To clarify, this teleological account of rights IS NOT equivalent to grounding rights in potential persons; for "potentiality" is a very loose term that covers more than telos (e.g., perhaps a cow has the potential to be a person since we could give it a brain chip). — Bob Ross

It's not clear what you mean by teleology.

If you just mean that a zygote is highly likely to naturally develop a rational will whereas a cow developing a rational will would require artificial intervention then it needs to be explained why this distinction is morally relevant, and why being highly likely to (naturally or otherwise) develop a rational will entails having a right to life.

In that quote you explicitly say that things without a rational will are not persons.

In previous comments you said that it is wrong to kill zygotes because they're human and wrong to kill humans because they're persons. Combining these together you were saying that it is wrong to kill zygotes because they're persons.

So you're contradicting yourself.

At the very least you need to amend your original remarks and say that it is wrong to kill zygotes because they will be persons, and then I will deny this claim; it is only wrong to kill something if it currently is a person, and what it could be in the future (or was in the past) is irrelevant.

Traditionally, a rational will; i.e., a sufficiently free will. That is a serious and impactful difference between humans and other species: most, if not all, other species lack the capacity to go against their own nature and inclinations such that they are motivated by pure reason.

Traditionally, a being which has a Telos such that it will have, if not already has, a rational will are called persons (because their nature marks them out to be such); and their will must be respected.

More technically, a being which has a such a "rational Telos" is not necessarily a person but, rather, will be; and their nature marks them out as such; and this is what grounds their rights (and not whether or not they currently are a person). — Bob Ross

Well, zygotes don't have a rational will, therefore by your own logic they aren't persons.

Tell that to the vast majority of parents who have children, that the child they have created and are carrying is morally insignificant and it doesn’t deserve to live. — NOS4A2

That does not address my point. I'm not interested in sentiment (unless you want to argue that morality is sentiment).

You claim that all humans deserve to live, but then must also accept one of these:

1. No non-humans deserve to live
2. Some but not all non-humans deserve to live
3. All non-humans deserve to live

If you accept (1) or (2) then you accept that it is appropriate to weigh the moral worth of living organisms. I don't see why weighing the moral worth of individuals within a species is any less disgusting than weighing the moral worth of species within a genus (or higher up in the taxonomy).

And I'll add, you already accepted with the trolley problem that the lives of five zygotes are worth less than the life of one baby, so why the about-turn?

But weighing the moral worth of human beings in various stages of their development so as to decide who are morally permissible to kill is a disgusting business. We’ve left ethics entirely and have approached an exercise in excuse-making and dehumanization, in my opinion. — NOS4A2

It's no less disgusting business than weighing the moral worth of non-human organisms. Is it wrong to kill plants? Flies? Cows? Dogs? E.T. the Extra-Terrestrial?

Plant ethics. Sure. But we’re talking about the killing of a human being. — NOS4A2

As established by the trolley problem, the moral worth of a human-as-zygote is less than the moral worth of a human-as-baby (and in fact, the moral worth of five humans-as-zygotes is less than the moral worth of one human-as-baby).

The moral worth of a human-as-zygote is equivalent to the moral worth of a plant.

There is a “should” for the one committing the act the act of killing. Should I or should I not take this course of action? — NOS4A2

To the extent that one can ask "should I or should I not kill the weeds in my garden".

Assuming that no one is forcing the mother to carry the child, and everyone believes it is wrong to intervene, should she or should she not kill her child? — NOS4A2

She can do what she wants. There's no "should" either way.

But you think it’s right so long as the mother desires it, up until and including species extinction. — NOS4A2

I think it's not wrong, or at least negligibly wrong, or at least less wrong than forcing the mother to carry the child to term and birth it (much like it's less wrong than allowing a baby to die).

But no the future doesn’t exist in the past. — NOS4A2

Then abort away.

It doesn't follow that it is right to kill zygotes. — NOS4A2

I didn't say it's right. I said it's neutral. The moral worth of a zygote is negligible, as shown by the trolley problem.

It wouldn't kill you because you weren't born at that time. — NOS4A2

I misread and thought you were asking about me going back in time and then someone terminating my grandmother's pregnancy, and that it would be a Marty McFly in Back to the Future situation.

But as for the question as asked, that really depends on how time travel works. Does the future still exist in some sense but changes as the past is changed? That would change my answer. If the future doesn't exist then no, it wouldn't be wrong to terminate the pregnancy (but it may be wrong to have gone back in time as that would have erased what was the present and is now the future).

No, I think killing a human being in its zygote stage is wrong because he doesn't deserve it. — NOS4A2

And as shown by the trolley problem killing five zygotes is less wrong than allowing one baby to die. Killing ten million zygotes is less wrong than allowing one baby to die.

The moral worth of one zygote is so negligible that killing it is less wrong than forcing a woman to carry it to term and birth it against her wishes.

If you could take a time machine and go back to the time when a mother was an innocent zygote, would it be ok to kill her then? — NOS4A2

That depends on whether or not killing the zygote in my grandmother's womb would kill me, because killing me would be wrong.

Refusing to procreate doesn't involve the act of killing. — NOS4A2

So? You were suggesting that killing all zygotes is wrong because it would mean the end of the species. I am simply showing that "it is wrong because it would mean the end of the species" is a non sequitur.

But it would mean the end of the species. — NOS4A2

Yes, as would happen if everybody alive refused to procreate.

Is it morally permissible to kill all zygotes then? — NOS4A2

If it's the mothers' desires, yes.

Fine, we should kill zygotes if and only if no mother is present and doing so will stop a train from running over babies. Now, absent those conditions, is it right or wrong to kill zygotes? — NOS4A2

It's neither right nor wrong. It's morally neutral. We've established from the trolley problem that five zygotes deserve less moral consideration than one baby. And I'll go so far as to say that one million zygotes deserve less moral consideration than one baby. Each individual zygote deserves negligible moral consideration, and certainly when compared to the moral consideration of a woman being forced to carry to term and birth a child.

Flies don’t develop into human beings. — NOS4A2

Develop into human beings. Interesting that you now phrase it that way.

But also, why does it matter? Why is it wrong to kill something that develops into a human being but not wrong to kill a fly?

If they are out of the womb they are already dead. Convenient. — NOS4A2

As I said, in the scenario under consideration these are living zygotes growing inside an artificial womb. When we have to choose between doing nothing and letting one baby die or doing something that causes five zygotes to die, what should we do? We should do the thing that causes five zygotes to die because they do not deserve anything like the same kind of moral consideration as a baby.

All of which are biological. — NOS4A2

And? It's not the biological stuff that's morally relevant. Ants are biological. Flies are biological. So what?

Isn’t that convenient. Remove the one act under discussion from the argument entirely. — NOS4A2

We're talking about whether or not it is wrong to kill zygotes. The manner in which the zygotes are killed is presumably irrelevant.

Your deflection is telling.

You believe there are just two sets of genes swimming around in there? — NOS4A2

There are 46 DNA molecules, each coiled around proteins, contained within cytoplasm and a cell membrane.

To kill a zygote you abort it. Go give abortions. — NOS4A2

We're considering a variation of the trolley problem as explained here:

1. If you don't change the track then five babies die. If you do then one baby dies. What do you do?
2. If you don't change the track then one baby dies. If you do then five zygotes die. What do you do?

We can assume, for the sake of argument, that we are technologically advanced and have developed artificial wombs within which the zygotes in question are growing.

I think that (1) proposes a moral dilemma but that (2) doesn't. It is quite clear that we ought take positive action to sacrifice the zygotes to save the baby, and even though the zygotes are more numerous.

Single-celled organisms, even if capable of growing into something like us, simply do not deserve remotely the same kind of (or even any) moral consideration.

Try it with the human zygotes still in their mother, where they are generally found. For some reason you removed the mother entirely. — NOS4A2

Then the moral dilemma concerns whether to kill a baby or an adult. We're concerned with whether to kill a baby or a zygote. So for the sake of argument we can assume that the zygote is not growing inside a woman but an artificial womb.

Intentionally sacrificing one, five, or even a million zygotes to save one baby is not a dilemma at all. We obviously should.

This is a misrepresentation. I never said nor implied biology was equal to or less than genetics. — NOS4A2

You said "this biology ... is present from the very beginning ... of every human being’s life." Except it's not. The genetics is present but the morphology and physiology aren't.

I don't know one Republican that says that if prior birth control (condoms, the pill, etc.) failed that the woman should be forced to carry through with her pregnancy. — Harry Hindu

Well, there are GOP lawmakers who oppose morning after pills.

They are persons. — Bob Ross

What do (all) innocent human beings have (that other organisms don't have?) that entails that they are persons?

So you would let a child die rather than save their life by sacrificing/using zygote(s)? I think your position is absurd. I also don't think you would let the child die, if push came to shove. — RogueAI

Extending this, here are two trolley problems:

1. If you don't change the track then five babies die. If you do then one baby dies. What do you do?
2. If you don't change the track then one baby dies. If you do then five zygotes die. What do you do?

I don't think there's any moral dilemma with (2), whereas there is with (1), showing the obvious moral difference between killing a baby and killing a zygote. We ought change the track and let five zygotes die to save the baby.

Notice that I've made (2) even more extreme by requiring an active choice that kills more things, whereas traditionally the active choice kills fewer. That's how little zygotes matter.

it is always wrong to directly intentionally kill an innocent human being — Bob Ross

What do (all) innocent human beings have (that other organisms don't have?) that entails this conclusion?

This biology, and all material required to develop it, is present from the very beginning to the very end of every human being’s life — NOS4A2

This is false. There's more to biology than genetics – there's morphology and physiology – and more than the stuff already contained within a zygote is required for it to grow into a baby (e.g. nutrients from the mother).

If it's the 1st term then it isn't contingent on anything, because there's no term prior for it to depend on. — Hallucinogen

You’re equivocating.

That something exists without having being caused to exist by something else does not entail that this thing necessarily exists, and it certainly doesn’t entail that this thing is eternal and omnipotent.

The universe is the product of an initial singularity and inflation. This initial singularity may have come into existence by accident/chance, and even if its existence was “necessary” it certainly isn’t anything like God.

No, I'm not. You're trying to equivocate between a series of presidents and the series of existence as a whole. — Hallucinogen

I am explaining that "if some A is the nth term then some B must have been the 1st term" does not entail "the 1st term necessarily exists (and is omnipotent)".

It doesn't make a difference what A and B are. The logic is a non sequitur whether we are talking about Presidential terms or "the series of existence as a whole".

Then you wouldn't be an atheist about a necessary entity and you wouldn't commit the contradiction. — Hallucinogen

You are misusing the term "atheist". An atheist is someone who believes that no deities exist.

That's false, a 1st term of the universe isn't contingent. — Hallucinogen

You're begging the question. Here are two scenarios:

1. A 1st term is necessary. A 2nd and 3rd term follow.
2. A 1st term is contingent. A 2nd and 3rd term follow.

Given that a 2nd and 3rd term exist in both scenarios you cannot use the existence of a 2nd and 3rd term to prove that the 1st term is necessary. This is the fallacy that your argument commits.

In my view it is, but my view doesn't change the fact that most God concepts are omnipotent and eternal. — Hallucinogen

Even if some X is necessary and even if this X is "omnipotent" and eternal it does not follow that this X is God. You are introducing properties unrelated to your argument.

As an atheist I could accept that there is some impersonal force – e.g. the union of electromagnetism, the strong force, the weak force, and gravity – that necessarily exists. I could even accept that this impersonal force is "omnipotent" and eternal. But it ain't God.

Something can do anything if everything is dependent on it.

...

Something exists forever if it isn't dependent on conditions. — Hallucinogen

These are non sequiturs.

And you are, again, equivocating. That a 2nd term depends on a 1st term to have existed does not entail that the 1st term must still exist. A clock must have been made by a clockmaker, but the clock doesn't cease to exist after the clockmaker dies.

Your conclusion, that there is a God that necessarily exists, simply isn't proven by the claim that causation is not an infinite regress.

None of that matters. Just assume that the premise is true. The conclusion is still (superficially) counterintuitive.

The issue concerns making sense of the argument's validity, not proving or disproving its soundness.

Something's eternal if it isn't dependent on conditions. Contingency means to have a condtional dependency, so a non-contingent entity is eternal.
Something's omnipotent if everything stands in dependency to it. Everything in a contingent series is dependent on the non-contingent member of the series, so it is omnipotent. — Hallucinogen

Something is eternal if it exists forever. Something is omnipotent if it can do anything. The one does not entail the other. And neither entails nor is entailed by necessity.

And I also suspect there's more to your "necessary being" than just being eternal and omnipotent. Is it conscious with a will of its own? Or is it just some mindless thing that maintains and shapes the material world, perhaps the hypothetical single force that unites electromagnetism, the strong force, the weak force, and gravity? An atheist can accept this latter thing.

The example of the Presidents doesn't answer my question. The 1st President is contingent because it is an nth term of the universe, and it is necessary for there to be a 2nd President. It's just not metaphysically necessary. — Hallucinogen

A 2nd President does not entail that a 1st President is metaphysically necessary. A 2nd term of the universe does not entail that a 1st term of the universe is metaphysically necessary.

Perhaps the 1st term of the universe was an accident, and because of that accident there was also a 2nd term, a 3rd term, and so on. Those 2nd and 3rd terms do not retroactively entail that the 1st term wasn't an accident.

So you are saying that your prayers might still be answered even if God does not exist? So that an atheist could be justified in praying? — Leontiskos

There are all sorts of hypothetical entities that could answer prayers; devils, angels, fairies, wizards, extremely advanced aliens, the universe branching into a new timeline in accordance to one's will, etc. There's no reason to believe that it can only be the working of some sort of monotheistic creator deity (and certainly no reason to believe that it can only be the working of a specific religion's deity).

"A group of organisms that share similar physical and genetic characteristics and are capable of interbreeding to produce viable offspring". — Bob Ross

A zygote is not physically similar to me.

When, for you, does an organism become a member of its species? — Bob Ross

There is no point. It’s like asking when does a species branch into two? There’s just a bunch or organic matter arranged together and behaving in certain ways, and then for practical reasons we group collections of similar organic matter together under a single name.

There was never a point where a non-Homo sapiens simply gave birth to a Homo sapiens. The evolution into Homo sapiens was a gradual process where we can say at the one extreme that it wasn’t human and at the other extreme it is but then in between there’s a grey, ambiguous area and any attempt at a definitive classification is arbitrary.

In order for X to be a member of the set of all existent square blocks, it must be a square block. — Bob Ross

And to explain what it means to be a square block you describe the relevant geometry.

How do you explain what it means to be a Homo sapiens?

My "parlor trick" includes the translation. The formalism is not very difficult to understand. What's fun is the way that the translation is intuitive. Hanover's difficulty is this, "Why did we say, 'So I don't pray'?" The explanations I have been giving answer that question and give an account of why the translation is intuitive. — Leontiskos

FYI I edited my post hours ago. Weird that you're seeing the old version.

I've corrected what I was trying to say.

See also this that might be even clearer.

You do have a mammary gland though. — Benkei

Well, I do, but those with congenital amazia don't. I assume they're still mammals.

The argument is valid but its first premise is false (or at least hasn't been proven to be true).

then that is a valid disproof of the logic within the OP — Hanover

There isn't a problem with the logic. The problem is that the premise isn't saying what it superficially seems to be saying.

"it is not the case that if I pray then it will be answered" does not mean "if I pray then it will not be answered"; it means "I pray and it is not answered".

So the argument actually amounts to "if I do not pray then God exists, I do not pray, therefore God exists."

Formally:

¬G → ¬(P → A)
∴ ¬G → P
∴ ¬P → G
¬P
∴ G

So no, nice try but nobody has ever used the term for any animal that doesn't produce milk and they never will. — Benkei

I don't produce milk?

It's much simpler than that.

¬(P → A) ↔ (P ∧ ¬A), so ¬G → ¬(P → A) means ¬G → (P ∧ ¬A).

The argument is actually "if God does not exist then I pray [and it isn't answered], I don't pray, therefore God exists".

¬G → (P → ¬A) is a more appropriate premise and with it the conclusion no longer follows.