We are arguing whether it is right or wrong to kill a human being at this stage in his life. It’s an important question. — NOS4A2

You're not making any sense. You claim that moral worth (and rights) are not properties of objects but "a status we afford or ascribe to them" but then suggest that whether or not it is wrong to kill a human is independent of whether or not we afford or ascribe moral worth (and rights) to them.

Do "so-and-so has a right to live" and "it is wrong to kill so-and-so" mean different things to you?

I don’t understand where this is going. Do you mean something like believing black cats to bring misfortune? — NOS4A2

Both humans and flies are living organisms. You seem to be claiming that it is wrong to kill (innocent) humans but not wrong to kill (innocent) flies. You are judging the morality of killing a living organism based on its physical characteristics (specifically in this case the physical characteristics that determine its species).

So why is it wrong to judge that it is wrong to kill some humans (e.g. babies) but not others (e.g. zygotes) based on their physical characteristics but not wrong to judge that it is wrong to kill some living organisms (e.g. humans) but not others (e.g. flies) based on their physical characteristics?

True, I meant they deserve to live or do not deserve to live. So which is it? — NOS4A2

Zygotes don't deserve anything, and so neither deserve to live nor deserve to die.

I think this is the simplest explanation.

Yes, “moral worth”, like innocence, is not a property of any given object. It is more like a status we afford or ascribe to other things when we consider them morally, at least insofar as I understand the phrase. — NOS4A2

Then what is there to argue? Pro-lifers ascribe moral worth to zygotes and pro-choicers don't. There is no objective fact-of-the-matter that determines one group to be correct and the other incorrect.

Just to be clear, my assertion was that it is wrong (and stupid) to judge the moral worth of a human being based on their physical characteristics. — NOS4A2

But not wrong (and stupid) to judge the moral worth of an organism based on the physical characteristics that determine its species?

They either deserve to live or deserve to die. — NOS4A2

False dichotomy.

I mean it in its standard sense: science of purpose [behind things as opposed to the physical cause of things]. — Bob Ross

There is no purpose.

When you say it is “highly likely”, you are not noting what it was designed to become but, rather, the probability of, in reality, under the nuanced circumstances, of its environment allowing it to develop into what it was supposed to become. — Bob Ross

There is no design.

#3 is fundamentally different than #2 and #1 because it is the only example Michael has (in their thought experiment) where the zygotes are a means towards saving the baby. I am suspecting neither of you understand this, and this is the root of your confusion. — Bob Ross

I fail to see why this is morally relevant. In every case you are performing some action which kills the zygotes and saves the baby. That is all that matters.

I would say this would be immoral; because you are not noting the probability of weighing who might likely save but, rather, the probability of doing something immoral vs. permissible. This would be a sadistic game that I would encourage anyone to avoid playing.

If we were talking about probabilities of producing bad side effects then that would be a different story. — Bob Ross

Saving the baby is all that matters. It is morally impermissible to allow the baby to die because you are unsure whether or not the death of the zygotes is a means rather than an unfortunate consequence.

That’s because you don’t believe they have rights; and I do. If you thought they had the right to life, then you wouldn’t make this kind of claim. — Bob Ross

I'm not claiming that they don't have a right to life. I'm claiming that even if they have a right to life this right to life is not absolute. We see this in the case where we are willing to sacrifice (as an unfortunate consequence) five zygotes to save one baby. Some things are worth more than the life of a zygote (e.g. the life of a baby, or the life of the mother). We just disagree on which things are worth more than the life of a zygote. I think that the mother being able to walk is worth more, and so abortion is permissible if continued pregnancy would lead to the mother's paralysis. And I think that the mother's bodily autonomy is worth more, and so abortion is permissible if the mother does not wish to carry a child to term.

This is the comment in question. Even two pro-lifers accept that we ought kill the zygotes to save the baby (notice in particular that we kill five to save one).

To make this more applicable to abortion, let's assume that continuing the pregnancy will damage the mother's spine, leading to permanent paralysis. Ought we terminate the pregnancy (if that's what the mother wishes)? I say yes. Not only is a zygote's life worth less than the life of a baby, it's worth less than the mother's ability to walk.

So we accept that not only is a zygote's "right to life" not absolute but also that their lives are worth less than other things (even things other than something's life). We might disagree with how little/much a zygote's life is worth, but at the very least we must accept that "we ought not terminate a pregnancy because the zygote has an absolute/overriding right to life" is false.

Pro-choicers then claim that the zygote's life is worth less than the mother's bodily autonomy. Pro-lifers might disagree, but given the reasoning above at least one of their arguments against abortion has been refuted. It's not enough to say that the zygote is human and has a "right to life"; it must be argued that this "right to life" has moral precedence over other concerns.

↪Tom Storm I'm not at all keen on so-called "trolly" arguments. There are intractable moral situations. — Banno

That is precisely why I think the trolley problem I suggested works well; because it isn't intractable. It's self-evident what one should do. Even NOS4A2 and Bob Ross accept that we ought actively bring about a situation that kills multiple zygotes so as to save one baby, showing that even those who claim that zygotes are humans who deserve to live accept that their lives do not carry the same moral weight as born humans, and that there are situations in which allowing the zygotes to live is morally worse than causing them to die, proving that their "right to life" is not absolute. That presents the opportunity to explain that the life of a zygote has less moral weight than the woman's bodily autonomy.

I don’t think all humans deserve to live. — NOS4A2

The "innocent" was implicit there.

One, that they are morally worthless, and two, that they deserve to die. — NOS4A2

I didn't say that they deserve to die. I have only said that we ought kill zygotes if it saves babies and that it is acceptable to abort a zygote.

You judge the moral worth of a human being based on their physical characteristics, and not because who they are and what they’ve done. — NOS4A2

What is the distinction between who someone is and what something physically is, in particular with respect to zygotes? You're the one who often argues against anything like a soul or folk psychology and reduces everything to base biology.

But again, you haven't answered the question. Why is it wrong to judge the moral worth of a human but not the moral worth of a non-human? You're engaging in speciesism without even attempting to justify it.

so long as someone sees moral worth in them, the being is not morally worthless. — NOS4A2

Well now we might be getting somewhere. Are you suggesting that a living organism has moral worth if and only if someone sees moral worth in it?

That leads to problematic scenarios, such as what if I see moral worth in cows or the serial killer trying to kill you, or what if the pregnant woman doesn't see moral worth in the zygote growing inside her but some random kid half the world away does?

There is no such example: I pull the lever if the one is being sacrificed is substituted for any number of zygotes; and this is not incoherent with my position. Like I said, you don't understand it.

Pouring zygotes on a building to put out a fire (to save a child) is not analogous to pulling a lever to save five by sacrificing N-amount of zygotes, for the zygotes are directly intentionally killed in the former as a means towards the good end whereas they are indirectly intentionally killed in the latter not as a means but rather a bad side effect of using the means to bring about the good end (and, at this point, with my principle of double effect, saving the child is always going to significantly outweigh the bad side effect of killing the zygotes but this is only valid for analyzing side effects NOT means). — Bob Ross

This a strange distinction.

Let's say there are two tracks. On one there is a box containing one living baby and on another there's a box containing five living zygotes. If you don't pull the lever then only the baby is run over and if you do then only the zygotes are run over.

This is achieved in one of three different ways:

1. Pulling the lever changes which track the trolley travels down
2. Pulling the lever switches the boxes
3. Pulling the lever moves the box containing five zygotes onto the primary track, before the box containing one baby (stopping the trolley from travelling further).

These seem to be morally equivalent. If one ought pull the lever in the case of (1) then one ought pull the lever in the case of (2) and (3). (3) is equivalent to @RogueAI's example of using the zygotes to put out a fire.

But if you still insist that (1) and (3) are morally distinct, then what if you don't know which of (1), (2), and (3) is the manner in which the baby can be saved? Each is equally likely. Should you pull the lever or not?

In my mind the answer is clear; always do what you can to save the baby, irrespective of how or how many zygotes are killed in the process.

To clarify, this teleological account of rights IS NOT equivalent to grounding rights in potential persons; for "potentiality" is a very loose term that covers more than telos (e.g., perhaps a cow has the potential to be a person since we could give it a brain chip). — Bob Ross

It's not clear what you mean by teleology.

If you just mean that a zygote is highly likely to naturally develop a rational will whereas a cow developing a rational will would require artificial intervention then it needs to be explained why this distinction is morally relevant, and why being highly likely to (naturally or otherwise) develop a rational will entails having a right to life.

In that quote you explicitly say that things without a rational will are not persons.

In previous comments you said that it is wrong to kill zygotes because they're human and wrong to kill humans because they're persons. Combining these together you were saying that it is wrong to kill zygotes because they're persons.

So you're contradicting yourself.

At the very least you need to amend your original remarks and say that it is wrong to kill zygotes because they will be persons, and then I will deny this claim; it is only wrong to kill something if it currently is a person, and what it could be in the future (or was in the past) is irrelevant.

Traditionally, a rational will; i.e., a sufficiently free will. That is a serious and impactful difference between humans and other species: most, if not all, other species lack the capacity to go against their own nature and inclinations such that they are motivated by pure reason.

Traditionally, a being which has a Telos such that it will have, if not already has, a rational will are called persons (because their nature marks them out to be such); and their will must be respected.

More technically, a being which has a such a "rational Telos" is not necessarily a person but, rather, will be; and their nature marks them out as such; and this is what grounds their rights (and not whether or not they currently are a person). — Bob Ross

Well, zygotes don't have a rational will, therefore by your own logic they aren't persons.

Tell that to the vast majority of parents who have children, that the child they have created and are carrying is morally insignificant and it doesn’t deserve to live. — NOS4A2

That does not address my point. I'm not interested in sentiment (unless you want to argue that morality is sentiment).

You claim that all humans deserve to live, but then must also accept one of these:

1. No non-humans deserve to live
2. Some but not all non-humans deserve to live
3. All non-humans deserve to live

If you accept (1) or (2) then you accept that it is appropriate to weigh the moral worth of living organisms. I don't see why weighing the moral worth of individuals within a species is any less disgusting than weighing the moral worth of species within a genus (or higher up in the taxonomy).

And I'll add, you already accepted with the trolley problem that the lives of five zygotes are worth less than the life of one baby, so why the about-turn?

But weighing the moral worth of human beings in various stages of their development so as to decide who are morally permissible to kill is a disgusting business. We’ve left ethics entirely and have approached an exercise in excuse-making and dehumanization, in my opinion. — NOS4A2

It's no less disgusting business than weighing the moral worth of non-human organisms. Is it wrong to kill plants? Flies? Cows? Dogs? E.T. the Extra-Terrestrial?

Plant ethics. Sure. But we’re talking about the killing of a human being. — NOS4A2

As established by the trolley problem, the moral worth of a human-as-zygote is less than the moral worth of a human-as-baby (and in fact, the moral worth of five humans-as-zygotes is less than the moral worth of one human-as-baby).

The moral worth of a human-as-zygote is equivalent to the moral worth of a plant.

There is a “should” for the one committing the act the act of killing. Should I or should I not take this course of action? — NOS4A2

To the extent that one can ask "should I or should I not kill the weeds in my garden".

Assuming that no one is forcing the mother to carry the child, and everyone believes it is wrong to intervene, should she or should she not kill her child? — NOS4A2

She can do what she wants. There's no "should" either way.

But you think it’s right so long as the mother desires it, up until and including species extinction. — NOS4A2

I think it's not wrong, or at least negligibly wrong, or at least less wrong than forcing the mother to carry the child to term and birth it (much like it's less wrong than allowing a baby to die).

But no the future doesn’t exist in the past. — NOS4A2

Then abort away.

It doesn't follow that it is right to kill zygotes. — NOS4A2

I didn't say it's right. I said it's neutral. The moral worth of a zygote is negligible, as shown by the trolley problem.

It wouldn't kill you because you weren't born at that time. — NOS4A2

I misread and thought you were asking about me going back in time and then someone terminating my grandmother's pregnancy, and that it would be a Marty McFly in Back to the Future situation.

But as for the question as asked, that really depends on how time travel works. Does the future still exist in some sense but changes as the past is changed? That would change my answer. If the future doesn't exist then no, it wouldn't be wrong to terminate the pregnancy (but it may be wrong to have gone back in time as that would have erased what was the present and is now the future).

No, I think killing a human being in its zygote stage is wrong because he doesn't deserve it. — NOS4A2

And as shown by the trolley problem killing five zygotes is less wrong than allowing one baby to die. Killing ten million zygotes is less wrong than allowing one baby to die.

The moral worth of one zygote is so negligible that killing it is less wrong than forcing a woman to carry it to term and birth it against her wishes.

If you could take a time machine and go back to the time when a mother was an innocent zygote, would it be ok to kill her then? — NOS4A2

That depends on whether or not killing the zygote in my grandmother's womb would kill me, because killing me would be wrong.

Refusing to procreate doesn't involve the act of killing. — NOS4A2

So? You were suggesting that killing all zygotes is wrong because it would mean the end of the species. I am simply showing that "it is wrong because it would mean the end of the species" is a non sequitur.

But it would mean the end of the species. — NOS4A2

Yes, as would happen if everybody alive refused to procreate.

Is it morally permissible to kill all zygotes then? — NOS4A2

If it's the mothers' desires, yes.

Fine, we should kill zygotes if and only if no mother is present and doing so will stop a train from running over babies. Now, absent those conditions, is it right or wrong to kill zygotes? — NOS4A2

It's neither right nor wrong. It's morally neutral. We've established from the trolley problem that five zygotes deserve less moral consideration than one baby. And I'll go so far as to say that one million zygotes deserve less moral consideration than one baby. Each individual zygote deserves negligible moral consideration, and certainly when compared to the moral consideration of a woman being forced to carry to term and birth a child.

Flies don’t develop into human beings. — NOS4A2

Develop into human beings. Interesting that you now phrase it that way.

But also, why does it matter? Why is it wrong to kill something that develops into a human being but not wrong to kill a fly?

If they are out of the womb they are already dead. Convenient. — NOS4A2

As I said, in the scenario under consideration these are living zygotes growing inside an artificial womb. When we have to choose between doing nothing and letting one baby die or doing something that causes five zygotes to die, what should we do? We should do the thing that causes five zygotes to die because they do not deserve anything like the same kind of moral consideration as a baby.

All of which are biological. — NOS4A2

And? It's not the biological stuff that's morally relevant. Ants are biological. Flies are biological. So what?

Isn’t that convenient. Remove the one act under discussion from the argument entirely. — NOS4A2

We're talking about whether or not it is wrong to kill zygotes. The manner in which the zygotes are killed is presumably irrelevant.

Your deflection is telling.

You believe there are just two sets of genes swimming around in there? — NOS4A2

There are 46 DNA molecules, each coiled around proteins, contained within cytoplasm and a cell membrane.

To kill a zygote you abort it. Go give abortions. — NOS4A2

We're considering a variation of the trolley problem as explained here:

1. If you don't change the track then five babies die. If you do then one baby dies. What do you do?
2. If you don't change the track then one baby dies. If you do then five zygotes die. What do you do?

We can assume, for the sake of argument, that we are technologically advanced and have developed artificial wombs within which the zygotes in question are growing.

I think that (1) proposes a moral dilemma but that (2) doesn't. It is quite clear that we ought take positive action to sacrifice the zygotes to save the baby, and even though the zygotes are more numerous.

Single-celled organisms, even if capable of growing into something like us, simply do not deserve remotely the same kind of (or even any) moral consideration.

Try it with the human zygotes still in their mother, where they are generally found. For some reason you removed the mother entirely. — NOS4A2

Then the moral dilemma concerns whether to kill a baby or an adult. We're concerned with whether to kill a baby or a zygote. So for the sake of argument we can assume that the zygote is not growing inside a woman but an artificial womb.

Intentionally sacrificing one, five, or even a million zygotes to save one baby is not a dilemma at all. We obviously should.

This is a misrepresentation. I never said nor implied biology was equal to or less than genetics. — NOS4A2

You said "this biology ... is present from the very beginning ... of every human being’s life." Except it's not. The genetics is present but the morphology and physiology aren't.

I don't know one Republican that says that if prior birth control (condoms, the pill, etc.) failed that the woman should be forced to carry through with her pregnancy. — Harry Hindu

Well, there are GOP lawmakers who oppose morning after pills.

They are persons. — Bob Ross

What do (all) innocent human beings have (that other organisms don't have?) that entails that they are persons?

So you would let a child die rather than save their life by sacrificing/using zygote(s)? I think your position is absurd. I also don't think you would let the child die, if push came to shove. — RogueAI

Extending this, here are two trolley problems:

1. If you don't change the track then five babies die. If you do then one baby dies. What do you do?
2. If you don't change the track then one baby dies. If you do then five zygotes die. What do you do?

I don't think there's any moral dilemma with (2), whereas there is with (1), showing the obvious moral difference between killing a baby and killing a zygote. We ought change the track and let five zygotes die to save the baby.

Notice that I've made (2) even more extreme by requiring an active choice that kills more things, whereas traditionally the active choice kills fewer. That's how little zygotes matter.

it is always wrong to directly intentionally kill an innocent human being — Bob Ross

What do (all) innocent human beings have (that other organisms don't have?) that entails this conclusion?

This biology, and all material required to develop it, is present from the very beginning to the very end of every human being’s life — NOS4A2

This is false. There's more to biology than genetics – there's morphology and physiology – and more than the stuff already contained within a zygote is required for it to grow into a baby (e.g. nutrients from the mother).

If it's the 1st term then it isn't contingent on anything, because there's no term prior for it to depend on. — Hallucinogen

You’re equivocating.

That something exists without having being caused to exist by something else does not entail that this thing necessarily exists, and it certainly doesn’t entail that this thing is eternal and omnipotent.

The universe is the product of an initial singularity and inflation. This initial singularity may have come into existence by accident/chance, and even if its existence was “necessary” it certainly isn’t anything like God.

No, I'm not. You're trying to equivocate between a series of presidents and the series of existence as a whole. — Hallucinogen

I am explaining that "if some A is the nth term then some B must have been the 1st term" does not entail "the 1st term necessarily exists (and is omnipotent)".

It doesn't make a difference what A and B are. The logic is a non sequitur whether we are talking about Presidential terms or "the series of existence as a whole".

Then you wouldn't be an atheist about a necessary entity and you wouldn't commit the contradiction. — Hallucinogen

You are misusing the term "atheist". An atheist is someone who believes that no deities exist.

That's false, a 1st term of the universe isn't contingent. — Hallucinogen

You're begging the question. Here are two scenarios:

1. A 1st term is necessary. A 2nd and 3rd term follow.
2. A 1st term is contingent. A 2nd and 3rd term follow.

Given that a 2nd and 3rd term exist in both scenarios you cannot use the existence of a 2nd and 3rd term to prove that the 1st term is necessary. This is the fallacy that your argument commits.

In my view it is, but my view doesn't change the fact that most God concepts are omnipotent and eternal. — Hallucinogen

Even if some X is necessary and even if this X is "omnipotent" and eternal it does not follow that this X is God. You are introducing properties unrelated to your argument.

As an atheist I could accept that there is some impersonal force – e.g. the union of electromagnetism, the strong force, the weak force, and gravity – that necessarily exists. I could even accept that this impersonal force is "omnipotent" and eternal. But it ain't God.

Something can do anything if everything is dependent on it.

...

Something exists forever if it isn't dependent on conditions. — Hallucinogen

These are non sequiturs.

And you are, again, equivocating. That a 2nd term depends on a 1st term to have existed does not entail that the 1st term must still exist. A clock must have been made by a clockmaker, but the clock doesn't cease to exist after the clockmaker dies.

Your conclusion, that there is a God that necessarily exists, simply isn't proven by the claim that causation is not an infinite regress.

None of that matters. Just assume that the premise is true. The conclusion is still (superficially) counterintuitive.

The issue concerns making sense of the argument's validity, not proving or disproving its soundness.

Something's eternal if it isn't dependent on conditions. Contingency means to have a condtional dependency, so a non-contingent entity is eternal.
Something's omnipotent if everything stands in dependency to it. Everything in a contingent series is dependent on the non-contingent member of the series, so it is omnipotent. — Hallucinogen

Something is eternal if it exists forever. Something is omnipotent if it can do anything. The one does not entail the other. And neither entails nor is entailed by necessity.

And I also suspect there's more to your "necessary being" than just being eternal and omnipotent. Is it conscious with a will of its own? Or is it just some mindless thing that maintains and shapes the material world, perhaps the hypothetical single force that unites electromagnetism, the strong force, the weak force, and gravity? An atheist can accept this latter thing.

The example of the Presidents doesn't answer my question. The 1st President is contingent because it is an nth term of the universe, and it is necessary for there to be a 2nd President. It's just not metaphysically necessary. — Hallucinogen

A 2nd President does not entail that a 1st President is metaphysically necessary. A 2nd term of the universe does not entail that a 1st term of the universe is metaphysically necessary.

Perhaps the 1st term of the universe was an accident, and because of that accident there was also a 2nd term, a 3rd term, and so on. Those 2nd and 3rd terms do not retroactively entail that the 1st term wasn't an accident.

So you are saying that your prayers might still be answered even if God does not exist? So that an atheist could be justified in praying? — Leontiskos

There are all sorts of hypothetical entities that could answer prayers; devils, angels, fairies, wizards, extremely advanced aliens, the universe branching into a new timeline in accordance to one's will, etc. There's no reason to believe that it can only be the working of some sort of monotheistic creator deity (and certainly no reason to believe that it can only be the working of a specific religion's deity).

"A group of organisms that share similar physical and genetic characteristics and are capable of interbreeding to produce viable offspring". — Bob Ross

A zygote is not physically similar to me.