But the article said he was talking about immigrants, not illegal ones. — NOS4A2

And you said he was talking about Biden.

At least the article was closer to the mark.

And his Truth Social post reaffirmed what he was saying earlier at the rally; that illegal immigrants are "poisoning the blood of our nation"

But wouldn't "belief", for a p-zombie, be precisely this "belief-analog"? — hypericin

"Belief" is a word in the English language that has a well-established meaning. If p-zombies are speaking English then the word "belief" means what it means in English.

Wouldn't it be preferable to say intentional attitude? That's the usual term used by philosophers, with a quite substantial backing in the literature. It avoids the problematic notion of the subjective. — Banno

Sure, I just grabbed that definition from Wikipedia.

The "they" he was speaking of were his political opponents, for instance "Biden and the lunatic left" and "the radical left democrats". He was saying they were poisoning the blood of the country — NOS4A2

https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/111593149429973351

ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION IS POISONING THE BLOOD OF OUR NATION. THEY’RE COMING FROM PRISONS, FROM MENTAL INSTITUTIONS — FROM ALL OVER THE WORLD.

Trump supporters don't seem ... cognizant — GRWelsh

:up:

along with the informational p-zombie belief-analog that they are p-zombies. — hypericin

Whatever "belief-analog" they have isn't belief.

If the p-zombies are speaking English then the words they use mean what they mean in English, and "belief" in English means something like "the subjective attitude that a proposition is true."

But the fact remains that they might be a p-zombie

Yes, which is why I said this.

Something inside their heads causes them to say things, just as it does for us. The only difference is the lights are out. — hypericin

Which is precisely why their claims, when made by them, are false.

"I am conscious" is false when said by a p-zombie.
"I believe that I am a p-zombie" is false when said by a p-zombie.

The words they use mean what they mean in ordinary English. They certainly don't have the intention to mean anything else.

"p-consider", "p-belief" is all the informational operations of "consider", "belief" without the conscious part. Like how a computer-vision program might "believe" it is looking at a table, without any conscious awareness of it. — hypericin

Something like "the computer algorithm inside my head has caused me to speak the phrase 'I am not a p-zombie'"?

Certainly that's possibly true, but anything that speaks like that isn't a very good facsimile of a real person, and so isn't a p-zombie.

If they're a convincing doppelganger, as p-zombies are, then they speak ordinary English, in which case the word "belief" that they use means what the word "belief" means in ordinary English. And so any self-proclaimed belief, as expressed by a p-zombie, is false. P-zombies, by definition, don't believe anything.

That is, when he says "I consider myself to be a p-zombie", what he really means (to you) is "I p-consider myself to be a p-zombie". — hypericin

What does “p-consider” mean?

P-zombies have no consciousness. They just have an outward appearance (including observable behaviour). You’ll need to explain it in these terms.

(By outward appearances I don’t mean to exclude muscles and bones and internal organs)

If you equate them, then you really need to pony up a generic word that applies to cars and such which consider some judgement to be 'true'. — noAxioms

You could just say “I am a p-zombie”.

The term “morning star” was used to refer to an object in space that appeared in the morning. The term “evening star” was used to refer to an object in space that appeared in the evening. Given that the object in space that appeared in the morning is the same object in space that appeared in the evening, and given that an object is necessarily itself, it then follows that the morning star is necessarily the evening star, even though this cannot be known a priori. Hence it being an a posteriori necessity.

But as I said, I think this is only the case if we consider the meaning of “morning star” and “evening star” in terms of their referent(s). I don’t think this is the case if we consider the meaning of “morning star” and “evening star” in terms of their senses.

I think p-zombies may believe things. They have the capacity to record and analyze information the same way we do. There is just no concomitant phenomenal experience of believing. — hypericin

I’m not sure that counts as belief. Belief seems to me to be a conscious activity. Machines can record and analyze information but they don’t believe anything.

Can you clarify the attempted distinction. Venus references love as well as a planet X. Lucifer references lucidity as well as the same planet X. The sense of each term is then obtained from the totality of what each term references - or so it so far seems to me. — javra

In the context of this discussion the terms refer to an object in the solar system.

I consider myself to be a p-zombie. — noAxioms

One of these must be true:

1. “I consider myself to be a p-zombie” is false because you are a p-zombie and so don’t believe anything.

2. “I consider myself to be a p-zombie” is false because you are not a p-zombie and believe that you are not a p-zombie.

3. “I consider myself to be a p-zombie” is true because you are not a p-zombie and believe that you are a p-zombie.

The statement “I consider myself to be a p-zombie” is only true if you are not a p-zombie and so no rational person can believe themselves to be a p-zombie.

The leading example I've seen of a posteriori necessity is that of "Venus = Lucifer". I so far find this fishy. Any bloke on the street will tell you that "Venus" does not equal "Lucifer". That they both in part reference the same physical planet is not the whole of the story. — javra

The sense/reference distinction. By sense it’s metaphysically possible that they’re different but by reference it’s metaphysically necessary that they’re the same.

I came across Kripke and a posteriori necessity in my brief reading on the topic before making this thread. While I find his ideas very interesting and convincing even, I think the thesis is a bit too recent to make any definitive claims on it as a layman. — Lionino

Naming and Necessity is 43 years old now. Certainly "recent" when compared to Plato, but it's not like we're talking about last year.

Isn't it a little far-fetched to imagine a p-zombie getting in a drunken argument and murdering someone? Doesn't something like that require a lot of anger, which they don't have? For that matter, why would they drink alcohol or do any kind of drugs? There's no mind for them to alter. — RogueAI

Drugs, Brains, and Behavior: The Science of Addiction

Drugs interfere with the way neurons send, receive, and process signals via neurotransmitters. Some drugs, such as marijuana and heroin, can activate neurons because their chemical structure mimics that of a natural neurotransmitter in the body. This allows the drugs to attach onto and activate the neurons. Although these drugs mimic the brain’s own chemicals, they don’t activate neurons in the same way as a natural neurotransmitter, and they lead to abnormal messages being sent through the network.

The brain controls the body. Drugs (and other normal stimuli like light and sound) affect the functioning of the brain.

How could a zombie commit a crime of passion??? By definition they have no passions. — RogueAI

Them killing someone after an argument after drinking alcohol wouldn't be a crime of passion then.

Would a p-zombie ever murder someone after having a bunch of drinks and getting in an argument, and then a fight at a bar? Or is that uniquely a human thing? — RogueAI

A p-zombie, by definition, will look and behave exactly like us. Anything we can do they can do. They're just not conscious.

True, but if feelings are sufficient for action (and I think it's obvious feelings are), and x has feelings and y doesn't, x may behave differently than y. — RogueAI

They may also behave the same. Or it may be that both x and y have feelings but still behave differently.

Do feelings cause action? It certainly seems like they do. — bert1

They happen to cause action in our case, but it is possible that in some other world those same actions are caused by something other than feelings.

Would a materialist grant that a p-zombie might act completely different than a human because it can't have desires or feelings? — RogueAI

They wouldn't be p-zombies if they acted differently. A p-zombie is defined as an entity that looks and behaves human but that does not have conscious experience.

P-zombies that procreate are self-replicating machines that look and behave human.

Normativity in Metaethics

Our decision to focus initially on metaphysical issues doesn’t get us any closer to what normativity is; it only tells us where to locate the initial important questions about normativity. But what would make a fact be a normative one? We started with some hand-wavy platitudes about normative claims being “action-guiding”, and “attitude-guiding”, and about their giving us reasons for action, or reasons for attitudes. We could also give lots of examples of normative claims, adding that, if they are true, they are true in virtue of the normative facts:

...

But while platitudes and examples can give one a general sense of the extension of the normative, they don’t tell us what normativity is.

...

This worry becomes deeper when we consider the possibility of reasons that are not “robustly” normative in the philosophically most interesting and important sense. In chess, there is a reason to castle early. In etiquette, there is a reason, when in Rome, to do what the Romans do. But it might seem that these reasons have no genuine claim on our attention in the way that the moral reason to be loyal to friends does. So it would seem that the normatively fundamental facts about reasons, if reasons fundamentalism is indeed on the right track, would be facts about robustly normative reasons. Perhaps, then, only some reasons are normatively fundamental – the robustly normative ones. If so, presumably the reasons fundamentalist would want to amend their view: what makes a fact normative is that it is, or depends on, a fact or facts about robustly normative reasons. But then it seems important for them to be able to say what makes a reason robustly normative – and it would be unsatisfying for them to answer that a robustly normative reason is one that makes its dependents robustly normative!

There is more to the issue than you and some others seem willing to admit. Robust moral realists, non-realist cognitivists, and moral non-objectivists all believe that we have moral obligations, but they disagree on what this means and how such obligations can be verified or falsified.

However, what would something metaphysically impossible but logically possible be? — Lionino

If Kripke is to be believed then any a posteriori necessity is metaphysically necessary even if not logically necessary, and so their inverse is metaphysically impossible even if logically possible.

The problem with Michael’s approach is that it disregards one’s responsibility to argue for a coherent moral theory and not contradict oneself. — Leontiskos

I don’t need to argue for any theory. You’re shifting the burden of proof. You made much the same comment to another poster earlier in the discussion from what I recall.

Michael has admitted that his own holdings are self-contradictory, but he ignores this fact and instead just argues with everyone. That is, he argues with noncognitivists, error theorists, subjectivists, and moral realists alike. Since his own position is self-contradictory he feels himself at his rights to argue against all possible positions simultaneously. It turns into argument for the sake of argument — Leontiskos

I’m interested in testing the strengths of each theory whether I agree with their conclusions or not. If these arguments cannot stand up to scrutiny then they fail in their task.

I don’t know why you think my personal beliefs matter at all.

Dude, I'm not here for eristic. The only philosophical thread I published is an anti-eristic thread. If you're looking to argue for the sake of argument, you'll need to find someone else to do it with. — Leontiskos

I don’t understand this. This is a philosophy forum. Our entire purpose here is to argue the merits of some philosophical theory. Are you just here to evangelise?

"That's not moral and I refuse to say what I mean by 'moral'," is not a proof by contradiction, it's just sophistry. — Leontiskos

I am saying that these are not the sort of sentences that are usually described as being moral sentences. This is a straightforward empirical observation of actual language use.

My hairdresser tells me that I shouldn’t wash my hair every day because it makes the hair brittle. I don’t know anyone who will say that this is a moral obligation. Most will say that this is just a pragmatic suggestion.

You are precisely the one claiming there are moral facts. — Leontiskos

No I’m not.

I am the one claiming there are binding normative propositions. — Leontiskos

But you refuse to explain what this means or how one can verify or falsify the claim that some proposition is normatively binding.

It's purely defensive or eristic and not inquisitive. It looks more like fly-swatting or contradicting than philosophy. — Leontiskos

Proof by contradiction is a valid argumentative response.

And as far as I'm concerned, to reject a definition without providing an alternative is bad faith argumentation. It's, "Effort for thee, but not for me." — Leontiskos

I’m not the one claiming that there are moral facts.

Which of these are moral utterances? Where should we draw the arbitrary line? — Leontiskos

Is it arbitrary? Or is it a fact that some sentences are moral sentences and some sentences aren’t? There may be cases where we’re not sure if a sentence is a moral sentence, but it’s certainly not the case that every sentence is a moral sentence.

What exactly is wrong with my approach? You offer a definition and I provide counter examples that might show the inadequacy of the definition. If you’re willing to accept the counter examples as being a true consequence then just say so.

Ought you listen to my music? Does it then follow that you are morally obligated to listen to my music? Does it then follow that it is an injustice for you to not listen to my music?

All I am saying is that this seems inconsistent with how moral language is actually used. That strikes me as a justified descriptive claim. Perhaps you want to say that moral language isn’t actually used correctly?

I’ve only had a brief look into it, but Derek Parfit’s non-realist cognitivism is an interesting take. The theory is that there are true moral sentences but that there are no (natural or non-natural) moral properties in the world.

It’s a moral objectivism without a realist ontology.

You are the one claiming that they are different, not me. — Leontiskos

You said that moral obligations are concerned with justice. Are you saying that the normative claim “you ought listen to my music” is concerned with justice? If not then you recognize that they are different, and so my questions need answering.

If you think that it is concerned with justice then the same questions can be asked about justice itself. It certainly seems like an unusual use of language to describe listening to my music as being “just” (and presumably not listening to my music as being “unjust”).

But you also vacillate on things like A3 — Leontiskos

I don’t vacillate. I accept that it’s true in the sense that it’s a reasonable pragmatic suggestion (much like “you ought brush your teeth”).

I don’t know what it means for it to be something more which is why I’m asking you to make sense of this “something more”.

But incidentally the syllogism is invalid. The first premise should be “I should not cause suffering for anything like me”.

What remains is that there are conversations about what we ought to do, and that these conversations include true statements. The lengths to which folk go to avoid admitting this are extraordinary. — Banno

I don't avoid admitting it. I've admitted it several times, in fact. What I see you and others avoiding is actually addressing the issues of cognitivist meta-ethics. What does it mean for an obligation to be moral? Are moral obligations discovered or socially constructed (or other)? How does one verify or falsify a supposed moral obligation?

I don't really care. It's true that you should brush your teeth. We can work from that rather than assigning "ism"s. — Banno

If you don’t recognise the difference between a moral obligation and a pragmatic suggestion then you ought try reading some philosophy.

That's neither here no there. But there are such sentences, and some of them are true. QED. — Banno

You think non-cognitivists and error theorists don’t say that I should brush my teeth or that it’s best if I don’t eat too much sugar?

We talk about what might be done, what ought be done, what's the best thing to do, and so on. Whatever word you choose for this behaviour, it would be absurd to deny that you engage in it. — Banno

None of this requires positing the existence of moral facts. We can do all of this without introducing moral language.

So when do you get to the part where you make sense of morality?

You pretend to understand how moral language is used but not what moral language is. That's somewhat disingenuous. — Banno

It’s not pretend. There is a significant amount of well reasoned literature on anti-realist metaphysics, whether that be non-cognitivism, error theory, subjectivism, fictionalism, etc., all of which recognise which claims are supposed moral claims but none of which agree on the meaning (or truth) of such claims, so your apparent suggestion that anyone who doesn’t accept your “common sense” realism is being disingenuous is itself disingenuous.

You made an assessment; this is not a moral obligation; as if you understood what a moral obligation is. — Banno

No, I just understand how people use moral language.

I know that quarks can be up, down, strange, etc., but I don’t know what this means.

I say that a claim like “you ought listen to my music” isn’t a moral claim because I recognise how people use moral language and recognise that they don’t use moral language to describe such a claim.

I accept that a claim like “you ought not hurt puppies” is a moral claim because I recognise how people use moral language and recognise that they use moral language to describe such a claim. But I don’t know what they mean when they describe it as a moral obligation, which is why I’m asking you to explain it.

The issue is that your suggested explanations would include claims that most people wouldn’t describe using moral language and so it seems that your explanations fail in their task.

So I’ll try to make this simple. Here are two interpersonal normative claims:

1. You ought listen to my music
2. You ought not hurt puppies

If the first isn’t a moral obligation but the second is then a) what does it mean to say that the second is a moral obligation and b) what evidence or reasoning determines that the first isn’t a moral obligation but the second is?

How can you make such a claim if you do not know what "moral" is? — Banno

I can remember what sorts of things other people describe as moral.