Or there could be no such true brute facts such as the categorical imperative. Or, such ultimate moral propositions may not be truth-apt, while everyday moral claims, being claims about such ultimate propositions, are perfectly truth apt. — hypericin

That would be moral subjectivism?

Although I would argue against moral subjectivism on the grounds that when we make moral claims we don't usually think of ourselves to be just expressing a subjective opinion. This is why there is such a strong disagreement. When I say that X is good and you say that X is bad, you don't tell me that it might be good for me; you tell me that I'm wrong.

Rightly or wrongly we mean to assert an objective moral fact, and as such it must be that either moral realism or error theory is correct.

Or even moral nihilism. — frank

That is error theory?

Or are you saying the categorical imperative itself is the brute fact, for Kant. — hypericin

Yes.

Moral statements being truth apt doesn't entail moral realism. — frank

I agree with that. It could be that error theory or moral subjectivism are correct.

I'm a little confused. Are you saying that moral sentences aren't truth-apt or are you saying that moral sentences being truth-apt does not entail moral realism?

I'm not sure who would argue for the latter. Moral sentences being truth-apt also allows for error theory and moral subjectivism.

I'm also unsure of the relevance of being a deflationist. Even if one is a correspondence theorist or a coherence theorist it is still the case that moral sentences being truth-apt also allows for error theory and moral subjectivism.

The problem is that's doesn't lead to the moral realism as a conclusion if you're a deflationist. — frank

My understanding of moral realism is that it is the theory that some moral propositions are true in such a way that if everyone believes that they are false then everyone is wrong.

Why can't a moral realist believe this and also be a deflationist?

But I do have a problem equating something which can be necessarily inferred from a state of affairs, to something which truly is malleable to opinion (that one ought not x). There is nothing that makes this true if no one believes it. I think that’s probably a fairly comprehensible difference. I know that may not be your position - just giving my position on that, given we appear to have come to terms. — AmadeusD

All you seem to be saying here is that you're not a moral realist. Obviously moral realists disagree with you; that one ought not X isn't malleable to opinion and there is something that makes "one ought not X" true if no one believes it: that one ought not X.

In the moral realist case (and this seems plainly evident with a fellow such as Banno) the claim is made…. And that’s it. It’s not inferred or exemplified or entailed by or understood in relation to anything which does exist. — AmadeusD

The same is true of mathematics. It is true that 1 + 1 = 2 even though this has nothing to do with the physical existence of anything. There are some, i.e. mathematical realists, who explain this by positing the existence of abstract mathematical objects, but I don't think that this is required. Mathematical anti-realists can believe that 1 + 1 = 2 even if everyone believes otherwise.

And perhaps some moral realists explain moral realism by positing the existence of abstract moral objects.

As much as it can be stated that its “the way things are” so to speak, that is incoherent as there’s zero evidence for it let alone good evidence.

You can verify the equation. You can’t verify a moral claim. — AmadeusD

Some think you can verify a moral claim. Kant attempted to prove the categorical imperative using what he called pure practical reason.

But even if you can't, it doesn't then follow that moral realism is false. It is possible that a) there is some sentence "one ought not X" that is non-subjectively true and that b) it is impossible to verify or falsify this sentence.

There are plenty of truth-apt sentences that cannot be proven or disproven, e.g. "the universe was created by a transcendent intelligent designer" and "if Hitler hadn't killed himself then he would have been arrested."

As I said before, if your only objection is that moral realists haven't proven that there are brute moral facts then I won't object. My only argument here is to refute the suggestion that all brute facts must have something to do with physical (or abstract) existence.

If that's what you mean by "objective" then I will use the term "non-subjective" instead.

Some truths are non-subjective, i.e. are true even if everyone believes otherwise.

The sentence "Santa does not exist" is true, and is so even if everyone believes that Santa does exist. If everyone believes that Santa does exist then everyone is wrong. "Santa does not exist" is non-subjectively true.

Moral realists claim that some sentence "one ought not X" is true, and is so even if everyone believes that one ought X. If everyone believes that one ought X then everyone is wrong. "One ought not X" is non-subjectively true.

The non-subjective truth of "one ought not X" does not depend on the existence of some particular physical or abstract object. The non-subjective truth of "one ought not X" does not depend on the existence of anything. The non-subjective truth of "one ought not X" has nothing to do with existence at all.

Exactly like the non-subjective truth of "1 + 1 = 2".

It just is the case that 1 + 1 = 2 and just is the case that one ought not X, and if everyone believes otherwise then everyone is wrong.

'Santa does not exist' can't be objectively true because it refers to no object. — AmadeusD

Why does something need to refer to an object to be objectively true? To be objectively true just means that it's true irrespective of subjective opinion.

If everyone believes that Santa exists then everyone is wrong because Santa doesn't exist.

How does one discover and verify such brute facts? — hypericin

That is the key question that moral realists need to answer. Kant, for example, believed that this could be done using what he called pure practical reason, leading him to the categorical imperative.

Presumably you meant "...why there is something..." — hypericin

No, my point is that if moral facts are brute facts then there is no answer to the "why". But it is reasonable to ask the realist to prove "that" there are brute moral facts.

Physicists can empirically verify is (with reference to definition, sure). Moral facts are not amendable to the same verification. I think this is the trouble, though i agree that's how realists see their position. — AmadeusD

Proving that something is the case isn't the same as proving why something is the case.

I'm saying that there is no explanation for why electrons are negatively charged, and that there is no explanation for why one ought not do something.

If all you want to say is that moral realists haven't proven that there is something that one ought not do then I won't object.

I just can't conceive of a moral statement being self-evident — AmadeusD

I said that they're brute facts, not that they're self-evident. It is a brute fact that electrons are negatively charged particles, but it isn't self-evident.

So when we look at the "One ought not keep slaves" statement, there HAS to be a 'why' or 'in what condition' that obtains. — AmadeusD

Why are electrons negatively charge particles?

No. This is merely another inference from the actual state of affairs, which is only able to capture that which is, not that which isn't. Re: teh second quote there, they don't come into contact with what actually is and so have no truth-value.

If you don't accept that, fair enough - but it seems pretty clear we're not misunderstanding each other anymore which i think is good. — AmadeusD

These statements are true:

1) there is no ball in the room
2) there is no elephant in the room

This statement is false:

3) there is no ball in the room iff there is no elephant in the room

Therefore, whatever it is that makes (1) true isn't what makes (2) true. This is the case even if the room is the only thing that exists.

Therefore, something other than everything that exists (the room) is a necessary truth-condition.

Therefore, not all truth conditions are things that exist.

If I have an inner monologue it’s definitely not auditory. I think for me it’s just micro tongue movements as if I was talking. When I focus on my tongue and try to keep it perfectly still I find that I can’t really think any words.

You don't have an internal monologue/voice? — RogueAI

https://www.psychologytoday.com/gb/blog/intersections/202304/inner-monologues-what-are-they-and-whos-having-them

30-50% of people have inner monologues.

So, I just disagree with this. Those are referencing the same state-of-affairs, but noting different things that are not in that state-of-affairs.

The room in both cases is the exact same: the same couch, same chair, etc.; so why would noting there isn't A vs. B, assuming they both are not in the room, refer to a different state-of-affairs?

For any given state-of-affairs, there is an infinite amount of things of which their existence cannot be found therein and, thusly, can be predicated as "not there". — Bob Ross

Then you're just using the term "state of affairs" differently to me.

Are you familiar with the distinction between truth makers and truth bearers? A truth bearer is a truth-apt sentence such as "the cat is on the mat." A truth maker is the condition that must be satisfied for a truth bearer to be true.

I use the terms "state of affairs" and "truth maker" interchangeably, but if you don't then I'll rephrase what I said above:

That there is no ball in your room is a truth maker.
That there is no elephant in your room is a different truth maker.

This must be the case otherwise it would be the case that "there is no ball in your room" is true iff there is no elephant in your room, which is of course false.

If your room is the only thing that exists then it is the case that a) just one thing exists and b) there are (at least) two different truth makers.

Therefore, a truth maker cannot be reduced to the thing(s) that exist(s).

Moral realists claim that some truth bearer "one ought not X" is true because a particular truth maker – that one ought not X – objectively obtains.

Their position has nothing to do with what does or doesn't physically (or abstractly) exist.

But the fact that different people have different values means that there is no point-of-view invariant value, as value depends on the point of view. — bert1

I'm not sure what you mean here by "value". I am simply saying that moral realists believe that there is some X such that "one ought not X" is a brute fact.

Asking them to explain why it's the case that one ought not X is like asking the physicist why electrons are negatively charged particles. There's just no answer to this question.

Correct. The proposition "there is no ball in my room" is true iff the state-of-affairs in my room is such that it excludes the existence of the ball. Michael appears to think, if I am understanding them correctly, that it being true is in virtue of a state-of-affairs which does not exist but makes it true. — Bob Ross

That there is no ball in your room is a state of affairs.
That there is no elephant in your room is a different state of affairs.

There is one room but there are (at least) two different states of affairs.

If your room is the only thing that exists then it is the case that a) just one thing exists and b) there are (at least) two different states of affairs.

Therefore, a state of affairs cannot be reduced to the the thing(s) that exist(s).

Anyway, the Supreme Court has already ruled on this in Brandenburg v. Ohio:

These later decisions have fashioned the principle that the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.

And that’s on them, not Trump. Took you long enough to get there. — NOS4A2

It's on both.

But there are people willing to act on all of the above, to abide by someone else’s dictates, up until and including throwing someone in jail because he made certain sounds with his mouth. — NOS4A2

And there are people willing to act on Trump's false claims of a stolen election and his suggestion to "fight like hell" against an "illegitimate president".

Glad you finally understand.

Their gag order is censorship. — NOS4A2

The gag order is just words. They don’t censor anything. That would be sorcery. Trump is perfectly able to ignore the gag order and say and post what he wants.

And as gag orders are just words, judges have a First Amendment right to issue them. They’re allowed to say whatever they like - even if they are threatening punishment.

You can criticise any punishment that’s actually issued, but unless and until that happens, there’s nothing for you to object to.

And the same for you paying your taxes.

If others are forced to move at the sight and sound of words, what’s your excuse? — NOS4A2

Well this a strawman. Influence and incitement aren’t force.

What you don’t mention is all the sales and all the ads that do not influence you. — NOS4A2

I’m not claiming that everyone is influenced by everything. I’m claiming that people can be influenced by the things other people say. It’s not sorcery; it’s psychology.

I suppose that reveals more about you — NOS4A2

That my behaviour can be influenced by the words I see and hear? Well, yes. That's just a well-known fact of psychology. Advertising is a science.

It's also why some politicians use slogans like Obama's "Yes we can" and Trump's "Make America Great Again". They serve a psychological purpose in winning over support that a dry explanation of policy wouldn't achieve.

Are you the type that buys a product when you see an ad for it? — NOS4A2

Not all the time, but I'm a sucker for a sale.

Not a single one of them has caused or influenced a goddamn thing. — NOS4A2

It's a good thing you don't work in advertising.

https://newrepublic.com/post/177342/jack-smith-new-evidence-trump-tried-start-riot-michigan

Prosecutors with special counsel Jack Smith revealed Tuesday that they have proof an “agent” for Donald Trump tried to cause a riot in Michigan to stop the vote count in the 2020 presidential election.

Smith indicted Trump in August for his role in the January 6 insurrection and other attempts to overturn the presidential election. Smith’s team said in a Tuesday court filing that an unindicted co-conspirator, identified only as “Campaign Employee” sent text messages on November 4, 2020, to an attorney working with Trump’s campaign at the TCF Center in Detroit, where ballots were being counted.

“In the messages, the Campaign Employee encouraged rioting and other methods of obstruction when he learned that the vote count was trending in favor of the defendant’s opponent,” prosecutors said.

Joe Biden won Michigan in 2020 with 50.6 percent of the vote. Trump was just a few percentage points behind.

According to the filing, around the same time the employee sent those messages, “an election official at the TCF Center observed that as Biden began to take the lead, a large number of untrained individuals flooded the TCF Center and began making illegitimate and aggressive challenges to the vote count.” Meanwhile, Trump himself began pushing false claims about the TCF Center.

You seem to have misunderstood what I was saying.

These are two different sentences with two different truth conditions:

1. My mind exists
2. Only my mind exists

The existence of my mind is sufficient for (1) to be true but insufficient for (2) to be true. Something other than the existence of my mind is (also) required for (2) to be true:

Only my mind exists iff a) my mind exists and b) nothing else exists.

(b) is a state-of-affairs but not something that exists. Therefore your claim that “something is a state-of-affairs only if it exists” is false.

But they can let a racist DA… — NOS4A2

Racist?

I may be needing to adjust my view here because there is no object. — AmadeusD

Objects don't need to exist for statements to be true. "Santa doesn't exist" is true. "1 + 1 = 2" is true. "The last ever human will die before the heat death of the Universe" is true. “Dinosaurs once walked the Earth” is true.

"trees exist" is made true by the existence of something and "trees don't exist" is made true by the non-existence of something. As such, existence of something is not a prerequisite of truth.

In fact, "trees don't exist" is true even if nothing exists.

Trump Loses Bid to Fast-Track Appeal of His New York Gag Orders

That was fast.

the absence of anything but that one mind exists in scenario 1. — AmadeusD

You're saying that non-existence exists. That makes no sense. At the very least you seem to be using the term "exists" in two different way which I suspect is leading you to equivocate.

I still end up with the answer "Not existing isn't a state of affairs". It's talking about a non-state-of-affairs. — AmadeusD

If you want to say that not existing isn't a state of affairs, and if it is objectively true that nothing else exists in scenario 1, then you must accept that objective truth does not always depend on there being some corresponding state of affairs.

So whether non-existence is a state of affairs or whether objective truth does not depend on some corresponding state of affairs, it is the case that objective truth does not always depend on the existence of something, and so it is fallacious to claim that moral realism is false because it doesn't correspond to something that exists.

So it's not like it actually frees up the use of the literal verbose name of the variable itself. It just makes it so "Ok now I have to use use '$name2' or '$variable2' instead of what comes firsthand in mind." as far as secondhand development/utilization of a framework goes. — Outlander

No, it means you're not allowed to change the name.

I agree with the statement that “something is a state-of-affairs only if it exists” — Bob Ross

Consider two scenarios:

Scenario 1:
Only my mind exists

Scenario 2:
Only my mind and your mind exist

The sentence "only my mind exists" is true in scenario 1 but false in scenario 2. If a sentence is true only if it refers to something that exists then it must be that something exists in scenario 1 that doesn't exist in scenario 2. But this clearly isn't the case. The only thing that exists in scenario 1 – my mind – also exists in scenario 2.

That nothing else exists in scenario 1 is a state-of-affairs, but not something that "exists". Therefore it is false to say that something is a state-of-affairs only if it exists.

https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-says-ground-forces-operating-across-gaza-strip-offensive-builds-2023-12-04/

Intense Israeli air strikes hit the south of the Gaza Strip on Monday, killing and wounding dozens of Palestinians, including in areas where Israel had told people to seek shelter, residents and journalists on the ground said.

Well that's pretty fucking terrible.

If you agree to that, we can put the whole issue of truth to the side and just talk about how statements refer, right? — frank

Sure, although I don't know how statements refer.

Edit: except that if you're a physicalist and you endorse correspondence theory, then for you, true statements are going to have to refer to physical things (or things that reduce to the physical.) — frank

I think of physicalism as the thesis that everything that exists is physical. That's not the same as saying that every true statement refers to a physical thing. The sentences "Santa does not exist" and "1 + 1 = 2" are true but do not refer to physical things.

I think too many in this discussion equate "truth" with "existence". They are separate matters of enquiry.

So we're dispensing with talk of the T-sentence and directions of fit, right? We're now directly addressing this argument for moral realism:

1. premise: Correspondence theory of truth
2. Moral statement M is true.
3. because of correspondence theory, M corresponds to a state of the world.
4. therefore, moral realism.

Do you agree with that? Correspondence theory is not rooted in physicalism. It was first expressed during the "age of essence" by Aristotle. It's blind to ontological commitments. — frank

I think of moral realism as the thesis that moral propositions are truth-apt and (attempt to) refer to objective features of the world, and that some such propositions are true.

If a statement "corresponding" to the world just is that it refers to the world and is true, then sure, moral realism implicitly endorses the correspondence theory of truth.

The proposition "Santa does not exist" is true because it corresponds to the state of affairs that Santa does not exist.

The proposition "1 + 1 = 2" is true because it corresponds to the state of affairs that 1 + 1 = 2.

The proposition "one ought not harm another" is true because it corresponds to the state of affairs that one ought not harm another.

I'm not exactly sure what it is you want. If you want to say that a statement is true only if it corresponds to some physical thing, then I would dispute that. Santa not existing and 1 + 1 equalling 2 are not physical things, and yet they definitely are the case. The moral realist will say that that one ought nor harm another is not a physical thing, and yet definitely is the case.

It is a fact that "santa does not exist" because what the proposition is referencing about reality is that there is no santa in it, and this is true. — Bob Ross

And the moral realist will say that it is a fact that one ought not harm another because what the proposition is referencing about reality is that one ought not harm another, and this is true.

At times it seems that you think of a fact as referring to something that physically exists, e.g. here where you say "[facts] correspond to a state-of-affairs in reality (where ‘reality’ is the ‘totality of stance-independently, existent things’)," although this is inconsistent with what you're now saying about the fact of Santa's non-existence.

Santa's non-existence is a state-of-affairs, but not an existing thing. This assumption that something is a state-of-affairs only if it exists is a false one, and so morality not existing (e.g. as some physical thing) does not entail that there are no moral states-of-affairs.

Instead use a prefix so it would be

$_name — Outlander

That used to be how things were done, but then PHP introduced "protected" and "private" visibility precisely so that we didn't have to do this.