Nope. Free will pertains to living beings, in particular humans. — NOS4A2

So it is not enough for my free will act to originate in me. I must also be alive and maybe also intend to do the act? But how do I choose an intention without already having it?

litewave, It's far from clear what you response to the OP is. — Banno

I agree with OP. We cannot choose to think a thought without already thinking it. Which means that our choice of thoughts is just thoughts popping into our head. So much for free will.

Still, intents do not of themselves choose outcomes. We as agents so driven by our intents do. — javra

Intents drive us and we drive outcomes. Seems like a row of billiard balls.

Thoughts don’t choose between thoughts. Agents - such as one’s own conscious being - choose between thoughts. — javra

Why would agents do that? Because they are driven by thoughts, including by thoughts to choose between thoughts. Or when they are not driven by thoughts, their choices are unintended, which precludes free will too.

. The slip itself is more of an act of physics, I suppose. — NOS4A2

So physics has free will?

Something I’ve been wondering about regarding the block universe is, does the block universe model depend on physicalism being true, or could it also work with ontologies such as monistic idealism? I’m hoping you could help me figure that one out. — Paul Michael

I think the simplest interpretation of theory of relativity is that time is literally a space and therefore it doesn't pass, it just exists. But we have various feelings and one of those feelings is that time passes, which is apparently associated with feelings of memories and expectations.

To rule out the possibility of free will one will have to show that thoughts, or any action for that matter, comes from somewhere or someone else. — NOS4A2

If you slip on a banana peel is it an act of your free will or is it an act of the banana's free will?

I have, however, edited what occurred to me. Was the editing an act of free will or was it the product of a fussy compulsion? — Bitter Crank

It occurred to you to edit what occurred to you.

If this is correct, does this automatically rule out the possibility of free will? — Paul Michael

Yes, and it gets even worse if you consider that time doesn't pass because it is just a special kind of space, as theory of relativity implies. Do we have free will if the future already exists just like the past?

What does such a redundant modifer even mean? As compared to 'not really real' or 'unreally real'' :roll: — 180 Proof

It means to emphasize that something is "real", especially when one doesn't know what "real" means.

Well but I was referring to logically possible (consistent) worlds, not ideal ones.

Kudos to David Lewis for saying out loud that there is no difference between a possible world and a "really real" world.

But - as with a) the infinity of nothingness or b) the infinity of at least certain understandings of God (each being a different qualitative version of what would yet be definable as metaphysical infinity) - it is possible for certain humans to conceptualize its occurrence. — javra

Nothingness cannot have an ontic occurrence since it has nothing to occur, and if there were an infinite God he would be different from other objects, for example from us humans, so he would have a boundary of his identity too.

Whereas metaphysical infinity would be infinite in length, in width, and in all other possible manners. — javra

But such a metaphysical infinity would still have a boundary of its identity because it would be differentiated from what it is not, for example from finiteness or from infinite lines.

Ontically occurring metaphysical infinity is devoid of any ontic identity for it has no boundaries via which such an ontic identity can be established. — javra

So an infinite line has no ontic identity?

Ontic determinacy, or the condition of being ontically determined, specifies that which is determined to be limited or bounded in duration, extension, or some other respect(s) - this by some determining factor(s), i.e. by some determinant(s). — javra

Every object is bounded in its identity, that is, it has a boundary that differentiates the object from what it is not. Does "ontically determinate" mean having such a boundary? Then it doesn't seem important whether the object is in some way infinite.

Ok then.

Too theoretical and insubstantial. Please give examples. — Alkis Piskas

For example, what is a universal circle? It doesn't look like a particular circle because every particular circle is continuous in space and around a particular point in space but a universal circle is not supposed to be located in any continuous area of space. A universal circle looks like certain deviations from any particular circle and thus more like a resemblance relation among particular circles.

You claim to see collections existing as particulars all around you. Please explain to me how you think that you are seeing a collection as a particular when you haven't even said what a particular is. — Metaphysician Undercover

A particular is an object that is not a property of any object. As opposed to a universal, which is a property of some object. A general collection or collection "in general" is a universal that is a property of every particular collection. A particular apple is not a property of anything, but general apple is a property of every particular apple.

In reality, you have shown that you construct a representation of a particular, an object, from some preconceived universals, set theory, but then you've tried to claim that universals are derived from particulars. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I am saying that particular collections are made up of particular collections, not constructed from universals. I take particular collections as granted because I see them all around me and because for any particulars there necesarily seems to be a collection of them, and universals don't seem necessary to explain the existence of particulars.

An "unordered set", a group of things which have no order, is really an incoherent fiction, an impossible situation, because things must have position. — Metaphysician Undercover

Objects in a topological space can have a position in such a space. But a topological space is just a special kind of collection and there are many other collections that are not topological spaces. So an object doesn't necessarily have to have a position in a topological space.

Does my comment not address your question adequately? If no, why? — Agent Smith

Your comment said that my OP wishes to make a distinction between a universal and a resemblance relation when I in fact question that such a distinction exists.

An object is much more than a collection of parts. Each different object has its parts ordered in a particular way. — Metaphysician Undercover

In set theory, ordered sets/collections (which have members arranged in a particular order) can be defined out of unordered sets. For example an ordered set (a, b) is a set with members a and b which are ordered in such a way that a comes first and b comes second, and it can be defined as an unordered set of sets { a } and { a, b }:

(a, b) = { { a }, { a, b } }

A set with the opposite order can be defined as follows:

(b, a) = { { b }, { a, b } }

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ordered_pair#Kuratowski's_definition

You can define any order, any mathematical structure in set theory.

Litewave, a collection is not an object. Therefore an empty collection is not a non-composite object. — Metaphysician Undercover

A particular apple is a collection of its parts. Is the apple not an object? What is an object then?

They have no location, that's the issue with quantum uncertainty. — Metaphysician Undercover

Still the elementary particles are particulars and not universals, no? And I am saying that any particular is a collection.

In short resemblance and universal are the same thing or, more accurately, they don't seem to be different enough to justify the kind of distinction the OP wishes to make. — Agent Smith

The title of my OP is asking whether there is such a distinction.

It would be a collection of parts without any parts. — Metaphysician Undercover

An empty collection is a collection of no parts. A non-composite object.

The appeal to fundamental particles does not help you because they are obviously not known as concrete entities. — Metaphysician Undercover

What? They are particulars located in space and time. Why would they not be concrete entities?

But "same" is the relationship which a thing has with itself. — Metaphysician Undercover

Such a relation, if it can even be regarded as a relation since it is between one thing (?), is usually called identity, as far as I know.

So if two distinct things are "the same" with respect to being red, then the concept of "red" cannot be a resemblance relation, which is a relationship of similarity — Metaphysician Undercover

Resemblance comes in various degrees and you can understand sameness as maximum or exact resemblance. So the meaning of resemblance also covers sameness.

If it is the case, that "A universal circle looks more like a recipe how to create all possible circles", then I do not see why you want to describe this as a resemblance relation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Because the recipe describes relations between particular circles, like translation, rotation, scaling. These are mappings between parts of one particular circle and parts of another particular circle. They specify how particular circles are similar.

How could there be a concrete entity which is an empty collection of parts? — Metaphysician Undercover

It would be a concrete entity without parts. Some people may think that elementary physical particles are such entities but I suppose that they do have parts/structures that give them their different properties.

So the appearance of infinite regress is an indication of unsound premises. — Metaphysician Undercover

Mathematics is full of infinities and it doesn't mean that it is unsound although infinities can be pretty mind-boggling. Then there is also Godel's second incompleteness theorem which I don't know exactly what it means but it says something in the sense that if a consistent system is complex enough to include arithmetic and thus involve infinities it is impossible to prove that it is consistent. So we may never know whether arithmetic is consistent.

As you yourself say the instance of colour here is a distinct particular from the instance of colour over there. So the proper logical conclusion is that it is incorrect to say that they are both the same colour, you have stipulated that they are different. — Metaphysician Undercover

They are two different particulars that are the same in the way that they are red. When two objects are the same it means that they are also different in some way because if they were the same in every way then they would be one object and not two.

I think you need to respect the meaning of "same" as described by the law of identity. "Same" means one and the same, "a single object". — Metaphysician Undercover

The word "same" is also used to refer to two or more different objects that are the same in every relevant way but not in every way (for example not in their location in reality). So that's how I used it when I said that two red particulars are the same in that they are red.

So if there is an "underlying sameness", this means that there is one and the same thing which underlies the two distinct instances, such that they are multiple occurrences of the same thing — Metaphysician Undercover

Ok but for example, what is the underlying thing that underlies all circles? One thing is clear: it does not look like a circle at all because if it looked like a circle it would be a particular circle and not a universal one. A particular circle is continuous in space but a universal circle would not be because it is not supposed to be located in some continuous area of space. A universal circle looks more like a recipe how to create all possible circles from an arbitrary particular circle: first define a particular circle by specifying all points on a plane that are the same particular distance from a particular point and then create additional objects by translating, rotating or scaling (enlarging/shrinking without deformation) this particular circle and you can call all those additional objects "circle" too. And they all resemble each other in the way of being a circle because any of them can be mapped onto any other via the relation of translation, rotation or scaling, and no other object can.

You don't see how this produces an infinite regress? If a concrete particular is a collection of concrete particulars, then each concrete particular in that collection is itself a collection of concrete particulars, and each concrete particular in that collection is itself a collection of concrete particulars, ad infinitum. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, that's how I think each particular is constructed. Except that there may be empty collections (non-composite particulars) at the bottom instead of infinite regress. But even if there was infinite regress I am not sure that would be a problem, as long as the whole (infinite) structure was logically consistent.

If they appear to be the exact same colour, then whatever it is which separates them as two distinct particulars, must be something other than colour. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, they have a different location and thus different relations to the rest of reality, which makes them two different particulars which however resemble in the sense that they are red. In a special case they could also have exactly the same internal structure (from empty sets upward), but that is not necessary since particulars with different structures can be red as long as their structures are such that they reflect light of the same wavelength.

Any way you look at it, we would have to conclude that there is something "the same" about the circumstances, something underlying, which is truly the same, which could produce the exact same colour in two completely different situations. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is an underlying sameness but I am not sure that there would need to be a single object (universal) to "produce" the resembling particulars. The particulars could resemble each other because their structures resemble each other. For example, two empty collections could resemble each other because they have no structure and not because there is a universal empty collection that produces particular empty collections.

Your idea is that we start with the phenomenon of resemblance, explain that in terms of predication, then explain predication in terms of universals. You want to cut off the last step, but you keep saying it means taking resemblance as more fundamental: it means no such thing; you're still explaining resemblance using predication, you just want to take predication as primitive. — Srap Tasmaner

Ok, how about this:

The predicate "is red" refers to the resemblance to an arbitrary red particular, instead of referring to the instantiation of the red universal. The resemblance relation among red particulars could then be defined as mappings among parts of the structures of the red particulars.

If I say that predication is constituted by the instantiation of universals, you have exactly the same resemblance relation, and its existence is no challenge at all to the universals account of predication. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes but then you have two additional entities (a universal object and an instantiation relation) that are primitive and purport to explain the resemblance relation: poof there is a universal and poof it is instantiated in the particulars. Those two additional entities seem redundant.

ground our use of predicates in the resemblance of things to each other. — Srap Tasmaner

So, for example there is a resemblance relation between two red particulars in the sense that they are both red. Sure, there is a circularity or primitiveness in this account of resemblance relation, but so is in the account of universal redness and its instantiation. So I drop the universal and instantiation and just leave a primitive resemblance relation, as a simpler account of resemblance.

That was my point. You're supposed to be grounding the use of predicates, aren't you? Or was your intention all along to ground some kinds of predicates in other kinds? — Srap Tasmaner

But they are the same predicate, just in different words. "To be red" means "to reflect certain wavelengths of light".

Is there a difference in principle between a simple looking predicate like "is red" and a complicated looking predicate like "whose structure interacts with light in such a way that it reflects certain wavelengths of light"? — Srap Tasmaner

No, both predicates refer to the same property of redness, the second predicate just elaborates what it means to be red.

Anyway, there's no trace here of your proposed resemblance relation. — Srap Tasmaner

I just identify a universal with a resemblance relation and thus simplify the metaphysical picture: instead of (1) a universal, (2) an instantiation relation between a universal and a particular, and (3) a resemblance relation between particulars, we would have just a resemblance relation between particulars.

I think it's kind of the opposite, as I see it: we see imperfect triangles all the time, which makes us think of triangles (which are perfect in our minds). You could perhaps say that imperfect triangles are a kind of derivative of mental triangles. — Manuel

I don't see what "perfection" has to do with universals anyway. What would it mean for a universal tree to be "perfect"?

That's a good point, but is it any use? If there's no criterion for membership, then the class you create is arbitrary, isn't it? — Srap Tasmaner

It seems that I could in principle define a part of the ball that constitutes the ball's particular red color. That part would be a subcollection in the ball, a subcollection whose structure interacts with light in such a way that it reflects certain wavelengths of light, and I could define this subcollection by enumerating its parts. My point is that a particular instance of a universal is a particular collection. According to set theory, any mathematical universal can be instantiated as a collection.

In the empirical world, we don't see triangles, nor rectangles nor any other geometrical figure, for exactly the reason you point out: they are imperfect, sometimes severely so. — Manuel

But we see at least imperfect triangles and they resemble each other in a particular way. You can postulate "imperfect triangle" as a universal, with some range of deviations from the perfect triangle.

And you really shouldn't be saying "collection" because that's a soft word for "class" and you precisely can't have classes without universals or predicates to define them. — Srap Tasmaner

I can also define a collection by enumerating its members, rather than by specifying a universal that is shared only by the members (or a resemblance relation that holds only among the members).

Are you (and others) referring to https://www.phil.cmu.edu › la...PDF
The Logical Structure of the World - Cmu? — bongo fury

I haven't read Carnap's book "The Logical Structure of the World".

Abstract, "pure mathematics" shows that we dream up universal principles (axioms) first, from the imagination, or they come to us intuitively, then we try to force the particulars of specific circumstances to be consistent with the universals. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ok, but I am saying that these "universal principles" are just resemblance relations between particulars rather than additional entities (universals) that instantiate in the particulars. I just identify a universal with a resemblance relation and thus simplify the metaphysical picture: instead of (1) a universal, (2) an instantiation relation between a universal and a particular, and (3) a resemblance relation between particulars we would have just a resemblance relation between particulars.

The psychology is messy. In many cases it seems that we imagine a concrete particular example, perhaps a typical or paradigmatic example, and call it a "universal". We can't visualize a universal circle, we always visualize a particular circle, but we can later write down the mathematical relationship among spatial points that defines a universal circle. But I don't rule out cases where our mind comes up first with a universal principle and then sees that it fits with the particular examples.

Litewave's suggestion, that a concrete particular is a collection of concrete particulars had already been demonstrated to be faulty because it was known to produce an infinite regress. — Metaphysician Undercover

How?

We can and do imagine many general properties without any particular instances. That's obvious in mathematics. — Metaphysician Undercover

All general mathematical properties have examples in particular sets (collections). That's why set theory is regarded as a foundation of mathematics.

I would say that the resemblance relation is dependent on the instances of a given general property - if there is no or if there is a single instance of such property, for example, there would not be a resemblance relation. The universal, on the other hand, I think, is independent of there being any instances of it. — Daniel

I think that a general property without particular instances is an oxymoron because it is inherent in the meaning of "general" property that it is instantiated in "particular" instances. Also, a general property with only one particular instance seems to be an oxymoron because if such a property is instantiated in only one particular instance, why call this property "general" and not simply identify it with the particular instance?

Thus, the resemblance relation requires that there are points in space that are red, and since their number and distribution is limited (not all points in space are red), the resemblance relation is also limited; on the contrary, redness requires that there are points in space that have the capacity to be red, independent of there being any red points. — Daniel

The resemblance relation I am talking about holds timelessly, among all similar objects that exist, have ever existed and will ever exist. (Actually, I would say that reality itself is timeless, in the sense that time is a special kind of space, as described by theory of relativity.) Also, I don't think that a non-red point of spacetime has a "capacity" or "potential" to be red; if such a point were red, it would change the definition of the spacetime that contains this point and so it would be a different spacetime, a different world, and the red point in this other world would be a different point than the non-red point in the former world. So it is not logically possible (consistent) for a non-red point of a particular spacetime to be red. We can say that a point in space can "change" in time, for example from non-red to red, but the non-red point of spacetime is non-red forever and the red point of spacetime is red forever. So, like the resemblance relation, the instantiation of a universal exists timelessly too, in all similar objects that exist, have ever existed and will ever exist.

By the way, when I said that the resemblance relation is "potentially" infinite-place, I just meant that maybe it has infinitely many relata.