If you claim...

"people use the expression 'I know x' when x is true"

...it requires that they are certain about x. Otherwise your claim becomes...

"people use the expression 'I know x' when they believe x is true".

Which deflates to..

"people use the expression 'I know x' when they believe x"...

(since 'x is true' is just to state 'x'). But that's the claim you're arguing against. — Isaac

They use the expression "I know X" when they believe that X is true, but as you (sometimes) admit, sometimes our beliefs are wrong.

If their belief is true then their claim of knowledge is true. If their belief is false then their claim of knowledge is false.

Do you mean a belief can be true even if the person whose belief it is isn't certain of that? If so, then I agree with that. — Isaac

Then why did you say the below in that very comment I was responding to?

It's your additional requirement that the beliefs be 'true' that necessitates certainty and renders all actual use incorrect. — Isaac

Requiring that a belief is true doesn't necessitate certainty.

It seems the other way around. I'm saying that 'knowledge' is just 'beliefs we take ourselves to have (specific) good reason(s) to hold'. That seems to acknowledge uncertainty and match the actual use of the term in real life. It's your additional requirement that the beliefs be 'true' that necessitates certainty and renders all actual use incorrect. — Isaac

A belief can be true even if it isn't certain. The money I have in my bag can be real money even if I'm not certain that it's real money.

You've repeatedly accepted that our beliefs can be wrong (and even that the language community can be wrong), so it seems that at least sometimes you understand what it means for a belief to be true or false. You just don't appear to be very consistent in this acceptance.

This discussion was merged into Gettier Problem.

I'm saying that because we don't know at the time whether an experience is veridical or not, it doesn't make sense to say that our expressions refer to the external objects of that experience. — Isaac

What do you mean by not knowing at the time whether an experience is veridical or not? Your entire argument is that to know is to believe. Iff I believe that my experience at the time is veridical then I know that my experience at the time is veridical.

Do you now accept that knowledges requires more than just belief? That knowledge requires that what we believe is (independently) true (and perhaps some other stuff as well)?

So in the scenario where it turns out there's no cat, the statement was about a cat? — Isaac

No, that's the first scenario. When there isn't a cat he isn't talking about an actual cat.
But in the second scenario where there is a cat he is talking about an actual cat.

In that context I simply mean a cat which everyone in the language game agrees is there. — Isaac

The person is alone. Nobody else is around to either see or not see a cat. The person can see a cat, and talks about the cat he sees.

I'm saying that if his experience is veridical then he is talking about an actual cat, and if his experience is an hallucination then he is talking about an imaginary cat. What can you say about this situation?

Also mass hallucinations are a thing, and it's possible that the entire language community hallucinates a cat.

I'm saying that because we don't know at the time whether an experience is veridical or not, it doesn't make sense to say that our expressions refer to the external objects of that experience.

We were talking about access to facts. If my experience is veridical then ipso fact I have access to a fact.

Imagine I were to have a bag of money. It may or may not be real money. Are you saying that because I don't know if the money is real then I don't have access to real money? That doesn't follow. If the money is real then I have access to real money, even if I cannot distinguish real money from fake money.

I'm saying they might not be. Although you've introduced 'real' now, a whole different kettle of fish. I think Frodo is 'real' in some senses of the word, we'd need to be clearer about what you mean by 'real' before I can properly answer that. — Isaac

Real in the ordinary sense of the word, as a realist would understand it. If my experience is veridical then the cat I see is a real cat.

If my experience is veridical then my finger is pointing to a cat. If my experience is an hallucination then my finger isn't pointing to a cat.

Right. So in the first scenario "the cat is black" is not about the cat (there isn't one).

So it's incorrect to say that the statement "the cat is black" is about the cat. At best, it might be about the cat, or it might not be. We won't know until we determine whether the cat was a hallucination or not.

My issue with this way of looking at things is that it sets up a situation where we don't know what we're talking about at the time of saying it. Which seems silly.

Also, in the second scenario, what was "the cat is black" about? It sounds like in the second scenario we find out that "the cat is black" turns out after all to have been about our belief, not an actual cat. So why didn't we know that at the time. We can't be wrong about our beliefs so I'd know at the time if I was referring to a belief. — Isaac

Also, I wasn't (yet) talking about the phrase "the cat is black." I was just talking about pointing to a cat (with one's finger).

Are you saying that in the second scenario the person isn't pointing to a real cat with their finger?

Also, in the second scenario, what was "the cat is black" about? It sounds like in the second scenario we find out that "the cat is black" turns out after all to have been about our belief, not an actual cat. — Isaac

No, it was about an actual cat.

But what do you mean by "an actual cat" when you say "'the cat is black' isn't about an actual cat"?

The discussion about the temporal mess of deciding post hoc what a statement was about was supposed to be an answer to that. Sorry.

The post I linked to was a response to your post about "deciding post hoc"?

If a person is hallucinating a cat and points to where they see a cat then they’re not pointing to a real cat, but will (wrongly) claim that they are. If they later come to realize that they were hallucinating then they will (rightly) claim that they weren't pointing to a real cat.

If a person is having a veridical experience of a cat and points to where they see a cat then they’re pointing to a real cat, and will (rightly) claim that they are. If they are later tricked into believing that they were hallucinating then they will (wrongly) claim that they weren't pointing to a real cat.

The fact that the first scenario can happen doesn’t entail that the second scenario can’t happen. In the second scenario the person is pointing to a real cat (even if they later come to believe otherwise).

And I’m not pushing you to answer but in case it was missed it there’s still this post where I address the issue of hallucinations and veridical experiences and access to the facts.

I've always argued that (when said by me) that "there's no flower in the box" means 'I believe there's no flower in the box'. — Isaac

Then let’s phrase your scenario appropriately:

Well then how do you talk about X? If I show you a box and tell you there's a flower in it, you say "the flower is green", but I believe that there's no flower in the box. How can you have been talking about the actual green flower? I believe that there is no actual green flower.

What do your beliefs have to do with what InPitzotl talks about and what his words refer to? Your beliefs are irrelevant; they have nothing to do with what he says. He will say that his words refer to the actual green flower.

If you say he is actually pointing to the actual rain at T1 you're required to change the past when you realise, at T2 that there's no rain. — Isaac

I said that if it’s raining then he’s referring to the actual rain. Your response is to say that if it’s not raining then he’s not referring to actual rain. Your response is a non sequitur.

In the scenario where he refers to actual rain there is no T2 where he “realised” that there wasn't rain. There actually was rain and there’s never any reason to believe otherwise. For the rest of his life he (and everyone else) (correctly) believes that it was raining at T1.

You can't then go back in time and change what the event at T1 was. — Isaac

I’m not changing what it was. As I keep explaining there are facts, independent of belief. You accept this yourself in your scenario where you say that there isn’t actually a flower in the box (apparently contradicting your own arguments).

If the independent fact is that there isn’t actually a flower, as in your scenario, then InPitzotl isn’t pointing at/referring to anything, even though he believes and says he is.

If the independent fact is that there is actually a flower then InPitzotl is pointing at/referring to that flower.

Well then how do you talk about X? If I show you a box and tell you there's a flower in it, you say "the flower is green", but there's no flower in the box. How can you have been talking about the actual green flower? There is no actual green flower. There's no referent for your sentence. You were talking about your 'mental image' of a flower which I had tricked you into thinking existed. — Isaac

Apologies for butting in, but I'd like to comment on this.

That we can point at nothing isn't that we can't point at something. If there is a flower then I can point to it. If there isn't a flower then there's nothing to point to, other than the floor or empty air or whatever.

And it's certainly not the case that if there isn't a flower then I'm actually pointing to my finger or to my mental image of a flower.

There's nothing in principle different between pointing to a green flower with my finger and using the phrase "that green flower."

If in your scenario there is a green flower in the box then that is what @InPitzotl is referring to.

So we can't be wrong? If I say "it's raining", after having experienced the rain, I'm not referring to my belief, but rather really am referring to the direct fact that it's raining. If so then what happens when I find out I was just hallucinating? Does what really happened change post hoc? — Isaac

If the experience is an hallucination then we do not have access to the facts, and what we say about the weather is false (even if we believe that it is true and never learn that it was an hallucination), but if the experience is veridical then we do have access to the facts, and what we say about the weather is true.

What you seem to be saying is that either 1) we never have veridical experiences, or 2) if hallucinations are possible then a veridical experience isn't access to the facts.

Whether or not the first is true seems a topic for another discussion, but the second is an invalid inference.

You can say that, yes. It would mean "iff I come to believe it is raining (after meeting my threshold of satisfactory justification) then John is right and Jane is wrong and iff it is not raining then Jane is right and John is wrong." It would mean that because that is the only context in which you could possibly use the term.

It doesn't mean that at all. I am quite capable of understanding that a) there are facts, and that b) it is possible that my beliefs are wrong (as they do not correspond to the facts). Given this understanding I understand the difference between "it is raining" and "I believe that it is raining," and so what I mean by "John is right iff it is raining" isn't what I mean by "John is right iff I believe that it is raining."

2. is a statement, not the wetness of John.

The statement "John is wet if I believe that he is covered in water" is false because John isn't made wet by you believing that he is; he's made wet by being actually covered in water, and so the statement "John is wet if he is covered in water" is true.

This just begs the question. The matter of discussion is whether this is the case, just restating that you believe that to be the case doesn't progress the discussion at all.

I have already said that some form of realism is taken for granted in this discussion (and you have agreed to argue your position from this understanding). There are facts, independent of what we believe.

If the independent fact is that John is wet then the person who believes (and claims) that John is wet is right, and the person who believes (and claims) that John is not wet is wrong. If the independent fact is that John is not wet then the person who believes (and claims) that John is not wet is right, and the person who believes (and claims) that John is wet is wrong.

What the JTB definition attempts to explain is the conditions that must be satisfied for us to know what these independent facts are.

Meadows texts show Hannity, Don Jr. wanted Trump to stop Jan. 6 riot

As rioters stormed the Capitol on Jan. 6, several leading Fox News pundits and Donald Trump’s eldest son all voiced desperate concerns that the former president was doing nothing to quell the violence and protect those in the building, according to damning text messages unveiled Monday night by the select committee investigating the attack.

The stunning messages, submitted to the panel by Mark Meadows, Trump’s former chief of staff, revealed that Sean Hannity, Brian Kilmeade and Laura Ingraham — all superstar Fox personalities with enormous conservative followings — and Donald Trump, Jr. were all pressing Meadows to convince the president to intervene during the early hours of the siege.

“He's got to condemn this shit ASAP,” Donald Trump Jr. texted Meadows as the attack was underway.

“I'm pushing it hard. I agree,” Meadows replied.

But when the president still did not act, his eldest son reached out again to Trump’s chief of staff, according to Jan. 6 Committee Vice Chair Liz Cheney (R-Wyo.), who read the series of texts during a hearing Monday night.

“We need an Oval Office address. He has to lead now. It has gone too far and gotten out of hand,” Trump Jr. texted.

Around the same time, a trio of Fox News hosts were also bombarding Meadows with text messages, trying to get Trump to call off the attack.

“Mark, president needs to tell people in the Capitol to go home. This is hurting all of us. He is destroying his legacy,” Ingraham texted.

“Please get him on TV. Destroying everything you have accomplished,” added Kilmeade.

“Can he make a statement? Ask people to leave the Capitol,” texted Hannity.

Meadows also received dozens of texts from GOP lawmakers, staffers and members of the press trapped inside the Capitol during the assault, Cheney said.

“We are under siege here at the Capitol,” read one text. “They have breached the Capitol,” read another.

A third person texted: “Mark, protesters are literally storming the Capitol. Breaking windows on doors, rushing in. Is Trump going to say something?”

A fourth person told Meadows: “There's an armed standoff at the House chamber door.”

A fifth person inside the Capitol wrote: “We are all helpless.”

Across the administration, Trump officials also pleaded for Meadows to convince Trump to intervene. Messages read: “Someone is going to get killed” and “POTUS needs to calm this shit down.”

That implies whatever statement Gödel is talking about isn't knowledge. What's happening? — Agent Smith

I don't understand your question. What does Gödel's first incompleteness theorem have to do with it?

You're joking, right? What does it say then?

If I believe p (B) and p is true (T) but have no justification (no J), do I have knowledge? — Agent Smith

It says that justification (and truth) are necessary for knowledge.

It doesn't say that justification is necessary for truth.

According to the JTB theory of knowledge,

1. If p is true then, there is proof of p (justification is necessary for truth) — Agent Smith

The JTB theory doesn’t say this.

What makes no sense is to talk about me using the term 'bachelor' to describe John and just being wrong, absent of anyone believing I'm wrong. It's not a state we can access, we can't act on it, it can never form part of our lives, none of our language or concepts can be based on it... — Isaac

I don't need to have access to the facts. I just need to accept that there are facts. If John believes that it is raining and Jane believes that it is not raining then I, the impartial third party with no opinion on the matter because I am locked inside a windowless room, can say "iff it is raining then John is right and Jane is wrong and iff it is not raining then Jane is right and John is wrong."

What I wouldn't say is "neither John nor Jane are right because I have no reason to believe either of them over the other," and nor would I say "both John and Jane are right because they are both convinced in their beliefs."

And sometimes we do have access to the facts; sometimes it rains and sometimes we experience that rain. What is that if not access to the facts?

The definitional equivalent would be...

1. John is wet if he is covered in water
2. John is wet if I believe that he is covered in water

Fine, but it’s still the same: 1) is true, 2) is not. John isn't made wet by you believing that he is; he's made wet by being actually covered in water.

It can be the case that one person believes that John is wet and one person believes that John is not wet, but the laws of excluded middle and non-contradiction entail that only one of them is right. Either John is wet or he isn't. Either the person who believes that John is wet is right (and has knowledge), because John really is wet, or the person who believes that John is not wet is right (and has knowledge), because John really isn't wet. And I can say this despite not having my own opinion on whether or not John is wet.

@Isaac

Which of these is true?

1. John is wet if he is standing in the rain
2. John is wet if I believe that he is standing in the rain

Which of these is true?

1. John is a bachelor iff he is an unmarried man
2. John is a bachelor iff I believe that he is an unmarried man

Which of these is true?

1. John has knowledge iff the facts are as he believes them to be
2. John has knowledge iff I believe that the facts are as he believes them to be

You are arguing that because we say “John is wet” if we believe that John is standing in the rain and that because we say “John is a bachelor” if we believe that John is an unmarried man and that because we say “John has knowledge” if we believe that the facts are as John believes them to be then in each case 2) is true.

This is a misunderstanding of meaning-as-use. In each case 1) is true. At the very least this should be obvious in the case of John being wet: he’s not wet because of my beliefs; he’s wet because of the actual weather. The same principle applies in the cases of being a bachelor and having knowledge.

You will get wet if it is raining and you stand outside uncovered.

The above is true even if nobody judges it to be raining.

You don't respond to the above by asking "if it's raining according to who?" That's ridiculous. It's not the case that "if, according to me, it is raining, then you will get wet if you stand outside uncovered." It's not according to anyone, it's just if it is raining.

If it is actually raining, irrespective of what anyone believes, then you will get wet if you stand outside uncovered. It is the actual rain that makes you wet, not my judgement that it is raining that makes you wet.

The meaning of "if it is raining" in the context of "you will get wet if it is raining and ..." is the meaning of "if it is raining" in the context of "John knows that it is raining if it is raining and ..." It's about the actual state of affairs obtaining.

There's no debate about what it means to be dead (or not much anyway). There's debate about what it means to know.

No-one is arguing that your position is incoherent (at least I'm not). It's a perfectly coherent possibility, it's just not the possibility which actually pertains.

'To know' could mean what you say it does. It just doesn't happen to. — Isaac

If you ask people which of these is true, I believe most would say the first (not the second and not both):

John knows what the weather is like if the weather is as he justifiably believes it to be.

John knows what the weather is like if the weather isn’t as he justifiably believes it to be.

John only has knowledge in the first scenario.

We say "I know if what I believe is true" and "you know if what you believe is true" but we don't say "I know if I have a belief" or "you know if I agree with what you believe." We say "I thought I knew, but I was wrong" but we don't say "I thought I believed, but I was wrong."

I say "John is a bachelor" if I believe that John is a bachelor but I don't say "John is a bachelor if I believe that John is a bachelor," and I say "I know his name" if I believe that I know his name but I don't say "I know his name if I believe that I know his name."

Well then, as I've asked before, if circumstances of felicitous use don't give us the meaning of terms, what does? — Isaac

See above. You’re equivocating. That it’s appropriate to say what you say isn’t that what you say is true. Your assertion that John is a bachelor can be appropriate, given what you believe, but false given the actual facts. And your assertion that you have knowledge can be appropriate, given what you believe, but false given the actual facts.

You're labelling it as a wrong use of the word, but I'm calling it a correct use of the word, just a wrong belief. It's correct to use the word 'bachelor' of someone you believe to be unmarried and believe to be a man, it's how everyone uses the word and it would be perverse to suggest it wasn't correct (ie everyone is wrong).

You might later come to believe that he is married, or a woman (or both), so now, believing this, it would no longer be correct to use the word 'bachelor'. — Isaac

This is further equivocation. The use is appropriate if you believe that John is an unmarried man, but if John isn’t an unmarried man (i.e your belief is wrong) then your assertion that John is a bachelor is false, because he isn’t a bachelor.

'Bachelor' is a term given to people who the user believes are unmarried and the who the user believes is a man. That is how 'bachelor's used. It is not reserved for use only when we have managed to obtain some sort of objective fact about a person's sex or marital status. — Isaac

It may be appropriate to use the term “bachelor” if you believe that the person is an unmarried man, but that doesn’t mean that “bachelor” means “a person I believe to be an unmarried man.” In fact, “bachelor” means “unmarried man.”

You’re equivocating.

But who can judge what is or isn't a Fact? — I like sushi

Nobody needs to judge it. The poison will kill me even if nobody believes it will. The facts do not depend on any person’s judgements.

Here's another example:

John will die if:

1) John drinks the potion, and
2) the potion is toxic

Do we interpret this claim as the below?

John will die if:

1) I believe that John drinks the potion, and
2) I believe that the potion is toxic

Of course not. That would be ridiculous. My beliefs will not kill John. The actual facts will kill John. The exact same principle applies to:

John knows that it is raining iff:

1) John believes that it is raining,
2) John is justified in believing that it is raining, and
3) it is raining

Number 3 'it is raining' is a Fact by what judgement? Abstract judgement. — I like sushi

I have addressed this repeatedly. There are facts, independent of what anyone believes or judges. If these facts obtain then our beliefs are true. These facts must obtain for us to have knowledge, otherwise our beliefs are false.

Yep. And as such the JTB definition of knowledge is wrong, because that's not how anyone ever actually uses the word 'knowledge' in any actual context because in all actual contexts people replace "actually is" with their own strong belief that it actually is. — Isaac

I clarified the mistake you're making here:

There's a difference between saying "a bachelor is an unmarried man because the language community uses the term 'bachelor' to refer to people they believe to be unmarried men" and saying "John is a bachelor because the language community believes that John is an unmarried man."

The former is true, the latter is not. The language community can be wrong about John.

And in the same vein, there's a difference between saying "things that are known are true and justified because the language community uses the term 'known' to refer to things they believe to be true and justified" and saying "X is known because the language community believes that X is true and justified."

The former is true, the latter is not. The language community can be wrong about X. — Michael

We use the term "bachelor" to refer to people we believe to be unmarried men, but that doesn't mean that "bachelor" means "someone I believe to be an unmarried man." The correct definition of "bachelor" is "unmarried man."

Sometimes I refer to people who aren't bachelors as being bachelors because I believe them to be, and I'm wrong.

We use the term "knowledge" to refer to beliefs that we believe to be true and justified, but that doesn't mean that "knowledge" means "a belief I believe to be true and justified." The correct definition of "knowledge" is "belief that is true and justified."

Sometimes I refer to beliefs which aren't knowledge as being knowledge because I believe them to be, and I'm wrong.

You're still ignoring context and trying to pin me down to one single meaning for expressions which clearly have different meanings in different contexts. — Isaac

I’m trying to explain to you that your interpretation of “it is raining” as “I believe that it is raining” is misplaced in the context of the JTB definition of knowledge.

When the JTB definition of knowledge states that John knows that it is raining iff 1) he believes that it is raining and 2) he is justified in believing that it is raining and 3) it is raining, it is simply stating in specific terms the more general definition that John knows what the weather is like iff it actually is as he justifiably believes it to be.

Or to be even more general, S knows a fact iff the fact is as S justifiably believes it to be.

Nothing about the JTB definition of knowledge has anything to do with what I or the language community believes.

No, they sound quite different to me, not sure how you got there from what I said. — Isaac

The fact that you’ve repeatedly said that you interpret “it is raining” as “I believe that it is raining.”

Applied to “John knows what the weather is like iff it actually is as he justifiably believes it to be”, and using rain as an example, we break it down to:

John knows that it is raining iff:

1. John believes that it is raining,
2. John is justified in believing that it is raining, and
3. It is raining

Applied to “John knows what the weather is like iff he is justified in believing what he does about the weather and I agree with him”, and using rain as an example, we break it down to:

John knows that it is raining iff:

1. John believes that it is raining,
2. John is justified in believing that it is raining, and
3. I believe that it is raining

So do you now understand the difference between “it is raining” and “I believe that it is raining”?

So you don’t understand the difference between these?

1. John knows what the weather is like iff it actually is as he justifiably believes it to be

2. John knows what the weather is like iff he is justified in believing what he does about the weather and I agree with him

So you finally understand that the third condition isn’t “I believe that X is true” or “the language community believes that X is true”? You finally understand that the third condition “X is true” is just saying that the actual facts obtain?

It can't be 'what his belief is about' because 'what his belief is about' is the actual weather and a proposition is not the weather. — Isaac

The third condition is saying that the actual weather has to be as the person believes it to be. If you accept that there is such a thing as the actual weather, distinct from what anyone believes it to be, then you can understand the third condition.

John knows what the weather is like iff it actually is as he justifiably believes it to be.

Nothing about the above has anything to do with what I or the language community believes about the weather. And the above isn’t the same as the below, which is false:

John knows what the weather is like iff he is justified in believing what he does about the weather.

It doesn't change the meaning of 'true' in JTB. I'm arguing that 'true' just means the same as 'justified belief' and so adds nothing. — Isaac

We don’t need to use the term “true”. We can say that:

John knows that it is raining iff:

1. John believes that it is raining,
2. John is justified in believing that it is raining, and
3. It is raining

Where 3. is to be understood as the propositional content of John’s belief, i.e what his belief is about. It’s the mind-independent state-of-affairs that our assertions refer to according to realism.

What you're missing (of my interpretation) is that there's no such thing as an independent fact that john is a married woman, someone must believe John is a woman. That John is a married woman is (and only is) someone's belief, so (2) and (3) are just direct contradictions, in this context. — Isaac

Right, so your entire argument rests on some form of extreme anti-realist metaphysics that denies that beliefs can be false or that there are belief-independent facts. I'm not willing to argue metaphysics here. This discussion is regarding a) what the JTB definition of knowledge entails and b) whether or not Gettier cases show the JTB definition of knowledge to be inadequate. For the sake of this discussion we must take some form of realism for granted.

No I'm interpreting the claim "John is a bachelor iff John is a man and John is unmarried" as the claim "John is a bachelor iff the language community general believe that John is a man and unmarried" — Isaac

Which is wrong as I have repeatedly explained.

1) John is a bachelor iff John is an unmarried man
2) John is a married woman
3) The language community generally believes that John is an unmarried man

Given that the above are true, the following is false:

4) John is a bachelor iff the language community generally believes that John is an unmarried man

Therefore, 1) and 4) do not mean the same thing.

So you are interpreting the sentence "John is a bachelor iff John is a man and John is unmarried" as the sentence "John is a bachelor iff the language community generally believes that John is a man and unmarried". — Michael

No I'm interpreting the claim "John is a bachelor iff John is a man and John is unmarried" as the claim "John is a bachelor iff the language community general believe that John is a man and unmarried" — Isaac

You are drawing a distinction between a sentence and a claim. What is the distinction? Is the distinction such that the sentence "John is a bachelor iff John is a man and John is unmarried" doesn't mean the same thing as the sentence "John is a bachelor iff the language community generally believes that John is a man and unmarried," and that the sentence "it is raining" doesn't mean the same thing as the sentence "I believe that it is raining"?

If so then we can finally go back to the original claim:

John knows that X iff:

1. John believes that X is true,
2. John is justified in believing that X is true, and
3. X is true

These are to be understood as sentences, not as claims. So no misinterpreting 3) as "I believe that X is true" or "John believes that X is true" or "the language community generally believes that X is true."

Incidentally, this distinction you seem to be making between sentences and claims seems to be the same distinction I made earlier between propositions and speech acts that you initially denied:

As a speech act asserting that one knows X may be equivalent to asserting that one believes X, but as propositions "I believe X" is not equivalent to "I know X" — Michael

If propositions are not speech acts, then where are they used? Do we mime them? Communicate them through the means of interpretive dance? — Isaac

We may be using slightly different terminology but it seems we got there in the end.

This is now the third time I've pointed out the context of that partial quote. If you don't understand, you can just ask, but please don't keep disingenuously quoting parts of what I say to make some kind of 'gotcha', it's not a level of discussion I'm interested in. — Isaac

Look at the entire context:

As a simpler example:

John is a bachelor iff:

1) John is a man, and
2) John is unmarried

You want to interpret this as the claim that John is a bachelor iff:

1) I believe that John is a man, and
2) I believe that John is unmarried — Michael

I'd interpret the claim as...

John is a bachelor iff:

1) My language community generally believe that John is a man, and
2) My language community generally believe believe that John is unmarried — Isaac

So you are interpreting the sentence "John is a bachelor iff John is a man and John is unmarried" as the sentence "John is a bachelor iff the language community general believe that John is a man and unmarried". This is wrong, and why I said what I said here:

There's a difference between saying "a bachelor is an unmarried man because the language community uses the term 'bachelor' to refer to people they believe to be unmarried men" and saying "John is a bachelor because the language community believes that John is an unmarried man."

The former is true, the latter is not. The language community can be wrong about John. — Michael

So we have two claims:

1) a bachelor is an unmarried man because the language community uses the term 'bachelor' to refer to people they believe to be unmarried men.

2) John is a bachelor iff John is an unmarried man.

Using 1), you interpret 2) as:

3) John is a bachelor iff the language community general believe that John is an unmarried man.

This is an invalid interpretation. And that's because this is true:

4) The language community incorrectly believes that John is an an unmarried man.

You accept that the language community can be wrong; that they can believe that John is a bachelor when in fact John is not. Given that, 2) is true and 3) is false, 3) is a misinterpretation of 2).

No I didn't. — Isaac

Yes you did. Here:

John is a bachelor iff:

1) My language community generally believe that John is a man, and
2) My language community generally believe believe that John is unmarried — Isaac

This is false. In fact, John is a bachelor iff John is a man and John is unmarried.

Because...? — Isaac

Because what? I am simply informing you of how language works. When I assert that I believe that it is raining, there is something that my belief is about. And what is it about? That it is raining. The "it is raining" in "I believe that it is raining" is a proposition that has a meaning, and that meaning is a reference to something that is the case (the weather).

Doesn't this all get resolved if it's acknowledged that on occasion knowledge is wrong because humans make mistakes. — Cheshire

We thought we knew X but we were wrong. We didn't know X because not X.

I said there is nothing more to the 'meaning' of bachelor than it's felicitous use and you respond by saying the language community can be wrong about things. I don't see how the two are linked at all, you'll have to connect them up for me. — Isaac

You previously claimed that John is a bachelor iff the language community believes that John is an unmarried man. That's false. The language community can be wrong about John.

It is not the case that John is a bachelor iff the language community believes that John is an unmarried man.

It is the case that John is a bachelor iff John is an unmarried man.

Parts of a sentence don't have independent meanings — Isaac

Yes they do. The "it is raining" part of "I believe that it is raining" has a meaning, and that meaning is different to the "it is not raining" part of "I believe that it is not raining," and both meanings are different to the "Paris is the capital city of France" part of "I believe that Paris is the capital city of France."

When I believe that it is raining, what do I believe? That it is raining. When I believe that Paris is the capital city of France, what do I believe? That Paris is the capital city of France. Beliefs have propositional content, and that propositional content can be (and is) asserted as a proposition.

The proposition "it is raining" refers to the weather. It asserts something about what is actually the case. It is true iff water is falling from the clouds and false otherwise. It has nothing to do with whether or not I believe that it is raining and nothing to do with whether or not you believe that it is raining and nothing to do with whether or not the language community believes that it is raining. And the same principle applies to "John is a bachelor," "the Sun orbits the Earth," and "X is true."