I think you are missing the point that the self is not 'in there' to begin with but more like an avatar within a conversation. — plaque flag
To me Brandom is the beautiful collision of AP clarity and continental insight. FWIW, an equivalence class is still abstract in some sense, what exactly do we mean by 'abstract' ? — plaque flag
I think this is where Hegel and Heidegger pour into Brandom who puts their ideas in a more AP and less freaky vocabulary. A person is like something like a dance rather than a pair of legs — plaque flag
. 'I' am held accountable for what I've said and done. An 'I' is the kind of the thing that ought not disagree with itself. This also applies to claims. I can't say I love animals and kick dogs for pissing in my yard. — plaque flag
This is where we will never agree. There is more to life and the world than language. Things happen that aren’t talked about. I don’t need a language or a community of people to interact with to have experiences. — Michael
:up:Lemons are sour and yellow, i.e., taste sour and look yellow. That you think this is (equivalent to) an hallucination plus an external trigger is just your headbound epistemology. — Jamal
It's not I see the tree directly but (much better!) I talk about the tree ( our tree) and not my image of the tree. — plaque flag
They aren't mental objects because one can be wrong about them, but they aren't physical like golf balls. — frank
Then this has nothing to do with direct and indirect realism, which concerns the nature of perception, not the nature of conversation. — Michael
:up:Yep, and it’s not just the problem of other heads. — Jamal
To what are you appealing to say so ? How could you possibly establish truths about the nature of perception without relying on inferential and semantic norms ? How could any theory avoid absurdity if it neglected to address or even acknowledge the condition of its possibility ? To do philosophy is to take up a duty to conform to certain norms and speak about a world beyond the self. Or is logic a private matter ? But that would be a self-cancelling statement. — plaque flag
It's about roles rather than 'positive elements.' And that gets us back to equivalence classes of tools that pretty much do the same thing. — plaque flag
1. I talk about external world objects
2. The nature of external world objects is given in my experience
Yes, both these claims require language to state, but they don’t mean the same thing. — Michael
All true. There are two egos. One appears in reflection only. As far as it has responsibility, this means it's being identified as a causal agent. It can also be helpless, so it's not just a matter of having power. — frank
quality of being. The here and now. The view out the windows of your eyeballs. — frank
Start with what you can't do without, then ponder the ontology. Otherwise the tail is wagging the dog. — frank
By and large phil-of-math people have recognized that we can't do without abstract objects due to some basic logic. Now if you want to dispense with logic, that's another matter. — frank
All true. There are two egos. One appears in reflection only. As far as it has responsibility, this means it's being identified as a causal agent. It can also be helpless, so it's not just a matter of having power.
— frank
We can maybe call this the empirical-normative ego. — plaque flag
In its radical purity, I think it's best called just being and not consciousness. We realize upon reflection, dragging in the heavy machinery of public concepts, — plaque flag
In principle, informal proofs can be translated into extremely pedantic formal proofs and checked by computers. So it's possible to think of all as a generalization of chess. I'm a big fan of Chaitin's Metamath. A FAS (formal axiomatic system) is an idealized program (one could create concrete examples in many ways) that cranks out all theorems implied by a set of axioms but enumerating all finite strings of symbols and seeing if they are proofs. It's all 'dead' symbol crunching. — plaque flag
But I do know with great certainty about my “sense data”. Even if I don’t know what is causing my “sense data”, I know for certain what my “sense data” is. And what is that? In this case, “sense data” of a tree. But did you not say that you did not know what is causing your “sense data”, so you can’t say it is “of a tree”. — Richard B
If the biological act of hearing involves using the body to perceive physical sound waves, it cannot be said that a man is hearing voices in his head, because there is neither the biological activity nor the sound waves required to hear such sounds. The biological activity of hearing and the biological act of hallucinating are two distinct biological activities. — NOS4A2
I didn’t say that I don’t know what is causing it. — Michael
But you only can say some empty generalization like “it is cause by some mind-independent object.” — Richard B
At first, yes. But then after a detailed scientific analysis (and assuming scientific realism is correct) we can extend it further to the cause being a collection of quarks, neutrons, and electrons, with the latter reflecting photons. — Michael
I really don’t understand you at all. — Michael
Whether or not I’m blind has everything to do with whether or not I can see and nothing to do with whether or not I can talk. — Michael
Interestingly, we by-pass the talk of “sense data”, and use everyday ordinary language of objects to set up some sort of correlation. — Richard B
A philosopher, as such, makes claims about semantic norms — plaque flag
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