Are you saying that mathematics exists? I will grant you that physical objects have properties that can be predicted by mathematics, but that's a far cry from saying that mathematics actually exists, right? — chiknsld

Are there collections in reality? If so, then reality is mathematical because all mathematics can be expressed in collections. That's what pure set theory has shown.

Does logic also exist, etc.? — chiknsld

Logic is just the principle of consistency. It just means that an object is what it is and is not what it is not. Logic is a necessary fact. And so are collections, because if there are some objects there is necessarily also a collection of them.

How is there space without time? — chiknsld

As I said, a space is a special kind of collection that has a continuity between its parts. There is a rigorous definition of it in mathematics. A space also has dimensions, which is the number of coordinates necessary to specify a location inside the collection. According to theory of relativity, spacetime is a 4-dimensional space where one of the dimensions, which we call time, has somewhat different mathematical properties than the other three. So in mathematics there is no problem in defining a space, with an arbitrary number of dimensions, without time.

Because they don't exist in the here and now? — Agent Smith

Yes, it would be a contradiction for unicorns to exist here and now because they don't exist here and now. If there is an object such as a spacetime whose definition includes that there is no unicorn at a location X inside it, it would be a contradiction if a unicorn was at the location X in such a spacetime. A spacetime with a unicorn at the location X would be a different spacetime, another spacetime.

Elementary 'particles' are directly quantum field quanta; there is no further structure. These field lumps of field excitations are conveniently called 'elementary particles', but they are not pinpoints and are spread out; an electron has a volume. — PoeticUniverse

If the particles are spread out in space then they obviously have a spatial structure.

What do you think the sensation is represented by? Energy perhaps? — chiknsld

Apparently, qualities of our consciousness are qualities of spatiotemporal objects with causal relations. Energy in physics is generally defined as the ability of an object to exert a force, so it is a property of all objects that have causal relations.

What is the object made out of? Just energy? It cannot be an object if it doesn't have some sort of physicality or energy. — chiknsld

In general, the quality of an object is just unstructured, monadic "something", "stuff". It is a non-relation that stands in relations to other non-relations. It is not necessary that every object has energy as there are logically consistent objects that have no causal relations; these objects are not a part of a spacetime. They may exist in a space without time or they may not even exist in a space. By the way, as I said, time is just a special kind of space. And a space is a special kind of collection that has a continuity between its parts.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Topological_space

Do you think the brain is responsible for everything? Might there be a soul that is helping out? Something beyond the brain? — chiknsld

I don't know. I can only say that if it is logically consistent for us to have a soul then we have it.

Have you explained the empty sets yet? Assuming there is no bias, what are they referring to as being real (regarding the empty set)? — chiknsld

As any other set, an empty set too has a quality (an unstructured stuff) that stands in relations to qualities of other sets. But an empty set is a combination of no other sets, so it has no members, no relations to its members.

It would be a contradiction for unicorns to exist here and now.

Possible vs. Actual dichotomy? Unicorns are possible (don't entail a contradiction), but they don't actually exist, do they? — Agent Smith

How do you know that they don't exist? They may exist on a different planet or in a different universe. They may also exist on Earth in the future. But since they don't exist here and now it would be a contradiction if they existed here and now - at a spacetime location where they don't exist.

You're saying that consciousness is comprised of qualia that which without there would be no consciousness? — chiknsld

Apparently consciousness consists of unstructured "stuffs" or qualities. For example the sensation of red color doesn't seem to be decomposable, although in the ontology where all objects are collections of other objects (or empty collections in the simplest case) even the sensation of red color is a collection that is composed of parts. Yet every collection is also an object in itself that is unstructured/partless and stands in composition relations to its parts. It is an object in itself that is not identical to any of its parts.

It may seem weird to say that a collection of objects is another object in itself. Like, if you have five apples, do you also have a sixth object that is a collection of those five apples? I think you do, although it doesn't seem to be a particularly noteworthy object. But even each apple is a collection of other objects, down to elementary particles like electrons and quarks which seem to be partless but definitely are not because that would mean they are empty sets and empty sets are all the same (which an electron and a quark are not, for example) and it seems impossible for an empty set to have properties like mass, electric charge or spin. Properties of a set are established by the set's structure and an empty set has no structure. So I think that even elementary particles have a structure although it may be physically inaccessible for us, or even physically inaccessible in general if laws of physics prevent the probing of such structure (for example, laws of physics seem to prevent probing of spatial distances smaller than so-called Planck length).

Some people think that collections are just "fictitious" objects and only non-composite objects (empty collections) are "real". That might be a psychological bias toward non-composite objects, caused by the fact that when our attention is splintered onto parts we lose the sense of an object as a whole.

But as I said, without definition there is nothing, so in order for an object to be logically consistent it must have a definition. I don't mean a human declarative definition, just the fact that the object must have certain properties that define it, that make it what it is. A logically consistent object, then, is one that has the properties that it has (and doesn't have properties that it doesn't have), which is the same as saying that the object is identical to itself. But what properties could an object have?

There seems to be a necessary principle of composition, which means that if there are some objects, whatever they are, they automatically make up another object that is a collection or combination of those objects. And this larger object automatically combines with other objects into even larger objects, and so on. So every possible object is either composed of other objects or is a non-composite object. Pure set theory can in principle describe all these objects; non-composite objects are called empty sets and composite objects are non-empty sets that are built up from empty sets. Pure set theory is also a foundational theory for mathematics because it is able to represent all mathematical objects or properties (numbers, spaces, functions, etc.) as pure sets. That's why reality is necessarily mathematical.

But mathematics is just the structural aspect of reality, the relations between sets, or structures of relations. The objects that stand in those relations, the sets "in themselves", are something unstructured, partless (even though they stand in relations to objects that are their parts, that is, to the sets that compose them). The unstructured nature of objects in themselves may be the basis for the qualitative aspect of consciousness (qualia).

I have two options before me, I can choose to eat a white chocolate or I can choose to eat a strawberry chocolate. I choose the strawberry chocolate.

Therefore it was never possible to eat the white chocolate? — chiknsld

Right, I think it never was.

By following your logic, I never actually had a choice, John was going to live no matter what? Hence, no freewill? — chiknsld

Right. But still, you could do what you wanted to do, so in this sense you did a freely willed (wanted/desired) action.

Here is an even more compelling picture of necessity: everything that will happen has already happened, in the sense that every event is a part of a 4-dimensional topological object called spacetime, where time, mathematically/structurally, is just one of the dimensions, a special kind of space. Spacetime itself, with everything inside it, just exists, timelessly, eternally. It exists because it is a logically consistent object, a possible world.

Or maybe the more rational route Is that I did have a choice, and at that very point, there were two possibilities, one that John could exist and one that John could not exist. As you say, two different worlds. Once I chose to have John, I entered into the world where there was no other choice than for him to exist? — chiknsld

If the world in which you have John and the world in which you don't have John were both possible worlds it would mean that both worlds exist. So you would both have and not have John, which would be a contradiction probably under any acceptable definition of "you". Theoretically, to make the situation logically consistent, you could define "you" as a collection of two persons, one of whom has John and the other doesn't, or you could define "you" as an object that is not conscious of being split into two conscious parts which are not conscious of each other and don't interact with each other and with each other's worlds. But who would care about such definitions of "you"?

But it seems possible for there to be two worlds that are the same (copies of each other), you live in one of them and another person who is exactly like you lives in the other, until the point where you mate and conceive John and the other person doesn't. From that point onward, of course, the two worlds would no longer be the same.

Very interestingly, would this apply a lack of freewill? — chiknsld

If free will is possible (logically consistent) then it exists. But how is free will defined? Without definition there is nothing. If free will means that we can do what we want then we obviously have free will, at least to some extent. But even then, our actions would be completely determined by factors over which we have no control, in the sense that they would be determined by our wants and we cannot choose our wants. Or if we could choose our wants, we would need to want to choose the wants, so there would be a regress of wants that would either begin with a want that we wouldn't choose or it would be an infinite regress, which we wouldn't choose either because there would be no beginning to choose.

What caused existence to be, and why? — chiknsld

I think this is equivalent to asking "What caused logical possibility (consistency) to be, and why?" Like, why is A identical to A (and not identical to that which is not A)? Logical possibility is a necessary fact. And some years ago I came to this big revelation: there is no difference between logical possibility and existence. Why? Simply because I don't see any difference between the two and I don't even know what that would mean.

Claiming that there is no difference between logical possibility and existence may seem absurd because you may readily point to an object, for example a tree in front of your house, and say "It is surely possible (logically consistent) that that tree over there would not exist, and yet it is there - hence, logical possibility and existence are not the same." To which I would say: "Um, no. It is not possible for that tree not to be there, because it would be a logical contradiction if a tree that is there was not there." It may be logically possible for there to be another world which looks exactly like ours except for that tree, but that would be another world, not this one.

So not only is existence necessary, but everything possible exists necessarily.

In order for an object to be “Godlike”, it must have every good or positive property. — Photios

What is a "good" property? Is positive electrical charge a "good" property?

It is really quite irrelevant that there is a quale representing a “feeling of what it is like”, if there is no aesthetic judgement made in relation to it. — Mww

Qualia have been posited as qualities of consciousness, as opposed to relations. They stand in relations and thus ground a structure of relations but qualia themselves are not relations and have no internal structure. They seem to fit the qualitative, unstructured character of basic elements of consciousness, for example the experience of red color, which is a homogenous, monadic redness. Qualia fit into a fundamental metaphysics of qualities and relations where both qualities and relations are seen as inseparable from each other: if there are qualities there must also be relations between them, and if there are relations there must also be non-relations (i.e. qualities) between which the relations hold. While relations can also hold between other relations, they must ultimately be grounded in non-relations, otherwise relations would be undefined.

On a representationalist view, there is a separation of (subjective) experience from the (objective) world. The subjective experience has to be synthesized from the signals coming from the environment. Hence the binding problem.

Whereas on a non-representationalist view, what we perceive just is the world (which we have attendant thoughts and feelings about). The signals coming from the environment enable us to perceive what is there. — Andrew M

But even in the non-representationalist view we don't perceive a tree (an external object) directly but only as "marks" left by incoming photons in our nervous system and these "marks" are a representation of the tree, not the tree itself, so I don't understand why such a view would be called non-representationalist.

When an OCR machine recognizes an alphabet character or a self-driving vehicle recognizes a pedestrian crossing the street, does it do so via a representationalist method or a non-representationalist method?

I mean programmed like learning machines. But initially the wouldbe organism has no goals (blind nature doesn't program any particular goal in it), it just exists and if it happens to have what it takes to survive, it will survive. If it doesn't have what it takes to survive, it will not survive. Those that are left will appear to have a "goal" of survival. But even those will decay over time. Some of them might happen to get the property to produce new copies of themselves and so they will continue to survive in their copies and will appear to have another goal: replication. As time passes they may change and get more properties and more goals, some of which may be subgoals to aid survival or replication, other goals may be irrelevant to survival or replication, and some goals may even be against survival or replication but if not too much they may not die out.

Can you imagine? Evolution sweating buckets while programming our behavior? Human behavior is not programmed, though it certainly can look so. — Raymond

Programmed but not necessarily consciously, just blindly smashing simple things into aggregates and those that happen to have the properties needed to sustain themselves in complex environment will sustain themselves and maybe randomly mutate and take on additional structure and replicate themselves and so on.

both of which are extensions of human sensibility, artifacts manufactured and programmed for just this purpose. — Wayfarer

But they have intelligent behavior like object recognition and logical operations which is realized by physical interactions. The intelligent behavior of humans may have been programmed too - by natural evolution or by other intelligent beings.

I don't think you can plausibly explain the elements of judgement in terms of physical interactions. — Wayfarer

Why not? We already have electronic devices that can recognize faces or other objects and act on that recognition. Or perform complicated logical operations and defeat humans in games like chess and go.

In our modern age, the idea of a soul as a conscious entity that can incarnate in a physical body and survive the physical body's death faces this dilemma: How can the soul interact with the physical body without being detected by scientists? In other words, if the soul interacted with the body via a very weak force, it might elude the observation of scientists but its influence on the body would seem insignificant; if on the other hand the soul interacted with the body via a relatively strong force, this force should be detectable by scientists.

How to resolve this dilemma? Well, there seems to be the possibility that the soul would interact significantly with the brain but it would elude detection because scientists would be unable to tell whether changes in brain activity that are measurable with contemporary brain scanning technology (fMRI, EEG) are or are not entirely caused by known particles or fields inside or outside the brain.

Still, if the soul was constituted by unknown particles or fields, why would such particles or fields not be detected in particle accelerators where they can be measured much more accurately than with brain scanning devices? For some reason, the soul would interact strongly with known particles in the brain (where it would be undetectable because of the complex brain processes and the limited resolution of our brain scanners) but it would interact only weakly with known particles in accelerators (where it would be undetectable because of the weakness of the interaction).

I don't know if this idea is viable but maybe the unknown particles that would constitute the soul normally interact only weakly with known particles (which makes them undetectable in accelerators) but their interaction with known particles in the brain is significantly amplified by resonance that can only occur between certain complex systems such as a soul and a brain (neural networks).

The Something cannot be still and unmoving, for then naught could have become as the temporary happenings that we take as something. — PoeticUniverse

According to theory of relativity, time is a kind of space. That seems to explain how time may exist within a larger, timeless reality. Time itself is just one of timeless mathematical objects (a space), so there is no "passage" of time just as there is no "passage" of space or of any other timeless mathematical object. The "passage" of time is therefore just a feeling, a property of certain complex parts of spacetime that we call "conscious".

Well the structure is what shapes the material stuff that it needs. — apokrisis

Are relations between stuffs or between nothings?

For the most part, education, health and wealth are not things you have a right to. That is, if I have some knowledge, and I have some medical know-how, and I have some money, then the mere fact you don't, doesn't by itself entitle you to use force against me to transfer some of what I have to you. — Bartricks

Well that's just your opinion. And it is a big bone of contention between advocates and critics of a 'minimal' state.

Assuming our universe is finite, what lies beyond it's edge? Where is the universe located in the first place? — Echoes

Space is just one of many mathematical objects and all mathematical objects exist in mutual relations of similarity, of which spatial relations are just a special kind of relation. And by the way, time is just a special kind of space, at least according to theory of relativity.

And since time doesn't pass, it's already occurring.

But can we know all the possible worlds a priori? — A Realist

Let's see. The simplest possible world is an empty set. Then there can be a world that is a set that contains an empty set. And another world that contains two empty sets. Or something more exciting: a world that is a set that contains an empty set and a set that contains two empty sets! The possibilities seem endless...

I can imagine how a cylinder looks like a square when seen from fare away but I can not imagine how a quantum wave looks like a particle by any manipulation of my mind. — FalseIdentity

A quantum wave doesn't look like a particle. In Bohm interpretation the wave and the particle are two different objects, but you're right that the Bohm interpretation is not popular because it requires faster-than-light signalling, which messes up the well-tested theory of relativity. The most popular interpretations of QM among physicists seem to be many-worlds and Copenhagen. According to Copenhagen, when the quantum wave interacts with a macroscopic (many-particle) object, the wave collapses into a particle, maybe somewhat like when a baloon bursts and only a small speck of it remains. According to many-worlds, when the quantum wave interacts with a macroscopic object, the wave splits into many non-interacting worlds, so that only a small part of it (a particle) remains in each world; in each world it looks as if the wave collapsed like the Copenhagen says. The collapse or splitting of the wave is caused by the barrage of particles from the macroscopic object the wave comes into contact with (a process called decoherence).

You just take the working and laws of your logics as a given, in the same way people take it for a given that apples fall to the ground: no further explanation required, it's just how nature is. — FalseIdentity

Yeah I take it as a given that A=A and I don't see why it would need explaining.

Not everything that seems weird to you is logically contradictory. The law of non-contradiction states that "contradictory propositions cannot both be true in the same sense at the same time". (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_of_noncontradiction) I have underlined the "in the same sense at the same time" part because it is critical for understanding what a contradiction is. When I say that an object looks like a circle from one perspective and like a square from another perspective, this is not a contradiction because there are two different senses in which the object looks (two different perspectives). The object may be a cylinder. (It is not a "square circle".)

In quantum mechanics, a small object like an electron is a probability wave (cloud) extended in space when it has not interacted with a macroscopic object, and it is a "pinpoint" particle when it has interacted with a macroscopic object. Again, there is a difference in senses (and in times, but "times" may be subsumed under the meaning of "senses"), so no contradiction. Bohm interpretation of quantum mechanics says that an electron is both a particle and a wave at the same time, but even here there is not necessarily a contradiction because the electron can be seen as a collection of a particle and a wave, so the particle and the wave are not one object but two different objects, and their collection is a third object that we can call electron.

I am pretty sure that your table does not exist in a propability cloud just because it's legs extend to several locations. — FalseIdentity

Yeah, the probability cloud is pretty much suppressed in macroscopic (many-particle) objects. Still, the probability cloud is a logically consistent object.

If they are not nothingness or absence then they fail to convey the nothingness or absence that I mean by A = -A. — James Riley

But they cannot be nothingness or absence because nothingness or absence mean not-being. If you want to convey that nothingness is "covered" by somethings, the coherent way of doing it could be by pointing out that nothingness is "contained" in somethings as the "content" of empty sets, and not by identifying nothingness with somethings.

To say that nothing is something simply because it is an idea or concept that must be categorized for reference/contrast to that which exists, is like referencing a book that contains both concepts (something and nothing) but which is still a thing (book).

I'm talking about the book itself not being itself. — James Riley

The book is still itself and is not nothing, even when it contains references to nothing. Informally we use the word "nothing" not in the sense of exact nothingness but to express absence of objects that are important to us, for example you see an empty room and say there is "nothing" in it, although there is obviously space there (which is something that has mathematical properties) and teeming with air molecules and whatnot. And if the book happened to contain a reference to exact nothingness, I would interpret it as the "content" of an empty set.

Consciously you and me might think that we argue for finding and defending truth. But subconciously it's more likely that we are just doing it to regulate hormones. — FalseIdentity

Logic is surely useful for survival - it is useful to know that a tiger is not a sheep. It is also useful for helping your fellow man - for example by knowing that giving him food is not the same as bludgeoning him to death; a person who couldn't tell the difference would be pretty evil.

So this is a violation of the law of the excluded middle: the electron is there and there and somewhere in between all at the same time. — FalseIdentity

Not necessarily. There doesn't have to be anything contradictory about an object being in several places at the same time. For example, my desk is in several places at the same time: one leg here, another leg there... Where's the contradiction? An electron being in several places at the same time means that it is a spatially extended object (although not exactly in the same way as a desk), not a pinpoint object as we used to imagine (although it can change into a pinpoint object under certain circumstances, namely when it comes into contact with a macroscopic object, for example with a measurement instrument).

As I stated earlier in this thread, I try to steer away from the word "things", singularly, or as a suffix. My reasoning is set forth in that post and I'll not repeat it here. However, the same analysis applies to the word "objects." All stands for All, whether object or non-object. Otherwise, it could not be All, now could it? It covers things and not things, or nothing, if you will. It covers presence and absence. It is and is not. — James Riley

By "object" I just mean something, or not-nothing. And every something has an identity: it is what it is, it is identical to itself. There is not anything more in addition to all somethings. Still, in a sense there is nothingness inside each empty set and between any two sets that don't overlap (their overlap is an empty set too). Empty sets are not nothing; they are somethings whose identity is that they are sets (collections/combinations) with no members (parts). So in a sense, somethings "cover" or "contain" nothingness or absence but they are not nothingness or absence; identifying something with nothing would be mistaking a set with its content (in the case of empty sets, they have no content).

They are an influence insofar as we have knowledge of them, although indeed they have no attraction. — Samuel Lacrampe

Ok, tell me one motive without attraction. I can't imagine that such a motive exists.

Let's say the pleasure and comma are permanent, and also the pleasure from the pill is significantly greater than the pleasure lost from losing relationships. — Samuel Lacrampe

My doubt and worries about the properties of such a pill already greatly reduce my expected pleasure from it. It is as if someone tried to coax me into comitting suicide with the promise of a blissful afterlife. But if the coma was not permanent and I saw someone try the pill and testify to its blissful effect without harm to their health, I might try it too.

2. You asked me what I thought A = A means. I mistakenly answered your question assuming X, not A. And I answered as I thought logic would answer, not me. So let me clarify. For me, A means All. Thus, A = A means to me that A not only = A, but it also = -A. In other words, All is not only All but it must necessarily account for (=) the absence of itself. Otherwise, it could not be All. — James Riley

By A, I meant any object. So any object must be limited to what it is. But if A stands for all objects, what else is there in addition to all objects? Nothing. So not-A is nothing (no object) and it can't be identical to A because A is something (objects).

I think A = A is a gentlemen's agreement that a thing must be limited to what we say it is, and no more, no less, and no different — James Riley

Interpreting A = A as limiting a thing to what we say it is would make the thing's identity subjective to us and vulnerable to our misidentification or mischaracterization of it. Objectively though, A = A limits the thing to what it is, regardless of what anyone may say it is. Is this objective definition of A = A not self-evident to you?

I was kind of hoping someone would prove that A = A and that A does not = -A. — James Riley

What do you think it means, that A = A?

You might as well write a negation of your whole post and it wouldn't make any difference to you, so why did you even bother?

Well, I still don't understand what you meant by "yes and no".

But for some reason you have answered just "no" here:

No; — James Riley

No; the answer is yes and no, precisely because I lack your pretense. — James Riley

What does the answer "yes and no" mean? You have asserted a truth (it is still there if you scroll a few posts up), so why not just answer "no"?

Is it true that you don't pretend to truths? — litewave

Yes and no. — James Riley

The answer is no, because you have claimed something as true (when you said that you don't pretend to truths).