I've made several accompanied by subsequent argument. You've chosen to neglect all that. — creativesoul

What argument are you talking about? Quote yourself.

The latest point was that you could not back up your claims about "there's a cow in the field" being justified. — creativesoul

First we have to agree on the notion of "justification", otherwise we are talking past each other.

You refuse to answer very basic questions regarding how? Instead, you feign ignorance and distract attention away from your own shortcomings by creating confusion regarding what is meant by the words that you must use in order to make your case. Like your herring a bit red, do you?

You've proven my last point rather nicely. — creativesoul

Given our past exchange, I can see why you are on the defensive. I didn't expect much from you either. Still I don't get what your point is. In this recent exchange between us, you didn't explain how you changed your views nor why. So either you quote your actual arguments or you can leave it at that. I suggest you the second, it's safer for you.

I'm still willing to see how "there is a cow in the field" satisfies your criterion for what counts as a justified belief. — creativesoul

Here is my proposal (for the third time):

• I think "justification" is a normative term, not a descriptive one. Additionally, justificatory practices vary depending on the genesis of a belief and they have different degrees of reliability (which also means that we distinguish "valid" from "sound" applications). Since our beliefs are fallible, our knowledge and justificatory claims are fallible as well
• since the distinction between justification+"no false lemma" and justification-"no false lemma" looks analogous to the distinction between sound and valid deduction, we could simply talk about sound vs valid justification depending on the context. So in the case of the farmer's false belief, we could say he is validly justified in believing that there is a cow, but not soundly justified. And only the latter case can be called knowledge.

Do you agree or not? If not why not?

Valid criticism of my own position works too, but if you do not understand it, then it would be unreasonable of me to expect you to provide such. I'm strongly asserting that it is not justified, and I've offered more than adequate/sufficient subsequent arguments and/or reasoning for that assertion. — creativesoul

Where? Quote yourself. I prefer to see the argument. Your self-promoting blablabla are not a replacement for it.

So in the case of the farmer's false belief, we could say he is validly justified in believing that there is a cow... — neomac

Still have not answered the question.

How does the farmer validly deduce/infer/conclude "there is a cow in the field" from mistaking cloth for cow(from believing that a particular piece of cloth in a particular field is a cow)?

validly deduce/infer/conclude "there is a cow in the field" from mistaking cloth — creativesoul

I answered that already but maybe you didn't get it. There is no deduction or inference or conclusion since these concepts for me apply more appropriately between propositions, not between perceptions and propositions! One can more appropriately be said to form a perceptual belief out of his perceptual experiences. How did the farmer form his perceptual belief "that is a cow" by watching a piece of cloth resembling a cow? My answer is that this can be explained as resulting from 2 factors: his perceptual activity (recognizing a cow-shaped appearance) and a cultural cognitive bias (due to the habits of watching cows in that field), these cognitive abilities constitute a VALID justification for his perceptual belief (because they are relatively reliable), but not a SOUND justification for his perceptual belief though (because in that specific case they failed).

There is no deduction or inference or conclusion since these concepts for me apply more appropriately between propositions, not between perceptions and propositions! — neomac

..these cognitive abilities constitute a VALID justification for his perceptual belief (because they are relatively reliable), but not a SOUND justification for his perceptual belief though (because in that specific case they failed). — neomac

Gibberish. One the one hand, you claim there is no inference, deduction, or conclusion possible between mistaking cloth for cow and the assertion "there is a cow in the field", and then call that assertion 'valid' despite just openly admitting that it is not even capable of being so.

Validity and soundness are qualities, characteristics, and/or features of logical arguments, reasoning, and such. They apply or not only after we assess how a belief(inference/deduction/conclusion) is arrived at. That's the part that's missing from the cottage cases. The former is measured solely by virtue of whether or not the target belief follows the rules of correct inference. The latter exhausts the former, but in addition, with sound arguments/reasoning, the target belief is not just validly inferred/deduced, but it is also based upon true premises.

Sigh...

There is no deduction or inference or conclusion since these concepts for me apply more appropriately between propositions, not between perceptions and propositions! — neomac


..these cognitive abilities constitute a VALID justification for his perceptual belief (because they are relatively reliable), but not a SOUND justification for his perceptual belief though (because in that specific case they failed). — neomac


Gibberish. One the one hand, you claim there is no inference, deduction, or conclusion possible between mistaking cloth for cow and the assertion "there is a cow in the field", and then call that assertion 'valid' despite just openly admitting that it is not even capable of being so. — creativesoul

You are evidently confused. In the quoted claims of mine the word "valid" is taken as qualifying "justification" (not "assertion") for a perceptual belief as contrasted to "sound" justification (not "assertion") and by analogy with the distinction of valid/sound deduction (not "assertion").

Validity and soundness are qualities, characteristics, and/or features of logical arguments, reasoning, and such. — creativesoul

The distinction valid/sound I'm expressly referring to is related to deduction. Then I'm proposing to extend the current usage of the distinction valid/sound from deduction to other cognitive tasks by analogy.
Here is my proposal (for the third time):

• I think "justification" is a normative term, not a descriptive one. Additionally, justificatory practices vary depending on the genesis of a belief and they have different degrees of reliability (which also means that we distinguish "valid" from "sound" applications). Since our beliefs are fallible, our knowledge and justificatory claims are fallible as well
• since the distinction between justification+"no false lemma" and justification-"no false lemma" looks analogous to the distinction between sound and valid deduction, we could simply talk about sound vs valid justification depending on the context. So in the case of the farmer's false belief, we could say he is validly justified in believing that there is a cow, but not soundly justified. And only the latter case can be called knowledge .

Still waiting for you to clarify how and why you changed your views or the way you present them.

So, your argument boils down to saying that "there is a cow in the field" is justified because you equivocate and/or abuse the term "valid".

Nice.

What's directly below is taken from Gettier's paper. It's worth mentioning here after the recent nonsense...

Various attempts have been made in recent years to state necessary and sufficient conditions for someone's knowing a given proposition. The attempts have often been such that they can be stated in a form similar to the following:

(a) S knows that P IFF

1.) P is true,
2.) S believes that P
3.) S is justified in believing that P


For example, Chisholm has held that the following gives the necessary
and sufficient conditions for knowledge:

(b) knows that P IFF

1.) S accepts P
2.) S has adequate evidence for P
3.) P is true.


Ayer has stated the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge as
follows

(c) S knows that P IFF

1.) P is true,
2.) S is sure that P is true, and
3.) S has the right to be sure that P is true.

I shall argue that (a) is false in that the conditions stated therein do not constitute a sufficient condition for the truth of the proposition that S knows that P. The same argument will show that (b) and (c) fail if ' has adequate evidence for ' or ' has the right to be sure that ' is substituted for ' is justified in believing that ' throughout.

I shall begin by noting two points. First, in that sense of 'justified ' in which S's being justified in believing P is a necessary condition of S's knowing that P, it is possible for a person to be justified in believing a proposition that is in fact false.

I agree with the first point.

Secondly, for any proposition P, if S is justified in believing P, and P entails Q, and S deduces Q from P and accepts Q as a result of this deduction, then S is justified in believing Q.

Here I disagree. I reject the rules of entailment because, as Gettier showed, we can use them to go from a belief that cannot be true to a belief that is. Logical/valid argument/reasoning preserves truth. The rules of entailment do not. If the preservation of truth is a requirement of valid, coherent, and/or logical reasoning, then the rules of 'logical' entailment fail to satisfy that standard.

In Gettier's argument, Q is not equivalent to S's belief.

The problem becomes apparent when we treat S's belief as S's belief(regarding who he believed would get the job and why he believed the disjunction was true) rather than as a naked proposition. I've done that work already.

An adequate summary...

Smith was not justified in believing anyone with ten coins in their pocket will get the job. He was justified in believing Jones did and would. Jones did not get the job, contrary to Smith's belief. Smith's belief was justified, valid, and false. What happened falsified Smith's belief.

Smith was not justified in believing that the disjunction was true because Q was. He was justified in believing that the disjunction was true because P was. The disjunction was not true because P was. The disjunction was true because Q was, contrary to Smith's belief. Smith's belief was justified, valid, and false. What happened falsified Smith's belief.<---that would be better put differently. What Smith believed to be the case was not.

"there is a cow in the field" is justified because you equivocate and/or abuse the term "valid". — creativesoul

I find your objections intelligible as farts, dude. As I stated, mine is just a proposal which must be judged on its own merit (consistency and explanatory/analytic power to say the least) not as a terminological issue. Indeed, I'm neither confusing my extended usage (valid/sound justification) with the standard usage (valid/sound deduction), nor violating the standard usage (i.e. I claimed nowhere that a deduction is valid when the standard usage claims it's not), so where on earth is the equivocation or the abuse exactly? Can you spell it out?
Concerning its analytic power, my proposal identifies and fixes an ambiguity in the standard usage of "justification" (e.g. does a misperception justify or not a certain belief? Justification with or without no false lemma? What is a partial justification?) by comparison to the standard and unambiguous distinction between valid and sound deduction, and this in turn clarifies where Gettier examples go wrong (they are grounded on a standard yet ambiguous understanding of "justification").
If we do not converge in the way we frame the problem, starting with clarifying the notion of "justification" which you never did, there is no chance we'll understand each other.

BTW,

Still waiting for you to clarify how and why you changed your views or the way you present them. — neomac

If Gettier is guilty of not properly taking account of Smith's belief, if Smith's belief was not equivalent to the propositions Gettier targeted, then there is no issue. JTB is left standing for in order to defeat JTB Gettier has to at least get the belief part right. He did not. End of story.

I reject the rules of entailment because, as Gettier showed, we can use them to go from a belief that cannot be true to a belief that is. Logical/valid argument/reasoning preserves truth. — creativesoul

Evidently you have no fucking clue what you are talking about. Valid deductions preserve truth, if premises are true, but that doesn't require nor imply that premises must be true! Indeed, valid deductions can very well conclude with true propositions (expressing beliefs) from false propositions (expressing beliefs)! Here is the example:
P1: All dogs are trees
P2: All trees are mammals
C: All dogs are mammals
This is a VALID DEDUCTION and the CONCLUSION IS TRUE, yet BOTH PREMISES ARE FALSE. Evidently you ignore the distinction between valid and sound deduction. And you want to discuss Gettier? Embarrassing.

BTW, since you keep dodging questions:

Still waiting for you to clarify how and why you changed your views or the way you present them. — neomac

This is a VALID DEDUCTION and the CONCLUSION IS TRUE, yet BOTH PREMISES ARE FALSE. — neomac

Valid deductions preserve truth — neomac

Self-contradiction.

Either it's not a valid deduction or valid deductions do not preserve truth. The premisses were both false. The preservation of truth includes the preservation of falsity.

You preposterously chopped my quotation ( Valid deductions preserve truth, if premises are true ) to suggest a contradiction which doesn't exist. How pathetic is that?!

In logic, specifically in deductive reasoning, an argument is valid if and only if it takes a form that makes it impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion nevertheless to be false.[1] It is not required for a valid argument to have premises that are actually true,[2] but to have premises that, if they were true, would guarantee the truth of the argument's conclusion. Valid arguments must be clearly expressed by means of sentences called well-formed formulas (also called wffs or simply formulas).

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Validity_(logic)

Either it's not a valid deduction or valid deductions do not preserve truth. — creativesoul

Well then you are unfamiliar with standard logic:

Validity of deduction is not affected by the truth of the premise or the truth of the conclusion. The following deduction is perfectly valid:

All animals live on Mars.
All humans are animals.
Therefore, all humans live on Mars.

The problem with the argument is that it is not sound. In order for a deductive argument to be sound, the argument must be valid and all the premises must be true.[3]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Validity_(logic)


However, an argument can be valid without being sound. For example:

All birds can fly.
Penguins are birds.
Therefore, penguins can fly.

This argument is valid as the conclusion must be true assuming the premises are true. However, the first premise is false. Not all birds can fly (for example, penguins). For an argument to be sound, the argument must be valid and its premises must be true.[2

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soundness


If you ignore or refuse standard logic, let's leave it at that. I'm not here for keep a record of your intellectual failures.

Excellent reply! Well, aside from the condescending petty personal remarks and focusing upon irrelevancy that you seem so fond of. Moving on...



Since you've demonstrated the ability...

How exactly is "there is a cow in the field" valid?

The preservation of truth includes the preservation of falsity. — creativesoul

Evidently, the above is not true in standard formal logic. My error. Good thing none of my objections to Gettier require it to be.

The preservation of truth includes the preservation of falsity. — creativesoul — creativesoul

What?!

How exactly is "there is a cow in the field" valid? — creativesoul

You are evidently confused. In the quoted claims of mine the word "valid" is taken as qualifying "justification" (not "assertion")

Evidently, the above is not true in standard formal logic. My error. Good thing none of my objections to Gettier require it to be. — creativesoul

Sure, dude, whatever makes you happy.

Question: Can we construct a Gettier case without it being possible to rephrase any aspect of it in terms of a mistake/unknown?

In the cow in the field case, the person mistakes the cloth in the wind to be a cow. In the original Gettier case, that Smith himself had 10 coins in his pocket was an unknown.

Here I disagree. I reject the rules of entailment because, as Gettier showed, we can use them to go from a belief that cannot be true to a belief that is. Logical/valid argument/reasoning preserves truth. The rules of entailment do not. If the preservation of truth is a requirement of valid, coherent, and/or logical reasoning, then the rules of 'logical' entailment fail to satisfy that standard. — creativesoul

A entails B iff "if A then B" is true. "If A then B" can be true even if A is false. For example, "if I was born in France then I was not born in Germany" is true even though "I was born in France" is false.

1. If I was born in France then I was not born in Germany
2. You are justified in believing that I was born in France
3. Therefore, you are justified in believing that I was not born in Germany

Trying to argue that (1) is false if I was not born in France seems unreasonable. Maybe you mean to argue that (3) is an invalid inference? If so then your issue isn't with entailment but with "justificatory closure".

Although I would disagree with you. (3) appears a valid inference to me. Thalburg's objection doesn't apply to this example given that being born in France and being born in Germany are mutually exclusive, and so the conjunction "I was born in France and not born in Germany" is not less likely than the singular "I was born in France".

I think more harm is done in rejecting justificatory closure than in rejecting the JTB-definition of knowledge.

your issue isn't with entailment but with "justificatory closure". — Michael

Indeed. My issue is not with entailment. As you may remember, I've been grappling with how to best come to terms with Gettier for several years now, off and on. We all know something is intuitively wrong. Gettier's paper causes many people to experience cognitive dissonance upon first reading it. The logic is so impeccable, and serves as an escape from that dissonance for those so inclined to follow it. The logic is incomplete in that it does not take proper account of Smith's belief. The underlying issue is the treatment of Smith's belief as though it were equivalent to a naked proposition.

In Gettier's paper, the issue is with treating Smith's beliefs as though they are equivalent to a naked proposition when they clearly are not. Case I has Gettier forgetting who "the man with ten coins in his pocket" referred to, and Case II has Gettier reporting Smith's belief in a manner that is incomplete. Smith believed the disjunction was true because Jones owned a Ford. Gettier left out the important bit. That last bit makes all the difference in the world.

The cottage cases are a different matter altogether. They do not follow and/or 'attack' the S knows that P iff... formulations that Gettier does. That puzzles me. Gettier at least begins with a justified false belief. The cottage cases do not.

1. If I was born in France then I was not born in Germany
2. You are justified in believing that I was born in France
3. Therefore, you are justified in believing that I was not born in Germany

Trying to argue that (1) is false if I was not born in France seems unreasonable. Maybe you mean to argue that (3) is an invalid inference? If so then your issue isn't with entailment but with "justificatory closure".

Although I would disagree with you. (3) appears a valid inference to me. Thalburg's objection doesn't apply to this example given that being born in France and being born in Germany are mutually exclusive, and so the conjunction "I was born in France and not born in Germany" is not less likely than the singular "I was born in France". — Michael

I do not see an issue here different from Case II.

If you were not born in Germany for any other reason than being born in France, then S's belief would be justified, valid, and false.

If you were not born in Germany for any other reason than being born in France, then S's belief would be justified, valid, and false. — creativesoul

S's belief that I was not born in Germany is true because I was born in England.

S's belief is not just that you were not born in Germany. It is that you were not born in Germany because you were born in France.

That is not true.

S's belief is not just that you were born in Germany. It is that you were not born in Germany because you were born in France.

That is not true. — creativesoul

If I believe A and B then I believe A and I believe B. Your argument seems to be that if I believe a conjunction then I don't believe each of its parts, which is false.

If I believe that you are a bachelor then I believe that you are a man and I believe that you are unmarried. To respond with "but you don't believe that I'm unmarried; you believe that I'm a bachelor" seems to me to be an unreasonable response.

S's belief is that you were not born in Germany because you were born in France.

. Your argument seems to be that if I believe a conjunction then I don't believe each of its parts, which is false — Michael

My 'argument' is that S believes that you were not born in Germany because you were born in France, and that your accounting practice is leaving out the most important part of S's belief.

S's belief that I was not born in Germany is true because I was born in England. — Michael

I think creativesoul is including the justification for belief in the truth statement. The belief qualifies as knowledge if both the justification and the belief were true.

1. If I was born in France then I was not born in Germany
2. You are justified in believing that I was born in France
3. Therefore, you are justified in believing that I was not born in Germany — Michael

It seems to me that 3 is more accurately rendered as...

S would be justified in believing that you were not born in Germany because you were born in France.


S's belief would be true only if, only when, and only because you were not born in Germany because you were born in France. If you were not born in Germany because you were born in England, then S's belief would be justified, valid, and false.

S's belief is not equivalent to the proposition you're reporting, claiming, asserting, and/or implying is equivalent to S's belief(you were not born in Germany). That's the underlying issue with Case II, and Case I as well. The difference is clearly shown in the truth conditions.

People believe more than one thing. Beliefs about one thing entail beliefs about another. I believe that Joe Biden is President. I believe that only one person is President. I believe that Donald Trump isn't President. I believe that Barack Obama isn't President. I believe that @creativesoul isn't President. I believe that an emu isn't President. And so on.

You want to rephrase all these beliefs as being "I believe that an emu isn't President because I believe that Joe Biden is President and that only one person can be President and that non-human animals cannot be President and... [whatever else there is]".

Whereas I can simply say "I believe than an emu isn't President."

And for the exact same reason, I don't need to phrase my belief as "I believe that so-and-so was not born in Germany because I believe that she was born in France and I believe that France isn't in Germany and I believe that people cannot be born in more than one place and... [whatever else there is]". I can just say "I believe that so-and-so was not born in Germany", and this belief is true if they were born in England.

Beliefs about one thing entail beliefs about another. I believe that Joe Biden is President. I believe that only one person is President. I believe that Donald Trump isn't President. I believe that Barack Obama isn't President. — Michael

"Belief" as a factual cognitive attitude doesn't entail any other beliefs, since entailment pertains to the domain of semantic and logic normativity. In other words, “entailment” expresses nothing more than a rational link that beliefs must comply with to be considered rational. So anybody can believe a certain proposition to be true and yet not believe all that it entails, out of ignorance or irrationality.

People believe more than one thing. Beliefs about one thing entail beliefs about another. I believe that Joe Biden is President. I believe that only one person is President. I believe that Donald Trump isn't President. I believe that Barack Obama isn't President. I believe that creativesoul isn't President. I believe that an emu isn't President. And so on. — Michael

We're in agreement.

You want to rephrase all these beliefs as being "I believe that an emu isn't President because I believe that Joe Biden is President and that only one person can be President and that non-human animals cannot be President and... [whatever else there is]".

Here you've mistaken your report of my mental ongoings with my mental ongoings.

Your objections are replete with enemies of your own making. From my view, your belief about why an emu is not president is irrelevant regarding both, why and how, S believes either the disjunction, or conjunction.

S is justified in believing that you were born in France. We can validly infer/deduce that you were not born in Germany based upon knowing that you cannot be born in two separate places at the same time and already believing for good reason that you were born in France.

So, if asked whether or not you were born in Germany, S would answer in the negative because they believe you were born in France. If explicitly asked exactly that, S would readily confirm. The belief about whether or not you were born in Germany is one about your birthplace, and it is based, in very large part at least, directly upon S's pre-existing beliefs about the same.

"Michael was not born in Germany" is an utterly inadequate report of S's belief.

As written, S's attitude towards that particular proposition would be one of general assent/agreement. It does not explicitly contradict S's pre-existing belief about your birthplace. Rather it is commensurate with it.

However, the proposition "Michael was not born in Germany" is not equivalent to S's belief about your birthplace. The proposition is not true only if, only when, and only because you were born in France. S's belief about both, your birthplace and that proposition, is.

"Michael was not born in Germany" is an utterly inadequate report of S's belief. — creativesoul

The fact that “Michael wasn’t born in Germany because he was born in France” isn’t equivalent to “Michael wasn’t born in Germany” doesn’t mean that someone who believes the former doesn’t also believe the latter. People can believe multiple things.

For your argument to work you must show that everyone who believes the former to be true doesn’t believe the latter to be true. You haven’t done that, and I don’t think you can.