I don't know if philosophers today would agree with Hegel. Especially the science based ones. — Jackson

Fair enough, but that wasn't really one of the questions I asked.

To answer one of my own questions I think very few philosophers today understand philosophy, as I think Hegel did, to consist in a comprehensive understanding of the whole movement of its thought, and of the dialectical logic of that movement,

Philosophy today is much more comprehensive overall than in the past, but it is fragmented into myriad schools, each of which in their main focus and central concerns seem to have little understanding of, or interest in, the others.

Best statement on the topic of progress in philosophy: " philosophy is its own time comprehended in thoughts." (Philosophy of Right, Hegel, preface). — Jackson

The idea of progress is the idea of movement towards something ever better. In the context of knowledge this means.more detailed, more comprehensive, more accurate.I think it is arguable that we see progress in this sense in science.

Hegel's conception of philosophy seems to be the expansion of comprehensive understanding via dialectic; but returning to the first basic idea of progress as the movement of betterment, is it plausible to say that the best philosophical understanding today is better than it was in the past, or is it merely more comprehensive?

Taking, for example Pierre Hadot's notion of philosophy as being. most properly, a way of life, do philosophers today generally live their philosophical understandings better than philosophers in the past did, such as to be better, more ethical people? If philosophy is, as the etymology indicates, "love of wisdom" looking from that perspective should we think that philosophers today are wiser than the ancients?

If philosophers today really do "comprehend their own time in thoughts", does that mean they also comprehend how our own time and its thoughts were arrived at? If you want to say they do, would this be all philosophers, or only some, and if only some, then which ones?

or example, you have reason to think I know what I am talking about. You don't though. So that reason is not being causally effective. — Bartricks

If I thought you knew what you were talking about then that would condition my behavior, I would behave differently if I didn't think you knew what you were talking about. so either way it is causal.

show how an evolutionary explanation of our development needs to posit actual noramtive reasons. Not causes and not the belief in normative reasons. Actual normative reasons. — Bartricks

All evolutionarily established reasons for behavior of social animals are in some sense, however attenuated, normative. This is because the social animal is constrained to behave in ways acceptable to the group or suffer the consequences. For the social animal to be exiled from the group is a disaster.

do you think that causes and normative reasons are one and the same — Bartricks

There are different kinds of causes for actions and normative reasons are one of them. Desires are another, and instincts are another. So that all reasons are causes does not entail that all causes are reasons, since there are other kinds of natural causes that do not pertain to human action and are thus not reasons for human action ( although they might be)..

So, you think normative reasons are causes and causes are normative reasons? — Bartricks

Answer the question: do normative reasons cause us to do things or not?

It would be an epistemic reason. There - that's a big word for you. You can misuse that one now. Have fun with it. — Bartricks

What do you claim we know when we have a normative reason to do something? Why should we follow what seems, normatively speaking, the right thing to do? As the word 'normative' suggests, when we follow normative reasons we are following norms; where do these norms come from and how are they established if not from social convention? I know you'll say they come from reason, but according to you it's not the case that reason "won't ever lie". So why should we follow normative reasons (even assuming that we know just what they are in all circumstances) if they might be based on lies?

I don't know what you mean by that (and nor do you). — Bartricks

It means that it is a distinction without a real difference. But you won't attempt to answer the questions I posed which will show that.

Address the OP. You haven't done that. If there are normative reasons, then we have reason to believe in them. — Bartricks

And what reason would that be?

You are a troll, Bloatricks; you have no intention of discussing anything in good faith. As soon as you're stumped you resort to insult and evasion. Enjoy your solitude.

I've already acknowledged there is a conceptual distinction, and I've already explained why I don't think it is substantive. So answer the questions and address the argument if you want this discussion to progress any further.

I'll put it another way: normative reasons are effective only if we believe them. Adaptive advantage gives us good reason to believe in them; namely that following them is generally adaptively advantageous.

I conclude that God is Reason. I don't claim it. I conclude it. — Bartricks

So you conclude it, but don't claim it to be true? Real consistent!

Er, no it doesn't. You explain why you think it does. It doesn't. — Bartricks

I've already explained why I think it follows: if reason doesn't deceive us, and God is reason then God doesn't deceive us. Try reading. Now explain why you think it doesn't follow.

Reason - who is a person - will be omnibenevolent. That doesn't mean 'won't ever lie'. — Bartricks

So, you think sometimes it is in our best interest to be deceived and that reason sometimes deceives us?

And it does not follow from his being omnibenevolent that he would never deceive us. — Bartricks

You claim that reason does not deceive us and that God is reason. It follows that you believe God does not deceive us. If this is not on account of omni-benevolence then what is it on account of?

Stop squirming: answer the questions, address the argument.

The distinction was between normative reasons and causes. — Bartricks

There is no such substantive, as opposed to a merely conceptual distinction. For example, when we do something we desire to do, does that mean we are caused to do it by the desire? If you say 'yes' then what grounds would you have to claim that if we do something for a normative reason, that we are not caused to do it by our belief in the normative reason?

Try addressing what I'm saying and not succumbing to your attention deficit or bad faith-driven desire to characterize it as "doobidoobidoo".

I understand the supposed distinction between normative reasons and adaptively advantageous reasons. We do things because we want to. If we don't do something we desire to do it is not because, abstractly speaking, it goes against a normative prohibition. It just shows that our desire to do the transgressive thing is not as strong as our desire to avoid transgressing an introjected normative proscription against doing the thing I desire.

Belief in normative reasons to do things is adaptive because generally those norms are designed to facilitate social harmony. For a social animal getting along with others is important to well-being. So my point is that there is no substantive distinction between normative reasons and adaptively advantageous reasons.

I said it is false because an evolutionary account does have to invoke reasons for doing things; namely that they are adaptively advantageous. Are you able to read?

You're right; my mistake; its a long time since I studied logic. In any case my point was that premise 2 is untrue, which makes you're argument unsound. Equating the terms 'sound' and 'true' is technically incorrect, but it does not change the point.

It is telling that you would rather pedantically address the technical error than address the obvious point of what I was saying.

Sound means true and unsound means false. Arguments are unsound, even thought they may be valid, if their premises are unsound. I told why 2 is false. don't pretend I haven't.

Premise 2 is unsound: the reason to do things invoked by an evolutionary account is that to do whatever is adaptively advantageous or at least not adaptively disadvantageous. I dont expect you to get that, bit I'd like to see you attempt to refute it.

Cheers.

I found an electronic version of the book, but I am yet to delve into it. Too much on my reading list, and too little time to read!

You've fulfilled my every expectation Bortricks.

By the way I love the consistency of your God. He is reason so he, being omni-benevolent, would never deceive us. But he has given us, according to that very reason (according to you, of course), a life not worth living on account of the fact that it involves some suffering, and the ultimate hurt: death, a degree of suffering such as to warrant our reason (god) to tell us that it is immoral to procreate. And yet God created the world with us and our ability to procreate as part of it. Now that's some real fine consistency right there, boy! You're doing just fine boy, don't let your detractors, those who disagree with your reasoning, undermine your perfect God/reason-warranted confidence in your own ability to reason better than anyone else. :rofl:

That got a chuckle outta me, I must say. And you know me.....everything philosophical worth repeating originated in Königsberg. — Mww

Right, but you didn't answer the question as to whether it was a quote from or paraphrase of the Meister... :smile:

Which is precisely the exposition given by ↪Wayfarer
: “What the observer brings *is* the picture”. — Mww

I think where he and I might disagree, at least in terms of emphasis, if not substance, is that I don't think the observer brings the whole of the picture, in fact I would say the observer is just one part of it, or to put it another way, the observer emerges as one frame out of the (living) picture (or perhaps "movie" would be a better term). (But again, probably more a matter of emphasis than substance).



:up: I'm all for it if some new interesting ideas might emerge.

Yeah except the premises of your argument do not entail the conclusion as far as I can tell. Perhaps you could offer further explanation.

You mean if I don't agree with you then there's no discussion, Backtracks?

3. If a purely evolutionary explanation of our belief that there are reasons to do things is correct, then our belief that there are reasons to do things is debunked because we do not have to posit any actual reasons to do things. — Bartricks

I don't know what you mean. 3 is a conclusion and so to reject it you need to reject either 1 or 2 — Bartricks

Firstly, 3 does not follow from 2. If you think it does then you need to explain how it would. Secondly, 3 itself is not merely a conclusion but an argument: "then our belief that there are reasons to do things is debunked because we do not have to posit any actual reasons to do things": you haven't explained why our reasons to do things is debunked on account of our not having to 'posit actual reasons' or what that even means, when it is obvious that we do posit reasons for doing things (despite your claim that we don't "have to"; {again whatever that could actually mean})and that those reasons motivate us, regardless of their truth value.

3. If a purely evolutionary explanation of our belief that there are reasons to do things is correct, then our belief that there are reasons to do things is debunked because we do not have to posit any actual reasons to do things. — Bartricks

That doing certain things is adaptively advantageous is in keeping with an evolutionary account, and provides a practical reason for doing those things. This is also in keeping with the understanding that there cannot be any 'pure' as opposed to practical reason for doing anything. Any reason to do anything is only as good as the purpose it is intended to fulfill.

feel like this is similar to the objection raised earlier. Saying something cannot or is highly unlikely to be right does not require you to know what the correct answer is: — Count Timothy von Icarus

Sure, I agree, but my point was more that it doesn't seem to make sense to say something isn't right if we can't say what its not being right could even mean.

So we could say that a snake is really a configuration of energy or quantum fields, but in any case that would just be another description, and we have an idea what that means. But if we say it is "something" that defies all categorization because it is "beyond" all our categories of judgement and modes of intuition then we would not be saying much, if anything.

I feel you brother...me neither.

Besides, if talking about it is pointless, then talking about talking about it is even more so. — Wayfarer

If talking about it is a waste of time, then talking about talking about it won't be a waste of time if it cures you of the habit of talking about it. :wink:

However, there is no logical reason that you can't have a selection pressure that is constructed by the mind as a "snake," and still have no snake. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The question is if anyone there would see a snake what could it even mean to say there "really" is no snake? If we say it's "really" just a configuration of energy or fundamental particles or fields or "something" atemporal even beyond those things, how would such judgements not be every bit as derivative of and dependent on our perceptions as the snake or the selection pressure for that matter?

So, yes, “scientific idealism” is emerging, which itself reduces to no more than to, “....raise a loud cry of danger to the public over the destruction of cobwebs, of which the public has never taken any notice, and the loss of which, therefore, it can never feel....”. — Mww

Nice, is that yours or is it a quote from, or paraphrase of, the Great Burgermeister? I cannot see how it makes any difference what metaphysics or ontology science assumes, or religion for that matter, not to mention everyday life, so for me the whole debate is a "storm in a teacup". It's unfathomable to me how impassioned the polemicists become, as though they are protecting something upon which their well-being, even the well-being of the whole of humanity, somehow depends.

Edit: Thinking further on this, it seems this is the crux of the issue: the supporters of idealism think that materialism will eliminate religion, that it produces an atmosphere in which religion cannot breathe and survive, and the materialist-minded folk think humanity will be fucked unless religion is jettisoned. Personally I don't buy either of these opinions.

Interesting links; now I understand what you meant by emerging. — Mww

I don't have time to read right now, but I looked and saw this in the heading:

"The only reality is mind and observations, but observations are not of things. To see the Universe as it really is, we must abandon our tendency to conceptualize observations as things."

I don't think we are entitled to claim that any more than we are its obverse. And one thing is definitely wrong there in my book: observations are of things. Of course, it might not be things as we understand them to be that give rise to the perceptions we count as observations.

Yes, the kind called ‘shifting the goal posts’. — Wayfarer

It's not shifting the goalposts if "real" is counted as meaning 'having actual existence regardless and independent of our opinions and perceptions.

I'd say it is misplaced, at least in philosophical parlance, just because we cannot decide whether it is misplaced or not, and the idea that it might be well placed but we could never know seems kind of incoherent.

So, the corollary here would be "I believe in physicalism, but I don't know if physical reality exists?"

This seems different to me because it is a positive claim made in the absence of knowledge as opposed to a negative claim such as: "I don't believe in physicalism, but I don't know if it is true or not." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Would it still count as physicalism if I said I believe in something real that reliably gives rise to our experience of a physical world and is somehow isomorphic with that experience, but that the concept physical would be misplaced if we attempted to apply it beyond the ambit of our experience?

How does that square with this statement from his interview:

The central lesson of quantum physics is clear: There are no public objects sitting out there in some preexisting space. As the physicist John Wheeler put it, “Useful as it is under ordinary circumstances to say that the world exists ‘out there’ independent of us, that view can no longer be upheld.” — Wayfarer

If you listen to the interview with Hoffman on Sam Harris' site that @Mww referred to from about 40 minutes in as suggested (note 9, on the Wiki page you linked) you will find that he agrees with one of the others that whatever gives rise to our world of everyday experience must be somehow "isomorphic" with that experience, which indicates that it is not that we freely or arbitrarily construct reality (although we as part of that "whatever" obviously play a part, in that whatever gives rise to us, to our perceptible bodies and brains as we understand them to be, must also be isomorphic with that perception and understanding).

And as Annaka Harris points out several times in the discussion, this thesis of Hoffman's is not at all controversial in modern science and is quite in keeping with scientific accounts of perception and indirect realism. (It is acknowledged that Hoffmann has arrived at the thesis via a unique route, i.e. via evolutionary theory, though).

So,the salient point is that,while acknowledging that reality might not be "like" (in the naive realist sense) what we experience, what we experienced is nonetheless, in some sense isomorphic with, and determined by, it. So, in that latter sense we have reason to think that reality is "like" what we experience.

So the real world in the naive sense is not "out there independent of us" but whatever gives rise to our everyday world is. And to say this is to espouse a kind of realism.

I say "almost", due to the fact that if realism, idealism and solipsism are understood to refer to grammatical stances, and if one is free to choose one's grammatical stance in accordance with one's circumstances, then the so-called "ontological commitments" that are entailed by these contrary positions can only refer to the state of mind and intentions of their asserters, in which case the public debate between realism and idealism amounts to psychological differences among the public that have no relevance to the empirical sciences at large. — sime

:up: Nor, I would add, to any other aspect of human life. These different systems of ideas are interesting and illuminating just in that they exemplify what is variously imaginable, in my view.

I think of awareness as usually being like a flashlight in a dark room. I just meant that physicalism, to the extent that it's monistic, has to accept that the universe has awakened to itself. That's what we are. — Tate

I think that it is undeniable that without awareness the universe would be as good as nothing. It might be said to exist in some sense, but it would be an entirely blind, deaf, dumb and senseless existence, whatever we might dimly be able to imagine that could be.

If you're a physicalist, you probably accept that in some sense the universe is aware of itself, so I don't know if it's more plausible. It's just the starting point our culture embraces. — Tate

I know there is a movement towards pan-psychism among some physicalists; Galen Strawson and (not sure) David Chalmers spring to mind. Does this idea of the universe being aware of itself mean that the whole universe is aware of it wholeness, or just that some parts are aware of parts? Of course the latter is uncontroversial, as animals and humans seem to show various degrees of self-awareness.

That it is the starting point our culture embraces reflects the ascension of the methodology of science to be thought as the gold standard of investigative approaches.

:up: I was adding to the post as you were responding. But I agree it is pragmatism that rules.

I would argue, are numbers abstract — Janus


That is the prevailing view in philosophy of math. — Tate

The opponent of the view that numbers are abstract in the sense of being thought to be merely epiphenomenally parasitic upon the physical will argue that it doesn't answer the question as to the reality of numbers. 'What kind of reality does abstraction enjoy?' they might say, and if abstraction is real doesn't that tell against physicalism?

And then they might continue by asking what kind of reality does physicality have. And can we say more than that it is real only insofar as it is measurable, tangible, available to the senses? So, then analogously we could ask is not abstraction similarly real insofar as it is conceivable, available to thought, and then even seek to extend that condition to physicality itself.

So, then the question that seems to follow is as to whether the physical is derivative of the abstract or the abstract is derivative of the physical, or whether they are codependent. Since this question seems to be undecidable, those who support one or the other contention show their preconceptions and partiality, and the more vehemently they support one view or the other they show their ingrained prejudice and its extent.

But 'NO!' the physicalist will cry 'the view that the physical is primary is the more plausible'. Yet plausibility is not a precise measure and a sense of it is gained only by comparing many cases, and in this connection we have only the one case to consider. So, it seems that our sense of plausibility here is merely a reflection of conditioned habit and the dominant paradigms of our social milieu.

All that said, the view that the physical is primary does seem the more plausible to the majority of modern thinking minds. Could this consensual majority carry any rational weight or it is merely a prejudicial normativity. That is the million dollar question!

thanks, hadn't noticed that second usage. Careless on my part. Hope it doesn't detract from the main point. — Wayfarer

I'm not sure whether it detracts from the point. I guess if subsist means

a. to exist as a concept or relation rather than a fact
b. to be conceivable — Janus

then we could say that particular numbers subsist in collections of objects that instantiate the appropriate numbers. As I say in my response to @Tate we cannot see the number three but we can see the pattern that three objects make.

Just keep in mind that if you find that your analysis of abstract objects contains the very thing you're trying to analyze (such as 'things we do', which is a set, and therefore an abstract object), you may take that as a signal that what you're dealing with is more primal than you previously may have thought.

But at least at this point, you've recognized that they exist and all that's left is to join the ongoing debate about how to understand them. — Tate

Just as "things we do" is abstract, like anything we say, and represents perceivable human actions, so, I would argue, are numbers abstract, and they represent the phenomenon of number, which is made possible by the recognition of perceptible similarity and pattern in the perceived environment. So, I can see one orange or I can see three oranges. Of course I don't see the number three in abstraction, but I see three similar objects, and I can see the different pattern that three objects show compared to one, two or seven objects. and then later abstract the notion of "threeness".

TGW was given a second chance, but I believe he blew it again. Of course it doesn't follow that Streetlight would do so.