Why do some forms of information processing result in first person perspective and other's don't? Why do these result in a phenomenological horizon centered on a specific body? — Count Timothy von Icarus

How about the following?

Because some forms of information processing occur in embodied systems with sensorimotor interaction with the environment. This results in the development of intuitions (deep learning) 'centered' on that specific body.

:up:

Humanist Pursuits: For humanists, meaning can come from scientific inquiry, the arts, and building technologically advanced societies. These pursuits aim to improve the human condition and advance knowledge, but they can still feel empty without a connection to something greater than individual or collective achievements. — schopenhauer1

This doesn't much describe what I experience as finding life meaningful, although there is an aspect of 'doing art' involved in the story below. For me what is most meaningful lies in human interactions, and cherished memories of such interactions.

I'm particularly high on finding life beautiful right now, due to a message I received yesterday. I want to share it, although I don't know if it will seem meaningful to you, and in fact I wonder if it will somehow make you angry.

To start off, there is this video game called Journey. It's a very artistic game designed with a goal of providing people with spiritual experiences via one on one interactions between two people, with the only means of communication between the players being via on screen 'body language' and repertoire of beeps. Typically you are playing with a stranger and don't find out the other player's screen name until the game is over. One playthrough of the game takes about two hours.

Five years ago I played through the game with someone, and afterwards I received a personal message that said:

Hi, sorry if this is weird or unusual, but you just went through a Journey with me, and I want to say thank you. This was my third play through and in my second I lost my companion through the [Spoiler omitted] Thank you for sticking with me and showing me all those symbols. For some reason this all made me really emotional. Thank you so much, that was an amazing feeling. I was thinking maybe some day I can help someone like that too. I hope I will. It's not just about completing the game.
That was something else really.

I'm not going to bother typing my response, but three months later she messaged again to say:

Hello, I wanted to say goodbye. I'm tidying up my friends list on here and removing anyone but my real-life friends and colleagues. I'm wishing you all the best. I hope you've been well whoever and wherever you are. I hope you'll always find joy even after dark times in your life. Be well and farewell, and maybe we'll meet again in Journey. Until then, take care, and thank you.

To that I replied:

Thanks for the kind words, and the same to you. And thanks for the best after Journey message I've ever gotten. There is nothing better I could have heard than that our journey inspired you to want to help people. Best wishes.

Yesterday, I decided to try another game of Journey, though the game is old and there aren't many playing these days. It can take a while to be paired up with a companion. When I logged on I found the following message:

Hey there, I played a bit of journey again, and was showing it to a friend. I mentioned you to her because after all this time I still haven't forgotten you. The playthrough was memorable to me. It really left an impression. I'm wondering whether you are fine and how you are doing -- I felt like we had talked more but I guess we didn't. I don't know where that memory came from. It's really strange seeing it now. I still think of you from time to time and hope you are well over there.

I guess my point, other than just wanting to share something very beautiful and meaningful to me, is that the nonexistence of cosmic meaning just doesn't seem very important to me. The human capacity for finding things meaningful exists, regardless of whether meaning exists. Furthermore the rather large percentage of the human population able to find such interactions meaningful simply isn't going to be argued out of finding life meaningful.

Thank you so much. That was beautiful.

Hilariously tragic. El-ev-en! :rofl: — Amity

Catharsis achieved? :wink:

They'd shoot you dead, just for being incomprehensible. — Vera Mont

Especially if you make us wait a long time for the fucking elevator.

But if causal closure is true the mental never—on pain of violating the principle—has any effect on behavior. — Count Timothy von Icarus

In addition to what I addressed earlier, I wanted to point out that there seems to be an implicit dualism behind this comment. It seems to assume that what we refer to as "mental" is something other than physical occurences. Admittedly such a dualism is at least deeply culturally engrained, if not to some degree a matter of biological biasing to our thinking. However, such dualistic thinking needs to be set aside if one wishes to critique physicalism successfully.

I don't think Plantinga's argument is air tight, but neither is it merely a strawman. It's been taken seriously because, even if it is a simple argument, there is something to it. — Count Timothy von Icarus

As I said earlier:

...I do think it brings up matters well worth thinking about. — wonderer1

And I'll admit it isn't merely a straw man, but a highly complex straw man brought up by a brilliant though (in this context) poorly informed mind.

There has been scholarly criticism of the argument, on the basis that Plantinga's P(R|N&E) is highly questionable in light of the possibility that what should be under consideration is P(R|N&E*) where:

E is Plantinga's simplistic conceptualization of evolution.
E* is a more thoroughly scientifically informed conceptualization of evolution.

I don't recall the name of the author(s) of that paper, and I lack motivation to track it down, but that paper is out there, and it does amount to strongly suggesting (using more sophisticated language) that the EAAN amounts to a straw man. It also meshes nicely with my objection that Plantinga neglects consideration of evolution occurring in a social species. (I.e. Plantinga's attack on E&N doesn't touch my E*&N.)

Maybe it depends on semantics of reliable - pretty vague word. — Apustimelogist

:up:

:wink:

probably because it's irrelevant. — Wayfarer

A straw man fallacy (sometimes written as strawman) is the informal fallacy of refuting an argument different from the one actually under discussion, while not recognizing or acknowledging the distinction.[1] One who engages in this fallacy is said to be "attacking a straw man".

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Straw_man

When he published his paper on the evolutionary argument against naturalism, a number of scholars responded critically to it, but, so far as I know, not along the lines that it was a straw man argument. — Wayfarer

And?

The ability to 'disseminate information amongst social species' - for example species that make sounds on the approach of predators, like meerkats, or that of bee dances - is obviously advantageous to survival, but what does that have to do with the issue at hand? — Wayfarer

Plantinga completely neglects consideration of evolution in a social species, so isn't presenting a seriously considered account of evolution. Ergo he is working with a strawman account.

I think biological determinism remains a potent force in contemporary thought. The whole of naturalised epistemology would seek to ground reason in terms of evolutionary psychology, would it not? — Wayfarer

I only got as far as "evo" before my search tool told me that I wasn't going to find "evolutionary psychology" in that link. I was unsurprised, in view of evolutionary psychology being a fairly small part of a much bigger scientific picture.

In any case my interest is in a cooperative naturalism perspective:

Cooperative naturalism is a version of naturalized epistemology which states that while there are evaluative questions to pursue, the empirical results from psychology concerning how individuals actually think and reason are essential and useful for making progress in these evaluative questions. This form of naturalism says that our psychological and biological limitations and abilities are relevant to the study of human knowledge. Empirical work is relevant to epistemology but only if epistemology is itself as broad as the study of human knowledge.

A lot of what is considered under naturalized epistemology isn't that interesting to me.

Plantinga's argument contends that if our cognitive faculties are the result of evolutionary processes driven purely by survival, then there is no reason to accept that that they produce true beliefs, only that they produce beliefs that are advantageous for survival. — Wayfarer

Accurate enough synopsis, but Plantinga doesn't consider factors which are of great relevance. For example, consider the case of a social species, and whether an ability to convey truths to conspecifics provides a fitness advantage to members of the social group. An ability to recognize and disseminate truths within a social species seems like it could be pretty damn adaptive to me.

Therefore, if one accepts both naturalism and evolution, one has a defeater for trusting the reliability of their cognitive faculties, including the belief in naturalism and evolution themselves.

Well I suppose, if one accepts Plantinga's naive understanding of the theory of evolution, but surely no one here would do that.

Also "defeater" is a bit much. Perhaps it is not such a binary matter. Perhaps it would be of benefit for members of the aforementioned social species to question the reliability of their cognitive faculties. After all, some of their conspecifics might be smarter or better informed than themselves. Do you think it is a bad thing that people question the reliability of their cognitive faculties. Peer review anyone?

This is a self-defeating position.

Are you familiar with Plantinga's "Paul"?

Supposing Plantinga's straw man account of evolution results in a self defeating position. It's still merely an argument based on a straw man.

By this I mean not that there must be some premises that are forever unrevisable but, rather, that in any process of reasoning or argument there must be some thoughts that one simply thinks from the inside--rather than thinking of them as biologically programmed dispositions. — Thomas Nagel

Thinking ones thoughts were purely a matter of biological dispositions would indeed be naive, but who actually thinks that way?

I'd think it more reasonable to say biological dispositions enable "thoughts that one simply thinks from the inside", but of course that isn't a full account of the causality of those thoughts.

After extensive research, reexamination of my understanding of evolution and cognitive science, and hours of contemplation I've come to the conclusion that it's the dumbest fucking philosophical argument I've ever heard. If someone will start a separate thread, I'll explain my thinking. — T Clark

:rofl:

I'd be interested in such a thread as well, but there are so many gaping holes in the EAAN, that it would be hard to pick a best objection to it. However, I do think it brings up matters well worth thinking about.

I'm interested in what people think is evidence for physicalism. — bert1

See here.

I think it's more that the physical sciences offer pseudo-solutions to a problem that their modus operandi can't accomodate. — Wayfarer

Ok, but you aren't coming from a well informed perspective. (Or do you no longer deny that there is evidence for physicalism?)

It’s not a problem in search of a solution. It’s pointing out that a third-party (objective) description cannot be equated with the first-person (subjective) experience, as the latter possesses a qualitative dimension which cannot be reduced to, or represented in, symbolic terminology. It’s not a failure on the part of scientific psychology, but a limitation inherent in the objective method. — Wayfarer

I'd say it is more a matter of limited perceptual and cognitive faculties on our parts. We don't have minds capable of comprehensively understanding the complexity of what goes on in our brains. So what you are concerned with is only a pseudo-problem from a physicalist perspective. It's no more a problem for physicalism, than is the fact that you can't demonstrate that your mind is not emergent from physical processes, is a problem for physicalism.

Sure, but that doesn't make the problem any easier does it? If it does, please do explain. — bert1

No, it doesn't make the problem any easier. Still physicalism is where progress in understanding is being made, whereas dualism and panpsychism seem to dismiss the possibility of progress being made altogether.

One point Hoffman makes very well is that we have made no progress whatever in explaining how it is that a particular neural event is (or causes or realises) a sensation of the smell of coffee rather than, say, the taste of chocolate. — bert1

On the other hand, a lot of progress is being made, in understanding that things like the smell of coffee are a function of coordinated activity in arrays of neurons, and that expecting to find a "particular neural event" accounting for the smell of coffee evinces a lack of sophistication in considering the subject.

In other news, if you put a capital Y in parenthesis, you'll create the thumbs up symbol. — Hanover

Nuh uh.

ParenthesYs

However, saw Phillip Goff's and Keith Frankish's Mindchat episode with him and was just basically spewing unintelligible garbage. — Apustimelogist

Having seen a blurb from Deepak Chopra on the Amazon page, I can't say I'm surprised.

The first line of the writeup in Amazon is "Challenging leading scientific theories that claim that our senses report back objective reality, cognitive scientist Donald Hoffman argues that while we should take our perceptions seriously, we should not take them literally." — T Clark

I wonder if the Amazon writeup is decribing what Hoffman is arguing for accurately. But regardless, (and with the cutesy 'seriously but not literally' aside) I can easily see myself agreeing with Hoffman if he means to say something like, "We need to take our perceptions seriously, because they are the result of interactions within reality, but there is a lot of benefit to understanding that things are a lot more complex than our perceptions suggest, and we can benefit from being cognizant of that."

Lorenz, on the other hand, explicitly stated that our understanding of the evolution of mind in humans and animals demonstrates that there is an objective reality. — T Clark

I wouldn't say "demonstrates", but certainly biological findings are consistent with there being an objective reality, not to mention such biological findings having great explanatory power.

Right now I'm in the middle of Konrad Lorenz's "Behind the Mirror" which also focuses strongly on evolution and objective reality but comes to a completely opposite conclusion. — T Clark

The conclusions don't seem so much in opposition to me. It seems to me that the following two sentences are just different ways of expressing a similar understanding.

This means that organisms develop a perception of the world that is directed towards fitness, and not of reality. — Hoffman

What we experience is indeed a real image of reality - albeit an extremely simple one, only just sufficing for our own practical purposes — Konrad Lorenz - Behind the Mirror

:up: :up:

You seem to be operating under the impression that the "Boltzmann Brain" is "a brain and just a brain experiencing is space." It isn't. It is just "physical system capable of producing consciousness." It says absolutely nothing about brains floating in vacuum having experiences. — Count Timothy von Icarus

:up:

I think you ought to notice that "signs that looked like the referents" indicates written language. And written language is viewed, while spoken language is heard. The two are very different, and have very different uses, so it is quite reasonable to consider that they evolved independently. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not sure what is meant by "evolved independently" when we are talking about things evolving in one species.

However, having a greater number of neurons available, to associate in more complex ways, things going on in visual cortex and things goings on in auditory cortex, might have been rather important.

It happens every time you dream, it's happening to people who have received chemical paralytic drugs, it's happening to people who are locked in. — frank

Unless it is happening when these people have stopped breathing, it should be evident that they are interacting with the environment in an important way.

Yeah. I mean what can one say? You've reminded me of being back in the lab where we slowed down bird calls so as to discover the structure that is just too rapid for a human ear to decode. And similar demonstrations of human speech slowed down to show why computer speech comprehension stumbled on the syllabic slurring that humans don't even know they are doing.

Do you know anything about any of this? — apokrisis

Sure, I posted something along similar lines in the shoutbox a year ago:

Psychologists solve mystery of songbird learning by taking into account the higher flicker-fusion rate of birds. — wonderer1

Anyway, I see from all your posturing that your ego is still as fragile as it was before you took your sabbatical from the forum. That's unfortunate.

The human difference is we have language on top of neurobiology. — apokrisis

It would be kind of silly to think there is only one difference.

And the critical evolutionary step was not brain size but vocal cords. — apokrisis

Considering all the bird species able to mimic human speech, it doesn't seem as if you have thought this through.

I'm fairly confident that you aren't in a position to prove that the mutation leading to ARHGAP11B wasn't a critical step on the path leading to human linguistic capabilities.

ARHGAP11B is a human-specific gene that amplifies basal progenitors, controls neural progenitor proliferation, and contributes to neocortex folding. It is capable of causing neocortex folding in mice. This likely reflects a role for ARHGAP11B in development and evolutionary expansion of the human neocortex, a conclusion consistent with the finding that the gene duplication that created ARHGAP11B occurred on the human lineage after the divergence from the chimpanzee lineage but before the divergence from Neanderthals.

...my guess is it's mostly there so that they can charge institutions the amount that they require to continue running... — Moliere

Excerpt from https://blogs.uwe.ac.uk/psychological-sciences/standards-and-profits-in-academic-publishing-all-publishers-and-open-access-arrangements-are-not-the-same/:

But increasing numbers suggest that even traditional academic publishers can be bad for science (see here and here). Academic publishing used to incur appreciable costs in terms of typesetting articles, producing physical copies of journals and distributing them around the world. More recently, desktop publishing software and online articles have reduced these costs considerably. Today, the academic publishing industry reports profit margins of around 40%. A New Scientist leader article argues it is the most profitable business in the world.

While the business model of academic publishing is extremely profitable for the publishers, it is extractive in terms of the academic labour involved (see here and here). Academics write articles for free, associate editors find reviewers for free, peer reviewers critique the articles for free, and even many editors in chief guide the whole process for free. All the while, some publishers are making huge profits.

For philosophers, rationality is not a material machine, but the cognitive function of a complex self-aware neural network that is able to infer (to abstract) a bare-bones logical structure (invisible inter-relationships) in natural systems*1. — Gnomon

I think a philosopher might be open to facing the truth of the nature of our minds, whatever that might be.

It sounds like you are saying that a philosopher is someone with a closed mind on the subject. Is that about right?

The idea that humans have a unique ability to understand signs is a direct callback to the divinity of humanity.

It implies that humans have access to a special mechanism that isn't part of the rest of creation.

To believe in this version of semiotics, I am tasked with believing that God gave humanity access to mechanisms that are not available to mere mortal animals.

Even with a more mundane "emergent behaviours" justification, this seems to me to exhibit characteristics of trying to fit the evidence to the prejudices. — Treatid

It seems to me one can dispense with theism, recognize that More is Different and that humans have more cortical neurons than any other species, and thereby have a basis for recognizing a uniqueness to humans.

Not sure what you mean. Why would our deep learning/intuition telling us determinism is not correct be evidence that determinism is correct? Or is that booty what you're saying? — Patterner

I wasn't referring to intuitions related to determinism specifically, but to intuitions in general and how slow they can be to change, and the changing of our intuitions not being a simple matter of choice on our parts.

If we don't have conscious control of how our intuitions shape our choices, do we have free will?

I don't know if I believe in something called human nature... — Tom Storm

Certainly "human natures" instead of "human nature" would be a step towards communicating with a greater degree of accuracy. However, I don't think we have a realistic option other than the use of fuzzy generalizations, when it comes to discussing psychology. 'Human nature' seems like a useful enough fuzzy generalization for this sort of discussion in many cases. (Though I recognize that using the term might have the unfortunate effect of supporting essentialism in the minds of some.)

Or am I wrong in thinking that, if asked about determinism, most people would say they have not heard of it, and would need it explained?

I also suspect that, once determinism had been explained to them, most would not say it reflects how they feel their thinking works/is accomplished. — Patterner

This itself is evidence for determinism, in that you can't choose what it is that you find to be intuitive. Intuitions, being a matter of deep learning that occurs subconsciously in our neural nets, can take quite a long time to change.

Do you think the relative conveniences a base-12 system would offer could have possibly lubricated our understanding of mathematics/physics to have potentially progressed meaningfully quicker in these disciplines? — Mp202020

I'm not a mathematician, and don't have sufficient basis for any strong opinion on the matter. As @SophistiCat pointed out there is a convenience to using integer multiples of 12 when thinking about geometry involving lines and circles, so we use 360 degrees to a circle. On the other hand it can be convenient to consider circles in terms of 2π radians instead of 360 degrees.

Regardless of what number base came to dominate in ancient history, advances in mathematics were dependent on the ability of mathematicians to shift between different ways of enumerating things.

Perhaps it is worth considering Euler's Identity:



Euler's Identity works regardless of the base number system used.

Different number bases have different convenience advantages depending on context. I use base 2 and base 16 frequently.

Base 12 would probably provide some convenience advantage over base 10, in that 12 can be divided evenly by five smaller integers (1, 2, 3, 4, 6), whereas 10 can only be divided evenly by three smaller integers (1, 2, 5).

Perhaps using base 12 would produce greater social harmony and result in world peace. For example, pizzas should always be sliced into 12 pieces to maximize the odds of harmony in pizza sharing.

:up:

is 10 a different type of number compared to 12? Simply by way of it doesn’t split evenly in the same way it’s higher orders do, the way 12 does? — Mp202020

12^2 (144) is evenly divisible by 9, whereas 12 is not evenly divisible by 9.

So 12 doesn't split evenly the way its higher orders do. Is there any particular significance to this?