@Tobias

So the summary of the argument of that paper is:

I am convinced that it is sheer effrontery to believe that anyone is morally obligated to do that which will make him unhappy. And yet I am just as fully convinced of the objectivity of good, that is, that some things are better than others, independently of what anyone happens to desire and independently of what any particular person happens to find to be satisfying, and that the uniqueness and dignity of man can never be understood in the absence of this concept. Why cannot both of these convictions be maintained? Surely the burden of proof rests in showing that they are not compatible.

In other words, for some X it is conceivable that:

1. "X is good" is true
2. "You ought do X even if doing so makes you unhappy" is false

I don't suspect you find this argument particularly compelling. I probably wouldn't if I were committed to your position. I'd simply reject (2).

There is, however, a passage that might provide a good launchpad for further discussion:

It would appear, indeed, that people who conceive of good in an objectivistic and non-naturalistic way, who believe, for example, that there is such a thing as a better character and such a thing as a better way of treating others, would be particularly inclined to believe that there are in fact moral obligations.

The focus is on ethical non-naturalism. But what of ethical naturalism? Is the person who claims that goodness is a natural (i.e. empirical) property committed to the claim that obligations are a natural (i.e. empirical) phenomena? Can science determine the physical existence of moral obligations? It seems like an absurd notion. But is ethical naturalism absurd? If not then there must be a conceptual (and so semantic) distinction between something being good and someone having an obligation.

One could also argue that whoever owns the toilet should decide. If it's a public toilet, it belongs to the tax payers, so let them vote and decide how it should be used.

If you decide not to do it that way, the question would be: why not? On what basis do we reject the public will? Is it because the public is danger of violating someone's rights? — frank

Whites only

My point is that bathrooms and sports are separated by biology, not gender. If sex and gender are separate then why is it so difficult to make a meaningful distinction between them? — Harry Hindu

A meaningful question to ask is why we have such separations.

For sports it's to give biological women a competitive chance, and that may be a reason to exclude trans women from women's sports. But then what about trans men? They're biological women, so ought they compete in women's sports? Or do we say that trans men who have taken hormones to transition into a man must compete in men's sports?

For bathrooms it may be something to do with "decency" or safety, but that may be a reason to allow trans women (esp. post-surgery) to use women's bathrooms and trans men (esp. post-surgery) to use men's bathrooms, and so bathrooms ought not be separated by biology but by something else (e.g. outward appearance, even if "artificial"). Of course, the difficulty then comes in how such things can be policed. Ought everyone be subject to genital inspection before and/or after using a public bathroom?

Do you have this upload icon next to the floppy disk/save icon? It might be for mods/sponsors only?

This may be an interesting read: Good and Obligation.

In what goes below I shall argue against the doctrine that there are moral obligations (in any unconditional sense), but at the same time I will affirm the objectivity of good. My general procedure will be, first, to argue that the doctrine of moral obligations is both a dubious doctrine and a superfluous doctrine and, second, to suggest that it is fallacious to assume – as might be tempting – that a belief in the objectivity of good commits one to a belief in moral obligations, or that a denial of moral obligations is incompatible with a belief in the objectivity of good.

I don't have access to the full paper, but I'll look to see if I can find it (for free) somewhere. I can see the appeal of the view, especially as I'm partial to Anscombe's remarks that the term "ought" lacks any real meaning but also do not agree with the moral nihilist who cannot draw a moral distinction between charity and genocide.

As a particular example, an ethical naturalist could claim that being good is a natural property without claiming that obligations are a natural property/phenomena.

And presumably my obligations, if such things exist, concern me, whereas the ethical goodness of charity has nothing (directly) to do with me at all.

The point I am making is that if truths exist then the proposition "only I exist" is a logical contradiction.

Therefore if "only I exist" is not a logical contradiction then truths do not exist.

I think we need to disambiguate the term "exists" and draw a distinction between saying that there are mathematical truths and saying that mathematical truths exist.

That 2 + 2 = 4 is not a problem for physicalism (or solipsism, for that matter).

In your previous post you alluded to the existence of mathematical truths, e.g. if "2 + 2 = 4" is true then the truth that 2 + 2 = 4 exists. Presumably, then, you also believe in the existence of propositional truths, e.g. if "bachelors are unmarried men" is true then the truth that bachelors are unmarried men exists?

If so then if "only I exist" is true then this propositional truth exists, and if this propositional truth exists then "only I exist" is false, giving us a contradiction.

So either "only I exist" is a logical contradiction or this notion that truths exist (whether mathematical or other) is mistaken – or at least the term "exists" is being used in two different ways, in which case mathematical truths are not prima facie problematic for physicalism.

Is "only I exist" a logical contradition?

Take the following exchanges:

Exchange 1
Michael: Why ought I give money to charity?
Tobias: Because giving money to charity is good.

Exchange 2
Michael: Why ought I give money to charity?
Tobias: Because you ought give money to charity.

Are these exchanges equivalent? I think prima facie they're not; the first appears to provide a reason why one ought give money to charity, whereas the second doesn't. So the suggestion that "X is good" is synonymous with "I ought X" doesn't seem to be consistent with how we actually understand moral language.

Carrying on from Exchange 1, the implicit syllogism is:

A1. Giving money to charity is good
A2. If giving money to charity is good then I ought give money to charity
A3. Therefore, I ought give money to charity

The problem is that if A2 is a tautology then A1 begs the question, assuming A3, and so the argument commits an informal fallacy. It would be equivalent to the following syllogism:

B1. I ought give money to charity
B2. If I ought give money to charity then I ought give money to charity
B3. Therefore, I ought give money to charity

Which returns us to Exchange 2.

I think that the uselessness of this second syllogism and of Exchange 2 shows that "good" and "ought" are not synonymous, even if there is a connection between the two, and so it's reasonable to ask for a justification for A2 (and for the more general and simplified "I ought do good").

The term "intersex" exists for a reason. Human biology is complex, and English vocabulary does not fully account for this complexity, and so the suggestion that the terms "biological male" and "biological female" each describe some unambiguous and mutually exclusive biological property that every human has shows a misunderstanding of both biology and language.

Take true hermaphroditism:

True hermaphroditism, a rare and usually sporadic disorder, is defined as the coexistence of seminiferous tubules and ovarian follicles. Most patients have an ovotestis with either an ovary or a testis on the opposite side; a gonad in the scrotum is usually a testis but may be an ovotestis.

The genitalia are usually ambiguous, but they may appear completely masculine or feminine. The anatomy of the internal reproductive tract depends on the nature of the gonads, particularly whether they secrete AMH. A uterus or uterine horn is present in 90% of cases. Testosterone response to HCG is variable, and AMH levels are usually low. Most patients experience breast development, ovulation, and even menstruation at puberty; pregnancy and successful childbirth are possible if selective removal of testicular tissue is feasible. Unless sex of rearing has already been chosen, male gender assignment should be restricted to patients with no uterus and descended testicular tissue because the latter is usually dysgenetic and prone to malignant degeneration. Most true hermaphrodites have a 46,XX karyotype. Despite the presence of testicular tissue, true hermaphrodites usually lack SRY; this suggests that the condition is the result of constitutive activation of a gene normally triggered by SRY.

But there, in the ear, is essentially where the effects of the mechanical soundwave ends, and a new sequences of acts begin. — NOS4A2

This seems to me like saying that if I kick a football through a window then I didn’t cause the window to break, as if I’m causally responsible only for kicking the ball and not also for what the ball does to the window after being kicked.

Your suggestion that this sequence of events is one causal chain, that this subsequent sequence of events is a second causal chain, and that there's no causal connection between the two is both incompatible with physics and a seemingly arbitrary delineation.

Brain states and mind? Not so much, though I do not begrudge their application in common use. — NOS4A2

A brain state is just the state of the brain, i.e its composition and the behaviour of its neurons. It is the way it is because of a long chain of causal events, both internal to the body and external. Our brains are not isolated systems.

What substances or objects can you move with your speech? — NOS4A2

The brain states of listeners. You could read up on speech perception for more technical information on the physics of neural activity responding to auditory stimulation.

Unless you believe that the mind is some non-physical substance that can somehow gain information from sound without being causally affected by it?

It does, though, when used here. You're bait-and-switching this to high hell. If you mean chromosomal sex, then say that. If you mean phenotypic sex then say that. These have no effect on whether one is a male or female organism.

I cannot understand why this is even something to push back against. They are simple observations about biology. — AmadeusD

Why do you think that the adjectives "male" and "female" properly refer only to the status of the SRY gene and not chromosomal sex or phenotypic sex?

Our disagreement has nothing to do with biology, but about the meaning of the adjectives "male" and "female".

I think as a general examination of etymology, phenotype is the most immediate determinant of how the adjectives "male" and "female" are ordinarily used, with their uses in other cases deriving from this, e.g. the "male" chromosome pair (or the SRY gene) is only described as being male because it is the most common cause of a male phenotype.

I put it to you that if there is an alien species that is phenotypically indistinguishable from humans, such as Kryptonians in fiction, but with different chromosomes and DNA, then the adjective "male" in the phrase "male human" means the same thing as the adjective "male" in the phrase "male Kryptonian".

Purely trivial. It is synonymous with X ought to be done. — Tobias

Is “X ought to be done” synonymous with “I ought to X”?

But it does not imply that you can. — Tobias

Then that’s the issue of contention. According to Kant, “for if the moral law commands that we ought to be better human beings now, it inescapably follows that we must be capable of being better human beings. The action to which the ‘ought’ applies must indeed be possible under natural conditions.”

As a practical example, “I ought breastfeed my child” must be false because I am incapable of breastfeeding.

Perhaps you cannot and you will fail, but that des not imply you should not have tried. — Tobias

So you’ve changed it slightly. It’s no longer the case that “X is good” means “X ought be done” but “X ought be tried”?

the question is whether we need to do good (or: 'good ought to be done' or 'I ought to do good'). — Tobias

Again, your own wording suggests that these two mean different things:

1. Ought I do good?
2. Ought I do that which I ought do?

The second isn't in question; it's a vacuous truism that I ought do that which I ought do. So if the first is in question then it isn't synonymous with the second.

I do not claim they are the same thing. I just do not see how that matters. — Tobias

If "X is good" is synonymous with "we ought do X" and if "we ought do X" is not synonymous with "I ought do X" then "X is good" is not synonymous with "I ought do X".

So we're missing a step that gets us from "X is good" to "I ought do X". That's why it matters.

No, of course not, but if you state that 'we should do X', it does not make sense to say 'we', but not 'I'. I would be puzzled if you would say "We are going on holiday, but I am not". — Tobias

You made the claim “we ought end world poverty”, not me. Did you mean to include me in that claim?

And this is where the claim "ought implies can" comes into play. If "we ought do X" implies "I ought do X" and if "I ought do X" implies "I can do X" then "we ought do X" implies "I can do X", and so "we ought end world poverty" implies "I can end world poverty". Therefore, if "I can end world poverty" is false then "we ought end world poverty" is false.

I think we need to disambiguate the claim "we ought do X". Consider these two claims:

1. Each person ought X
2. Humanity ought X

The phrase "we ought X" could mean either (1) or (2), but (1) and (2) do not prima facie mean the same thing, e.g. "humanity weighs 390 million tons" does not mean "each person weighs 390 million tons".

So even if "I ought X" follows from (1) it does not prima facie follow from (2). If it doesn't follow, and if "we ought X" only means (2), then "I ought X" does not follow from "we ought X".

Yes exactly and that is precisely what I told the OP and Amadeus. The mistake in the OP is that it asks for a justification for this vacuity, but it cannot be given because it is a truism. — Tobias

But a previous comment of yours hints at "I ought to do good" not being a vacuous truism:

"So if we ought to do good...".

The conditional here is telling. You don't seem to be saying "So if we ought to do that which we ought to do".

I do not see the distinction. — Tobias

Well, "I" and "we" mean different things, so "I ought end world poverty" is not synonymous with "we ought end world poverty". That’s the (semantic) distinction.

It is synonymous with ''X' should be done', I guess. — Tobias

But does "X should be done" logically entail "I ought do X"?

In your example, you are part of the 'we' right? — Tobias

Perhaps, perhaps not. It's certainly not the case that the pronoun "we" necessarily includes every human, else a phrase like "we're going on holiday" would mean "every human is going on holiday".

So you need to clarify what you mean when you say "we ought end world poverty". Do you mean "every human ought end world poverty"?

So if we ought to do good, than I ought to contribute to that doing of good. Since good is totally unspecified, we can just as well say" I ought to do good". — Tobias

This seems to equivocate. You've been claiming that "good" is in some sense synonymous with "ought", in which case the claim "I ought do good" is synonymous with the claim "I ought do that which I ought do", which is admittedly a truism but also vacuous.

I think that we want "I ought do good" to mean more than just "I ought do that which I ought do", in which case we want "good" to not be synonymous with "ought", even if the one does entail the other.

But how can we get "good" and "ought" to each entail the other without being synonymous?

We ought to end world poverty, no, even though it is impossible to do so for anyone in particular. — Tobias

So it's not that I ought to end world poverty, only that we ought to end world poverty. That's a pertinent distinction.

Perhaps, then, "X is good" is not synonymous with "I ought do X" but is synonymous with "we ought do X"?

But we're still missing something from which to derive a personal obligation. How do we get from "we ought do X" to "I ought do X"? The example of ending world poverty perhaps shows that the former does not logically entail the latter.

And there are people who have neither an XX nor an XY karotype, therefore according to your own definitions there are people who are neither biologically male nor biologically female.

So “biological male” means “has an XY karotype” and “biological female” means “has an XX karotype”?

In the other cases, we don't just give up and say we don't know which biological sex they are. We might have a different set of predictions due to a certain condition, but it's still a male or female that has the condition — frank

Then what does “biological sex” refer to? You seem to be saying that even though the vast majority of biological men have an XY karotype and that even though the vast majority of people with an XY karotype are biological men, there are exceptions.

If there are exceptions then “is biologically male” doesn’t mean “has an XY karotype”.

So what does “is biologically male” mean?

I don't understand why you're asking that. — frank

Because AmadeusD is claiming that every human is either biologically male or biologically female, and so that no human is intersex.

If his claim is true then it's not clear to me what counts as being biologically male and being biologically female, given the existence of individuals with XX male syndrome, complete androgen insensitivity syndrome, ovotesticular syndrome, gonadal dysgenesis, etc.

As an example, if to be biologically male is to have a penis and to be biologically female is to have a vagina, and if everyone is either biologically male or biologically female, then everyone has either a penis or a vagina. And yet people with ambiguous genitalia exist.

Or, if to be biologically male is to have an XY karotype and to be biologically female is to have an XX karotype, and if everyone is either biologically male or biologically female, then everyone has either an XY karotype or an XX karotype. And yet people with different karotypes exist.

So you tell me; what does "biological sex" refer to? Does it refer to karotype? Does it refer to phenotype? Does it refer to something else? Is biological sex a strict dichotomy such that every human must be either one sex or the other?

It means the person was born male. — frank

Which means what?

It's easy enough to pin it down. — frank

Then what does it mean?

We can, and do, talk about intersex individuals having both a female phenotype and a male karotype, or having both a male phenotype and a female karotype, therefore the terms "male" and "female" cannot mean what you claim they mean, else such biologies would be logical contradictions.

As an example, someone with complete androgen insensitivity syndrome (NSFW) has a female phenotype despite having an active SRY gene.

Therefore the adjective "female" cannot mean "doesn't have an active SRY gene".

Your account is incompatible with how the English language is actually used.

we have a number of factual examples of trans 'women' raping or assaulting women in female prisons. — Jeremy Murray

And there are factual examples of trans women being raped or sexually assaulted in men's prisons.

In fact, according to this, "the total number of transgender victims far exceeds the number who were suspected of carrying out sex attacks, with only one such case in 2019."

Both the safety of cisgender women and the safety of transgender women (and cisgender men and transgender men) matter. You (and at least one other in this discussion) seem to only care about the safety of cisgender women.

SRY determines maleness. — AmadeusD

What's maleness?

Neither of these is true. — AmadeusD

You missed the preceding sentence:

Is a biological male any human with testes and a biological female any human with ovaries?

If the answer to this question is "yes" then someone with both testes and ovaries (i.e with ovotesticular disorder) is both biologically male and biologically female and someone with neither testes nor ovaries (i.e. with gonadal dysgenesis) is neither biologically male nor biologically female.

But if the answer to this question is "no" then what is the connection between an active SRY gene and being biologically male?

Passing isn't a criterion for me, though, so unsure why I'm asked to defend it. — AmadeusD

You were responding to my question to BitconnectCarlos, who claims that it is acceptable for a trans woman who passes as a biological woman to use women's bathrooms. My question to him is relevant to his position. If you disagree with his position then my question isn't relevant, so I'm not sure why you answered it.

An active one, yes. That seems to be the deduction of biology. — AmadeusD

The deduction of biology is that an active SRY gene is responsible for the development of testes. What does that have to do with being biologically male? Is a biological male any human with testes and a biological female any human with ovaries? Then someone with ovotesticular disorder or is both biologically male and biologically female, and someone with gonadal dysgenesis is neither biologically male nor biologically female.

SRY. — AmadeusD

Are you saying that a biological male is anyone with an SRY gene and a biological female is anyone without an SRY gene?

The person who can tell that they aren't. — AmadeusD

I believe that Jane passes as a woman. John believes that Jane doesn't pass as a woman.

Does Jane pass as a woman? Ought Jane be allowed to use the women's bathroom?

If a man decides to start using women's spaces, is anyone even allowed to confront him in your view? What is the proper response if he claims to be trans but just hasn't started transitioning?

It can be difficult. Ambiguity is inherent to gender transition; it is a process, not an immediate switch from A to B. — BitconnectCarlos

Why does appearance matter? If the concern is the safety and well being of cisgender women, and if you say that trans women who pass as biological women ought use women's bathrooms, then there's the implicit claim that trans women who pass as biological women are less likely to sexually assault cisgender women in women's bathrooms than trans women who don't pass as biological women. Is there any basis behind such a claim?

But if you're not making such a claim then what's the reasoning in only allowing trans women who pass as biological women to use the women's bathroom? Is it just that cisgender women would be uncomfortable with transgender women who don't pass as biological women using the women's bathroom? I don't think that's a sufficiently good reason. There are likely plenty of homophobic women who are uncomfortable around lesbians and racist white men who are uncomfortable around black men, but that's not a sufficiently good reason to restrict bathrooms by race or sexuality.

Trans people should generally strive to act in ways that facilitate social cohesion and integration. — BitconnectCarlos

Everyone should generally strive to act in ways that facilitate social cohesion and integration, and one such way is to not lash out when someone you don't want using your bathroom is taking a piss. Just wash your hands and leave.

I used to frequent a nightclub where all the toilets were unisex. It's really not a big deal.

No. Trans people should generally strive to act in ways that facilitate social cohesion and integration. A very passable trans woman (e.g., Blaire White) belongs in a women's restroom even with male genitalia. — BitconnectCarlos

Who gets to decide whether or not someone is passing? Is the masculine-looking cisgender woman who is often mistaken for a man required to use the men's bathroom, despite both her biological sex and gender identity being female?

Sure, and I wouldn't support such a law. However, I don't believe that male genitalia belongs in women's locker rooms under any circumstances.

I have heard of incidents where FtMs enter women's locker rooms, and it leads to chaos. — BitconnectCarlos

So your suggestion is that bathrooms should be divided by "has a penis" (including trans men with an artificial penis) and "doesn't have a penis" (including trans women who have had their penis removed)?

Trans men get erased from conversations like these because men tend not to care if trans men use their spaces. Nobody will be outraged by Leo Macallan in a men's room. — BitconnectCarlos

But if the law requires that one's biological sex determines which bathroom one can use then plenty of women will be outraged by Leo Macallan in a women's bathroom.

So what bathroom should Leo Macallan use?

No, they are perfectly synonymous. — Tobias

Which sentences are synonymous? Surely not "X is good" and "I ought do X" because ought implies can but "X is good" does not seem to imply "I can do X".

I’m arguing that men should not be allowed access to women’s spaces. — Malcolm Parry

By this you mean "biological men should not be allowed access to biological women's spaces"?

But the question is: should prisons be divided into one space for biological men and one space for biological women?

This is why I suggested before to not use the term's "men's prison" and "women's prison". There is only Prison A and Prison B.

Two possible scenarios are:

1. Prison A is only for people who are biologically male and Prison B is only for people who are biologically female
2. Prison A is only for cisgender and transgender men and Prison B is only for cisgender and transgender women

In scenario 2 there is no such thing as a "biological women's space" (with respect to prison).

So we must ask ourselves; which of scenarios 1 and 2 is preferable? What factors must we take into account to determine this?

There is a reason why the sexes have separate prisons. What about this don’t you understand? — Malcolm Parry

We want to protect biological women from biological men.

But we should also want to protect transgender women from cisgender men.

So how do we balance these two concerns? We could treat cisgender and transgender women as equals, and so try to reduce the total amount of sexual violence amongst these two vulnerable groups.

Again why should women have to exposed to male violence for men to be protected from male violence? — Malcolm Parry

Why should transgender women have to be exposed to cisgender male violence for cisgender women to be protected from transgender female violence?

If you want to claim that the safety of cisgender women matters more than the safety of every other group, then just say it.

You are fixated on a tiny tiny minority of people that have had quirks in their development. These people are not a separate sex or both sexes. — Malcolm Parry

Well yes, they are. That's why they are classified as biologically intersex rather than biologically male or biologically female.

There is no set of necessary and sufficient conditions that qualify someone as biologically male and no set of necessary and sufficient conditions that qualify someone as biologically female such that every human satisfies either one of these sets or the other (and not both).

I’m not sure what this brings to the debate. For the 99.98% of the results are 100% accurate. — Malcolm Parry

The remaining 0.02% is 1,600,000 people. They exist, and any laws we pass that dictate which bathrooms or toilets or prisons people can use must account for them, else what is to be done if they want to use a public toilet, play football, or are convicted of a serious crime?

Why should women be put at risk of male violence to protect men? — Malcolm Parry

That's a leading question.

If our primary concern is in reducing the total amount of sexual violence in the prison population then we must determine which of these scenarios reduces the total amount of sexual violence in the prison population:

1. Trans women in women's prisons and trans men in men's prisons
2. Trans women in men's prisons and trans men in men's prisons
3. Trans women in women's prisons and trans men in women's prisons
4. Trans women in men's prisons and trans men in women's prisons

It may be that more trans women would be the victims of sexual violence in men's prisons than would be the perpetrators of sexual violence in women's prisons, in which case the total amount of sexual violence in the prison population is reduced by placing trans women in women's prisons.

Whereas you seem to be arguing that the safety of cisgender women matters more than the safety of transgender women, such that it's better for 10 transgender women to be the victims of sexual violence at the hands of a cisgender man than for 1 cisgender woman to the be the victim of sexual violence at the hands of a transgender woman? That would be incredibly sexist/transphobic.

Your reasoning seems to depend heavily on the empirical question of how dangerous a male or else a trans woman is within a women's prison. — Leontiskos

And also how dangerous it is for a trans woman to be in a men's prison.

Why waste time on all these unrealistic assumptions and get to the point of the matter - does free speech involve the capacity to question authority and criticize what others say, or not?

Even if we were to suspend reality for the sake of your example, you still need to explain how the idea of free speech defined as "You can say ANYTHING with no repercussions" is reconciled with the idea that everyone has the right to free speech, which includes questioning authority and criticizing what others say because your examples are all of those in some authoritative position dictating to others, or manipulating others (in your new example) that lack the correct information. The solution to all of your examples it to have a more informed population - where all views are free to be expressed and criticized, not less free speech. — Harry Hindu

I don't really understand what you're saying here.

We ought be allowed to question authority and criticise what others say, but we ought not be allowed to defame (slander/libel), reveal classified information, or encourage others to commit certain (esp. violent) criminal acts, etc.

A well-functioning society depends on some restrictions on what one can and cannot say. Free speech absolutism (like many libertarian ideals, e.g. "no taxes!") is a naive fantasy that any reasonable person should understand is unworkable (and unethical, if consequentialism is correct).