You are not getting it. Which is worrying, given the point is so simple.

The claim that morality requires God (which is demonstrably true) is not equivalent to the claim that belief in God is necessary for moral behaviour. Indeed, they are so obviously not equivalent that I think anyone who regularly conflates them is a total berk. — Bartricks

I know, right. And sometimes some people act as if others are stating such things even though they haven't...

Jeesh.

Some folk, huh?

Lost interest in this discussion with you...

I'll continue my assessment, further reading and review in spite of your absence.

Be well.

I think anything I consider as something an animal believes can be put into a statement. — Coben

Is anything you consider as something an animal believes equivalent to the animal's belief, or is it best understood as an account thereof?

The latter involve presuppositions to which to the statement, or proposition, stand as answer to a question about those presuppositions. And this you do not agree with. — tim wood

Well no. As I explained in the last post...

We can take a statement out of the context in which it's uttered, and when placed into different sets of circumstances, it could stand as an answer to some question relevant to those different circumstances. So, I do not disagree that that can be done.


I'm saying that it does not follow from the fact that we can do that, that the statement extracted was originally made in answer to a question.

...moral norms and values are the prescriptions and values of God... — Bartricks

This claim is taken upon faith and faith alone. Some people have moral norms and values despite not believing in God. I personally do not believe that the God of Abraham makes much sense at all given today's knowledge. Back in the day, sure...

God did it.

If one wishes to exalt their own moral values above others' then attributing their existence to some supernatural being is one way to convince others; although I find such claims to be presupposing exactly what needs argued for.

You know what we find when we look at codified rules of behaviour?

People writing those rules based upon individual particular circumstances. I've yet to see any evidence whatsoever that leads me to believe that some supernatural divine entity such as the one described in JudeoChristian or Islamic circles has somehow intervened in some set of circumstances of another.

The problem of evil. The euthyphro problem. Occam's razor.

The holy trinity.

Collingwood makes the universal claim that each and every statement ever made is made in answer to a question. In order for that to be true, each and every statement ever made must be made in answer to a queston. That is quite simply not always the case. So, proposition i.) is false as written.

I've given a perfectly adequate example which adequately serves as prima facie empirical evidence that refutes proposition i.) as written. Universal claims made about all statements that have ever been made that are later found lacking correspondence to what's happened and/or is happening are false. Proposition i.) is exactly such a claim. It is wanting, lacking, begging for truth. An inherent deficiency is shown by it's inherent inability to take proper account of things that happen on the daily.

Black swans and all...

Not all statements ever made are made in answer to a question. Each and every day some statements are made by speakers that find themselves in completely different sets of circumstances than those proposed by Mr. Collingwood(statements that are made in answer to a question). As it is written, the first proposition is falsified by our looking at actual events, as well as by our listening to accurate historical accounts.






From a slightly different angle; granting truth to see what follows...

If it is true, then there can be no statements ever made that are not made in answer to a question. The problem, of course, is that there are! Each and every statement that is made despite no question being asked at the time, serves as a clear cut prima facie example to the contrary. There are a plethora of actual events that are actual examples to the contrary. Universal claims have no exceptions. Proposition i.) does. Proposition i.) is therefore denied universal value. It's not worthy.

I do not make up the rules. I'm just using them. Some statements are made in answer to a question. Not all.





In the simplest terms...

Collingwood asserts with the utmost certainty that each and every statement ever made is made in answer to a question. However, statements are made each and every day, across the globe and in different tongues, that are not made in answer to a question. There is no question involved in such cases. In each and evry one of these cases, the circumstances relevant to the utterance do not involve the speaker answering a question.

I mean think about it...

One can most certainly state the case at hand without being asked any questions whatsoever, whether those interrogations come from within oneself or directly from others at the time of utterance.






Reflecting back upon lines of thought in your earlier response to my counterexample...

Sure, we can all take statements completely out of their context, pretend that they are in some other context, and show that - when we take statements completely out of their context - the statement is, in fact, an acceptable answer to any number of relevant proxy questions. For example, you proposed a perfectly meaningful question that "I am ready for bed" could be answer for - if it were made in a completely different context; in completely different circumstances. The problem, of course, is that "I am ready for bed" is not always made in answer to a question. Whether or not a particular statement was or is actually made in answer to a question is not determined by Collingwood. Rather, in each and every case, whether or not a statement is made in answer to a question is completely determined by whether or not it was meant by the speaker to serve as an answer that particular question at the time of utterance. I say "I am ready for bed" as a means to inform my significant other that I am ready for bed. During all such times, the statement about my physical/mental state is not made as an answer to any question at the time of utterance.

Surely you're not going to insist on telling me otherwise, are you?

:kiss:

Do you have an argument? A valid counter? Something?
— creativesoul
Sure... — tim wood

I'm all ears.

And yet another question... different once again. How I know that I am ready for bed is different than how I know "I'm ready for bed" is true or how I know what I mean when I say it.

Do you have an argument? A valid counter? Something?

It does not follow from the idea that statements can serve to answer some question relevant to them, that all statements are made in answer to a question.

I suggest you reread our exchange. The question you've asked has changed.

I'm saying that sometimes I make statements and they are not made in answer to a question. You're saying that that's false. Not much else to say here...

Religion filled in the gaps of our ignorance...

That's why.

End of story.

Is there a point, or counterargument somewhere here? I'm not interested in much else. The question you now ask, for the very first time, is irrelevant to the charge I levied here. In addition, it seems to be just plain obtuse, for obtusity's sake.

The point is that when I say that I am ready for bed, I do not always make the statement in answer to a question. Thus, prop. i.) is false, as it is written.

Now, are you going to put Collingwood's method to use here, or just keep on deflecting into irrelevancy?

When you say, "I am ready for bed," what do you mean? And to save a step, how do you know you mean it? — tim wood

When I say "I am ready for bed", I mean that I am tired at the time I say it. Perhaps it had been a long physically or mentally exhausting day, and I am ready to lay down and fall asleep for the night. I know that that's what I mean because that's what I've learned to say during such circumstances.

Relevance? — creativesoul

Sure and of course. But how do you know? — tim wood

It's very odd when one, such as yourself, readily accepts the answer given to a question by saying "Sure, of course", only to then ask the same question.

:confused:

It seems more likely that they already believe such things, rather than having "bought into his lies". — baker

Indeed. I've said - ad nauseum - that Trump is not the problem, but rather, he is a symptom of underlying problems.

Although, in this case of claiming that the election was stolen from him, that is simply not true. He is much of the problem. It doesn't matter whether or not he believes it(whether he is lying or delusional). Trump began sewing the seeds of doubt about the election results of 2020 a year and a half prior to the election. He took action at the USPS which made it much harder to successfully deliver the ballots in time, and then complained about the difficulties faced by the institution regarding that. It was well known that mail-in ballots were going to be used in far greater numbers than ever before due to the pandemic(that he denied, lied about, and basically ignored).

So much of the problems in American society boils down to the systematic deterioration of trust in elected officials that the white American electorate has been going through since the seventies(that minorites have been going through since the beginning of the country). This includes but is not limited to the ongoing lies and false promises made to the white American people from both sides of the aisle, by each and every administration since Carter. The lack of protecting innocent citizens/consumers from predatory lending practices and other forms of blatant harmful practices and purported public services(the dismantling of anti-trust laws). The disasterous effects/affects that the outsourcing of good paying American jobs has had, and that exodus itself being incentivized and rewarded, and then sold to the American people in the guise of cheaper prices and more choices. Lost incomes and destroyed livelihoods were supposed to be avoided by workforce development programs. These were already underfunded, and they are some of the first social programs to have cuts made to them. Hillary herself proposed such cuts in her last campaign.

It used to be the case that if one wanted to work hard and follow the rules, one could find a job that would allow one to live without financial worries like choosing between paying bills or having food on the table. Many of the people who just began voting again for Trump chose Trump because he said what they had been wanting to hear... "America first", which meant regular blue collar Americans' interests ought supercede the rich and powerful peoples' desire to be even richer.

This bit does not even begin to reflect the underlying systemic racism aspect... but alas, I'm tired. Minorities were cast as the cause of the problems facing white Americans. Disgusting.

When I say "I am ready for bed", I mean that I am tired at the time I say it. Perhaps it had been a long physically or mentally exhausting day, and I am ready to lay down and fall asleep for the night. I know that that's what I mean because that's what I've learned to say during such circumstances.

Relevance?

:brow:

The point is that in logical terms it is — tim wood

Then that's about what counts as being "in logical terms"...

My statement is one made in everyday discourse. It is not always made in answer to a question.

A position can be completely coherent(lacking self-contradiction) and based upon false premisses. Collingwood's is one such position. We do not look to Colliingwood's position to see if it includes falsehood. We look to what he's describing, in the real world. We look at real world examples.

I've given one, and it's certainly not the only one.

Collingwood's claim(prop i.) is about each and every statement made. He's wrong. Not each and every statement ever made is made in answer to a question.

Kudos for actually engaging. I appreciate you keeping the implicit promise that many others did not.

Cheers!

The way to build a better scientific community is to keep it well funded so that the world, rather than the corporate world, owns the knowledge coming out of it, and keep it free from political interference... — Kenosha Kid

Indeed.

Science is a method of approach for acquiring knowledge about stuff. Science is neither good or bad. How science is used is another matter altogether. It can be used for horrible ends, but need not be. I, for one, agree with Banno in that in the big picture, science has been instrumental in marvelous things, and a marked improvement in the overall quality of human lives.

What Trump actually did during the occupation of the capital on Jan. 6 needs to be revealed to the public. He falied to defend the US government. He cheered the attack itself. He promoted it. He still promotes it. His supporters still promote it. One Republican party leader, McConnell, has said that there's nothing more to learn about what happened on Jan 6.

It's fucking disgraceful.

Trump lied about widespread voter fraud throughout his term, and particularly often in the last year and a half. That lie was repeated often in right wing news outlets and talk shows. He alone led the long string of lies that led up to Jan 6. Half of House Republicans and nearly all of Senate Republicans are complicit in this defrauding of the American people. Nevermind the nutjobs. Now, after conjuring up enough doubt in the minds of citizens regarding the trustworthiness of elections(based upon lies and falsehoods mentioned heretofore), the republican party iitself is using that distrust(that they manufactured from lies about widespread voter fraud) as a reason to make it harder and harder to vote.

For those who keep acting like and/or believing that the US is a democracy. It is not. Never has been. It's a republic with democratic traditions. A representative form of government. A group of elected officials, chosen by the people and for the people, who are supposed to be acting on behalf of the people.

The rules of logical entailment allow one to change the truth conditions of a statement, as Gettier so aptly demonstrated. That completely changes the meaning. I reject entailment as a logical tool(all of which are supposed to preserve truth) due to exactly that fatal flaw in understanding the meaning of a statement stemming from divorcing speaker from statement.

"I'm ready for bed" is something I say to myself often, or to my significant other. Sometimes, it is a statement made in answer to a question, and other times it is not. The point here is simple:It is a statement that is meaningful and it is not always made in answer to a question. So, it only follows that Collingwood's first proposition is false, as it is written.

Prop. 2. ’Every question involves a presupposition.

This is much better.

That is amenable to evolutionary progression. It also situates presuppositions prior to common language acquisition(prior to our learning naming and descriptive practices).

"What's that?" is a question that can exist in it's entirety; that can be formed by a language-less creature, and thus it's a question that can be formed prior to language creation, acquisition, and/or it's subsequent use, despite it's inability to be meaningfully articulated. It is one that has long since taken a linguistic form. We've all asked it at some point or other. It is perhaps the simplest of all questions; one that is perfectly capable of being completely articulated via language to the user's own satisfaction, but need not be in order to be formed by a language-less creature.

What's most notable is that it is a question that does not always require language use. It leads us to realize that we're in need of setting out what sorts of presuppositions such rudimentary questions can possibly involve. They certainly cannot involve presuppositions that are existentially dependent upon language and/or have linguistic content, because we're talking about language-less creatures.

At some of the earliest stages of human development, we can watch exactly and precisely what an undistracted, deep, and genuine curiosity looks like upon the face of another, and as a result we can also know beyond any and all reasonable doubt that curiosity itself does not require language. We all wonder about what we're looking at prior to, during the initial stages of, and long after our own language acquisition and/or the subsequent mastery thereof; all the while we're continuously learning the names of new things. Sometimes these things are directly perceptible, and sometimes not. That which is not warrants very careful attention. The point is that not all questions are existentially dependent upon language use(do not consist of language), whereas all statements are(do).

Long before using language to do stuff; long before ever adopting our first worldview; long before ever honing our initial worldview into what we may now call our 'very own' belief system/worldview; long before we ever became aware of the fact that we were already taking account of ourselves and the world before we came to realize that we were doing so; long before we ever even conceived of the idea of our having a place in this world; long before we ever even began talking about our own thought - like we are here; long before any of that, we began to wonder about what we were looking at. We can and do watch the face(s) of undistracted attention belonging to any creature after having just discovered something entirely new, something so interesting that it completely captured/captures their attention.

There are no statements about the world and/or ourselves possible unless and until there is a means for making them and a creature capable of doing so. If questions are asked prior to each and every statement that is made, as must be the case if every statement is made in answer to a question, then it only follows that questions give rise to statements. If questions give rise to statements, and all questions involve presuppositions, then all statements involve the same presuppositions as the questions giving rise to them(as the questions they were made in response to).




To labor the earlier point of refutation:There are any number of statements that can be, have been, and/or are currently being made about the world and/or ourselves that are not being made in answer to a question.

That's just the way it is.

Not all statements are made in answer to a question.<------That stands as an objection to Prop i, but it does not pose a lethal threat to the rest of Collingwood's project. I'm not looking to blow him up. To quite the contrary, the correction adds to the distinction between scientific thought and non scientific thought(in Collingwood's own sense of the terms). I'm not denying that all scientific thought involves statements that answer questions. I'm not denying that every scientific question involves at least one presupposition, and most involve a constellation thereof. I'm not denying that the role and/or operative function played by absolute presuppositions within scientific thinking are exactly as Collingwood describes. They act exactly like primary and secondary premisses, particularly those whose correspondence and/or meaningfulness is never questioned; those whose business it is to be believed. I'm not denying that it is not their business to be true/false. I'm not denying that the notion of verifiability/falsifiability does not apply to them, although they can sometimes be verified/falsified. I'm not denying that they are things left unspoken, unarticulated, and/or unpropounded by the candidate holding them.

I am most certainly denying the idea that absolute presuppositions are things that a subject can form, have, hold, and/or otherwise depend upon(infer from) when it is also the case that the subject themselves have never once even witnessed their being articulated. One can work from presuppositions that they've never witnessed being articulated without knowing that they are doing so. Such is the case whenever someone first learns that they've adopted some belief or another, or perhaps some set thereof, or to put it in Collingwood's terms, some constellation of absolute presuppositions, from someone else. For example, the absolute presuppositions that Collingwood concerns himself with through page 80 or so, are a group of three regarding causality. Some events were, are, and/or will be caused. All events were, are, and/or will be caused. No events have been, are, or will be caused.

All three of those are much too far along the timeline of evolutionary progression to be formed by anything less than a creature capable of taking account of it's thought, belief, emotions, feelings, and/or experience with a mastery that only metacognition can deliver. Such complex thought are the result of processes directly involving naming and descriptive practices(common language). None of the three are presupposed by any creature unless that creature has already found themselves at a loss to be able to take proper account of everything(all events).

It's well worth pointing out that Collingwood's notion of scientific thought aims to take proper account of that which already existed in it's entirety long before being untangled and re-arranged. It's a shame that he chose to dub the process itself as scientific, because in doing so he simultaneously devalued all other thought. It's akin to placing the utmost of importance upon lemon meringue pie, all the while devaluing the ingredients themselves along with the tools required for making/forming pies.

Scientific questions are asked long before any answers are ever offered. But we act as if we are very interested in all sorts of different stuff long before we ever being asking questions. Furthermore, there are some questions(most if I were to hazard a guess) about some stuff that quite simply cannot be asked until long after language use has begun in earnest. Questions about our own thought, for instance. Questions about one's own thought, belief, mind, feelings, emotions, experience, and/or all discussions about "what's it's like" to be another creature are just plain not capable of being articulated by language-less creatures.

The very capability of taking account of one's own thought requires something to take account of, something to take account of it, and a means for doing so. Collingwood is making a concerted attempt at taking proper account of metaphysics, and he begin doing so by virtue of cleaving the one common practice into two separate and distinct practices; ontology(the science of pure being), and the search for presuppositions(the science of thought). The former he relegates to the dustbin. The latter, he attempts to make good sense/use of.

Proposition 2 offers all of us a bit of knowledge regarding the evolutionary stages/development of human thought. It does not start out scientific. Just because something is true of scientific thought does not make it true of any preceding thought leading up to the scientific. Thought begins simply and grows in it's complexity. That is true with each and every individual thinking/believing human being that has ever existed. That is equally true of any and all thinking/believing creatures, regardless of the biological machinery. The complexity level of thought and belief is made possible, in part at least, by the biological machinery.

We are saying that the one is existentially dependent upon and thus precedes the other.
— creativesoul

Yes. — tim wood

Upon rereading, I deleted that bit. It's nonsensical as it is written, although I knew what I meant. Too bad I wrote the opposite. When something is existentially dependent upon something else, the something else exists in it's entirety either prior to or simultaneously alongside with,

He looks to have an interesting position...

...you need to be good - really good - at philosophy to be a professional academic... — Bartricks

Just look at all the marvelous lines of thought coming from those who are really good...

:death:

Really good at doing what, exactly?

I've studied that part many times over. He's just plain mistaken here. His case is not as strong as he'd like it to be. It does not have the universal scope of applicability that he'd like it to have. Not all statements are made in answer to a question, at the time they are being made. That holds good regardless of the source of the purported question being answered. I've already offered a clear, readily understandable example to the contrary. "I'm ready for bed" is a statement that is not always made in answer to a question, regardless of whether one is engaged in thinking scientifically or not.

Collingwood wants to draw a distinction between thinking scientifically and not, where the former is untangling and reordering one's own thoughts with the aim of shedding light upon the presuppositions and/or questions underlying one's own statements(thought), and the latter is not. His justification for claiming that "Every statement that anybody ever makes is made in answer to a question" is one of arguing by definitional fiat. He goes on to claim that...

The reader’s familiarity with the truth expressed in this proposition is proportional to his familiarity with the experience of thinking scientifically. In proportion as a man is thinking scientifically when he makes a statement, he knows that his statement is the answer to a question and knows what that question is. In proportion as he is thinking unscientifically he does not know these things.

He goes further by re-introducing the clothesline example. I've no real issue with that example. He parses it well, and his method could be used with equal success regarding all sorts of statements where something or other is being identified. However, not all statements are ones in which the speaker is stating what something or other is or is called. Thus, "what is that?", or "what is that thing for?" are questions that quite simply do not arise regarding many other statements, regardless of whether or not one is thinking scientifically. "I'm ready for bed" being but one of many.

I would agree with the first proposition if and only if it were further subsequently qualified in the following way...

The claim "Every statement that anybody ever makes is made in answer to a question" would become...

Some statements are made in answer to a question.

For example, "I'm ready for bed" is a statement coming from someone who is ready for bed. Not everyone, when they're ready for bed, asks themselves some question or another which is answered by that statement at that time. Not everyone, when ready for bed, are being asked a question that that statement stands in response to... at that time.

Not all statements are made in answer to a question. Rather, some are.

I'll say one thing though; I strongly suspect that Collingwood is as brilliant as any other philosopher in the history of the world that I have personally had the pleasure of reading.

For now, Collingwood's piece receives reasonably high marks. However, I remain unconvinced that his first proposition is true at each and every point along the evolutionary timeline of human thought and belief(it's not always true). Do not get me wrong here. Collingwood does a fantastic job of describing exactly what many historical metaphysicians were doing, as well as clearly describing what he thinks we ought be doing instead, when he characterizes some historical lines of thinking. He uses the clothesline example to some degree of success to make his point. I agree with most of what he said in so far as it pertains to those peculiar lines of thought historically called "metaphysical", or those typically being articulated when someone in the past was 'doing' metaphysics(playing the sorts of language games commonly called "metaphysics"). No. That's all fine by me. I'm also not troubled by the rough mention of the commonality between metaphysical and scientific thought, even though I'm undecided regarding his arguments regarding that classification.

I'm also quite fond of the endeavor of disentangling thought and later rearranging it. He's talking about metacognition. That is to think about pre-existing thought and belief as a subject matter in it's own right. He mentions that not everyone practices. He's correct, for the most part. He admires systematic thinking. When we take account of our own thought with the sole aim of rearranging them in order of which must take place prior to the next, which is precisely what he does with the "fallacy of many questions" example as well as the clothesline, we are placing them into an order of emergence.

He lashes out at certain notions and thinkers in ways that sometimes may antagonize. I do the same here, often, so shouldn't I agree with his style? — Olivier5

No, you should not. Generally speaking...


Not - for that reason alone - should anyone conclude that some behaviour or another is acceptable or ethically permissible. If another's behaviour is, was, and/or will be judged as acceptable simply because one does it, then it always and only follows that all actual behaviour is morally acceptable and/or ethically permissible.

That conclusion is quite clearly false. Not all are.






When one agrees with another's behaviour based upon the fact that it is like one's own, then one is - at a bare minimum at least - being consistent. Consistency is admirable for a plethora of reasons. Dependability requires consistency. Dependability is good. However, consistency of behaviour alone does not warrant moral acceptance of that behaviour. Slave traders were consistent enough in their treatment of the enslaved that others could, and did, successfully plan on it continuing, for example. Hitler was consistent in his treatment of any and all perceived enemies of his goals. That's another example.

Now, I'm not saying that all people holding a consistent belief system are equivalent to people who've consistently committed horrible atrocities, or consistently acted in horrific ways. Rather, I'm simply mentioning tha prima facie evidence, I'm just reminding the reader of actual events that prove to us all - well beyond a reasonable doubt - that behavioural consistency alone does not warrant admiration, praiseworthiness, and/or moral consent of that behaviour.







We could also say of one - regarding such situations - that one is practicing what they preach, so to speak. That's a good personality trait to have. There's nothing wrong with that, in and of itself. There's inherent worth/value in dependability. When someone acts in a consistent manner, they are more dependable than someone who is more unpredictable. Here again though, that's not enough. I mean, we could certainly depend upon Hitler's behaviour to be a certain way towards Jewish people and his perceived enemies. Like clockwork. The point, in everyday terms, is that practicing what one preaches does not make the practice praiseworthy and/or acceptable.

So...

To sum it up as briefly and concisely as I can, if all one's behaviour is faultless, then there is no problem whatsoever with them assenting to any and all others' behaviours based solely upon the fact that they share such a propensity.

However, to quite the contrary, if it is the case that some of one's behaviours are in dire need of marked improvement; if any are shameworthy, if any are unacceptable, then there is a problem with one using one's own behaviours as the standard by which to judge the moral permissibility of such behaviours in general.

I'd be curious to see your work set out.

One is that I followed his reasoning and adhered to it, by and large. I share his analysis of presuppositions. I'm saying this just so my critiques below are taken for what they are: sympathetic overall. — Olivier5

I too am quite sympathetic. I would like to put his method of analysis to use here; play around with it, so to speak. I've read through around page eighty, but I keep getting the feeling that I need to read what I've already read, yet again. So, I've quite carefully studied the first five chapters reading through them multiple times taking notes and such. The more I read it, the more I actually want to make a concerted attempt at employing his method of analysis. However, I do not wish to do so alone.

Would you be interested in such an endeavor/discussion? As before, I'm very pressed for spare time lately, and do not see that changing anytime soon, so the pace will be slooow.

:wink:

I'm only through page 77, but I must say that something about this writing is quite striking to me, particularly that Collingwood keeps metaphysics connected to everyday events. I'm very impressed.

...it is better just to read him first and then take on the critics. — tim wood

Sound advice. I, myself, have just recently realized that I had spoken too soon earlier.

For you cannot insist that Hume was mistaken to question the uniformity of nature on the basis of it being an absolute presupposition, without adopting the dogmatic ontological standpoint that absolute presuppositions constitute objective existential claims — sime

Unless you first hold that absolute presuppositions are not claims at all, they are not propounded by those who hold them, and that what makes them what they are is their function as a basis from which questions arise not their truth value(not whether or not they are true). The uniformity of nature is not something that can be true. So questioning whether or not it is is mistaken. Hume's questioning of that much displays the logical efficacy of the absolute presupposition itself.

Glad you're reading this. Yes, it's interesting. That term jumped out at me as well. It plays a key role it seems. I've yet to have understood exactly what it picks out to the exclusion of all else. Is it on par with "normative" on your interpretation?

This text is a pleasure to read. Elegant, amusing and precise. Seems like the writings of a true gentleman. — Olivier5

Indeed, it has been a pleasurable piece of reading at times. Of particular interest to me is that he avoids using inherently inadequate dichotomous terms like "subjective" and "objective", "internal" and "external", "noumenal" and "phenomenal", "object" and "subject", "perception" and "reality", etc.

I'm not at all certain whether or not he is what I would call a gentleman though. I do not have enough evidence before me to make such a declaration.

Actually, now that I'm thinking it over, although he's yet to have admitted this, I'm left with the impression that he has tested his theory out on other people. That would go a long way in explaining the sheerly remarkable level of confidence expressed by him. Now, to be clear, such experiments are not always unacceptable. I mean, not all such endeavors are based upon unacceptable moral grounding or ethical principles involving the deliberate treatment of others. For example, not all people strive to minimize harm. That guiding principle ought be strictly adhered to in that situation(where one is deliberately aiming to reveal another's presuppositions to them) as a matter of moral principle. I know not of Collingwood's.

So, with all this in mind, assuming that this particular essay consists of conclusions drawn from actual behavioural studies of people first becoming consciously aware of their own absolute presuppositions, I still do not know whether or not he let his desire to verify his hypothesis overwhelm his desire to falsify it. I also do not know whether or not he let his desire to confirm cloud his judgment regarding how he was effecting/affecting others. Both of those could possibly mark someone not such a gentleman. There's no doubt about it; if what he claims about how people react when faced with their own absolute presuppositions is true, whether sometimes or all the time(I'm tending to think he's overstated his case), I still do not know whether or not he intentionally avoided unnecessarily harming others during the course of his own experiments just to prove his point, or if he accidentally discovered how certain individuals react when their own thought and belief is being placed under such scrutiny and began recording and studying those circumstances in greater detail as a result. What I am sure of is that there's no anecdotal evidence in the essay to suggest that he witnessed any other reaction aside from one he described; which makes me wonder if he tried to elicit different ones...

If he accidentally discovered the reaction, as compared/contrasted to aimed at provocation thereof, and was the kind of person who cared about the effects/affects that his inquiry had upon others when he forced them to face their own absolute presupposition(I'm thinking of the pathologist), one would think that he would make a concerted attempt at lessening the negative impact. But again, there's simply no evidence to suggest that he even considered the negative consequences that his pursuit had upon others, and as a result, tempered his approach in such a way as to lessen it while retaining the benefits(whatever Collingwood thought they may be). No. To quite the contrary, he seemed to relish in the discomfort of others.

So was he a 'true gentleman'? That question is one that remains unanswered from my vantage point.

I've witnessed those same sorts of situations described by him up close and personal, and there have been times that people do react exactly as he so eloquently described. So there is some truth to what he says, no doubt. However, not all people react like that. The reaction is partly influenced, partly created, partly conformed by the conversation leading up to the exposure of the presupposition, and that much is crucial to properly understand. I mean, I've found that sometimes when someone values another's opinion, and trusts that their words are true, an appeal to the 'right sorts of reasoning' can go a long way in lessening the potentially negative impact that uncovering an absolute presupposition can have. To labor the point:An astute reader can see for themselves that the essay did not paint the picture of a pleasant unveiling, and there was no mention of his own responsibility towards the impact such an event has upon the subject in question. That lack of openly expressed concern towards who he is effecting/affecting concerns me and leaves his gentleness open to question. But alas, I've spent far more time than I initially expected talking about whether or not he is a gentleman. I do not know that. Could be.

I want to say a lot more about the aforementioned the appeal to "the right sorts of reasons" in the paragraph directly above. What I mean to say is that the practical and necessary reasoning required in order to show another's absolute presuppositions to themselves varies according to the individual. I am not of the opinion that everyone is even capable of understanding that they do hold such things if we restricted our endeavor to Collingwood's terminological preferences. There are also times which another can be shown that they are working from absolute presuppositions without inciting such angry resistance.

This essay is the only time I can remember seriously reading Collingwood(although I've seen him mentioned a number of different times over the past decade or so). What I can say with a fair amount of certainty is that if he is claiming that absolute presuppositions are discovered, then that claim alone rests upon it's own absolute presupposition that that which has been discovered existed in it's entirety prior to it's discovery. Talking about a discovery is to make the claim that something or other has been found as it already is/was, existing in it's entirety, at that particular time... the moment of discovery. A claim of discovery itself rests upon exactly that absolute presupposition.

I strongly suspect Collingwood would agree, for he does not strike me as man beyond reproach. He was an archeologist afterall, and clearly seems like he was a reasonable fellow. I do wonder though, upon hearing this articulation, upon hearing me propound his absolute presuppositions for the first time, if he would act in the same manner so described by him when characterizing how other people act when one of their absolute presuppositions was first revealed to them, or if he could be gently led along a path paved by the right sorts of reasons?

No matter really...

Back to reading and glad so many have found interest.

Thanks. I'd be delighted to see what you think.

:smile:

In the preface Collingwood states...

This is not so much a book of metaphysics as a book about metaphysics. What I have chiefly tried to do in it is neither to expound my own metaphysical ideas, nor to criticize the metaphysical ideas of other people ; but to explain what metaphysics is, why it is necessary to the well-being and advancement of knowledge, and how it is to be pursued.

In the second place I have tried to dispel certain misconceptions about it which have led (and, had they been true, would have led with perfect justice) to the conclusion that metaphysics is a blind alley of thought into which knaves and fools have combined these many centuries past to lure the human intellect to its destruction.

In the third place I have offered to the reader’s attention a few examples of metaphysics itself, in order to show how metaphysical inquiry will be conducted if the principles laid down in the opening chapters are taken as sound.

To anyone interested, there's no time limit here or strict reading schedule. It seems that most who've expressed interest prior to and since I posted the OP all share limited time. Given that, I'm in no hurry, and really a careful deliberate reading is required to begin with, so...

Everyone can read at a pace that is best for them...

There's no need for daily participation either. We can all do it at our own leisure.

Thanks for that link. I think I've corrected the one in the OP.

Good suggestions. Collingwood provided his own definitions though. So, one who knows that in order to understand such a piece of writing, one must grant definitions/senses of key terms. Should anyone here wish to argue definitions, they're in the wrong thread.

:wink:

Cool. Just trying to drum up some interest in carefully reading it...

No worries.

In case you may be interested...

Nice. Interesting parallels drawn between RGC and Witt's notion of forms of life, with both emphasizing the importance of language. The difference between them is RGC's focus upon thought.

No worries, my friend.



Looks like we're the only ones who want to read this...

:razz:

I'm only on page 56, and I'll not be able to spend much more than an hour or so, maybe two, a day reading and/or discussing it. However, I'd be happy to begin a new thread on the paper itself, because this thread is not about that. We could discuss it as we read... as needed. Maybe start the discussion by summarizing the first four chapters? That looks like it's though page 33. Or, perhaps do it chapter by chapter?