innate intelligibility and so on, but we have no way of testing those theories.

but that's precisely the issue. The claim about intuitions is that we do know. And the debate is about whether such self-credentialing knowledge, absent either self-evidence or rational argument, is possible. I think what you meant was, "We can't know whether they are true, given the usual philosophical understanding of what 'knowing to be true' means." But this is exactly what the intuitionist wants to challenge. They may be entirely misguided, of course. — J

Again, I agree entirely. I put stock in my own intuitions, but I would never claim that anyone else ought to believe anything on account of what I believe in following my own intuitions. So, the point for me is that intuitive knowledge is not amenable to intersubjective corroboration. This is something some people find very hard to admit, so I get labelled by some a positivist, which I am most certainly not.

More labelling. Seems to be all you are capable of. Oh well, back to the ignore-ance.

I don’t at all but I recognise the metaphor. — Wayfarer

I see...we see through a glass darkly but you don't. :rofl:

You're attempting to ground logic itself in a notion of what is "logically compatible." This is circular without intuition. This is just an appeal to LNC as being intuitive. This seems like: "no intuition is required because the LNC is self-evident." I agree it is self-evident. However, this is the definition of an intuition, perhaps the prime example of it historically. There are logics that reject LNC at any rate. — Count Timothy von Icarus

You seem to be trading on an equivocal idea of intuition. Self-evidence obtains when something is true by definition. We don't need intuition to see it, it is obvious by virtue of the meaning of the terms. If you make a statement that contradicts itself, it is clear that you haven't asserted anything because you have asserted two things which cancel each other out.

Intuition on the other hand refers to when you feel something is so, when its being so just "rings true' to you. Intuition and self-evidence are two very different things ̶ with intuitions you don't know whether they are true, with self-evidence there can be no doubt.

I have heard there are logics in which the LNC plays no part. I can't imagine how that would work, but then I haven't studied exotic logics. I can't imagine them being much use in everday life or science, but of course I could be mistaken. In any case the LNC is basic to our default logic.

I think you were on the right track to start with. — Banno

The implication seems to be that I deviated and went off-track somewhere. Perhaps we disagree about self-evidence as I explain it in my response to Tim above?

Most of the assertions about what is real vs what isn't use a definition that implies, if not explicitly, mind dependence. — noAxioms

Well, it seems fairly plausible that the idea of reality derives form our perceptual and somatosensory experiences. But it also seems plausible that the fact that we don't really know what the body experiences prior to cognition gives rise to the idea that there must be a mind-independent reality.

We have no physical relation to such worlds.
I disagree. We share the same big bang perhaps. — noAxioms

I was referring to other universes, not remote parts of this universe. Other universes, if they existed, would not share our spacetime, hence no possible relation.

Not an exact calculation, no, but 'stupid improbable' can very much be shown. Just not exactly how stupid improbable. — noAxioms

"Stupid improbable" according to our current understanding perhaps. I wonder just how deep our ignorance is. In any case no matter how "stupid improbable" it might be, it has happened in our case, and thus we are here wondering about it. We find ourselves looking from inside a sample of one.

You posited a sense we can have no sense of.
— Janus

As I said. — Wayfarer

:roll:

but sense that we’re not able to apprehend - after all we see ‘through a glass, darkly.’ — Wayfarer

From my point of view you certainly seem to see through a glass darkly.

:roll: It was a question. You posited a sense we can have no sense of. Given that it seems a fair question.

Why would you say that? I haven't made any claims about what others should accept.

sense that we’re not able to apprehend — Wayfarer

What use is a sense we can't apprehend ̶ what could it be to us?

So, which? — Wayfarer

It's not a matter of "which"; I don't hundred percent believe there is no afterlife, because I have no way of knowing if that is true. And because none of us can know whether it is true until we die (if then) it cannot be more than a fantasy ̶ meaning it is something which is imagined, not known.

Death can’t be avoided but if there does turn out to be an afterlife then what one has or has not done may indeed be highly significant. — Wayfarer

All we can do anyway is try to live the best lives we can, ethically speaking. Worrying beyond that is worrying about something you can know nothing about and can do nothing about.

That's all fair enough and quite Kierkegaardian ̶ you admit it is a leap of faith, and I respect that.

However, if there really is a life beyond this one, then foreclosing it would be momentous, would it not? If you don't believe in it, it is only a matter of a fallacious belief; but if you do, then something is at stake which might be more significant than anything else in your life.

Me, I'm wrestling with it. I think a lot of what is said about it is obviously mythical, but it remains, for me, at least an open question, and something that nags me, now I'm in my 70's. And that if it turns out to be real after all, it could be the ultimate in rude awakenings. — Wayfarer

I don't 100% believe there is no afterlife, but it really is nothing more than a fantasy, whether oriented towards the pleasant or the unpleasant, for us earthlings given that we could have no way of knowing. I find it impossible to believe in eternal punishment which would be the only version of an afterlife that scares me.

If there really is a life beyond this one, then I'll deal with it then. It's only the assumption that one or other of the Abrahamic religions might be the only true one(s) that I would need to worry about my own personal suffering post mortem. If there is judgement then I assume the judgement would be made on the basis of whether or not one has lived an ethical life. We should know that about ourselves. I know that I have lived an ethical life, by and large; I have always tried my best to avoid harming others and helping them where I can.

I could never buy the Christian idea that you just need to believe in Jesus as your savior. I think preoccupation with personal salvation is a form of egoic attachment anyway. On the Buddhist view the being that inherits my karma will not be me, so why would I be any more concerned about that being than the beings who will inherit the Karma of others?

I spent years seeking enlightenment; meditated virtually every day for eighteen years, and all I got were a few powerful epiphanies, somewhat akin to my copious psychedelic experiences, and the ability to still the mind. It wasn't a waste of time because I am now calmer and more accepting of life as it presents itself. That calmness frees me up for creative pursuits; I'm no longer preoccupied with trying to solve problems that cannot be solved.

I turn 72 this year, and I feel calmer about death than I ever have. It is not death, but dying that frightens me somewhat if I choose to think about it. You know the old saying : "A coward dies a thousand deaths" ̶ I can't see any point in worrying about something you can do nothing about.

Sure we can navigate the world pragmatically, but claiming true comprehension overlooks the potential complexities beneath our experiences. Our confidence in “understanding” as you say often rests on habits of thought and inference, not on direct access to reality’s underlying structure. Habit and comprehension would seem to be different things. — Tom Storm

It is obvious that we comprehend the world, both in an everyday sense and in the enormously complex web of coherent understanding we call science. Some of our understandings may turn out to be incomplete or even wrong, to be sure. Is that what you mean when you refer to "true comprehension"?

You mentioned "complexities beneath our experiences"; by that I take you to refer to things we cannot gain cognitive access to? If so, I would say those are merely imagined possibilities which cannot really mean much, if anything, to us except as perhaps enjoyable, stimulating or even inspiring exercises of the imagination.

So, when I say we obviously comprehend the world, I'm only speaking in an everyday sense, a sense in which I would include science as an augmentation of the everyday. "Direct access to reality's underlying structure" seems to me to be a kind of nonsense. It is impossible, or even if you believed we can have it, having it would be impossible to prove. Comprehension and habit are not unrelated as I see it; you cannot develop habits without any comprehension...think of language in this connection. Animals comprehend their environments through forming habits too. Habit is a sign of comprehension, in other words.

So you're a realist? I'd probably reserve judgment on this. We pragmatically engage a world of forces and sensations, but can we infer unmediated access to a noumenal reality beyond those experiential conditions? And at some level, sure, who gives a fuck? It works, so let's just intervene in the world. But isn't this just suppressing our metaphysical assumptions? — Tom Storm

Why do say I'm a realist? I really don't see myself as any kind of "ist". I merely accept the warmth on my skin from the sun, the feel of the wind, and the sense of acting upon and being acted upon, as ineliminable aspects of my life. I accept the explanation of cause as not merely correlation, but as exchange of energy or force, because it jibes with my bodily experience and comprehending phenomena that way has produced a vast and coherent body of understanding the world that I see no need to question as a whole. That doesn't mean I think it is some kind of timeless, absolute truth, but merely that it is the best we have so far in the way of understanding the nature of the world we find ourselves in. The point is that it is an understanding, and a vast, complex and coherent one at that. So we most definitely do comprehend the world.

I don't think we can infer unmediated access to a noumenal reality; I don't even really know what that could mean, and I certainly don't think it could be all that important. I don't know what you mean by "suppressing our metaphysical assumptions" ̶ did you mean "supposing"?

Anyway I really gotta go do something...I got sucked back in.

I'm not sure if that's quite the difference. Perhaps ↪Janus can clarify, but I thought his point could variously be:

A. That there is a common sense metaphysics that can just be assumed (your reading);

B. That what is called metaphysics can just be done as part of each individual science; or

C. That methodologically one does not need to begin from metaphysics.

I think all three are true to varying degrees. Metaphysics is prior to the other disciplines in the order of generality, but not in the order of knowing. Indeed, in general we know the concrete and particular better than the abstract and universal.

I think it should be uncontroversial that parts of what are generally deemed to be "metaphysics" come into play on the sciences at every turn. For example, one cannot discuss the "origin of species" in biology, or different "types" of atom or molecule without the notion that different concrete particulars can nonetheless be "the same sort of thing" (i.e., the notion of species, essences, and universals coming into play). — Count Timothy von Icarus

cosmological evidence that our space-time universe had a beginning in philosophical time — Gnomon

I can't make sense of the idea that the Universe had a beginning in time, and certainly not "philosophical time" (whatever that is meant to be). The beginning of the Universe was the beginning of time according to my understanding of the current theory.

Count T and I, in contrast, want to use "metaphysics" more broadly, to mean any framework that results in a philosophical position about "the world as we find it." On this usage, it looks impossible to do without metaphysics, since philosophy presupposes it. — J

It seems then that you are redefining metaphysics as philosophy and not as merely one domain of philosophy. If metaphysics is philosophy then of course you can't do philosophy without doing metaphysics; you have simply stipulated that by your definition. I'm not going to agree because I don't think philosophy is all, or even mostly, metaphysics.

There is clearly a difference between looking at the world as Wittgenstein does, and as, e.g., Ted Sider does. Is someone "doing metaphysics" here? Let's not worry about it. Instead, let's ask into what these two ways of looking consist of, and what they would entail. Perhaps, after this very difficult subject is thoroughly understood, we might then feel we had reason to circle back and offer a (now ameliorative) definition of "metaphysics" -- or perhaps not. — J

I'm not familiar with Sider. I performed a quick search and it seems he is a 'modal logic as metaphysics' kind of philosopher. I'm not that much up on modal logic, but what I have encountered of it has led me to think it is primarily about what we can coherently imagine. So I would see it as semantics, not metaphysics. I'm open to rethinking this, though, given my sketchy knowledge of the subject.

I'm not sure if that's quite the difference. Perhaps ↪Janus can clarify, but I thought his point could variously be:

A. That there is a common sense metaphysics that can just be assumed (your reading);

B. That what is called metaphysics can just be done as part of each individual science; or

C. That methodologically one does not need to begin from metaphysics. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I am not claiming 'A' because I don't think the commonsense understanding of the world is metaphysics, but is rather an evolved pragmatic practice.

I am not claiming 'B' because I don't think metaphysics needs to play any part if the sciences (although I agree that it may play a part, and that it has, historically speaking, played a part in shaping what we now call science).

I agree with 'C'. Methodologically we can in science do without metaphysics entirely.

Also I want to make a distinction between 'doing metaphysics' meaning holding one or another metaphysical standpoint, and speculating about ontological possibilities. The latter is an exercise in creative imagining which may feed into scientific theory to be sure. But I don't count speculating about what might exist as "doing metaphysics". To repeat, for me doing metaphysics means holding to a particular position regarding the fundamental nature or reality.

Indeed, in general we know the concrete and particular better than the abstract and universal.

I agree, but it's also true that most of our knowledge of particulars comes through generalizing, which I think amounts to recognizing regularities and patterns. I don't like the term 'universal' much because I think it's loaded with metaphysical baggage, and it really doesn't mean anything more that 'general'.

I think it should be uncontroversial that parts of what are generally deemed to be "metaphysics" come into play on the sciences at every turn. For example, one cannot discuss the "origin of species" in biology, or different "types" of atom or molecule without the notion that different concrete particulars can nonetheless be "the same sort of thing" (i.e., the notion of species, essences, and universals coming into play). Likewise, questions of emergence includes the relationship of parts to wholes, and shows up in physics, chemistry, biology, etc. Perhaps the most obvious example is causation.

Those "parts" may be deemed by some to be metaphysics, but I wouldn't deem them to be so. Different concrete particulars can be the same sorts of things on account of shred morphologies. We don't need essences for that ( if you mean the idea of unique essences as opposed to essential characteristics). And of course I don't see universals coming into play, but just a human capacity to generalize on account of the ability to recognize patterns and regularities, as I already noted above.

The relationships of parts to wholes are multifarious, and I think it is basically a sematic issue. Like the 'Ship of Theseus" or the supposed puzzle about what constitutes a heap, these are just open to different ways of framing, and are thus semantic possibilities. We can say the ship of Theseus is the same ship or not depending on how we want to define it. When it comes to heaps if a number of items jumbled together doesn't resemble the general pattern of a heap then we won't call it a heap. There is no precise cutoff point and it depends on the kinds of items jumbled together.

Doesn't science rest on metaphysical assumptions such as the world is comprehensible and that reason and observations are reliable and there's an external world and causality - those kinds of things? Or do hold a view that methodological naturalism (as opposed to metaphysical naturalism) is a default common sense foundation that requires no justification other than our continued demonstrations of its reliability in action? — Tom Storm

We find the world to be comprehensible, so I don't see a need for any assumptions in that matter. We comprehend it in terms of causation and it might be argued that causation is a metaphysical assumption, since it cannot be observed as Hume claimed. Hume says we arrive at the notion of causation by observing constant correlations between events. I think that's part of it, but even it was the whole of it I don't think it counts as a metaphysical assumption but as simply a matter of habit, which is what Hume thought too.

Even animals show by their behavior that they think causally. Where I think Hume only told part of the story is that failed to acknowledged that we all feel causation in our bodies. We feel the sunlight and wind on our skins. We feel the force when we throw objects or wield a hammer or strain to walk up a steep hill and in all our bodily activities. Of course animals feel these things too, so causation, acting upon and being acted upon, is a natural aspect of embodiment.

That's all I have time for right now.

My whole way of thinking about God and suffering includes thoughts of what is “sin” and what is free will, what is the heart, what is love, why did God become a man and die, on a cross….

Anyone who might decide there must be no God because they think they understand the syllogism, had a shallow understanding of “God” or “all-good” or “suffering” or all of the above.

This forum, to me, is not really the place to account for God and suffering, as that would take Bible quotes and histories of saints and in the end, we will only be able to answer how God allows suffering by asking God, so if there is no God to you, there is not only no need to ask the question, but no need to think there would be an answer discoverable through our own reason. — Fire Ologist

It seems we think very differently. I cannot make sense of libertarian free will ̶ the kind of free will Christians posit when they claim that we are 100% responsible for our actions and will be judged for them, as to whether we will receive eternal reward or eternal punishment or, according to some accounts, a spell in purgatory.

There is no point saying that people have a shallow understanding of "all-good" ̶ that's a cop out in the context of philosophy because it dispenses with human reason. I for one do not say there must be no God, but I do say, and have said, that the human notions of perfect goodness and justice (which are the only ones we have access to) do not jibe with the world we live in, so something has to give.

You're just doing the usual religious apologist thing when they have no answer to the critique and saying what amounts to "God moves in mysterious ways". If God is beyond human knowing then why believe in God at all?

I agree with you that this forum is not really the place for theology. I think the faithful should find themselves content with their faith ̶ there seems to be no point asking questions of it which cannot be answered by human reason, and then turning the back on human reason. Better to turn the back on it from the start ̶ at least that would be consistent with faith.

Consistency consists in simply not saying things that are logically incompatible, mostly not saying things which contradict one another. No intuition required; it's as simple as 'yes' and 'no'. If you say both yes and no about the same subject you are contradicting yourself.

The reason consistency is better than inconsistency is that if you allow the latter you can say whatever you like and all sayings would become equal what you mean would become inscrutable. The reason truth is to be preferred over error is that basically it is a matter of survival; if you constantly believed what was false you would not survive for long.

The authority of reason itself rests on intuition and understanding — Count Timothy von Icarus

This cannot be true. The validity ("authority" makes no sense) of reasoning rests on consistency. In any case any authority is either imposed by force or else is normative. Intuition is subjective. There are common understandings but it is individuals that understand or fail to understand. Also many things may be understood, while remaining consonant with reason in various ways.

It seems we can do philosophy without bothering about metaphysics. We don't need metaphysics to do ethics, aesthetics, philosophy of language, history of ideas or phenomenology as far as I can tell.

We don't need to make assumptions, in the sense of holding some metaphysical view or other, to do science, and I count science as part of philosophy. We don't even have to make assumptions in order to critically examine metaphysical assumptions.

To frame it simply naive realism thinks that the eyes are windows onto a world; we look out through them and see exactly what is out there. Indirect realism says we see mental models assembled form sense data and that we don't see objects as they are. Direct realism can admit that we don't see objects just as they are in all their ways of being (colours for example are not inherent in objects, even though the property of reflecting particular wavelengths is) but we do actually see objects not mental models. It has a lot to do with linguistic framing though. So I would say that mental models of objects just are seeing the objects, rather than saying that we see mental models.

Yes, epistemology strictly speaking, but isn't epistemology a sub-inquiry under metaphysics? Is it possible to frame a question about what we can know, without an explicit or assumed metaphysical framework? I don't think so. — J

We can know all kinds of basic things, like whether it is raining or not, for example. We know things because we see them. I know I am looking at a tree for example. Now you could object and say "how do you know it is really a tree?" or "how do you know you are not being tricked by a demon?" or "Does the tree exist apart form its being perceived?", and so on. Those are metaphysical questions, and I consider them to be pointless in one way, simply because there cannot be any way of answering them if they have no empirical or logical solution.

So, I see accepting that basic human situation, accepting the world as we find it, as eschewing metaphysical speculation not as assuming any metaphysical framework. I am not opposed to metaphysical speculation, though, as I've said on these threads many times; I think it can be a great exercise of the creative imagination. I just don't take it very seriously or expect any answers from it. New ways of thinking? Sure...

Ah, but which ones are the fly-bottles? :wink: Problem is, to ask "Should all metaphysical questions be dissolved rather than (if possible) resolved?" is to ask a very metaphysical question. Witt's answers, whatever their merit, also depend on evident metaphysical premises. — J

Would that not be more an epistemological question? Why must we make any metaphysical assumptions at all? Surely we can just accept the world as it appears to us without worrying about what might be "behind it"?

Where do we go next, with this insight? Should we conclude that the answers to such questions will never be forthcoming? Or simply never forthcoming within rational philosophy? — J

I can't believe that pure rationality (speculative reasoning) can have anything more after nearly three millennia to offer apart from thinking about fresh material that has come from science. I mean I think it has nothing more to offer that derives purely from itself. It's come to look like "pouring from the empty into the void".

I also think we don't so much find answers as new ways of looking at and thinking about things. If the purpose of philosophy is to come to terms with our lives and live them the best way we can, and if this entails radical acceptance of our condition, then it would seem the task is not so much trying to find answers to abstruse metaphysical questions, but rather coming to understand and work on ourselves.

As to ego as impediment: certainly true in my ethical life. Probably in my intellectual life as well, since like anyone else I enjoy being correct about things, and get seduced by this pleasure into believing that there is no end to the topics about which I could be correct . . . see above. — J

Yes, we all suffer from that particular affliction to one degree or another. I used to think analytic philosophy was useless, dry "logic-chopping", and pedantic concern about being correct, but I have changed my view on that. What I have come to like about analytic philosophy is its ability to free us from conceptual confusions. That may not give us wisdom per se, but I think it can help clear the way to seeing our condition more clearly.

All that wriggling and to-ing and fro-ing just to admit that the usual conception of a loving, personal God does not jibe with the reality of the world we find ourselves living in!

But I wonder why I sense an underlying, lingering "and yet..." in your words? Something you find hard to let go of?

complaining about the God they don't believe in doing things they don't believe God ought to do. :roll:
— Wayfarer

Essentially, my whole way of thinking about the problem of evil. :100:

The argument concludes the premises on which this conclusion was based make no sense, so why would anything concluded based on those premises be able to be held soundly? — Fire Ologist

That's a poor characterization of the critique of what merely amounts to two ideas which are inconsistent with one another. It's a lame attempt to dismiss the critique by attempting to explain it away psychologically, as though those pointing out the inconsistency are merely whiners.

It's very shallow indeed if that's your "whole way of thinking about the problem of evil".

No I tend more towards direct realism than indirect. That said I also think their differences are largely on account of linguistic framing.

I've often thought that some personalities are drawn to narratives of enchantment — Tom Storm

I'm attracted to narratives of enchantment, science being in my view the most potent narrative of enchantment there is. So, I don't see as science disenchants the world. I also like the old magical narratives of enchantment, but I no longer take them to be anything more than enjoyable fantasies.

I believe the real reason behind the claim that science disenchants the world is that it seems to foreclose on the idea of any kind of afterlife. People say science is dehumanizing and I can only think that the dispelling of the fantasy of an afterlife must be what they mean.

To be sure some technologies can be dehumanizing in real ways and the consumer culture our contemporary world so depends on can be too, but those are not inevitable outcomes of science.

Yes, the "I can't imagine it being otherwise, therefore that's the way it must be" is indeed a powerfully seductive thought for some.

Again, opinion, but the opposite opinion is to posit the existence of something (a preferred moment in time) for which there is no empirical evidence, only intuition, and I rank intuition extremely low on my list of viable references. — noAxioms

Well we agree there when it comes to questioning which of our resources is most likely to lead us to understanding the nature of things.

You also seem to agree that there are things independent of minds. In which case you would appear to be one the "anybodies" who support mind-independent reality.
Except for the 'reality' part, sure. Mind-independent, sure. Relation-independent, no. I think in terms of relations, but I don't necessarily assert it to be so. I proposed other models that are not relational and yet are entirely mind-independent. See OP.

Why must something be "relation-independent" in order to count as real? Is anything relation-independent? I would say probably not.

We have no relation to such worlds

Sure we do. It's just a different relation than 'part of the causal history of system state X', more like a cousin relation instead of a grandparent relation. The grandparent is an ancestor. The cousin is not. The cousin world is necessary to explain things like the fine tuning of this world, even if the cousin world has no direct causal impact on us.

We have no physical relation to such worlds. If we did they would be counted as of this world. The fine-tuning argument has never done it for me. I don't believe we can accurately calculate odds when the sample is but one. Even if we could the outcome is still not a zero possibility. That said I'm not against the 'Multiple Universes' idea. It does seem to be impossible to test. though.

How could we ever demonstrate that consciousness collapses the wave function

That interpretation can be shown to lead to solipsism, which isn't a falsification, but it was enough to have its author (Wigner) abandon support of the interpretation.

I'll take your word for it.

or that there really are hidden variables?

By definition, those can neither be demonstrated nor falsified.
They have proven that certain phenomena cannot be explained by any local hidden variable theory, but that just means that hidden variable proposals are necessarily non-local.

So it would seem.

The impulse isn't deep; it’s a confusion of category. — Banno

It seems to be a deeply imbedded psychological impulse in some. Metaphysicians, to quote Nietzsche: "They muddy the waters to make them seem deep".

I'm not sure now whether you are referring to what I would characterize as relational realism as weak, or whether you mean naive realism is weak. I wouldn't call sophisticated realism 'weak". I think naive realism is weak realism, because it allows only how we perceive things to be real.

Are you referring to naive realism which, as it is commonly characterized, thinks that the things of the world are just exactly as we perceive them to be? Do you think anyone who had done even a little intelligent reflection and critical thinking would hold such a view? There is a reason it is called naive realism.

Maybe one could say perceptual differences reflect the fact we see different parts of the same reality, obtaining different partial information about actual physical events, but animals with different cones or more resolution of vision are just detecting more stuff or different stuff than we are. I guess this again is a very weak realism still. — Apustimelogist

I don't understand why you say this is a "weak realism". Are perceptual organs and the experiences they enable not as real as that which they sense and that which is experienced?

Our intuitions are not universal and unchanging. They are influenced by experience, exposure to ideas (from science, but also from history, philosophy, religion), socioeconomic conditions, moral attitudes... That's not to say that there is some fixed asymptote towards which our collective metaphysical intuitions are inevitably converging. They may well diverge, swing and meander this way and that forevermore. — SophistiCat

Right, I haven't said or implied that our intuitions are universal and changing. They are conditioned by culture and tradition. My point was just that the idea of intellectual intuition as source of metaphysical truth is the idea of revelation or of some pure insight which is beyond the relativistic mediations of culture.

I think it is arguable that most of the remodeling of our metaphysical intuitions since the Middle Ages has come form science. It seems reasonable to think that if it hadn't been for science there would have been no really new data. When it comes to mystical intuitions as they are presented to us in the literature there is a base commonality across traditions and cultures, and it is only science which has thrown a spanner in the works, so to speak.

Are questions considered to be data? It looks to me like the questions that philosophy poses keep changing, era to era and tradition to tradition. And yes, the data that philosophers then appeal to in order to answer those questions tend to be more or less the same -- with a big exception for current advances in cognitive science. — J

As I say above, I think many if not most of the new questions have come on account of science, and as you note, especially cognitive science.

That said, I have some sympathy for those, like Wittgenstein, who want to use (a version of) philosophy to free us from metaphysical fly-bottles. — J

I do too, and I think the thrust of that project was to show that such questions are to be dissolved rather than resolved.

I'm not crazy about the "purity" theme, but this certainly sets out the problem concisely: What sort of person must I be, or become, in order to pass across that threshold? We all know the usual suspects: "I must become intellectually accomplished (good at philosophy)." "I must become ethically good." "I must make a certain profession of belief in an avatar." "There is no threshold; shut up and calculate."

In part it's a self-reflexive problem: If we knew how to choose among those standard answers, we would presumably also be demonstrating, in so choosing, why our answer is true or wise. Can that be done without going in circles? — J

I think you've hit on something important here. When it comes to how to live, which in my book is what philosophy is (or should be) really about, we do better the freer we are of concern about the self. I think it is arguable that we see our lives and others with greater clarity the more relaxed, the more at peace with ourselves we are.

It is the state of radical acceptance that I see as being the essence of enlightenment, and not imagined knowings of the answers to the great questions, which have never been, and I think arguably never can be, answered definitively. So "crossing the threshold" for me is a metaphor for a radical shift in our total disposition to life.

you can want something, but also will not to want it, and turn that will into reality. — flannel jesus

Yes, but that's just another will you can't will. The stronger will will win.

So, something you can't explain then?

Why not?

Your questions are confused. — flannel jesus

How can questions be confused? Perhaps you meant confusing? Did you not understand them? The questions are designed to find out if your position is confused...I'm not claiming anything at this stage.

Are you experiencing that shit as it is? Is the fly? — flannel jesus

Is it not part of the piece of shit being what it is to be attractive to the fly and disgusting to you, or to provide a suitable environment for egg-laying for the fly and be such as to make you sick if you ate it? Are those not all real attributes of the piece of shit and its relations with you and the fly?

A very poor response that assumes I don't understand what indirect realists propose, which of course I do. I want to know what you think in your own words. I'm not interested in trying to discuss with someone who hides behind labels. The ball's in your court. Do you have anything interesting or informative to say?

Because that question that you asked makes me think you're completely confused about what indirect realists mean when they say we don't "experience reality as it is". — flannel jesus

Do neuroscientists observe brain processes as they are according to you? If our experiences are real then why should we say we are not experiencing reality as it is? Are you simply saying that we don't experience those aspects of reality which we cannot experience? If so, that would be a tautology, no?

Or perhaps I should have just asked what you think indirect realists mean when they say we don't experience reality as it is.

That's not an answer. I understand the difference between direct realism and indirect realism well enough.

So our brain processes and hence our experiences are parts of reality then?

I don't mind if you respond and of course it's up to you...but I cannot imagine any argument that God's opinion matters more than human opinion or even that anyone could know God's opinion could be convincing, or that revelation could be demonstrated to be more than a human production or even that God actually can be rationally, logically, empirically or some other way, demonstrated to exist.

I'm not trying to be difficult or inflammatory...and I've spent many, many years examining all the arguments, so I doubt you can present anything I haven't already encountered.

So our brain processes are not real according to you...not a part of reality? Experiences are not real events?

If you say you can make free choices then I will ask whether you believe it is reasonable to think your choices are preceded by neural activity that leads to, gives rise to, the choices?

If you think it is reasonable to think that, then I will ask whether you were aware of that neural activity, and whether you somehow engineered it.

Also, it depends on what you mean by "free choice". Are your choices free if you are under no external constraints that prevent you from acting according to your nature? We don't create our own natures. As Schopenhauer observed: "A man can do what he wills, but not will what he wills,"