There is no denying that thinking about words is a kind of thought that needs words. Otherwise, there would be nothing to think about.
— creativesoul

True enough, but is it not therefore logical, and rational, to claim that thinking about anything except words, would not need them? — Mww

Well, no. Some things we think about are themselves existentially dependent upon words. If A is existentially dependent upon words, and thinking about A is existentially dependent upon A, then thinking about A is existentially dependent upon words.

Now my claim has just been that a complex argument or train of thought involving abstract concepts cannot be followed except in symbolic language terms — Janus

Yup.

In the complete absence of light and leaves there cannot be any experience of seeing them. In the complete absence of the biological machinery, there cannot be any experience of seeing them. Thus, the experience consists of both internal and external things. It most certainly follows that the experience is neither internal nor external for it consists of elements that are both. — creativesoul

So, ...

You've agreed to all of what's in the above quote.

I put it to you that whether or not experience is external, internal, and/or both is something that is not up to us any more than whether or not our biological machinery, the tree, leaves, and light are. Would you agree with that as well?

:brow:

...there is no fact of the matter concerning whether experience is internal, a combination of internal and external or neither internal nor external... — Janus

Never claimed otherwise. Red herring. Strawman. Non sequitur. Readers' choice.

There are better approaches.

In the complete absence of light and leaves there cannot be any experience of seeing them. In the complete absence of the biological machinery, there cannot be any experience of seeing them..

Do you object to either claim..? — creativesoul

Sure I agree, but I see those claims as being more obvious, more trivial,.. — Janus

Perfect. Do you object to what's directly below?

Thus, the experience consists of both internal and external things. It most certainly follows that the experience is neither internal nor external for it consists of elements that are both.

In the complete absence of light and leaves there cannot be any experience of seeing them. In the complete absence of the biological machinery, there cannot be any experience of seeing them... — creativesoul

So, to repeat myself, "these are just different ways of speaking, different ways of conceptually dividing and/ or sorting things". — Janus

I understood the first time. I agree, but that is a trivial point to make. We all know that much. Do you object to either claim in the quote at the top of this post?

The division of us and the world...
— creativesoul

But division is not independence. — Isaac

When dichotomies are used as a means to divide everything up into stuff that fits into one or the other, then the inevitable result is a failure to be able to properly account for that which is both, and thus... neither one nor the other. There are no such things in those accounts.<-----That's the fatal flaw. It's a consequence of consistent language use combined with an inherently inadequate terminological framework.

For whatever it's worth, I'm not at all against claiming that some complex thoughts need words whereas some do not.
— creativesoul

So do you see then, that we can make the general claim "complex thought does not need words"? And in your examples, the words are "needed" not for the complex thought, as you seem to think, but for something else. We could for instance name a special type of complex thought, propositional thought, or something like that, and say that words are needed for this. — Metaphysician Undercover

If some thought needs words, and some does not, then claiming that thought does not need words is false. Claiming that thought needs words is also false. It's a matter of nuance:All, some, none.

That's what I see.

I might agree some complex thought does not presuppose words, but rather, ensue from them... — Mww

There is no denying that thinking about words is a kind of thought that needs words. Otherwise, there would be nothing to think about.



We're considering whether or not any thought needs words. Regardless of which linguistic framework we put to use, any and all meaningful coherent answers to that particular question are based completely upon what counts as thought that needs words, as well as what counts as thought that does not. This, in turn, relies upon what counts as thought, because both do.

It seems to me that the difference between thought that needs words and thought that does not is one of existential dependency. The former is existentially dependent upon words, and the latter is not. Thought that is existentially dependent upon words cannot possibly exist when and where words have never been. Thought that is not existentially dependent upon words can.

Here we face a 'problem' though.

If we claim that simple thought existed prior to the first words, and we aim to set out that kind of thought, then we are taking account of that which existed in its entirety prior to our taking it into account. Thus, we can get it wrong! While what counts as "thought" is determined by how we use the term, if we're using the term as a means to take account of that which exists in its entirety prior to our taking it into account, then whatever we say about such thought must not only be consistent with the ability to exist in its entirety prior to words, but our account must set out how it can/does.

how can we experience a tree? — Art48

Look at it. Get hit by it. Climb it.

You figure we're looking at, getting hit by, and climbing green bundles of texture???

:wink:

I find that the single problem with direct and indirect perception is shared in that both positions drive a terminological wedge into the practitioners' brains by virtue of divorcing perception from reality.

That's the fatal fundamental flaw of both.

Human perception is not existentially independent of reality. Rather, it is most certainly a part thereof. We are both, objects in the world and subjects taking account of it and/or ourselves. The division of us and the world, of our perception and the world, creates the very problems that those practitioners find important enough to talk about for hundreds if not thousands of years.

Flies and bottles come to mind.

In my view.....
......it is preposterous, bordering on the catastrophically absurd, that the totality of that of which I am aware, re: the entirely of my cognitions, requires that I read, write and speak; — Mww

Agreed. Who would ever say such a thing, whether overtly or by virtue of inevitable logical consequence?

......if language developed as a means of simplex expression by a single thinking human subject, or as a means of multiplex communication between a plurality of thinking human subjects, then it is the case language presupposes that which is expressed or communicated by it; — Mww

Well sure. I've no issue at all with that aside from the inadequate qualification that stems from your having driven a definitional wedge between language and thought in such a way that you're incapable of even admitting that some thought is itself existentially dependent upon language use. On pains of coherency alone, you must deny all such talk! I mean, good on you for the consistency. However, we both know that coherency alone does not guarantee truth. A position can be perfectly valid, consistent, internally coherent, etc...

...and false.

How do we know whether or not such positions are false, despite being perfectly consistent? A plethora of counterexamples succeed in showing us that the framework in question contradicts everyday events. By acknowledging those contradictions we can also experience the added benefit of bringing our attention to the fact that our framework is inherently flawed somewhere along the line. In this case, it could be somewhat corrected by proper qualification(claiming "some" rather than necessarily implying that all thought is existentially independent of language).

With much agreement, I'm quite certain(for empirical as well as logical reasons) that some language presupposes that which is expressed and/or communicated by it. Not all. So, I would be fine with saying that prior to expressing and/or communicating some thought using language, there must first be a thought to express and/or communicate with language. I'm readily accepting the validity and/or internal consistency(coherence) of your position. I've foregone any criticism of that aspect of the position you're putting forth. However, it lacks much needed explanatory power(the aforementioned examples to the contrary).

The contentious matter at hand is whether or not all thought needs words, which I take to mean whether or not any thought needs language in order to be formed to begin with(in the first place; initially formed; emerge into the world for the very first time; etc.). Some thought clearly emerges solely as a result of prior language use. I mentioned a few already here and now as well as earlier and elsewhere. Odd(perhaps indicative of an inherently inadequate linguistic framework???) that you did not directly address those counterexamples. More generally speaking(being Kantian you hopefully appreciate that)...

There are thoughts about words.

Where words have never been, there could not have ever been thoughts about words. All thoughts about words are existentially dependent upon words. We need words to think about in order for us to even be able to think about words. All such thought needs words.

......if language is assemblage of words, and words are the representations of conceptions, and language is the means of report in the form of expression or communication, then language presupposes the conceptions they represent, and on which is reported; — Mww

This is part of the problem as well.

Language is far more than merely "assemblages of words". Meaning comes immediately to mind. Not all assemblages of words are meaningful. All language use is. So, language takes a bit more than just an assemblage of words. Words are not inherently meaningful. Meaning is attributed.

We also use language to do far more than communicate and/or express pre-existing thought(which is the only use you've focused upon as of yet). I'm claiming that there are far more uses of language, some of which produce entirely new thought. Language use has introduced so many different kinds of thought that I find it very very odd that anyone could possibly disagree with claiming that many thoughts need language(are existentially dependent upon language).

......thinking is cognition by means of conceptions. If language presupposes conceptions, and conceptions are the form of cognitions, and cognition is thinking, then words presuppose thinking. — Mww

Our frameworks are quite different, as you well know. I mean, this is not our first exchange. However, generally speaking, although I reject your framework for all the different reasons I'm putting forth, I would whole heartedly agree that words presuppose thinking, if by that I mean that thought emerges prior to language. Well, to be more precise and consistent, some does anyway. Whereas certain other kinds of thought cannot for they are a product thereof.

Thoughts about what time it is cannot possibly exist(be formed) prior to the existence of clocks(a means of time telling, if you prefer). Clocks are themselves existentially dependent upon language in that they owe their very existence to language use. Thus, it only follows that wondering what time it is, even if unspoken, is one kind of thought that needs words, for it is about stuff that is itself existentially dependent upon words. Where there has never been a means of time telling, there could not have ever been thoughts about what time it was/is.

Wondering about time is a kind of thought that needs words.

If language is so all-fired necessary for the formation of complex thoughts, why did we come equipped with the means for the one, but only for the means of developing the other? Why did we not come equally equipped for both simultaneously, if one absolutely requires the other? — Mww

I have no idea why. That's a psychological question.

Seems to me that we come equipped with the capability to form both thought that needs language as well as thought that does not. Interesting that I've recently watched Chomsky stuff as well as other linguistics and neuroscientists, and they've claimed that the human brain has not undergone much evolution at all over the past ten thousand or so years.

The robotics engineer manufactures a machine with pinpoint circuit board soldering accuracy; the toddler has somewhat less accuracy but still understands the distinction between thing-as-object and thing-as-receptor-of object, and the congruency of shape for both, to put a round object in a round hole. — Mww

Oh yeah...

It's fascinating to watch children at an age where their understanding of language use exceeds their mastery of speech. They invent totally "new" two word combinations like "more outside" while standing at a glass sliding door separating them from what they want; from being outdoors.

Acknowledging that some thought is existentially dependent upon language does not force us into saying that all thought is.

So I come upon a thing, some thing for which I have absolutely no experience whatsoever. Maybe something fell to Earth, maybe I discovered something previously unknown in the deep blue. The modern argument seems to be......I can form no complex thoughts about that new thing, can have no immediate cognition of it, unless or until I can assign words to it. But, being new, which words do I assign if I don’t cognize what the new thing appears to be? What prevents me from calling the new thing by a name already given to an old thing?

And, of course, everything is new at one time or another. — Mww

You misunderstand the modern argument. Mine anyway. Not all opinions are equal.

Let me explain then. You have provided examples of complex thought which uses words. These examples are insufficient to produce the inductive conclusion "complex thought needs words". You have provided no evidence whatsoever, that complex thought requires words, only evidence that some complex thought uses words. Therefore you do not have the premise required to conclude that this proposition "a complex thought doesn’t need words any more than does a simple thought" is false. You have provided no indication that complex thought needs words. — Metaphysician Undercover

"Using words" and "needing words" are not always the same thing. I am responding to a claim about complex thought not needing words. I provided a few examples of thoughts that need words, and seem to be complex thoughts. Such examples falsify the claim I objected to as it was written. A simple qualification of "some" would fix the issue.

A criterion of simple and complex thought is on order as well. I mean, if we aim to determine which candidates belong in which category, we need to know what the differences are between the two. I've yet to have seen anyone aside from myself attempt to even perform that task. I drew a distinction between thought that does not include words as content(part of correlation) and thought that does to make the point that some complex thought needs words.

All the nuance, of course, is packed up in both the aforementioned criterion for what counts as thought(simple and complex), as well as what it takes for a thought to "need words".

For whatever it's worth, I'm not at all against claiming that some complex thoughts need words whereas some do not. "Need", on my view, means existentially dependent upon. Furthermore, depending upon the content of the thought in question, some languageless creatures can have thoughts that need words although they do not use words. It's nuanced, but no issue if we have an adequate linguistic framework.

I never said that or otherwise...

The issue - to me - is what sorts of complex thoughts can be formed in the complete absence of language(without words). My objection was to the claim that "a complex thought doesn’t need words any more than does a simple thought." That claim is false as it is written. I gave examples of complex thoughts that most certainly do.

I think I shall remain content that a complex thought doesn’t need words any more than does a simple thought. I affirm that complex thoughts are indeed possible, but deny the necessity of language as the ground of their possibility. — Mww

On your view...

Are thoughts about the truth of a sentence considered complex thoughts? Thoughts about what's going to happen next Thursday? Thoughts about which words best describe meaningful experience? Thoughts about language use in general?

All those thoughts are impossible to form, have, and/or hold without words.

I'm curious though, does that elimination have consequences regarding whether the red leaves are directly or indirectly perceived?

P.S. For whatever it's worth, the indirect/direct dichotomy and/or debate is neither a necessary nor helpful tool for acquiring understanding of meaningful experience. It can be brushed aside, and ought on my view due to the inherent deficiencies in how they talk about experience itself.

My pleasure...

Pretty much. As mentioned before in my first reply to you, it's a terminological quibble. However, removing that bit will sharpen the position as well as eliminate any justified objections based upon it, such as I raised and the underlying anthropomorphism.

...Is mediating something not 'part of'? The mediator in a discussion is part of the discussion, no? — Isaac

1.) Mediation requires a worldview. The biological structures under consideration have none.

2.) The mediator in a discussion is not necessary for the discussion. The biological structures under consideration are necessary for seeing red.

3.) A mediator has the expressed purpose of overseeing and/or governing the conversation to ensure the respective parties successfully reach agreement/consensus through thoughtful negotiation and compromise. The biological structures under consideration are not doing that.

You might have to unpack that a little. I'm not really sure what you might mean by 'divorce'... — Isaac

As above, so below...

4.) Mediators do not mediate themselves.

If there is no meaningful distinction between internal and external... — Janus

That's not what I said.

If the experience is considered to be an affect of the biological machinery insofar as it is the biological machinery that experiences red and not the leaves or the light, then it follows that we are thinking of the experience, by your own definitions, as internal. — Janus

That does not follow from what I've written. It is contrary to it.

Of course it needs the stimulus of external elements (light and leaves) but it does not follow that the experience is both internal and external on that account, Of course if you define experience as the whole process, then of course it, tautologically, is both internal and external, so these are just different ways of speaking, different ways of conceptually dividing and/ or sorting things.

There are different terminological frameworks and methodological approaches used as a means to attempt to take proper account of the same things; each framework and/or approach with their own set of logical consequences as well as explanatory power, congruence with current knowledge, and amenability to evolutionary progression. In this case, we're taking account of the experience of seeing red. Seeing red is a meaningful experience.

We're talking about exactly what sorts of things meaningful experiences are.

Due diligence holds that there are necessary elemental constituents of all meaningful experiences such that all meaningful experiences include them, and if any are removed what remains does not have what it takes. Hence, these basic ingredients are rightfully called the necessary elemental constituents of all meaningful experience. Seeing red is but one.

Seeing red leaves includes leaves that emit/reflect the wavelengths of light we've named "red", a light source, and a creature endowed with certain biological structures capable of not only detecting the light and leaves, but also of somehow isolating and/or picking out the color itself as significant and/or meaningful(attributing meaning to the color). That task(attributing meaning) is successfully performed by virtue of drawing correlations between the wavelengths and something else.

In the complete absence of light and leaves there cannot be any experience of seeing them. In the complete absence of the biological machinery, there cannot be any experience of seeing them. Thus, the experience consists of both internal and external things. It most certainly follows that the experience is neither internal nor external for it consists of elements that are both.

The only notable difference seems to be that you divorce the biological machinery from the experience of seeing red when you claim that the machinery "mediates" the experience. The summary you just agreed with does not. Rather, it talks about it as a necessary component thereof; the machinery is a part of the experience, not a mediator thereof.

My point is only that complex thought is impossible without language.
— Janus

Ok, maybe. What is a complex thought, such that that kind of thought is impossible without words, but carries the implication that simple thoughts are possible without words? — Mww

Roughly: Complex thoughts consist of correlations including words by a creature so capable. Simple thoughts would be correlations drawn or being drawn between things not including words.

Thinking that a mouse ran behind a tree requires no language. Thinking that "a mouse ran behind a tree" is true does.

I thought all along that our views dovetailed nicely.

Interesting book summary. Seems right up my alley, so to speak. Wish I had more time...

...to understand how to make sense of a scientific conception of nature as itself part of nature...

...for that quote is worthy of attention.

You missed the point of the ontological consideration
— creativesoul

Could you perhaps repeat it for me? — Isaac

In all fairness, I haven't made it clear. That's one of my personality flaws... assuming others are already on the same page as myself, so to speak. Put differently, I assume others have interpreted the bulk of the conversation the same way I have. Mea Culpa. In retrospect, that was the exact opposite of what was warranted.

A common phrasing concerning forests and trees comes to mind. As it applies here, I'm rendering the forest, as a general outline with ambiguous enough edges to do both, effectively set out the basics(of all meaningful experience) in as simple a manner as possible and subsequently extrapolate with and/or in terms of evolutionary progression in such a way as to be capable of taking account of meaningful human experience as well. Whereas, on the other hand, you're rendering the biological structures of the individual trees within the forest, doing so at the micro level - with respectable precision.

It's that pesky little notion of internal/external that's the problem.

Simply put:Seeing the wavelengths we've named "red" is a meaningful experience that consists, in part, of those wavelengths. They are being emitted/reflected by something other than our own biological structures. Thus, the meaningful experience of seeing red leaves requires leaves that reflect/emit those wavelengths. Leaves are external to the individual host of biological machinery. As is the light being emitted/reflected from the leaves. The experience also consists of things that are internal, such as the biological machinery itself. So, the leaves and light are external, and the biological machinery is internal. It takes both(and more) to have a meaningful experience of seeing red. If we remove either, what's left doesn't have what it takes to produce a meaningful experience of seeing red. This tells us that both are necessary elements of the experience. The experience consists of all the necessary elements. If some of it is internal and some is external, then the experience can rightly be called neither, for it is not the sort of thing that has such spatiotemporal location.

How those wavelengths become meaningful is imperative as well. However, the above is enough for now...

Whenever a terminological framework has the purpose of explaining human consciousness(meaningful human experience) and/or other kinds of consciousness(such as non-human meaningful experience), and it is based upon either internal/external, or physical/non-physical, or even perhaps both, then those practices are doomed to fail as a result of not having the explanatory power to be able to take proper account of that which consists of both internal and external things, physical and non-physical things.
— creativesoul

I can see how that might be the case, but I don't think dividing states into internal and external suffers from that problem as it still retains the possibility of modelling something which is both (a person in their environment for example). The division doesn't prevent both sides from being in the model.

Meaningful experience exists in its entirety, in simpler forms, prior to our knowledge. <-------That's the pivotal ontological consideration which ought inform the selection/creation of our terminological framework.
— creativesoul

I think you're making a mistake in assuming that because something exists prior to our accounting for it, it must be that our accounting is wrong if it doesn't represent it fully. You're making tow unwarranted assumptions. Firstly that {that which exists in its entirety prior to our accounting practices} can be represented with only one 'true' model, that there's only one 'true' way to account. There may be many, hundreds. Secondly that our accounting practices must capture the entirety of the thing they're accounting for. I see no reason why they should. — Isaac

The mistakes you think I'm making are ones I'm not. We need not know everything. Our models need not be able to account for everything.

However, if we are to place confidence in a model of meaningful experience(consciousness), it ought be that the model is amenable to terms of evolutionary progression. It ought be simple enough to be able to account for the simplest meaningful experiences while having the richness of potential to be able to account for our own highly complex meaningful experience, as well as all other meaningful experiences in the meantime.

You missed the point of the ontological consideration, and neglected to address the elucidation of the issues raised that followed from my initial reply to you. All good though. No worries.

Multiple models can all be useful and contradict one another. They cannot all be true and contradict one another. Not sure why truth has been invoked here...

Seeing red...

The color red cannot be properly taken into account when and if the practice itself involves situating the result of biological machinery within the biological machinery. Seeing red is a result of biological machinery working autonomously. The result is not equivalent to the machinery necessary in order for it to happen anymore than it is equivalent to the wavelengths we call by the name "red".

The experience of seeing red consists of all the individual things causing us to see red. The biological machinery is but one of many. The wavelengths we call "red" are another.

The colors we see are not in the head. They are not outside the head. They are part of a larger whole(light). Where there is no biological machinery capable of detecting light(parts of the spectrum anyway) there are no individual colors(ranges of wavelengths) being filtered from the rest. That filtering happens and must in order for them to become meaningful by virtue of becoming part of a meaningful correlation drawn between them and something else by a creature so capable. That's how everything becomes meaningful. Light is no exception. There are certain biological structures that do parts of that job; that autonomously detect some wavelengths which has the unintended consequence of isolating them from the rest. However, seeing red requires more than just isolating/detecting the color. In order for it to become meaningful and/or significant to creatures, they must be endowed with the machinery required for detection as well as correlation.

That is not to say that seeing red is something that happens in the brain, for the biological machinery - while necessary for seeing red - is not exhaustive of the meaningful experience. Seeing red requires more than just adequately evolved biological structures capable of isolating certain wavelengths of light. It first requires light being emitted and/or reflected from things other than the host of biological machinery, being detected, and becoming part of a meaningful correlation(which requires the previous biological machinery, and other structures as well).

All seeing red consists of the wavelengths we call "red", an emission source, and a creature with adequate biological machinery to detect(isolate) and subsequently draw correlations and/or associations between the color and something else. That is how all red things become meaningful to all creatures so capable. The richness of the individual experience is directly proportional to the sheer number of correlations drawn between the color and other things by the creature having the experience.

All experience is meaningful to the creature having the experience<---------that's just a common-sense core tenet/guiding principle.

A creature cannot be said to see red if the color is not meaningful to them. The color red must be meaningful to any and all creatures capable of seeing red, unless all detection of those wavelengths counts as seeing red. Seeing red is a meaningful experience, afterall. Some things completely lacking biological machinery are capable of detecting those wavelengths. Surely we aren't going to demolish our understanding of meaningful human experience by virtue of equating it to color detection devices, are we?

Besides, there are some things with adequate biological machinery capable of detecting those wavelengths, but there is neither good reason nor adequate evidence to warrant subsequently claiming/believing that the color is somehow significant and/or meaningful to machinery host for they do not have the other biological structures that seem to be required for drawing correlations between the color/wavelengths and other things. The structures serve as benchmarks for certain complexoty levels of meaningful experience, should our knowledge of them be robust enough. This all lends itself well to evolutionary progression.

....you're still operating within the science paradigm. Philosophy is a different way of thinking or being — Wayfarer

Methodological Naturalism.

It seems that you want to say that we do not directly perceive anything at all. That seems to be based upon current knowledge regarding how our relevant biological machinery works. Good stuff, by the way. It's as though the denial is based upon the fact that so many different autonomous biological structures are necessary and involved in a timely(albiet virtually negligible increments) fashion.

That's only a problem for accounting practices(notions of mind/consciousness/meaningful experience) when and if they are based upon one of the aforementioned dichotomies. — creativesoul

I'm not really sure what you mean here? — Isaac

Just a general overview of what we're all doing here. We are attempting to take proper account of something that existed in its entirety in some form or another prior to our awareness and especially prior to our accounting practices(naming and descriptive practices).

Whenever a terminological framework has the purpose of explaining human consciousness(meaningful human experience) and/or other kinds of consciousness(such as non-human meaningful experience), and it is based upon either internal/external, or physical/non-physical, or even perhaps both, then those practices are doomed to fail as a result of not having the explanatory power to be able to take proper account of that which consists of both internal and external things, physical and non-physical things.

All meaningful experience consists of internal and external things, physical and non-physical things. Categorizing all the elements of meaningful experience into those dichotomies guarantees misunderstanding of that which consists of both, and is thus neither. Seeing red is a meaningful experience.

Meaningful experience exists in its entirety, in simpler forms, prior to our knowledge. <-------That's the pivotal ontological consideration which ought inform the selection/creation of our terminological framework.

As best I can tell, there's no problem with someone accepting most, if not all, of your explanations and simply noting that you've done a great job of teasing out all of the nuance regarding how biological machinery works autonomously as an elemental part of all meaningful experience(consciousness; thought; belief; etc.). — creativesoul

Are you perhaps suggesting that some parts of meaningful experience are not mediated by how the underlying biological machinery works? — Isaac

You've highlighted the role that the biological machinery plays in seeing red. I've a couple of quibbles with certain phrasing but those terminological choices may not be important to your position. In other words, I do not think your position hinges upon the idea that autonomous machinery like biological brain structures "mediate" in the same sense that people do. I could be wrong, but if I take you to mean that the underlying biological machinery directly influences and/or determines every part of meaningful experience, then you would be correct. I am suggesting that some parts of meaningful experience are not "mediated" by the underlying biological machinery, if by that we mean "mediated" in the sense of directly influencing and/or determining everything that meaningful experience consists of.

An individual's biological machinery, while facilitating their meaningful experiences, does not have any determinative influence whatsoever upon that which exists in its entirety prior to becoming a part of an individual's meaningful experience.

...modern philosophy has miraculously broken free of ten thousand year old shackles. — Isaac

Internal/External. Physical/Non-physical. Physical/Mental. Material/Immaterial. Noumenon/Phenomenon. Subject/Object. Mind/Body. Direct/Indirect.

The dichotomies above, and undoubtedly several more like them that didn't immediately come to mind, are the problem. All fail to be able to take proper account of meaningful experience. No one seems to have figured out how to escape them, stipulate a simpler but richer terminological framework that is amenable to evolutionary progression; a taxonomy that retains their usefulness but improves upon explanations where they have failed. No one well-known enough yet, anyway. This first bit is just a general set of remarks involving one aspect of the recent discussion.




To your account...

I'm in agreement with most if not all of your criticisms here. The special pleading, in particular, that the mod has been guilty of. That said, there is one thing that struck me as needing attention. It has to do with(seems to based in and/or upon) your uncertainty regarding the concepts(philosophical positions) of direct and indirect perception. Direct realism vs. indirect realism. I'm with you on the skepticism about those notions- their muddled. Ill-conceived frameworks as best I can see. Both of them. For the same reasons, no less. That said...

It seems that you want to say that we do not directly perceive anything at all. That seems to be based upon current knowledge regarding how our relevant biological machinery works. Good stuff, by the way. It's as though the denial is based upon the fact that so many different autonomous biological structures are necessary and involved in a timely(albiet virtually negligible increments) fashion.

That's only a problem for accounting practices(notions of mind/consciousness/meaningful experience) when and if they are based upon one of the aforementioned dichotomies.

As best I can tell, there's no problem with someone accepting most, if not all, of your explanations and simply noting that you've done a great job of teasing out all of the nuance regarding how biological machinery works autonomously as an elemental part of all meaningful experience(consciousness; thought; belief; etc.).

Could explain the behavior. NOTHING excuses the inaction!!!
— creativesoul

Are you God?
Else, on what grounds can you fret about what they do or don't do? — baker

Seditious conspiracy. Conspiracy to commit fraud against the United States of America. It's illegal to know about a planned attempt at sedition and not notify the proper authorites. It's illegal to help another implement either of the two clearly defined illegal behaviours above.

On the ground that I am an American citizen, and as such I expect all elected officials to do what's in the best interest of the country.. Seditious conspiracy and conspiracy to defraud the United States of America is never in the best interest of the country. Nothing excuses the inaction of those who knew what was happening and did nothing to prevent it. In times of strife, character is not built. Rather, it is shown.

Each and every individual who knew about and failed to report, and/or actively participated in either has committed a crime worthy of the most severe punishment, including removal from public office and being prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law(according to the crime).

On what ground can you justify arguing otherwise?

:brow:

"Are you God?"

Pffft. Fucking morons around here.

I'm sorry you don't like reality, but closing your eyes to it — Streetlight

The irony...

Your lumping all Americans together as supporters of what's happening is akin to each and every stupid fucking gross generalization out there underwriting the political speech atmosphere. The very bipartisan outlook is part of the deeper problems with American government. You know. Oligarchy with different actors.

This is who and what the US is... — Streetlight

Gross overgeneralization. Ironically similar to one of the underlying(but not spoken much about) issues with current political speech patterns.

That which exists has an effect and/or affect.

Broadening your brush only reveals the lack of precision you had prior to.

You know better than this.
— creativesoul

Meaningless. — Streetlight

I can see how that could be true for you based upon what you've said here.

No. I do not give one shit about daddy syndrome that Americans have. The framers were rapists and slave owners and what they thought means nothing. America is shaped by those who govern, and those those govern are quite happy to let Americans eat dirt so long as they accure power and wealth — Streetlight

The broadened brush reveals the lack of precision prior to. It does not make up for it.

You know better than this.

It means that anyone wanting to run needs lots of money. That places restrictions on who can run... — Isaac

Yes. That's a problem, not because it costs so much. How current campaigns are financed is the problem. That means violates the Constitution.

Again, not a problem with the system, but rather with improper implementation.

No, it's the result of the American system working exactly as intended, regulation or not. — Streetlight

In order to know that you'd have to be privy to the framers' thought and belief. That's quite a presupposition.

Unaware of this case.
— creativesoul

Assange.
— Isaac

Not clear of the actions he performed or the charges he faces. — creativesoul

I for one, am thankful for the DNC leak regarding the deceptive practices in the 2020 primaries. I knew it all along. Clinton Obama season had 29 or so public debates. Clinton Sanders had 4 or 5. The debates showed that Sanders' support increased and Clinton's took a tumble afterwards.

I'm not naive. I'm vested. I am doing everything in my power to improve and/or help what I can, when I can, and how I can. The framework has been ignored when it comes to safeguards against the bribery of elected officials. The Constitution has been violated. The results of those violations are what you seem to be railing against. I'm suggesting a sober look at how those issues arose. You seem bent upon damning America for it. I'm bent upon fixing it, and I'm nudging and/or gesturing towards how to do it.

Freedom of speech is not unfettered. Especially when so few have so much power over what gets put into the public sphere for it's political consumption.
— creativesoul

Restrictions on freedom of speech are not the issue, the issue is who wields that power. — Isaac

Who gets to be the final arbiter of truth?