Comments
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Why are We Back-Peddling on Racial Color-Blindness?Thanks, I tagged you and @Luke of course out of respect for your skill at noticing any need to clarify/correct, which would be appreciated.
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Why are We Back-Peddling on Racial Color-Blindness?I cannot be bothered with the concept of race — NOS4A2
After Kant we can say to refuse to consider race as a valid category is to deny the concept any rationality at all. How are we to address this? I can only understand this (mostly because of ignorance) through analytical philosophy, rather than as a social commentary. After Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, we can see that the "concept of race" has its own "grammar" as he calls it: the way it does what it does, the criteria for its identity, what counts in assessing it, what matters about it to us (here there seems at least two of "us"), the terms of its judgment--our criteria for race, and, of course, racism (separately, I think, perhaps even from "racist").
The point here is that the concept does not have anything to do with you (personally, individually) and your cares or refusals; it stands apart, like langauge, or culture. Our concepts: thinking, believing, knowing, apologizing, threatening, subjugating--all the whirl of human activity and expression--were here before you.
You do not "mean"--as if: intend or cause or control--your words and expressions. You say something (maybe choose to say it even, what to say) but then in a sense it is no longer yours (except to clarify after). How expressions have meaning to us was already there, existing before you, and whatever "reference" you believe you want (to outside/or from inside) is not for you to now decide. Now you can say you misspoke, offer excuses, apologize, but to say: "that is not what I meant" is limited to very specific distinctions, already built into the senses/uses an expression provides for (unless an extraordinary context, or poetry, etc).
So, categorically (to be part of the concept), the grammar of racism--the, in a sense, logic of it, based on the history of our lives--is not based on how you feel or your opinions (this is not a decision); this is to conflate "racism" or "racist" with the concept of prejudice. Racism does not care about your idea of yourself. And so your desire to be beyond judging (thus judgment), your sense of being just, your hopeful idealism--none of that matters (is weighed in). You want to claim (dictate) criteria of character and affirmation of the other. These are neither yours to grant, assume, nor impose. To believe you are doing right, what you are convinced is good, is to imagine you can will justice (righteously) into the world. Desire, feeling, belief, imagination--I'm sure the intention is well-meant, but your intention, as your meaning, disappears from the calculation of a concept. What you mean or intend from your act or expression are nothing to us unless there is something phishy, as in: "What did you intend here"? (Austin) To strip away the criteria of a concept--here overlaying equality, neutrality; to put everything, as it were, on a level field--is to turn from the "bumpy" ground (Wittgenstein) of the manners of our practices, toward an abstract, general, pre-decided ideal. But imposing a standard, abstract from any context, provides privilege to those favored by the current situation.
To see the problem as generalized (and yet within you) comes from a desire to solve the truth of your separateness from others, the possibility of your moral failure, with an intellectual solution. However, despite your desire for a certain, universal answer or rule of action, you are responsible for your response (or lack thereof--what you find is your duty is your own); it forms your character (higher than knowledge, Nietszche and Emerson will agree). The Other makes a claim on us (Wittgenstein says we do not know another's pain, we react to it (or ignore it); that we are not of the opinion that another has a (individual) soul, we see them as if they do, or not). Wittgenstein would call imposing requirements for our moral acts the sublimation of our concepts--the stripping away of our ordinary criteria and any context--our active avoidance of the Other with our convictions (PI, p. 191); not letting them come to us on their terms (Heidegger).
All of this choosing and willing and intention begs the question of what it is that might be hidden--maybe "behind" your morality, what you feel you act from--in controlling the terms of the conversation. An analogy is our blindness of the Other by our selves. Then your action is violence (a distinction always pushing away something else), your speech is suppression (of all that is unsaid), your vision (your picture) for yourself and for the just world is your ignorance--your opinion/knowledge ignores our shared criteria; how you want to treat people ignores the Other. Cavell writes in the Claim of Reason that the horror of slavery was not seeing slaves as inhuman, but, in your words "affirming another as an [equal] individual" while they are in chains.
Much as language functions on grammar already in place in our lives, so racism (by its grammar) is in the structure of our society, our culture. So what is the grammar of racism? (An honest question for investigation by all of us, each to see for themselves.) What counts towards it, what are the criteria: for identity, judgment, excuses, pardons, reconciliation? The picture of its grammar as overt and individual acts directed at the race of the Other (judged as bad) limits and allows me to control my exposure (I'm not a racist!). In addition, economic opportunity, education, enforcement of justice, and other fabric of our society are embedded with consequences for the race of the Other. The individual act subsumed into the institution (its policies, its goals, its measures of success). The overt act became unseen, implicit, ignoring the implications for the Other, from us (our shared unconscious as it were). We are compromised by those implications and culpable to them as we are for our picturing of the criteria of the concept. Our "self"-knowledge is our understanding these implications and consequences of our acts and expressions and institutions and culture. To make intuition into tuition as Emerson would say.
Why are we teaching kids to be conscious of another’s race, and to factor it into their judgements and treatment of others? ...racializing people and being overly conscious of their race and skin-color... — NOS4A2
Teaching being "conscious of", the "factor [ s in ]... judgement", the "treatment of"--simply--"others", is to universalize our concepts, generalize them until they are abstract from any context, such as the Other's--not their situation, nor yours, nor ours. None. But making explicit the grammar of race is learning about ourselves, becoming aware, accounting for our part (Cavell calls it, the education of adults). A claim to the implications of race are subject to discussion, reasons, evidence, flushing out contexts, etc., for you to see for yourself, to know the self you publicly bind yourself to, or when you claim different implications, criteria. So your characterization of the racializing of people and that classifications based on race are dubious, are legitimate, at least as claims, as are the claims you take issue with. Unfortunately, that we can disagree (maybe without resolution--after your spade is turned, I argue that Wittgenstein means to @Banno @Luke), does not justify your skeptical reaction that there is no rationality to the concept of race and to strip all criteria and context away. This negation of the concept at all, in a sense, kills the conversation about those claims--the conversation of justice--before it even begins. -
Bedrock Rules: The Mathematical and The Ordinary (Cavell-Kripke on Wittgenstein)@BannoI've just finished reading the second chapter of Cavell's Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome; the chapter on Wittgenstein and Kripke. — Luke
Great, I appreciate the effort. I hope it was worth the time. I find the Introduction and defense of Nietszche/Emerson moral perfectionism in the first essay worthwhile. This is Cavell's later work, which assumes a lot of arguments built from his first book and The Claim of Reason, which are more detailed analytical arguments, especially closer readings of Wittgenstein.
I note that Cavell says PI is not meant to refute skepticism; but that's not the same as saying that Wittgenstein attempts to resolve skepticism. — Luke
Well taken, I agree with this clarification. Cavell reads Witt as breaking philosophy's penchant to take its problems as generalized and singular (e.g., a universal theory of meaning), and abstract (without any responsibility on our part). In looking at the criteria for each concept individually--what is meaningful to us in their various ways--and considering the context of the issue, but there is no generalized solution.
So it becomes a philosophical moment: how do we continue, put our concepts and the world back together in this crisis. This cannot be accomplished ahead of time, but, in remembering our ordinary criteria, we have the rational, rough ground to possibly, as you say, resolve this (skeptical) instance, but only in this case/context, our differences there, to continue our relationship, even if we only end in rational disagreement, with the possibility of giving up.
the interlocutor could alternatively be viewed as a mere literary device which allows Wittgenstein to express these typical philosophical concerns — Luke
Witt's previous attempt to overcome skepticism (in the Tractatus) is his inner skeptic, embodied in the interlocutor in PI--Cavell takes this that we all have two "voices" within us, so that the “style” of PI must be taken seriously (as “confessions” or "compulsions", he says in The Availability of the Later Wittgenstein--a good intro his approach to PI); and that Witt is trying to find a space between those two voices (our human voice and our desire to negate that voice--our "corrective" voice).
Do you view [the exhaustion of justifications] as Wittgenstein conceding to the sceptic? The quotes from 198-199 in my previous post include his reply to the sceptic (that following a rule is a custom, a practice, a usage, an institution). — Luke
Yes, our justifications of how we practice a custom may run out; we may concede to our exhaustion. And knowledge (what I can tell you) has a limit, and then I am left with you. How/why I am following a custom/practice/usage/rule the way I am may be, at a certain point, impossible to reconcile with you, so yes, Wittgenstein keeps alive the possibility of groundlessness that the skeptic fears.
we can go over these examples and see if the context matches ours, whether it is an example, etc. And that grammar, even that of obeying a rule, is different than rules--even leaves us in a different place in the end.
— Antony Nickles
Cavell references Wittgenstein's PI 199 regarding the grammar of obeying a rule. I don't know what you mean by the rest, starting from: "see if the context matches ours, whether it is an example, etc." — Luke
The grammar of obeying a rule is drawn out through examples (the OLP philosopher, like Witt, makes a "claim" to the grammar in answering: what do we imply when we say X? e.g., "I obeyed the rule". So this is what Witt does in #199--asking us to imagine someone following a rule only once. Now the claim--about what it is about the way rules work that the activity has to recur, have some regularity, etc.--is on you to see for yourself (thus so many unanswered questions in the PI). If we disagree about the implications, we can do so rationally, productively, by, for example, seeing if my understanding of the relevant context is the same as yours, how this example is representative of my claim about the grammar for obeying rules.
Witt's realization is that our grammar/criteria for obeying a rule are not rules, so that the grammar of the custom and technique, our mastery--not knowledge--of the grammar, structurally puts us in a place where our discussion of the justification of the grammar of obeying a rule starts at the end of where Kripke's action is taken and judgment is made of whether you did or did not "obey a rule" (rules playing too large a part, as if in every action). If that is not clear, I would need more than "[ you ] don't know what [ I ] mean"--say, questions, what you take me to say, logical errors, an differing example, etc.
The idea is that things are not straightforward like rules (#426), that our criteria (our lives) are open-ended, unpredictable, etc.
— Antony Nickles
What has this got to do with rule following? — Luke
Cavell's take is that this is about more than following rules. Witt's example of an action is obeying a rule (looking at its grammar--the custom of it); but the investigation is of how action, meaning, etc. works (in each case): that even in obeying a rule the grammar is not bound by rules. We only want our forms of expression/action to be as "designed for a god"--in the sense of a mathematical rule. (#426)
I don't see Wittgenstein or Cavell as talking about "the moral realm" with regard to rules, so I don't see that as being "the further point of the passage of the turned spade". But I invite you to make a case for it. — Luke
Cavell refers to "the moral realm" as the places in PI where Witt examines how we do not know how to continue with our customs, after the limit of our knowledge of the Other, that our separateness is unbroachable by our desire for mathematical rules, at the end of our justifications for our actions (that they are right). When we are left in further ethical response to the Other: the "conviction" on p. 192, seeing an aspect of the other, what is different than an opinion of the other's soul (our reacting to them as if they have a soul) p. 152; and of course when our spade is turned. Cavell's argument is that Wittgenstein's investigation of the limitations of epistemology (its inability to substitute for us at a point) leads to the realization of our ethical relation to each other (beyond rules or grammar).
On p. 192, Witt calls this a "conviction".
— Antony Nickles
In which edition? The word "conviction" does not appear on p. 192 of my copy. — Luke
I was in the 2001 50th Anniversary 3rd edition, which is German on the left and English on the right (actually on 190-192). In the 1953 3rd Ed., it is on 191. This is the page I read in my discussion of the Lion Quote. The "conviction" there is expressed in the desire for the (referential) picture (requiring "mathematical" certainty) to "know" the Other (that their pain is the "same" as mine); that the certainty has shut our eyes (p. 192) to our responsibility to acknowledge the other (or the consequences of dismissing them)--their claim on us (there, the claim of their pain; in our discussion, the possibility of the end of our moral relationship).
240. Disputes do not break out (among mathematicians, say) over the question of whether or not a rule has been followed. People don’t come to blows over it, for example."
— LW
I would say #240 clarifies our need to be able to know how to fight well (keep open the possibility for reasonable moral debate),
— Antony Nickles
You might need to expand on why you think that. I don't see that at all. 240 is simply describing the wide (world-wide) consensus that exists among language users and among mathematicians. — Luke
Sorry, yes, cryptic. I was reacting to the (I would say conscious by Witt) contrast to what is set out by Plato between the mathematical, which Witt is describing here, and everything else.
If we disagree, you and I, about quantity, over which of two groups is greater, would our disagreement over this make us enemies and angry with each other, or wouldn't we quickly resolve the issue by resorting to counting?
Euth: Certainly.
* * *
So: Then what topic, exactly, would divide us and what decision would we be unable to reach such that we would be enemies and angry with one another? Perhaps you don't have an answer at hand, so see while I'm talking whether it's the just and the unjust, and the noble and shameful, and the good and the bad. Isn't it these things that divide us and about which we're not able to come to a satisfactory decision and so become enemies of one another, whenever that happens, whether it's me and you, or any other men? — Plato - Euthyphro Sec. 7
Cavell's point being that, rather than Kripke's (pre-)judgment and exclusion, Witt is asking us to remember our lives and their ordinary criteria, and, at their end, the beginning of our moral relation to each other, its possibilities (if only for rational disagreement).
I think your assumption that Wittgenstein intends 240 or 241 to be about a "moral debate", or about a solution to it, still requires justification... I take 241 only to be clarifying the type of agreement/consensus Wittgenstein is referring to at 240. — Luke
If we are discussing how to obey a rule (as with: how to apologize, how to judge justice)--if we are discussing the grammar of an act (not "a rule")--and we come to a place where I cannot offer a motivation for you/justification to you, then we can not agree on what is the "right" or "correct" or "felicitous" example of such an act (and/or its justification). The discussion of what is right is a moral discussion. So this is a conversation about politics/justice; the relationship between society and the individual. The breakdown of the discussion of the justification of how to obey a rule--is a moral moment.
That we do not come to "agreement in opinions but in form of life" is a grammatical description of the difference between Kripke's understanding of social agreement (in knowledge, explicitly, beforehand, with certainty, as a written contract--a rule) and our "agreement" in our living (Witt next says" in "judgments" #242). This is not to substitute "forms of life" for our opinions/knowledge--that our lives have all the mathematical criteria Kripke assumes---but that Cavell takes Witt to be saying that, yes, our separate judgments come to the same result (most times), but not because the criteria/justifications are certain (rule-like; followed), but because we have similar lives (as it were, coincidently). So when I act, and there is a question of why my judgment differed, this is where justification begins, or continues, not that we have decided ahead of time, and that all that is left is to act, then be judged (as Kripke pictures it).
Pointing to the existing practice that constitutes the rule. "You're not allowed to move your knight like that!" (in chess) because that's not the practice or the way it's done.
— Luke
This is to justify the judgment of not obeying a rule by pointing to our practice. We (teacher-student) are actually at the moment where there is an attempt to convey what it is to obey a rule, how it is that we obey a rule. That this has an ordinary (non-"mathematical") grammar that is not just pointing to a rule (Kripke as it were, generalizes this practice/picture).
— Antony Nickles
Sorry, I don't understand. How can you convey what it is to obey a rule without pointing to our practice? Are you referring to the student's (and/or teacher's) thought processes or something? And what do you mean by "grammar" here? — Luke
So this would be easier if we were talking (I tried to highlight above the emphasis to show the difference). I am not saying we are not conveying something about our practices, but that, to start with, you are talking about a different practice (or only one part of it). You are describing a way of judging the student--"You're not allowed"--not our practice of justifying our claim about how we obey rules (not what we do when you haven't); our justification of what we think it looks like to obey a rule, disobey a rule, how we justify (what counts as justifying) our claim to have obeyed a rule, etc. (the grammar of "justifying obeying a rule"). So you are providing an example of how judgment of obeying a rule works, but, your teacher is merely "pointing" and, in sense, saying, "No". Your example is Kripke's casting-out of the other based on the (fixed, predetermined) practice--the "way it's done". So we have not yet even started to discuss what constitutes the grammar of "movement" of a knight.
(Confusingly in this case, the grammar for movement of a knight in chess is based on rules--it falls into the category of mathematical criteria: that all the applications are circumscribed, predetermined, etc. Witt is showing this to take up the exceptions, in investigating what grammar would look like for everything else, not based on rules).
And the other might claim his is an example, but responsive to a new context. "This is justice, but here we must do harm in this case."
— Antony Nickles
That would require that the student/trainee already understands what "justice" means; that they are not being taught the rule for how to use the word. — Luke
Again, your formation takes rules as "encompassing" concepts other than math and chess, like justice (like everything not mathematical). And, although the teacher has authority over the student, that does not mean the teacher knows all there is about justice (which, my point here, is impossible--seeing the whole of each infinite series #426), that the teacher could concede that: not only has the student applied (justified) the concept of justice appropriately (within its grammar--not the "meaning", but what is meaningful to us about it), but that the student has taught the teacher something, in this instance by extending the concept into a new context (my example doesn't really fit), something about justice in a new world (say, what is just in reconciling our past incorporation of our reaction to race into our continuing institutions).
Not to open a new can of worms, but saying that justice "means" something (rather than has grammar/criteria) is going to get in the way, as the question begs Kripke's society to "know" what the thing is that is justice (and to the slippery slope: with certainty, universality, ahead of time, definitively, entirely). Also, the formation of being taught how to use a word, is different than being taught what counts as (the criteria that makes this) a particular use of the word (one of its possible senses--say the four (or more) uses/senses of "I know"), and that the concept maintains unforeseen possibilities/justifications, which is analogous to the ever-possible continuation of, answering for, our moral relationship to each other.
The student and teacher can "resist philosophy's anxiety" in order to "make themselves intelligible"? — Luke
The fear of skepticism (groundlessness) is what causes Kripke's society to work out everything head of time, almost as if they(we) don't want to have a conversation later (one that may fall apart), to be then responsible to make themselves intelligible (explicit, understood).
if the student does not know the rule.. [they are] in no position to claim that they did obey the rule... Unless they already know the rule, then the student would not have a "blind obedience" to it. — Luke
I may have mucked this up. What the student is being taught is what counts as--the grammar, or criteria of--"obeying a rule" (later, the grammar of justifying that one obeyed a rule), not learning "the rule"; but the criteria for having been said, or being able to say, that: "I obeyed the rule"--one of which would be it can be used as an excuse: "Hey, I obeyed the rule; it's not my fault it didn't turn out how you expected!" (Our desire for deontological morality--"I'm a good person! I obeyed the rule!".) But also, obeying a rule is different in different contexts--the rules of chess, like those of math, are not like a rule of thumb, the rule of law.
Again, the student is (as, analogously, we are, to society) in exactly the position of making a claim of having "obeyed the rule" without either their or our "knowing" they have (for certain), after the act, before the justifying (even without opening the moral discussion.) It is in a sense a provisional claim ("beyond" knowing, Nietszche will say), but we are not (the human condition is not) in a position to make any other type of claim--without the tyranny of mathematical criteria: its foregone judgment.
And 222 neither states nor implies that "normally we do not follow rules". — Luke
Cryptic, sorry; I meant in the sense that normally we obey rules, we do not "follow" them, as we do not "doubt" someone else's pain (#303). "Following" is grammatically not a part of obeying rules (with exceptions). I meant to point to the entire section from #218-#232 (after the passage #217 under discussion), which, following the grammatical claim that "When I obey a rule, I do not choose," (#219) in the sense that: part of the criteria for "obeying" a rule is that I do not obey "my inspiration" (#232), as it were, at each moment, like my "eye travel [ ing ] along a line" Id--as if always tracking it/myself--that, if I do that, then I am, categorically, not "obeying" the rule. At #222, Witt sees this fantasy of ours is only a picture of the line intimating to us (absolving us of being "irresponsible"--or the one who taught us being so); that the line does not nod, or whisper, or tell us (#223); that we do not follow along it as a path "on tenterhooks", anxious each second about society's moral judgment (our intention, what we "mean"). And that such a grammatical study can show us the flip side of a concept's logic: say, as grammatically we ignore someone's pain, not doubt it, and when we do not "obey" a rule, we might not necessarily simply "disobey" it.
Wittgenstein is only talking about the teaching and learning of existing rules. I don't see him as talking about morality, justifying choices or changing rules. — Luke
Well again I take #217 as about teaching someone how to be able to obey rules, presenting my justifications (say, even: myself as justification by example) for how it is that obeying rules is justified (in justifying how I have obeyed one). So, again, not teaching the rule itself, but the justification for the grammar of how a/the rule is obeyed--which are not rules (neither the justification nor the grammar (except when they are: in math, chess, or when my justification is simply to enforce a rule (we have set), say, with the threat of judgment).
Where does he insist "not to treat our practices mathematically"? Perhaps you could provide an example or two? — Luke
The "tendency to sublime the logic of our language" calling anything else "an inexact, approximate sense." #38; "Here [ in thinking something is queer about propositions ] we have in germ the subliming of our whole account of logic. The tendency to assume a pure intermediary... to try to purify, to sublime, the signs themselves."; being "seduced into using a super-expression" #192; that giving someone a number (in association with a mathematical series) is like telling what a (symbolic) machine will do because all the movements are already there, pre-determined (though even a machine can actually move in other ways) #193; turning around the "preconceived idea of crystalline purity" to still have rigor in our ordinary language without "formal unity" #108; and basically in drawing out our ordinary criteria for any other action except math (or chess). -
Bedrock Rules: The Mathematical and The Ordinary (Cavell-Kripke on Wittgenstein)@Luke @Banno I hope adding some direct language of Cavell's, may provide more grist than my attempts to paraphrase.
.The rule for addition extends to all its possible applications. (As does the rule for quaddition...otherwise it would not be known to us as a mathematical function.) But our ordinary concepts are not thus mathematical in their application: we do not intuitively, within the ordinary, know in advance... a right first instance... know whether to say an instance counts... no concept is "bound" by ordinary criteria....
When the child starts to walk, they walk, [ though ] tentatively, as I do; we agree in walking; but we have not achieved this agreement, come to agree... If chairs ceased to exist... then something would happen to our concept of a table. I do not insist that one agree that the concept would change, but the role of the concept of a table [ would be different ] because the role of tables in our lives would be different.
In reaching the gesture expressed as, "This is simply what I do"... I say I cannot then say I am right [ as Kripke's society does ]; and in going on to say that the repudiation of deviance is a stance, a voice taken in disapproval, betokening social repression; and in remarking further that the violence in claiming to be right where there is no right repudiates the ordinary (the ordinary criteria for the application of everyday [ nonmathematical ] concepts, e.g... of "this"--since it counts on criteria that are already rejected--of "I"--since it seeks to represent a community that does not exist — Stanley Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome, p. 89, 94, 95 -
Bedrock Rules: The Mathematical and The Ordinary (Cavell-Kripke on Wittgenstein)Witt's example is meant to show us something about philosophy; its powerlessness, and hope. — Antony Nickles
And its recurring, thematic, archetypal problems, which he is attempting to resolve. — Luke
Both Kripke and Cavell take Witt as pointedly not trying to resolve skepticism (the "orthodox" view I described earlier), but take it seriously, investigate it, see what it shows about us.
The issue that Wittgenstein identifies (or forecasts) is that philosophers such as Kripke are sceptical or dissatisfied with any and all justifications of behaving in accordance with, or obeying, a rule. — Luke
In the passage starting this OP, Witt acknowledges the possibility of the exhaustion of justifications.
There is no middle ground in obeying the rule for how the knight moves in chess, only conflict or accord. — Luke
And this would be Kripke's stance. But Cavell is attempting to draw out that there is grammar (not just judgment) in obeying a rule; that there are cases that exhibit what these criteria are (#201); that we can go over these examples and see if the context matches ours, whether it is an example, etc. And that grammar, even that of obeying a rule, is different than rules--even leaves us in a different place in the end.
For the sake of clarity, let's use the example of a very straightforward rule instead, such as a rule of chess or a signpost. — Luke
It gets even more straightforward, let's use the example of math. The idea is that things are not straightforward like rules (#426), that our criteria (our lives) are open-ended, unpredictable, etc.
I disagree that Wittgenstein is inviting a moral discussion at all, nor any further justification in general terms, although he might consider a place for philosophy or justification to intervene in relation to some specific issue. Generally speaking, the matter is fairly black and white: people do manage to follow rules and are able to be judged as following them or not. As W says: "there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which, from case to case of application, is exhibited in what we call “following the rule” and “going against it” (201). See also 240-241. I view 232 as a continuation of the thread that brings into relief the impossibility of privately determining a rule (see 202). — Luke
The further point of the passage of the turned spade is that, though I can wield rules the way you point to (as Kripke grabs onto them as finalizing), we do not have to, there is nothing necessary in treating the other on black and white terms--unless you don't want to address the Other (open the moral realm), that you just want, as it were, to apply the rule. On p. 192, Witt calls this a "conviction". I would say #240 clarifies our need to be able to know how to fight well (keep open the possibility for reasonable moral debate), and that #241 does not solve those issues, by pointing to our way of life in the way Kripe takes it as a contractual (enforceable) agreement.
Pointing to the existing practice that constitutes the rule. "You're not allowed to move your knight like that!" (in chess) because that's not the practice or the way it's done. — Luke
This is to justify the judgment of not obeying a rule by pointing to our practice. We (teacher-student) are at the moment where I claim there is an attempt to convey what it is to obey a rule, how it is that we obey a rule. That this has an ordinary (non-"mathematical") grammar that is not just pointing to a rule (Kripke as it were, generalizes this practice/picture).
It's an odd reading to think that Kripke is attempting to resolve this worry, when, by design or by folly, he exacerbates it. — Luke
Cavell is trying to examine how and why Kripke ends up there.
Cavell takes Witt as leaving that possibility of failure open, but also continuing a conversation beyond our pre-determined judgment. An ongoing conversation about, say, what constitutes an example (#223)--rationalizing our relationship instead of it relying on, say, violence (understanding rather than just change). — Antony Nickles
I'm not sure what you mean here [the discussion of what constitutes an example], but I don't see 223 as questioning what constitutes an example. — Luke
One might say to the person one was training: "Look, I always do the same thing: I . . . . . — Witt, PI #223
And the other might claim his is an example, but responsive to a new context. "This is justice, but here we must do harm in this case."
To make themselves intelligible. They might claim they did obey the rule; or explain their aversion to conformity--examine their "blind" obedience (#219); as normally we do not "follow" rules (#222). — Antony Nickles
This is not my reading of 219 or 222. — Luke
When I obey a rule, I do not choose.
I obey the rule blindly. — Wiit, PI # 219
This is in contrast to the "mythological" description (#221) of "all the steps already being taken". But it is not that we cannot choose to obey a rule (its all about rules), only that when (grammatically) I (choose to) obey a rule (am to be said (judged) to have obeyed), I do not (thereafter) make (further) choices. I do not then "follow" the rule, as in watch it go on ahead of me (#232). Kripke takes it that our justifications end (I act blindly) when I obey the rule, and then as if this is how we are said to act at all, with no space for discussing (justifying) that choice afterwards, for rescission if your suggestion to obey the rule was irresponsible, that I would no longer (morally) say I obeyed the rule, but that I obeyed your intimation (#222).
I don't see Wittgenstein as talking about ethics or about "what is right" in general (in life) in PI. Or at least, not in relation to his discussion on rule following. — Luke
It is peppered throughout, in his insistence not to treat our practices mathematically, singularly, but also (albeit cryptically), in Part II, with his discussion of attitudes, seeing aspects. -
Bedrock Rules: The Mathematical and The Ordinary (Cavell-Kripke on Wittgenstein)I remain at a loss to understand the difference between - taking from the thread title - a rule's end for mathematics and an ordinary rule's end; that is, while I understand the difference between mathematics and ordinary language, there is something here that I do not understand. — Banno
Yeah that was maybe being more poetic than informative. I guess I should have said this is the imposition of the standards for math in place of (sublimizing) those of the rest of language. The desire for our actions to meet the criteria we have for math (or rules) when each action has its own grammar (including that of obeying rules). That math is circumscribed by rules, but that grammar is not.
You or Cavell seem to want there to be a difference between the spade being turned at the end of an analysis of mathematics, and a spade being turned in ordinary language or something along those lines. Or is that such a distinction might be made the topic here? — Banno
Perhaps; it is two reactions to the ("mathematical") desire in the face of a skepticism--for some rule or other foundation--that divides the readings to the Witt passage; that for Kripke the criteria is decided (learned or not) before I make my final/initial claim (without further justification) that is then correct, or not. For Cavell, Witt leaves our response open, that we do not point to rules (or not always)--creating a space between skepticism and foundationalism.
I would have thought that the spade was turned, in either case, when there was nothing more to be said, and only the "exhibition of what we call obeying the rule" as in §210; the point at which every interpretation is no more than the "substitution of one expression of the rule for another". — Banno
Just that Kripke takes it that an action would be held to judgment of whether the rule was followed, and Cavell reads it that, yes, I can not tell you anything more, that we cannot just explain something (a rule, even its grammar) and you will/must continue. But we can wait; for a response, an inquiry. That we continue to be (exhibit) an example. That to continue a concept into a new context will require more than rules (Cavell refers to this as "the human voice", echoing Niestzche); that in contrast, what it is to be mathematical does not require me (it could be anyone adding). -
Bedrock Rules: The Mathematical and The Ordinary (Cavell-Kripke on Wittgenstein)Are we really aware of what matters to considering it part of/not part of, the game?
— Antony Nickles
I've bolded the bit that is bothersome. — Banno
Yikes, caught me; red-handed. I'm burning all my Austin--shameful.
Are we aware of what matters to considering it part of/not part of, the game?
Well, yes, we are. — Banno
The word I was looking for (maybe) was: are we always aware? aware of every consideration? (not that we can't be, but that the questions sometimes come after the act; the questions can be without end).
There is a difference between plus and quus. — Banno
Oh, this looks like a rabbit-hole. I'm not entirely versed in this scenario, but Cavell would acknowledge with Kripke that there is no fact to you/me obeying a rule, or meaning a sentence; nothing in me or about our world. But Cavell takes Kripke to read #201 as a paradox that must be solved--that our relationship with rules must/can be fixed. Maybe too simply, Cavell argues that rules have grammar, and they are (and obeying them is) not more fundamental than the grammar for other actions, and that the "fact" is the requirement (creation) of the skeptic.
But we fear that I may become, or be seen as, the deviant--that I might mistake plus-ing for quus-ing. The skeptic sees this as eminent tragedy, and scrambles to ward it off. Cavell "wants to say" there is the fact of "me", here, ready to be responsible for my act, or not; to apologize, rescind it, defy your law (ironically, subversively), explain these differing circumstances; stand as an example, waiting... -
Bedrock Rules: The Mathematical and The Ordinary (Cavell-Kripke on Wittgenstein)Cavell [is] differentiating between mathematical rules and grammatical rules. How is this distinction to be made?
I gather we are talking in terms of the broad notion of "grammar" Wittgenstein used, roughly the way appropriate to a given language game... but isn't mathematics a language game? — Banno
This is a good thing to have clarified. You are already aware that Austin provided a lot of examples to show that there are more types of statements than just ones that are true or false (also, this harkens to Kripke's black-or-white treatment of the Other). And that Wittgenstein spent a lot of time showing us that there is not one theory of meaning; that there are many other "games", as you say (he also calls them "concepts"), within which to mean something, then just reference. They showed that we can not think in just one way. They also both showed how each concept--like, pointing, meaning, intending, playing chess, apologizing, marrying, etc--was differentiated from others, what counted for identity, felicity, how we judge, why a distinction here is important, etc. with each concept, and even differences (sense, uses) within one concept in different contexts. Cavell calls these our criteria, Witt calls them the grammar of a thing.
I gather we are talking in terms of the broad notion of "grammar" Wittgenstein used, roughly the way appropriate to a given language game... but isn't mathematics a language game? If so, there is no prima facie distinction to be made here. — Banno
What Witt shows is that there is a desire to impose grammar (criteria) on the concepts of which we are skeptical, the criteria/grammar which here Cavell refers to as "mathematical". The term is not meant to imply math is categorically different than a concept (not a "language game"); just that "the way appropriate to" math, its grammar/criteria--certainty, repeatability, universality, predictability, etc.--are similar to the skeptic's requirements for morality, rationality, aesthetics, etc. The "mathematical" is also analogous to the criteria Plato's metaphysical forms have, or Kant's conditions for rationality, or positivism's logic. So in contrast to that are the "ordinary" different, unpredictable, specific grammar of each concept. Now there may not be certainty, or universality, but Cavell's point is that we are left with a rational path when certainty runs out, when we are unsure if our concepts can be, if not universal, at least aligned. Though our actions can not be made predictable, they can be understood as reasonable, taken as good enough (fair, just). -
Bedrock Rules: The Mathematical and The Ordinary (Cavell-Kripke on Wittgenstein)Seems you might set out in some detail what you think is Wittgenstein's orthodoxy, Kripke's variant, and Cavell's reply. — Banno
This is well-taken; the OP does jump past some groundwork. Broadly, I would say there is the traditional skeptic, who sees that our actions are groundless, and thus "aspires to mathematical rules rather than" what Witt would call a concept's grammar; what Cavell refers to as our "ordinary" criteria, framed as the opposite of the skeptic's imposed criteria of ("mathematical"-like) certainty (also referred to as "metaphysical").
Then there is the superficial (the "orthodox" perhaps) reading of Witt as solving (or dissolving) the problem the skeptic is reacting to with our forms of life, which they take as grounding meaning, actions, etc. in the same framework, or by calling skepticism nonsense, or a trick of language.
Cavell and Kripke share the desire not to dismiss or solve the problem the skeptic sees; to acknowledge that there does come a point at which our justifications come to an end. (Here I may get stuck in the same problems I appear to have in the initial reading.) Kripke pictures that we have already (ahead of time) agreed on what the rules are (or practices/criteria/justifications); then I act instinctively yet correctly (without reference to the rules--"as I am inclined to", in his reading), and then I am judged on whether I followed the (circumscribing) rule or not--in or off the island.
Cavell takes the passage not to be the moment of judgment, but the (at least possible) beginning (at the end) of a discussion of our continuing together in the same moral realm, my understanding of your action without society's pre-arranged consent (our immoral act as Nietszche might say), our furthering justification(s) into un-ventured contexts, etc. He sees this as possible because the type of "agreement" we have is not in rules, as to a contract (though we can), but in the way our lives have (so far) been aligned, the possibilities that affords for development.
This would be why Witt words it as training, as we are not teaching (telling) rules, but the practice or skill of, here, how to obey a rule (which Austin would say we could further understand in examining how to disobey, how to be seen as obeying, how it differs from being forced, ordered, etc.--Kripke has this all worked out in advance, Cavell is continuing after Austin). Cavell might add indoctrinating (accepted without justification) because we have yet to imagine all the justifications we might have, and thus where we might go (together, alone) once we feel we are at the end of them.
When, for example, Metaphysician Undercover repeatedly misunderstands certain notions in mathematics, there is a point at which one concludes that he is simply not participating in the game. One might then either turn away or attempt to follow the path of the eccentric. The question becomes one of what is to be gained in going one way or the other. — Banno
And this is perhaps an example of such a (moral) moment. There are many examples in Philosophical Investigations that verge on insane, alien, strange reactions or responses. If we "conclude that he is simply not participating in the game", we have reached the bedrock--if we follow Kripke, this is the point of judgment, conclusion. But, conclude how? Are we really aware of what matters to considering it part of/not part of, the game? Even granted we have rules for inclusion, do we have answers about their desire to be excluded from those rules? What does it mean for who I am if I measure the other by my gain or loss? These questions can continue or stop. We might then "turn away", but, if we don't, do we only follow another path, having already judged an "eccentric" from without? This is at least possibilities (grounds?) for a discussion, where the skeptic and their nemesis fight over grounds (before) to avoid having the discussion at all (in the future). -
Bedrock Rules: The Mathematical and The Ordinary (Cavell-Kripke on Wittgenstein)But even the notion of addition was expanded in 1801 when Gauss introduced the modern concept of modular arithmetic. — jgill
This actually helps to clarify, so thank you. It is not that math cannot change, or be expanded, but there is a structure/conditions to math (as there is a method for what we consider science, why it produces a certain kind of "fact"). We count (pun intended) something as math because it is predictable, universal, eternal, etc., which is unlike our ordinary criteria for how/when something counts as a justification for obeying a rule. -
What are the "Ordinary Language Philosphy" solutions to common philosophical problems?Calling it language philosophy implies it has a corner it ought stay in which it resents — Cheshire
This is reserving judgment? What you see as resentment is perhaps a projection of jealousy (enough to want to trivialize OLP as only about words). Not being interested does not make you right. -
What are the "Ordinary Language Philosphy" solutions to common philosophical problems?Can't I say something without having to imagine 360 degrees of qualifications any given term might entail. I rather be misunderstood than difficult to understand. — Cheshire
I might put it that, in making a claim about what the implications are of the expressions of our concepts (how we qualify knowledge, intention, meaning), we are saying something; something important to the problems of philosophy. Calling it "language" philosophy is to assume that there is (always) a space between our words and our lives. -
Bedrock Rules: The Mathematical and The Ordinary (Cavell-Kripke on Wittgenstein)We can point to rules, we can give examples, we can threaten consequences; at a certain point sometimes they run out, you don't continue as expected--it is meant to be a situation which summons skepticism.
— Antony Nickles
Is it meant to "summon skepticism", though? Maybe from Kripke's overly philosophical perspective, but I doubt it would summon skepticism from the average person. This is a very alien way of looking at obeying a rule. — Luke
Summon the specter of skepticism for the philosopher (reader), yes; the fear that leads to our need to have a foundational bedrock to justify our acts. An average person might feel an inability to communicate, that words/fact/truth lack power, discouraged at the prospect of (or empowered by) not having anything else to say... but, yes, Witt's example is meant to show us something about philosophy; its powerlessness, and hope.
Kripke's take on the passage is that this leaves us with only the options of following the rule, change the rule, or be excluded--that it is conformity to a rule.
— Antony Nickles
So the exhaustion of justifications for how you should obey a rule, make a wish, apologize, mean what you say, etc. can be that you refuse to follow the rules, but it can also be that we have not yet imagined all the implications, shown you how our interests are aligned, etc.--that there is not only force and defiance
— Antony Nickles
This seems to fit into the three options cited above. — Luke
Maybe not my best work trying to show a distinction (part of the problem is Witt is discussing justification for how we follow a rule; and Kripke is reading that as we act from inclination ("inspiration" #232) and then are judged as right or wrong based on if we follow the rule, conform to the rule (before there is any justifying why/how you did or didn't follow the rule)). Cavell takes Witt as leaving open the judgment/exclusion to begin a conversation about what it means to have followed a rule (what counts, what matters, etc.). One view ends the relationship, the other begins a moral discussion.
The fear is of the inability to justify obeying a rule or justify how we obey rules.
— Antony Nickles
I get that, but you (or Cavell) were instructing someone about what constitutes obeying a rule. — Luke
What constitutes justifying that I obeyed a rule. And Kripke wants to resolve the worry that we may not be able to justify how we obey a rule or what constitutes obeying a rule, just between our impulse to act and your judgment and exclusion; Cavell takes Witt as leaving that possibility of failure open, but also continuing a conversation beyond our pre-determined judgment. An ongoing conversation about, say, what constitutes an example (#223)--rationalizing our relationship instead of it relying on, say, violence (understanding rather than just change).
You say that the teacher is unable to provide sufficient justification to the student about what constitutes obeying a rule. Then you say - crucially - that the teacher does not have to give up on the student because both teacher and student can "resist philosophy's anxiety". I guess I'm asking: what is it that allows the student to "resist philosophy's anxiety"? — Luke
To make themselves intelligible. They might claim they did obey the rule; or explain their aversion to conformity--examine their "blind" obedience (#219); as normally we do not "follow" rules (#222). Not to take the position that their actions are unable to be communicated--to feel there is something private, unknowable (not just personal). But really this is an examination of the teacher, and the limitation/impotence of our knowledge (what comes after it).
But teaching (indoctrinating into society) sometimes runs out of ways to convey, in this example: what constitutes obeying a rule (justifies saying how/that we obey/have obeyed).
— Antony Nickles
Teaching/indoctrination is training someone how to obey the rules or how to "go on" (or behave) in a particular way(s). You cannot first teach/train someone what it means to obey a rule in order for them to then go on and obey a rule; otherwise, you would not be able to teach them what it means to obey a rule in the first place. — Luke
I agree with framing it as training, but I am trying to show two "particular ways" we can be seen as going on--that maybe it isn't (as in teaching math), that we behave (obey) or not, but that we are learning the skill of how to continue, to be able to justify our actions at all--to move forward rather than not be able to "conflict" or "accord" at all (#201) @Banno.
You cannot first teach/train someone what it means to obey a rule in order for them to then go on and obey a rule; otherwise, you would not be able to teach them what it means to obey a rule in the first place. — Luke
Maybe it helps that Witt notices that we learn our whole lives in learning something new (or something like that). That we already: follow, explain ourselves, disobey, judge, defend, etc. So we are not teaching "what it means", as if providing the correct directions, delineating ahead of time what it is to "obey", all other actions being judged as incorrect. I may ask why you didn't obey, say, the golden rule, and you may claim that you did, and then go on to try to justify how what you did was still an instance of obeying the rule. If Kripke's reading is correct, the discussion of what is right happens before my personal action, upon which I am judged. If we take Witt to be reserving judgment, then we begin a dialogue of what it is to, say, treat the other as having a soul (p, 152; 3rd 2001), or convince ourselves we can not know them (p. 192). -
Bedrock Rules: The Mathematical and The Ordinary (Cavell-Kripke on Wittgenstein)Depends on what you refer to as "rules of math". For instance, the Law of the Excluded Middle is useful in traditional or standard math, but not allowed in constructive math. Turmoil in the jungles of the mind. — jgill
I believe that is a rule of logic, but, yes, I'm thinking more of addition. -
What are the "Ordinary Language Philosphy" solutions to common philosophical problems?It's more that philosophers will read a series of books written in response to each other, and assume that what's talked about in those books must be universally meaningful or interesting, or get at what problems intrinsically confront human beings in some interesting way. The problem is that their scope is typically limited, and so they're typically wrong — Snakes Alive
Are you sure you're in the right forum...? -
Bedrock Rules: The Mathematical and The Ordinary (Cavell-Kripke on Wittgenstein)Weren’t you instructing me (or “someone”)? How does your not giving up on me in your instruction (about what constitutes obeying a rule) suddenly become you and I both resisting philosophy’s anxiety? How does that help me? — Luke
The fear is of the inability to justify obeying a rule or justify how we obey rules. Both Cavell and Kripke leave that possibility open, but Kripke's picture pits "what we typically do" against your instincts, in judgment of your authority, in a sense, before our discussion even gets started. This is to cave into the anxiety of leaving it up to us, to the vision that there is more to us than rules and conventions, that such discussions can be reasonable, between conformity and exclusion. -
Bedrock Rules: The Mathematical and The Ordinary (Cavell-Kripke on Wittgenstein)What do I mean when I say that the teacher judges that, for certain cases, the pupil must give the 'right' answer? I mean that the child has given the same answer that he himself would give... that he judges that the child is applying the procedure he himself is inclined to apply. — Kripke, p 90 (emphasis added).
-
What are the "Ordinary Language Philosphy" solutions to common philosophical problems?I hadn't noticed it, and have not read Cavell, although I have addressed Kripke's Wittgenstein before. But I'm not sure there is more to be said than is set out in §201. — Banno
This would be the point at #217 where we are no longer looking at interpreting a rule, but examining the act of obeying a rule; how we teach that and the implications when that falls apart. Cavell and Kripke are similar in believing things can still fall apart, but differ in how we keep it (put it back) together. -
What are the "Ordinary Language Philosphy" solutions to common philosophical problems?I'm wary of claims like [ that we are separate and knowledge is limited ] since there is no a priori reason to listen to philosophers about what is or isn't part of the human condition — Snakes Alive
Well all they have are a clear and thorough descriptions and examples at hand, but if you feel that philosophy has nothing legitimate or worthwhile to say about doubt, fear of uncertainty, and the desire for control, than maybe you haven't been gripped by the necessity philosophy can instill, which differs from the solidity of the method of science.
One of the things I like about OLP is that it is able to treat problems as they arise in their native home. The bad flip side of this is that its refusal to create an abstract theory or set of procedures prevents it from being very effective in a lot of practical environments. — Snakes Alive
I agree with the globalization of skeptical doubt, but Witt and Cavell uncover a informative reason the skeptic needs/wants that jump (I tried to get into this about Witt's Lion Quote in another discussion). I'm not sure OLP doesn't have a set of practical procedures--it is being used in aesthetics and literary theory and education. -
Bedrock Rules: The Mathematical and The Ordinary (Cavell-Kripke on Wittgenstein)Isn’t it just the case that we obey the rule because that’s the practice/convention and that’s what people typically do here? — Luke
We can point to rules, we can give examples, we can threaten consequences; at a certain point sometimes they run out, you don't continue as expected--it is meant to be a situation which summons skepticism.
Or else we don’t follow the rule for whatever reason, yet the rule still exists because that’s how most people do this particular thing, as a rule. — Luke
Kripke's take on the passage is that this leaves us with only the options of following the rule, change the rule, or be excluded--that it is conformity to a rule. Where Cavell takes Witt as showing that people's judgments are attuned, they share the same interests, etc.--not as an agreement, but because our lives are similar. Because this happens mostly implicitly, he is trying to make explicit a case in which it doesn't happen. And we can do lots of things, but we do not just point to a rule. So the exhaustion of justifications for how you should obey a rule, make a wish, apologize, mean what you say, etc. can be that you refuse to follow the rules, but it can also be that we have not yet imagined all the implications, shown you how our interests are aligned, etc.--that there is not only force and defiance, which says something about knowledge and reason and pre-determined deontological morals (rules). -
What are the "Ordinary Language Philosphy" solutions to common philosophical problems?This thread is now an excellent example of why ordinary language philosophy is both important and useful. Especially the bit about focusing on specifics. — Banno
Meanwhile this discussion lies ignored with no response. Either way, not winning. -
What are the "Ordinary Language Philosphy" solutions to common philosophical problems?I think that topics like "what it's like", "mind-body problem" and a few others can be, if not solved, then thought about properly using ordinary language. But these issues continue going. — Manuel
Again, it's not to get to a problem "thought about properly" (with exceptions). And it is not using a certain type of language, words, terms. It is an investigation into the ordinary criteria we have for language that informs us about the criteria we set for philosophy. And the reason these problems continue going is because, for example, one drive of the human is to not need the human--philosophy's problems shed light on the human condition. OLP is just a more productive way of doing that I've found.
And who belongs in OLP is also a bit messy. As you say, Austin, Strawson and other get grouped under this heading. At the same time, it seems to me as if some facets OLP are be closely related to logical positivism. Carnap comes to mind as someone who tried to use ordinary language to solve "big problems". Also A.J. Ayer. — Manuel
Because it is not a theory (not knowledge--an explanation) and does not have a common purpose, the method is used for a lot of things. But logical positivism is the exact nemesis of Wittgenstein's later work, and A.J. Ayer is the example Austin uses of a "descriptive fallacy". -
What are the "Ordinary Language Philosphy" solutions to common philosophical problems?The belief, I do have, (all the time) is that language intends some coding and decoding of information. The success of the sounds to carry information was successful prior to talking about it in a strange way. — Cheshire
What if the "coding" "language" "intends" is something hidden, forgotten? That we need to reflect on when it is not successful?
If we didn't know what we were saying(when you say it), then we couldn't talk about it; could we? — Cheshire
People mostly don't know what they are saying when they say it. Only the "what you are saying" is not the "meaning" of the words, but their criteria for identity, the way they are judged, the responsibilities we are expected to uphold, etc.--what makes a mistake different than an accident.
I'm skeptical of claims that regard insight into meaning delivered in the most difficult to comprehend way. — Cheshire
Some things you can't tell people--or that they are so resistant to, they can only see for themselves. And you better skip Emerson, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, etc.
some how this thread defies a desire to be understood. — Cheshire
I think you mean a desire to understand; and that is not a desire to force something, constrain it, require of it a basic explanation.
Or get stuck on a raft with @Banno and mock each other while drifting, slowly, nowhere.. -
What are the "Ordinary Language Philosphy" solutions to common philosophical problems?
I'm going to tread lightly here, as all I am trying to point out is that modern OLP is relevant and important to the future of philosophy.
on inspection, the philosopher is either confused, or is expressing nascently some desire to refer to what is normally called a fox using a different word, 'wolf' – for some reason. Hence the issue, if there is one, is linguistic. — Snakes Alive
Let's take the example of the skeptic, who wants to say knowledge is essentially groundless. Now most people would put OLP in the camp that says, "No it is not!", only by means of showing that the skeptic is confused about what they are saying (or saying meaning is use). But Wittgenstein (and, after, Cavell) are able to show that there is a truth to skepticism, that knowledge is limited--we are separate (see The Claim of Reason). Now this is not "linguistic"; it is part of the human condition. -
What are the "Ordinary Language Philosphy" solutions to common philosophical problems?Yeah, that could be attempted trying to figure out what are the instances in which people use words to either refer or shout or anything else people do with words. — Manuel
OLP is not trying to come up with "all the conditions" or instances, but just to compare the ordinary criteria we use in saying something like "I believe it might rain" (a hypothesis), or "I really believe in the Dodgers this year" (feel strongly), compared to the goal of some philosophy to differentiate belief from truth, and comparing the difference in the criteria. And this isn't to say OLP is trying to find or impose the "correct" way, though Austin may feel stronger about that. -
What are the "Ordinary Language Philosphy" solutions to common philosophical problems?OLP informs what it means to say "I know"? — Cheshire
OLP makes claims** about the implications of when, for example, we say, "I know your phone number". How it matters, what counts as an instance of it, in what ways it is meaningful to us. Here I am either confirming that you have given it to me, or I am making an assertion for which I can produce evidence to justify; i.e., that I can tell you what it is. But we also say, "I know" when someone makes a claim upon us, like, "I am in pain", which tells us about the problem of other minds, because we cannot confirm with knowledge that the other is in pain; so in this sense we acknowledge it, which also tells us something about our moral lives. **this is a type of claim I explain in an earlier discussion on OLP.
People have been arguing about what it is "I know" means. — Cheshire
If you are looking at the criteria for when/why we say it, the implications of saying it, the responsibilities we are expected to answer for; you are arguing about what knowledge is.
The philosophical problem best addressed by OLP is the phrase "I know". — Cheshire
I believe, I mean, I think, I understand, I see, I intended, I doubt... -
What is "the examined life"?...the examined life is of importance to Socrates in that it may lead to various terms that lead to a better life. Such terms can be called, "enlightened", "rational", "virtuous".
Yet, without context these terms are ambiguous in terms of living an examined life. If we to take what Socrates said as important to ourselves, then what does it mean to live an examined life, as surely it is to our benefit to do so?
Do you think it boils down to ethics again? How so?
Or more technically, what kind of analysis or even methodology should a person incorporate when doing this examination? Isn't it really psychoanalysis?
Contemplation seems to be the natural arising thought in regards to the issue. So, what kind of contemplation? — Shawn
Well I hate to bring up a methodology by name being hammered out (upon) elsewhere, but the examination (contemplation) of ordinary thresholds and procedures (criteria) in contexts, for, as an example: an excuse, teaches us about ourselves (our actions) and how we take responsibility and avoid it, etc. The further argument, by Wittgenstein among others, is this makes one a better person, or able to see (be enlightened as to) where our part comes in (what virtue is). Socrates, unfortunately, was only looking for one (kind of) answer, rather than necessary for each practice (concept) in its own way. -
What are the "Ordinary Language Philosphy" solutions to common philosophical problems?"What are the "Ordinary Language Philosophy" solutions to common philosophical problems? — Chaz
I guess I got sidetracked by the poor depiction of OLP that I didn't even answer the question (@chad @Manuel @god must be atheist @Amalac @Cheshire @Banno)
Stanley Cavell examines the Problem of the Other Minds in "Knowing and Acknowledging" and covers a lot of ground on skepticism in his work; Austin examines the standard of true/false statements in How to Do Things With Words; Wittgenstein examines why we want a referential picture of meaning and what that means about the limitations of knowledge, and then the ethical position we are in; Nietszche uses examples of the things we say and do to show that our moral realm is affected by our desires, and how history plays a part, as well as our part; Emerson and Thoreau are drawing out our ordinary criteria from so far inside that it almost doesn't seem like they are doing philosophy, or that it applies, say, to Descartes, when Emerson says "we dare not say, 'I think,' 'I am,' ". I would even argue that Socrates is doing OLP, but that he ignores all the criteria except the ones he has in his back pocket. -
What are the "Ordinary Language Philosphy" solutions to common philosophical problems?OLP makes claims about the ordinary (non-metaphysical, let's say) criteria we have for different language in different situations, for the purpose of shedding light on philosophical problems. — Tony Nickles
Look me in the eye and claim this isn't bullshitting. I don't mean can you rationalize it either. Rather, is there really information content that could be further examined? In a meaningful way; as it applies to any philosophical problem called X. X=? — Cheshire
I edited that comment to say I provided Malcolm's example (about "I know") above, and Austin's as well. Cavell (in Must We Mean What We Say) draws out Austin's examination of "intention": his finding (claim) that one condition is that something has to be "phishy" compared to our ordinary criteria for an action in order for there to be (the possibility of) an intention (see the cows and donkeys above). Now if we have criteria for pulling off an action correctly (felicitously Austin will say), apart from true/false, then we have a rational way to discuss a moral situation (understanding excuses, judgment, etc.), and also a explanation of the "normative" nature of language/our actions--you may say anything you want; at a certain point you are no longer, say, apologizing, or, playing chess (Witt's example). That conversation is the one Socrates started, Kant tried to finish, Nietzsche pried open again; one which we want finished, and ahead of our actions, with certainty, etc. Philosophy itself is under investigation (again). -
What are the "Ordinary Language Philosphy" solutions to common philosophical problems?Meta-semantics? — Cheshire
Semantics smacks of only about words, or limited in importance to language. When OLP examines the criteria of what we say when, we learn about our lives.
First, words are our tools...
Secondly, words are not (except in their own little corner) facts or things:...
...these surely are likely to be more sound, since they have stood up to the long test of the survival of the fittest, and more subtle, at least in all ordinary and reasonably practical matters... — Austin
The second [ quote ] both negates it and muddies the water. — Cheshire
He is alluding to the historical argument that corresponds words to "meanings" or "thoughts", as if these are facts or things--that they refer to/from them.
The third explains... it's authoritarian dismissal as the emperor's new wardrobe and served to maintain the religious madness we are still trying to cure. Did that make sense? Not asking for agreement; just is it a coherent claim about a thing? — Cheshire
Austin is defensively dismissive of philosophy's profundity over our ordinary criteria. Wittgenstein does a better job of investigating what philosophy wants in supplanting our ordinary criteria, and what it says about the human condition.
The point I should be making is that if you can't say something coherent about simply 'words', then stop. — Cheshire
The desire for "coherency" and the attitude that words are simple, are some of the reasons philosophy has theories of language (all of it), and meaning (in every case, for every thing). Your unwillingness to look further may hide the need for a certain answer. -
What are the "Ordinary Language Philosphy" solutions to common philosophical problems?"I'm only saying that people refer, it's is an act that people do. They can refer with words, as is often the case, or with gestures. — Manuel
I agree; OLP would be looking into what (ordinary criteria) makes it "referring" in different cases, maybe how it is differentiated from implying, in order to see how "referring" is held to different (metaphysical) criteria at times, such as:
Either words refer or they don't. — Manuel
Austin and Wittgenstein's starting point is that, yes, words can refer, but they do not only refer. They marry us, make promises, lie. That not only are things not meaningful in one way, but everything has its own ways; each of: agreeing, condescending, threatening, pointing, playing chess. (Some of these are/can be done with words, some not, of course.) And that maybe there are reasons for this, for us wanting referring to work a particular way.
@bongo fury
That Frodo depends on words isn't that "Frodo" refers to words. "Frodo" refers to a hobbit, and hobbits exist only in a fictional piece of writing. — Michael
And how OLP might help here is with the criteria for referring as naming; and with how we use "existing" as, say: alive; or: among the records we have but not all that we might find; or: "real" as opposed to literary, but then what if we want to say hobbits have an actual impact on me, as much as people (who can come off as unreal)? or that some people are alive, but lack existence (their self does). I realize these are mostly questions, but part of the point is that you must answer these for yourself for them to be philosophically relevant (they are not statements), that you could continue to answer these types of questions to shed light on why we want a referent to be a certain type of thing. -
What are the "Ordinary Language Philosphy" solutions to common philosophical problems?I see, you did not take my advice on how NOT to explain things with negatives — god must be atheist
I'm not sure we agree on what the grammar is for advice. When someone doesn't ask questions but just makes blind assertions, one answer is: well, no, not quite, more like....
You used two negatives with one blurred, muddled, ineffectual, vague positive claim. — god must be atheist
Well unless you have a counterclaim or a question, this is just rude; and just because you don't understand it, doesn't make it any on those things.
So... I don't know your point, until you state it in ordinary language. Simple, ordinary, common language. — god must be atheist
This is the most common misconception--granted, thus, it is a dumb name--but the last thing OLP can do is "state" things "with" "simple" "common" language. It makes claims about the ordinary (non-metaphysical, let's say) criteria we have for different language in different situations, for the purpose of shedding light on philosophical problems. I do provide examples elsewhere in this thread. -
What are the "Ordinary Language Philosphy" solutions to common philosophical problems?Critiques are solutions too. Inasmuch as solutions can be found. In the sense that 5 <> 6 is a solution much like 5=5 is a solution.
***
After all, solutions point to a set that satisfy the criteria in question — god must be atheist
OLP does not point to a set that satisfies (and, again, notice the skeptical fear of inconclusiveness); it uncovers the criteria of how we even are satisfied (here), or not. And it is not a "solution", say, on the terms/grounds of mathematics. See The Mathematical and the Ordinary. -
What are the "Ordinary Language Philosphy" solutions to common philosophical problems?Carnap devoted an essay on the impossibility of metaphysics, it had a strong flavor of "ordinary language philosophy". But it's an open question as to if Carnap succeeded in showing that metaphysics is nonsense. — Manuel
I don't know Carnap, but Wittgenstein literally embodies (with the interlocutor) our tendency for something certain (like a Platonic form, or positivist logic), and Cavell explores what that means for us, our struggle to overcome the fear of our responsibility.
referring is an act people do, it's not something that a word does. — Manuel
Let's try this OLP style: "Referring"--as is promising, indicating, distinguishing--is a concept ("knowing" "intending", say, practices). I would offer that one ordinary criteria of referring is that it is something words can do, that you actually can do it (get the referring done) using only words, that the words are the doing of it--"I refer you to Exhibit A". With those words, the act of referring is accomplished. Well, yes, you said it, but you can (or not) acknowledge that saying: "I convince you" does not make one convinced (but we can talk about what/how words convinced us). And I even do something to you; I have referred you to something, as in: given notice. There is no now avoiding being referred, even if you don't, thereafter, actual refer to whatever someone has referred you to.
That can be an ordinary language philosophy solution to a problem. But there's bound to be disagreements. — Manuel
My claim is that these are the workings, the criteria for identity, the terms of correctness, of referring; if you disagree (on the features), there may be examples or counter-examples, after which I might: see and grant that something is an important distinction, admit I was thinking of something else, point towards the concept in different contexts, etc.--but we have a process for coming to agreement, call it rational--even if only to learn how we/to disagree. Now can we learn anything from this, or from looking more into this, about the philosophical idea of reference?
Also, the desire to never have a disagreement, fueled by skepticism, creates the opposite of the kind of "ordinariness" that language has. -
What are the "Ordinary Language Philosphy" solutions to common philosophical problems?It's a mode of critique more than a set of solutions. It's basic tenet might be "cut the bullshit". — Banno
Austin for sure. Then Wittgenstein started to look at how we bullshit ourselves, and what it is about us that we want to bullshit ourselves, drawn out by Cavell into an investigation of our shitty human condition. -
What are the "Ordinary Language Philosphy" solutions to common philosophical problems?Thanks for writing the above, but I actually don't see how it relates to our argument. My position is that a summary may be a good starting point while not being (or else being) a good summary at all, of philosophical (other other types) of enquiry for the otherwise uninitiated. Your counter point was to decry three-sentence or shorter garment label descriptions (so to speak) of any philosophical trend, particularly the trend of ordinary language philosophy. — god must be atheist
If it wasn't just advice, I would argue that philosophy is not about acquiring knowledge, that your thoughts in reading it are more important than what it is telling you. Thus starting with a summary reduces philosophy to a set of answers people judge and regurgitate or dismiss; it trivializes the point of going through the process of being changed by reading. Not just changing your mind, as in now you hold a different opinion, but changing the actual way in which you think, broadening your sense of the world, realizing a greater version of your self. Wittgenstein does not have a "theory of meaning" anyone (he) can tell you. Even the method of OLP can not be explained by its outcomes (as is being assumed here); there are no conclusions; no "maxim" or answer, e.g., when questions are framed without any sense of the picture itself. Most importantly, the postulations of what is implied when we say ___, are for you to see (come to) for yourself, or they have no force; they are not arguments, not true/false "theories" or statements--what is there to summarize? -
What are the "Ordinary Language Philosphy" solutions to common philosophical problems?If we follow the late Wittgenstein's maxim that the meaning of a word (or of a sentence) is its use in a particular language game, then all that matters is that everybody understands what the phrase means in the context of ordinary life activities, and have no need of analyzing the logical structure of the phrase to do so. — Amalac
The whole point of OLP is to "analyze the logical structure" of our concepts. Not as a normative authority, or to "make everyone understand", or to come to (uncover) some agreement. It is to shed light on the problems of traditional philosophy, as our language (the criteria for it) reflects our interests, and judgments, and the ways things fall apart, etc. This can be a study, as Austin does, or when we do not know how to continue with a concept, as Wittgenstein examines.
If we follow the late Wittgenstein's maxim that the meaning of a word (or of a sentence) is its use in a particular language game — Amalac
And, again, Wittgenstein examined lots of words (and the different but ordinary criteria there are for judging in which of their sense they have been used, in this context) in finding out there is no one way in which words are meaningful to us--that there is no maxim. -
What are the "Ordinary Language Philosphy" solutions to common philosophical problems?Thanks for providing an example of your point: — god must be atheist
Yeah, right--the irony was not lost on me. Another specific example from Malcolm is coming up with circumstances when we would say: "I know" and then see and describe what those instances imply about our various criteria for that concept (realizing that a concept can have multiple options--"senses" Witt says--ways they make sense, ways they can be used in different contexts.
One sense of "I Know" is that I am certain: "I know when the sun will rise today"; the criteria for this might be that I can give evidence of that certainty, etc. This appears to be philosophy's one and only use and preoccupation. Second, we can say "I know New York", as in: I know my way around; I can show you; Third, I know (knew) that, as in to confirm or agree with what you said; and Fourth, I know, as in to sympathize with you. Cavell uses this last sense to shed light on our knowledge of another's pain--we don't "know it" in the first sense, we acknowledge it, recognize and accept (or ignore or reject) the claim their expression of pain makes on me. -
What are the "Ordinary Language Philosphy" solutions to common philosophical problems?I didn't mean to be condescending, but you are better off diving into the text yourself and making your own mistakes. Especially about a method that is not about arriving at theories or making arguments or explaining. A knee-jerk, superficial, three-sentence takeaway can't be anything but misleading.
OLP is not about knowledge or being told anything; it's about texts, and going through a process; answering the questions, seeing for yourself. -
What are the "Ordinary Language Philosphy" solutions to common philosophical problems?Wittgenstein's basic idea was that there is no general solution to issues other than the custom of the community. — Hanover
This takes Wittgenstein as solving (or trying to solve) skepticism (or something else) with communal agreement--that "forms of life" are somehow foundational. This is a cliff-note misunderstanding; like that OLP champions "ordinary language"; which will solve philosophy, or make it irrelevant. I'm sorry, but this is just a jealous dismissal without any real understanding, which unfortunately happens more often than not really though.
From Wikipedia: — Chaz
Oh please for all that is good in the world save me from philosophical summaries (even mine).
Antony Nickles
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