You seem to be saying the very strange thing, "Well I agree that we use the word 'good' to describe that which conduces to flourishing, but I don't see why the word 'good' means that which conduces to flourishing." This would not be a legitimate objection. — Leontiskos

It's not a strange thing. Some people use the word "good" to describe chastity. It doesn't follow that "good" means "chaste".

You seem to be saying the very strange thing, "Well I agree that we use the word 'good' to mean that which conduces to flourishing — Leontiskos

I don't agree with that.

There's a difference between using a word to mean something and using a word to describe something. The latter does not entail the former, which is where Bob Ross' argument falters. He argues that because we use the word "good" to describe acts which are conducive to flourishing then "good" means "conducive to flourishing". That just doesn't follow.

It is different to say, "Good is different from أخلاقي," and to say, "Arabians have no conception of good." That is the first problem. — Leontiskos

That's why I said if there's no Arabic word that means the same thing as 'moral' then they might not have a conception of good.

Do you have a conception of أخلاقي?

These are both false. Do you have a concept of a Ford sedan? On your theory, you could only have a concept of a Ford sedan if you have a word for a Ford sedan. This is plainly false. We don't have a word for a Ford sedan. — Leontiskos

We have the phrase "Ford sedan". I didn't mean to suggest that it requires a single word.

If an Arabian has a concept of flourishing then they very likely have a concept of Bob Ross' "good." It doesn't matter at all whether that concept is represented by the word أخلاقي. — Leontiskos

If they have a concept of "flourishing", and if this concept is different to their concept of "أخلاقي", and if "good" means "flourishing", then "أخلاقي" and "good" don't mean the same thing.

(1) is also partially true and partially false — Leontiskos

Which is precisely why I said that determining the meaning of the word "good" isn't as simple as just looking at which things we describe as being good. (1) is an oversimplification. Bob Ross' account of the meaning of "good" is insufficient.

Why? Your argument is like saying that if I haven't studied C++ then I can't know what "if" means in Java. When Bob uses the word "good" he is not making a supra-English utterance, at least not in the way you seem to suppose. — Leontiskos

Because this is a contradiction:

1. The meaning of a word is determined by the things it is used to describe
2. The words "moral" and "أخلاقي" mean the same thing
3. The things the word "moral" is used to describe are not the things the word "أخلاقي" is used to describe

One of these must be false. I think (3) being true is uncontroversial, and so we must determine which of (1) and (2) is false.

If (1) is false then Bob Ross' explanation of the meaning of the word "good" fails.

I am not going down that rabbit hole, but note that this is not a matter of words, it is a matter of concepts (as you seem to recognize). — Leontiskos

What's the difference? Do you have a concept of أخلاقي? Perhaps only if "أخلاقي" and "moral" mean the same thing. If they don't mean the same thing, and if there's no other English word that means the same thing as "أخلاقي", then you probably don't have a concept of أخلاقي.

And conversely, if there's no Arabic word that means the same thing as "moral" then Arabic speakers probably don't have a concept of moral.

So if Arabic speakers do have a concept of moral then surely there must be an Arabic word that means the same thing as "moral". Perhaps "أخلاقي". And so premise (2) above is true. Therefore premise (1) above is false, and Bob Ross' argument has failed.

There is no necessary contradiction if "good" does not mean the same thing as "أخلاقي". — Leontiskos

But does it mean the same thing?

If it does mean the same thing then Bob Ross' explanation for how we determine the meaning of the word "good" doesn't work, or at least is insufficient.

If it doesn't mean the same thing then it doesn't make sense to say that Arabic speakers have different moral values, because they don't really have any moral values, given that they don't have a word for or concept of "moral" (much like we don't have a word for or concept of "أخلاقي"). Comparing our moral values to their أخلاقي values is comparing apples to oranges. It certainly wouldn't make sense to say that our moral values are "correct" and that their أخلاقي values are "incorrect", given that what they mean by "أخلاقي" isn't what we mean by "moral".

The only proper response is to offer an alternative definition of good — Leontiskos

You're shifting the burden of proof. If Bob Ross suggests that the meaning of "good" is X then he needs to support this claim. I don't need to offer an alternative.

The meaning of words comes from language users, and is tied up with their intent. This intent is generally communal/linguistic, but it is always a back-and-forth between the community and the individual. — Leontiskos

I address this in my post above, which I rewrote before you replied (because it said that you hadn't been online for 2 hours). I'll say it again:

Bob Ross is saying that we determine the meaning of the word "good" by looking at what sort of things we describe as being good.

The problem with this is that different cultures with different languages describe different things as being good (using their words for "good"), and so if we accept Bob Ross' reasoning then the word for "good" in one language doesn't mean the same thing as the word for "good" in another language.

If this is an unacceptable conclusion then we must reject Bob Ross' reasoning. Something else is required to determine the meaning of the word "good".

In order to understand the meaning of a predication, one must understand the meaning of the words within the predication — Leontiskos

This is the issue I am addressing. We say that something is good, but what does "good" mean?

Bob Ross is saying that we determine the meaning of the word "good" by looking at what sort of things we describe as being good.

The problem with this is that different cultures with different languages describe different things as being good (using their words for "good"), and so if we accept Bob Ross' reasoning then the word for "good" in one language doesn't mean the same thing as the word for "good" in another language.

If this is an unacceptable conclusion then we must reject Bob Ross' reasoning. Something else is required to determine the meaning of the word "good".

The point here is that if two people disagree with respect to a predication, "X is good," then they are either disagreeing about what good is or else they are disagreeing about what X is. — Leontiskos

This is a false dichotomy. Some people claim that chastity is good; others that it isn't. Both groups might agree on what chastity is, and on what it means to be good (e.g. "something we ought support"), but still disagree on whether or not chastity is good.

My comment to Leontiskos here is worth reading.

The crux of this issue is this:

Regardless, we have to distinguish the type of use that establishes the meaning of a word from the type of use that is a fallible act of predication. It's not entirely clear which kind of use is in play when we say that acts which promote flourishing are good.

These are two different kinds of claims:

1. A three-sided shape is a triangle
2. This plastic object is a triangle

Whereas (1) is true by definition, (2) isn't, and so (2) is possibly false. If (2) is false then looking at that plastic object isn't going to help us determine the meaning of the word "triangle".

You seem to be saying that "acts which promote flourishing are good" is similar to claim (1). This needs to be justified. Perhaps it's similar to claim (2).

Ross is saying that acts which promote flourishing are good because that is what 'good' means, and we know what 'good' means by looking at the way the word is used. — Leontiskos

That's a reasonable approach, but as I explained here there might be some issues with his application of it.

To summarise; those who speak another language might use their word for "good" to describe things that English speakers don't describe as being good. If we follow Bob Ross' reasoning then it would seem to follow that their word for "good" isn't in fact their word for "good" because, given how they use it, it must mean something else.

But this does seem problematic. We often say that people of other cultures (with their own language) have different moral values. How can this be unless relevant words share meaning across languages but are used to describe different things?

Perhaps it's more accurate to say that we use the word "good" to describe things that we ought do and the word "bad" to describe things that we ought not do. This is somewhat supported by the etymology of the related word "moral", from the Latin "moralis" meaning "proper behavior of a person in society". Other languages have their own words used the same way. We just disagree on which things we ought and ought not do.

Regardless, we have to distinguish the type of use that establishes the meaning of a word from the type of use that is a fallible act of predication. It's not entirely clear which kind of use is in play when we say that acts which promote flourishing are good.

I'm not a subscriber. I can see the article fine?

Also, Trump struggles to say the word ‘climate’ and reveals he recently took a cognitive test

At a New Hampshire campaign rally, Donald Trump claimed to have “aced” a recent cognitive test and struggled to pronounce the word “climate,” footage from the event shows.

“I don’t know if you saw, but a few months ago, I took a cognitive test my doctor gave me,” Mr Trump told supporters at the Saturday event.

His comments came just after former South Carolina Governor Nikki Haley questioned whether the former president was mentally capable of taking office again after he appeared to repeatedly confuse her with former US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi in a campaign speech on Friday.

“I said, ‘give me a cognitive test, just so we can you know,’ because you know what the standards were, and I aced it,” Mr Trump continued.

Dr Jonathan Reiner, a medical analyst for CNN and professor of medicine and surgery at the George Washington University School of Medicine and Health Sciences, called into question why Mr Trump would need multiple cognitive tests, considering he also took a cognitive test while serving as president.

“Why has Trump had multiple cognitive exams? According to the Cleveland Clinic ‘cognitive tests are usually done if there’s a suspicion of mental decline or impairment,’” Dr Reiner posted on X. “Last night we saw the former president mistake Haley for Pelosi. Has he experienced other symptoms?”

In their post on cognitive testing, the Cleveland Clinic also states, “a good score doesn’t necessarily mean there’s no brain impairment.”

“There still could be brain functioning issues,” their website reads.

At the same event, the former President inexplicably referred to the climate as “clime,” appearing to struggle to pronounce the word correctly.

“They don’t go far,” Mr Trump said, referring to electric vehicles. “But it’s certainly not great for your clime. Your clime. They call it climate.”

In the case of #1, you would be disagreeing that the word ‘good’ should be used to refer to ‘acts which promote flourishing’; and, to that, my response is, briefly, that I think this is historically how the word tends to be used. We say ‘I am doing good’ when our bodies are healthy (i.e., our body parts are acting in harmony and unity to accomplish survival and thriving) and our goals are being fulfilled; and, most universally, we say ‘everything is going good’ when everyone is acting in harmony such that each person is respected and sufficiently sovereign. Likewise, when we say society is ‘doing good’, we usually mean that each part of the society is acting in harmony and unity to achieve the safety and sufficient sovereignty of its citizens. You see the pattern. — Bob Ross

Though this is an interesting take if we consider other languages.

The Arabic word for "moral" is "أخلاقي". But if we take an Arabic-speaking nation like Saudi Arabia, the things they describe as being أخلاقي are in many cases not the things that we describe as being moral. Islamic countries tend to have different values to non-Islamic countries.

If we follow your reasoning then it must be that the English word "moral" isn't a translation of the Arabic word "أخلاقي" as each word is used to describe different things.

So what we mean by "moral" isn't what they mean by "أخلاقي", so there aren't actually any moral disagreements as we're comparing apples and oranges. In fact, the Arabic-speaking people don't make any moral claims at all because they don't use the word "moral". They only make أخلاقي claims.

There certainly does seem something problematic here. I think there's a case to be made that the word "moral" is a translation of the word "أخلاقي" even though the things we describe as being moral are not the things they describe as being أخلاقي. If so then it must be that your approach to understanding the meaning of the word "good" is mistaken.

If the words "moral" and "أخلاقي" mean the same thing, and if the things we describe as being moral are not the things they describe as being أخلاقي, then one or both us are wrong in our claimed "particulars".

So, as I asked before, how do we determine whether or not something which is claimed to be moral really is moral? If we can't do that then we can't look to the things that are claimed to be moral to determine what "moral" means, as we may be looking at things that aren't moral.

In the case of #1, you would be disagreeing that the word ‘good’ should be used to refer to ‘acts which promote flourishing’; and, to that, my response is, briefly, that I think this is historically how the word tends to be used. We say ‘I am doing good’ when our bodies are healthy (i.e., our body parts are acting in harmony and unity to accomplish survival and thriving) and our goals are being fulfilled; and, most universally, we say ‘everything is going good’ when everyone is acting in harmony such that each person is respected and sufficiently sovereign. Likewise, when we say society is ‘doing good’, we usually mean that each part of the society is acting in harmony and unity to achieve the safety and sufficient sovereignty of its citizens. You see the pattern. — Bob Ross

So acts which promote flourishing are good because we have historically used the word "good" to describe acts which promote flourishing? This seems to be a kind of constructivism: moral facts are established by the conventions of our language use.

I think that you're on the right track, but I think that this is a form of anti-realism, not realism.

It is because it “satisfies the criteria ...”; but we only gain knowledge of that criteria by abducing it from the particulars. — Bob Ross

You seem to be saying that we learn what it means to be good by looking at what all good things have in common? But how do we determine that something is good in the first place?

You say helping the sick is good. I say helping the sick isn't good. Where do we go from there?

I don’t immediately know what the concept of a triangle is, but particular triangles are triangles because they meet the criteria of that concept of a triangle. I gain knowledge of the concept of a triangle by abstraction of particular triangles. — Bob Ross

Surely being a triangle is a mind-independent state of affairs? Some object either is or isn't a three-sided shape, regardless of what we believe or say. But in your OP you say that being good isn't a mind-independent state of affairs?

So I don't see how your example of triangles explains what it means for being good to not be a mind-independent state of affairs but to be some "non-Platonic objective abstract category".

I've read that but I can't see where it's actually explained what "good" means. It only seems to say that good is a "transcendental" and so not reducible to some natural property. There is mention of "desires", but it clarifies that it's not that something is good because we desire it but that we desire it because it is good.

So all I get from this is that "good" is supervenient and desirable. It still seems that "good" is undefined. How am I to distinguish "good" from some other supervenient and desirable property? Even if it's the only supervenient and desirable property, unless "good" means "supervenient and desirable" it is as-of-yet undefined.

Am I just misreading or misunderstanding the paper?

I think it poses enormous problems, and that it is directly related to these intractable problems of metaethics. — Leontiskos

I agree with that. But then there's also a problem with many of the proposed definitions. If we take hedonism as an example, if "this is good" means "this is pleasurable" then the proposition "pleasure is good" would be a tautology and so the question "is pleasure good?" would be a confused one, much like the question "are bachelors unmarried men?".

But the question "is pleasure good?" does seem to be a reasonable one, which suggests that "this is good" doesn't just mean "this is pleasurable". And so too for many (all?) other similar questions.

So if "good" being undefinable doesn't work and if "good" being defined in some natural term like "pleasurable" doesn't work then it seems that morality just doesn't work.

Just like how we can infer the general conception of a triangle from particular triangles, we can infer the general conception of the good from particular examples (e.g., helping the sick, being kind, respectful, truthful, etc.). This conception is objective just as much as the conception of a triangle. — Bob Ross

This isn’t very clear.

Is helping the sick good just because we use the word “good” to describe things like helping the sick? Or is helping the sick good because it satisfies the criteria of “being good”?

If the former then it doesn’t quite seem like realism. If the latter then you need to explain what that criteria is.

So, does ChatGPT know things? — RogueAI

That's an ambiguous question. As it says, it has access to "a vast amount of information". But it doesn't have conscious beliefs like we do, and our kind of knowledge is something akin to "justified true belief".

The concept of p-zombie researchers exploring the frontiers of science without having any knowledge is incoherent. — RogueAI

Are you being literal with your use of the term “incoherent”? Because prima facie it doesn’t appear to be a contradiction.

Something like a Boston Dynamics robot installed with ChatGPT is quite capable in principle of turning on the Large Hadron Collider, reading its data, and then writing out a natural language description of the result. A p-zombie scientist is exactly like this except that its body is made of skin and bones, not metal, and that its “software” is much more advanced than any current AI.

It has “knowledge” only in the sense that LLM’s have “knowledge”. It isn’t conscious. It is simply capable of processing input and reacting accordingly, whether that be with movement or speech.

@Lionino @Wayfarer

https://www.etymonline.com/word/substance

c. 1300, substaunce, "divine part or essence" common to the persons of the Trinity;" mid-14c. in philosophy and theology, "that which exists by itself; essential nature; type or kind of thing; real or essential part;" from Old French sustance, substance "goods, possessions; nature, composition" (12c.), from Latin substantia "being, essence, material." This is from substans, present participle of substare "stand firm, stand or be under, be present," from sub "up to, under" (see sub-) + stare "to stand" (from PIE root *sta- "to stand, make or be firm").

Latin substantia translates Greek ousia "that which is one's own, one's substance or property; the being, essence, or nature of anything."

The figurative and general meaning "any kind of corporeal matter, stuff," is attested from mid-14c. As "material wealth, property, goods," late 14c.

The sense of "the matter of a study, discourse, etc.; content of a speech or literary work" is recorded late 14c. That of "meaning expressed by a speech or writing," as distinguished from style, form, performance, is by 1780.

So Greek to Latin to French to English.

I don't get the relevance of this though.

An abstraction of similar acts. — Bob Ross

I don't know what this means. How is it mind-independent?

For example, there is no mind-independent state-of-affairs (or arrangement of entities) in reality that makes it true that “one ought not torture babies” but, rather, it is true because it corresponds appropriately to the mind-independent category (i.e., abstract form) of ‘the good’. — Bob Ross

As you don't appear to be arguing for Platonism, in what sense is this category mind-independent?

All those words are not synonymous.

We can all think of examples where something is harmful, disgusting, or despicable, but not immoral. — Hanover

Alright, because I know what "cruel", "harmful", "disgusting", and "despicable" mean. I don't know what "bad" means (if something else).

Is rape bad? — Hanover

Does the word "bad" mean something that isn't already covered by words like "cruel", "harmful", "disgusting", "despicable", etc.?

Hanover/Moore's position that morality has no essence and yet moral claims are nevertheless meaningful seems to make no sense. — Leontiskos

Moore doesn't say that morality "has no essence" (whatever that means). Moore says that moral terms like "good" are undefinable. This contrasts with naturalist theories that claim that moral terms like "good" can be defined in one or more other terms, such as "pleasurable" or "healthy".

What precludes it is the double jeopardy clause of the 5th. — NOS4A2

As per the Constitution, if convicted he "shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law” and so clearly double jeopardy doesn’t apply, precisely because impeachment and removal from office isn’t a criminal matter.

Your suggestion is that double jeopardy only applies if acquitted. As I’ve mentioned before, this is denying the antecedent. It’s a straightforward formal fallacy. That he can be prosecuted if convicted isn’t that he can’t be prosecuted if acquitted. Nowhere in the Constitution does it say that “The President, Vice President and all civil Officers” are only liable if convicted.

They have the power to try and convict of high crimes and misdemeanors. — NOS4A2

They have the power to fire a President if he commits a crime. They don't have the power to try and convict an actual criminal case which is why he wouldn't have been jailed if found guilty by the Senate.

The firing is just the punishment for that process. — NOS4A2

Yes, and the only punishment. But someone who does things like kill or steal military secrets should be punished by more than just being fired. They ought be criminally prosecuted and jailed if found guilty.

He was acquitted. — NOS4A2

From being fired, yes. That doesn't preclude subsequent criminal prosecution.

At least their wild thought experiment runs parallel to a more realistic scenario. What if the president sent the DOJ or some AG to prosecute his political opponents in the lead up to an election? — NOS4A2

Or a real scenario: what if the President tried to prevent the legitimate certification of a Presidential election that he lost?

The constitution provides a mechanism to sort it out, and he was acquitted through this mechanism. — NOS4A2

The Constitution provides a mechanism to fire a President. He wasn't fired. It doesn't then follow that he can't later be criminally prosecuted.

US president could have a rival assassinated and not be criminally prosecuted, Trump’s lawyer argues

Former president Donald Trump’s lawyer argued that presidential immunity would cover the U.S. president ordering political rivals to be assassinated by SEAL Team Six.

During a hearing at a federal appeals court on Tuesday, Trump’s lead lawyer John Sauer made a sweeping argument for executive immunity, essentially saying that only a president who has been impeached and removed from office by Congress could be criminally prosecuted. Therefore, Sauer argued, the former president should be shielded from criminal prosecution.

One of the judges asked Sauer: “Could a president who ordered SEAL Team 6 to assassinate a political rival, and is not impeached, would he be subject to criminal prosecution?”

Sauer responded: “If he were impeached and convicted first... there is a political process that would have to occur.”

So if he were to resign before being impeached? He'd get away with it? Because, at least according to Mitch, former Presidents can't be impeached.

Or, hell, what if he has Seal Team Six kill off Congress? Then he can't be impeached even as President.

Ex Trump Press Secretary Says His Base Would Rather Believe ANY Conspiracy Than Realize He’s a ‘Fraud’ Who Doesn’t Care About America

GRISHAM: I think that when you believe in somebody so much, when you believe in somebody like Donald Trump. And I can speak to this because I actually did believe in him for a very long time. I think that when you put it all on the line and believe in somebody, I think it’s easier then to just want to believe that the FBI, that law enforcement, that the people who go to help us when we’re in trouble would be behind something, rather than admitting that the person you’ve been backing for years and years is a fraud and actually doesn’t care about the American people or our country.

I say that just from personal experience. It was really hard for me to come to terms with who he was because I really believed in him, his policies and the person I thought he was. So that’s what I think. I think that people just would rather believe these conspiracy theories rather than admit that they were wrong about this person.

ACOSTA: Yeah. And, Stephanie, I mean, you were around him so much. I mean, based on your experience when he peddles this stuff, does he know he’s lying? Does he convince himself that the lie is true? Is he just a kind of a crackpot who believes in conspiracy theories? And so he thinks what he’s saying is true. Which is it? Do we know what it is?

GRISHAM: Well, he’s not a crackpot. He’s actually a very smart man. I mean, he was president of the United States, so we have to give him a modicum of credit for that. But no, he knows he’s lying. He used to tell me when I was press secretary, go out there and say this, and if it was false, he would say, ‘it doesn’t matter, Stephanie. Just say it over and over and over again. People will believe it.’

He knows his base, believes in him. He knows he can basically say anything and his base will believe what he’s saying now. I think this will help propel him into the general. But I think that independents and, you know, center-leaning Republicans are not going to be buying this. They’re much, much smarter than that. And so I think that he’s going to get in trouble in the general with this kind of, uh, these kind of lies.

ACOSTA: So when he says that, oh, the FBI, Antifa, that kind of stuff, you think he he knows he’s lying.

GRISHAM: I know he knows he’s lying. I mean, I, you know, was with him nonstop for six years. He knows all he has to do is continue to say thing, and people — say these things and people will believe him.

I don't know if the "He’s actually a very smart man" is a reason I shouldn't believe the rest of it. :lol:

We can’t certify a fraudulent election. Do you think this is the advocacy of a crime? — NOS4A2

He wasn’t asking his supporters to prevent some hypothetical fraudulent election. He was asking them to prevent the actual election, which wasn’t fraudulent. You don’t get to get away with a crime by falsely claiming that what you’re doing isn’t a crime.

No, given the proof the presumption of guilt is warranted. — NOS4A2

Proof without an indictment and conviction? Glad you finally recognise that it's possible.

It is not only a human right, it is stupid to do otherwise. — NOS4A2

So I see a man with a knife standing over a dead and bloody body. It would be stupid of me and an abuse of his human rights to presume him guilty and so run away; instead I ought presume him innocent, approach him, and ask him if he'd like a lift home so that he can shower and change his clothes.

Thank God I don't think like you.

Did you see him do it? — NOS4A2

I did actually, it was on TV. I also heard him do it on various phone calls.

One of the human rights I was speaking about is the presumption of innocence. It doesn’t seem to ring any bells around here. — NOS4A2

Presumption of innocence isn't a human right. Not being jailed without guilt being proven is probably a human right. But nobody here is suggesting that we simply kidnap Trump and throw him in a pit.

I'll tell you a secret. I wrote this over two years with an intended purpose: to get the atheists and theists in here to think. — Philosophim

I had assumed that this was what it was. Of course, it's a non sequitur to go from "there is a first cause" to "this first cause is an all-powerful, all-knowing, all-good, intelligent designer who gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth on him should not perish, but have eternal life". But as you didn't make the claim I didn't bring it up. If you want to make this claim now then, well, it's a non sequitur.

Any supposed "first cause" might simply be an initial singularity of infinite temperature and density that then expanded.

Yes I read that, and it is why I accused you of being ambiguous with "distance". In the first sentence you said there is a distance "even if we never measure it". — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, which is to say that the base and the peak do not occupy the same position in space. The space between them is called distance.

That there is distance between the base and the peak is measurement-independent. It's certainly not the case that the base and the peak are touching until we look at the mountain.

That this distance is described as being "8,000m" or as being "26,246.72 feet" is measurement- and language-dependent.

I'm not sure why you felt the need to explain the latter fact. I'm not sure how it's exactly relevant.

But he hasn’t even been charged for insurrection, let alone convicted. You’re saying he’s guilty of a crime he hasn’t been charged with or proven guilty of. That’s a problem you have. — NOS4A2

People tend to commit crimes before being charged and convicted, not after. That's how time works.

And some people commit crimes without being charged and convicted. See, for example, every unsolved murder in history.

The notion that Trump hasn't committed a crime because he hasn't been charged and convicted is fundamentally mistaken.

As a counterexample see my mathematical example. — jgill

Where?

But note that I specifically said that "an infinite sequence of events has no end". I didn't say that "an infinite series has no end".

And as I also mentioned in that previous comment, there's a difference between saying that there is no first number and saying that there is no first counted number.

The actual act of counting the integers has to start somewhere, and each second of passed time (at least assuming an A series concept of time) is an act of counting.

No. But maybe I'm wrong. Can you answer this question: "What caused there to be infinite regressive causality?" Remember the answer that I gave to finite causality. "It just is, there is no prior explanation for its being." Is your answer different? — Philosophim

The answer is the same: "it just is; there is no prior explanation for why causation is an infinite regress".

What I take issue with is your claim that this then entails that there is a first cause. That is clearly a contradiction, as it cannot be both that causation is an infinite regress and that there is a first cause.

You appear to conflate "brute fact" and "first cause". As I mentioned in my first comment, that explanations end isn't that causation starts.

This "brute" existence of an infinite regress isn't itself a cause, let alone a first cause. Again, it's like saying that the set of all integers is itself an integer.