On that total agreement from me.

Cheers, Tom.

I think it's fair to say that religious tropes may enliven dimensions of feeling that the garden, the bush and the gallery may not. And, of course, vice versa.

That's exactly what can be described physically. — Cornwell1

Not remotely with adequacy.

So, I am asking you to clearly state Jack's belief and then proceed to tell me what Jack's belief is about and what the content of that belief is... — creativesoul

I already have:

"The content of the belief (if you want to characterize it as a definite belief, rather than a mere passing assumption) would be "That clock is working". "

Jack's belief is obviously about a clock that he doesn't realize is not working. If he did realize it wasn't working his belief would be "That clock is not working".

Looked at at face value, they are senseless, and so not the sort of thing one might understand. — Banno

But they are the sorts of things one might be moved by. Also they might be understood in an allegorical, metaphorical or poetical sense, if one has the "ear" for it.

Then why is there no entry on materialism in SEP? — Banno


Look harder. — Wayfarer

There is no SEP entry on materialism as such because there are so many "materialisms", as the OP asserts.

What you are railing against is elimininative materialism, which treats experience as an epiphenomenon. From the point of view of science it is an epiphenomenon, whereas from the point of view of phenomenology it is central. Two different disciplines which by no means need to be at odds with one another.

But as soon as philosophical religion brings forth a proposal, it is found wanting. — Banno

Right, "philosophical religion", which I think is verging on being a non sequitur. On the other hand if religion is understood to be a kind of poetry, then there is no problem, no? Because nothing expresses the sense of wonder better than poetry, or put another way, the expression of wonder just is poetry.

Again you introduce the ambiguity. For Jack, he does not believe of a broken clock that it is working, because that would be an absurdity. There is nothing more to be gleaned form this than that Jack does not realize the clock is not working. That is, it has no implications for whether or not beliefs can be expressed in propositional form.

He said the mind is strictly describable in terms of the entities explored by science, and that when this was complete, there would be nothing unexplained. — Wayfarer

Even if such a project were completeable it would still be the case that science cannot describe lived experience. No one really can, beyond offering allusions, evocations and analogies. But then science should not be denigrated for being unable to describe the indescribable. or explain the unexplainable.

Science may one day be able to explain how it is that a physical brain can give rise to consciousness, but that would still leave out the ineffable lived experience of being conscious. Since the latter cannot be observed, but only directly felt, I don't think that's going to change.

Also, all scientific explanations are defeasible, so it will always be impossible to know whether any scientific explanatory theory is complete and final for all time.

If we say that Jack believes of that broken clock that it is working, what is the content of Jack's belief, and what is Jack's belief about? — creativesoul

The content of the belief (if you want to characterize it as a definite belief, rather than a mere passing assumption) would be "That clock is working".

But if something can be reduced to matter, then matter is all that is real, right? If thinking really is the output of neurotransmitters, as materialists say, then the neural chemicals and their reactions are what is real, whereas thinking is derivate from that, is it not? — Wayfarer

To say that thinking is dependent on neural activity is not to say that thinking doesn't exist, or that it is immaterial (in both senses of the world). You could say thinking is non-physical (if you define the physical as that which can be observed and quantified).

Remember, what is physical and measurable is not mere matter, but in-formed matter; so the physical is always hylomorphic, whereas matter as such is not necessarily.

If we say that Jack believes of that broken clock that it is working, what is the content of Jack's belief and what is Jack's belief about? — creativesoul

It's very simple; the belief is simply that the clock is working. If he was asked whether he thinks 'the clock is working' is true, he might say 'yes' or he might say, as I said before 'give me a minute and I'll tell you'. Or he might say 'I had assumed that, but on reflection I realize that was a baseless assumption'.

Your belief that folk in Darwin can sometimes buy shoes is not a discrete state of your mind. So it's not quite my view. — Banno

If someone believes that folk in Darwin can sometimes buy shoes then there must be a mental state (or probably better, process) correlated with that belief. It need not be a conscious state or process, just as the belief need not be explicit.

That said, would any belief be " a discrete state of your mind"? Would the idea that beliefs are discrete states not be an illusion fostered by the apparently discrete character of the sentences in which they are expressed?

You did not answer the question I asked about the charge you're levying. — creativesoul

I did. To repeat: to say that X believed a stopped clock was working is ambiguous; it could mean that X believed the clock was both stopped and working, which is obviously absurd, and is the real reason to reject the propositional equivalent: "X did not believe 'A stopped clock is working' is true".

Anyway I and several others have pointed this out to you, and you refuse to hear apparently.

"they believe a spherical object is flat" — creativesoul

AS I said this is prone to equivocation. The incoherent interpretation would be equivalent to they believe that "a spherical object is flat" is true. It doesn't seem to me that you are willing to engage with the (sensible) objections that others are raising.

My view is that of course h. Sapiens evolved pretty much as the science tells us, but reached a kind of threshold through the explosion of the massive human forebrain which enabled abilities profoundly different to any possessed by their simian forbears. — Wayfarer

Yes, H.sapiens possesses language; a relatively larger brain, unique tongue and lip structures, sinus cavities and opposable thumbs. All good for grasping.

Codependent people, for example, engage in behaviors that indicate a disposition of predominant concern for others, but we don't consider codependent people to be enlightened. — baker

I don't agree that codependent people do that at all; I think they manifest inordinate concern with themselves; others are not seen as important in themselves but only insofar as they are needed by the dependee. If that were not so, they would not be codependent.

And even if a codependent person did manifest overweening concern for those on whom they were codependent, that would not be manifesting concern for all others, without prejudice, which was the point.

:cool:

So, we cannot say of those people that they believe that a spherical object is flat — creativesoul

We can say of those people not "that they believe that a spherical object is flat", but 'that they believe of a spherical object that it is flat'. The former is ambiguous, and could mean either that they, absurdly contradicting themselves, believe that an object is both spherical and flat, or it could simply mean that they mistakenly believe that an object that is actually spherical is flat. Apart from it's being mistaken, the latter interpretation is unproblematic, and says nothing about beliefs being able to be rendered in propositional form.

On another tack, let's say a fox believes a rabbit is behind a tree; we say that can be rendered in propositional form, but what if the fox is simply visualizing the rabbit being behind the tree, and following that image, and goes to look? Would we call that believing? If so, would we say that it is in any sense, in its 'raw' condition, propositional? I think we might say it is a kind of believing, but not that is it is in the form of 'believing that'. So, as I have argued before, in other similar conversations with you, I think it makes sense to say that animals believe, but not that they hold beliefs.

On yet again another tack, I think the phenomenological point of distinguishing between the feeling of believing and what is believed is important to keep in mind. The latter is intentional (in the phenomenological sense) and the former is not. So, there is no simple, unambiguous, 'yes or no', 'one size fits all' answer to the question as to whether the act of believing, as distinct from beliefs themselves, in the abstract as it were, can be rendered in propositional form.

in media res. — Agent Smith

Common mistake: it's 'in medias res'.

It was once believed the Earth was flat. It was not believed that the spherical Earth is flat, because for those people the Earth was not spherical. The belief in propositional terms was " The Earth is flat " is true, not "The spherical Earth is flat" is true. This is analogous to your "broken clock" example.You are conflating actuality with belief and producing a fatally incoherent admixture.

I think religious experience can definitely be transformative. The only evidence we could ever have for someone's "enlightenment" would be behavior that indicates a disposition of predominant concern for others.

That's what I've been arguing in this thread and elsewhere; that enlightenment is not a matter of knowing anything like "the ultimate nature of things", or what happens after you die, or any supposed metaphysical "truths"; it is a matter of dissolving the overarching concern with the fate of the self. Ironically, the search for personal salvation is basically a cult of the self in my view.

Yes, spiritual can be problematic. As you say there are so few simple words that can be used as an alternative in a plain English discussion of such matters. Happy to hear from anyone with a useable alternative. I think I generally use spiritual as an alternative to idealism. — Tom Storm

How about 'transformative'?

My post was not directed at the independence of human observers from what they are observing, but merely noting that perfect Objectivity is an ideal, not a reality. — Gnomon

OK, if that's all you were claiming then I cannot but agree; perfect anything is an ideal, not a reality.

Some people explain the Universe as a universe based on matter. But there also exists something which we call value or meaning. A Universe consisting only of matter leaves no room for value or meaning in civilizations and cultures.

I think this is wrong on account of treating matter as "raw" particles, understood as utterly devoid of meaning, which ignores the fact that beings which are nothing other than material, in any substantive sense, create meaning in interaction with environments which are nothing other than material.

What matter is on the basic level does not exhaust what it can be on the cellular and sentient fleshly levels.

What is real is much greater than what exists. Hard idea to get. — Wayfarer

Hard to get because it is impossible to explain, meaning it is not a discursive idea at all (since any discursive idea can be explained). So, really it is nothing but an intimation, a kind of feeling; the stuff of poetry; which is certainly not without value, since it opens up the human imagination; a faculty of equal or greater importance than the intellect. But it is certainly not something that can be cogently argued for or demonstrated to be true.

Uncompromising Realists are assuming that they can observe the world from an objective perspective, which eliminates the subjective biases of the observer. — Gnomon

Maybe some naive realists assume that, but sensible realists find the imaginable possibility that the Universe exists independently of humans more plausible than its imaginable antithesis.

Th most obvious Idiōtēs at present are perhaps the sovereign citizens. — Banno

"They believe that laws only apply to them if they agree to them". :roll:

:up:

I think you're just playing with words CS.

Was the clock he believed to be working not stopped? — creativesoul

As I said he just assumed in that moment, in passing, that the clock had not stopped. So, I don't think it is really accurate to say that he believed the clock was working, because if he had thought about it, he probably would have realized that he couldn't know it was working unless he hung around for a bit to check. So there is "believing", and then there is believing, so to speak.

I made the same observation a while ago. — neomac

And a very sensible observation it is, I think.

Which premiss are you denying? — creativesoul

I am denying that it makes sense to say that Jack believed a stopped clock was working, because there is a fatal ambiguity in that way of describing the situation. Jack believed, or better, simply assumed in that moment, that the clock was not stopped. If he was asked whether he believed the clock was running, and if he was a sensible fellow, he would say "Give me a minute or so and I'll tell you".

You beat me to it! Of course Jack didn't know the clock was stopped. So he didn't believe a stopped clock was working, he believed a clock was working.

No more than that "P" is a reference to P, and not P itself. — Banno

I thought it would be something along those lines; which makes sense.

I'm not at all inclined to speak in phenomenological terms. So, if the conventional notion of intention means being of and/or about something, then I find it best to talk in those terms, unless "intention" adds explanatory power that is otherwise somehow missing without it. — creativesoul

To talk in terms of intension (I think this is the proper spelling) just is to talk in terms of being about or of something. For me terminology is not so important as what's being said.

I don't know why you're directing this at me when if you read Banno's quote, he said that ""P" is the name for a proposition, P is the proposition. — Harry Hindu

You'll have to take that up with @Banno; I don't know what he had in mind.

OK, I missed that; did he understand it?

Yeah, I remember looking forward to replying to something you said earlier, then I could not find it. Could you repeat it, or link it, or somehow otherwise fill me in? — creativesoul

This is the comment I was referring to:

↪creativesoul
Is your disagreement with Banno only that you take him to be claiming that all beliefs are in propositional form, as opposed to claiming that all beliefs can be rendered in propositional form? Because I imagine you would agree that all beliefs can be rendered in propositional form. If this is so, then I can't see what you two could be disagreeing about. — Janus

I later made the comment below, which I would be interested to hear your response to:

How can a language less creature, say a prehistoric mammal, have an attitude towards a proposition when propositions themselves are language constructs? The failure of what you argue is shown in it's inherent inability to make much sense of such language less belief. — creativesoul

Say a prehistoric animal is thirsty and remembers where it last drank. Then it starts moving in the direction of the water. Is it not expecting the water to be where it was last time? I would say expectation is a kind of propositional form, insofar as it is intentional (in the phenomenological sense of being of or about something) even in the absence of symbolic language. — Janus

Truth is best understood through T-sentences: "P" is true iff P — Banno


"P" is the name for a proposition, P is the proposition. ""The cat is on the mat" is true iff the cat is on the mat. The first is mentioned, the second, used. The firs tis spoken about, the second, spoken with. — Banno

This is confusing. You're saying the name is true iff the proposition? What does that even mean? You seem to be saying that something is true if it is simply spoken. — Harry Hindu

The T-sentence is simply the minimal formulation of the correspondence notion of truth. "P" is the statement or proposition, 'iff' means 'if and only if', and P is the state of affairs or actuality. So "P" is true if and only if P. "It is raining" is true if and only if it is raining. It's very simple and totally commonsense; just our ordinary "correspondence" understanding of truth; where what we say is true if it corresponds to the described actuality.

Yep, I guess you have to have something to argue about, and if creativity fails...(willful?) misunderstanding may be resorted to,