If water is H₂O, then necessarily water is H₂O. There is no prima facie contradiction in water being made of other stuff, but once it is found to be made of H₂O, the alternatives are pruned from the tree of possibilities. — Banno

That's because "H₂O" and "water" are rigid designators that refer to the same thing. If ethical non-naturalism is true then "immoral" and "harmful" are not rigid designators that refer to the same thing.

Can there be a posteriori necessity without rigid designators referring to the same thing?

A third layer, so we have alethic, deontic and now epistemic modalities.

And so back to my point: the framework being used here is far from clear. — Banno

Considering deontic logic, is OA → ◻OA an axiom?

If it is, is it an axiom by choice or by necessity?

There's something specious in the question Michael asks about how worlds differ given moral truths. they differ specifically in the truth of those moral statements... — Banno

I've been clearer in subsequent posts. I'm asking about observable differences.

I believe that eating dirt will make me sick. I eat dirt. If my belief is true then I will be made sick, if my belief is false then I won't be made sick. This is an observable difference.

I believe that it is immoral to eat meat. I eat meat. If my belief is true then... what? If my belief is false then... what? In either case I just eat meat. I can't think of an observable difference between the belief being true and the belief being false.

If there is no observable difference then what is our motivation to be moral?

Why are we unable to determine right and wrong in the non-naturalist world? — Hanover

I'm not saying that we're unable. But we're not infallible, and so it's possible that our moral beliefs are wrong. I am simply asking about the observable difference between our moral beliefs being true and those same moral beliefs being false. If ethical non-naturalism is true then it seems to me that there would be no observable difference.

But as a related question, if ethical non-naturalism is true then how can we determine right and wrong? Can there be empirical evidence of non-natural facts? Or if it's determined by reason alone then from which premises can we derive moral truths?

There would be an observable difference in either world. — Hanover

In one possible world babies suffer if they're murdered and it's immoral to murder babies.

In another possible world babies suffer if they're murdered but it's not immoral to murder babies.

In both worlds we believe that it is immoral to murder babies.

What is the observable difference between each world?

Why would it be different if ethical naturalism were the case? It might just be that murdering babies is moral in such a possible world. — Hanover

If ethical naturalism is true and "immoral" just means something like "harmful" then a world where nothing is immoral is a world where nothing is harmful. There would be a significant observable difference between living in that world and living in the world we're in now.

It would make a difference to our lives if our beliefs about what is harmful and what is not harmful are wrong.

This assumes a consequentialist justification is necessary for morality, which means your beef isn't against non-naturalism, but it's with deontolgy. — Hanover

Not exactly.

In one possible world hurting people is wrong because of the consequences.

In another possible world hurting people leads to the same consequences but it isn’t wrong.

Why does it matter which world we’re in?

In one possible world we just have a duty to not hurt people.

In another possible world we don’t have a duty to not hurt people.

Why does it matter which world we’re in?

If ethical non naturalism is true then it seems to be that whether or not our moral beliefs are true has no practical import. Our lives go on the same.

As to your specific question I quoted above, yes, it matters if we think we shouldn't harm others if we should because we'd be wrong if we didn't. — Hanover

Why does it matter if we're wrong? It makes no practical difference to our lives.

As if "physical or emotional injury" were not evil. — Banno

If ethical non-naturalism is true then "if X causes physical or emotional injury then X is evil" is not a tautology.

When I'm using the term "harm" I'm using it in the sense of "physical or emotional injury".

Sorry - the OED is ethically naturalist? Can you explain that? — Banno

It’s defining evil as harm.

That’s ethical naturalism. I’m talking about ethical non-naturalism.

That's just reasserting that it's not a contradiction. — Banno

If ethical non-naturalism is true then “immoral” doesn’t mean “harmful”.

If “immoral” doesn’t mean “harmful” then “this is harmful” doesn’t mean “this is immoral”.

If “this is harmful” doesn’t mean “this is immoral” then “if this is harmful then this is immoral” is not a tautology.

If “if this is harmful then this is immoral” is not a tautology then “this is harmful and this is not immoral” is not a contradiction.

If “this is harmful and this is not immoral” is not a contradiction then it is possible that something is harmful but not immoral.

Therefore, if ethical non-naturalism is true then it is possible that something is harmful but not immoral.

Again, "Why be moral?" is an infelicitous question - being moral is what you ought to do. Hence the answer to "ought you be moral?" is "yes!" — Banno

These are two different questions:

1. Ought I be moral?
2. Why would I be moral?

“Ought I” and “why would I” mean different things.

The answer to the first is, presumably, “yes”. The answer to the second isn’t “yes”.

And it doesn’t prima facie follow that if the answer to the first is “yes” then the answer to the second is “because I ought to”. Or at the very least it’s not the only answer. Other answers may be more compelling.

See here.

I don't think you're a serious interlocutor and I've explained in detail why I am not interested in engaging you. — Leontiskos

Because you want me to say “moral theory X is right and theory Y is wrong”?

I don’t have to say that. I am simply addressing the weaknesses in both theory X and theory Y. I don’t know why you think this means I’m not being serious.

This is a thread about moral subjectivism, not moral realism. Please stay on topic. — Leontiskos

You claimed that “we have a moral claim that we know to be true" as part of your counterargument. If you cannot justify this claim then your counterargument fails.

It is unclear what you mean by "immoral" and therefore that these are "possible worlds". — 180 Proof

Assuming ethical non-naturalism, whatever "immoral" means the sentence "it is not immoral to harm others" is not a logical contradiction, and so "it is immoral to harm others" is not necessarily true. If "it is immoral to harm others" is not necessarily true then "it is immoral to harm others" is possibly false.

So if ethical non-naturalism is true then these are two possible worlds:

1. It is immoral to harm others
2. It is not immoral to harm others

Assuming that in either case we believe that it is immoral to harm others, does it even matter which world we're in?

Lines 1 and 5 beg the conclusion, making the argument fallacious. — noAxioms

Line 1 is just a definition.

Line 5 doesn't beg the question because it doesn't claim that consciousness is non-physical. It just claims that whatever consciousness is we have it. A physicalist can also accept this premise.

We can conceive of something that is physically identical to us not having consciousness — Michael

This also begs the conclusion. — noAxioms

Yes, this is one of the common counterarguments against the p-zombie argument.

I’m not sure that works.

Here are two possible worlds:

1. It is immoral to harm others
2. It is not immoral to harm others

Are you saying that if I were to harm others in world (1) then I would be miserable but that if I were to harm others in world (2) then I wouldn't be miserable? How does that work? What is the causal connection between the (im)morality of an action and my psychological state?

Also the OP is directed at categorical imperatives, not the kind of hypothetical/pragmatic imperatives that you’re describing.

I’m sorry but I’m not going to read 20 different papers to try to understand your position. Would you mind giving, in you own words, an answer to my question? How do you justify your belief that no one should torture babies?

You keep asking @Bob Ross to rationally justify his claim. You must do the same.

See this.

What would the non-psychological reason be for, say, killing a cheating spouse for revenge? — RogueAI

Physical determinism.

Are you going to tell me you've never done anything purely based on psychological reasons or because you were compelled by desire or rage or passion? — RogueAI

That I did it for psychological reasons isn’t that it couldn’t have been done for non-psychological reasons.

What those cases show is that the inclusion of a “congressional power of enforcement” section in an amendment does not entail that the other sections in that amendment are not self-executing and can only be enforced by Congress.

Therefore your claim that the inclusion of Section 5 in the 14th Amendment entails that Section 3 is not self-executing and can only be enforced by Congress is unjustified. There is nothing in the text that suggests Section 3 to be unique in that regard. Any reasonable interpretation of the Constitution will grant it the same status as being self-executing and subject to judicial enforcement.

It was my understanding that Congress can repeal an amendment with another amendment, which it has done before. — NOS4A2

A new amendment requiring 2/3 of Congress and 3/4 of States can repeal any Amendment, including the First.

But that’s not what we’re talking about. You are arguing that if Congress does not establish the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendment as law then they are effectively moot and that the courts cannot enforce them if petitioned by affected parties. That is simply not the case. The Supreme Court has already ruled that they are self-executing, and like every other self-executing provision of the Constitution, the courts can enforce them.

Congress could repeal the entire amendment if they wanted to. — NOS4A2

No it can't. Congress does not have the power to repeal the Thirteenth, the Fourteenth, or the Fifteenth Amendment.

The Supreme Court has already ruled that each are self-executing.

Holding public office or being on the ballot does not exonerate one from the article. — creativesoul

True, but the particular case brought before the Colorado Supreme Court was to stop Trump being added to the Republican primary ballot. If Trump is on the ballot, or otherwise wins the Republican primary without winning Colorado, further litigation will be required to remove him from the actual Presidential election.

it's going to be interesting. Will politics trump principals? My prediction is that the conservative justices will find some way to wave their hands and rule against Colorado. But it would make me very happy to be wrong. — EricH

My prediction is that they will stay the ruling beyond Jan 4th because they're too busy to hear it right now, after which they will declare the case moot as Trump would have already been added to the ballot.

On the other hand, the 14th amendment does confer the power to enforce the provisions to Congress, so one can assume correctly that that power belongs with Congress and no one else. — NOS4A2

One would be assuming incorrectly.

See also the Supreme Court's ruling on the 15th Amendment in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966)

Section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment declares that

"[t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."

This declaration has always been treated as self-executing, and has repeatedly been construed, without further legislative specification, to invalidate state voting qualifications or procedures which are discriminatory on their face or in practice.

The notion that the inclusion of Section 2 entails that there must be a federal law that grants citizens the right to vote is a false one. Section 1 is enough, and if someone is denied the vote then they may petition the courts to enforce their right. Congress doesn't need to get involved.

Section 5 entails that Congress has the power to enforce the provisions of the article. It doesn’t confer that power to anyone else. So why assume someone else can have that power? — NOS4A2

The 1st and 2nd Amendments don't confer the power to anyone. So why assume that anyone can enforce them?

I’m talking about the 14th amendment, section 5. — NOS4A2

So am I, and so was the Supreme Court in The Civil Rights Cases. Section 5 of the 14th Amendment doesn't entail that the courts cannot enforce Section 4, and Section 2 of the 13th Amendment doesn't entail that the courts cannot enforce Section 1.

Section 3 of the 14th Amendment and Section 1 of the 13th Amendment are "self-executing", and like every other Constitutional provision (e.g. the 2nd Amendment), the courts have the power to enforce them.

It doesn’t say that any court has the power to enforce the provisions of the article. — NOS4A2

Neither does the 2nd Amendment.

It says there in plain English that those powers are left to Congress. — NOS4A2

No, it simply extends Congress' power. As I mentioned here, the Supreme Court has already ruled that these amendments are "self-executing" (much like the 2nd Amendment), and much like the 2nd Amendment the courts have the power to enforce it.

In fact, see The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883), where the Supreme Court ruled that:

[The thirteenth] amendment, as well as the fourteenth, is undoubtedly self-executing without any ancillary legislation, so far as its terms are applicable to any existing state of circumstances. By its own unaided force and effect it abolished slavery, and established universal freedom.

I suppose yes because the 13th amendment also grants “Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation”.

No state or federal court has authority in either matter. — NOS4A2

How do you draw that conclusion? The 13th Amendment establishes two things: first, that slavery is abolished, and second, that Congress shall have power to enforce this abolishment.

Your conclusion only follows if the 13th Amendment was written as:

Congress shall have power to abolish slavery and involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.

But it wasn't written this way.

Compare, for example, Article I, Section 8, Clause 1:

The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States...

This wording precludes state and federal courts from laying and collecting taxes.

It’s probably why section 5 of the fourteenth amendment says “The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.” In regards to enforcing these provisions It doesn’t mention states or state courts. — NOS4A2

Would you say the same about the Thirteenth Amendment?

An originalist would need to consider this as a glaring problem with the state’s ruling, and also the fact that the president is not mentioned in the list of people who would be unable from holding office. — NOS4A2

It mentions "or as an officer of the United States". The court found that the President is an officer of the United States, starting page 79.

I think he's right, but that's because I'm a panpstychist. I suspect all causation is, at bottom, psychological. That avoids overdetermination. — bert1

The p-zombie argument is an argument against physicalism. If you're a panpsychist then the p-zombie argument is irrelevant. You already accept the conclusion that the mind is non-physical.

The point here is that we have a moral claim that we know to be true, such as, "No one should torture babies." — Leontiskos

Assuming that knowledge is (at minimum) justified true belief, what is the justification for the belief that no one should torture babies?

If moral subjectivism is unable to rationally justify such a truth, then moral subjectivism is an inadequate moral theory. — Leontiskos

The same goes for moral realism.

You seem to think that certain bodily behaviours can only be caused by subjective consciousness. Why is that?

The body is a physical object. Muscles contracting, neurons firing, sense receptors responding to various stimuli; all of this is purely mechanical.

I think the problem is that you keep trying to think of the “why” in intentional terms, when in fact intentions have nothing to do with it. I’m sure you know of deterministic arguments against free will? So just consider them. P-zombies have no free will. Everything they do is a physical effect of prior physical causes.

They’re an advanced ChatGPT in an advanced Boston Dynamics robot.

Biden pardons marijuana use nationwide.

That's nice of him.

Nice, definitions from the 19th century. Thanks for clearing that up. — NOS4A2

Well yes, that’s how originalism works, and originalism seems to be one of the most common ways to interpret the constitution.

Oddly enough they didn’t look up what “engage” means, because he wasn’t even present where the event happened, yet they conclude he engaged in it. — NOS4A2

They referenced United States v. Powell, 1871:

The expression “engaged” in insurrection, as used in the amendment, implies a voluntary effort to assist the insurrection.

Also they did look up the dictionary definitions. It starts on page 103.

Then there's this:

Attorney General Stanbery’s opinions on the meaning of “engage,” which he issued at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was being debated, are in accord with these historical and modern definitions. Attorney General Stanbery opined that a person may “engage” in insurrection or rebellion “without having actually levied war or taken arms.” Stanbery I, 12 Op. Att’y Gen. at 161. Thus, in Attorney General Stanbery’s view, when individuals acting in their official capacities act “in the furtherance of the common unlawful purpose” or do “any overt act for the purpose of promoting the rebellion,” they have “engaged” in insurrection or rebellion for Section Three disqualification purposes. Id. at 161–62; see also Stanbery II, 12 Op. Att’y. Gen. at 204 (defining “engaging in rebellion” to require “an overt and voluntary act, done with the intent of aiding or furthering the common unlawful purpose”). Accordingly, “[d]isloyal sentiments, opinions, or sympathies would not disqualify; but when a person has, by speech or by writing, incited others to engage in rebellion, [h]e must come under the disqualification.” Stanbery II, 12 Op. Att’y. Gen. at 205; accord Stanbery I, 12 Op. Att’y Gen. at 164

...

For example, in Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. 75, 126 (1807), Chief Justice Marshall explained that “if a body of men be actually assembled for the purpose of effecting by force a treasonable purpose, all those who perform any part, however minute, or however remote from the scene of action, and who are actually leagued in the general conspiracy, are to be considered as traitors.” In other words, an individual need not directly participate in the overt act of levying war or insurrection for the law to hold him accountable as if he had.

Well... I think that rules come down to individual particulars. I'm sure you'll agree. Different communities hold different rules/moral belief.

So, with enough qualification it may be the case that kicking puppies is forbidden in some communities but not in others.

I'm okay with that. — creativesoul

Right, so you're arguing for moral relativism. I'm okay with that.

But why the need for rules here? Kicking puppies is wrong in and of itself. — creativesoul

Because you brought up rules. I'm happy to do away with them.

So what does it mean for something to be wrong? How do we verify or falsify (or justify) the claim that something is wrong? You say kicking puppies is wrong, I said kicking puppies is right. How do we determine which of us is correct?

Premise 2 is stating the rules. — creativesoul

So you say. But I say kicking puppies is not forbidden. That's me stating the rules.

Presumably you will say that one of us is right and one of us is wrong. So how do we determine which of us is right? How do we determine what the real rule is?