I usually can't tell from their posts what most members like Wayfarer or @Constance intelligibly mean by either of these terms. — 180 Proof

That's because you are religiously blind, don't you know? :wink:

With apologists it always comes down to "you must not understand" if you disagree with them and/or present arguments they can't cope with. Also, they argue from the mindset of wanting something to be true and ignoring anything that doesn't confirm their wishes, rather than seeking to discover the truth with an unbiased disposition.

This denial of our mortality has a more basic analysis, for the question is begged, why bother with this issue at all? Fear of death assumes there is something fearful about death. — Constance

Death is feared because it represents the radically unknown, the radically unknowable, and this is naturally profoundly unsettling, as the very idea of non-existence may also be.

Add to this that death is associated with the humiliating loss of physical and cognitive powers, as well as being possibly associated with terrible pain. Add to this the loss of loved ones and everything familiar. It is not surprising that people should wish for immortality and an afterlife which is perfect, unlike the present life.

I already said why I don't think it works, because it all depends on what objective goodness is (assuming for the sake of argument that there is any such thing). For example, the Gnostics thought the created world is defective, objectively bad, because they believed it was created by a deluded, if not evil, demiurge. For the Gnostics escaping from this fallen existence to re-unite with the transcendent God (which they understood as The Good) was good and not this existence (which as I said they saw as intrinsically bad).

An objective morality would be an analysis of what good is apart from culture, emotions, or subjectivity.

How do you define "The Good"? I'm not using that term here so I don't know what it means. — Philosophim

Such an analysis would need an objectively good object of analysis, and that object would be "The Good" if it existed.

No, I mean the steps that I go through on the OP to reach the conclusion. If good is "what ought to be" and there is an objective morality, it must necessarily conclude "Yes" to the question of "Should there be existence?" — Philosophim

What is the difference between there being an objective morality and there being The Good? What would there being an objective mporaity look like for you?

Good is "What should be"
I conclude that if there is an objective morality, it necessarily must answer the question, "Should there be existence?" with Yes. — Philosophim

Do you mean something like 'If there is the Good, then existence must be good'? Buddhism proposes that the Good would be the end of suffering, and that all existence is suffering, which entails that existence is bad, something to be transcended.

I'm not arguing for the truth of Buddhism, just pointing out that it's always going to be a matter of interpretation.

I already did, and I will, at this point, refer you to the OP. You are still fundamentally claiming that propositions can be made true or false relative to beliefs about them which is quite obviously the issue I was expounding in the OP. — Bob Ross

The problem is you are treating moral "propositions" as though they are empirical, logical or mathematical propositions. You can't or won't say what kind of imaginable truth makers apart from people believing them there could be for the former.

You are confused about how moral propositions, beliefs, and truth work: if they are true, then they are binding irregardless if the subject-at-hand realizes it or is motivated by it. — Bob Ross

You just keep claiming this. You need to give an argument for why moral propositions, if they could be known to be true, would be binding. What happens if someone refuses or fails to be bound by a moral proposition even when they believe it to be true, let alone when they don't believe it to be true?

The other point is that you apparently cannot explain how a moral proposition could ever be known to be true. If they cannot (unlike empirical, logical or mathematical propositions) be known to be true, then how could they possibly be binding (assuming that they would be binding even if they were known to be true)?

Janus, you don’t believe that there is a truth of the matter about moral judgments; so I don’t see how you are confused about this: the moral judgments you are advocating for are not even attempting to get at the truth because there is no truth of the matter. This plainly follows from what you are saying. — Bob Ross

No, you are not listening. The only truth of moral beliefs, the only normative force they could possess, the only bindingness, lies in the fact that most normal people believe them, think and/or feel them to be true.

It is patently incoherent to think that a statement can and cannot be propositional; which is what you just said (with word-salad). — Bob Ross

Because moral statements are not truth-apt, beyond the empirical facts of whether people believe them, I don't see how they qualify as propositions in the sense that empirical, logical or mathematical do, so I see the incoherence as being yours.

This is an entirely separate question: I am just trying to get you to see the implications of your moral anti-realism; because you don’t see it yet. — Bob Ross

It's not an entirely separate question because the very coherence of your reference to moral beliefs, feelings, thoughts or statements as "propositions" hinges on it. This is, ironically, something you don't see, while accusing me of not seeing something which you apparently cannot identify or are at least yet to identify. If there is something you think I don't see, then spell it out; I'm listening.

If it's games and feelings of usefulness all the way down, no one can ever be wrong about anything — Count Timothy von Icarus

You can be shown to be wrong about logical, mathematical and empirical claims. How could you go about showing that someone is wrong regarding a metaphysical, religious or aesthetic claim?

Sorry, Russell, I'm not seeing the relevance to the point we were labouring over.

Whether or not you claim moral propositions are true or false relative to one or a several beliefs about them does not get around the issue expounded in the OP. Your moral “inter-subjectivism” falls prey to the same internal inconsistencies. — Bob Ross

I don't think so. Make your argument and we'll see how it stands up.

There’s a difference between a proposition being binding, and people being forced to honor something: the former is binding purely in virtue of the truth-value of the proposition, whereas the latter is binding insofar as one wants to avoid the consequences of not obeying it. — Bob Ross

No, most people hold to finding murder, rape, etc., morally wrong because they feel compassion for the victim, and that is normal. You keep talking about truth being binding, but it's not. There is no reason other than a love for truth that would bind someone to accepting a true claim, and even then, they may not act on it. And there I am talking about logical and/ or empirical truths.

The "objective" truth of moral beliefs cannot even be established let alone made binding. You seem to have some kind of idealized notion of human morals. The only fact that could be established regarding attitudes to carious moral issues would be surveying people to see what they think and/ or feel about those issues. What other imaginable criterion could there be?

What you have described, is the irrational position that we should impose beliefs which do not even attempt, in principle, to correspond with the truth on other people. Do you see how irrational that is? — Bob Ross

That is nothing like anything I've been saying. You need to read more closely. I have nowhere spoken about forcing anyone to do or not to do anything. In any case the most significant moral prescriptions, those regarding what are considered to be serious crimes, are codified in law, and those laws would not hold if most people didn't agree with them. That's normativity at work, not some kind of nebulous notion of being bound to imagined "objective" moral truths which can never be established as such.

(e.g., how can something be stated in “propositional form”, yet not be a valid proposition?). — Bob Ross

This is classic! People can propose whatever they like, valid or not. It's the soundness, not the validity of moral "propositions: which cannot be established. I think you need to ask yourself whether you can imagine any kind of truth maker for such "propositions".

All you can say is that “you believe that torturing babies is wrong”; and this is not normatively binding nor is it a moral proposition. — Bob Ross

If torturing babies is wrong because normal people think it is wrong then it is true that it is wrong for most people, I have not claimed anything beyond that. The very idea of objective wrongness of a moral proposition in some kind of imagined quasi-empirical or objective sense seems to be incoherent. And normative does not mean objective. Unless you take objective to mean nothing beyond 'intersubjectively agreed'.

If it is the case that eating some food is wrong (harmful) for the human body, it does not necessarily follow that it is normatively binding not to eat that food. Note the semantic relation between "normative" and 'normal'. If we say that because it is normal to find torturing babies repugnant, then there is some normative force in saying it is generally wrong for people to do it.Normative does not equate to imperative.

NO. You cannot deny that “torturing babies is wrong” can be evaluated as true or false (which can only be done objectively) and then turn around and say it can be if we just evaluate people’s beliefs about it. — Bob Ross

I think you have it backwards; moral principles cannot be objectively evaluated. The only such evaluations are empirical or logical, and moral beliefs cannot be evaluated in either way. Beliefs can only be evaluated normatively, that is whether or not it is normal to hold them. If someone thinks torturing babies is OK, most people will conclude there must be something wrong with them, that is normativity at work. Chasing moral objectivity beyond this kind of inter-subjective agreement amounts to chasing a chimera.

"I feel like murdering is abhorrent" (subjectivism) and "Boo murder!" (emotivism) are in no way binding on others, and they are arguably not even binding on oneself. — Leontiskos

They are binding socially (normatively) only insofar as most normal people hold to them. So, I am not advocating moral subjectivism or skepticism, but rather a kind of moral inter-subjectivism. What is morally wrong is what most people would find to be so. Of course, I don't deny that this position has its weaknesses, and I think these show up in the case of social mores, like sex before marriage, but when it comes to significant moral issues like murder, rape, child abuse, theft, and so on I think it works well enough.

How does commonality between humans work because of their shared DNA?

For the same reason that there is more commonality between humans who share 99.9% of their DNA than commonality between humans and chickens who only share 60% of their DNA — RussellA

Right, but I was talking about commonality of particular perceptions, for example seeing the same things in the same places and being able to agree about all the details of those things. I don't see how DNA would explain that, rather it might explain why we see things in the same kinds of ways.

As I said the behavior of animals shows us that they see the same things in the environment as we do, but they probably don't see those things in just the same kinds of ways we do due to their different perceptual setups.

How would that work?

But, there is a good argument to be made that these discrete things don't exist "outside minds," even if it is the case that minds do not create these identities ex nihilo or at all arbitrarily. To my mind, this should call into question the idea that "the view from nowhere/anywhere," should be the gold standard of knowledge. Rather, things most "are what they are," when known. — Count Timothy von Icarus

My view is that although what things are in themselves is unknowable, we have good reason to think that the structures of things constrain how we perceive, differentiate and understand them. Of course, I don't know that for certain.

In other words, we simply don't know whether things exist outside minds, but that they do has always been the default assumption on the basis of our shared experience and the fact that the behavior even of animals shows that they perceive the same things we do.

Other than positing some hidden connection between all minds, there is no way to explain the commonality of human experience, a commonality that extends even to some animals.

Saying Torturing babies is wrong" is really just shorthand for the former "I believe......"
— Janus

but my believing that does not make it so for them
— Janus — Leontiskos

I'm saying that for me to say torturing babies is wrong is equivalent to me saying I believe torturing babies is wrong. Og course the two sentences are not semantically equivalent, what I'm talking about is my own intentions my own meaning when I say that.

It's like if I say to you "Your wife is having an affair" when I don't have hard evidence for it but I believe it very strongly for whatever reason; what I'm really saying is I beleive your wife is having an affair if I am honest,

I can't make sense of the claim "torturing babies is wrong" if I take that to be saying it is wrong tout court, because I can't imagine anything that could make that true, apart from what most people would feel and believe. Which means that the proposition is inextricably tied to belief, mine, someone else's, even most peoples'.

Torturing babies is wrong
I believe torturing babies is wrong

The point is that (2) does not entail (1). — Leontiskos

As I explained in the absence of any other truthmaker belief is all we've got. I'm opting for intellectual honesty.

The obligation towards a moral proposition, is its truth-binding nature. If you deny this, then you are saying that you can affirm that it is true that “you should not torture babies” without affirming that it is true that you should not torture babies. — Bob Ross

You are talking about committing a semantic contradiction. That has nothing to do with what may or may not be morally binding. Really nothing is morally binding: people can believe something is wrong, even feel terrible shame in doing it, and yet do it, nonetheless.

In general, when I say I believe something is morally wrong I mean that it is morally repugnant to me, it feels wrong because I don't want to hurt another or whatever.

.

No I didn't, I asked what could make something wrong beyond it being believed to be so. If I believe something is wrong, then that belief is sufficient to make the something wrong for me. I might believe it to be wrong for others too, but my believing that does not make it so for them: they also need to believe it. If I want to claim something is wrong tout court, then I need to be able to say what it is that makes it so, otherwise it is mere hand-waving.

I haven't anywhere said the two sentences are semantically equivalent. Are you going to answer the question, which is exactly the same question I've been asking Bob?

We know what would make "aliens exist" true. We don't know what would make torturing babies wrong, other than that it is (presumably) deeply felt to be so by most people. What else do you have?

If “I should not torture babies” is true, then you are obligated to not torture babies. You can’t affirm that it is true that “I should not torture babies” without conceding it is true that I shouldn’t torture babies: that’s incoherent. — Bob Ross

On the strength of what would I be obligated? And what would it mean for such a claim to be true beyond my feeling or thinking it to be so? Would there need to be a lawgiver who would punish me if I transgressed.

It follows that I believe it to be a normative claim.

But it wouldn’t be a normative claim, and that’s the point. — Bob Ross

What makes a normative claim a normative claim other than people believing it to be so. You didn't answer my question: if it is people believing it, then how many would be needed? If it is something else, then what is that "something else"? Are you invoking God?

If the proposition expresses something about how something ought to be. Saying “I believe one ought to ...” is not a proposition about what ought to be: it is about what one believes ought to be. — Bob Ross

You continue to leave out the critical part. If a proposition expresses how something ought to be for some individual, then it is the fact that the individual believes that proposition that "supports the ought", so to speak. If you want to go beyond that you need to discover what "supports the ought"—you need to address that question.

There is nothing about “I believe torturing babies is wrong” being true that obligates you not to torture babies: it is a non-normative statement about your belief about babies being tortured. It isn’t expressing that “I shouldn’t torture babies”. — Bob Ross

There is nothing about any moral proposition that obligates anyone to adhere to it. If torturing babies is morally repugnant to me, I am unlikely to torture babies,

If I say, "I believe torturing babies is wrong" then that amounts to saying, "I believe no one should torture babies". It follows that I believe it to be a normative claim. Saying Torturing babies is wrong" is really just shorthand for the former "I believe......"

How do moral propositions become normative under your view? Does it require that they be believed by many people? How many people would be sufficient or insufficient?

but I don't agree that it amounts to reason in the sense that h.sapiens demonstrates it. — Wayfarer

I agree it doesn't amount to reasoning in symbolic language, since animals don't have symbolic language.

I refer to it as historical background. I'm simply making the point that Plato's epistemology differentiated between different levels or kinds of knowledge in a way that modern philosophy does not. — Wayfarer

Again, I agree, but that historical background says nothing about the relative value of Platonic versus modern epistemologies.

The last paragraph is a reference to Kant's idea of synthesis and synthetic a priori judgements. I think there's an important point here, which you've gone from objecting to, to seeing nothing significant about (although I'm hesitant to explain why I think it's important). — Wayfarer

I don't recall ever objecting to Kant's idea of synthetic a priori judgements, but as you may recall I think they are made possible by reflecting on the general nature of human experience, perception and judgement. For me that is the foundation of phenomenology, which I think you should know I have a great deal of respect for as a discipline.

I am differentiating this from what used to be called 'intelligible objects' - logical principles, numbers, conventions, qualifiers and so on. For example, if I were to say to you, 'show me the law of the excluded middle', you would have to explain it to me. — Wayfarer

I think it is fine to refer to logical principles, numbers, conventions, qualifiers and so on as objects of thought, by analogy to the way we refer to physical objects as objects of the senses. As you say to present an object of thought to another it must be explained, because it obviously cannot be seen, heard, touched, smelled or tasted.

All of these can only be grasped by a rational intelligence. I could not demonstrate or explain them to a cow or a dog. — Wayfarer

They cannot be explained to a dog, because dogs don't speak English. You would not be able to explain them to someone who spoke a different language from you either without consulting a dictionary, or a translator. From this it does not follow that animals are not rational. I think there is plenty of good evidence that some animals are capable of reasoning, although obviously not in English or any other language.

As I said at the outset, in regular speech it is quite clear to say 'the number 7 exists'. But when you ask what it is, then you are not pointing to a sensable object - that is the symbol - but a rational act. (That's the sense in which I mean that 'counting is an act', but it doesn't mean that the demonstrations of rudimentary reasoning in higher animals amounts to reason per se.) — Wayfarer

That's true and it's a loose kind of usage. If you ask anyone just how the number 7 exists, they won't be able to say. I've often said to you that number exists, and it seems obvious to me that it does. We see numbers of things all the time, so number in a sense, exists in the phenomenal world. It could be said that numbers exist as numerals, and it is true that without those anything more than the most rudimentary counting or arithmetic would be impossible unless an abacus were to be used, and even then I don't think you could get too far in your mathematical endeavours

In Plato these levels or kinds of knowledge were distinguished per the Analogy of the Divided Line . Those distinctions are what have been forgotten, abandoned or lost in the intervening millenia due to the dominance of nominalism and empiricism. But In reality, thought itself, the rational mind, operates through a process of synthesis which blends and binds the phenomenal and noumenal into synthetic judgements (per Kant). — Wayfarer

In this passage you appeal to Plato as someone who thought as you do. But there is no argument to support that way of thinking, just the claim that it has been "forgotten, abandoned or lost" which may be so, but says nothing about whether those ideas were right or had good rational support.

The last paragraph just seems to say that we synthesize sensory experiences (particulars) and ideas about them (generalities) into judgements. This is uncontroversial, but says nothing about what, if any, inferences we could draw from that fact regarding the reality of universals.

So, I find nothing there to disagree with other than the exclusion of animals from the "rational club", which I see as an example of human exceptionalist thinking. I think the latter is mistaken and also a net negative in relation to human and other biological life

Just tell me concisely, and without bringing in other authorities, what evidence or rational support you think there is for the reality of universals.

It wouldn't be a pointless argument if you could actually make an argument; then we might actually get somewhere.

If you don't want to try, then I'll conclude that you don't have such an argument.

Reading those you have cited, I would say they make the same mistake you do: the mistake of thinking that there is a rational case to be made in the absence of either empirical evidence or logical necessity, or else some other kind of evidence. As I see it, the fact that others make the same mistake as you do does not make it any the less a mistake.

What is it precisely you think I don't understand about your position? You should be able to pinpoint that and you should be able to lay out your case clearly if you have a cogent one, and I haven't seen you do that. When, or if, you do then I will respond.

I deal with every interaction on its merits, or lack thereof. — Wayfarer

Why is it that you cannot tolerate disagreement? Surely you know that when it comes to philosophical questions there never has been consensus, or any way to prove the truth or falsity of positions. I'm not demanding any kind of proof from you; there is no proof even when it comes to scientific theories. But you have stated many times that your views are in the minority on this forum, and there is nothing intrinsically wrong with that, but it should give you pause when you want to level accusations of "misunderstanding" to your interlocutors. It just makes you look defensive.

Unfortunately I don't have the rhetorical skills to fend of such exalted polemics. And, as always, you declare what you yourself don't understand as the limits to what anyone else would consider. — Wayfarer

I've noticed that if anyone disagrees with you or questions your ideas you fall back on the claim that they don't understand. I think that if you understood what you meant by saying that universals are real, you would be able to explain it. But no such explanation is ever forthcoming, which leads me to conclude that you don't understand it yourself.

I have no problem with you believing that universals are real entities in some way on the basis that it "feels right intuitively" or whatever, but when you enter a forum like this and want to argue for your belief then you'd better have a strong case to support it, otherwise discussions will devolve into "yes, it is", "no, it isn't".

I'm actually not saying that universals are not real, just as I don't positively claim that God doesn't exist, but I freely admit that I cannot positively imagine any such reality or existence or see any evidence to lead me to conclude that I would have rational justification for believing that there is such an existence.

Doffing my rational hat, I do tend to be intuitively drawn to such ideas, and I allow myself to entertain them in my feelings, and in my poetry and art practice, but I don't claim to have any rational arguments to support my doing that.

"in the same way", Frege says "that a pencil exists independently of grasping it. Thought contents (e.g. numerical value) are true and bear their relations to one another (and presumably to what they are about) independently of anyone's thinking these thought contents - "just as a planet, even before anyone saw it, was in interaction with other planets." — Frege on Knowing the Third Realm, Tyler Burge

In the same way the rules of chess, or the value of money could be said to exist and be mind-independent. Likewise for the perfect form of the turd or the pile of vomit. Do you want to claim noumenal (in the platonic sense) status for those?

Do you believe logic existed begore it was formulated by humans? Frege in that passage says that planets and their interactions with other planets existed before they were known—I bet you don't agree with that.

The real problem I see with saying that universals are mind-independently existent or real is that no one has the foggiest notion of what kind of reality or existence they could enjoy.

Are you not arguing for two kinds of reality—the reality of the body and the different reality of the mind?
— Janus

Not two kinds but two levels, phenomenal and noumenal - and the role of the mind in synthesizing them to produce a unity. — Wayfarer

Below is quoted from you on this;

By 'existent' I refer to manifest or phenomenal existence. Broadly speaking, this refers to sensable objects (I prefer that spelling as it avoids the equivocation with the other meaning of 'sensible') - tables and chairs, stars and planets, oceans and continents. They're phenomenal in the sense of appearing to subjects as sensable objects or conglomerates.

I am differentiating this from what used to be called 'intelligible objects' - logical principles, numbers, conventions, qualifiers and so on. For example, if I were to say to you, 'show me the law of the excluded middle', you would have to explain it to me. It's not really an 'object' at all in the same sense as the proverbial chair or apple. — Wayfarer

Kant's phenomenal/ noumenal distinction as I understand it is not between sense objects and abstracta, but between what we can know and what we cannot.

You seem to be claiming there are two kinds of objects: the physical (phenomena) and the mental (abstracta)_and claiming that at least abstracta are real independently of the mind. If you claim both phenomena and abstracta are mind independently real, then that would be dualism. I guess if you claim that only abstracta are real then that would be idealism, but certainly not of a Kantian kind.

Just what your position consists in remains unclear to me.

Is this a property it acquires naturally, along with its chemical composition, its mass, etc?

Or do we deem each object to be an instantiation of One? — Srap Tasmaner

If an object has a unique identifying chemical composition and mass "naturally" would this qualify it as being one thing naturally? If we go down the road of thinking that some properties are merely "ascriptions" where would we draw the line?

And you don't see any circularity here?

Remember the issue was whether number could be a property of an object, and it just obviously can't unless sets count as objects. It's really straightforward and it pissed Quine off considerably. — Srap Tasmaner

When I think about the visual field, comprising many things, it has the property of number. We can think of it as one or many. Do you think our seeing it as comprised of many is constrained by actual structure, actual diversity, difference and configuration, or does the brain make it all up from scratch?

Thanks for your response. I have a full-on week of work starting tomorrow, so it may take me a while to respond further, but I'll just say one thing for now...each object is an instantiation of one, and groups of things obviously have different numbers of objects in them. You can see the difference between one object and a group of ten or any other small enough number.

I don't understand what you mean by saying:

but then moral propositions do not exist, which seems pretty absurd. — Bob Ross

Can you explain?

Likewise, in this version of the position, one can't say that the moral proposition "one ought not torture babies" is true for them: they would have to say that "I believe one ought not torture babies" is true for them. I think most moral subjectivists do not realize this, and fall into the (internally inconsistent) trap that I outlined in the OP.

They would no longer be discussing ethics, essentially.

If torturing babies is morally repugnant to me, then why can I not say that it is truly morally wrong for me? I may feel that others should also see it as morally wrong, but if I am a consistent moral subjectivist I cannot justify that feeling. Does that matter?

I distinguish ethics from moral philosophy as I see it as being concerned with the question as to how I should live. It doesn't necessarily concern how others should live although whether it does or not might depend on one's starting assumptions. Moral philosophy concerns how I think I should treat others and perhaps also how I think others should treat others,

But what does that mean? Is "different" a property an object can have?

Yes, I'm being a little cagey, but you can do better than a shrug. — Srap Tasmaner

We don't see individual objects in isolation, but as embedded in and different from their surroundings, so difference if not a property of some putative completely isolated object, but a property it displays in its situatedness.

Do you mean numbers as abstracted from any particular instantiation if them? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes that sounds about right.

What do you think of the claim that discrete entities only exist as a product of minds? That is, "physics shows us a world that is just a single continuous process, with no truly isolated systems, where everything interacts with everything else, and so discrete things like apples, cars, etc. would exist solely as 'products of the mind/social practices.'" — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't see any reason to think that we carve up the world arbitrarily, but rather I see many good reasons to think that we are constrained by its actual structures.

I don't see why it should be a "tough sell". If diversity, sameness and difference are acknowledged as being real, then number would seem to naturally follow. It is easy enough to physically demonstrate all the basic operations of arithmetic with actual objects; you start with, say sixty objects and then group them to show how they can be variously added, subtracted, multiplied and divided.

Many people will ignore that too because they will say that numbers aren't real (Field, Azzouni).
I, personally, think mathematics is an empirical endeavor. — Lionino

I think mathematics is an empirical (as well as logical) endeavor also, so we agree on that. But note I said number is real, not numbers.

The dualist will say that they are abstract objects (not spatial, not temporal, causally inefficacious).
— Lionino

Yes, and unfortunately, we have no idea what it could mean to be such an object, apart from, as I said above, it being thought by some mind. — Janus

If number is real in the sense I say it is, that is in the sense that there are numbers of objects, then number would be a real attribute of objects, and the objects would be real, but the numbers themselves would only be real as ways of thinking and dealing with objects, and also as elements in formalized systems of rules elaborated upon that basis.

even distribution of prosperity at the present total level of consumption would be sustainable, or anywhere near sustainable.
— Janus
Of course it would be, if the economic base were changed and the population levelled off, and we allocated the redistributed resources intelligently. — Vera Mont

What I wonder about is whether. assuming all but necessary wastage could be eliminated, even distribution of prosperity at the present total level of consumption would be sustainable, or anywhere near sustainable. — Janus

It would help the conversation if you quoted the entirety of passages instead of truncating them. In any case, the underlined section of your response allows for population reduction so it is not really addressing the question I asked. That is because if the population were levelled off, the present level of total consumption would obviously not be as great. Also by "changing the economic base" I assume you mean a model that involves less consumption and waste, independently of a population reduction.

I would like to believe that this position is nearer to Kant’s transcendental idealism. There’s no way I posit anything like Descartes ‘res cogitans’ or the seperatness of mind and body. — Wayfarer

Are you not arguing for two kinds of reality—the reality of the body and the different reality of the mind?

↪Janus You always argue from an unquestioned empiricism and can’t see how anything that challenges that can ‘make sense’ in your terms. — Wayfarer

This just seems to be an ad hominem deflection. I have asked for an account of the reality you want to claim for abstracta, which is alternative to the account that says they are real insofar as they are thought, and you have not been able to give me any account to comment on.

So, it's a bit rich for you to be claiming that my position is "unquestioned" and that I am incapable of seeing anything that challenges it, It is my long and deeply considered view that the only kinds of intersubjective justification that are possible for beliefs are the empirical and the logical/ mathematical, but I am open to having my mind changed if someone presents an alternative to those that is convincing. I hold that view because I am yet to see such an account.

And I shouldn't have to remind you that it is my position that people can be justified in believing things which cannot be empirically or logically supported on the basis of their own intuitions or experience, but I maintain that that cannot be justification for anyone else believing those things (unless of course they share the same intuitions and/or experience).

So, my position is not positivism, despite your repeated attempts, despite repeated corrections, to paint it as such. And in any case even if it were pure positivism, that does not let you off the hook from being called upon to actually give an account instead of the constant hand-waving and claims to be misunderstood you do generally present.

Not quite sure what you're driving at, but logic was always a formalization of what is understood to be the necessary characteristics of real things.

I read it and agree with @Banno that you are saying there are two realities—the physical ("sensable") and the mental (abstract) which is basically dualism.

You still haven't given an answer as to why the reality of number (as "sensably") instantiated could not possibly explain our understanding of mathematics. Nor have you explained in what sense an abstract "object" could be considered to be real beyond its being thought by humans (or other suitably competent beings).

The dualist will say that they are abstract objects (not spatial, not temporal, causally inefficacious). — Lionino

Yes, and unfortunately, we have no idea what it could mean to be such an object, apart from, as I said above, it being thought by some mind.

I don't see that quoted passage from @Wayfarer as an argument. I think he continues to ignore the fact that number is real; it is merely diversity, number is instantiated everywhere we look.

I have asked him to explain what could be meant by saying that numbers are real beyond our recognition of number in the world, and the formalization of the idea of number in the symbolic language of mathematics, but he does not seem able to proffer an answer.

So initially the population will grow, but then stabilize and decrease, as the majority will be older people. — jkop

And then we may face the problem of insufficient workforce to sustain the population.

If it is not your claim, did you refer to the article in order to agree or disagree with it?

As for the unfathomable subtlety of living organisms, I'm all for it. I think many things we describe as 'instinct' are impossible to fathom, but that's a completely separate issue. — Wayfarer

It's not a separate issue if we include mathematical understanding as one of these unfathomable capacities of living organisms, a capacity much more developed in our own case, itself a fact which would seem to have much to do with our command of symbolic language.

But, the rationalist’s claims appear incompatible with an understanding of human beings as physical creatures whose capacities for learning are exhausted by our physical bodies. — Wayfarer

Can you state just why you think that incompatibility obtains? Many animals appear to have extraordinary capabilities, capabilities that we call instinctive without being able to explain them. How can we understand the idea that we and other animals have resources and capacities which would not be possible for the body/ brain alone when we really understand so little about these unimaginably complex organic beings.

It is questionable whether we have the intellectual capacity to comprehensively understand biological complexity.