I can name two distinct experiences: (purporting to) understand X; and saying (to myself or others), "I understand X,"perhaps followed by some performance of this. — J

I’m not exactly clear what this is meant to distinguish; certainly there are distinct cases. I can front (lie, bluster… purport) that I understand without knowing if I do; I can believe that I understand but it turns out I don’t; I can “say” I understand and it turns out to be the case, or I can say I don’t understand but then it turns out I did. All seem to be claims “followed by some performance” (whether honest or not or deluded or humble, or denials). What other “types of understanding” don’t fit this?

The “certainty” I mentioned is in comparison to this kind of claim; our desire that knowledge tell us something sure, beforehand, and without us having any part in it. If dispositions were internal states, then they would exist or not, before being tried, judged, demonstrated. We could look in our brain and find our “understanding”; we would “have” beliefs (like emotions).

@Banno

we should treat "understanding" as a cluster of concepts and (perhaps) events, and not try to generalize more than necessary about it. — J

Sure; only to say that what is important about understanding, how it matters to us, is not any process of the brain, as if an internal ability that reaches a conclusion, but the demonstration of it.

But I could do all that to myself, in which case I am the one who gets to say whether I (believe I) understand. — J

Yes, but you would be using the criteria we share to judge whether you get the joke, just as we would. Thus the ability to also use them to demonstrate it to others. This makes it no less, but no more, reliable or possible to myself than others.

You're right that we couldn't say someone had understood without the behavioral signs, but that doesn't mean they haven't; it just means we'd have no way of knowing; we couldn't say. — J

This is the classic distinction between saying and knowing, or it being the case, which is tied to the desire for something more certain (ahead of having to demonstrate it). The importance of “saying” something is that we are making a claim, which involves (then) judging whether something is the case, which is based on our shared criteria for it being the case. Our saying we understand (even to ourselves), is to make such a claim. Even the feeling of realization is itself merely the possibility of our understanding. It is not a matter of knowing or not knowing; there is nothing (internal or otherwise) that “is the case” until it is demonstrated (or determined not to be the case), which is also the case with other dispositions, like knowing or, as I am claiming, believing (though belief is not the same type of claim).

Shank

@Banno @Hanover @J

All intentions are driven by a feeling-about-something. All conscious experience is - in some form or another - a judgement-about-something as a means to navigate the world…. None of the above can be absent of emotional content. — I like sushi

I think you’ve gotten at the crux of the matter. I suggest that a better term for this “feeling-about-something” is our “interest”. And this has the ever-presence (of a kind) that you claim for “emotional content”. I would suggest that our actual emotions are just one subsection of the expression of our interests, and that they belong to only part of them, which we could classify or at least characterize as “individual” interest (normally only considered “self” interest).

What Wittgenstein did is recognize that we share interests, and they form into practices (“concepts”). More importantly, we share the standards, or criteria, that judge one thing from another, their workings, or: what is essential to us about it (PI #371). Our criteria codify what matter to us (or interests us) in a thing (thus why his method of looking at how we talk about a thing, shows us our shared interest in that thing).

we need to distinguish between beliefs held in the face of evidence and beliefs held without any concern for evidence — I like sushi

And this is the classic philosophical framework, denigrating anything that doesn’t involve criteria that removes any human involvement. Our interest in evidence is that it can be certain without us (thus the power of science, whose conclusions would be the same no matter who conducts the experiment). But evidence is just one kind of interest among all others, which are not simply opposed to evidence, either as irrational or individual. Belief is not a lesser form of knowledge, they simply work differently.

The point here is that the individual (their “emotion”, or anything else thought to be internal to them) is not the arbiter of our acts—I apologize for the same reasons everyone else does, so no need for “me” to be involved at all, and, when I am, it is only to explain myself as the exception to the rule.

@Banno

If you do not know why you did something what makes you think your justification for something you did means anything? — I like sushi

Well I would hope we can agree that, out of everything we do, not all of it we know why. And, even if we do consider something beforehand, as you say, it may not matter, or mean anything, to others; maybe never need justification. But also, something I did may be asked to be explained afterwards to others, and those possible questions could never all be considered beforehand. But we can fill in the blanks for others (even ourselves) without reasoning out every possibility ahead of time.

We can automatically react to something and try to understand why, but that is not the reason 'we' did it because 'we' didn't do it. This is not to say there is not an underlying process, just that it was not a conscious one and therefore not an act. — I like sushi

That seems to be both brushing off basic individual responsibility (“we” do it all, outside of mitigating circumstances) and granting me too much control over what is considered an act (only those I am conscious of). Perhaps we believe an act doesn’t reflect who we truly are, or that we shouldn't be judged by everything we do (both understandable desires).

I do not want to get bogged down in arguments about free-will and what that means to different people at all. — I like sushi

I think for our purposes it’s just a matter of reimagining intention as not accompanying everything we do, and seeing that an action is based on classification not individuality. They are labels that are judged externally after something is out of the ordinary or brought up. Every movement is not an action, and every action is not intended. “Were you [completing the act of] hailing a cab, or just raising your arm?” “Did you intend to run that red light?”

Pretty much what I was getting at with "background belief," wouldn't you agree? The important thing is that a background belief really can't be said to cause anything. — J

Granted; but the nomenclature is misleading (behind what?). The circumstances for a belief are in the world, at a time, and may define who I am. Also, all this may in fact “cause” me to do something (what I believe is my duty), and may be the culmination of my life, or maybe just a moment.

Let's say someone tells a joke, and at first I don't "get it." Then all at once, I do. I have now understood the joke. Are you saying that until I continue in some fashion -- perhaps by making a witty reply -- I can't judge that I have understood the joke? Why would that be? — J

Yes we have “a-ha” moments, but that does not happen every time we understand something, nor is it demonstrative that we do understand (“I’ve got it! Wait, darn it.”) It can accompany understanding, but it is not the criteria for understanding. In what circumstances is someone said to get a joke? They laugh, they could tell it, paraphrase what is funny about. But, maybe more interestingly, someone may not understand a joke, and no amount of explanation might get them to.

deontology doesn't have to overlook 'the human practices of mistakes, reconsideration, excuses", — Banno

All I meant was its nature is the desire to determine what is right ahead of time, so it has no use for how we mop up afterwards when the rules are not enough (or steer us wrong).

The neuroscience is not yet up to the task, and may never be. — Banno

The problem here is that it’s apples vs the concept of justice. There is the “knowledge of the construction of the apparatus, quite apart from what it does.” (PI #149). It’s perfectly fine to learn how the brain works; it facilitates the possibility of our lives. But it doesn’t come into consideration as a criteria for how belief works, or our interests in claiming them.

I'm not sure I follow your idea of "lowering" a belief from a disposition to an emotion, although treating them as dispositions may overcome one objection to treating them as emotions - that an emotion is an occasional thing, I am angry now, and will calm down later...whereas a belief endures even when not considered. — Banno

I only said “lower” because emotion is traditionally, pejoratively deemed irrational, subject only to persuasion, etc. What I was trying to hang onto is that a belief maintains its rationality not because of its structure or nature, but because I claim responsibility for it. It is my reason, even if it comes from my being afraid, or delusional, or parroting someone else. That it is mine, that I own up to it, is what makes it intelligible. Yes, my anger may fade, but what really “endures” is that I am answerable for what I have said I believe, or what that leads to.

One still believes that the Earth is round, even when not giving it conscious consideration. — Banno

Get @Sam26 in here why don’t you. Not to stray off topic, but, of course, we can agree we don’t (can’t) “know” the earth is round (except scientifically). I would argue we would be hard-pressed to believe the earth is round, but only because: who would we make that claim to? Now, I could believe the earth is flat, because there is some responsibility in holding that position.

@Banno @Hanover

I'm thinking of what are often called background beliefs. It's a truism that I continue to believe in, say, the theory of evolution regardless of whether I happen to be thinking about it at the time. — J

There is no need for a background. I could say a fundamental part of who I am is my belief in Jesus, but that doesn’t mean there is something that “continues” in me, other than how I act and what I focus on and how I respond to others (say, in “putting God first”). Any of these if questioned could be answered with, “Because I believe in Jesus”, and that is the extent of its function: as the expression of our willingness to stand for something.

I am arguing that belief (believing) is a disposition, as understanding, knowing, or thinking. These are judged positions (and only thus “states”) that are demonstrated by the circumstances. We are disposed to do something because the possibility is there, not because of some thing in us, or behind us, or, say, unattended to. Part of the problem here is imagining belief or thinking as an “object”; again, differentiating the common parlance of “thoughts” as the talking that you do with yourself, from “thinking”, which is judged as problem solving, or attending to something in depth, or considering various future consequences, etc. Not to be cryptic, but not every thought is an instance of thinking.

Lurp

Why would it follow that, because we don't judge a disposition prior to an act, said disposition could not affect whether the act took place or not? (And yes, I'm with you in believing we need to be very careful about invoking "cause" here.) — J

I would extract “disposition” farther away from anything like a sensation, emotion, or internal predilection. I would look at it as a circumstance (PI #149), like a possible state of affairs. So when I understand, it is not a change in my body (that “affects” it), but an opportunity. I may continue or not, but it is only when I do, that we (and even me) can actually judge that I “understand”. Thus why Wittgenstein acknowledges that something “has occurred” to us (#154); but it is the “manifestations” that matter (#149).

@Banno @Hanover

Would you say that dispositions, possibly including beliefs, can be distinguished from thoughts on the basis that they may affect our actions, our "going on," without having to be consciously entertained? And in that sense, are not "mental processes" at all? Something like this seems a plausible reading of Witt. — J

As I said up here, the category of dispositions are not judged prior to an act, and so do not “affect” them, say, in a causal way. They are determined afterwards by external criteria such as whether I do in fact continue (this distinction separates someone judged to be thinking from the internal self-talk commonly taken as “thought”; or demonstrating my understanding as different from picturing it as a lightbulb that goes off in my head). So the distinction of conscious or unconscious does not apply (PI #149); it is an entirely different matter than turning inward more.

Nothing is purely emotional or purely rational. It is more or less about whether or not we are attending to something. — I like sushi

We may not know our reasons before we act, but only because we only make ourselves intelligible to others afterwards, not because they were in us already but unknown/unattended. Now, we can reflect on what we are going to do, and we can justify our act to ourselves ahead of time (with a belief), but those are not, nor do they determine, the criteria we share to judge an act.

@Banno @Hanover

I tried to read a paper recently that discussed the difference Wittgenstein makes between sensations (toothache) and “dispositions” (PI #149-154) which would be knowing, thinking, understanding, etc. It is a little confusing because disposition also sounds like some internal state. However, he says “ 149. If one says that knowing the ABC is a state of the mind, one is thinking of a state of a mental apparatus (perhaps of the brain) by means of which we explain the manifestations of that knowledge. Such a state is called a disposition. But there are objections to speaking of a state of the mind here, inasmuch as there ought to be two different criteria for such a state: a knowledge of the construction of the apparatus, quite apart from what it does. (Nothing would be more confusing here than to use the words "conscious" and "unconscious" for the contrast between states of consciousness and dispositions. For this pair of terms covers up a grammatical difference.)” (Bold emphasis added)

The “difference” is that dispositions are not determined by attending to brain processes (or mental states), because they are classifications judged by external criteria. #154 “Try not to think of understanding as a 'mental process' at all.— For that is the expression which confuses you. But ask yourself: in what sort of case, in what kind of circumstances, do we say, "Now I know how to go on," when, that is, the formula has occurred to me?”

I would classify belief as this type of “disposition”, externally judged on its “manifestations”, or, in this case, what we are willing to stand up for. Judging belief as an emotion is an attempt to capture this “non-cognitive” nature of belief, but still being trapped in the picture that it is an internal state. As I said, however, there are obviously emotions involved in or accompanying belief, even “wrong” ones such as arrogance, misplaced righteousness, etc. But, again, to lower belief to that level (although possible) is to dismiss the person, not solve the “irrationality” belief is characterized as.

@Banno @Hanover

I take it McCormick wants to find a way out of the categorization of belief as only rational, without part of it being cast out as irrational, which is the classic derogation of it as opposed to everything that is certain, logical, or true/false (knowledge). However, I find they are fighting too close in, and so their solution is tangled up by the confused framework. Instead of seeing past (Hegel style) the cognitive/non-cognitive misconception, they are attempting to resolve it with a different “mental state”, a feeling of belief. The funny part is that it does “feel” close to true. But I would argue that is because it captures the sense that part of what belief is are things like conviction or resolve or hope—which I wouldn’t characterize as species of belief @Banno, but that they show that belief is about what is important to us (what we might get emotional about). There is something like a feeling we must have in them, because it is a position (Wittgenstein’s “attitude”) we take towards them, what we are willing to do for them. Part of its workings as a practice is not the judgment of beliefs (or feelings), say, as right or wrong. We hold a person to their beliefs; we judge them. We can call them delusional, puppets, ignoring the facts, convinced by emotion, righteous, courageous, etc. “do we say instead that because [Bathasar] will not act on what he holds to be true, that he doesn't really believe?” @Banno Well, we would say they do not have the courage of their convictions perhaps.

Of course, that belief works this way also means people may abuse the practice and only judge the belief, thus moralizing the person away before considering them, their interests, their reasons, their context. “I can believe for whatever stupid reason i want. That won't make a non belief. That will just make it a stupid belief.” @Hanover

Part of the issue is with a lot of moral theory before Nietszche: it is thought of as before an act or statement. As casual or considered (or felt)—which they can be—but we actually consider most of this only afterwards. We judge a statement as true based on our criteria for knowledge. We judge the other for their act and ask for their reasons. Deontology overlooks the human practices of mistakes, reconsideration, excuses (here I nod to Austin’s work on action @Banno). Still, despite all your evidence to the contrary, I may be willing to die for my belief. We may not come to agreement, but to call that irrational or an emotion, misunderstands how belief works, cutting off the possibility of common ground before we begin.

Hope you have time to read an consider the article. — Banno

Flip, flip, flip

I’m interested in the idea of a blended state, where a belief is seen as consisting of both cognition and feelings. — Banno

I have yet to read the article, but, as just an initial response, I would think we need to consider the topic in relation (say apart from) the classic, problematic division of (certain) knowledge and (irrational) “belief”, also termed “emotivism”. I do think there is a distinction (and thus a connection) to be made between what is believed and something more, say, our relation to it.

I appreciate @Hanover pointing out that “belief” is used as a catch-all phrase for what is actually different things (hope, resolve, etc.). Wittgenstein claimed that belief works as a hypothesis (I believe it is raining), PI pp. 190-192. In relation to the discussion @Banno brings up, I would suggest that the “emotionality” of belief, put another way, is that something matters to us, because one thing belief is singular for is that it is me that is believing in it (my reasons is categorically different than the idea of rationality). So the way it works is that: I will stand up for my beliefs, I can be compromised in relation to them, I must evidence my faith in them by my actions; I am responsible for what I belief in a different way than a fact, which is true without me. The “truth” of belief is my willingness to remain true to it.

@flannel jesus

Well, I miscalculated the time zone and missed the lecture. If anyone saw it and/or wants to discus the paper I’m game.

Fail

Yes it is free. Email Oskari and just ask to be invited. He will send the link and the paper.

It is a paper going over the positions regarding skepticism of Wittgenstein, Stanley Cavell, and Kierkegaard.

This is part of the University of East Anglia International Wittgenstein Workshops
https://www.facebook.com/UeaInternationalWittgensteinWorkshop/

On the other hand, he is thinking about "meaning-objects", so there ought to be a similarity of some kind [between the feeling examples and the toothache]. — Ludwig V

I think the point of understanding the earlier discussion of feelings in comparing it to the toothache case, is to show that the words we use are not as important as the distinctions, etc. that are made (the “use”, or “grammar”). “Is it correct to describe my first feeling by an intransitive verb, or should I say that my fear had an object although I did not know that it had one? Both these forms of description can be used. To understand this examine the following example: It might be found practical to call a certain state of decay in a tooth, not accompanied by what we commonly call toothache, "unconscious toothache" and to use in such a case the expression that we have toothache, but don't know it.” (pp. 22-23 emphasis added). The toothache example is meant to show that “I don’t know it” (as Russell says about feelings as objects) can be differently used as: “unconscious” in that we are unaware—that the words have (at least) two senses/uses—but that we then might get confused, as Russell does, that “I don’t know it” means that there is an undiscovered object (say, existing in the mind), particularly as science can measure and quantify toothache, which criteria are the models philosophy aspires too. So, though I also am tentative about the science/philosophy claims and confusion, I take this fundamentally as his working out the importance and distinction between words and sense, or “use”; the beginnings of “grammar”.

@Paine @Ludwig V @Joshs @Shawn @Srap Tasmaner @Luke

I think I have to go back over his investigation of knowledge and the situation between science and philosophy.

Now is it wrong in this sense [the sense of having tooth decay without the common accompaniments] to say that I have toothache but don't know it? — (p.23)

I take him to be claiming that it is okay to say I don’t know my toothache (it is “unconscious”) when it is not accompanied by the common qualities of a toothache. But he is also claiming then that it is logically wrong—not how toothaches work for us—to claim, when my toothache does have the common features, that I do not know it.

On the other hand it obviously makes use of the word "to know" in a new way. If you wish to examine how this expression is used it is helpful to ask yourself "what in this case is the process of getting to know like?" "What do we call 'getting to know' or, 'finding out'?"

So: what is the process like of getting to know my unconscious toothache? Well, whatever common accompaniments were missing would become present. Pain could be missing, or the location of pain transmitted elsewhere or too global to be pinpointed to that tooth, or there could be pain but I do not feel it (paralysis, medication). So “getting to know” my unconscious toothache would be to become aware of something, “finding out” what was missing or hidden. This is different than saying I have a toothache and don’t know it, when getting to know my toothache is: to be able to measure it, or identify it, or equate it with yours.

But the new expression misleads us by calling up pictures and analogies which make it difficult for us to go through with our convention.

Now are identifying and equating the: “pictures and analogies” that make it hard to say I have a toothache and don’t know it (in the sense of being aware of it)? And “make it hard” why? Because awareness isn’t measurable? Because we want to be more than just aware?

Thus, by the expression "unconscious toothache" you may […] be misled into thinking that a stupendous discovery has been made, a discovery which in a sense altogether bewilders our understanding…. [T]he scientist will tell you that it is a proved fact that there is such a thing, and he will say it like a man who is destroying a common prejudice. He will say: "Surely it's quite simple; there are other things which you don't know of, and there can also be toothache which you don't know of. It is just a new discovery".

It is a new fact that bewilders the commoner, but not science, which will “discovery” it, in the sense it is unknown, unmeasured, not yet analyzed, our guesses unproven. (A popular view in philosophy is that the philosopher is in a superior position to the common person.)

But philosophy is “extremely puzzled”, unsatisfied and tongue-tied, I think Witt would say: because it pictures this fact as an object with the same analogous relation as the tree I can point to, so it is also “tempted to deny the possibility of unconscious toothache”, as it would a material ‘mind’, or ‘sense data’. This slippery slope is because we only think of the second kind of knowing—blinded to any other use, such as the first sense (becoming aware)—because we are captivated by the outcomes of science.

@Paine @Ludwig V @Joshs @Shawn @Srap Tasmaner @Luke

Section 5 (pp. 21-23) Russell and Undiscovered Feelings

Maybe someone can help fill in the Russell here (mine is hearsay). The distinction I take as important is between things like ‘expecting’, which Witt claims need to have an associated subject, and ‘wishing’ (crying, etc.), where those feelings can stand alone (p.21). It appears (only from inference) that Russell is concerned about what we wish for because he gets himself confused how we might “know” what he is only presuming is an essential subject. This seems to be similar to the mistake of picturing feelings (sense data) as an object, thus creating an empirical ‘problem’ rather than accepting there are many ways actual feelings are meaningful to us. Witt points out that expectation not only doesn’t happen one way, but it can happen a number of ways (not along rules), so it is better thought of as an open question (with “endless variations”), rather than an object that cannot then be captured in a name (turning the as yet undetermined into something “undefinable”).

In forcing the picture of a feeling by itself to require an object, it seems to twist what would be the task of explaining our interests in my feelings into needing to be certain about something unique. “‘I am afraid of something, but I don't know of what’. Is there an objection to this terminology? We may say: ‘There isn't, except that we are then using the word 'to know' in a queer way’.” (p.22)

With the example of an “unconscious” toothache he appears to be noting that there is a difference which is legitimately recordable, but that our analogy (our form of notation) may lead us to imagine that the solution is a (scientific) “discovery” rather than simply noting the difference between a potential and recognizable pain. I can’t imagine what the discovery would be, nor do I have a good grasp of the “situation” between philosophy and science here, but he does seem to again want to underline that the philosophical muddle should not be thought about being “solved” (resolved) by an investigation that finds something new, but rather by a philosophy which uncovers “‘What do we call 'getting to know' or, 'finding out'?’” to “break the spell of those [notations] which we are accustomed to.” (p.23) He also points out that what we say is not just a matter of “notation” (just language), but is telling us something about the world, making a distinction that has importance to us; that this is what he means by “grammar”.

The scientific method, as we know it, was not a model for Plato. Wittgenstein does not seem interested in Plato's own problems with analysis. There are the many times when the singular essence is sought for and not found. — Paine

I think this is a confusion of Witt’s making. When he says the “method of science”, he might seem to be talking about comparing methods, but, based on all other evidence in the discussion, he means to be saying the results of the method: predictable, repeatable, and not relying on who is doing it, not compromised of/by the human. And Witt is trying to understand how and why Plato had problems (of his own creation) in that what he wanted could not be found because he started by looking only for a “singular” “essence”. In fact, Witt’s method is based on the start of Socrates’ inquiry into what is commonly said in a situation.

But I wouldn't claim that the same is true of every philosopher since then. — Ludwig V

Descartes equally has his requirement of inability to doubt within the first paragraph, and he too starts talking math as an ideal for knowledge. Kant seems to take away the issue (the: wanting the thing-in-itself), only to start by looking for imperatives. “Science” is the umbrella term Wittgenstein is using for this desire for logical purity (a math-like order).

The point is that there is no way of comparing private sensations in a way that would allow us to classify a given sensation as either they same or different from another. — Ludwig V

“A given sensation” is creating the picture of feelings as objects (specific ones). And we do compare our feelings all the time and do classify them as different or the same. “I have a headache.” “Me too!” “No, but mine is throbbing in my neck” “Me too!”

. But the point of the example (language games) is to get us to see things in a different context and so differently. It's not really an exercise in logic at all. — Ludwig V

We must be in agreement about the facts and context of his examples, but not the conclusion. There is a logical force to the clarity gained by the description. Witt is making a subtle shift but his method is able to show an actual distinction, which cuts across the issue. We’ve seen logical mistakes here exposed by comparison to the evidence of simply what we say when doing a thing.

There is something [skeptics] are trying to express, but it is better expressed in another way. — Ludwig V

Yes he does sometimes change the way an expression is recorded (“changing the notation”), removing the familiarity that blinds us, maybe adding a larger context of implications which makes certain unseen distinctions now clear. But yes “changing the notation” is merely a tool for perspective, not an argument that there is something wrong with words, nor for a new or better language.

many people do follow the rules more often than not — Luke

In our discussion, this illustrates Witt’s insight that reasons get mixed up by the skeptic/metaphysician with causes (p. 14). People will do things that people do or have done, but they may only do them because of rules at times (when a practice even has “rules”); but there are other reasons for doing things (or none at all). We can of course judge whether they followed a practice, thus why it is then (after an act) that they would give reasons (including that “I was just following the rules”). We of course don’t usually judge anyone when they are conforming to our practices and norms, as Austin would say we don’t bring up ‘intention’ unless something goes wrong, rather than it being pictured as a cause for every act.

Apologies if it is off the current topic and that it probably ignores the context of the preceding discussion. — Luke

It’s fine, but you and @Joshs maybe should take a look at pages 14-15 as it is a discussion of reasons (vs causes), and it also may help straighten out a few things. First, nowhere is he discussing what is the correct or incorrect use of language, nor any explanation of what gives it any normative force. Also, he is not denying that we each have our sense data (aka feelings), only that they are not “objects”, subject to fixed knowledge (or ‘ownership’). Thus, they are not the “cause” of our language use, but we give reasons for their expression (after the fact), as @Ludwig V points out. We are thus responsible for our acts and speech, not whether they are “correct” or not.

Don't these remarks [about family resemblances] invite distracting arguments about whether they are factually correct? — Ludwig V

It seems to me that the limits to analysis being put forward by Wittgenstein are arguing for a particular set of facts over others. — Paine

I think it is important to revisit page 17 when he discusses language games. “These are ways of using signs simpler than those in which we use the signs of our highly complicated everyday language.” I take these to be examples (here), not focused on an argument, but using “general facts” (as he mentions in PI #128, #143, p.230] that he assumes we agree to in order to show a distinction. It is methodological, not a hypothesis about the world (“we are not doing natural history” id). Thus why he can invent imaginary cases (and facts) to show how things might look if we make assumptions before examining what we say when… (his method). He is not trying to explain rule-following in the PI, but looking at it to see why we get confused about it in our hunt for purity. As @Paine says, these facts are not “competing” (but not for any “elemental structure” either), but simply arrogantly presented as self-evident in service of a greater purpose. If he is wrong, then it is of no consequence (that fact just becomes irrelevant, or could be better described), as the purpose is not to get the grammar correct, but to see what it shows us about the skeptical/metaphysical requirement of certainty (generalizing, etc.).

“His contention in §48 is rather constructing a new language game in order to confute logical atomism than, in the spirit of a critical method, trying to discuss Russell’s distinctions one by one. Wittgenstein was as little interested in critical arguments or analytical sorts of discussions with ancient authors as with modern or contemporary ones.” -Soulez

A “language game” is not a (somehow different) explanation of the world, it is an invented case, not to prove Russell wrong, but to show that the criteria comes before any examination. Yes, Witt is reaching back to a deeper level, but it is not a “primitive” (underlying) language or reality, so much as looking at assumptions, fundamental premises, which couldn’t be more “analytical”.

The work does not solve the problem but shows how it is surrounded by other problems. — Paine

True, “dismiss” was strong. It’s not like we don’t learn something along the way. And, in a very real sense, we would not have that knowledge without Socrates’ curiosity, his dissatisfaction with the easy, first impression.

he was not assigning the problem of the good to being simply another case of craving generality. — Paine

He obviously has a bone to pick with Socrates, and I’m not sure I see what else for other than Socrates moves on from each particular case in search of something universal (generality at its highest form).

Using the individual soul to measure the body politic is not done by Wittgenstein — Paine

I agree, he only feebly picks up “politics” in terms of our relation to the other individual—the student, the skeptic—or how we relate to our self (as I believe is in the realm of “governing” oneself in Plato’s analogy).

@Paine @Ludwig V @Joshs @Shawn @Srap Tasmaner

Section 4C (pp. 18-20] Philosophical “Attitude”

To step back just to page 18, he is I believe referring to Socrates when he asks why philosophy is “contemptuous” toward the particular case. On page 20 he says outright “When Socrates asks the question, ‘what is knowledge?’ he does not even regard it as a preliminary answer to enumerate cases of knowledge.” Power (might=right) is someone’s goal of what is good. Is it the most worthy goal? No, but it still exists in the world, and it gets dismissed because it doesn’t meet the standard Socrates wants.

“The contempt for what seems the less general case in logic springs from the idea that it is incomplete.” It wouldn’t seem this equates to the logical necessity Socrates is looking for, but to me “complete” lines up with a solution (answering the “problem” again) that ties up all the loose ends and addresses every contingency before an act. As if we could determine the right thing to do in every angle up front, “completely”.

And this is a matter of method for him. Like Austin, who always investigated how an action failed in order to learn how it worked, Witt implores us to be interested in what distinguishes something rather than search for neat and tidy commonalities. “For after all, there is not one definite class of features which characterize all cases of wishing.” We can draw sharp boundaries to feel we have a complete idea, but “there are many common features overlapping.” as he seemingly first refers to family resemblances, which is important enough to be in the preface of the PI.

I had the impression that his explanation of the temptattion is the only answer that I found in the text. I must have missed something. — Ludwig V

It’s not a matter of another general answer he gives as much as the “answer” he claims that the solipsist wants to satisfy that desire for their pure, imposed criteria. That desire causes them to see the issue only as a problem/answer dichotomy (rather than a “muddle” and “temptation”). Many readers take him to be solving (answering) that “problem” just in a different way, or dissolving it, or not taking it seriously (it’s just about language).

He doesn't seem to take into account that a description can be an explanation and can give us a new view of what we are already looking. — Ludwig V

I think people take the idea of not explaining anything a bit too far. He is of course making claims and explaining things all along. The difference between his descriptions of what we say, and the “explaining” that he wants to avoid is tied to the desire for a single criteria and working backwards to ‘explain’ the world in order to fit that goal (thus the creation of a theoretical, metaphysical perfect realm). So in this tight construct, “explanation” is almost a technical term for him, not the loose act of drawing conclusions. An “explanation” for him is driven by the desire for the kind of “answer” we want in looking at skepticism as a “problem” as above.

I do think Wittgenstein is looking for a way to help the solipsist find an answer to a problem: — Paine

In a sense, but I’m making a finer distinction between kinds of “problems”. In my discussion of Sec 2 above I claimed he was pointing out how philosophy mixes up a conceptual confusion with the desire the solipsist has for a scientific answer because they want to see it only as an empirical problem.

“He is irresistibly tempted to use a certain form of expression; but we must yet find why he is.” Yes, he is trying to help find an “answer”, but just not a scientific answer to the problem the solipsist has framed. He is trying to find out why the solipsist is “irresistibly tempted”.

[Witt] is oddly just like Socrates in accepting he has to live with the arguments he makes. — Paine

I’ve always thought they both start in the same place: asking what we say in a given situation, but Witt listens in a way where Socrates seems to already have something in mind. But they are very similar. Are you saying they both hold us responsible for what we say? or that they are somehow stuck with the arguments they make?

I don't read the issue he has with Plato as equivalent to his complaints about the temptations of modern science. The latter are the people he lives amongst. — Paine

I agree; he is specifically taking on ‘sense data’, and the paragraph about science is as vehement as he gets. I only bring Plato into it to say that the issue (of metaphysics) has followed philosophy all along.

I do think W urgently wants to get past the 'problem of skepticism' in regard to phenomena versus reality frames of discussion. He may eschew other explanations but he keeps taking aim at that one throughout his life. — Paine

Absolutely, that is the target of the times (as with Austin). Given our reading, I think I would phrase it as the “problematizing” of skepticism. That if we take skepticism as a problem, it leads to the desire for an answer, and he wants to show examples of the ordinary working rationality we have, to say that: when that comes to an end (as @Joshs @Ludwig V are discussing), we at least are on open, common ground to differentiate from, rather than fighting in “frames of discussion” of theoretical fantasy. As @Ludwig V says “my ability to dissent from and to question what I am taught (in any meaningful or relevant way) rests on my having learnt what it is to dissent and to question.”

It's not a question of argument, but of learning. — Ludwig V

And of course, as you say, “we are inducted into what we do”, but in the PI we are constantly brought up by the (seemingly irrational) rogue student. Here, just as we’ve resolved a misunderstanding about the locality of thought between science and philosophy (p.8), we are thrust back into disagreement: “But what if someone said ‘I can assure you I feel the visual image to be two inches behind the bridge of my nose’; what are we to answer him? Should we say that he is not speaking the truth, or that there cannot be such a feeling?” (p.9, emphasis added). And bringing in “feeling” tempts us to say the conversation is now hopelessly irrational, to say we perhaps have to rely on the force of (society’s) authority, but he says we “**don’t say that the [person] is telling a lie or talking nonsense” (p.10, my emphasis), just that it “has yet to be explained to us” (id.) how what they are saying makes sense. It is not the sense (truth) that has any power, but the people, open-endedly (or not “negotiation”, but rebellion), just needing to find our (a rational) way together to go forward (not ‘agree’). It doesn’t surprise me that Plato feels differently (though now I’m intrigued to go read that***).

**As I have taken the position before, I take this “don’t” as an ethical *admonition on Witt’s part (we can but shouldn’t), perhaps even political (as it would not be the first time he seems opposed to dogmatism (PI #426).
***turns out it’s the group who believe in the gods but that believe they don’t hold dominion of over us, as if rationality had no sway. They would be (this translation) “ministered to their souls salvation by [*]admonition” for five years then killed, for their “folly”. Laws, Bk 10, p. 909. (In America, it’s four years.)

@Joshs

In the end, the authoritative. dogmatic, answer is the only possible one. — Ludwig V

Cavell will point out that the teacher is only “inclined to say: ‘This is simply what I do.’” (PI #217] so of course we can shut the door to further teaching with dogmatism and authority, but we can always continue the conversation in order to reach agreement and compliance, because it’s the relationship—to each other, to society—that’s more important in this case than anything we might take (or force) as foundational.

@Banno @Paine @Ludwig V @Jamal @Astrophel @Joshs @Shawn @Srap Tasmaner

Section 4B (pp.17-18) science vs. philosophy (generalizing)

Obviously, over-generalization leads to logical errors, but what’s interesting is how he ties it to traditional philosophical issues (however obliquely). It also seems clear that in saying “language” causes problems, he is referring to general problems in thinking, like the desire for simplicity, imprecision, mis-categorization, false analogies, etc., and not that we are pitting ordinary language against philosophy.

In (a) he brings up the abstraction of a quality into an independent property (creating an object) such as turning “real” into a thing that something either has or does not (as in his example of the “ideal” of beauty), which slides into the (not only Kant’s) idea of an (objective) “reality”.

In (b) is our main issue so far in a nutshell in that we turn the meaning of a word (leaf, or, say, thinking) into an object and take it to be what is common to particular instances (hello Plato). Not only that, but it is an image that resides “‘in him’”, creating ‘my’ ‘meaning’ for the solipsist (and the “mechanism” problem of (c)). What he sees is that we don’t actually put particulars together, but we learn (and reflect to make explicit) “certain features or properties which they have in common.” (p.18 my emphasis) These are the criteria for judging what is a leaf (say, from a seed that looks like one)—what is essential about it. (PI #371)

In (d) we see the creation of metaphysics (Plato’s forms; Descartes’ mind) as the product of science’s desire for an “explanation”, which is turning a “muddle felt as a problem” (p.6), into the “preoccupation” with ”answers” (not just never explaining anything @Paine), and here he clarifies, reduced to AN answer. This is the root temptation to solve the “problem” of skepticism, which blinds us (in “complete darkness”) from seeing our everyday criteria, which don’t unravel our “muddle” (once and for all) but unravel us so we can continue on.

But this is not to continue in the same manner, much less with the same goal. He doesn’t want to change the answer, he wants to change us, our interests. Our method is to look at “particular cases”, and our goal is to see what “distinguishes” them (our criteria for judgment).

what makes the reasons mine, as opposed to justifications after the event? — Ludwig V

Aren’t justifications just a subset of reasons, like an excuse is a reason, as is acting on principal? Preparing them in advance to decide to act a certain way does not alter their category as a reason because they are given after the fact. And yes I think I am answerable for the reasons I give to you, as I am responsible for my actions.

there is more than one use of words at stake here — Ludwig V

Agreed, as evidenced by the pencil statement variations.

So do you read Wittgenstein here as rhetorically casting doubt not only on the assumption noted ― about the separate, mental act of interpretation ― but also on the idea of giving a word an interpretation, or interpreting a word to mean something? — Srap Tasmaner

Yes. You pick out the banjo. The picking results in a particular interpretation, or use, as: ‘This is pencil’ can distinguish the material, or the number, etc. depending on the circumstances.

Do you take Wittgenstein to have been saying that "this is tove" might mean any one of… depending on context? — Srap Tasmaner

Yes. Same statement (“This is pencil”), different “uses” (usages, made explicit), or as he also calls them: interpretations. Not that the use is given by me.

But he doesn't exclusively use "use" as a noun — Srap Tasmaner

True. Not sure if sometimes he is just writing “using” regularly or not, but it still bears keeping in mind the point that a usage/interpretation is more than something I do, what with history, context, others’ judgment, multiple uses, etc. (even though I can consider, choose words, plan, hope).

However, my problem is with his comparison of reasons with motives. I have to say, I think of a motive as a desire or wish or value - reasons map the path from there to the action. as in the third bolded passage. But set that aside. My question is how does this fit with the justification post hoc? It looks as if I may act for no reason, but then offer a justification post hoc, which suggests that I did act for a reason. But that doesn't fit with our immediate awareness of the motive. — Ludwig V

I think the comparison of motives with reasons is logical (grammatically similar) both compared to causes, which we may not know. But I can know my motives (though I may not), and I’m the only one that can know, and give, my reasons (“actual reasons” not being mistake for causes). I’m not sure we would act for a reason (seems like a motive, or a principle), but after the fact (post hoc) we could give reasons for acting as I did (which could include causes and motives, as it could include excuses and justifications).

if you're talking about a sign (or doodling mathematical symbols, whatever), you're not using it but mentioning it. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, but we don’t manipulate language to build what we want; we communicate along “well established usage”(p.3) which we share, demonstrated by any of us contributing to options of the different uses of “This is a pencil” in the phrases which follow it (solved by imagining a context for that “use”, as if a crossword).

But one natural test of whether an utterance is a use is whether the speaker means it, or is just quoting — Srap Tasmaner

An utterance is not judged as, or as not, a ‘use’ of words; an utterance has a use—it is a plea, or a threat, or points out a difference; as are the examples regarding the pencil—depending on the context. Thus why words are not ‘meant’ by us, other than in contrast to when we jest.

@Banno @Paine @Ludwig V @Jamal @Astrophel @Joshs @Shawn @Srap Tasmaner

(If anyone else does not want to be “notified” when I read another section, just let me know.)

Section 4A (pp.16-17) “language games”

As he puts off until later in the book the actual discussion of whether a machine can think, I will defer until then as well, only to point out the form of argument that he takes here is, again: a fact making a logical exclusion (what “can”, and “cannot”), which is simply that a machine cannot think because it is not human (analogously it can’t have a toothache either). I don’t know that this would be convincing to those that believe that eventually machines will be capable of “being human” or that reduce their interest in “thinking” to replicating an activity, such as problem-solving, but we can take that up later. As well as the brief reference to the desire that thought be “private”.

Another note on method involves the misunderstanding of what “language games” are for him. Many believe these are, say, contexts of rules that underly or justify the meaning of words, but, clearly here, he is “looking closely” at simplified examples that are “particular”, which I take to be distinguishing enough to show facts that matter to the workings of a specific activity (the criteria of its grammar), with thinking with words involving uses of “comparison”, “difference”, “agreement”, etc. (Thus, the PI is not, for instance, arguing that using words is like following rules, but is drawing out the mechanics of rule-following as a case to study; there, to show how the grammar is different than (falls short of) a desire for pure logic.) Here it shows thinking to be more than merely “activity” but not necessarily “mental”. Importantly, so we are not “misled by… linguistic form into a false conception of… grammar” as we might be misled by the expression that “thinking is an activity... of our mind” into thinking that the mind is “the seat of the activity of thinking” (rather than just pointing out, say, that we did it in our head rather than worked it out physically, and not a matter of locality).