There's are mathematical structures where geometry is valid. There are mathematical structures where our physics is valid. There is a world where a unicorn exists (same structure, different world). — noAxioms
Which guru is your jargon "master"? — Gnomon
So maybe not recognizing the opportunity to go metaphysical is a feature rather than a bug. — Srap Tasmaner
So I'm back to thinking that philosophy is defined as whatever's left over, that it's whatever science hasn't been able to do much with yet. A mere science incubator — or nursery! — as it always has been. Maybe that's okay if we take that role seriously and try to raise good responsible little sciences. — Srap Tasmaner
it would stand to reason that what Russia has on the entire front, rear area and reserves is several orders of magnitude greater and Ukraine is doomed in any sort of war of attrition. — boethius
They have a lot of systemic and institutional weaknesses that had been masked because they had not operated on this scale in a really visible way, at least not for quite a while. You’d have to go back to their invasion of Georgia, in 2008, to find something approaching the scale that they’re operating at now. And that one didn’t go well.
They were showing the same kind of problems back then: this disunity of command; logistical weaknesses; poorly trained, poorly motivated, poorly led troops; very poor quality of officer corps; very poor quality of campaign design and ability to plan. They also have very poor integration within and among the armed services, including the synchronization of air and ground operations.
They made misjudgments, but also just institutionally they don’t have the capacity. What we can now see is that they simply do not have the institutional capacity to support offensive operations deep into enemy territory and aren’t able to give units supply and combat support of all kinds: artillery support, air support, air-defense support. With an already weak logistics base, it was an enormous mistake for them to chop their main offensive into four major axes that were widely geographically dispersed. They don’t have enough trucks. They don’t really have expeditionary logistics.
They were driving trucks into Ukraine that were breaking down because they were old, because there had been slipshod maintenance or no maintenance done on these vehicles and they were being operated by troops that didn’t know how to operate and maintain them. That’s why so many of these vehicles were breaking down and being left by the side of the road. That tells you all kinds of things.
It seems like one of the priorities for their modernization project was the air-defense systems, and also their precision-guided munitions—both aircraft-borne and surface-to-surface missiles—and ballistic missiles. But those all failed. You have Turkish-made U.A.V.s flying over the Russian air-defense systems and zapping them from the air—that’s not supposed to be happening. So I don’t really buy it.
Even the quality of the things that did get modernized seems like smoke and mirrors. I find it hard to swallow that they’ve been spending fifty billion, sixty billion, seventy billion dollars a year on modernizing these forces, and, after almost fifteen years of that, they didn’t get around to modernizing their T-72 tank fleet or retiring it. I think the most logical conclusion is that a large portion of that budget was evaporated in corruption.
A bad army was ordered to do something stupid. They were sending armored units just ambling down the road with no infantry screen, no reconnaissance, no air cover. And then the Ukrainians just picked them off with anti-tank weapons. It’s not surprising. The Russians took some of their supposedly élite airborne units and then had them assault toward an airfield.
They were supposed to open up the airfield so they could fly in more ground forces quickly, but their secure communications system failed on the first day. This is why they’ve been dependent on Ukrainian cell-phone towers ever since.
It looks like their officers have been promoted based on patronage as opposed to military ability. We know a lot of the names, including the guy [General Aleksandr Dvornikov] who’s been named the over-all commander now. In Syria, it looked to me like their focus was not really on effective military operations but, rather, on trying to acquire assets—trying to acquire property and revenues for themselves from the Syrian regime or from other actors—and, secondly, on using Syria as a test bed for weapons systems. But they were not terribly impressive in their planning or decision-making in Syria.
What we’ve seen in action is a military machine on the Russian side that could not pull off a confrontation with any nato power. So escalating into a confrontation with nato would be suicidal for them. And I have to believe that they’re not suicidal. Imagine if that invasion force had stumbled into Poland instead. The casualties that we’re seeing now are high enough, but the entire invasion force would’ve been wiped out.
https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/is-the-russian-military-a-paper-tiger
These are simple, rational arguments based on contemporary military logic, in light of which much of the popular narratives can be dismissed outright. — Tzeentch
Far from bestowing glory on Russia’s military brass, the war in Ukraine is proving toxic for top commanders, with at least eight generals fired, reassigned or otherwise sidelined since the start of the invasion on Feb. 24.
After a long string of failures and few significant victories, the knives now seem to be out for Russian generals, amid criticism from prominent Russian military correspondents, state television propagandists and even members of the normally obedient parliament.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/10/07/russia-military-commanders-dismissed-war/
My one unending, drum beating message for almost all the time I've been on the forum has been that metaphysical statements are not true or false. They have not truth value. — T Clark
What physicists inappropriately label "Negentropy" is what I call, "Enformy". — Gnomon
The point of the forks is that we both can see the different responses to the same thing and be right, meaning we aren't seeing the same thing yet aren't wrong, right there at the table. — Banno
A little, but again that's not quantum physics. — Darkneos
Don't think that's how it works. — Darkneos
Everyone? You're literally debating right now the issue with 3 other interlocutors who disagree. — boethius
That is not a sign of military incompetence. The issue of whether it was politically wise, — boethius
If you read the analysis cited, what actual experts believed before the war was that an invasion would be costly, involving thousands KIA and significant armour and airframe losses. — boethius
However, we're now at a point in the war where Ukraine has lost all of its initial tank stock and is now nearing critical depletion of all the Soviet tanks NATO could scrounge up and send. — boethius
What is your source for this? — Paine
What I find most interesting about the incompetence narrative is that's it's needed to support the idea there should not be any negotiation strategy — boethius
I do. I marvel all the time. — T Clark
QM says that things work differently at small scale than they do up here where we are. — T Clark
So, you are not just a "bag of chemicals", you are a walking, talking, thinking, feeling, self-governing, purposeful, opinionated system of Information. — Gnomon
You believe this is evidence? — Tzeentch
I challenged your story that the Russian attempt to secure an airfield somehow proved the Russian intentions towards Kiev - something for which you haven't provided a shred of evidence. — Tzeentch
At around 6:00 PM on February 24th, 2022, head of Bellingcat (a widely respected international group of investigative journalists) Christo Grozev reported that 18 Russian Il-76 military transport planes were flying from Pskov to Kyiv. However, it soon became apparent that events were not unfolding according to the scenario established by the Russians. The first paratroopers did not manage to accomplish their objective and the Ils changed their course to the Belarusian city of Gomel. Later, after establishing control over the airfield, the Russians tried to repair the runway. However, this also proved to be impossible due to the constant fighting, which prevented the Russians from implementing their plan logistically. Instead of landing on the threshold of Kyiv, several thousand Russian paratroopers were forced to advance on the Ukrainian capital on their own.
Russian propaganda interprets the events in a profoundly different way. As early as the afternoon of February 25th, 2022, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced that the Antonov airport had been seized the day before after a successful operation involving 200 helicopters, the suppression of all Ukrainian air defense systems and the complete isolation of the landing area from the air. According to the Russian version of events, 200 paratroopers allegedly landed, fought a successful battle, captured the airfield and the military base, repelled all Ukrainian counterattacks, facilitated the landing of Russia’s main forces and defended the facility without losing a single soldier. At the same time, 200 “Ukrainian nationalists” were purportedly eliminated during the operation.
The scale of the attack, particularly in relation to the number of helicopters, is wildly overstated and not supported by any existing evidence. Russian propaganda tried to cover up the failure of the landing by describing an attack on an absurd scale. At that time, Russian armor convoys had entered Hostomel. After connecting the remnants of the first Russian landing group with the rest of the airborne forces and reinforcements supplied by additional army units, the airport came under the control of the Russian army.
The fixation of Russian propagandists on the number 200 has a history of its own that goes back as far as the Incident at the Pristina airport in June 1999, when 200 Russian airborne troops seized the international airport of Pristina (the capital of the Republic of Kosovo). The incident was also considered to be a “pre-emptive" operation that took place surrounded by enemy forces, namely actual NATO troops, not imagined ones. Russia assigned an epochal historical significance to the incident, calling it "the beginning of the transition to an independent foreign policy."
The victory in Hostomel was supposed to be a triumph of the Russian military and constitute a new milestone in Russian geopolitics. These goals were not achieved, but Russia is not used to departing from a story that it has already announced as factual. Therefore, the myth engineering shifted its focus to an unequal battle. Stories about the "200 Spartans" and the "heroes of Hostomel" began to circulate in Russian social networks, including a poem that was written in their honor which later would later become a song.
In mid-July 2022, Russia published a video with footage of both the landing in Mozyr, Belarus and the 45th Separate Guards Special Forces Brigade (based in Kubinka, near Moscow) disembarking at the Antonov airport. The military personnel of this airborne unit did actually occupy Hostomel, but they most likely entered the village after crossing into Ukraine from Belarus after February 24th, 2022 along with the armored convoys. Certain Russian brigades were also swapped out in order to further serve Russian propaganda narratives. Instead of the decimated 31st Brigade, whose participation in the assault has been confirmed by Ukrainian and foreign sources, Russian media widely glorified the 45th Brigade, which did not suffer devastating losses. Despite their best efforts, Russian propaganda outlets could not change the factual reality of the events - Russia had lost the battle, despite its own superiority in manpower and equipment.
The architect of the military operation to storm the Antonov airport remains unknown. However, the course of the actual battle, the results of the battle and Russia’s attempts to rewrite history are evidence to the fact that the authors did not give adequate consideration to the impending assault. On February 27th, 2022, the Ukrainian Security Service released documents recovered from soldiers of the Russian National Guard that had been killed near Hostomel, including call signs, planned maneuvers, conventional designations, ciphers, and more. In addition to the general utility these documents supplied to the Ukrainian special services, the information provides further supporting evidence for the idea of a planned Russian blitzkrieg. Russian units tasked with dispersing Ukrainian rallies and protests were just behind the initial invasion forces leading the assault into Ukraine, as Russian strategists did not anticipate they would encounter serious resistance.
https://rusaggression.gov.ua/en/russian-occupiers-fail-to-secure-their-foothold-in-the-attack-on-kyiv-eb11ccc699f8e6de615c66aafee4b5bb.html
do you think are reasonable speculations in relation to QM? Do you think it can point to idealism? — Tom Storm
Denying its use to the enemy, securing it for future use, etc. — Tzeentch
Also, what would air assault troops be using an airfield for? Landing helicopters perhaps? — Tzeentch
But on the other hand, who cares? Sure, you do and I do and a bunch of other dorks do. — T Clark
For me, in the case of Ukraine, it's important to try and stop a nuclear disaster, which, though not certain, is within the realm of possibility. — Manuel
I don't think disliking the Taliban is a good reason to allow millions of people to die of starvation. That's a big issue, with a solution. — Manuel
It's a philosophy forum, — Banno
Better, the mooted distinction between epistemology and ontology is here misplaced. Always, already interpreted. — Banno
Why would you expect events at scales of 10 or 15 orders of magnitude smaller than ours to act the same way they do up here? — T Clark
As a matter of convention, I think it makes sense to think of interactions at human scale as foundational, at least for bookkeeping purposes. It was at that level that the whole concept of reality was established. It's at that level that most people experience reality directly. It's at that level where noting weird is going on. — T Clark
Just real. Arses on armchairs. — Banno
What is foundational depends on what one is doing. — Banno
the chair remains very real. — Banno
You grew up in HK? — frank
Most people in the US govt thought the British and French Empires were going to come back after WW2. It took a while for it to sink in that they weren't.
The idea started to take root that communism would grow until the British and Americans had no one to make a profit off of but each other. That was the genesis of the idea of the US taking the place of the British Empire. — frank
The Fifty Year Wound, Derek Leebaert — frank
I don't think that it's necessarily the Geneva Convention that limits state behavior in war, but domestic populations, who have grown to see war as an evil. So the Vietnam War was much worse than Iraq, in terms of methods employed and war crimes, yet the Geneva Convention applied to both. — Manuel
Is the fact that Kiev still a running city a reason as to why the Russians are so violent? — Manuel
Moscow’s ruling establishment feels so emotional because the first Russian state called Kievan Rus was established in Kiev 12 centuries ago. Even the name of Russia originated in the name of this loose confederation of Eastern Slavic, Baltic and Finnic nations.
Rurik, the founding leader of the Kievan Rus dynasty, has been considered one of the godfathers of the Russian state.
https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/why-ukraine-matters-to-russia-so-much-52281
But then there are cases which are illustrative. I mentioned the Afghan case, which you can look up. It illustrates to me the double standards "the West" has in its proclamations of "freedom and democracy". — Manuel
I had the impression you were a science guy - we talked briefly, or better stated, you gave me your views on Peirce. Very interesting job to have. — Manuel
Then again, the propaganda system in our countries tend to be very sophisticated compared to authoritarian systems. — Manuel
Dictatorship was based on fear. Totalitarians such as Hitler, Stalin, and Mao combined repression with indoctrination into ideologies that demanded devotion to the state. They tried to isolate citizens from the world with censorship, travel restrictions, and limits on trade.
Now a modified authoritarianism has been spreading. From Hugo Chávez’s Venezuela to Vladimir Putin’s Russia, illiberal leaders have managed to concentrate power without cutting their countries off from global markets, imposing exotic social philosophies, or resorting to mass murder.
Many of these new-style autocrats have come to office in elections and managed to preserve a democratic facade. Rather than jailing thousands, they target opposition activists, harassing and humiliating them, accusing them of fabricated crimes, and encouraging them to emigrate. When these autocrats kill, they seek to conceal their responsibility.
The key to such regimes, we argue, is the manipulation of information. Rather than terrorizing or indoctrinating the population, rulers survive by leading citizens to believe—rationally but incorrectly—that they are competent and public-spirited. Having won popularity, dictators score points both at home and abroad by mimicking democracy.
https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/jep.33.4.100
For Tzeentch, the question of intent and planning seems to be on hold until the day documents and investigations can prove one view against the other. He has ruled out any reports presently available to us as being valid. Also, he has said that he is not providing a competing assessment of actual intent but only offering 'speculation' of what might be the purpose of the operation. — Paine
So, his or her claim that using airborne troops to secure an airport in order to establish an airbridge is simply inconceivable in this situation is not an argument for an alternate purpose. By the rules of evidence being demanded by him or her, that cannot be stated. — Paine
That mission was the fallout of the demise of the British Empire, which had the job of securing the infrastructure of global trade prior to WW2. — frank
Sometime around 1949 a secret study was performed by the US govt to determine the cost of taking the place of the British. The study said the figure was uncountable, so they mulled over whether they could do the job of the British with nuclear weapons. — frank
This war may have at least one virtue, if it reconciles the Russian elite with the importance of telling the truth. — Olivier5
Vlad Vexler: “Putin’s propaganda doesn’t try to persuade you of an alternate reality that you should believe in. It tries to manipulate your sense of reality. It basically tries to saturate the informational environment with incompatible pictures of reality – and the aim isn’t to persuade you of anything. It isn’t to initiate you into a kind of political mobilization, into a kind of vision.
The aim is to de-politicize you to make you feel well this is too complex for me to engage in and make you feel that maybe there isn’t such a thing as an unqualifiedly stateable truth about anything.
Soviet propaganda was clear: this is the truth and if you don’t believe in that you’re wrong
Putin propaganda does not try to tell you we have the story here this is what you believe
Putin propaganda tries to tell you “Look, this is a very complex world,” and there are claims and counterclaims and then it tries to pump information at you from all directions and the idea is that you simply give up on politics that’s the key aspiration and it’s been working very tragically effectively.”
