If my will is not a thing then how could I be free to pick my words? Again contradiction. — Benj96

I feel like we are rushing past the distinction I am making. I can choose my words, and there is a part of that where I am free (and partly I am constrained); all I am saying is that that is a matter of how freedom is judged to work, not that our choices come from a “will” pictured as a thing, a power or casual object, thus knowable with specific certainty. And the original point being that we picture consciousness in the same way in order to meet our criteria of a knowable predictable generalized special “thing” that makes me “me” amongst everyone. The facts that we are self aware and can choose our words is not generalizable to every act nor to extrapolating that there is something behind it all.

What of it? — Benj96

Yes, you might not care about what I am talking about, which is fine, but I’m not sure you understand the point that putting our requirement for certainty first creates these frameworks, rather than looking at the specific criteria of each act.

being able to take control and actually taking control are two separate things. This is a choice within consciousness. — Benj96

That you can chose to focus on doing something, or make a decision to do it, does not mean you always focus or always make a decision (you don't "intend" what you mean, but you can choose your words carefully); you making things happen (or not) is not how our motions are deemed to be actions. Your "will" is not a thing either; you are free to pick your words if you like, you are then fated to them (the implications of having said them).

You just contradicted yourself from start to finish. Not talking about being sure I exist and ending with do you really exist. — Benj96

You're right; and that was churlish. I was going to delete it.

The difficulty is discerning "self identity" or "human consciousness", "goat consciousness" "dog consciousness etc" from fundamental consciousness (the "I am" sensation). Don't conflate the 2. — Benj96

My point is that philosophy imagines that consciousness is a thing in order to make our part in the world more under our control than it is, more certain. It makes us seem like a given entity, the cause of action and the meaning behind speech. What would be an issue if you pictured a world without "consciousness"? We are aware of (part of) ourselves. We can talk to ourselves. We can focus on sensations. There is more, but why does it have to be consciousness? What are we missing without it?

Consider that I've ripped a paragraph out of a systematic philosophy. — plaque flag

I hope I didn't give the impression of disrespect. Is he not saying that we judge our acts by reasons for and against?

Certainty of the knowledge of ourselves doesn't have to be imposed. — Benj96

I'm not talking about you being sure that you exist (though being self-aware is a pretty low bar to say you're not a sheep, or a puppet, or a dupe, or a "ghost of your former self". You "exist"?; if you are here but it wouldn't matter if it were someone else just as much as you, do "you" really exist? Yes, existence is another idea we ascribe to the world to give it solidity, predictability, certainty).

Anyway, what I was trying to say is that the idea of "consciousness" as something specific, knowable in a "we-can-find-out-about-it" way, as if looking further (perhaps with science!) we could see it (me), as if it has agency or causality, this idea is created so that we can have surety, not about consciousness (its existence), or our self-awareness, but so we can be certain about what others are going to do, about our understanding of ourselves. If it is a thing, an object, or the byproduct of an object, then we know how to handle those with math and the methods of science. We don't have to prove we have a self by being responsible for what we say, because we have "consciousness" which handles intention and meaning and judgment, etc. for us.

Note that Brandom is trying to merely describe what we are and were always already doing as philosophers. He is making this background situatedness explicit. — plaque flag

I understand that we may assess when and whether or how well someone has done something, but it's just that we do not make anything explicit before we do an act (unless we are doing philosophy, or we're lawyers) and, if we are doing that, then reasons for and against are not what we look at, as every act has its own criteria for identity and completion, for missteps, excuses, etc.

Did you ever wrestle with Limited Inc ? — plaque flag

I never did get into that one. I hate to say I read a book about a book, but Stanley Cavell was a student of Austin's, and, in his second chapter of "A Pitch of Philosophy", he discusses the book and how it appears to him that Derrida was responding to a mistake he read into Austin's work, and then later that Derrida had turned presence (or the voice) into something more metaphysical than logos. I have a hard enough time with Hegel, so I skipped it.

The self is not different than any other thing in the world. If what you say is true then what you've written is also true of the rest of reality, not just of our selves. — T Clark

I think I get this, and, yes, the idea of "reality" is also a quality attributed to the world to give it certainty--facts correlate to reality, words refer to reality, etc. That's not to say that there is no reality; it's the opposite of fantasy (what smacks you awake in the face). And words do refer to the world, when we are naming objects (they do much more) but that is not the blueprint for how language works. And we do have facts that are certain; they come from the dependability of the scientific method (you do it; I do it -- same answer? fact).

The self is not a thing like an object. And I know of nothing else in the world that it is like.

what one becomes liable to assessment as to one’s success at doing, is integrating one’s judgments into a whole that exhibits a distinctive kind of unity: the synthetic unity of apperception

quoting Bransom

I agree that we may be assessed on our execution of, say, our apology. My only concern is imagining that everything happens before we do anything--like we are using "apperception" all the time. We may not even be judged on our apology, but, even so, we definitely do not usually think of any of the parts--reasons for and against, etc.--until we are judged. We may very well not have a reason, but what responsibility means here is that, if I am to stand behind what I say, I remain open to answer those questions (even if I have to think about what answers to give after the fact of having done it). If we picture communication working that way, then we are a slippery slope from attributing "intention" to each act, or imagining morality as a matter of working out what is best ahead of time.

I have read Austin years ago. He seems to convince himself that he has it all commonsensically figured out and that it is misuse of language and only misuse of language that causes philosophers to tie themselves up with metaphysical knots that can never be unravelled, but rather, like the Gordian knot of legend, can only be cut by the sword, in this case the sword of linguistic analysis. I find that attitude unconvincing because I see it as over-simplistic. — Janus

I can understand seeing it that way. Wittgenstein is better at keeping open the question of why skepticism continues to appear. And, yes, Austin can seem like he is just cataloguing how language works. What he is doing though is looking at: what we say when we.... (know, think, etc.) because the way we talk about those activities shows us what matters to us about the activities. The criteria for having apologized are what count towards being forgiven. So the workings of how we discuss the activity show us what we are interested in about it. The language shows us the world.

We are both paraphrasing influences. But that's beside the point I was trying to make. — plaque flag

I thought it was a question about how I could be certain about the claim I was making. What was your point that I didn't address?

A person's hero myth is roughly the thing they can't easily put in question. — plaque flag

I understand that we want to hold someone to what they say, to have them answer for it, make it intelligible to us. But what if one way they did that was to rescind it? As Emerson would say "Speak what you think now in hard words, and to-morrow speak what to-morrow thinks in hard words again, though it contradict every thing you said to-day" Self Reliance.

How certain would you like to be about your theory about the desire for certainty? — plaque flag

It's actually Wittgenstein, but the claim is made on the evidence of the things we say when we discuss these things: knowledge, intention, meaning, excuses, etc. His method is now referred to as Ordinary Language Philosophy. Drawing out the implications of the way we talk to show how these things work. The "proof" is if you can see it for yourself; come to the same conclusion. I would say the idea of this kind of Truth is that it is accepted, adopted more than justified, which I would agree gives it the feeling of being not tied to specific grounds of the here and now.

I agree that responsibility (responsiveness) is the key to understanding this issue in a new sense. Instead of knowing ahead of time the, say, process of our brains, or my meaning or intention, we should see these issues as a historical process (as Nietszche grasped) to examine what was intended (afterwards) when we deviate from ordinary implications in the context of a case. “Did you intend to do that [unexpected thing—fishy Austin says]?”

I’m not sure of a few things. My claim would be that both philosophers and scientists are prone to the desire for certainty. I guess the “costume” would be the hats we wear in pushing an agenda (of predetermined universality, overlooking our ordinary criteria).

I also wonder what you mean that “unity” and “self” should be taken as the same thing. Thoreau characterizes our self as two, Freud as three. I imagine you mean that we are fated to be held to all of our acts in relation to our (one) self. So when you say we “can’t disagree with ourselves” you are underlining that who we are is subject to all our acts in our, or others’, desire to put us together as a coherent self.

@Fooloso4@Nickolasgaspar@green flag@fdrake@RogueAI@Benj96

I will try to help with the philosophy though I am late to the game. In an attempt to impose certainty on our knowledge of ourselves and others--to try to have control over who we think we are and what we say—philosophy created the idea of "consciousness" (along with subjectivity, internal intention—“my” meaning, qualia, etc.)

Our individual "experience" does not happen in a unique way, unpossessable by others. At times we alone experience something unique, perhaps even inexpressible (a rare sunset). But our self awareness does not characterize our relation to ourselves (define “us”), or to others, or to the world. Wittgenstein saw that, to the extent we come to agree that our pain is similar, it is the same (though we are not "the same" as if identical).

Taking "me" as given and special and building our understanding around that desire is an attempt to remove the unpredictability of people, the vagueries of communication, and our ongoing responsibility to make ourselves intelligible and to respond to the claims of others. These things cannot be secured in advance by the wish for knowledge of something inside ourselves or of others that could be followed, or expressed without having to stand behind what we say and do and be defined by that.

So, what everyone is searching for to either know by science or explain through philosophy is a bogey created by our need for (mathematical-like) certainty or ownership of something that makes us special by default.

I find much of philosophy, however impressively intellectually acrobatic it might be, tedious and uninspiring. If it lacks poetry, then I lack interest — Janus

I find Emerson inspiring, though it can be hard to make out how he is doing analytical philosophy (following Kant and Descartes and Socrates). Nietzsche is as arcane unfortunately. The later Heidegger (Poetry Language Thought in particular) is a kind of poetry. I would try an essay of J.L. Austin’s too. Although pedestrian, it is refreshing to see him actually get somewhere with issues that tie others in knots, though again it can be hard to take him as dealing with the same issues as the tradition.

an acceptance/knowledge of death is a liberation from dread and anxiety and an open door to freedom? — Tom Storm

When Socrates, in the Pheado, says philosophers "practice death", he meant that, as death releases the "soul" from the body, so do philosophers release pure truth from the deceptive body, distracting desires, opinions, biases, etc. Cicero believed we should "meditate" on death, and Montaigne picked that up in saying: "Where death waits for us is uncertain; let us look for him everywhere. The premeditation of death is the premeditation of liberty; he who has learned to die has unlearned to serve." Essay #20. His point being that if we are not afraid of losing life, we are free to live it.

Ignoring death--not being afraid of it happening, of our losing life--can look like we are focusing on "life". We are "in the moment" and pursuing "feeling alive"--Derrida refers to this, I believe, as Presence. However, if you ask any psychotherapist they will tell you that we do not fear death so much as we fear life.

It has been said that those who are afraid to die are afraid to live.... — Janus

Perhaps dread is a terrified resistance to the endless rush forward of life, as if one note from the horn refused to die to make way for the next.... Is the expansion of identity precisely the destruction of its pettier identifications? — green flag

Emerson believed that we grew in partial circles which we had to close in order to form each version of our self. The picture is an adolescent becoming an adult, first having any and every opportunity open to them, but then stepping into the world and becoming a lawyer, etc. It's also pictured as the time before speaking (before suffering I think the Buddhist would say), when our experience of the world can be immeasurable, and so fitting that into a word is a kind of violence, and expressing it to others is putting it on the record--as if thought were alive and writing was dead.

As I read Heidegger his notion of death does not refer (predominately at least) to physical death, but to the closing off of many possibilities that comes with committing oneself to anything. — Janus

So I would agree that "not fearing death" is not to ignore it, or think of it always, or to focus on "living", but to have the courage to define ourselves in committing to form and structure and institutions and the judgment of others; to speak despite the inadequacies of our expressions and still be held to our words as if all that we are was in them, with everything else dying each time.

I presume sensory simple mistakes are not the essence of the question. — Alexander Hine

Not sure who you are responding to, but, for my part, the whole exercise of looking at mistakes is to see that we judge them based on what act was being done and how any deviation could be excused by a response from the actor. So the essence of the issue is our criteria for judging what matters to each type of action (and also in this instance)--what counts. So a "[simple] sensory mistake", if I understand that right as, say, seeing something (mistakenly) as something it is not, could be what matters when I shoot my neighbor's donkey instead of mine. The excuse would be that "my eyes played tricks on me" or something similar, but this only shows that that particular excuse is rare and not "essential" to most acts. But the ordinary excuse would probably take the form of: "I wasn't paying close attention", as there is the expectation of care in acting, especially shooting something, and it is the expectation which is important here, not our sensations or my experience of the incident.

a failing in any part (knowledge to execution) can lead to an undesired outcome and thus a mistake. — Benj96

My point (well, Austin's) before was that we have to be clear about the circumstances and describe them accordingly; a mistake is different than an accident, etc., and not every act incorporates all the list of things that an act can. You may not have knowledge, or planning, have executed it perfectly, etc., and this comes into play in judging and excusing.

And, as you say, nothing may go wrong at all in our view, which is what I take you to mean in doing a "good" thing. And this would be something you would justify if someone disagreed, not beg to be excused. You would argue it was not a bad or wrong act. Again, there is admitting I did it and justifying that the act was right or good, but, separately, denying it was me that did it, or that I (fully) did it.

For me, whether a mistake is forgivable or not is primarily based on intent. Intent can be good or bad. How you act out intent can also be good or bad. — Benj96

Which brings me to my main point. Austin will comment that, in philosophy, there is a lot of hand-wringing about "cause", "intention", "effect", "consequence"--thus Hume's attempt at explaining the moral compass in each of us (and our praise and blame) and Kant's reaction to try to remove our feelings from moral consideration altogether by making our judgment logically necessary or categorical (beforehand). What Austin is doing is taking every single act as its own category (with different--mostly external--criteria for what makes up a mistake, accident, etc.) as well as taking into consideration the exact situation (context) and this specific occurrence (here, now, to be drawn out as much as necessary).

My point is that judgment based on one's intent is taken from an oversimplification of action pictured as happening one way; Austin uses the example of pushing a rock (Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations is about looking at tons of examples). In the simple (generalized) case, we make a conscious decision of what to do and how, we "cause" ourselves to move, and we anticipate (intend) a particular result or consequence. However, more types of examples show that we so rarely consider our acts or decide or think what exactly to say--much less that we can even be aware of all the implications, which do not depend on us--that we will find that intention and causality are internalized by philosophy onto every instance only in order to have control, universality of theory, "knowledge", when both are actually only investigated after the act and determined not by our good or bad intention (as some ever-present internal force of mine) but through parcing it out from the shared expectations of this situation (Wittgenstein calls these an act's Grammar, which are the criteria Austin is drawing out for each type of excuse--what makes something a "mistake"). We only ask about intention when something is unexpected: "Did you intend to do that (bad, weird, unexpected act)?" "No, I didn't even cause it to happen; he pushed me!"

That is not to say that with some acts it does matter why (or whether) I did choose to do something--judging between 1st and 2nd degree murder; judging someone who chose to send a missle or did it mistakenly (they wanted to send something else), or, more likely, accidentally (Whoops! Wrong button!) The imaging of ever-present "intention" or "cause" gets at our relationship to responsibility (and freedom) for our actions. But looking at all the different ways we get out of responsibility or say our freedom (to act) was limited, shows it is not always (or even most times) the case there is a good or bad motive. This also shows that having a predetermined judgment of what acts are good and which are bad is not what is really a "moral" situation (just following rules), as most moral theory struggles with and stumbles upon. This is why Nietszche implored us to move beyond good and evil (side-stepping the deontological-teleological-emotive debate).

J.L. Austin has an essay called "A Plea for Excuses". It is actually about morality, looking at how a normal act gets screwed up, to see how we make amends, learn our responsibility, understand our freedom, etc. He says it starts with someone being accused (even ourselves) of doing something (wrong, bad, poorly, etc). Now admitting the act and denying it was bad is to justify it, which is what most moral theory tries to do (even beforehand -oo- Kant). But to admit it was bad but deny responsibility is to make an excuse, which turns on how (me) doing something works at all.

He looks at the things we say (doing Ordinary Language Philosophy) in making excuses to see how action works. He learns it is broken into parts: knowledge, decision, planning, resolve, execution, etc. But in the case of a mistake it falls under a failure to realize or appreciate the situation. Ultimately every case has its own standards and some excuses fold together, even here with inadvertence, absence of mind, not to mention sheer, mere, simple, etc. but sometimes these distinctions are everything; the more serious or complex the act may call for a closer look at the details of the situation, the context in that case.

To the point at hand, he says "In an accident something befalls; by mistake you take the wrong one; in error you stray..." Philosophical Papers, pp. 201-202. His example of a mistake would be writing Dairy instead of Diary on your new book, but elsewhere he says you may go to shoot your donkey and find you have shot your neighbor's--by mistake (mistakenly taking one for the other). If you go to shoot your donkey and miss and hit his cow--that's an error. If the gun misfires and kills anything, that's an accident.

Now you go to plead your case to your neighbor, and out will come any mitigating circumstances (no coffee blurry-eyed; donkeys all look the same; he just bought a donkey? you didn't know!). Does how bad you feel have anything to do with whether your neighbor will forgive you? Maybe; depends. Will it matter in the case of labeling your journal Dairy? Depends on the judge.

There are activities that can only be enjoyed individually — javi2541997

I think I was trying to say the same thing. What I meant was that, yes, we have singular experiences but there is nothing that ensures our individuality (nothing taking the place of the metaphysical "mind").

to reach a real ordinariness, we have to stay away from the "mass" of other ordinary people. — javi2541997

And I agree here as well I believe. Emerson calls it aversion to conformity in Self Relience; Nietszche will call it rising above (roughly). The idea of a shared culture and language can be turned from, or continued on, or, as Wittgenstin will say, torn down and built again from the rubble (PI 118)(not, however, gotten outside of, even if only a scream or a splotch of paint).

My point would only be that this: I Am!, is an action, a process; who we define ourselves to be, say, against the crowd, is not given to us as an inherent fact. People believe they have "thoughts", and those are precious gems that come from who they are, their identity as a singular person, something special from inside only them, when most of the time they are platitudes or regurgitation--though sometimes what is common is most true (it all depends). As Heidegger says: what is most thought-provoking is that we are not yet thinking.

Thank for taking the time to read it again, and I hope that makes it clearer if you are interested @Jamal

I'll try this one more time. Dismissing someone out of hand is doing you no favors in being able to learn anything new, and no one wants to respond to someone who just says they are wrong because of your opinion. I suggest seeing what you agree with first and then asking questions about the parts you don't understand and just wait on what you think you disagree with. Also, my object this to get you to see something you may be missing, not that I know something I can prove to you; so if you don't see it, and won't let me help you possibly to, I can't force anything on you, say "logically" or factually (you in a sense have to see it for yourself). Also,,I clarified the original post.

If you're interested, I rewrote the OP to be, I hope, clearer.

Sorry, I didn't make clear that the "special" I am arguing against is not being distinguished, more intelligent, unequal in social or economic position (I've tried to edit that into the OP). What I am trying to root out is the idea that we have an individual "consciousness" or "thoughts" or "our" "meaning"--say, as casual or which is "me".

That being said, saying "we have the real version of ourselves" makes me nervous because, although we might have secrets (and from ourselves as well) and can present a facade (a false "image") there is not a "real" version of us that we "have" by default, much as the world is without a "reality".

But, yes, we are all ordinary humans, individual as separate bodies, but under the same condition/human situation. Reaching out from this state does not seem "impossible", and it is our (political, cultural, economic) circumstances that are the hurdle we must reach over. But, yes, this is an ethical plea as well; if our internal state of affairs are not direct, determinate, controlling--as if metaphysical, or physically (scientifically) distinctive--then our ordinary words and concepts are enough, if we let them be.

Yes, the claim of the skeptic is about the entire human condition. Finding a logical inconsistency in what you take their claim to mean is not to dismiss that our knowledge of the other is inadequate nor to resolve the real outcomes of living in the grip of skepticism. We believe ourselves more powerful than we are if we think our knowledge of the other is sufficient.

But wouldn't a real skeptic (in genuine doubt rather than theory of knowledge hubris) just not know much about me — green flag

But the skeptic wants to be sure about you or deny you entirely. Granted, "exist", is a loaded word, but, non-metaphysically, we are still talking about you not mattering, me not wanting to be responsible to you personally, to acknowledge your claim on me, thus the skeptic's insistence on science, which draws its conclusions regardless of the individual; and their need for the world to be "real", creating frameworks like “objective”, “reality”, “consciousness”, etc.

Yes, we cannot be factually certain of others and the world (except math, though that only makes the desire worse) and that the results of solipsism can be real. I suggest you take this seriously and start working to understand the philosophy as well as take steps to make sure you are safe. I have requested your account be reviewed to give you time to do so. Good luck.

I'm not sure what you mean by that exactly. — Darkneos

The way this would work is that you ask a question about which part or parts you don't understand, or, even better, you take a stab at echoing or paraphrasing what you think was said, or you assume you know what was said and disagree, stating your objections.

I think I can forget about it as long as I stop feeding it and focus on other stuff, or at least see a therapist about it. — Darkneos

A therapist is not going to help you with a philosophical problem like solipsism, though they can help with reasons for turning our human condition of being separate from others into an intellectual problem where we think we are lacking some knowledge. I would suggest both, especially given that you will come back to it again and again, but I t doesn't sound like you are ready to work on the philosophy yet. I ask that you not post here again unless you are serious, as you must realize you've wasted the time of earnest people actually trying to do philosophy here. If you continue in this vein, I will ask that you be banned until you can convince the admins of your sincerity in wanting to do the work. Good luck.

I just want to know if the links I give prove it or not — Darkneos

What I’m telling you is, yes, what leads to the conclusion of solipsism is true about our human condition. But having certainty that others exist, knowing that, is not the only consequence of the truth of the skepticism that leads to solipsism, as knowledge of the other and the world is not our only connection.

And you will not forget about this because your isolation and doubt and disconnection are based on something true. The danger of philosophy is why Socrates was killed, why Descartes’ Meditations was not taught to young adults, and why Wittgenstein kept telling people to give up on philosophy after his conclusions in the Tractatus. It is too late for you , however, so I would use your mind to overcome your mind.

Every thing I’ve read just seems to erode my mind a little more each day — Darkneos

You’re just reading the wrong works. I appreciate the effort in reading the Cavell. Where did you stop understanding it? If you can work to formulate questions, I can probably answer them (no one understands meaningful philosophy at first glance; its process requires your becoming someone different). The most important part is the end where he finds the truth of skepticism (that solipsism is real and an ongoing threat) and then analyzing the uses of knowledge to find the route of acknowledgement as our human relation towards others (apart from insisting on knowledge of them that is certain). I stand ready to help if you are willing to put in the work, but, yes, stop reading anything that is attempting to dismiss or disprove solipsism (and ignore @Judaka and @green flag tell you you’re crazy or that the position is ridiculous) as it is a important part of the human condition.

I know I exist because I have a first person point of view in my world
Other things have a third person point of view in my world
Things are not both first person and third person point of view at the same time in my world — Darkneos

In saying the skeptic and the other are not in the skeptic's world together, is to say that the skeptic does not know whether the other is them (the skeptic), or whether the other's point of view is the same, say, their pain is just like the skeptic's, so that they would exist, based on the ground that the skeptic takes themselves to.

Given that doubt, that lack of certain knowledge about the other, "there is only one 'me' in my world." From that requirement for the existence of the other, there is no stopping the conclusion that follows.

the first person point of view is not in other worlds
Hence, other worlds don’t have a “me” — Darkneos

The converse of not having knowledge of the other, is that I cannot explain myself to anyone either. I am inexpressible; no one can know me--no world has whatever is unique to me fully out of me, in it.

If there is a subjective world, there can only be one such subjective world — Darkneos

Thus, if there is to be a me, a me that I am certain of, then no one can have the ability to see me, to know me in the same way I want to be sure of myself. So the other cannot exist, as they threaten the grounds of my existence because they may know me better than I know myself, and then what do I know if not even myself?

The only way out is through. If you read that one and don't get anything meaningful from it, I'll eat my hat. Plus, you haven't commented on any of my posts I worked very hard on for your benefit, so you owe me that much.

I would suggest the Cavell essay on other minds that I attached above, but I will review the post, thank you.

The thread with the argument for solipsism is broken for me. Just copy the text here.

If you take needing certainty for knowledge then you really have nothing. — Darkneos

Yes but that desire is what allows the skeptic to see the truth that we do not have foundational, unreproachable knowledge of others and the world—that the impetus to solipsism is true. Isn’t that what you were looking for, one way or the other?

I think this other fellow is more on target. — green flag

I would tell you that reality is an illusion, that everything exists from the perspective of the individual, the individual holds a privileged position to dictate what is and isn't true, and to legitimatise their way of interpreting and characterising all concepts and things — Judaka

Not to drag @Judaka into this, but solipsism is not a better, more powerful position; it is seen as the the only available position, but a powerless one. I cannot know that you exist, or, in a less dramatic example, know your pain. And the idea of "reality", as a quality everything has or that we compare things against, is the measure that makes the world illusory to us.

You only need to sufficiently doubt the idea [ solipsism ] — Judaka

.

And although many of the conclusions of solipsism can be doubted, the truth of it is that knowledge fails to provide us with certainty of others and our world.

I am convinced or sure that I cannot have absolute irrefutable knowledge. — Antony Nickles

Who would refute it though ? And what would refutation mean ? If the self is all there is, there is nothing the self can be wrong or right about.

What I was doing with the statement above was re-wording your comment that: "I am certain that I cannot be certain". The skeptic is not "right" that the self is all there is. His truth is that there is no fact to make us certain of others or the external world. We can be all alone in the world; it can be that the world does not meaningfully exist for us.
— green flag

How could logical norms be binding? — green flag

They aren't.

Unless there is something I can be wrong about, what can uncertainty mean? — green flag

Lack of justification by knowledge; not being sure--having doubt. Now if we want to say "unless there is something to doubt..." it is not that the skeptic doubts the world exists; they doubt we can be certain it exists.

This is not a mathematical proof but an attempt to make visible the basic unintelligibility of solipsism. — green flag

I agree this is not math, but, again, your resorting to calling it unintelligible does not refute it--it's giving up.

it's not clear as it stands why desire is not a personal feeling. — green flag

It would maybe be clearer to say, their argument has a logical prerequisite.

I can answer any questions about the posts I have made, but probably the most helpful might be reading the attached essay of Cavell's where he dissects the truth of solipsism from what we feel compelled to make it mean.

"I am certain that I cannot be certain." — green flag

These are two different senses of certain. I am convinced or sure that I can not have absolute irrefutable knowledge. More to the point though, it is the skeptical conclusion of the solipsist, not their salvation or any kind of refutation of skepticism.

If you are making something like a psychological point, then maybe I agree." — green flag

Part of the history of analytical philosophy is that Plato and Descartes and Kant and the Tractatus, wanted something particular from philosophy, that is a desire, but not a personal "psychological" feeling. It is a logical prerequisite, which leads to an oversight.

In the case of this thread, my hypothesis is that the fear of solipsism is actually a fantasy of solipsism. — green flag

Cavell will say there is both. The desire to remove the faulty human from knowledge is also the wish to be unknowable, special, not responsible.

When entertained as a philosophical thesis, subject to rational norms, it's absurd — green flag

If we dictate the terms on which we accept anything, it's easy to dismiss everything. But at the basis of skepticism (leading to solipsism) is the truth that there is no fact to give us a foundation of certainty in knowledge; that if we require that threshold criteria, the world does fall apart in our hands, our moral realm becomes unnavigable, others are unknown to us--not as a fantasy, but actually--that these outcomes can be true. There is no refuting this without calling it absurd or illogical or just a theoretical issue, or having god or the Forms save us, or cutting off the need for anything meaningful (abandoning what is essential about anything in barring the thing-in-itself).

What is the minimal concept (in an epistemological/metaphysical context) of a world ? Of a self ? The world is something that I can be wrong about. — green flag

The skeptic would say that acceptance that we can be wrong does not provide any foundation for our knowledge of the world--they can always fall back on the irrefutable position that everything can be uncertain, wrong. What I am suggesting is that there is a way not to refute skepticism, or dismiss it, without taking the bait that it is necessary to prove our knowledge of the world, because knowledge is not our only relationship to the world and others (see above).