If I reveal that my position in this discussion is as an artist, not a critic, would that change how you perceive my argument? — "Possibility

I can only say for sure that although the artist may understand the workings of the form as well or better than the critic, I would say the critic understands the explicit criteria, the history of the art form, and is more deliberate, thoughtful, and comprehensive in his investigation into a work (though of course the artist could do this too, but then: is he an artist? or a critic?). That's not to say there aren't sensationalist, or populist, or just bad critics, or that the good ones aren't sometimes wrong. But I don't put any stock necessarily in the artist's position--his goal or intention, etc.

When I argue that a logical, rational discussion of art is not ‘objective’, [I'm only saying] its claim to objectivity is limited. ...my view of Kant’s aesthetics abandons no ‘standards of objectivity’ to begin with, but rather strives towards the possibility of a more complete objectivity. — Possibility

Well "objective" gets used a lot without it being clear why. The "claim" of the discussion of art is not "limited" (it is, say, unguarded to the Other's rejection); it is not making a claim "to objectivity". Also not sure what a "standard of objectivity" is--certain, predictable, enforceable? Here Kant is saying we have a universal claim (acceptable by anyone) and impersonal criteria (though not certainty of agreement). How can we approach? Towards what? What would make this "more complete"? I would point out that the "more complete" a critique of art (the more evidence used, the more implications followed through, the more questions/objections addressed, etc.) its possible the more people may see it the same way, agree that all those determinations, the critique, are right/correct. Now, could we also deepen/broaden our criteria of a form? sure. Stanley Cavell's observations in "The World Viewed" about the nature of film bring to light criteria I don't think film critics even considered before; and Northrup Frye's "Anatomy of Criticism" is such a fundamental framework of the structure of literature, people call it the bible. (I will note that both of these works investigate the "forms" of these arts.)

This approximation...is a call...to engage in a shared relational ‘space’, in which differing systems and structures of rationality, logic or end-place can be understood and restructured in relation to others without consolidation or conflict based on significance. Without this approximation, which expresses an awareness of its incompleteness through aesthetics (whether intentional or not), how do we acknowledge and respond to the call in the first place? — Possibility

I like the idea of a call: the work draws us in, it speaks to us through the criteria of its form, and our critique beckons the Other for their assent. Are these all not "space" enough? A discussion of the form of art does not require or allow for "differing systems and structures of rationality", as in, different rationality than: criteria of a form. But we also don't create the criteria nor change them (arbitrarily; say, without the art form changing). Where is the need for an "end-place"? Modern art expands and re-examines its own rational criteria in the making of the art--it's become its own critic. The criteria are not "incomplete", or unfinished, or, as of yet, only of a lower order (only an approximation?). A discussion of them need not end or be resolved or bettered for the rational conversation of art to begin--the one is the means to the other. We will have no other, better ("objective"?) means, to, say, have a particular, better ("objective"?) end. The frailty of the possibility of agreement in a discussion of art is its triumph, not its lack.

[claiming objectivity is limited] is due in part to Thomas Nagel, and in part to my examining Kant in the ‘wrong’ order. — Possibility

Yes, we'll need a full accounting of this.

You or I might consider something beautiful, but it's not true beauty, according to the conceptions of Kant. — Mijin

I get what you're saying; Kant can be esoteric. I usually work from ordinary language (its ordinary criteria), but, if you let go of the personal use of the words as terms, the categories of judgement themselves regarding aesthetics are part of our world, just the names don't line up. In other words, don't throw the baby out with the bathwater. The criteria aren't Kant's opinions or "conceptions", these are categories he is observing; he isn't making this stuff up (except, of course, that is, the names).

That is to say, you can consider something whatever you want ("beautiful"), but it's just your feeling or opinion until we have some external criteria to agree or disagree about it over. And we are not discussing whether something is actually beautiful, but discussing the categories of judging (say, how it is determined to be beautiful). And true and false do not come into an aesthetic discussion, i.e., "true" beauty (the claims aren't propositional statements).

Well, I have no reason to suppose these conceptions are the correct framing; it's just a proposition that I either accept or reject. It can't be used as an argument to convince anyone of anything. — Mijin

I just gave a ton of reasons! Throughout this thread! And yes, just as with most claims to our shared criteria, you can, of course, reject my (Kant's) claim (again, not a proposition). You are, however, answerable for that rejection, the lack of depth of it**, the refusal to address the distinctions, the impatience with any standard/terms but your own, etc. Maybe you no longer care, maybe you're attacking the method because you don't want to accept the conclusions, I don't know (maybe I'm not sure I care anymore.) And here is where we may be at the end of the rope with any claim about our shared criteria (as Wittgenstein says), which is the same failure that can happen with an aesthetic claim of the judgement of the beautiful. But this end is our failure more than just the possibility for it in the nature of the judgement of the aesthetic (or the philosophical).

**I'm not sure it makes sense to say I "can't" use whatever it is you're saying; maybe you mean that Kant's argument is not going to convince "anyone" (no one? harsh) of "anything" (wow, none of it?); or maybe you mean necessarily convince, say, everyone--and when is that possible? / if ever a requirement? Ooooohhhh, wait! are we doing science?!

I'm still not sure I entirely follow, as you still have not provided a concrete example.... Is it your view that true beauty has to be based on rationality? — Mijin

Yes, Kant's judgement of the Beautiful is rational, and universal, in a sense. And I wanted to make clear that, according to Kant, any "object" can be an example for the judgement of the Pleasant (a pleasing feeling) or the Good (popular), so we could pick literally any thing. You've chosen a face. As an object it is categorically not a subject for Kant's judgement of the Beautiful--he uses ordinary words as terms, I know, it's annoying; let's call it pretty or attractive to make it easier. You say everyone is hard-wired to "like" symmetric faces, sure, fine. We could say it's the pleasing feeling of it ("oh, pretty!" the brain says), and we could try to call the feeling the "reason" we find it pretty, but, just as one point, is there any space for that reason/feeling to be mine? other than it is my body, or is the "reason" in the face?

Now we can judge a face (or faces) to be attractive ("I like that!"), but my valuing that face over another is my choice, i.e., any rationale would be "my" reasons, not universal, external (objective?) rationale. Even if we all value that face, does popularity lead to rationality? We could all have different reasons, or the exact same (say, the same feeling).

Now Kant's idea of the Beautiful is judged by the criteria of the form not the object, for example, an art form, say, literature. Above I explain and quote Kant's process and basis for the rationality of the Beautiful, but, roughly, I make a universal claim for all of us based on the external criteria of the form, though your assent to that claim is uncertain. Here, imagine literary criticism that rises above what is pleasant or popular to use the criteria of written story to try to get you to accept what I see is correct based on the textual evidence and ways in which stories work.

Again, above I argue against the popular but outdated objective/subjective distinction: is the feeling of the pleasant more, or less "objective" than the use of public criteria to reach agreement that I am right in what I see and say about the aesthetic? But if we will only accept certain, determined, necessary solutions beyond the human voice, then we could call the feeling of pleasure an "objective" judgment of the aesthetic--Oh, pretty! Yay!

Unless you knew people of my grandmother's generation, I don't really care what you think. — Athena

Well, I deeply apologize; I got an email that I thought was you replying to my post, but it was, instead, you replying to someone else's (a little new to this). I thought it was strange, but I made some poor assumptions, and I'm sorry that I offended you. If it helps, my mother lived through the war in England, and my grandmother the century before last.

I have no idea why some people appear to worship Nietzsche. — Athena

As I don't take this as a real desire to learn, I would only say that people who take Nietzsche as proposing "ideas" or social opinions, miss the point (which is to say everyone who has only read snippets of him, or think the "will to power" is a moral theory.) His mission was to show the historical and contextual quality missing from Kantian and deontological morals, along with the additional point I am making about our human condition (I think it important to say, though, that he did not believe we are always living beyond morals; only that they have a life and a limit).

This is not quick judgment... — Athena

Again, my sincere apologies. As a token of peace, I offer that you might (if you can forgive him for basically being a Nazi) find Heidegger's essay “The Question Concerning Technology” interesting. He has a very dark view of the influence of technology, roughly, "enframing" (narrowing) our view of humanity and nature as only a means (echoing Marx).

["[Antony's argument] that we can bypass ['the distinction between the rational and emotional, or (Hume's) moral sense/innate moral judgment'] and still have a personal moral decision bound to reasonable action"] would be highly dependent on our culture, associations, and the books we read. Social animals have what some call a pre-morality. They are wired for group behavior.... we are not born with [cultural/thinking] language, nor are we born knowing the concepts essential to moral thinking and we aren't born knowing the high order thinking skills. Any "personal moral decision bound to reasonable action" is dependant on what we learn and because our circumstances are different, our sense of morality can be different.

This is where the higher-order thinking skills come in. That is the learned ability to reason through our choices and make decisions. ...Morality based on how we feel instead of how we think, leads to power struggles not a high standard of morality. — Athena

I agree that "higher-order thinking skills" embetters us and our society, not only with knowledge of the criteria of our morals, but also our understanding of our obligation to ourselves (and others) to the ethical consideration of a moral moment. I would only say that the idea of "dependent" and "different" does not affect the human condition between (any) morals and when they leave us turned upon ourselves without further guidance. Our "culture" and our "circumstances" and even our "morals" can be different, but the responsibility (among other things) that we have is universal, as you say, "to reason through our choices and make decisions", though I wouldn't call this a "learned ability" so much as a human obligation (categorically, as it were), say, our moral duty.

I would only else say that we are not born with moral/cultural/language, we are born into them. They are there before us and apart from us. We do not (always) "learn" these (as rules, laws), as much as we pick them up in going along and becoming a part of society (an unconscious social contract by osmosis as it were); they are wrapped up in what our society cares about and the way things count in the world (this is Wittgenstein's Grammar and Criteria)--they are not "knowledge" and we don't "agree" on them. But, yes, we can renounce them, be ignorant of them, contradict them, but also, become conscious of them, reform them, extend them (into new contexts), etc. We do not need nor have a "higher standard". It is not a dichotomy between feeling and knowledge--we/the world already have ordinary criteria for morals, etc. The criteria may be forgotten, or unexamined, but that does not mean we don't live by them (are left to our "feelings") or can't explain them if asked (by Socrates, Austin, etc.).

Whoops, responded to a response that was not to my post.

I quibble on the word "epistemology." If you mean methods by which we know, I agree, — tim wood

Method is basically what I am talking about, though I would say that we do gain something. "Knowledge" is a loaded word in ethics, but we do gain insight (even, of ourselves), a larger perspective, and, say, an understanding of the criteria of our concepts and the context we find ourselves in, etc.

I suggest we are always lost and never not lost, anything else is mere illusion propped up by a seeming regularity: we think we know, and for a while win some of our bets, but our knowledge is spurious. — tim wood

Although we might not always know the criteria for something (what is indicative of "walking" is one example Wittgenstein gives"), it might be a little cynical to say we are "always lost". This is only to say though that not everything is a moral moment, the same as to say not every motion is an action, or every action is "intended". We normally go along saying things and doing things, and only when something is fishy (Austin/Cavell say) do we ask "What did you mean?" or "Did you intend to do that?" The things we do and say being, not illusion, but merely not usually conceptually investigated (looking at their criteria and use). And I would claim knowledge is not so much false, as limited--it comes to an end, say, with respect to the separate Other (which I take up in my examination of Wittgenstein's lion quote).

Our duty then to be informed and self-informed as best we can be, reason being our best and only true navigational aid. And it seems to me Kant finds morality in reason, at least as much as with reason. — tim wood

I agree that what I am suggesting is both an examination of the world, and learning about ourself. And also agree that Kant is trying to find morality in and with reason, but my argument here is that his is still an effort to solve the moral problem beforehand. It is also to deny the human contribution (thrown out with the desire to remove emotion, inclination, etc. (the "subjective") from moral decision-making); seeing the partial role of rational rules and criteria is to acknowledge the human standing up for what matters to them (or not), subject to the consequences to their identity, character, answerability, etc.--completing the circle Emerson would say.

And this is precisely what the mariner does, not just in storm but always. He reads his moment, the vibration of the wind in his lines, the colour of the sky, and what experience tells him. His decision then at that moment being always and forever correct, notwithstanding what comes over the horizon at him. — tim wood

You may enjoy Stanley Cavell's essay in "The Quest for the Ordinary", in which he uses The Rime of the Ancient Mariner to investigate the loss caused by the line Kant draws between us and the thing-in-itself.

I do agree that aesthetic rationale applies an internal logic to the form, terms, means and structure in talking about art. But this logic serves to constrain the aesthetic in art, as it does in nature - there remains an aspect that transcends and even dissolves these categories of sculpture, dance, visual art, language or music. I think Kant refers to this as ‘the aesthetic idea’ - in relation to which all concepts, all thoughts and indeed all art, is but a rational approximation. — Possibility

I agree if this is to say not everything about the aesthetic can by captured in critique (or even words), i.e., the Sublime, but I think it's a scapegoat to throw the baby out with the bathwater to say that we are only "approximating" an idea (as it were, that taking the same unknowable place of the "object"--except if you only want to accept a certain type of rationality, logic, or end-place). Also, I'm not sure what "constrain" accomplishes other than to also say it does not meet a particular standard--one which changes nothing about our ability to discuss the aesthetic for everyone to see the public criteria of the form we have pointed out in a universal voice. It is not up to us to assent to the criteria, or an ultimate "idea", only to the critique--only that is subject to agreement.

I agree with all of this - but a rational discussion of art is still not objective. However, it is not ‘rational discussion of art’ that this thread refers to, but aesthetics in general - and it’s about this subtle distinction that I’m continuing to quibble with you. I think that aesthetics could be objective - but any discussion of it can only approach this possibility through uncertainty and a self-conscious capacity to transcend the laws of logic. — Possibility

Well if we have to discuss the hangup with "objectivity"/("subjectivity") we must--I believe Kant starts the death-nell (started by the idea of the metaphysical "object" with Plato) for "objectivity" by shriveling its application to only certain standards (self-contained, impersonal, certain, universal, pre-determined, having moral force, etc.) I get his desire to distinguish out the "subjective", as feeling, inclination, and all the other failings of the particular human; but, in doing so, he entirely removed the human voice and the natural human condition dictated by the limits of knowledge, our separateness from each other (which I discuss in my post about Wittgenstein's lion quote), and the powerlessness of rules/logic/rationality. Modern philosophy (Wittgenstein, Emerson, Heidegger, Nietzsche) puts a nail in the coffin by making the "object", "reality", etc. obsolete, and dialectically filling the object/subject distinction in with our ordinary criteria.

With the judgement of the Beautiful to aesthetics, however, Kant claims the standard of "objectivity" is not even used--we are not discussing the "object" (or the "idea"), we are not applying criteria for its identity or its certainty, universality, its "existence" apart from us. My whole point is that we give up "objectivity" but still have a logical rational discussion--we have everything else except the certainty that we will agree (or force to make us). Who needs the approximation other than to ignore the possibility of the voice of the other to speak for all of us, and to make us responsible for a cogent, rational response--we are answerable to each other; what are we missing?

...one example of what you mean by "sensations of the Pleasant, or the value of the Good".... — Mijin

It's not that there needed to be a reason; just some specificity--which you have now provided. I did suggest reviewing Kant's description of the Pleasant: "As regards the Pleasant every one is content that his judgement, which he bases upon private feeling, and by which he says of an object that it pleases him, should be limited merely to his own person” Sec. 7. As I noted above, this would be that you have a sensation, say, feeling sad or pleased by an object of art, that you may feel without anyone disagreeing.

The Good (taste) is “that which is ESTEEMED [or approved] by him, i.e. that to which he accords an objective worth, is good." Sec. 7. It is the value of the art or of its purpose, assigned by the individual based on their approval of an object, say, one with an exemplar, which others can agree regarding its worth, or interest.

They are both similar categorically, only to say your experience of art (it's pleasantness) may lead to the judgment that it has value (or good). The Pleasant would be the sensation, and the Good would be its popularity. Both are in consideration of the artwork (as an object), and both are attributable in their same manner to any object (a flower, a horse, a painting, etc.).

Of course, my point in beginning my remarks only concerned these concepts in contrast to the disinterested, impersonal, intelligible rationality that the judgement of the Beautiful has.

The ability to discuss anything rationally is not necessarily objective. When we render aesthetics in discussion, reduced to a particular language structure, objectivity often defers to certainty. Still, rational is not always logical. I don’t believe the possibility of failure makes discussion hopeless, only uncertain. — Possibility

I concede that aesthetic rationality is not "objective" (another post I think to argue that standard is based on Kant's desire to empower some judgment to be, say, irrefutable, but not based on a "real" "universal" object; however, I don't need agreement on either of those contentions to make my point here.

And I do allow for uncertainty, but only in the sense that it is uncertain that you will see what I see. I do claim that aesthetic rationale has a logic to it, though not a logic that ensures agreement or certainty in conclusions (not the logic you may want). This is an internal logic to the form of the art, the terms and means and structure--what makes a difference in sculpture compared to dance. Wittgenstein and Emerson inherit Kant but make every concept (here every form of art) categorical; each with its own class and criteria.

When we allow for this uncertainty - acknowledging purposiveness without agreeing on a stated end or purpose, or exemplary beauty/sublimity without agreeing on what is correct about its relation to form - the discussion itself allows for a relation between perspectives to approach objectivity in meaning beyond inter-subjective significance. This aspect of the discussion is irreducible, however. — Possibility

And I allow that we might not agree (on the end of purposiveness--though I'd want to re-read my Kant--or exemplariness of the art form) but the "uncertainty" of agreement here is not corrosive to the possibility of agreement (or even just "approaching" agreement), it does not make the discussion of art irrational or illogical. We do not "agree" on the terms and forms of art (though we may disagree about one criteria's "significance" over another in a certain work). Our "perspective" is not something personal (the art's "significance" to us) so much as seeing the art, for example, thoroughly, within the history of its form, taking in all available evidence, etc. It's not what matters to me, it's what matters in, say, making that art--what is meaningful to the art form. I'm not sure this reduces anything so much as broadens our stifled philosophical terms and conditions.

I don't understand any of that.
Can you give an example of the distinction(s)? — Mijin

I'm not quite sure it's unfair (or even rude) to say you're going to have to try harder. First, you say that you "don't understand any of that", which is grammatically referred to as a "naked this". What is the referent? Everything? The Pleasant and the Good? And so I'm not sure as well the distinction(s) to which you are referring? Also, do you mean you would like a scenario which better explains the distinction(s)? Or examples of (maybe?) judgments of each type? It might help to read my last threeposts, the first with quotes from Kant.

Following Kant (and subject to correction on the details), the argument here is that freedom is exactly freedom to do one's duty, and nothing else. * * * Duty, for the moment, is just what reason tells us ought to done.... But the purpose here is to draw attention to people who claim as a matter of right under freedom to do what they want... And I think the logic of the thing compels agreement. Yes? — tim wood

A very important discussion currently, so thank you for the post. What sparked my curiosity was the idea of duty and whether there is any compulsion. First, there is the distinction between the rational and emotional, or (Hume's) moral sense/innate moral judgment. I would argue that we can bypass this and still have a personal moral decision bound to reasonable action.

Starting with the idea that duty is "what reason tells us ought to [be] done", I would point out that this frames our moral decisions as occurring beforehand; rationally coming to a morality--a defined moral standard (in Kant's case), or theory, or the setting of what is a moral/immoral act (through authority, agreement, or other process, etc.--"regularity" Kant says). Morality and the "ought" have their place, but, like much of the moral, they have no force (apart from moralism, punishment, shame, etc.). I can make a case for what you ought to do (like Kant), and even have reasons that make sense (including internal coherency, categories or levels or rationality, etc.), but that does not ensure anyone will do what they ought to (see, e.g., Dostoyevsky). The same applies to the Good, though I believe teleology makes sense in relation to an object, say, in bettering our institutions.

Instead, imagine a case after our morality (beyond Good and Evil, as Nietzsche says)--a moral moment. As Cavell would say, when we do not know what to do; we are at a loss despite our deontological rules. Part of the picture here is that we are standing in the present, with a current context. And by this I do not mean a pre-determined context as in some thought-puzzle; a context that is as full and deep as the entire world, and that includes not only physical circumstances, but also our morality, all the distinctions we make and could make, and, most importantly, us as an unfinished work. One of Emerson, Wittgenstein, and Nietzsche's important contributions is that our action defines us; we are not here good/bad, right/wrong, but lazy, selfish, courageous, etc. Wittgenstein talks about "continuing a series" and taking an "attitude". Our action reflects on us; so consequences matter, but when we come to the end of a rule, who we are is at stake. Sometimes even, as Nietzsche and Thoreau point out, the "immoral" act is the necessary act.

So whatever moral "force" there is, it is not (only) immorality, punishment, or wrong/bad, but our responsibility (to ourselves, our words, our actions), our integrity--not so much our reputation, as our character--our moral identity, in a sense. People, obviously, sometimes don't care about these things (nor do they have to), but they are nevertheless subject to this human condition in the moral realm. As I have said in my post on Witt's lion quote--when we come to the end of knowledge of the Other's pain, we either accept or reject them (their moral claim on us). He says, "My attitude towards [them] is an attitude towards a soul. I am not of the 'opinion' that [they have] a soul." p. 178. We don't have knowledge that they have a soul, we treat them as if they do (or not), but the point being that we are in the mix here, our human frailty and possibility.

Now if our course of action is not defined (by, say, rules) ahead of time, nor by others (entirely); if we are lost and our character is on the line, what is our duty? If we can not rely on rationality to tell us what to do (should do)--say, definitively, certainly, "objectively", as it were, without our "person" being involved (though not emotionally/"subjectively")--are there criteria for determining our duty in that moment? Now here, all the moral philosophers I have read spend most of their effort pushing against simple morality/moralism (Wittgenstein, Nietzsche, Cavell, Emerson) so, what came to me first, actually, was the Bhagavad-Gita. Not that I agree with the answers themselves, nor feel that ours is a theological argument, but the situation and the type of discussion is an example of the type of grounds/criteria for a "reasonable" determination of our duty.

The case is that Arunja is going to war against his own family, and he is filled with doubt, pity, grief, etc., and turns to his "charioteer" Krishna for advice (imagine he is talking to himself). Krishna does not make a case for war (say, a "just" war), nor does he rely on how one should treat others--it is not a discussion of ends nor means. As part of the discussion, Arjuna keeps asking how he will know what to do, and Krishna is left with only being able to show Arjuna "his totality"--here again imagine Krishna is Arjuna's own voice to himself--to which Aruna says "You [I, as it were] alone fill the space" (20). It is similar to how Job's questioning is finally left only with the vision of the Leviathan--turning him back on himself to provide the answer.

Arjuna asks what defines a person whose insight is sure (54). They discuss discipline, detachment from emotions and goals, necessity, what differentiates an act from a motion, the need to ask questions, reflection, and the partial nature of our world's concepts and outcomes (only made whole by our action). Krishna advises "knowing the field", which is a way of saying the lay-of-the-land, which I take as making explicit the criteria of the (then-present) situation as well as of our concepts of action, courage, selfishness, flippancy, thoughtfulness, being reasonable, etc. These are criteria for defining a person in light of their actions. I submit that our duty is found in this space and the context and the ways our character/"humanity" is judged, not as right or wrong or good and bad, but nevertheless as rational (reasonable), rigorous, careful, detailed--as if our approach to a moral moment required an ethical epistemology.

Are we bound to our duty? In this sense we are; we are bound to our act. In these ways we are more responsible than just to rules/laws; we are, in a sense, created by our actions and finished as well (to a particular conception of ourselves). (The fact that here there are excuses and mitigation--such as lack of freedom to do what we decide is our duty--aides the point.) I believe these are not traditional philosophical rationale, but ordinary, everyday criteria. The "logic of the thing [that] compels agreement" is that we are disappointed by people, we no longer trust them, we believe they are fools, braggarts, cowards, etc.; that they made their choice in a moral moment thoughtlessly, hastily, self-servingly, recklessly, on a whim, etc. Do they care? Maybe not. Nonetheless, it can be true.

Well, I understand the part about the sublime delight in art's transcendence, but the Sublime does not negate the Beautiful. The Beautiful is still a rational discussion of claims to (for) everyone about what is correct/felicitous ("right") about an art's relation to its art form.

Universal validity/communicability is not objectivity. — Possibility

So if we agree on the first part, how is it "not objective"? I (and Kant) have already granted that it does not have an "object"--which I take in Kantian terms to mean there is no absolute, certain, pre-determined "right"--but does not having a final fixed point obviscate our ability to rationally discuss art? Maybe if we let go of the "objective"/"subjective" dichotomy, we can allow ourselves the grey areas (Witt. post-Tractatus). In other words, does the possibility of failure make discussion impossible/hopeless?

An objective object can clearly invoke subjective experiences however it is difficult to see how there could be anything beyond this to make a subject experience 'right or 'wrong' with reference to an objective value. I don't think it is possible to make an argument for why something is beautiful other than merely describing the object, feeling beauty needs first hand experience. — Tom1352

Yes, an art "object" can invoke "subjective [first-hand] experiences." Categorically, this is what Kant calls, the Pleasant--an experience that it is nice (say when you look at it), or whatever personal "feelings" you have . And Kant also allows that an art "object" can have good/bad "value" for us (@Tom1352)(although, again, "object-ive" is not a possibility there either). These two categories of the possibility of art do not wipe out the third means of addressing art, which is called the Beautiful (don't get caught up in the ordinary words--focus on the distinctions). It is not the "experience" of right or wrong, it is the rational discussion that is right/wrong (this is a rational category; not the kind of fixed Right!/Wrong! you may be thinking of); this is not in reference to the object, or its "objective" or "subjective" value. The thing to focus on is the form of the art--the way in which a story is told (think Northrup Frye's Modes and Genres); or the possibilities of the camera, the method, processes, framing, etc. in photography. These are the tools that a critic rationally uses to get us to try to see his insight into a work of art. For example, Cavell claims that the "modern" is now the discussion of the form through the work of art. The rest follows from my arguments above.

Speaking from a more neuroscientific point of view, there are of course aesthetic qualities to things for the vast majority of people. * * * And while it's fashionable to try to define standards of human beauty as arbitrary cultural creations... The more specific we get, the more subjective it gets though. — Mijin

We are bumping up against the limits of neuroscience (and sociology) here; and there is a categorical confusion here. What we can say about art through science refers either to the sensations of the Pleasant, or the value of the Good (popularity--@TheMadFool @Bitter Crank). What I am discussing is not a standard to judge the object, it is the ways a type of art has as its means. This is not a standard or "cultural creation" (as opposed to some "thing" created outside of culture?). And the more "specific" the claim gets, usually the better its argument--the more evidence it incorporates, the deeper the insight, etc. The Weltanschauung Wittgenstein would say, the comprehensive view. Of course, you may mean the more specific as the more personal (merely pleasant or good), and I would agree, but let's not mash everything together.

I think you might be thinking of the pleasant, not the beautiful. The "concept" of beauty is not determined (not an "object" in Kant's terms), and it is disinterested: not related to any individual "experience".

“Consequently the judgement [of the beautiful]... must claim validity for every one, without this universality depending on Objects. That is, there must be bound up with it a title to subjective universality” Sec. 6.

Compared to the pleasant: “As regards the Pleasant every one is content that his judgement, which he bases upon private feeling, and by which he says of an object that it pleases him, should be limited merely to his own person” Sec. 7.

I hope my (Kant's) point is clear about the nature of the claim here. “[ B ]ut if he gives out anything as beautiful, he supposes in others the same satisfaction—he judges not merely for himself, but for every one... which can make a rightful claim upon every one’s assent. ...the beautiful undertakes or lays claim to [the universal].” Id.

As to the criteria of our art forms: “It is not what gratifies in sensation but what pleases by means of its form... [that] is... the only [element] of these representations which admits with certainty of universal communicability” Sec. 10.

I would agree with @Thorongil that Kant's description of our judgment of what he terms the Beautiful allows for rational discussion (apart from just personal feelings or value judgments, etc.). Although we are not assured of aesthetic agreement (not just agreement in taste or value), we do have internal criteria (to the art) for what constitutes a beautiful painting or a movie that is well-made, etc.

But the value of this aesthetic, the identity of the aesthetic, depends upon the individual. — darthbarracuda

There is judgment just based on personal taste, but its existence does not negate the possibility of a different category of aesthetic discussion and agreement (you are entitled to "your" "opinion", but there is also the possibility of "informed judgment").

Part of the structure of an aesthetic claim to Beauty according to Kant (and drawn out by Cavell in "Aesthetic Problems in Modern Philosophy") is that I am making such a claim in a universal voice. I am making a claim (with rationale) on behalf of everyone for others to accept or discuss even though the outcome is not predetermined to be an absolute, certain conclusion (this is not an "objective" object, to the extent there are any). The art critic does not have better knowledge of the art, so much as a deeper perspective--their goal is to get you to see what they see (as @Moliere points out).

And I would tweak @Bitter Crank and @TheMadFool's emphasis on popular criteria (or "agreement"), to aspire to judgment based on the terms of that art (photography, modern dance, etc.--each having its own). A disagreement that regresses to simply unsubstantiated agreement (or personal taste) ignores the rational structure and evidence in art (as @Hanover points out).

It invokes a feeling of sadness to me, and a feeling of hope to you, which are subjective experiences that cannot be right or wrong. — darthbarracuda

We are also not making a judgment of value (as it were, that the critic has better taste; simply the authority to label a work "good" or "bad"). If there is an insightful critique, would we say it was "good" or "bad" (see @Moliere above) or are we more likely to say the critic is, in a sense, "right" or "wrong"? (Of course, these are different senses of the terms than someone solving a math equation.) In other words, if we say they are wrong, we can, for instance, discuss in what way they are not justified based on the entire context of the evidence in the work within the forms and terms and methods for that art, i.e., rationally.

This is the kind of claim that Wittgenstein is making when he describes the Grammar (criteria) for our ordinary use of concepts (each one, their own). He is postulating something which may be disputed based on the contextual evidence or a misunderstanding of the importance of, and what counts for, a concept (its criteria). The open-ended nature of aesthetic discussion leave some to dismiss it as "subjective" or irrational or emotional, but this may only be the desire for a standard of universal, absolute rationality (or to deny any rationality to art, actions, morality, etc.).

We see more and more that science, mainly physics, has strayed into the realm of philosophy and thought experiments. Seeing this what is your opinion on the subject? Do you believe science has become no longer the study of the world as it is, but as it may be? or do you see science as simply the persuit of knowledge no matter the form? — CallMeDirac

Straying a little from this OP, and given we do have philosophy of science (Kuhn, etc.), there has been a slow chipping away of the subjects of philosophy by science, though I don't begrudge science taking its place, nor believe that philosophy does not benefit from the lessons of science and that philosohy must be accountable to scientific advances.

However, the feeling of satisfaction with the method of science to provide certainty, predictability, universality, necessity, etc. has lead to an expectation that everything should meet that standard. Beginning with the Renaissance with Descartes and Kant dividing us from the "world", we've tried to sew that seeming distance back together with true knowledge, even logically necessary rationality. It reached a peak with the positivism of Comte, Carnap, Popper, and recently, even Stephen Hawking--the idea that only true/false empirically or logically-verifiable statements offer real knowledge of the world (the descriptive fallacy). This leads this scientific outlook (or its corrupted philosophical cousins) the feeling it can (and has more authority to) speak to the original and remaining purview of philosophy--aesthetics, morality, how to lead a better life, the investigation of our unreflected concepts, etc.

Even after Nietzsche, Emerson, Wittgenstein, Austin, Cavell, we still believe that science is the standard, and knowledge/theory the solution for the answer we demand. Despite its inability to teach us what we want to know about our moral realm, the problem of the Other, our skeptical doubt, etc., we still desire an answer of its certain form, thus its criteria for a valid solution are set in our cultural unconscious before even beginning to look. We want DNA and have forgotten how to (or fear to) assess the credibility of a witness and convict on circumstantial evidence. We follow the same desire to remove our responsibility in the face of the limitations of knowledge and the need for judgment, or assertion of ourselves, our acceptance of the other. This is science's belief its success allows its knowledge and standard to address our problems, "no matter the form".

There's a story of how Raven released the People from a cockle shell, stole the light, and brought it out to light up the world (the trickster?); another story of the beginning of our frailty, tied to our knowledge of the world; another story of a cave with a light that creates a new world, if only we could turn from our shadow.

These are origin stories. Theology? The genesis of everything? or (and?) Philosophy? (conducted through literature?** ) our (re-)birth, our birth to ourselves, the beginning of a journey, where everything is clearer, say, seen in a different light?

**Other stories: Hobbes' state of nature; Rousseau's first land fenced from that nature; Hume's creation story of creation stories (causality)...

real - not imaginary
real - not painted
real - not virtual
real - not made-up
real - not a hallucination
real - not a semblance — unenlightened

Is it a real painting, or a reproduction? Is it a real coin, or a counterfeit? Is it a real lake, or a mirage? Is it real magic, or prestidigitation? — Banno

how did we even come up with the concept of "real?" — TiredThinker

I see that @unenlightened and@Banno have already made the observations I would have based on Ordinary Language Philosophy (Austin, Wiggenstein, etc.) of the ordinary uses we have for the concept of "real", but the question remains of why did we come up with the philosophical (abstract) idea of "real"?

Now my history of philosophy is patchwork, but I offer that the common thread is the same desire that is behind "existence" or "consciousness": philosophy "came up" with its own picture of the world and its criteria for deciding what was real (thanks Plato) because of the problems created by our disappointments with our ordinary ways of judgment and certainty (such as in each case above). "We can't tell if they are lying to us? but we must know their pain? they could be a robot!" "I see tons of chairs; what is the 'meaning' of 'chair'? I don't see all of it! maybe what I see is not the 'true' chair?!" So, yes, our (philosophy's) imagination ran away with us to create, as one example, a quality opposed to the "appearance" of the world, and then that open question became an independent desire for a world/quality to be a foundation to our world --"reality".

I would only say that the skeptic's concerns about the world do reveal some truths about us: we are not ultimately in a position of knowledge toward each other. Our ideas of the structure of our world can not ensure, nor account for the failures of, communication. Philosophy's fear of the world, and desire for a solution to doubt, are not limited to philosophers alone: it is the human condition to want to reach past our partial, failing, contingent role in the world to something "real" that does not rely on us.

The self ‘is’ an expression, which is why [Heidegger] puts discourse as equiprimoridal [existing together as equally fundamental] with attunement and understanding. — Joshs

I agree here (though still not sure where this Heidegger is from--I assume Being and Time), though I don't see why our ordinary means aren't sufficient here. Our identity, as it were, our character, our individuality, our aversion to conformity Emerson would say, is not given, but claimed, by our voicing, our expression (including actions). Emerson removes the "therefore" and simply says " 'I think', 'I am' " as emphatic assertions, as it were: standing up for what matters to us, being responsible for the public language we say. To use your Heidegger--the self is an expression; it does not exist, it is expressed. As it is, we may not exist; we carve ourselves out, or not (aligning with others, along party lines, against our mother, etc.). Being and thinking are not ever-present states of the human condition--only possibilities.

And I agree with the post-metaphysical position you assume is necessary to any modern philosophy. I would only hope that you might see that the desire to have the relationship to the Other as constant, ensured, and/or pre-existent, and thus not subject to rejection/termination, is born of the same desire for the private, hidden self or subject--that these theoretical machinations are born of the same fear of our fragile, ephemeral (or lack of any) connection to the Other and of our personal burden to our voice and to answer the claim on us of the Other. This is not subject-object; it is two individual people left with the failure of knowledge to connect them.

Or perhaps you are thinking of something as easy as the context that precedes and allows for the possibilities of our concepts, communication.

...what makes things 'matter'[?] ...desire or need to do anything other than 'live'.... the ability to want things is what now drives our lives and allows us to want to do more than just survive. It means we have our own goals and desires to fulfill in life.... Without them, none of this would matter. — existentialcrisis

To return to the topic at hand, although I balked at the phrasing of "emotions" or "feelings" initially, I do agree that what makes us human is our interest, our attraction, our desires, our needs--as you say, what matters to us. Without that, not only would we just be surviving (which I would argue some only do), but those interests are the framework of all the criteria which shape our concepts. Unfortunately, philosophy has been neurotic about allowing our human expressions of these interests (or disinterest) to be what comprises us, without its theoretical nets.

The self is already a sequentially sel-transforming community. There is never a self-identical’I’ to return back to from moment to moment , because the very sense of this ‘I’ has been subtly changed by its being in the world. As Heidegger says, the self is a ‘between’ , not a private space. — Joshs

Your summation of Wittgenstein reverses his objective: he is trying to do away with the "private", the "self" (not to say, the personal). Yes, we are "sealed off from... the other" except through language/action (we could say we are even sealed off from ourselves (our subconcious) in the same way); this is not solipsism (there is nothing kept in reserve--our makeup is, as it were, entirely public), but rather a fact of our human condition. The Other just is separate--it is our responsibility to bridge that gap through expression and understanding (where does Heidegger conflict with this?); there is no more certain, theoretical explanation or solution for our situation--no "more intimate site", and, more importantly why do we feel the need for there to be?

Must we insist that explaining consciousness at a mechanistic level [is] any easier than explaining the subjective first-person experience aspects of consciousness? — Wheatley

In reviewing all the other responses, I don't believe this will be very popular, but perhaps, after Kant and after Wittgenstein, we can let go of the need for the "subjective" or "consciousness" or "experience". The personal, secret, suppressed, etc., occupy the same place in our world and language, except one. Philosophy has never been able to do without an internal, unique, special quality for me (e.g., my "thoughts", my "being", my "existence"), say, among other goals, to fulfill the desire to be unknowable or to have my expressions fixed to something certain or controllable ("intention" "meaning" "perception").

All conscious experience is meaningful to the creature having the experience. Consciousness is the ability to attribute meaning. — creativesoul

All(?) "conscious experience" is meaningful? We are unavoidably pierced through with "our experience"? constantly bombarded with meaning? How can we differentiate from the mundane, unmeaningful? Perhaps this is just to hold the keys to the castle--we have "meaning" and then we "attribute" it. That picture certainly makes it easy to ensure meaning, or wiggle out, or avoid our answerability to others for our expressions. Perhaps it is sufficient that something is meaningful enough to us that we say something, take a stand, disagree, etc.--and in this sense: be, exist--and simply leave it that our language (along with the world) works apart from (and before) any need for some hidden, private, mental process. Perhaps we are simply not as special as we would like to imagine.

Well this is a refreshing attitude I must say. And, as well, I propose, not without philosophical relevance. (I take some liberty in the exact wording of the quotes, but I believe the spirit is the same.)

By demanding and pursuing some perfect and excellent way of understanding the world, we really do nothing but discourage [participation from our friends in the talk of] truth, justice, and all of those things [that really matter]. — Garth

What jumped out at me is the "demanding" a "perfect" "understanding [of] the world". Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Nietzsche (among others) all warn that the desire for certainty, universality, predetermination, predictability, pre-judgement, etc., occludes our ability to see the meaningfulness of our ordinary, differing criteria for the varying concepts we have in the contexts in which, and when, they are expressed. The harder we squeeze the less we grasp, Emerson and Heidegger say. Witt would say we sublime (universalize) our language's logic, strip from its context and ordinary criteria, beginning with the example that we might think all language works as naming--a word for an object. PI #38. A logic that "seeks to see to the bottom of things" and not "concern itself whether what actually happens is this or that." #89. To purify (#94) communication is, as @Garth says, to "discourage" the "participation" by humans--fallible, partial, unsure, etc.--in their friendship.

...demanding excellence from one another constantly, we do nothing but destroy the possibility of [the] genuine and authentic [and of] fun. — Garth

J.L. Austin decried the "profundity" of philosophy--for him, the desire for the descriptive fallacy--the difference between fervent ideological belief/theory and a real investigation of our concepts (which is quite fun in his case). Also, an important part of Emerson's work is its constant optimism (in the face of conformity and skepticism). Wittgenstein's interlocutor in the Philosophical Investigations is very adamant and certain--and Witt is constantly leaving them flustered with almost a mocking enigmatic humor. Nietzsche also found joy, courage, and a sense of humor was necessary for philosophy; even to title a book The Gay Science. This is not a trivial, tangential topic--the more certain and strict and strident we are, the less we see of the awe and fullness and fun of the world.

I would say though that, having let go of only being satisfied with a perfect solution, we are still (then) able to perfect our existing human world. Foregoing righteous justice, we can strive for a more just "good-enough" justice (from Stanley Cavell's discussion of Rawls). A new yet unapproachable America, Emerson says.

Quoting John Shotter: "...different directions their new inquiries would take [would show up], “in ‘frontier’ thinking – where the direction of new inquiry has regularly to be redetermined” — Joshs

This extrapolation of the evolution of our scientific paradigms is somewhat analogous to the extension/adaptation/change that does happen with our concepts (Witt discusses it as "continuing a series"). But how this works with scientific theories is different than in the moral realm or with modern art or political discourse, etc. In science, we may put facts together under a different paradigm, but we do not have facts in the other instances (though we might wish to have the "fact" of the certainty of our own "experience", etc.), and we are not changing a paradigm or theory; our words and our lives are tied together, though we are not always able to work out our differences--understanding is not ensured.

is it better to recognize that perceptions in general appear against a bodily interactive field? — Joshs

But here we do have a "verification color"--the swatch in the paint store (not a metaphysical "color"). We do not "misunderstand" each other about a color, we disagree in particular, intelligible, resolvable ways. If we agree, they are the same color (we do not each have our own and simply agree that they are the same). These distinctions and pathways are part of how the concept of color works. But the generalization of color schema for the meaningfulness of everything is to run roughshod over all the different ways concepts work (there is no universal theory of "meaning"). Our identification and description of color is different than that for objects or headaches, etc. (Stanley Cavell, in "Knowing and Acknowledging" from Must We Mean What We Say does a good job of investigating the ways in which we talk about color, pain, etc. regarding knowledge of other minds.)

The implication of a private "perception" (thought, intention, meaning) is to wish to hang on to our own experience (apart from that answerable to others)--they are not "language"; language is for expression (even to myself). As I explain in my other post on Witt's lion quote, his observation is that the desire for certainty, universality, predictability, and something private or hidden, is so that, among other things, I must know myself and can never really know the other. If I say something, I always have something extra to hold back:"my experience", so that I can avoid the responsibility I have to what I express.

That is, perhaps the notion that there is such a thing as an unchanging word use is an derived abstraction, rather than the true case. Husserl pointed out that objectivity is the result of intersubjective correlations. We convince ourselves that what is in fact only similar from one person to the next in our understanding of social conventions like words is identical. — Joshs

And here, in order to hold onto the idea of an internal, private something, we fold ourselves over with theoretical explanations, rather than looking to see how a concept is used (this is not "an unchanging word use"), in an expressive event (not all expression) in an ordinary (temporal, situational) context.

How should a psychotherapist proceed in understanding what their client means in their use of word concepts if not by attempting to discover the idiosyncratic ways in which such concepts are interrelated with a personal system of meanings for that client? — Joshs

My understanding, limited as it is, is that therapy is to bring the client to terms with the ordinary repercussions of their idea of themselves, and with the regular reactions one might have to their trauma, in contrast to the "personal system of meanings" created by their denial and avoidance. So, basically, exactly the opposite of finding "them"--dragging them into the public world.

We then [when we have differences] say they distorted , misread, misinterpreted the ‘true’ meaning of the concepts because we assumed that ...how did you put it?... “ they are not "changing" anything about the workings of that concept.” — Joshs

A. Saying there is a "'true' meaning of [a] concept" is to miss my point entirely that there is no "meaning"--there are ways that a concept is meaningful to us, and these are exactly the different criteria that frame its functioning. Also, "true" (and false) is not how most concepts (other than, e.g., true/false statements) work--you wouldn't say an apology was false, other than to say it was disingenuous.

C. People do not normally (have to) examine the workings of a concept in order to use it correctly or know when someone else is not. We grew up in a world where you must say "I do" in order to get married, that you must acknowledge some wrong in order to apologize correctly, that there is usually something fishy when you ask what someone intended, what the difference is between a game and just playing, etc. These, by the way, are the tools of Ordinary Language Philosophy (like Wittgenstein)--that there are ordinary uses for our concepts and that they work in different, semi-rational (not certain but intelligible, discussable) ways.

B. Though speaking of "semi" rational, you are now using political discourse as an example, which we can say anything about--no amount of my pointing out something isn't fair (part of how fairness is measured) may help. Though this is not to say that it is impossible to have a meaningful, productive conversation about politics--the existence of its failure does not negate its possibility. We are responsible for our denial of the other and our acceptance of our disappointments in our refusal to continue the conversation of justice. Calamitizing based on our failure in, say, the moral realm, is the skeptic's resort to throw up their hands about every concept and desire to, say, internalize something (for me), or otherwise find some solution to maintain the idea of a nevertheless workable world outside of our responsibility for/to it. I would point out that it is exactly the creation of a private world that allows someone to claim "that's not (you don't know) what I meant!" or otherwise renege on their bond for their expressions. Austin points out that it is the saying of "I do" that is crucial in marrying someone, not the idea of an internal experience of "meaning it" (apart from just a normal lie)--reserving a private experience is, among other things, the desire for a world apart from our failings.

Can two people, sharing the ‘same’ context of use, still end up with slightly different sense of meaning of a word? — Joshs

Reading this from the perspective and terminology of Wittgenstein: There is a context, but it is not a fixed thing, nor "shared", nor the "same". The purpose of a context is an endless, if necessary, event of distinctions, if we need to understand in what sense a concept is/was used (by someone). Let's try to let go off equating/connecting "meaning" with words (language), and broaden the idea of a "word" to Witt's term "concept", so, "Can two people... end up with slightly different sense of a word [concept]?" Yes, misunderstandings happen all the time; see the different senses of just the expression "The sky is blue" above, or "knowledge": of a fact, of a skill, acknowledging the other, etc.

Does not a single individual, alone, in using the ‘same’ word over and over, end up slightly changing the sense of meaning of that word ever so slightly from day to day? — Joshs

No. The individual (feelings, intention, cause) does not change the senses of words. They may use a word (concept) in its different senses, but they are not "changing" anything about the workings of that concept. That's not to say there is not the possibility of the extension of a concept, particularly into a new context, that does change/add/diminish/invigorate/cheapen our concepts, but this is as much to change our lives/culture as our words, so not "immediate" nor "intimate" and without the idea of an "identically ‘shared’ discursive meaning" (though it can be said that an individual can change our lives/culture).

if you believe it makes any sense to talk about a world independent of out construals of it — Joshs

This is a misunderstanding. When I said "facts do exist apart from us", I meant: apart from us personally--our feelings about them--not, as apart from humans in (or in relation to) a metaphysical "world" or "reality". Though my point that facts are based in method doesn't mean that we can't have an opinion about how the science was done, or also about the paradigm they are a part of--but the rationality of that discussion is its own matter (as Kuhn, etc. discuss).

In briefly reviewing the essay: I do like the idea of an "event", which brings in the context Witt focuses on as well as Nietzsche's sense of the historicity of our concepts; I believe I studied someone French in the '90s--DeLeuze? And I'll grant there is change and extension in the sense of our concepts as well (over time; or in the moment, along certain possibilities), but I still think there is a confusion here between the personal and the public in terms of control, "intention", "meaning", etc. The explanation seems tied in knots to hang on to the idea of something unique and ever-present and "affected" to/by us, compared to Witt's (and Emerson's, and Austin's) idea that we mostly don't (and don't need to) assert ourselves into our expressions--not everything is an "event". In response to "cognitive and affective processes ...to situate or attune the context of our conceptual dealings with the world." I would say we usually only situate ourselves and examine the context of the concepts we use ("our conceptual dealings") in order to clarify (afterwards) the sense of an expression to another. "The sky is blue." "Do you mean: we should go surfing? It's not going to rain? or are you just remarking on the brilliant color?" All these concerns of course may not need investigating (either to the Other or myself) based on the context.

quote="TheMadFool;483467"]The mystery in all this is whether the distinction subjective and objective significance is real or just a figment of my imagination?[/quote]

As I said differently above, Witt would say that the way a concept matters (its importance, significance)--publically as it were, not to us personally--is baked into the criteria of what counts for us in sorting out all its distinctions in different contexts from our lives and living: for identity, performance, judgment, consequences, etc.. Our personal feelings do not change that (say, each time). We may feel a particular way, and so say something based on that (or without thinking), but that does not change the concept and the senses in which it is used in contexts, or the way those are discussed (their/our rational).

Yes, but this statement must be thought by someone. It doesn’t rest in some eternal space of fact. When it is thought, it is thought with certain aims and purposes in mind, and arises within a certain context. There is always a reason why it should occur to someone at a certain point in time that a watch needs a battery to run , and that reason pertains to their concerns at that point in time. — Joshs

Part of this confusion ("must" 'always") is the idea that everything that is said is connected to a thought (or feeling) or to some intention. Our reasons for saying something most of the time are only developed afterwards when we are asked why we said (or did) something outside the ordinary course of a concept within a certain situation (see J.L. Austin). If I say "A watch needs a battery to run", that is strange enough to elicit such responses as "Don't you know there are spring-powered watches?" or an explanation such as "What I mean is that everyone needs energy to stay productive, so take care of yourself." Someone is responsible for a statement--it is not connected to an internal (hidden) cause (this is not to say that people do sometimes consciously try (intend) to say something particular--controversial, deliberate, etc.). And, though I don't think this is the place for this discussion, facts do exist apart from us. That is the allure of them--that the methods of science remove our responsibility for them.

The particular felt significance the fact has to them cannot be separated from the fact itself. — Joshs

Again, saying the significance of a fact is "felt" by us reduces our relationship to facts to a private, non-rational, personal connection. It may be true that we feel a certain way about a fact, but hardly always, and never necessarily. Most times we simply accept the larger paradigm that gives the fact significance in a scientific theory--doubting a fact/theory is not a feeling; it's a claim.

The way a word concept matters to us not only colors but co-defines the very sense of the word. Wittgenstein shows how the use of a word in activity with others determines its meaning. That implies affective as well as ‘rational’ sense. — Joshs

This is so close I would only clarify that "us" is not "me". The way a concept matters is baked into the (most times unspoken) criteria people have developed through the ways we live for identity, performance, judgment, consequences, etc., for that concept. Our feelings do not change that, though our actions might (including claiming only a personal connection to language). Wittgenstein uses these criteria to show that our concepts are flexible and intelligible in different particular senses, but there is not a "meaning" that is determined by (connected to) "use" so much as if we look at the use of a concept in a certain (present) context we can see the particular sense of that concept there (see my post on Witt's "use" of his lion quote). Again, if that is not assumed, accepted without concern, we must turn to the Other and asks them to explain what (external) sense they were using.

Do you make a distinction between feeling and emotion? — Joshs

I'm not sure it matters here. If we say that emotions are like hunger, anger, love, etc. and that "feelings" are our emotions about situations, statements, opinions, etc., we are still removing things that matter to us like, interest, need, fairness, right/wrong.

Feeling is another way of talking about the way something appears to me — Joshs

I would say if you have an opinion about a situation, it muddles the discussion to say that is "the way something appears to me" as that gives the impression that this is something internal to only you, that you hold that opinion beyond our public language and the distinctive forms of our concepts. Adding that "feeling" is another way of talking about what is basically solipsism only makes the matter worse, as then it is reduced to an unintelligible position with the assumption that it is as valid as a rational discussion. You can of course feel however you want and claim that your point of view need not have any justification other than it is yours, but that narrows the grounds for agreement and isolates you to taking a stand without any responsibility to others by simply maintaining something private, i.e., its a copout.

any concept is understood from someone’s point of view. — Joshs

Concepts (action, knowledge, an apology, etc.) are public and so understanding is not from a "point of view" so much as, say, two people getting clear about a particular context and the sense in which a concept is being used; of course we can have a position on that ("That wasn't the act of firing the pistol, it was a mistake.") but our position ("feelings" if you like) does not dictate the grounds of that discussion.

Awareness always implies a ‘mineness’ to experience. — Joshs

Saying "experience" is mine implies that it is not also others as well. Granted, you are you, in the sense of being separate, but to say your experience is different than any others' is to claim a ground where you can not be reached or that you speak uniquely by the shear fact that you claim an (imagined) quality for your self. Now this is not to say that "awareness" is not different than being unaware, say, of the implications and consequences of what you do and say, and that you can't deliberately decide what expressions you commit yourself to, or to consciously enter into a contract with society regarding justice, etc. But our being aware does not imply (ever) that the experience is yours, only that the choice (or not) and the responsibility for the consequences are yours to make and suffer.

Is duty an emotion? Is fairness a feeling? I might agree that part of what is important to us, what matters, is "what we want to do and what we don't". But to limit what interests us to emotions is to cheapen our motivations and remove our reasoning altogether.

Having the ability to feel sad or happy about something allows us to view things as good or bad depending on the way it makes us feel. — existentialcrisis

Even as an intuitive theory of moral guidance in judging good and bad, "the way it makes us feel" seems arbitrary and, I want to say, left to a state of nature. In any event, even if we do have moments where we are left without guidance, most of our actions are simply following rules and standards ordinarily unquestioned--beyond that, our actions morally define us. What would it look like to have an emotional state always deciding what is good or bad? If you are angry and hate something, does that automatically make it bad? For everyone?

If you are beating your wife and she kills herself, you are responsible; but not morally responsible; you're just a &!$! who beats women and who everyone is going to blame for the death even though you may not be legally culpable. There's already all the tools in place in society to say, e.g., "responsible" is, say, subject to the consequences. And there are many different kinds of consequences; no friends, lose your job, fall into alcoholism by guilt and blow your own brains out. It is not a moral problem--if you are abusing someone, you take the results of those actions. To ask when we are morally responsible is to be in a situation where we do not know already what the consequences are. What matters in this situation. Then you are in charge and,will be judged for determining what to do based on what reasons; how you proceeded or reacted or stood idle..

I could argue that "mental content" (consciousness, thought, meaning, belief, etc.) is a construct, i.,e., does not "exist", if you like, in all animals, but I'm not sure you'd like it as I've already hammered away at this with Mmw in my post about Wittgenstein's Lion-Quote, and, because it is Ordinary Language Philosophy, I think it comes off as if I'm not playing by the rules because all I'm trying to do is get you to see a different angle rather than argue on the same "terms".

This is a philosophical God very strictly defined as "Having the knowledge and power requirements to create a specific universe". There is no mention of anything else. So dismiss all else. Morality... * * *

Everything you need to consider to solve the issue is within the strictly defined definitions and words. Anything outside of these terms is irrelevant. So that being the case, consider how I conclude the probability of a God being a first cause is infinite to one. Does having multiple possible first causes negate my reasoning for claiming this? — Philosophim

Well here I partly beg off. I don't believe philosophy is served by the modern vogue of creating contextless, pre-defined situations (trains and people in trouble as showing us anything about our moral realm)--but I walked into it, so that's on me. I'm trained in Ordinary Language Philosophy, which attempts to flesh out the contexts in which/when we would be talking about, say, causes, in order to see what we want in "strictly defining" the criteria beforehand, say, limiting "[e]verything [ I ] need to consider". If we are not considering "chains of multiple first causes" (moral chains, chains of actions, of identity, etc.) other than the creation of the "universe", then I'm not sure I can help. If the "universe" is just the first thing created, than the question thins out so much as to not hold anything; if you mean the universe to include everything without exception (the "universe" of possible/inevitable things), then everything is caused initially together. Which is to say, this is teetering into a discussion of solipsism/behavioralism and/or determinism/free-will, or devolving due to terms that can mean multiple things without any investigation into what necessitates them here other than adherence to a certain logic. The cart is before the horse I'm afraid, which, again, rigs the game.

I would suggest Emerson's Self-Reliance and American Scholar as examples of his rallying-cry in the face of skepticism, though they take some work to see as commenting on analytical philosophy (Kant, Descartes, etc.); and if you read A.J. Ayer's book "Language, Truth, and Logic", then you will understand the humor/fun in J.L. Austin's "How to Do Things With Words". Nietzsche is similar to Emerson in being hard to see as an extension/critique of Kant, etc., but his references to joy and courage are more explicit though the reason is as complicated/intricate as in Emerson. Good luck and good cheer.

Yes. There can be multiple first causes. But what is necessarily concluded is that all causality reduces down to a first cause. There may be separate causality chains that reduce down to separate first causes. This may be a step in countering the conclusion I made, but it alone is not enough to counter the conclusion I made. Can you flesh it out and show why this counters the claim? — Philosophim

Well, if we are allowing for "multiple first causes", then it opens the field to say that there are infinite chains. We can say the movement to pick up your cup has at least a biological/physical cause, and that stepping in front of a bullet also has the same cause yet also other causes (sacrifice, love, moral duty). Let's say we grant that there is a First Cause to every chain,and that these two causes are simply separate chains, each with a First Cause, then the question is, for each different chain, what do those First Causes consist of/in? You've give us two answers.

In a sense we are sliding into the question of whether every thought is "intended" or whether every movement is an "action"--is God behind movement or just actions (specific movements recognized as an act)? Or both as different causes? And what is it to say the Devil is the cause? Emerson is asked " 'But these impulses may be from below, not from above.' I replied, 'They do not seem to me to be such; but if I am the Devil’s child, I will live then from the Devil.' No law can be sacred to me but that of my nature. Good and bad are but names very readily transferable to that or this; the only right is what is after my constitution, the only wrong what is against it." Are we always acting from the "God" within us? If so, why is Emerson imploring us to rely on that instinct.

Again, is this to refute your claim? I don't think so. But, as I said, perhaps the premises have their own motivations which dictate the form of the answer.

There is an actual difference between a belief and a report/account thereof. Do not conflate the two. We put our reports of another's belief into statement form, we do not put another's belief into statement form. Only they can do that, if they're capable of expressing their belief with language. — creativesoul

And this is to only use a particular ("philosophical") sense of the concept of belief, that is specific but absent any ordinary context, which leads to a framework (picture Wittgenstein would say) that there is something internal (unspoken or hidden) which may or may not be capable of expression, but especially in language. (As I pointed out above, there are other senses of belief that don't have to do with language, even expressions of belief). This is the imagination of thought as a mental process or image or activity which is either constantly happening or, when it does, is something private or internal to me--undetectable by the Other unless reported. Cavell identifies this as a secret, but that does not account for the space (or not) between this particular sense of belief and language. To this I can only say, from Wittgenstein, that this sense of belief is necessitated (created?) to satisfy a purpose. Cavell would explain this as either the desire to be (or fear of being) unreflectively entirely expressed in every report, i.e., that there is no "belief" without language, that our account is equal to our belief. Or the desire to remain unknowable--that we maintain something of ourself (belief) beyond language so that we can, say, slide out of our accounts because they do not entirely report something hidden in us.

The "profundity" of philosophy was a serious nemesis for J.L. Austin, who is actually very funny at times. He was trying to show the difference between serious investigation and fervent ideological belief/theory. Also, an important part of Emerson's work is its constant optimism (in the face of conformity and skepticism). Wittgenstein's interlocutor in the Philosophical Investigations was very adamant and certain--and Witt is constantly poking them or leaving them flustered with almost a mocking enigmatic humor. Nietzsche also found joy, courage, and a sense of humor was necessary for philosophy; he wrote a book called The Gay Science. This is not a trivial, tangental topic. Maybe the more certain and strict and strident we are, the less we see of the awe and joy and fullness of the world.

"Not All Belief Can Be Put Into Statement Form"

Not sure if I'm just the schlub who's taking the bait on a gag, but I would think we'd have to investigate what "statement form" is, and what we are talking about when we say we "believe".

Obviously "putting something into statement form" is not meant simply as opposed to: not stating it, as in, not expressing it in words; though belief can be simply: not doubt. It could also be said to be an outlook, a perspective, an "attitude" Wittgenstein says (p. 152). And, say we believe that the Other is in pain. Do we state that?--"I believe you are in pain"--or do we move to help them, call 911, etc. (Of course we CAN say it, as above, but it is not in the "form" of a statement, to express or claim anything; it is to acknowledge the Other--in this case, possibly, to reassure them that you are with them, that you accept that they are not lying, etc.

I imagine we are actually, however, tied up somehow in the philosophical problem that statements (their "form") are either true or false, and everything else is belief--or, however that one is better explained--or some tangent thereof. (This begs the question: how do we change a worded expression from a "belief" (form?) to "put" it into "statement form"?)

we might have to work backwards. There are numerous examples in Wittgenstein, J.L. Austin, and Cavell, of statements being subject to other, say, "truth-value" standards than true-falsity (other "forms"?). To say "I'm sorry", is to state something, but then what is the form? You can call this a "belief"--to consign everything not certain, universal, or true/false to the rubbish bin--but do we really say that we "believe" we are sorry? Some might say it is the expression of a belief (or knowledge) of something inside of me--my sorry-ness? But "I'm sorry" is a statement in the form (sense) of an apology. And an apology can be done correctly, or incorrectly--it can avoid any acknowledgement of wrong-doing (one of the criteria of doing an apology correctly). It can be sincere or insincere. Now, if I "believe" you; can I "state" that? Sure. Can I call your apology true? false? And again, what would it be a 'statement' of? My (internal state of?) belief?

My passive-aggression? or what it is about "inner ineffable confidence" that to express it properly includes something other than words? (actual confidence?)

Not properly

To attempt a serious reply, take a look at how the pre-chosen criteria for an answer (allowable with unexamined terms) dictates what is acceptable to consider, i.e., the game is rigged.

Either all things have a prior cause for their existence, or there is at least one first cause of existence from which all others follow. — Philosophim

Here, have we thought about the possibility that both are the case? And what would it take for that to be a possibility? First, the term "existence" is murky. Can you point to some thing's existence? the existence of a concept? Or, more importantly, what is it to say that something exists? that it is differentiated from another? that it is here rather than not here (and when would we say that)? that, for me, something has value and importance to affect my life? All of these things?

And so what sense of "existence" are we using here? Well, it appears to be (necessarily?) tied to the idea of a cause--maybe what something is made of, how it turns out, or its purpose. Now, it seems possible that we want some control over how things exist (turn out, continue on, are driven, etc.), so we necessitate a "cause" (The proximity of Descartes meditations can not, I would think, be ignored, and his attempt to find/create something fixed in order to try to solve the problem of skepticism.)

Any deviation in particulates makes it a different universe. — Philosophim

I won't argue whether there is a cause or what started the cause, only ask it be considered whether the idea of "causality" taken back to an initial point starts to thin out. Say I grant that one cause/thing is caused by something prior, etc. When we get back to the First Cause and turn to look forward, yes, we can see possible ripple effects through time (materially, biologically, evolutionarily, etc.); but is every outcome dictated? Morally? Creatively? Aesthetically? Or, in other words, does "everything" have a cause? The 'choice" of the same lunch I have every day? and, even more, a determined one? And where are we drawing the line? Again, what is important about "existence" and "causality" for us in this context? I'm not sure this is exactly an argument against your conclusion (or failed conclusion), so I'm not sure we can call these "flaws" rather than maybe the pitfalls of pre-constructed logic.