@Banno @Wayfarer @Joshs @Fire Ologist @Leontiskos

within any practice that is deeper and more complicated than, for instance, "what constitutes a correct and sufficient apology or excuse," there is likely going to be debate about framework and criteria that is difficult to resolve — J

Sure: knowing, understanding, thinking, seeing, being just, but they all have (specific) ways we judge them and philosophy is the way we talk about what is essential to us about them. There is no fact that ensures those discussions even will be resolved, but that doesn’t annihilate the ability or process to do so, nor make it a matter of individual “opinion” (or a sociological matter). Separately, I would think agreement on the criteria for what constitutes good (even “correct”) scientific method would be easier.

His point is that you don't even get to practices without certain understandings about basic background stuff. — J

We feel we need justification for the “background stuff” beforehand, because we require it to be abstract and absolute. We have no specific topic or situation to dig into. It’s like wanting to agree on the terms of discussion before you can start a conversation. We may not come to an agreement on criteria, but there is at least some substance to talk about.

For Williams' purposes -- and, he suggests, for Descartes' -- an absolute conception would allow us to make sense of, to explain in a unified way, "local" things like secondary qualities, social practices, and disagreements within philosophy. — J

Now I’m not sure what to think, but my concern has only been that dictating that a conception be “absolute” forces what constitutes “local” in comparison. And again, I think we are smooshing together “absolute” as a criteria and “absolute” as all-encompassing (“unified”).

[The absolute conception] should be able to overcome relativism in our view of reality through having a view of the world (or at least the coherent conception of such a view) which contains a theory of error: — Williams, 301

As a reader of Austin, my curiosity is piqued by a discussion of error (he looks into action by examining excuses). Only, I don’t think relativism is to be “overcome”, nor do I imagine a “theory” of error. But yes, error and mistakes and failure and impasse must be accounted for. We have a conflict of interest, however, because our conception wants to avoid the possibility of doubt, or maybe include every outcome. So in saving some of the world (or gaining a complete picture of it), we relegate the rest to “error” or "local predispositions".

What is the difference in kind that you see? — J

Maybe the easiest way to say this is that a moral disagreement is different than an aesthetic one or a scientific dispute. Kant might call the differences categorical, in what makes a thing imperative (to itself). Wittgenstein says the different criteria tell us what kind of object a thing is, what is essential to that kind of thing (for us), what possibilities each thing has.

the assumption is that philosophy's criteria for how to [talk about (say, scientific) criteria] are not on the table. But when the inquiry turns inward, we don't have the luxury of bumping any questions of judgment or method to some off-the-table level. — J

Yes, the last bastion is undefended, without justification or authority, without an arbiter of right. Thus why it is a claim for acceptance, that you accept my observations because you see them for yourself, that you have gathered on your own what evidence is necessary for you to concede. As Wittgenstein puts it, we see the same color to the extent we agree to call it that. This may or may not dovetail into seeing philosophy as a set of descriptions, rather than answers. Doubt creates a gap in our relation to the world, which we turn into a problem of a lack of knowledge, of being unable to envision the world at all (absolutely).

Tank

@Banno @Wayfarer @Leontiskos

The problem is that while "we all" can indeed make intelligible and rational claims in support of a given framework, another group of "us all" can dispute them, with equal rationality. — J

This seems to be generalizing a sense there is relativism in any practice where the requirement for certainty (authority) does not apply. Philosophy is describing the workings of practices in which we already share interests (in the practice; thus their normativity) so it’s just a matter on agreeing on the explication of the criteria. To say you can speak intelligibly and have reasons doesn’t mean you can say anything you want (intelligibly) in claiming, say, how an apology works (or how knowing does). Again, we might not end up agreeing, nor circumscribe every case or condition, but it’s not as if anything goes.

[Specific criteria] hardly transcends the local interpretative predispositions of various cultural communities on earth, [so] there is not much reason to think it could transcend the peculiarities of humanity as a whole — Williams, 302-3

Some practices are human, some are just people who throw cabers. But making how they are judged explicit is not an “interpretation” nor does it rely on “predispositions” (I can only imagine the assumption is that since we don’t usually speak of them they are some natural, individual inclination.) Plus, if we have different but related practices, that does not make either any less accountable, reconcilable, nor necessarily destroys the criteria for identity of the practice itself. In different things this matters more or less. Doing science, more, making tea, less (or not).

How are you understanding "power" here ? — J

Science’s power is, among other things, it is predictable and verifiable as an independent authority (though I may still “disagree”, take its findings as not important).

Wouldn't a genuine View from Nowhere provide, along with many other things, an account of those standards, and why they can serve as a basis for judgment? What would be questioned, from this view, would be the absolute nature of such judgment -- only the Absolute Conception gets to say absolute things. — J

We can’t measure everything with the same spoon. I just did “account for those standards, and why they can serve as a basis for judgment.” We can’t with one hand give that there are a multitude of criteria and with the other require that the judgment of each thing requires the same “basis”. It depends on the thing whether the judgment is “absolute” or not. Judging a good shoe and what is considered a planet are different in kind, not hierarchy, or scope. The more we restrict our criteria, the less meets the standard, so the less we actually notice, can understand, and so get to say anything about.

"Why have so many philosophers, beginning with Descartes, tried to locate genuine philosophy within an Absolute Conception?" — J

This is a good question which requires a lot to explain, but Descartes’ fear of making mistakes created the desire to never make one again. If Plato could use knowledge to be certain of everything, we would have control prior to doing anything (life as physics by math in space). Wittgenstein called this the requirement for crystalline purity of logic, that we want prior to a moral act. If we turn our doubt into a problem, we require a particular answer (knowledge), one that meets preset criteria (certainty).

The philosophical assessment of philosophy is presumably based on philosophy's own criteria. You don't see a problem there? — J

But how philosophy is done, and what even counts as philosophy is always an internal struggle of the discipline; it’s self-guidance and lack of external adjudication makes it harder to reconcile, but not impossible (there is no better/other). This is the benefit of looking at the tradition as a set of texts, and not necessarily a set of problems.

Flub

@Banno @Wayfarer

Well, if what I claim to know is framework-independent, true no matter who asserts it, etc., et al., then surely it must be certain. What more could I require, in the way of certainty?"…. There are those who believe that scientific realism is self-verifying, on pain of contradiction. — J

Additional criteria would be completeness (encompassing all variables and outcomes); infallibility or predictability; being right without being responsible; ensuring agreement, being only either true or false, etc. It seems we are taking abstraction from context or an individual (or human fallibility, limitation) as the criteria for “certainty”. I’m trying to point out how forced this is by differentiating topics and claiming that their individual criteria and their appropriate contexts are necessary and sufficient for being accepted (that we can all assert intelligible and rational claims about their “framework”). That this does not ensure agreement is philosophy’s (and morality’s) lack of power (which @Fire Ologistpoints out correctly) which science claims (though as easily ignored it appears). But this a categorical difference (it works differently) not a relegation to individual persuasion, opinion, belief, rhetoric (“locality”).

What Banno says, would indeed be the problem if speaking from within some absolute conception implied only one type or level of description. But does that follow? Perhaps you could say more about why we'd have to describe abstracta and physical items the same way. — J

If we insist on removing a topic from its context and specific criteria, then we lose the ability to judge a thing based on its own standards.

Is it the same sort of discourse that allows phil to speak about a discipline outside itself, such as science? — J

Yes. Philosophy is the unearthing of the criteria for a practice, such as why we value, and how we judge, science. The philosophical assessment of science is not based on science’s own criteria.

What form does that acknowledgement take? — J

As I said earlier: “Our reflection on our (shared) interests in the things we do is recognized in our ability to articulate.”… in order for you to see it for yourself; to provide your own proof.

To simplify, if I claim (describe sufficiently) how a mistake is different from an accident, or what constitutes a correct and sufficient apology or excuse (or scientific study), you may agree with those criteria. You may claim others more important. You may assert other distinctions are necessary. We may need to discuss examples in order to resolve the issues. This conversation is intelligible and rational because we share these practices (over the course of human history) and the evidence (and our standing to make claims) is available to all of us. This is not “local”, so much as, specific. Not based on the individual, but the particular (criteria and context of a practice). Abstraction makes philosophy impossible; thus, ironically, our desire to want everything to be like science is the death of rational discourse.

(* the claim is: "as long as I don't claim knowledge about what the [absolute] conception is, my talk about it can remain "local.") — J

I think we are pushing a few things together maybe. I took the “view from nowhere” as the requirement of a criteria of certainty (which I take Descartes to be desiring, even in bringing up “God”). But if we are talking about a conception of the “absolute”, then we’ve reached the cliff @Banno was worried about, as that would be theology’s discussion with science. If we are talking about a conception of absolutely everything, then we’d describe justice and rocks the same way.

Let's grant that both "absolute" and "local" are predetermined, created standards. How does this exempt philosophy from nonetheless speaking from one or the other? What would be the third alternative? — J

Above I said “Thus knowledge of something is uncovering the particular criteria for judgment of identity, completion, correctness, etc. to itself (a practice).” As Wittgenstein was trying to point out, different practices have different criteria, different standards (not just certainty)—what matters as that counting as such-and-such (pointing, apologies, a moral stance, a fact); as it were, being true to itself.

But is it the kind of certainty that says, "This very statement [about the grounds and limitations of the absolute conception] is certainly true"? That goes to the heart of my discomfort with Williams' "move." — J

When I said here that “A philosophical claim has its power only in as much as you see it for yourself”, the kind (sense/use) of “knowledge” I am talking about is acceptance, acknowledgment (in contrast to other senses of knowledge: as awareness, or a promise that I have authority). Our reflection on our (shared) interests in the things we do is recognized in our ability to articulate. More may be dreamt of than in our philosophy, but that’s not to say we can’t acknowledge, say, how science is important to us, or paraphrase a poem, or even discuss the unknowable (@Wayfarer).

To throw another couple monkeys in, Cavell (from Wittgenstein) would say that our relation to the world is not only through knowledge, which is not to say it is opinion or faith, but that part of what it is to take action is not knowing what to do, but in doing it, being the one who does it, is held responsible for having done it. There is also our own growth; e.g., changing how we think, rather than just what we think (even more than wisdom).

@Banno

If philosophy asserts [knowledge about what an absolute conception is] is it asserting a piece of absolute knowledge? …what is its claim to being knowledge, and of what sort? Is it "merely local" -- that is, the product of a philosophical culture which cannot lay claim to articulating absolute conceptions of the truth? — J

I think what we're experiencing here is a version of what Richard Bernstein called the Cartesian anxiety: the fear that unless we can affirm an absolute with certainty, we’re condemned to relativism. — Wayfarer

Without a full and exhaustive (-ing), discussion of what “knowledge” is, let’s assume we are all pretty much right that our desire for certainty (an absolute) is a unachievable standard we created; that philosophers (humans) have always wanted knowledge to be math-like—elevating science as the closest (to: complete, predictive, universal, abstract, etc). The presumed fallout without that is chaos, which @"Wayfarer” rightly points out is equally imagined.

Can the mere avoidance of self-reflection or self-appraisal still leave philosophy able to say what it wants? — J

reflecting critically — and necessarily — on the conditions of intelligibility that science presupposes... — Wayfarer

A philosophical claim has its power only in as much as you see it for yourself. We are not “avoiding” reflection; that is exactly the method. But it is not reflection on the “self” as much as “the conditions of intelligibility”, put otherwise, the interests we all have in this or that practice (not our personal interests). Thus knowledge of something is uncovering the particular criteria for judgment of identity, completion, correctness, etc. to itself (a practice). Now, of course, one may dissent, disagree, live against our practices, opt out, but the key is philosophy is able to make what is presumed (say, the need for an absolute)—what is: not “known”—made “intelligible” (as in, aware of/explicit).

“we have to know that we have [an absolute conception of the world]. . . . To ask not just that we should know, but that we should know that we know” -Williams

Thus we have multiple uses or senses of know happening at once without distinction, “we have to know [as in: understand (be aware of) the criteria] that we have [for] an absolute conception of the world… To ask not just that we should know [be aware], but that we should be [absolutely certain] that we know [have the right criteria].

@J

“We have agreed . . . that we would need some reasonable idea of what such a [absolute] conception [of the world] would be like, but we have not agreed that if we have that conception, we have to know that we have it.” Williams

In the spirit of the argument, what I am pointing out is that the “need” (desire) for certainty created the “absolute conception of the world”. It is philosophy that created “what such a conception would be like”, and it was its job to understand that reason for such a framework (“idea”)—to “know that [why] we have it”.

as long as I don't claim knowledge about what the conception is, my talk about it can remain "local." — J

That is philosophy’s claim, but it neither claims it “absolutely”, nor “locally”, as these are predetermined, created standards.

If there is or could be such a thing as the View from Nowhere, a view of reality absolutely uninterpreted by human perspectives and limitations, then scientific practice would produce this view, not philosophy. — J

The idea of “reality” was created by philosophy and is not what scientific practice produces, thus one reason why philosophy is “larger” than science (is prior to it, as it were). The basis of any stability, predictability, universality, and certainty (“facts”) of science is based on its method, not its correlation to a “real” world. Because the practice is repeatable, and not dependent on us (can be done by anyone—is not “local”), is what gives science its power, and also allows it to be (really) wrong sometimes.

I am not arguing that we do not cooperate (even, fundamentally), nor even that this is a “fact” (biologically/socially universal; say, formative of our humanity, or however else this wants to be framed). I am also not arguing for or against it being “good”, because, as you’ve pointed out, it is just something we do (a means), even inevitably, necessarily. But the import being claimed for that fact (implicitly perhaps) presumes a particular framework of morality that I would suggest we have not yet adequately considered. Deontology does have its place; we do have norms and rules and we do act on them or justify our actions based on them, judge others by them. But we have traditionally warped “morality” taking it simply (only) as justified norms of action, because we want to rely on the solidity of their ground (the more factual or logical the better) rather than examine our own part.

A few things to consider: we don’t normally take all action as moral, so what categorizes a moral act? The modern answer (Nietszche, Wittgenstein, Austin, Cavell) is that it is when our norms and practices actually come to an end; when we are at a loss as to what to do at all and there is no guidance or authority for what is right. Thus there is no single process or level of justification because it happens at a particular case, with a specific context, and facts that are uniquely relevant.

You point to Rawls above; which brings up another facet of morality that people want to nail down (apart from having factual or rule-like norms), which is figuring it out ahead of time. Rawls would have justice be decided in a just process, only: beforehand. Now whether that is best or if science and biology is a better method is not my point. In a truly moral moment, we stake our future not in deciding it (agreeing on it, being agreed in it by biology), not thus turning on relative values or self-interest, but on our future responsibility for our current actions. Emerson will put this as “Character is higher than intellect.” We take a stand which we answer for, which characterizes who we will be.

I said I agreed that cooperation is part of morality, because it is a defining moment, and we can move forward together (in our further judgments and practices), or not (as has been said, sometimes the moral thing is to actually break with society). Our cooperation is our commitment to be intelligible to each other (even in disagreeing), without a pre-determined standard for reason, even without any guarantee of (or fact that “requires”) our success.

Stepping in only having read your OP, I would agree that cooperation of a kind is necessary in a moral situation (not everything is a moral moment). I would only question the desire that it need be “factual”, either innate or based on a (agreed/universal) response to the world. The human condition of being separate requires cooperation, but nothing (no fact) ensures it. Thoreau of course points out that sometimes doing what is “moral” requires us to not cooperate with society.

I previously introduced a discussion about norms (as rules) and facts in this OP.

Perhaps I'm being told that I can't really believe it's warm out, given the temperature?… I can't believe something I also acknowledge isn't true. — J

That would be the sense that “You can’t be serious!” (Not, denying the fact, but questioning my experience). But I could say, “You should have seen the weather where I grew up” or concede partly “I must still be warm from inside.” Maybe it takes more, better example of when belief absolutely flies in the face of facts, because it is contingent on me, thus the desire to either discount it, or create something to fix it internally, like “emotion”.

@J @I like sushi

At the least some beliefs are about facts — Banno

Yeah I worded that poorly, making it sound like belief has no relation to the world, which of course is putting too much mustard on it. And having the impression that it is fine out, when it really is cold, I accept is a belief. But is this a matter of actually being correct? Even if you point to the fact it is below freezing, I may still hold to my belief (impression, perspective, position). Would we then call that wrong? lacking evidence? unreasonable? irrational? I may even concede the temperature, but maintain my position (unrelated to my sensation even). Then you might think me courageous, or silly, or insane, but not wrong about a fact (unless I am guessing the temperature, which is belief as hypothesis).

It is convenient to have the terms gathered, but I think the important part about OLP is that a human can imagine cases (even fantasies), fill out the context to distinguish (even novel extrapolations), or change the circumstances—even as part of a collaboration with others because everyone has the ability to provide input—which is different than aggregating data and regurgitating analysis.

Turnt

@Banno @I like sushi @J

Looking at the diagram of associated concepts made me think more on the assertion of a claim of knowledge compared to a statement of belief. I want to say we don’t “believe” in facts as some tentative or lesser claim to knowledge. When we say “I believe steel has a high tensile strength”, we might be in a situation where we are trying to calm ourselves before driving a heavy truck over a steel bridge, and we are expressing (reiterating) our trust in a fact. When we say “I believe in global warming”, we are in a sense accepting the consequences of facts. Another general sense is that we are ready to stand behind the science, which simply means that we assess the scientific method was followed competently (which is not to doubt the facts so much as their validity at all).

I put this out there because I hold belief is not about facts, not in contrast to knowledge; they are not part of how belief works. Of course, our desire to stand for something can be lessened by learning facts, but that is not the same thing. Accordingly, there is no “fact” about us as well. There is no occurrence, or instance (existence) of something (an emotion) that is “believing”, which is the desire in the paper: to solve for belief, to find the version of it as a switch that could be flipped. We don’t account for belief through a fact about it, we hold the person to account.

Another feature this brings up though is that there is a scale of attachments; I wouldn’t characterize it as “tentative or firm” but what extent we are willing to go to. It could just be an expression, or “view”, to willing to risk life and limb. So, from the diagram, maybe scaling from suspicion to impression to inclination to assumption to confidence to disposition to attitude to idea to tenet to conviction to creed to dogma to faith. These seem to move between those I hold for myself to those I express or claim to others, thus giving the impression of “emotion” vs “rationale”.

@J

It's part attitude, part emotion, part intent, part disposition, but not wholly any or all or some grouping of these. — Banno

I’ve learned in this thread that belief does have more involved than I thought. Even though emotion seems to be an accompaniment (and not essential), I had not realized that they reveal what matters to us; they are an expression of our interests. I do still argue the common feature or important mechanics is that it involves me, individually, tied to my responsibility in claiming (or wanting to claim) to believe, and so reflecting or creating me.

All in all, watching AI do Ordinary Language Philosophy kills a part of my soul, as it’s not about an answer so much as an exploration. And I hate, even more, to agree with a machine, but “She holds a strong belief in democracy” demonstrates that belief involves commitment (here a recognition of it actually); the person has done something to demonstrate that they hold fast against some threat.

I hate even worse arguing with one, but “That’s just your belief” is simply sloppy (who even says that?); I only possibly imagine it as a very disrespectful insult, in the vein of “I don’t care about what is important to you”, though that shows that who we are is tied to our interests. p.s. - We of course say “That’s just your opinion.” (which is also dismissive) but opinions and beliefs are not the same thing (as “I believe it’s going to rain” is neither a judgment nor an opinion, but a personal conjecture, a hypothesis, a gamble). Opinions are assessments, of people, or politics, or plumbing estimates (thus the personal nature of the jab about my opinion, and why we consult experts).

“Do you believe in ghosts/God?” is in one sense obtuse, asking for justification (evidence), ignoring this is about living in a way in relation to something other, say, than ourselves.

I do find the example interesting that “He acted on the belief that she was in danger” but isn’t it just qualifying a mistake? Seems it turned out she wasn’t in danger and he perhaps did something bad and is asking to be excused because he had the wrong impression. But is thinking that something is the case and being mistaken really what is at stake? Consider, “Why did you do that?” “She was in danger.” I take an action and when asked say “I did it because I believe x”, which is, again, to say something about me, who I claim myself to be. In this case, the defender of those in danger. And so is the request to be excused about being wrong? or asking that the bad be erased by the (perceived) good?

Grk

@Banno

the difficulty we have giving a satisfactory explanation of what's actually going on shouldn't blind us to the fact that it is our experience, it is something we do. — J

I’ve been trying to argue that this “what we do” is our individual responsibility, and not anything like “what’s actually going on” that we could “explain”. The “difficulty” is our inability to relinquish control over belief, and yet also our reticence to have it depend on us. The characterization of this as a problem with something “actual” happening is created by this desire for control and inevitability.

Maybe we should say that a simple claim like "There are bacteria on my left shoe" is capable of multiple interpretations, ranging from "I believe so" to "I damn well know it," depending on context. — J

Absolutely the phrasing is loose and the circumstances and responses determine a lot; only to add that those two cases (once differentiated) would be categorically different, with different workings and different criteria, claimed for different types of reasons with different ways of moving forward and resolution (with what mattered about the context being different).

@Banno

Indeed, if you wanted to call the [a-ha!] experience by a different name that doesn't invoke "understanding" at all, that's fine. — J

I of course acknowledge that we have that experience, even would call it a feeling, but, yes, it is not understanding (see PI #323 et seq “Now I have it!”). It is optimism perhaps, a “glad start”, (countered by deflation when we realize we didn’t really understand), but that feeling is not evidence of the occurrence of “understanding” somewhere in us, as belief is not evidenced by emotion (or even interest, because we might not care enough to meet the criteria for believing: to put ourselves out there as answerable for our desires).

"I believe there are bacteria on my left shoe" is simply the assertion, "There are bacteria on my left shoe." An assertion is no more certain than a belief, so degrees of certainty wouldn't be an issue. — J

The assertion would technically be “I know that there are bacteria on my left shoe.” Certainty isn’t part of belief (perhaps resolve) and it may not even be possible for knowledge, but it is a desire philosophy has always had for knowledge, thus minimizing anything else as “belief” or “instinct” or “emotion”.

But it seems equally odd to call such a belief a disposition. A disposition to do what? To confirm certain statements about shoe bacteria? — Banno

I don’t like the word either. But maybe it is that we are disposed to fulfill the requirements (criteria) associated with what we believe (or claim to); for belief (generally), that I can and will answer for it. Though I wouldn’t put this as “confirming” “statements”, as that sounds like having justification to claim a fact (“evidence” as has been suggested), which is the purview of knowledge (acknowledging the long held opinion that knowledge is justified belief, which I would argue against).

Of course we may claim it is raining outside (“I believe it is raining”), even based on x,y,z, but this isn’t a claim to a fact, nor that x,y,z constitute knowledge. Belief (in this case) is a hypothesis; one which is not justified, but tested. I am not putting a “statement” up for confirmation, but putting my word on the line. When we look outside, we know it is raining (or not), but this doesn’t confirm my belief—though the fact is confirmed by our seeing it rain—because I never claimed I “knew”. If it is not raining, you think less of me: in being fooled, or making a ridiculous claim, or lying. I could try to mitigate your low opinion by saying I believed it was raining because the weather report said it would, but in doing so I am not making a claim to knowledge that fell short (was found to be unsubstantiated). I am making an excuse by shifting responsibility (I could be right with ridiculous reasoning too). If I walked into the house through the rain, I might claim I know it is raining. If it had stopped when we went to look, I would be wrong. If it was actually the sprinkler, I would be embarrassed. I didn’t “not know” it was raining, I (personally) was mistaken, but I believed it was.

I can name two distinct experiences: (purporting to) understand X; and saying (to myself or others), "I understand X,"perhaps followed by some performance of this. — J

I’m not exactly clear what this is meant to distinguish; certainly there are distinct cases. I can front (lie, bluster… purport) that I understand without knowing if I do; I can believe that I understand but it turns out I don’t; I can “say” I understand and it turns out to be the case, or I can say I don’t understand but then it turns out I did. All seem to be claims “followed by some performance” (whether honest or not or deluded or humble, or denials). What other “types of understanding” don’t fit this?

The “certainty” I mentioned is in comparison to this kind of claim; our desire that knowledge tell us something sure, beforehand, and without us having any part in it. If dispositions were internal states, then they would exist or not, before being tried, judged, demonstrated. We could look in our brain and find our “understanding”; we would “have” beliefs (like emotions).

@Banno

we should treat "understanding" as a cluster of concepts and (perhaps) events, and not try to generalize more than necessary about it. — J

Sure; only to say that what is important about understanding, how it matters to us, is not any process of the brain, as if an internal ability that reaches a conclusion, but the demonstration of it.

But I could do all that to myself, in which case I am the one who gets to say whether I (believe I) understand. — J

Yes, but you would be using the criteria we share to judge whether you get the joke, just as we would. Thus the ability to also use them to demonstrate it to others. This makes it no less, but no more, reliable or possible to myself than others.

You're right that we couldn't say someone had understood without the behavioral signs, but that doesn't mean they haven't; it just means we'd have no way of knowing; we couldn't say. — J

This is the classic distinction between saying and knowing, or it being the case, which is tied to the desire for something more certain (ahead of having to demonstrate it). The importance of “saying” something is that we are making a claim, which involves (then) judging whether something is the case, which is based on our shared criteria for it being the case. Our saying we understand (even to ourselves), is to make such a claim. Even the feeling of realization is itself merely the possibility of our understanding. It is not a matter of knowing or not knowing; there is nothing (internal or otherwise) that “is the case” until it is demonstrated (or determined not to be the case), which is also the case with other dispositions, like knowing or, as I am claiming, believing (though belief is not the same type of claim).

Shank

@Banno @Hanover @J

All intentions are driven by a feeling-about-something. All conscious experience is - in some form or another - a judgement-about-something as a means to navigate the world…. None of the above can be absent of emotional content. — I like sushi

I think you’ve gotten at the crux of the matter. I suggest that a better term for this “feeling-about-something” is our “interest”. And this has the ever-presence (of a kind) that you claim for “emotional content”. I would suggest that our actual emotions are just one subsection of the expression of our interests, and that they belong to only part of them, which we could classify or at least characterize as “individual” interest (normally only considered “self” interest).

What Wittgenstein did is recognize that we share interests, and they form into practices (“concepts”). More importantly, we share the standards, or criteria, that judge one thing from another, their workings, or: what is essential to us about it (PI #371). Our criteria codify what matter to us (or interests us) in a thing (thus why his method of looking at how we talk about a thing, shows us our shared interest in that thing).

we need to distinguish between beliefs held in the face of evidence and beliefs held without any concern for evidence — I like sushi

And this is the classic philosophical framework, denigrating anything that doesn’t involve criteria that removes any human involvement. Our interest in evidence is that it can be certain without us (thus the power of science, whose conclusions would be the same no matter who conducts the experiment). But evidence is just one kind of interest among all others, which are not simply opposed to evidence, either as irrational or individual. Belief is not a lesser form of knowledge, they simply work differently.

The point here is that the individual (their “emotion”, or anything else thought to be internal to them) is not the arbiter of our acts—I apologize for the same reasons everyone else does, so no need for “me” to be involved at all, and, when I am, it is only to explain myself as the exception to the rule.

@Banno

If you do not know why you did something what makes you think your justification for something you did means anything? — I like sushi

Well I would hope we can agree that, out of everything we do, not all of it we know why. And, even if we do consider something beforehand, as you say, it may not matter, or mean anything, to others; maybe never need justification. But also, something I did may be asked to be explained afterwards to others, and those possible questions could never all be considered beforehand. But we can fill in the blanks for others (even ourselves) without reasoning out every possibility ahead of time.

We can automatically react to something and try to understand why, but that is not the reason 'we' did it because 'we' didn't do it. This is not to say there is not an underlying process, just that it was not a conscious one and therefore not an act. — I like sushi

That seems to be both brushing off basic individual responsibility (“we” do it all, outside of mitigating circumstances) and granting me too much control over what is considered an act (only those I am conscious of). Perhaps we believe an act doesn’t reflect who we truly are, or that we shouldn't be judged by everything we do (both understandable desires).

I do not want to get bogged down in arguments about free-will and what that means to different people at all. — I like sushi

I think for our purposes it’s just a matter of reimagining intention as not accompanying everything we do, and seeing that an action is based on classification not individuality. They are labels that are judged externally after something is out of the ordinary or brought up. Every movement is not an action, and every action is not intended. “Were you [completing the act of] hailing a cab, or just raising your arm?” “Did you intend to run that red light?”

Pretty much what I was getting at with "background belief," wouldn't you agree? The important thing is that a background belief really can't be said to cause anything. — J

Granted; but the nomenclature is misleading (behind what?). The circumstances for a belief are in the world, at a time, and may define who I am. Also, all this may in fact “cause” me to do something (what I believe is my duty), and may be the culmination of my life, or maybe just a moment.

Let's say someone tells a joke, and at first I don't "get it." Then all at once, I do. I have now understood the joke. Are you saying that until I continue in some fashion -- perhaps by making a witty reply -- I can't judge that I have understood the joke? Why would that be? — J

Yes we have “a-ha” moments, but that does not happen every time we understand something, nor is it demonstrative that we do understand (“I’ve got it! Wait, darn it.”) It can accompany understanding, but it is not the criteria for understanding. In what circumstances is someone said to get a joke? They laugh, they could tell it, paraphrase what is funny about. But, maybe more interestingly, someone may not understand a joke, and no amount of explanation might get them to.

deontology doesn't have to overlook 'the human practices of mistakes, reconsideration, excuses", — Banno

All I meant was its nature is the desire to determine what is right ahead of time, so it has no use for how we mop up afterwards when the rules are not enough (or steer us wrong).

The neuroscience is not yet up to the task, and may never be. — Banno

The problem here is that it’s apples vs the concept of justice. There is the “knowledge of the construction of the apparatus, quite apart from what it does.” (PI #149). It’s perfectly fine to learn how the brain works; it facilitates the possibility of our lives. But it doesn’t come into consideration as a criteria for how belief works, or our interests in claiming them.

I'm not sure I follow your idea of "lowering" a belief from a disposition to an emotion, although treating them as dispositions may overcome one objection to treating them as emotions - that an emotion is an occasional thing, I am angry now, and will calm down later...whereas a belief endures even when not considered. — Banno

I only said “lower” because emotion is traditionally, pejoratively deemed irrational, subject only to persuasion, etc. What I was trying to hang onto is that a belief maintains its rationality not because of its structure or nature, but because I claim responsibility for it. It is my reason, even if it comes from my being afraid, or delusional, or parroting someone else. That it is mine, that I own up to it, is what makes it intelligible. Yes, my anger may fade, but what really “endures” is that I am answerable for what I have said I believe, or what that leads to.

One still believes that the Earth is round, even when not giving it conscious consideration. — Banno

Get @Sam26 in here why don’t you. Not to stray off topic, but, of course, we can agree we don’t (can’t) “know” the earth is round (except scientifically). I would argue we would be hard-pressed to believe the earth is round, but only because: who would we make that claim to? Now, I could believe the earth is flat, because there is some responsibility in holding that position.

@Banno @Hanover

I'm thinking of what are often called background beliefs. It's a truism that I continue to believe in, say, the theory of evolution regardless of whether I happen to be thinking about it at the time. — J

There is no need for a background. I could say a fundamental part of who I am is my belief in Jesus, but that doesn’t mean there is something that “continues” in me, other than how I act and what I focus on and how I respond to others (say, in “putting God first”). Any of these if questioned could be answered with, “Because I believe in Jesus”, and that is the extent of its function: as the expression of our willingness to stand for something.

I am arguing that belief (believing) is a disposition, as understanding, knowing, or thinking. These are judged positions (and only thus “states”) that are demonstrated by the circumstances. We are disposed to do something because the possibility is there, not because of some thing in us, or behind us, or, say, unattended to. Part of the problem here is imagining belief or thinking as an “object”; again, differentiating the common parlance of “thoughts” as the talking that you do with yourself, from “thinking”, which is judged as problem solving, or attending to something in depth, or considering various future consequences, etc. Not to be cryptic, but not every thought is an instance of thinking.

Lurp

Why would it follow that, because we don't judge a disposition prior to an act, said disposition could not affect whether the act took place or not? (And yes, I'm with you in believing we need to be very careful about invoking "cause" here.) — J

I would extract “disposition” farther away from anything like a sensation, emotion, or internal predilection. I would look at it as a circumstance (PI #149), like a possible state of affairs. So when I understand, it is not a change in my body (that “affects” it), but an opportunity. I may continue or not, but it is only when I do, that we (and even me) can actually judge that I “understand”. Thus why Wittgenstein acknowledges that something “has occurred” to us (#154); but it is the “manifestations” that matter (#149).

@Banno @Hanover

Would you say that dispositions, possibly including beliefs, can be distinguished from thoughts on the basis that they may affect our actions, our "going on," without having to be consciously entertained? And in that sense, are not "mental processes" at all? Something like this seems a plausible reading of Witt. — J

As I said up here, the category of dispositions are not judged prior to an act, and so do not “affect” them, say, in a causal way. They are determined afterwards by external criteria such as whether I do in fact continue (this distinction separates someone judged to be thinking from the internal self-talk commonly taken as “thought”; or demonstrating my understanding as different from picturing it as a lightbulb that goes off in my head). So the distinction of conscious or unconscious does not apply (PI #149); it is an entirely different matter than turning inward more.

Nothing is purely emotional or purely rational. It is more or less about whether or not we are attending to something. — I like sushi

We may not know our reasons before we act, but only because we only make ourselves intelligible to others afterwards, not because they were in us already but unknown/unattended. Now, we can reflect on what we are going to do, and we can justify our act to ourselves ahead of time (with a belief), but those are not, nor do they determine, the criteria we share to judge an act.

@Banno @Hanover

I tried to read a paper recently that discussed the difference Wittgenstein makes between sensations (toothache) and “dispositions” (PI #149-154) which would be knowing, thinking, understanding, etc. It is a little confusing because disposition also sounds like some internal state. However, he says “ 149. If one says that knowing the ABC is a state of the mind, one is thinking of a state of a mental apparatus (perhaps of the brain) by means of which we explain the manifestations of that knowledge. Such a state is called a disposition. But there are objections to speaking of a state of the mind here, inasmuch as there ought to be two different criteria for such a state: a knowledge of the construction of the apparatus, quite apart from what it does. (Nothing would be more confusing here than to use the words "conscious" and "unconscious" for the contrast between states of consciousness and dispositions. For this pair of terms covers up a grammatical difference.)” (Bold emphasis added)

The “difference” is that dispositions are not determined by attending to brain processes (or mental states), because they are classifications judged by external criteria. #154 “Try not to think of understanding as a 'mental process' at all.— For that is the expression which confuses you. But ask yourself: in what sort of case, in what kind of circumstances, do we say, "Now I know how to go on," when, that is, the formula has occurred to me?”

I would classify belief as this type of “disposition”, externally judged on its “manifestations”, or, in this case, what we are willing to stand up for. Judging belief as an emotion is an attempt to capture this “non-cognitive” nature of belief, but still being trapped in the picture that it is an internal state. As I said, however, there are obviously emotions involved in or accompanying belief, even “wrong” ones such as arrogance, misplaced righteousness, etc. But, again, to lower belief to that level (although possible) is to dismiss the person, not solve the “irrationality” belief is characterized as.

@Banno @Hanover

I take it McCormick wants to find a way out of the categorization of belief as only rational, without part of it being cast out as irrational, which is the classic derogation of it as opposed to everything that is certain, logical, or true/false (knowledge). However, I find they are fighting too close in, and so their solution is tangled up by the confused framework. Instead of seeing past (Hegel style) the cognitive/non-cognitive misconception, they are attempting to resolve it with a different “mental state”, a feeling of belief. The funny part is that it does “feel” close to true. But I would argue that is because it captures the sense that part of what belief is are things like conviction or resolve or hope—which I wouldn’t characterize as species of belief @Banno, but that they show that belief is about what is important to us (what we might get emotional about). There is something like a feeling we must have in them, because it is a position (Wittgenstein’s “attitude”) we take towards them, what we are willing to do for them. Part of its workings as a practice is not the judgment of beliefs (or feelings), say, as right or wrong. We hold a person to their beliefs; we judge them. We can call them delusional, puppets, ignoring the facts, convinced by emotion, righteous, courageous, etc. “do we say instead that because [Bathasar] will not act on what he holds to be true, that he doesn't really believe?” @Banno Well, we would say they do not have the courage of their convictions perhaps.

Of course, that belief works this way also means people may abuse the practice and only judge the belief, thus moralizing the person away before considering them, their interests, their reasons, their context. “I can believe for whatever stupid reason i want. That won't make a non belief. That will just make it a stupid belief.” @Hanover

Part of the issue is with a lot of moral theory before Nietszche: it is thought of as before an act or statement. As casual or considered (or felt)—which they can be—but we actually consider most of this only afterwards. We judge a statement as true based on our criteria for knowledge. We judge the other for their act and ask for their reasons. Deontology overlooks the human practices of mistakes, reconsideration, excuses (here I nod to Austin’s work on action @Banno). Still, despite all your evidence to the contrary, I may be willing to die for my belief. We may not come to agreement, but to call that irrational or an emotion, misunderstands how belief works, cutting off the possibility of common ground before we begin.

Hope you have time to read an consider the article. — Banno

Flip, flip, flip

I’m interested in the idea of a blended state, where a belief is seen as consisting of both cognition and feelings. — Banno

I have yet to read the article, but, as just an initial response, I would think we need to consider the topic in relation (say apart from) the classic, problematic division of (certain) knowledge and (irrational) “belief”, also termed “emotivism”. I do think there is a distinction (and thus a connection) to be made between what is believed and something more, say, our relation to it.

I appreciate @Hanover pointing out that “belief” is used as a catch-all phrase for what is actually different things (hope, resolve, etc.). Wittgenstein claimed that belief works as a hypothesis (I believe it is raining), PI pp. 190-192. In relation to the discussion @Banno brings up, I would suggest that the “emotionality” of belief, put another way, is that something matters to us, because one thing belief is singular for is that it is me that is believing in it (my reasons is categorically different than the idea of rationality). So the way it works is that: I will stand up for my beliefs, I can be compromised in relation to them, I must evidence my faith in them by my actions; I am responsible for what I belief in a different way than a fact, which is true without me. The “truth” of belief is my willingness to remain true to it.

@flannel jesus

Well, I miscalculated the time zone and missed the lecture. If anyone saw it and/or wants to discus the paper I’m game.

Fail

Yes it is free. Email Oskari and just ask to be invited. He will send the link and the paper.

It is a paper going over the positions regarding skepticism of Wittgenstein, Stanley Cavell, and Kierkegaard.

This is part of the University of East Anglia International Wittgenstein Workshops
https://www.facebook.com/UeaInternationalWittgensteinWorkshop/