What are you talking about?

It’s really simple; the self-referential sentence “this sentence contains five words” is meaningful. I understand what it means, you understand what it means, and everyone else understands what it means. It’s not some foreign language or random combination of words. And we can count the words in the sentence to determine that it’s true.

You’re trying to create a problem where there is none.

I totally agree that there is nothing problematic with the sentence "this sentence contains five words", and can indeed be a meaningful sentence.

As long as "this sentence contains five words" is not referring to itself. — RussellA

It’s meaningful even when it’s referring to itself.

The redundancy theory of truth usually applies to all sentences, whether it be "this sentence contains five words" or "it is raining". Seems strange to only apply it to self-referential sentences.

But even then, there's still nothing problematic with the sentence "this sentence contains five words". It is meaningful, despite your protestations to the contrary.

Therefore, how can any one say that "this sentence contains five words" is true if no one knows which sentence is being referred to? — RussellA

In context we do know.

If I hold out an apple and say "this apple is red" then it's obvious that I'm referring to the apple in my hand and not the apple on the table behind me, and so what I say is true iff the apple in my hand is red.

If you want to be explicit, then:

The self-referential sentence "this sentence contains five words" is true.
The self-referential sentence "this sentence contains fifty words" is false.

Here's the visible spectrum.



There is a clear distinction between wavelengths of light and the corresponding colour. We can certainly conceive of a variation of this image with the colour red on the left, the colour violet on the right, but the wavelength staying as it is, with the shorter wavelength on the left and the longer wavelength on the right. Such could even be the case for organisms with a different biology, and so a different neurological response to the same stimulation. We even see examples of that with the dress, where different colours are seen by different people despite looking at the same screen emitting the same light.

And the fact that we use the adjective "red" to describe tomatoes because they look to have the colour on the right is completely irrelevant. They look that way because they reflect that wavelength of light, and our biology just happens to be such that objects which reflect that wavelength of light look to have that colour. That's all there is to it.

But the colour just is that mental percept, falsely believed by the naive realist to be a mind-independent property of the tomato. Physics and neuroscience has taught us better.

There is no red pen while dreaming and hallucinating red pens. — creativesoul

So? I'm talking about colours, not pens.

Similarly, it is not correct to say that the sentence "this sentence contains five words" is true because it contains five words. — RussellA

Yes it is.

All I'm trying to say is that an expression that self-refers cannot be grounded in the world — RussellA

Yes it can.

The self-referential sentence "this sentence contains five words" is true because it contains five words.

The self-referential sentence "this sentence contains fifty words" is false because it doesn't contain fifty words.

This is incredibly straightforward.

Your equivocating "red". — creativesoul

I am being very explicit with what I mean by the word "red", which is the opposite of equivocation. I'm saying that the colour red, as ordinarily understood, is the mental percept that 620-750 light ordinarily causes to occur, and that this mental percept exists when we dream, when we hallucinate, and when 620-750 light stimulates our eyes.

Any other use of the word "red", e.g. to describe 620-750 light, or an object that reflects 620-750 light, is irrelevant, because the relevant philosophical question is "do objects like tomatoes, strawberries and radishes really have the distinctive [colour] property that they do appear to have?", and this question is not answered by noting that we use the word "red" in these other ways.

My question is, if the expression "this sentence" within "this sentence contains fifty words" is referring to itself, ie referring to "this sentence contains fifty words", then how can there be any grounding in the world? — RussellA

It's grounded in that we can count how many words are in the sentence "this sentence contains fifty words". There are five words, not fifty, and so the sentence is false.

I also asked what the difference was between the mental percept that 620-750 light ordinarily causes to occur and seeing red, and dreaming red.

You claimed "nothing" as an answer to all three questions. If there is no difference between four things, then they are the same.

They're all experiences. — creativesoul

The red part of hallucinating red, dreaming red, and seeing red are all the same thing; the occurrence of that mental percept, either reducible to or supervenient on neural activity in the visual cortex, that is ordinarily caused by 620-750 light stimulating the eyes.

The when and how it is caused to occur is then what distinguishes dreams, hallucinations, and non-hallucinatory waking experiences. It's a dream when it occurs when we're asleep, it's an hallucination when it occurs when we're awake and in response to something like drugs, and it's a non-hallucinatory waking experience when it occurs when we're awake and in response to light stimulating the eyes.

In the hyperreal number line, it's wrong. In this line, 0 is one of the possible values of h, which is defined as a number which, for all values of n, is greater than -n and less than n. From this it follows that any number divided by 0 equals infinity, because 0 is a non-finite value equal to every other value within h. And thereby the calculus is made respectable. — alan1000

No.

See division by zero:

In the hyperreal numbers, division by zero is still impossible.

"this sentence contains five words" is grounded and is true.
"this sentence contains fifty words" is grounded and is false.
"this sentence is false" is ungrounded and is neither true nor false.

You say that the sentence "this sentence contains fifty words" is false.

But you don't know that. — RussellA

I do know that. It refers to itself, it contains five words, and so it doesn’t contain fifty words.

If "this sentence" is referring to itself, ie, "this sentence contains fifty words", then both the SEP and IEP discuss the problems of self-referential expressions.

The SEP article on the Liar Paradox starts with the sentence "The first sentence in this essay is a lie"

The IEP article Liar Paradox talks about "this sentence is a lie" — RussellA

They are discussing the liar paradox. We are not discussing the liar paradox. We are discussing the sentences "this sentence contains five words" and "this sentence contains fifty words".

From the SEP article on self-reference:

... self-reference is not a sufficient condition for paradoxicality. The truth-teller sentence “This sentence is true” is not paradoxical, and neither is the sentence “This sentence contains four words” (it is false, though).

Maybe replace "of" with "about"? In the sense in which intentionality emerges from our brains with 'mental objects' being about distal objects? — wonderer1

What does it mean to say that brain activity is about distal objects?

Regardless, our primary concern isn't with intentionality but with appearances. As asked by Byrne & Hilbert (2003), "do objects like tomatoes, strawberries and radishes really have the distinctive [colour] property that they do appear to have?".

Prima facie one can claim that distal objects are the intentional object of perception but also that the visual imagery (e.g. the shape and colour) they cause us to experience does not resemble their mind-independent nature (much like we'd say the same about their smell and taste), i.e. maintaining the Kantian distinction between noumena and phenomena. That strikes me as being indirect realism rather than direct realism, not that the label really matters.

Phenomenal consciousness is either reducible to or supervenient on brain activity. The only connection between distal objects and brain activity is that distal objects often play a causal role in determining brain activity. This is what the science shows.

Given this, it's not at all clear what 'direct perception' is. That phenomenal consciousness is 'of' distal objects? What is the word 'of' doing here? If, for the sake of argument, phenomenal consciousness is reducible to brain activity then this amounts to the claim that brain activity is 'of' distal objects. What does that even mean?

It strikes me that 'direct perception' requires a very different (unscientific) interpretation of phenomenal consciousness, e.g. some kind of extended immaterial mind that reaches out beyond the body.

Regardless, it is a fact that colours are constituents of phenomenal consciousness, and so an explanation of colours requires an explanation of phenomenal consciousness. The hard problem is still unsolved, and so the best we can do is recognize the neural correlates of colour percepts.

That's why there is a SEP article on the Liar Paradox. — RussellA

But you weren't talking about the liar paradox. You were talking about the sentences "this sentence contains five words" and "this sentence contains fifty words". These two sentences are meaningful, with the first being true and the second being false.

You asked me "what's the difference between hallucinating red and the mental percept that 620-750nm light ordinarily causes to occur."

The mental percept that 620-750nm light ordinarily causes to occur is the mental percept that occurs when we hallucinate red. That is why it's hallucinating red and not hallucinating green or voices. But it is an hallucination because it is caused by something like drugs rather than 620-750nm light stimulating the eyes.

Notice that the shades of red are red? Do you suppose that the shades of pain are painful? No; the items in the first are red, the items in the second are not pain. — Banno

I don't even understand what you're trying to say here. That I can't see pain when I look at that chart? Obviously, because pain is felt, not seen. That I can't feel pain when I look at that chart? Obviously, because looking at things doesn't tend to cause pain.

But if you visited me in person then you could show me "shades" of pain by first punching me, then breaking my finger, and then having me put my hands in a bowl of bullet ants.

What, exactly, would any of that prove? It certainly wouldn't prove that pain is not a mental phenomenon. And so showing me a bunch of images that I see to be red doesn't prove that colours are not mental phenomena.

And yet, overwhelmingly, we agree as to what is red and what isn't. — Banno

And we agree as to what is painful and what isn't.

As always your arguments are non sequiturs.

If "this sentence" is referring to "this sentence contains fifty words", then this is a case of self-reference, and being a case of self-reference is meaningless. — RussellA

No it’s not.

In that event, this sentence, ie the sentence "this sentence contains fifty words", contains fifty words. — RussellA

No it doesn’t. It contains five words and so is false.

"Jack is tall" is making the claim that "Jack is tall" is true IFF Jack is tall — RussellA

It's not. Here are two propositions:

1. It is raining
2. "it is raining" is true iff it is raining

(1) and (2) do not mean the same thing. (1) is true iff it is raining but (2) is true even if it isn't raining.

1. This sentence contains five words
2. This sentence contains fifty words

(1) is true and (2) is false. It's not complicated. I don't understand the problem you have.

Otherwise, the sentence "this sentence has fifty words" would be making the claim that "this sentence has fifty words" has fifty words. — RussellA

Yes? And the sentence would be false.

https://my.clevelandclinic.org/health/symptoms/23350-hallucinations#possible-causes

https://health.clevelandclinic.org/why-do-we-dream

When this neural activity occurs when asleep we call it a dream. When this neural activity occurs when awake but not in response to optical stimulation we call it an hallucination. When this neural activity occurs when awake and in response to optical stimulation we call it a non-hallucinatory waking experience. — Michael

Did you even read the comment you quoted?

Hence, if they all include "the mental percept", and yet they are distinct, then it only follows that the notion of the "mental percept" is inadequate/insufficient for explaining those differences. — creativesoul

The differences are explained by the cause of the mental percept, as I literally explained in the comment you quoted.

Supose that we all do see colours differently, and named them accordingly - so what Lionino sees as red, you see as blue, and you both use the name for what you see. This is to take @Michael's suggestion literally! If @Lionino were to ask for the red pen, you might say "There is no red pen here, but there is a blue pen, and from past experience I know that Lionino is content for me to pass the blue pen when he asked for a red. At the least, it shuts them up.' — Banno

The suggestion is that I am on the left, Lionino is on the right, and that the colour we each see the apple to be is a mental phenomenon, falsely projected onto the apple. The apple does not really have the property that it appears to have.

The fact that I pass Lionino the apple when he says in our non-English language "flurgle nurgle blurgle" is utterly irrelevant to the issue being discussed.

The question, then, is how it came to be that you learned these words? — Banno

How have I come to learn the meaning of the word "pain"?

Can you pass me the red pen in your hand? Can you pass me the pain in your hand?

These are quite different. — Banno

You cannot pass me pain or colours.

It doesn't have to be left there, if you like. So long as it is noted that we do agree that tomatoes are (sometimes) red, and that a theory which cannot account for this is thereby inadequate.

So any theory that claims colour to be a something in an individual's head, and no more, is inadequate. — Banno

The question is "do objects like tomatoes, strawberries and radishes really have the distinctive property that they do appear to have?". Any interpretation of the proposition "the tomato is red" that does not concern the appearance of the tomato is a red herring.

But also, we agree that stubbing one's toe is painful, but pain is nonetheless in the individual's head, and so your claim above is also a non sequitur. Our words can, and do, refer to mental phenomena, and we can agree which things are causally responsible for that mental phenomena.

If... — Banno

Yes, and so we engage in further examination. We do not simply leave it at “we agree that tomatoes are red.”

Well, there are red tomatoes, and one way of saying that is that some tomatoes have the property of being red. Not sure what what it means to further ask if they really have the property of being red... — Banno

If "the tomato is red" means "the tomato looks red" and if the word "red" in the phrase "looks red" does not refer to a property of the tomato then tomatoes do not have the property that they appear to have.

Instead we have a case of eliminativism, subjectivism, and projectivism, as opposed to naive realism, reductionism, or dispositionalism.

Again, take a look at the SEP article, which sets out a few of the problems with eliminativism and some of the alternatives — seven main theories each with many variants. — Banno

And if you were arguing for one of them then we could have a meaningful discussion. My problem is with your approach to the problem. Our concern is with perception, not with language, which is why the phrasing in the question presented above is important: "do objects like tomatoes, strawberries and radishes really have the distinctive property that they do appear to have?".

This is not answered by saying that we use the word "red" to describe tomatoes. That we agree that tomatoes are red is a red herring.

Well, we still have the hard problem to contend with here. — Harry Hindu

Yes, because we don’t have an answer yet.

If colors are not parts of pens, then how can they be parts of neurons, or neural processes? — Harry Hindu

If pain is not a part of knives then how can it be a neural process?

Your question doesn’t make much sense.

Was it using ONLY one sense? Did it involve ONLY using your senses? — Harry Hindu

Sense and reasoning.

This is the issue:

If someone with normal color vision looks at a tomato in good light, the tomato will appear to have a distinctive property—a property that strawberries and cherries also appear to have, and which we call “red” in English. The problem of color realism is posed by the following two questions. First, do objects like tomatoes, strawberries and radishes really have the distinctive property that they do appear to have? Second, what is this property? (Byrne & Hilbert 2003: 3–4)

The question "do objects like tomatoes, strawberries and radishes really have the distinctive property that they do appear to have" is not answered by saying that the word "red" can refer to different things. Your entire approach to the problem is misguided.

The two main positions with respect to this problem are colour eliminativism and naive colour realism. Physics and the neuroscience of perception support the former over the latter.

There is a physical meaning of 'red', 'blue', 'green' that is used in physics. — Lionino

And that is not relevant to the question "do objects like tomatoes, strawberries and radishes really have the distinctive property that they do appear to have?".

This isn't a question about language use.

I have replied before that the question is badly posed. — Lionino

I understand it just fine, as do I suspect most laymen, scientists, and philosophers of colour. Try reading the first section of the SEP article.

Now, talking grammar. Of course, you will then say that no molecule is bitter, bitterness is a perception. That is correct, but that is because that is the only possible meaning that 'bitter' may take. However, that is not the case for colours, 'blue' may very well take on a physical meaning. It would be otherwise if 'binding to the bitter taste receptor' was a current, chemical usage of the word 'bitter', but it is not. What I am saying can be attested in dictionaries. — Lionino

The question "do objects like tomatoes, strawberries and radishes really have the distinctive property that they do appear to have?" is not answered by saying that the word "red" can refer to different things.

Speaking of biology, there are many molecules that may bind to bitter taste receptors. One part ot the causal chain that typically gives us the perception of bitter taste is the binding to the respective receptor, whatever molecule binds to it. Being able to bind to the receptor is a common property of those molecules, and that ability breaks down to their molecular structure, they either have it or they don't. — Lionino

This amounts to the claim that the property that all objects that appear to be bitter have in common is that they cause a bitter taste.

I'm fine with that, but it isn't taste realism (as the sister to colour realism).

If all you can say is that the property that all objects that appear to be red have in common is that they cause a red sensation then that amounts to colour eliminativism.

It does follow if we do not admit ex nihilo regularities. That is, as soon as we accept that everything has a cause, and that our senses at least sometimes are caused by outside objects, the commonality of some senses will have a cause in common — some would call this a universal, platonic or not. — Lionino

No it doesn't. See for example the science and complexity of bitter taste:

Compounds that are perceived as bitter do not share a similar chemical structure.