You're asking a question Moore doesn't ask. — Hanover

I know. This discussion is intended to show that if theories like Moore's are correct then moral facts don't matter, and so perhaps works as a reductio ad absurdum against such theories. I do not endorse Moore's ethical non-naturalism.

That is, Moore was a non-naturalist and a consequentialist, which means he cared what the consequence of his behavior was. What made him a non-naturalist was his refusal to provide an essentialist definition of "the good. "

Per Moore, your motivation not to kill wild animals for food (as you have posited that it is immoral) is that by not killing animals, you will promote more good through time. That means you have a goal and purpose for your behavior, which is to maximize the good. — Hanover

And the argument I am making is that this simple, indefinable "good" is of no practical consequence. A world that contains lots of this "good" is empirically indistinguishable from a world without this "good". Whether or not pleasure is good makes no difference to our experience of pleasure. Whether or not suffering is bad makes no difference to our experience of suffering.

It may be factually the case that pleasure has this non-natural property of goodness and that suffering does not have this property (and perhaps has some non-natural property of badness), but these non-natural properties are inconsequential.

So why are we motivated to promote the good? Why not just be motivated to promote pleasure? If pleasure happens to be good then this is merely incidental and irrelevant to our considerations.

but to say that someone should act in a certain way does not necessarily involve obligations. — Leontiskos

My argument in this discussion is specifically related to the supposed existence of obligations. I have often given examples of "should" claims that do not involve obligations, e.g. "you should brush your teeth", that are not the target of my enquiry.

The existence or non-existence of obligations does not affect the outcome of the decisions we make. The consequences of eating meat are the same whether or not I have an obligation to not eat meat.

There appear to be no practical benefits to "obeying" an obligation, and no practical detriments to "disobeying" an obligation. So I would like to understand the motivation of those who choose to "obey" obligations (for no other reason than that the obligation exists).

And when I say that I would like it if you were to make others happy I am not saying (either explicitly or implicitly) that you have an obligation to make people happy.

That's not to say that I am necessarily averse to any proposition that includes the word "should". As per an edit to my previous comment (that you may have missed):

Given these propositions:

1a. She should give me the money if I am to get rich.
2a. She should not give me the money if she is to avoid being conned.

Perhaps they are best interpreted as such:

1b. I will get rich (only?) if she gives me the money
2b. She will avoid being conned (only?) if she doesn't give me the money

These seem sensible (and true), but of course are clearly not normative. I can accept 1a) and 2a) if they are to be interpreted as 1b) and 2b).

What we have are two rationales:

1. She should give me the money if I am to get rich.
2. She should not give me the money if she is to avoid being conned.

When the robber acts to influence Bonita's behavior he is acting on judgment (1). It doesn't matter if he is aware of (2). Knowledge of (2) does not preclude (1). — Leontiskos

So what does "should" mean in this context? It certainly doesn't seem to mean that there is an obligation to behave a certain way, as these sentences don't seem to make sense (or at least don't seem true):

1. She has an obligation to give me the money if I am to get rich.
2. She has an obligation to not give me the money if she is to avoid being conned.

Perhaps what you mean is this:

1. I will get rich (only?) if she gives me the money
2. She will avoid being conned (only?) if she doesn't give me the money

These seem sensible (and true), but of course are clearly not normative.

He might think, "She should not give me the money if she doesn't want to get conned," but does this mean that he cannot simultaneously think that she should give him the money? — Leontiskos

Your very question has introduced two different senses of "should", else it would be a contradiction to claim that she both should and shouldn't give him the money. I'll need you to explain what you mean by this second (and maybe the first?) "should" before I can answer.

As a very simple real life example, plenty of people who have affairs believe that they shouldn't be having an affair. They believe that what they are doing is wrong. But they do it anyway because it's what they want. Their desires are stronger than their moral convictions.

He doesn't think she should do what he wants him to do? — Leontiskos

No. In fact he might think that she shouldn't do what he wants her to do because he knows that what he wants her to do is wrong.

But the salesman was not merely wanting, he was acting to influence behavior. So too with the husband. In both cases we have cases of people who act to influence behavior on the basis of their desires. Are the salesman and the husband involved in a judgment about what another person should do? — Leontiskos

The conman is trying to influence her behaviour into giving him what he wants. He isn't trying to influence her behaviour into doing what he thinks she should do (e.g what is "right" or "good" or "best for her"). Maybe for the husband he's trying to do both.

I didn't realize that wants were incompatible with oughts. — Leontiskos

I didn't say that they are incompatible. I am only saying that the one does not necessarily entail the other. In the case of the conman, what he wants her to do and what he thinks she should do are opposed. In the case of the husband, what he wants her to do and what he thinks she should do might be the same.

To use your example, if someone is trying to sell Bonita a bridge, and they are trying to influence her to act such that she buys the bridge, do they possess the judgment that Bonita should buy a bridge? — Leontiskos

No they do not. They want her to buy a bridge. They don't think she should.

Next, I think that if one is attempting to influence the behavior of another, they are manifesting an explicit or implicit judgment about how that other person should act or behave. Do you agree or disagree? — Leontiskos

I disagree, as I keep saying. If I'm a conman trying to sell you a bridge I don't own then I am trying to influence your behaviour into giving me money but I don't believe that you have a moral obligation to give me money.

Now I say 'ought' involves a judgment about how someone should act. It involves a judgment about how someone should behave. Where such judgments are present, the reality of 'ought' is present. Do you disagree? — Leontiskos

Well yes, because that's a truism: "ought" and "should" are synonyms.

But again I refer you back to what I said here:

That may be true when you say it but it's not when I say it. When I say "I'd like it if you did this" I am only saying this. — Michael

You accused me (here) of saying something that I haven't said (that "we should act in a certain way"). I am simply trying to correct you on this. I have not said this, either explicitly or implicitly. You're reading something into my words that just isn't there and accusing me of believing something that I just don't.

'Ought' is a reality that is very often present even when the word is not present. Do you agree or disagree? — Leontiskos

Yes. So I refer you back to what I said here:

That may be true when you say it but it's not when I say it. When I say "I'd like it if you did this" I am only saying this. — Michael

You accused me (here) of saying something that I haven't said (that "we should act in a certain way"). I am simply trying to correct you on this. I have not said this, either explicitly or implicitly. You're reading something into my words that just isn't there and accusing me of believing something that I just don't.

Then you'll need to revise your definition. We are discussing whether an 'ought' is involved. — Leontiskos

And in this case an "ought" isn't involved as I keep saying. Here are a couple of sentences:

1. I would like it if you made others happy
2. I would like it if you were to give me your money

In both cases I am trying to influence your behaviour. In neither case is the word "ought" (or the word "immoral") involved, either explicitly or implicitly.

Someone who says, "I would be very sad if you cause them suffering," is obviously attempting to influence behavior. — Leontiskos

That I am trying to influence behaviour isn't that I believe that you have a moral obligation to behave a certain way.

When I try to convince you that I have a bridge to sell I am trying to influence you into giving me your money. That doesn't mean that I believe that you have a moral obligation to give me money. In fact I may be a moral realist who believes that what I am doing is wrong, but I care more about being rich than being good. Or I may be a moral nihilist who doesn't believe that anything is good or bad. But I still want your money.

You speak because you believe I ought to care how you feel — Leontiskos

No I don't.

You need to stop telling me what I believe.

Whether or not kindness and empathy and charity make the world a better place does matter though. — creativesoul

I know it does.

But whether or not kindness and empathy and charity are moral doesn't matter. Kindness and empathy and charity would make the world a better place even if kindness and empathy and charity aren't moral.

You are advising — Leontiskos

No I'm not. I am expressing how I would feel if you were to behave a certain way. I'm not advising you to do something. I'm not telling you to do something. I am not asserting that there exists some objectively binding moral obligation to do something.

I think there's been some confusion. I said to Leontiskos that I would like it if he would make others happy. He then accused me of telling him that he ought make others happy. I was explaining to him that I wasn't because "I would like it if you did this" doesn't mean "you ought do this". I then presented that biconditional in an attempt to show him that they mean different things. As he is a moral realist I expected him to reject the biconditional and so accept that I wasn't telling him what he ought to do.

But then he confused the matter by accepting the biconditional whilst still claiming to be a moral realist.

I'm not sure what you want from me. You're putting words into my mouth and I'm simply explaining that I'm not saying what you accuse me of saying.

I'd like you to pass the salt. I'd like you to meet my parents. I'd like you to donate to cancer research. I'd like you to join the protest. None of this implies that I believe in some objectively binding moral obligation.

When I say that I'd like you to be kind to others and make them happy, that's all I'm saying. I am neither explicitly nor implicitly endorsing moral realism.

It not a statement of suggestion that one gives to another - for in the example all who know the alcoholic want him to continue drinking. The example I gave was given as a statement of fact. — javra

Is it a moral fact? We're discussing moral obligations, not non-moral obligations.

2) Why presume that morality is independent of pragmatics? — javra

I'm not. I'm explaining that if ethical non-naturalism is true then being moral has no practical benefit. If ethical non-naturalism is true then the consequences of eating meat are the same whether eating meat is immoral or not. If ethical non-naturalism is true then the consequences of drinking alcohol are the same whether alcoholism is immoral or not.

I'm not arguing that ethical non-naturalism is true.

That quote of yours does not address mine.

"You should stop causing suffering," and, "In my opinion you should stop causing suffering," — Leontiskos

I haven't said "in my opinion you should stop causing suffering". I have only said "I would like it if you would stop causing suffering". These propositions mean different things.

We've already acknowledged that the world would be a different, better place if everyone acted morally — Count Timothy von Icarus

I haven't acknowledged this. I can acknowledge that the world would be a different, better place if everyone acted with kindness and empathy and charity, but whether or not kindness and empathy and charity are moral makes no difference.

A) The alcoholic (who thereby self-destroys themselves via alcohol consumption) should become sober, this despite B) the alcoholic and all which surround him wanting the alcoholic to continue drinking alcohol (for whatever reasons, with these possibly ranging from that of wanting the alcoholic to continue being their merry self in the company of others when drunk to that of wanting the alcoholic to die).

What’s missing here for a satisfactory account of moral realism is the reason for why (A) is valid despite (B). Notwithstanding, to me this scenario presents an intuitive truth that I presume is universally shared. If so, then the proposition you’ve offered is not true - this, as you claim, just as the moral realist affirms. — javra

That they should become sober is not an objectively binding moral obligation. It is a pragmatic suggestion, like telling someone that they should brush their teeth.

See here where it's explained that the meaning of the word "should" is not exclusively moral.

Still, when I say to someone, "I'd like it if you stopped causing suffering for others," you are simultaneously saying, "You should stop causing suffering for others." — Leontiskos

That may be true when you say it but it's not when I say it. When I say "I'd like it if you did this" I am only saying this.

To make this clearer, do you accept that non-cognitivists, error theorists, and moral subjectivists exist? Do you accept that they do not believe in objectively binding moral obligations? Do you also accept that they express their personal preferences? Then you must accept that when they express their personal preferences they are not simultaneously asserting the existence of objectively binding moral obligations.

I believe the biconditional is true. I am a moral realist. — Leontiskos

That strikes me as a contradiction. You ought not eat meat if and only if I would like you to not eat meat? That seems like textbook moral subjectivism.

And if the "I" refers specifically to me then why am I the authority on what you should or shouldn't do?

If you want to argue that there is no motivation — frank

I'm not arguing that there is no motivation. I'm explaining that I have no motivation to be moral and am asking others why they have it given that there are no practical benefits to being moral. Is it entirely a matter of principle?

What's the difference between saying "I'd like it if you did X," and, "You should do X"? — Leontiskos

Is this premise true?

1. "You should do X" is true iff I'd like it if you did X

According to moral realists it's not. According to (some) moral subjectivists it is. I'm assuming moral realism, not moral subjectivism, for the sake of this argument. And you've previously argued against moral subjectivism so I presume you believe that the premise is false.

You think we should act in a certain way (seek happiness and avoid suffering) and yet you refuse to call this predilection "moral," even though any definitions of "moral" that you provide entail that your predilection is moral. — Leontiskos

I don't say that we should. I only say that I do, and that I'd like it if you did too.

I would say that those who promote happiness believe that happiness ought be promoted, and given your definition here that would mean that happiness is moral. Is it possible to promote something while not believing that it ought be promoted? When I do something it is because I think it should be done, especially when it is something I've deliberated about. — Leontiskos

I promote happiness because I enjoy it and because I have empathy for others. Moral considerations do not factor into my decision making at all.

But the second question presumably asks why it is immoral to cause suffering. You want to know how to answer the second question on a Moorean ethics, — Leontiskos

I'm trying to explain that it doesn't matter if it is immoral to cause suffering.

If it is impermissible to cause suffering and I cause suffering then the consequences are the same as if it is permissible to cause suffering and I cause suffering.

The permissibility of causing suffering does not affect the outcome of my decision to cause (or not cause) suffering.

Whereas the viability of antibiotics can very much affect the outcome of my decision to take antibiotics. If they're viable then my sickness is cured, if they're not then I will probably die.

The viability of antibiotics matters. The permissibility of causing suffering doesn't. Suffering is just suffering whether permissible or not.

You aren't presenting an argument that shows that its wrong to look at things that way. — frank

I'm not trying to. I'm not arguing in favour of moral realism and ethical non-naturalism over moral subjectivism or error theory or divine command theory or cultural relativism or non-cognitivism. I am only arguing that if moral realism (specifically ethical non-naturalism) is correct then moral facts don't matter.

You have to have some sort of framework or context for the usage, otherwise there isn't any meaning to your expression. — frank

Then "this is immoral" means "one ought not do this".

I don't care if I ought or ought not promote happiness or if I ought or ought not cause suffering. I'm going to promote happiness and not cause suffering either way.

If you were a Roman stoic, you would say the latter is tied up in the former. What is the cultural framework within which you're using the word "moral?" You have to have some sort of context, otherwise it's language on holiday. — frank

I'm not working under any cultural framework. I am assuming, for the sake of argument, that Moore's ethical non-naturalism is correct: that "this is immoral" doesn't mean "this causes suffering". As such it isn't a truism that suffering is immoral.

You might be concerned about whether your existence makes the world better or worse. — frank

I'm concerned about promoting happiness and reducing suffering. I don't care whether happiness or suffering is moral or not.

Perhaps I can make this easier. Assume, for the sake of argument, that everybody knows with irrefutable certainty that it is immoral to kill wild animals for food. Assume also that we are a fully libertarian society that does not punish people (whether legally or socially) for doing things that they ought not do (except where their actions bring harm to other people).

I know with irrefutable certainty that I ought not kill wild animals for food. I also know that I will not be punished or shunned for killing wild animals for food.

Why does it matter that I ought not kill wild animals for food? What is my motivation to be moral? Perhaps I simply don't care that I ought not kill wild animals for food; I'm going to do it anyway because I like the taste of meat.

However, a full analysis would show that I believe antibiotics will cure my infection because they will actually cure my infection, that I think my wife cheated on my because she actually cheated on me, etc. The possibility of false beliefs here doesn't negate this connection if there are ways to come to true beliefs. If beliefs are properly related to facts, including moral facts, I don't see an issue here. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I address this in the first part of my post:

22% of people believe that eating meat is immoral and 88% don't. Either some (or most or all) of the 22% believe what they do because eating meat is immoral or some (or most or all) of the 88% believe what they do because eating meat is moral.

I am accepting, for the sake of argument, that whoever is right believes what they do because of the moral facts.

What I want to know is why it matters who is right?

It matters if antibiotics can cure my infection because if they can then if I take them then I won't die. But why does it matter if eating meat is immoral?

@Merkwurdichliebe has been banned for trolling and child-killing apologism.

Isn't it begging to question to assume the correct moral beliefs are distributed such that being correct about them is a 50/50 proposition? — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'm not saying that they are. 50% was just an example. If you prefer, we can reconsider my question using the actual apparent percentages (according to this):

22% of people believe that eating meat is immoral and 88% don't. Either some (or most or all) of the 22% believe what they do because eating meat is immoral or some (or most or all) of the 88% believe what they do because eating meat is moral.

Why does it matter who is right? The consequences of eating meat (or not eating meat) are the same whether eating meat is immoral or not.

The same seems true with assuming that those who commit immoral acts face no heightened risk of suffering due to later realizing they have acted immorally. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The same is also true of someone who is falsely convinced that they have acted immorally. So it isn't the fact that they have acted immorally that has caused them to suffer but the belief that they have acted immorally that has caused them to suffer. It makes no difference to their suffering if their belief is true or false.

There can be "natural" consequences of immoral acts without morality being constituted by these outcomes. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, but my point is that the immorality of that act is irrelevant. The natural consequences of that act would be the same even if that act wasn't immoral.

This is true only if you assume that people's beliefs about morality have nothing to do moral facts. But if people have the moral beliefs they do because of moral facts (at least in part)... — Count Timothy von Icarus

This isn't relevant to the argument I am making. Let's take this example:

Half of everyone believes that it is moral to eat meat and half of everyone believes that it is immoral to eat meat.

If it is a fact that it is moral to eat meat then those who believe that it is moral to eat meat do so because it is moral to eat meat, and those who believe that it is immoral to eat meat are, in some sense, delusional.

If it is a fact that it is immoral to eat meat then those who believe that it is immoral to eat meat do so because it is immoral to eat meat, and those who believe that it is moral to eat meat are, in some sense, delusional.

So this grants that moral facts can influence moral beliefs.

Now let's assume that everyone who believes that eating meat is moral eats meat and that everyone who believes that eating meat is immoral doesn't eat meat.

Half of everyone eats meat and half of everyone doesn't eat meat. Why does it matter if eating meat is immoral or not?

It's not the case that if it's immoral to eat meat then those who eat meat are going to suffer from some unwanted consequence as a result of their meat eating (or at least not any consequence that wouldn't also be a consequence even if it is moral to eat meat).

So why the motivation to be moral? There are no practical benefits, either for ourselves or for others. Is it entirely a matter of principle?