A social overhaul would be necessary for that to be meaningful to anyone. In other words, you're stepping out of your time in history to make that observation. It gets lonely analyzing the earth from a vantage point on the moon, so it's a rare insight. — frank
Likely someone wanting a Ferrari would try to give him more than the asking price. Because why not? — ssu
I reject the notion that Mary could know everything there is to know about color vision without seeing color.
— creativesoul
That is the whole point of the thought-experiment. It's an argument against reductive physicalism. Compare it to this statement:
In Consciousness Explained, I described a method, heterophenomenology, which was explicitly designed to be 'the neutral path leading from objective physical science and its insistence on the third-person point of view, to a method of phenomenological description that can (in principle) do justice to the most private and ineffable subjective experiences, while never abandoning the methodological principles of science.’
— Daniel Dennett, The Fantasy of First-Person Science
So Dennett is arguing that it is possible, presumably, to know everything there is to know about the seeing of color, without the first-person experience. That is what the Mary's Room experiment is directed against. — Wayfarer
...you can know about color vision in a theoretical sense - rods, cones, optical nerves, wavelengths, absorption, and so on - without having seen colours... — Wayfarer
That doesn't make sense. — ssu
My analogy assumed that rattlesnake does indeed taste like chicken. If that is the case, I know quite a bit of what eating rattlesnake will be like: like eating chicken. Escargo tastes nothing like venison. Furthermore, one is a mollusk, the other is a deer. — RogueAI
Is it your contention that the experience will be similar to Mary seeing color for the first time? — RogueAI
There will be some differences, but it's still just putting chunks of meat in your mouth and chewing. — RogueAI
Some of us think inflation happens when you print too much money, or simply create from nothing new debt to pay back the old debt. — ssu
The reductive physicalist can identify and thoroughly explain how all sorts of 'the parts' commonly associated with conscious subjective experience work physically(See Dennett's Quining Qualia). The opponent will simply state that the hard problem hasn't been solved, or say "that's the easy(soft) problems"... Yada, yada, yada.
It's akin to the physicalist pouring hundreds of thousands of grains of sand onto the floor and pointing at the result, while the opponent says... that's not enough to count as a pile of sand. — creativesoul
Hmmm... but you explicitly forbid physicalist accounts from appealing to obscurity???
I understand that prima facie it seems hypocritical, but let me clarify. I am fine with soft problems having obscurities in their explanations but not hard problems. That is the difference. — Bob Ross
Fair enough, let me try to elaborate on those terms.
From an analytic idealist’s perspective, one’s organs that correspond to those senses you listed (e.g., auditory, gustatory, olfactory, etc.) are extrinsic representations of those senses of the immaterial mind within your perception (and other’s perceptions). I am not saying that your senses exist only within your subjective experience, because subjective experience is synonymous, in the case of humans, with perception and your senses are not contingent on your perception to exist (however their extrinsic, physical representations do depend on perceptions). — Bob Ross
Uh, but the price will rise because of the higher demand. It's the fundamentals of demand and supply. I mean, if a hundred people would desperately want something that costs 10$ and there's only one item left, you think that nobody of them would buy it for 11$ or even 20$? — ssu
Can I not be said to know that without knowing what the tree is as it is in its unperceived status? — Janus
But that line of reasoning is untenable. There is no way to compare noumena and phenomena in order to determine that the one is not the other.
— creativesoul
But I know that my perception of the tree is not the tree, right? My perceptions are constituted by phenomena: sights, sounds, tactile sensations and so on, but the tree is not merely a sight, or a sound (say wind in the leaves) or a tactile sensation (say the feel of its bark) or the sum of those. Can I not be said to know that without knowing what the tree is as it is in its unperceived status? — Janus
If someone says that eating rattlesnake is like eating chicken, I know what the experience of eating a rattlesnake will be like. — RogueAI
My point was that the hard problem can only be accounted for by an obscurity, — Bob Ross
I still have no idea what point you are attempting to make. — Janus
I don't think of the ideas of noumena and in-itself as add-ons, but as qualifications marking the limits of knowledge. — Janus
Personally I have no idea what it's like to be me let alone you, or a fucking bat! — Tom Storm
There is no sensible meaningful answer to it.
— creativesoul
Which I think overstates the case, for reasons I have spelt out. — Tom Storm