My answer to that question was, when I am not perceiving the world, there is no reason that I can believe in the existence of the world. I may still believe in the existence of the world without perceiving it, but the ground for my belief in the existence is much compromised in accuracy and certainty due to lack of the warrant for the belief. — Corvus

Do you actually mean that there is no reason or do you just mean that the reasons given are inadequate?

Which ones — AmadeusD

Perhaps “one ought not harm another.”

what mind-independent feature — AmadeusD

Perhaps that one ought not harm another.

and how could that come to our sensibility if not through phenomenal interpretation — AmadeusD

Perhaps not all truths come to our sensibility through phenomenal interpretation.

For example, perhaps either it is a mind independent fact that the universe was created by a transcendent intelligent designer or it is a mind independent fact that the universe wasn’t created by a transcendent intelligent designer. Perhaps either it is true that it is sometimes reasonable to believe in something despite there being no phenomenal evidence or it is true that it is never reasonable to believe in something despite there being no phenomenal evidence.

Or must we be agnostic on all such things? But then what phenomenal evidence suggests that we must be agnostic on all such things?

Leontiskos brought up a good point: update 1 & 2 can now be condensed essentially into the following argument:

P1: If we do not know of any moral facts, then we have no reason to believe them.
P2: We do not know of any moral facts.
C: Therefore, we have no reason to believe them. — Bob Ross

Are you saying that we do not know that there are moral facts or are you saying that we do not know whether or not something like "you ought not harm another" is a moral fact? Because these are different things (e.g., I know that you have/had a mother but I do not know which woman is/was your mother).

I’m not trying to prove that one ought not harm another. I’m trying to make sense of moral realism. Moral realists claim that there is something like an objective, mind-independent fact that one ought not harm another, and that because of this fact the proposition “one ought not harm another” is true.

I’m not offering a syllogism. I’m using something like Tarski’s T schema.

“Electrons objectively, mind independently, are negatively charged particles” is true because electrons objectively, mind independently, are negatively charged particles.

“One objectively, mind independently, ought not murder” is true because one objectively, mind independently, ought not murder.

Demonstrating why something like that might be true could constitute merely pointing to a relevant fact about why it is wrong to harm people. — ToothyMaw

Asking why it’s wrong to harm people is like asking why electrons are negatively charged. There is no answer; some things are simply fundamental, brute facts. Explanations have to come to an end somewhere.

Sure, one might make mistakes in analyzing such explanations, but the moral person would search for those most true given a set of "brute facts". — ToothyMaw

One such brute fact might be “it is wrong to harm people.”

I know. Are you saying you are a realist and thus that your claim that one ought not murder is a moral fact? It sounds more like you are just adopting a pragmatic way of going about it that appeals to concepts like innocence and obligation and not actual fact hood. — ToothyMaw

I'm simply questioning the assertion that if one cannot derive an ought from an is then any claim of obligation is false.

Perhaps "you ought not harm another" is simply a brute fact about reality, much like "electrons are negatively charged particles" is.

If you cannot demonstrate why your particular morality is fundamentally more justified than another's, what reason do I have to follow it? — ToothyMaw

If by "what reason do I have to follow it" you mean something like "why should I believe you" then maybe you shouldn't believe me if I can't prove it.

But whether or not I can prove it and whether or not you should believe me is a separate issue to whether or not it is true.

If realism is correct then something can be both true and unprovable.

Why is it wrong to do that? — bert1

Why are electrons negatively charged?

I don't think there's a meaningful answer to the question. Some things are simply fundamental, brute facts about the world. Explanations have to come to an end somewhere.

Better questions are: "how do you know that it's wrong?" or "how can one verify that it's wrong?".

The proposition “there is a normative fact such that ‘one actually ought not harm another’” does not entail, if true, that “one actually ought not harm another” — Bob Ross

I'm not stating the former proposition; I'm stating the latter.

One actually, absolutely, really, categorically, objectively, super duper, ought not harm another.

I don't think I addressed Sirius...? — Banno

Yeah, sorry, got mixed up with another discussion. I meant Bob Ross.

My concern is simply that folk accept that there are moral truths. — Banno

That's fine, but there can be a big difference between the various ways that such truths are understood. Consider mathematics; both mathematical realists and mathematical ant-realists believe that there are mathematical truths, but there is a distinction between the Platonism of mathematical realism and the formalism of mathematical anti-realism. Or consider an example from the SEP article: there is a distinction between a diamond being made of carbon and a diamond being worth £1,000.

The question many want an answer to is if moral truths are comparable to Platonism/a diamond being made of carbon (realism), or to formalism/a diamond being worth £1,000 (anti-realism).

Yes, with respect what I regard as ‘moral’ signification, the word ‘morally’ is signifying in #1 that this is something you actually ought to be doing (and, in this case, more specifically, that you should not be harming others). — Bob Ross

I don't understand the distinction between something I ought to do and something I actually ought to do.

But fine, using your language:

A moral realist might claim that the statement "one actually ought not harm another" is made true by the mind-independent fact that one actually ought not harm another (much like someone might claim that the statement "electrons are negatively charged particles" is made true by the mind-independent fact that electrons are negatively charged particles).

... it will never be related as strongly as if it corresponded to a fact about reality (or something like that). — ToothyMaw

The realist will claim that that one ought not murder is a fact about reality, much like that an electron is a negatively charged particle is a fact about reality.

Why is the "ought" in "one ought not murder" morally compelling? — ToothyMaw

That's a different question. It might be true that one ought not murder even if knowing this doesn't compel me to obey. Perhaps I just don't care about what I ought or ought not do. Perhaps I enjoy doing things I shouldn't.

Meta ethics isn't concerned with what we actually choose to do.

I don't know what the philosophers are doing. — Inyenzi

Trying to make sense of and justify the many things we simply take for granted.

Let's keep it simple.

Electrons are negatively charged particles. How do I verify (or falsify) this?
One ought not murder. How do I verify (or falsify) this?

Assume that we can verify that electrons are negatively charged particles but cannot verify that one ought not murder. What then? Perhaps:

One ought not assert a claim that one cannot verify.

But then how do I verify (or falsify) this?

I have no problem, fundamentally, with this (other than labeling it as a moral realist position) because it didn’t specify the mind-independent fact of ‘one ought not harm another’ as morally signified. My argument doesn’t negate the possibility of normative facts—just moral facts. — Bob Ross

What would it mean for a fact to be moral? Do these two propositions mean different things?

1. one morally ought not harm another
2. one non-morally ought not harm another

If so then let's just rephrase my previous comment:

A moral realist might claim that the statement "one morally ought not harm another" is made true by the mind-independent fact that one morally ought not harm another (much like someone might claim that the statement "electrons are negatively charged particles" is made true by the mind-independent fact that electrons are negatively charged particles).

There are, broadly speaking, two types of derivation.

The first is to derive from a single premise:

a)
Premise: This is a red car
Conclusion: Therefore, this is a car

The second is to derive from more than one premise:

b)
Premise: If John is a man then John is mortal
Premise: John is a man
Conclusion: Therefore, John is mortal

So now let's consider obligations:

c)
Premise: One ought not murder
Conclusion: Therefore, one ought not murder John

d)
Premise: If John is innocent then one ought not kill him
Premise: John is innocent
Conclusion: Therefore, one ought not kill John

Perhaps you want an argument of these forms:

e)
Premise: Murder is Y
Conclusion: Therefore, one ought not murder

f)
Premise: If murder is Y then murder is Z
Premise: Murder is Y
Conclusion: Therefore, one ought not murder

I don't think either e) or f) can ever be valid. But so what? Why isn't c) or d) sufficient?

There seems to be this implicit claim that if "one ought not murder" cannot be derived from "murder is Y" premises alone then it cannot be true. What justifies this claim?

1. Naturalism is true

2. The linguistic and non-linguistic practices which do not refer to or supervene on any natural fact outside the linguistic and non-linguistic practices must solely depend on the collective mind judgements of the community. — Sirius

Moral realists reject 1 and/or 2.

To prove moral realism wrong you must prove 1 and 2 true. You haven't done so, only asserted them.

Although it would help if you could explain what you mean by naturalism. Do you mean physicalism? If so, what of mathematics?

I believe there is a fundamental disagreement between us regarding the ontological and logical status of possible states and actual states of affairs.

...

A true possible state of affairs is actual. — Sirius

Yes, there is a fundamental disagreement. My take is that truth is a "property" of expressions, i.e. speech, writing, thought, etc. As such, as you say, "true statements can only exist as cognitive content," given that speech, writing, and thought can only exist as cognitive content. But there's more to the world than speech, writing, and thought, and so that speech, writing, and thought can only exist as cognitive content isn't that the rest of the world can only exist as cognitive content.

But you seem to be arguing that truth is a property of other things (e.g. the states of affairs that speech, writing, and thought are about). It's not a position I agree with.

Even if I were to accept that truth is a property of these other things, note that these other things aren't statements. A true state of affairs isn't a true statement, and so that true statements can only exist as cognitive content isn't that true states of affairs can only exist as cognitive content. Your argument appears to equivocate.

Seems too strong to me.

A moral realist need only claim that "one ought not harm another" is either true or false.

A moral antirealist claims that it has no truth value...? — Banno

Your use of the term "moral realism" seems equivalent to what most philosophers mean by moral cognitivism, and your use of the term "moral antirealism" seems equivalent to what most philosophers mean by moral noncognitvism. Yours isn't the standard terminology.

See here:

Cognitivist theories hold that evaluative moral sentences express propositions (i.e., they are 'truth-apt' or 'truth bearers', capable of being true or false), as opposed to non-cognitivism.

...

Moral realism ... holds that such propositions are about robust or mind-independent facts, that is, not facts about any person or group's subjective opinion, but about objective features of the world.

...

Ethical subjectivism is one form of moral anti-realism. It holds that moral statements are made true or false by the attitudes and/or conventions of people, either those of each society, those of each individual, or those of some particular individual.

...

Error theory, another form of moral anti-realism, holds that although ethical claims do express propositions, all such propositions are false.

...

Non-cognitivist theories hold that ethical sentences are neither true nor false because they do not express genuine propositions.

Or if you don't like Wikipedia then see here:

Traditionally, to hold a realist position with respect to X is to hold that X exists objectively. On this view, moral anti-realism is the denial of the thesis that moral properties—or facts, objects, relations, events, etc. (whatever categories one is willing to countenance)—exist objectively. This could involve either (1) the denial that moral properties exist at all, or (2) the acceptance that they do exist but this existence is (in the relevant sense) non-objective. There are broadly two ways of endorsing (1): moral noncognitivism and moral error theory. Proponents of (2) may be variously thought of as moral non-objectivists, or idealists, or constructivists. So understood, moral anti-realism is the disjunction of three theses:

1. moral noncognitivism
2. moral error theory
3. moral non-objectivism

Sirius is arguing against moral realism as described above, not against moral cognitivism in general.

If my OP is true, then this position would be false because moral statements are not made true by some mind-independent feature of the world (i.e., they are not moral facts). — Bob Ross

A moral realist might claim that the statement "one ought not harm another" is made true by the mind-independent fact that one ought not harm another (much like someone might claim that the statement "electrons are negatively charged particles" is made true by the mind-independent fact that electrons are negatively charged particles).

I don't see how you've shown that this can't be the case.

Also, there are infinitely many numbers, right? — RogueAI

Not in the Platonic sense. Numbers don't exist. Rather, when we say that there are infinitely many numbers we are just saying that we can (in principle) keep adding 1 forever.

You take facts to be possible states of affairs, which must either be true or false. — Sirius

Statements are true, states of affairs obtain. A statement is true if it describes a state of affairs that obtains, and false if it describes a state of affairs that doesn't obtain.

There are a finite number of statements but (possibly) an infinite number of states of affairs. Statements depend on "cognitive content" but (some) states of affairs don't.

3. There are infinitely many statements that are necessarily true, independent of spacetime itself — Sirius

I dispute this. There may be infinitely many facts, but it does not follow that there are infinitely many true statements. Some facts just aren’t talked about.

At the very least you can say that there are infinitely many possible true statements, but I don’t think that requires an all-encompassing mind.

Let’s take a simple example: one ought not harm another.

Broadly speaking there are three different approaches.

1. The moral nihilist will argue that no statements of this kind are true.

2. The moral anti-realist will argue that some statements of this kind are true and are made true by some mind-dependent feature of the world.

3. The moral realist will argue that some statements of this kind are true and are made true by some mind-independent feature of the world.

I don’t quite see how your argument proves 2 and/or disproves 1 and 3.

Special counsel investigating Joe Biden’s handling of classified material is not expected to bring charges

Special counsel Robert Hur is not expected to charge anyone in connection with the mishandling of classified documents at two locations connected to President Joe Biden, two sources close to the investigation told CNN.

The most common argument against the existence of objective morality and moral facts besides moral differences between societies is that they aren’t tangible objects found in the universe and can’t be measured scientifically. Are there any refutations or arguments against this? — Captain Homicide

Question the implicit assertion that if something isn't a tangible object found in the universe and can't be measured scientifically then it doesn't exist.

Will no one rid me of this meddlesome priest? — Michael

Hah, Jack Smith even quoted this in a recent court filing.

https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.cadc.40232/gov.uscourts.cadc.40232.1208570955.0.pdf

As the court explained, targeted disparagement of this sort poses a danger even when it does not explicitly call for harassment or violence, as repeated attacks are often understood as a signal to act—just as King Henry II’s remark, “Will no one rid me of this meddlesome priest?” resulted in Thomas à Becket’s murder. JA.183, 202; see, e.g., United States v. Smallwood, 365 F. Supp. 2d 689, 696 n.14 (E.D. Va. 2005) (discussing idiom). Such risks are far from speculative here, the court found, given uncontradicted evidence showing that when the defendant “has singled out certain people in public statements in the past,” it has “led to them being threatened and harassed.” JA.209.

I personally didn’t attend any of Biden’s rallies. — praxis

Why would anyone attend a political rally? It's so weird. Just watch whatever they have to say on TV. It's much more comfortable.

The irony of someone trying to argue that words have no power to influence.

https://www.thedailybeast.com/trump-shares-creepy-fantasy-about-citizens-arrest-of-judge-engoron-ag-letitia-james

Former President Donald Trump may already be on thin ice with the jurist presiding over his New York fraud trial, but that didn’t stop him from reposting a supporter’s creepy suggestion that Judge Arthur Engoron and New York Attorney General Leticia James should be placed under citizen’s arrest.

https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/donald-trump-fiery-rhetoric-jonathan-karl_n_6552a1dee4b0c9f2466156af

Trump Told ABC Reporter He Hopes Fans Act On His Fiery Rhetoric

Will no one rid me of this meddlesome priest?

He’s literally not. — NOS4A2

He literally is.

All I have to do is look at the preceding context (which you suspiciously leave out) and see that you’re wrong.

“They have done something that allows the next party — I mean, if somebody, if I happen to be president and I see somebody who’s doing well and beating me very badly, I say ‘Go down and indict them.’ They’d be out of business, they’d be out of the election.” — NOS4A2

Exactly. He’s saying that because he is being indicted then if he wins the election then he will indict his opponents if he sees that they are doing well and beating him.

But you thought he was saying it allows him to terminate the constitution, which is an absolute lie. — NOS4A2

"A Massive Fraud of this type and magnitude allows for the termination of all rules, regulations, and articles ... found in the Constitution."

He's literally saying that.

False. He was explaining why it was wrong. — NOS4A2

He wasn't just explaining why it was wrong. He was explaining that he would commit that very same wrong (that he is falsely accusing others of).

This is true. — NOS4A2

No it's not.

He was explaining why it was wrong to weaponize the justice department, because doing so sets the precedent. — NOS4A2

He wasn't just explaining that. He was also saying that he will weaponize it in the future.

And whereas he is being indicted because there is evidence of multiple crimes, he explicitly said that he would indict someone if "[he sees] somebody who is doing well and beating [him] very badly."

He's planning to weaponize the justice department in response to legitimate cases against him.

The notion that Trump called for the termination of the constitution or that he was going to indict political opponents is nonsense. — NOS4A2

https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/109449803240069864

A Massive Fraud of this type and magnitude allows for the termination of all rules, regulations, and articles, even those found in the Constitution.

https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/376097-trump-take-the-guns-first-go-through-due-process-second/

“Take the guns first, go through due process second,” Trump said.

You load every single item (thousands), image link, and description (often lengthy) when someone visits your homepage? That doesn't seem efficient to me. I suppose it simply loads the blank "default item" page and clicking the item individually loads its information? That would still require every single item in inventory's ID, picture, title, and usually price to be loaded from the first homepage visit. That seems a bit much. — Outlander

Not if you use code-splitting. On the initial page load it just pulls down something like "index.js" and then runs the code in that. When you click the "/about" link it pulls down "about.js" and then runs the code in that. If you go back to the home page it re-uses the "index.js" that has already been downloaded. And the same if you return to "/about". This can make for a faster user experience and reduce the load on the server.

But for anything useful like a public forum or guestbook, or say billing or payment application where an action could have been made from another avenue ie. by phone and needs to be updated, it really ought to communicate with the server, wouldn't you say? — Outlander

Yes. Many SPAs will use Ajax. I was just pointing out the technical point that SPAs and Ajax are independent technologies.

As for "AJAX vs. HTML page loading" as you say, again it's a matter of allowing for a faster user experience and reducing server load. With an SPA when navigating to the second page of a discussion it only needs to return a JSON object of the second page's post data and then rebuild the section of the page that displays the post, whereas with an MPA it has to return all the HTML for the entire page as well as run any additional processes/queries to generate any of the surrounding data (e.g. using TPF as an example, the list of categories and the logged-in user's mention, comment, and discussion count).

Historical precedent also confirms that a criminal conviction is not required for an individual to be disqualified under Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment. No one who has been formally disqualified under Section 3 was charged under the criminal “rebellion or insurrection” statute (18 U.S.C. § 2383) or its predecessors. This fact is consistent with Section 3’s text, legislative history, and precedent, all of which make clear that a criminal conviction for any offense is not required for disqualification. Section 3 is not a criminal penalty, but rather is a qualification for holding public office in the United States that can be and has been enforced through civil lawsuits in state courts, among other means.

Well that addresses my initial skepticism that the lawsuit would succeed.

I think you misunderstand what an SPA is.

Think of a website as a book. In traditional MPAs (multi-page apps), you ask the website to give you a page. You read it and then ask for another page. In SPAs (single-page apps), you ask the website to give you a book. There are still pages but you don't have to ask for the website to give you them each individually.

So in a way the "P" in "SPA" and "MPA" is a bit of a misnomer.

Although even this analogy is a little off as with code-splitting you do get given each page individually, but it only gives you the new stuff, e.g. the particular block of the website that is about to change. You don't have to be sent all the surrounding stuff as well. This makes it faster.

@Jamal

Plush Content Ltd financial statement Feb 2023

They have 1 employee and £1,745.42 in the bank.

Also remember you're describing AJAX deep down at the end of the day — Outlander

SPAs don't require Ajax.

You might prefer Svelte.