The original use of "true" was set out earlier by me, and it meant consistent with what occurred. I personally do not employ the notion of "fact" because of - as you like to say - all of its philosophical baggage. I tend to stick to the long form. But, given that not all true statements are so as a result of being consistent with what happened and/or is happening, it seems reasonable to extend its application to being consistent with the way things were and/or are as well as the case at hand. I say this, if for no other reason than to account for things like claims about personal preferences, as well as social conventions and other parts of reality that emerge via language use.

It's interesting to me, as well, how the original use did not involve being taken account of. I mean, we began using the term "true" long before ever considering that and/or how we were. The same goes for "truth". It was only later that skepticism over the use emerged.

Seems to me to be a refinement of language over time. — Banno

Don't refinements usually imply improvement?

Thoughts? — ThinkOfOne

Karma presupposes supernatural record keeping and judgment.

The reassurance was directed at the etymology. — Banno

The etymology is interesting, because the term "true" was first used in the sense of being consistent with what has/had occurred, long prior to the term "fact" being coined and/or being used in a manner inconsistent with what had occurred. The first use was that sense, what has/had ocurred. I cannot be too certain off the top of my head, but it seems like a couple of centuries went by...

"Fact" in the sense of the case at hand is notably different than "fact" as what has/had occurred. Those are both distinct from "fact" as a true statement.

You're welcome.

:wink:

If being true means being consistent with fact, then a true statement is consistent with fact, where "fact" is what has occurred. True statements are not facts. To quite the contrary, true statements are so, only if, only when, and only because they are consistent with fact. — creativesoul

Sure. — Banno

And then...

I'd say they are both facts because they are both true statements, and facts are true statements. — Moliere

Yep. — Banno

:brow:

There are only variables that can be substituted for English sentences... — Moliere

Yeah, I think that that is a key consideration here. Logic is an accounting practice of that which already existed in its entirety prior to being taken into account.

True statements are sentences. Facts are not. — creativesoul

Yep. — Banno

1. snow is white - fact
2. "snow is white" - sentence
3. "snow is white" is true - fact
4. '"snow is white" is true' - sentence.

You seem to think that (1) and (2) are the same. They are not. But (1) and (3) are logically equivalent. Or if you prefer, (2) and (4) are equivalent. — Banno

(3) is about the sentence "snow is white". (1) is not. How are they both facts? As a result of logical equivalence?

Truth conditions are on the right

True statements are sentences. Facts are not.

I want to run something by you and any others who may be reading this.

The most common Old English use had it that truth was the quality of being steadfast, loyal, faithful, trustworthy, honest, steady in adhering to promises and friends, etc. That is... "truth" originally meant the quality of being true, and when something was true it was steadfast, loyal, faithful, trustworthy, honest and steady in adhering to promises and friends, etc. Such use of "truth" seemed to be more applicable to people. Another Old English use, the sense of "something that is true", was first recorded mid-14c., whereas the sense meaning "accuracy, correctness" is from 1560s.

The term "true" was first used in the sense of being "consistent with fact" around c. 1200. Given that the English language began being written around c. 600, it comes as no surprise to me that English speakers would begin using it "true" to mean consistent with what occurred because they found themselves faced with conflicting stories about the very same events, especially when amidst much denser populations, many of which that had written record. They needed a means for distinguishing dependable and reliable stories from those that were not. Hence, true stories are consistent with what occurred. Stories that are not true, are not.

If being true means being consistent with fact, then a true statement is consistent with fact, where "fact" is what has occurred. True statements are not facts. To quite the contrary, true statements are so, only if, only when, and only because they are consistent with fact.

"snow is white " is true iff s..........All we need to do now is work out what s might be.
— Banno

My attempt:

I believe that I am observing something that is atmospheric water vapour frozen into ice crystals and falling in light white flakes or lying on the ground as a white layer

Rather than keep saying "I believe that I am observing something that is atmospheric water vapour frozen into ice crystals and falling in light white flakes or lying on the ground as a white layer" it is more convenient to say "I believe that I am observing snow"

Where "snow" is defined as "something that is atmospheric water vapour frozen into ice crystals and falling in light white flakes or lying on the ground as a white layer".

In other words, "white" is part of the definition of "snow".

I need no knowledge of the world to know that "snow is white", only knowledge of language.

In Tarski's terms, I can say "snow is white" and a German can say "schnee ist weiss". These are said within the object language

The metalanguage is where words are defined, in that "white" is part of the definition of "snow", "white" means "weiss" and "snow" means "schnee"

Therefore, we can replace "snow is white" is true iff s by "snow is white" is true iff "white" is part of the definition of "snow", "white" means "weiss" and "snow means "schnee"

Therefore s = the linguistic declaration that "white" is part of the definition of "snow", "white" means "weiss" and "snow" means "schnee". — RussellA

Just wondering if you saw this ...

Probably best not to delve too deeply into belief though, given this is a thread about truth.

Well...

Unless that is, truth emerges within some language less creatures' thought and belief formation itself as compared/contrasted to emerging as a property of true statements, assertions, claims, propositions, etc.

:wink:

So be it...

I'll have to read it then. His notion of "proposition" must be notably different to yours in that they cannot be equivalent to statements or assertions. I hope he's not one of those who claim that propositions are somehow existentially independent of language. Either way, I've found him helpful in a few ways. If there are some things I disagree with, then it would be quite normal. As before, I'll give it a look. Thanks for the link...

Well shit!

No link. For some reason, I believed you'd given one. Do you have one? I do not remember that title, so I doubt if I have a copy of it. I'll have to look to be sure...

Searle employs the objective/subjective dichotomy in interesting ways when he draws a distinction between using them in an epistemic sense and an ontological sense and the historical conflation of the two when it comes to any and all positions which deny direct perception... idealism(s), arguments from illusion, argument from science, Stove's Gem, etc.

I've had several of his books for years. That library will not be thoroughly cracked and enjoyed until I have more spare time. Been collecting for over a decade though.

The proposition is the content of the belief, not the object of the beleif.
— Searle

Making the Social World — Banno

He's not talking about language less creatures' beliefs.

For the casual readers' sake alone...

A cat's belief that a dog is in the house is not an attitude that the cat has towards the proposition "a dog is in the house". That's patently impossible. The cat's belief does not consist of meaningful marks or attitudes towards meaningful marks. It consists of correlations drawn between a dog, sheer terror(fear), and all sorts of other directly perceptible things.

Here I was hoping to attain mutual concessions in order to further the discussion beyond the sticking points we always seem to arrive at. I am willing to concede that language less belief can be put into propositional form. I was hoping at least that you would concede that a language less animal is incapable of having attitudes towards propositions.

The insult is petty and it's not true. Ah well...

Our report of a cat's belief comes in propositional form. Cats cannot have attitudes towards propositions such that they take them to be true. You know that.

Cookie's belief that a dog is in the house is not an attitude that she has towards that proposition such that she holds it as true. Rather, it's more of the direct presentation of the dog being in the house. Searle's account of direct perception and intentionality works well here. I've been watching Searle, being the exciting guy that I am...

Isn't part of this because they have taken Plato's cave allegory to heart? The assumption being that those illusory shadows are everywhere and that only adults and smart people can work to discover the truth behind the deception of appearances. — Tom Storm

Perhaps.

I think Searle has it right when he talks about the mistakes that have been repeated, in some form or another, for hundreds and hundreds of years. It pleases me that a highly respected authority has so much to say that dovetails nicely to my own position.

A twenty-seven-month-old child can know when "there's nothing in there" is false, when the speaker is talking about a fridge. I gave that real life example earlier. She demonstrated that knowledge. She has no idea whatsoever about theories of truth. The terms "truth" and "falsehood" are not even understood by her. She certainly does not understand the logic of truth.
— creativesoul

Which is why use tells us much more about these concepts, i.e., tells us much more about meaning and understanding. — Sam26

Hey Sam!

Indeed. It's puzzling how a child that can barely string two or three words together knew when she heard the claim that it was not true, and then went on to demonstrate that much, and yet highly educated people seem to have talked themselves right out of that.

I think that that qualifies for Witt's notion of bewitchment. The story may be able to tell us something about hinge propositions???

Truth is not belief - already covered:
Truth is a unary. T(p) is a general representation of the statements, propositions, sentences, facts, or whatever you will, that we cast as true: "p is true"

Belief is binary. B(x,p) is a general representation of the statements, propositions, sentences, facts, or whatever you will, p, that we cast as being believed by x. "x holds that p is true"
— Banno

Further, one chooses between a realist and an antirealist grammar. The best grammar for cats and mats is realist. — Banno

This is about our accounting practices. It restricts and/or limits all belief to propositional attitudes. While this is little to no problem at all if we're talking about language users who have and or develop propositional attitudes, it is quite problematic if we're talking about creatures that are incapable of having a propositional attitude but are perfectly capable of believing that a mouse is behind the tree, that a lizard is under the stove, that a dog is in the house, that food is in their food bowl, or that another cat is on the bed. So, while it works well for analyzing belief statements, the grammar of belief being put to use here is inherently inadequate for taking proper account of language less creatures' belief. It's found lacking in explanatory power.

Cats do not have an attitude towards propositions. They do not hold propositions as true. The T sentence cannot properly account for creatures incapable of having propositional attitudes, and thus, we cannot rightfully encapsulate a cat's belief within quotes on the left side as we do with language users for that would be a mischaracterization of the cat's belief(an accounting malpractice when used in such a way). However, and this is very interesting to me, when we do talk about what it would take in order for a cat's belief to be true, we find ourselves saying much the same thing as we do when it comes to propositional attitudes, despite the fact that cats are incapable of having and/or developing them.

Cookie's belief that a dog is in the house is true only if, only when, and only because a dog is in the house.

Such are the kinds of belief that some language less creatures are capable of forming, having, and/or holding. Much like us, they are more than capable of forming, having, and/or holding belief about what's going on around them. Unlike us, they are incapable of talking about their own thought and belief as a subject matter in its own right. Unlike us, they are incapable of considering what sorts of things can be true, and what it takes in order for them to be so. Unlike us, they are incapable of doubt and/or skepticism. Much like us, they are capable of forming, having, and/or holding true belief, false belief, as well as belief that is neither at the time(in the case of expectation).

Again, I find it very interesting that our analysis of what sorts of things can be true and what makes them so has no issue at all exhausting some language less creatures' belief, so long as it's not formal logic being used. Common language works just fine.

Is there any practical difference between understanding the logic of truth, and how to know the truth? — Yohan

A twenty-seven-month-old child can know when "there's nothing in there" is false, when the speaker is talking about a fridge. I gave that real life example earlier. She demonstrated that knowledge. She has no idea whatsoever about theories of truth. The terms "truth" and "falsehood" are not even understood by her. She certainly does not understand the logic of truth.

My point is that when you say "...but not-P is true", then you are using "is true" in a non-deflationary way. — Luke

Your critique(Pie's claim) reminds me of Moore's paradox.

This discussion is about what 'false' means. — Isaac

That's where you've staked your claims, as well as your objections, I suppose. You're not very good at providing valid objections. Just sayin'...

I find it quite telling that a twenty-seven-month-old child knows when "there's nothing in the fridge" is false
— creativesoul

Yet you've not demonstrated that to be the case within the context of this discussion... — Isaac

The fridge had stuff in it. Someone stated, "there's nothing in there", talking about the fridge. The statement was false. The child knew that the statement was false. She demonstrated that much.



:brow:

It seems rather indecorous of us to assume they're lying — Isaac

No need to assume that they're lying... They could be very confused about what sorts of things can be true and what it takes in order for them to be so.

Someone might, for example, take the position that "the cat on the mat" is true if and only if a reasonable number of their community agreed. I think they'd be wrong. Or that it can be "true for them". Again, wrong. But what are we to make of the fact that there are people who make such arguments. It seems rather indecorous of us to assume they're lying, or being stubborn. So it seems we've no choice but to concede that some people do not know when "the cat is on the mat" is true. — Isaac

Insincerity pervades everyday discourse, I find it highly suspicious for anyone who knows what "the cat is on the mat" means to deny that it is true only if, only when, and only because the cat is on the mat. If they have never ever thought about what sorts of things can be true and what it takes in order for them to be so, then we have an interesting case.

Upon what grounds would anyone deny that the statement "the cat is on the mat" is true only if, only when, and only because the cat is on the mat?

A twenty-seven-month-old child put her knowledge of when a statement is false on display for all to see. She was told "there's nothing in the fridge". She knew better. She uttered a toddler sized version of "Yes there is!" when she said "uh, huh!" as she opened the door to show the speaker that they were wrong! She pointed to things inside and said, "Ders dat, nnn dat, nnn dat...

She knows when "there's nothing in the fridge" is false.

I see no possible way for anyone to even be able to arrive at any philosophical position without already knowing at least as much as a child who's barely stringing two or three words together.

As written we can't 'all know' full well when it's not true otherwise there'd be no disagreements about that. There are. There are relativists, there are idealists, there are solipsists. — Isaac

I find it quite telling that a twenty-seven-month-old child knows when "there's nothing in the fridge" is false, and so many 'highly educated' adults seem to have somehow talked themselves right out of it.

:brow:

...

It's a category error to say that people in their ordinary conversations are speaking wrongly because they don't use a word in accordance with the rules set down for it's use in some given mental practice. — Isaac

Who has done that?

No, they are referring to truth. If they are understood, then that's what the word means. There's no god-given dictionary, and if there were it's certainly not the one you happen to have in your head. They may not be referring to truth in the sense you mean it, but you are not the authority on what the word 'truth' ought to mean. — Isaac

The irony. Pots and kettles once again.

I've had many discussions over the years with different people who talk like that. I knew some of them quite personally. I understood them just fine. "Your truth" refers to what that the listener believed to be true. The same holds good with "true for you".

it's simply not how the word is used.

On what authority do you define words for a language community which clearly uses them in defiance of your edict? — Isaac

Mirror mirror...

Pots and kettles...

I'm not defining terms for them. I have no issue at all with acknowledging different accepted uses. You seem a little chippy...

Not all senses of "truth" are on equal footing. Many nowadays use it when they're talking about what they and/or others believe. That's what's going on when someone utters "my truth", "your truth", "his truth", "her truth", "our truth", and/or "their truth". They are referring to belief. That kind of speech is often used to openly attribute respect and value to another's person by virtue of attributing respect and value to another's opinion and/or worldview. People take lots of stuff personally. The same thing is often happening when people say things like "everyone has a valid opinion". It's about showing consideration to others. So, that particular use isn't all bad(like morally unacceptable or anything), but there are much better ways of being considerate to others without sewing and perpetuating such confusion into the public domain.

Not all opinions are valid. Not all belief is true. It is best to keep that in mind.

...and ummmm.... I'm not alone in that, not in the least.

We all know full well when it's not true
— creativesoul

Nonsense. This would imply that there's never disagreement. — Isaac

That claim is not at odds with disagreeing about the claim. The point is that we all know full well what it takes in order for the statement to be true.

To your point, we do not always know when it is. We do quite often though. So, not nonsense at all, just not as clear as it could've been and not properly qualified.

We disagree when one of us believes the cat is on the mat and another does not. We both know full well that if the cat is there then the statement is true. We also both know full well that if the cat is not there, then the statement is false. We must know that much in order to even disagree upon whether or not the statement is true.

Whether or not the statement is true and what it takes in order for it to be so is perfectly well understood by many children under the age of four. My twenty-seven-month-old granddaughter knew full well when she heard someone say there was nothing in the fridge that that was false. She opened the door and showed the speaker their mistake. We all know full well when it's true because we all know full well what it takes in order to be so.

We all know full well that it's true when the cat is on the mat. That's all I was saying.

Take the statement "the cat is on the mat".

We all know full well when it's not true, because we also know full well what it means. Because we know what it means, we know what to look for and where to look in order to check and see.

When it comes to whether or not that particular statement is true...

It does not matter whether or not anyone believes that the cat is on the mat. It does not matter whether or not anyone would assent to the statement. It does not matter whether or not anyone has some disposition and/or attitude such that they take it to be the case.

That particular statement is true only if, only when, and only because the cat is on the mat.

Tarski's T sentence illustrates that beautifully.

Serendipitous storytelling timing!

:smile:

So what's your preferred understanding of truth ? — Pie

My understanding of truth, how it emerges, and how it works within all thought, belief, and statements thereof is not exactly conventional. Correspondence Theory is closest but has vestiges of historical mistaken accounting practices persisting. Tarski's 'explanation' is best, but I've been told that I misunderstand it, because to me it is a near perfect account of how a true statement is so by virtue of correspondence to the way things are, the case at hand, what's happened, is happening, and/or has yet to have happened(wrt predictions/expectations). My outright rejection of "propositions" as they've been historically conceived doesn't help either, given their continued prevalence. As we've touched upon elsewhere, my objection is based upon the fact that convention has it that truth requires language in a way that it is somehow existentially dependent upon it, such that where there has never been language, there could have never been truth. I've very good reason to reject that claim and hold otherwise, but I'll leave it at that for now.

A story may prove helpful...

There was a recent power outage after a storm in one of my sons' homes. The lack of electricity had already lasted for most of the day, and the power company informed everyone in the affected areas that it may take quite a while longer to restore power to everyone's homes. All the adults in the house were cognizant of the dangers of food spoilage, particularly the stuff in the fridge. As a result, there was a concerted effort to minimize potential losses by keeping the fridge closed as much as possible.

My not-quite-two-year-old grandchild had just begun putting more than one word together in speech. She had no clue what the word "truth" meant. She could not use the terms "true", "false", "not true", or any of the other common terms and words used to talk about true and false statements. However, she definitely knew when she heard a false claim about the contents of the fridge, even though she was barely capable of stringing words together, and could neither name nor describe a single item therein.

That fact is interesting and relevant.

So, the power is out, the adults are deliberately attempting to open the fridge as little as possible as a means to save the food within, when she walked towards the fridge extending her arm, fingers outstretched, as if to open the fridge door to look inside. This was already a habit of hers, to stand there holding the door wide open while looking all around inside to decide if she wanted anything she saw. All the adults in the home knew that much and they had all been long since attempting to discourage her from do so, even before the power outage. So, when one of them took notice of her intention to open the fridge, they also believed that she would once again stand in front of it with the door wide open while deciding if she wanted anything she saw. In a proactive attempt to put a halt to that, they sternly called out her name as a means of immediately getting her attention so that the door remained closed. It worked, temporarily at least. She stopped right in front of the fridge, her hand already on the handle of the door, looking back. He then goes on to say, in a much friendlier tone, "There's nothing in there" in an attempt to stop her from opening and holding the fridge door open and letting all the cool air out of it while she 'window shopped'. What he meant was that there was nothing that she needed at the time, because they were conserving the cool air within, but he did not say that, and she did not understand what he meant. She heard exactly what he said, understood exactly what those words meant, and knew that what he said was not true. The interesting part is that she knew all this even though she was completely incapable of expressing her knowledge with the terms I'm using to describe the situation.

Ahhh...but what she did do was sooo much better!

Instead, she furled her brow, displayed all the confidence that a toddler of that age can possibly muster, and retorted "Uh huh" while opening the door wide enough for him to be able see inside. After ensuring that he could see inside for himself, she began directly contradicting his claim that there was nothing inside the fridge by virtue of pointing to all the different things that were inside the fridge saying "There's that... and that... and that... and that..."

So, what can this situation tell us about truth and/or our understanding thereof?

It tells us quite clearly that a mastery of language is not necessary in order to be able to tell when some statements are true or false, or to already intuitively know how to check and see for ourselves as well as showing another that what they've said is not true. It shows us that we can already understand all of this, on a very basic level, long before having acquired the mastery of language replete with metacognitive endeavors that are required in order for us to be able to talk about it. It shows us that she understood how true claims correspond and false ones do not long before ever being capable of using those terms. She showed him that what he said was not true, and that she knew that much, despite her not being able to tell him.


It also shows us quite clearly that coherence played no role in her understanding, in her knowing that what he said was not true. She was not taken aback regarding whether or not his words followed the so-called 'rules' of correct inference. She was not criticizing the consistency of his language use. She was not keeping a keen eye on the form of his language use. She was not attempting to judge whether he said what he meant.

She was comparing what he said about the contents of the fridge to her knowledge of those contents. She already knew that some stuff was in the fridge, so she knew that what he said was not true. That comparison happened autonomously without the mastery of language required to be able to say so. She communicated to him that what he said was not true. She did not have the mastery of language in order to be able to tell him. So, she did so by virtue of the only means available to her at the time. She showed him that what he said about the contents of the fridge did not correspond to the contents of the fridge. In her doing so, she shows us that we need not be able to use the terms so often used in philosophical and normal everyday discourse in order to intuitively know that 1.)some meaningful statements are false, 2.)what makes them so, 3.)how to check and see for ourselves, or 4.)how to show someone else.

It's no stretch at all to extend that to knowing some meaningful statements are true, what makes them so, how to check for ourselves, and how to show others.

All long before having a linguistic framework replete with the terms "truth", "true", "false", etc...

So, I take it that you agree that "is true" adds nothing meaningful to a sincere belief statement? That truth is presupposed within belief statements?
— creativesoul

That's it, yes. "P is true" is "P"... — Pie

Yep. So long as we do not mistakenly take that farther and claim that all belief are equivalent to "P". They are not.

So, I take it that you agree that "is true" adds nothing meaningful to a sincere belief statement? That truth is presupposed within belief statements?