So better to not point out that there are white victims too? Is even mentioning that some kind of dog whistle? — ssu

I would not say that. If the context is police brutality or abuse of power, it would seem appropriate. If the context is the disproportion, it would not.

Well that's too bad because if you're trying to effect change it might come in handy to show those largely (but not entirely) white suburbanites that police violence actually effects people like them. — BitconnectCarlos

Oh, many know and thus also realize that pointing to white ones as a means to divert from black ones is rather beside the point.

Police brutality does not apply to just blacks. Don't think anyone who's the least bit knowledgable on the subject thinks that it does. There's overlap though, and disproportion...

Pointing out examples of white victims misses(or devalues) the point in much the same way that "All lives matter" does...

Convention.

Typing "ball pin hammer" into google translates correctly...

Right. I figure in the end you've(or he's) done me a favor.

All comments are subject to moderation, including deletion, and the system does not allow for automatic notification. I don't know of any other way your comments would have been lost. — Baden

:razz:

That's what I figure happens when mine disappear. Usually when I've let my emotions get the best of me.

You totally missed the point. Using "five red apples" to acquire five red apples shows that the user knows the correct use/meaning of "five red apples".

Are you making the french press or what?
— creativesoul

Turkish. — Banno

You made a Turkish press?

Updating the passing theory.

I'm enjoying this thread, but am a bit shy to respond because I'm not very familiar with the philosophy of language. — Dawnstorm

Seem to be doing just fine to me. I am certainly one who is not familiar with it, at least not a conventional understanding...

:wink:

So, you'll always be adjusting the passing theory with me.

Is it more that one cannot rely solely on convention? — Banno

I'd say so.

It is only the federal government than can relieve the injuries. Don't kid yourself. They have not. That's the point.

Sure. We're now both drawing correlations between the same things, after a little effort on my part to clarify which two statements I was referring to with my word use.

:wink:

Communication by speech does not require shared meaning. Communicating by speech is just doing things with words. Meaning only enters into it when we become self-conscious of what it is we are doing. — Banno

I did spend some time wondering why "That's not well expressed, but it'll do while I get some more coffee" was a point of contention... — Banno

That was not well expressed by me. I meant in the paragraph at the top of this post.

And I want to further examine the relation between this and Godel's incompleteness. — Banno

I found that an apt analogy. The continual need for ad hoc corrections based upon new information not yet covered by strict conventional sets of rules. That's the problem in a nutshell I think...

To expect something as fluid as natural/common language to be limited to such a fixed set of conventional rules is to neglect to consider the fluidity itself. It is to mistake our account of how language works with how language works. As always, communication and language use existed in it's entirety prior to our account of it. As such, we can get it wrong. This paper shows that we have in some important respects...

It appears that Wittgenstein thought that it isn't necessary to know the meaning of a word in order to use it correctly hence, meaning is use for him. — TheMadFool

Or perhaps that using it correctly shows that one knows what it means.

When someone goes to a store and asks for five red apples, receives five red apples, and goes on their way, it seems that that person knows how to use the words. Ask such a person what the meaning of "five red apples" is, and they may or may not know how to answer.

Are you making the french press or what?

:wink:

Not sure if you wanted to continue the recent bit, or revise those two contentious claims. I'd like to try to keep this relevant to the topic as well, so I appreciate your efforts towards that thus far. My turn to get coffee...

:point:

...pledging to increase access to capital in Black communities by nearly $500 billion...

Sometime soon... perhaps in the next week or two...

Wonder who - exactly - will be granted such access. Is "My pillow" building a factory there?

Good to see the GOP spending their time upon what's most important right now...

Nevermind eliminating and/or at least easing all of the economic, emotional, and physical injury to everyday Americans as a result of the pandemic, which was not at all a result of anything that the average citizen has done, but is most certainly the result of government.

Communication by speech requires shared meaning.
— creativesoul

A casual phrase, into which I might be reading too much, but I think this puts the cart before the horse, and is perhaps at the core of the difference between our approaches. — Banno

It very well may be. Our approaches and positions seem to me at least to be very much alike. Given I've adopted a number of your approaches to certain subject matters, I'm probably more like you than you are like me.

:wink:

There's a bunch of posters - Harry Hindu, @TheMadFool, @Olivier5 for starters - who take the view, contra Wittgenstein and most of philosophy of language since - that meaning is made inside one's head and then transported to another head by putting it into words. That meaning precedes communication.

This leads to the reification of meaning, and all sorts of odd attitudes.

Isn't it rather that we do things with words - things that are embedded in our everyday comings and goings?

The notion of meaning is added, post hoc, as a lie-to-children that wrongly explains what we did - "Oh, I meant the other plate", and so on. — Banno

We're in complete agreement here aside from one notable exception. I agree that meaning can precede communication. Not always though. And perhaps most importantly, not for any of the reasons many folk hereabout offer. Meaning is not made inside one's head, not by any stretch.

A simple example...

The meaning of "tree" includes a tree. Trees are not inside of our head, nor are words.

Communication by speech does not require shared meaning. Communicating by speech is just doing things with words. Meaning only enters into it when we become self-conscious of what it is we are doing.

That's not well expressed, but it'll do while I get some more coffee. — Banno

The first and last statement are points of contention. The second one isn't a problem.

That all depends upon you. You are the only one that can decide that much. Not me.

Personally, given my meticulous nature and fondness for complex systems and methodology(I'm an artist, inventor, engineer, manufacturer, etc.) I find that it does me a whole lot of good, on a personal level, and on a public level.

On a pragmatic level, understanding this paper's underlying subject matter(meaning), is crucial to understanding some of the everyday events that I find myself in. Since I've been doing philosophy(and I'm fond of the analytical approach, but not at all devoted so to speak I do not place logic itself upon a pedestal) I've been able to effectively communicate with(and actually understand) a much wider variety of people than before. Common ground seems to be much easier to find when we understand thought, belief, meaning, and truth and how they work and/or operate in our lives.

Yes. Again, you've somehow chosen something out of the paper that I've already been carefully considered/studying. It's like you're reading my mind.

Contrary to the impression I may have left earlier, it seems that Davidson is largely in agreement with what I wrote earlier as it pertains to the referential aspects of "Smith's murderer". I think that that post set out that "firm sense" of the difference between what words mean and what a speaker means, but there still remains important differences between he and I, for it did so in a way that does not seem entirely agreeable to Davidson.

At least some(perhaps the bulk) of the disagreement involved the conclusion about saying something true by using a false statement. I found that that statement was not false, for all the reasons set out heretofore, and it seems that you've since shown that the T sentence is amenable to that account as well.

And yes...

The third principle is what Davidson is finding to be wanting when it comes to malapropisms. I would agree, mainly because of the "learned in advance" part. Those interpretations, that shared meaning, happens at the time.

I'm suggesting that that failure to understand the very basics of meaning may constitute the entirety of the problem(s). Perhaps?

...the assumption that communication by speech requires that speaker and interpreter have learned or somehow acquired a common method or theory of interpretation—as being able to operate on the basis of shared conventions, rules, or regularities.

As Davidson notes, this assumption is wrong. There is no theory or method that "fills the bill" according to Davidson. But, what if the problem is not so much that no method or theory of interpretation fills the bill, but rather that we expect it to?

Communication by speech requires shared meaning. I do not think that shared meaning requires any separate and distinct method/theory of interpretation. Successful interpretation is equivalent to shared meaning, isn't it?

Could this just be a case of unnecessarily multiplying entities?

If two people draw correlations between the same things, say "Smith's murderer" and a particular individual, then they have a common method between them which does both, attributes meaning and succeeds in communication(results in shared meaning).

can a singular, novel use, establish a convention?
— StreetlightX
Again, it could only do so were it a first use that came to be repeated in a community. — Banno

I think that this is key in actually understanding the issues that malapropism raise for the three principles in question. They cannot account for this, can they?

Ah.. you went back to the earlier part, and I moved on. We can do that. I just do not want to be an impediment to progress. So far as that answer goes...

Good. I have been thinking something along those lines since that longer post. In doing so, I had already arrived at believing that the T sentence may not be in as much peril as I had thought at the time I wrote that. "Good" because I am quite fond of it, and happy to know that it's use is consistent and/or amenable with my own position.

I meant as a show of support for the movement itself. I doubt anyone would take offense for that.

Davidson wrote:

Because a speaker necessarily intends first meaning to be grasped by his audience, and it is grasped if communication succeeds, we lose nothing in the investigation of first meaning if we concentrate on the knowledge or ability a hearer must have if he is to interpret a speaker. What the speaker knows must correspond to something the interpreter knows if the speaker is to be understood, since if the speaker is understood he has been interpreted as he intended to be interpreted. The abilities of the speaker that go beyond what is required of an interpreter—invention and motor control—do not concern me here. Nothing said so far limits first meaning to language; what has been characterised is (roughly) Grice’s non-natural meaning, which applies to any sign or signal with an intended interpretation. What should be added if we want to restrict first meaning to linguistic meaning? The usual answer would, I think, be that in the case of language the hearer shares a complex system or theory with the speaker, a system which makes possible the articulation of logical relations between utterances, and explains the ability to interpret novel utterances in an organized way.

This answer has been suggested, in one form or another, by many philosophers and linguists, and I assume it must in some sense be right. The difficulty lies in getting clear about what this sense is. The particular difficulty with which I am concerned in this paper (for there are plenty of others) can be brought out by stating three plausible principles concerning first meaning in language: we may label them by saying they require that first meaning be systematic, shared, and prepared.

(1) First meaning is systematic. A competent speaker or interpreter is able to interpret utterances, his own or those of others, on the basis of the semantic properties of the parts, or words, in the utterance, and the structure of the utterance. For this to be possible, there must be systematic relations between the meanings of utterances.

(2) First meanings are shared. For speaker and interpreter to communicate successfully and regularly, they must share a method of interpretation of the sort described in (1).

(3) First meanings are governed by learned conventions or regularities. The systematic knowledge or competence of the speaker or interpreter is learned in advance of occasions of interpretation and is conventional in character.

Enter malapropisms and novel use and the issues that arise with the inability to take them into account by virtue of using the above principles...

Davidson ended with this:

The problem we have been grappling with depends on the assumption that communication by speech requires that speaker and interpreter have learned or somehow acquired a common method or theory of interpretation—as being able to operate on the basis of shared conventions, rules, or regularities. The problem arose when we realized that no method or theory fills this bill. The solution to the problem is clear. In linguistic communication nothing corresponds to a linguistic competence as often described: that is, as summarized by principles (1)–(3). The solution is to give up the principles. Principles (1) and (2) survive when understood in rather unusual ways, but principle (3) cannot stand, and it is unclear what can take its place. I conclude that there is no such thing as a language, not if a language is anything like what many philosophers and linguists have supposed. There is therefore no such thing to be learned, mastered, or born with. We must give up the idea of a clearly defined shared structure which language-users acquire and then apply to cases. And we should try again to say how convention in any important sense is involved in language; or, as I think, we should give up the attempt to illuminate how we communicate by appeal to conventions.

I would think that if we acquired knowledge of how language use first begins(what that requires), then all these issues would be resolved.

It seems that Davidson begins with interpretation(or the account he's reporting on does). That which is being interpreted is already meaningful. I agree with Davidson's conclusions here that there is no such thing as language, if the account being critiqued is what counts as such. Basically that conventional account is found lacking. I'm not sure that it's entirely wrong though. I further think that it's lacking as a result of not being basic enough.

The attribution of meaning and all that that requires happens prior to interpretation and language. Though, even here, I would argue against Grice's notions of natural meaning as well. I personally do not think any of them have gotten basic meaning right, and without doing that we cannot expect for them to get language use and/or successful communication right either... not entirely anyway.

No worries. It would be cool though.

It's not true?

Well, shit. I thought it was cool that they would do so...

The read that a university in Scotland renamed the David Hume building to George Floyd. — NOS4A2

Yeah, what a horrible thing to do. I mean it's not like there's any need to focus upon systemic racism, institutional racism, racial justice reform, abuse of power, or Black Lives Matter. I mean, what a ridiculous ideology. Such people who focus upon things like that act as if something is wrong with the way things are...

I mean, even the president hopes there's not a race problem, or so he says. He doesn't have a problem.

That says it all, doesn't it?

I don’t think any of it is true, just like your statement that Trump has never said anything about the plight of “African Americans” — NOS4A2

Well, as I said... I stand corrected on that. He has made a few(scripted by others) remarks about that. The facts proved me wrong on that, just as they prove me right regarding the aforementioned nine paragraphs that you've refused to directly discuss.

All good.

If we place Trump's nice remarks on one side of lady justice's scale and his derogatory negative devaluations and actual behaviours regarding racial justice reform and the ever-growing movement for it on the other, it's quite easy to see how he leans...

Holy shit Isaac! Just read through a bit of the Naming and Necessity thread and after going through just one of our exchanges, I'm left with a very poor impression of myself...

My apologies!

:yikes:

It's not that I think I was wrong, mind you. But I was certainly being a dick... Jeez.

This discussion was skirted around here. Successful reference was a notion that pervaded my contributions throughout that thread. The similarities here are remarkable.

Take some advil.

:wink:

I'm going back to reading...

We can leave that bit above to the side if you like. I understand that it is tangential to the thrust of the paper. I'd not planned on focusing so intently upon that portion. I'm good with moving on, and am currently continuing past that part.

:nerd:

One part of A nice derangement that we have not directly addressed so far is that about Donnellan: the referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions. I enjoyed the droll interplay, and the link to modal logic; and the observation that one can say something that is true, using a sentence that is false. — Banno

Interesting that you should mention this, because that particular section has definitely captured my attention. Due to the overwhelming compelling interest that I have in the general subject matter, I'm very carefully studying this part at the moment. I'm reminded of a recurring issue that rears it's head elsewhere. It relates to meaning and/or reference, and seems quite relevant to the Donnellan distinction between two uses of definite descriptions and the MacKay objection to that distinction as discussed by Davidson.

I suspect that the conclusion that one can say something true by using a sentence that is false is based upon conflating the very nuanced but quite remarkable differences in both, the meaning and the truth conditions of what are otherwise identical looking statements. Neglecting that distinction is the recurring issue I'm seeing here and elsewhere(Gettier in particular). I'll try to explain concisely showing the relevance to the paper.

Identical looking statements can and do mean very different things, particularly when examined in a more general sense, such as when completely isolated from the individual speaker(what words mean according to Davidson) as compared/contrasted to what the exact same words mean when they are examined as a belief statement(what a speaker means according to Davidson). The same sentence can and does have very different meaning/reference, and thus very different truth conditions depending upon whether or not we're examining what the words mean(in general) or what the words mean when used by a specific individual speaker.

For example, and in at least partial agreement with Donnellan, I too find that "Smith's murderer is insane" is true when and if "Smith's murderer" refers to an insane individual, regardless of whether or not that individual murdered Smith. I disagree that that is a false sentence when we examine it as an individual belief statement, for the referent of "Smith's murderer" does not need to have murdered Smith. Rather, the referent need only to be insane. That holds good because "Smith's murderer" is doing the work of a rigid designator(pace Kripke in Naming and Necessity). It picks an individual out of this world, to the exclusion of all others. If the individual picked out is insane, then "Smith's murderer is insane" is true because the individual picked out is insane.

It is only when we examine the statement as a general one(divorced from the individual, and such not as a belief statement) that problems arise. That becomes a problem, because "Smith's murderer" no longer refers to the same individual that Jones picked out. Rather, when divorced from Jones and taken in general; the referent, the meaning, and the truth conditions all change accordingly. In such a general case, "Smith's murderer" only picks out the individual that murdered Smith, to the exclusion of all others. In this example, the person that murdered Smith is not insane. There is no problem however, because Jone's most certainly referred to someone else, and that person was insane, despite the fact that a misnomer was used. What we have here are two identical looking statements with very different referents, meaning, and thus truth conditions. The only problem I see is neglecting the differences between them.

That same neglect is also true of Gettier, and it is the very foundation that gives rise to 'Gettier problems'. For example, "The man with ten coins in his pocket will get the job" refers to completely different people depending upon whether we examine it in general(any man with ten coins will do here) or as a particular belief statement of Smith about himself(only Smith himself will do here). Gettier conflates the two. Smith was, of course, talking about himself. He did not believe that anyone else would get the job. Hence, the recurring problem mentioned earlier. That's worth mention, but I digress...

Contrary to Donnellan, and perhaps in some agreement with Davidson(based upon his mention of the disconnect between MacKay's objection and Donnellan's answer)I also do not think MacKay's Humpty Dumpty objection is valid as a result of all this. Rather, I think Donnellan granted far too much, because it is not at all uncommon to use language like that. Perhaps the underlying importance of intentions for Donnellan represents the bulk of the actual problem(s). It could also be the result of the distinction drawn between what words mean and what a speaker means, for that distinction does not successfully do the job needed, as shown above. Davidson also denies that the truth conditions of the statement change according to the meaning, which is very odd to me. He said the following...

Jones’ belief about who murdered Smith cannot change the truth of the sentence he uses (and for the same reason cannot change the reference of the words in the sentence).

That is a point of contention. I would strongly disagree, in part based upon what's above. In addition, I would also charge Davidson with having this the wrong way around. The truth conditions of a statement are determined by the referent and what's being said about the referent, not the other way around. It's not so much that Jones' belief about who murdered Smith changes the truth of the sentence. To quite the contrary, the referent of "Smith's murderer" and Jones' belief about the referent wholly determines it's truth conditions, in the exact same way that Smith's belief determines those things in Gettier's Case I.


Tangentially:The distinction I've set out above may pose insurmountable problems for the T sentence, because the T sentence is incapable of drawing the aforementioned remarkable distinction between the meaning and truth conditions of identical statements(in general as compared/contrasted with individual belief statements). I see no way for the T sentence to disambiguate these remarkably different truth conditions and/or meanings of identical looking statements. Perhaps, Davidson knows this and as a result denies the distinction I've set out here as a means to salvage his project(save the T sentence).

Well shit...

I stand corrected. I guess someone did stuff a few nice words about blacks into his mouth.

:rofl:

Probably killed him to say them. He's such a great third grade reader too. Perfect cadence.

A racist president today cannot publicly admit it(yet), but will instead claim to support the black community in their fight for racial justice reform in public spaces while simultaneously doing all of the things I mentioned yesterday. Which leads us back to that...

I offered nine different paragraphs setting out Trump's behaviour and the only reasonable conclusion drawn from what he has actually done. You neglected to directly address any of them, in lieu of proposing a defense for three charges that I did not make. Which paragraph, if any, are you claiming is not true?

Ah, yes!

For what it's worth...

I agree with Davidson when it comes to first meaning(involving sentences and words) requiring an idiolect(their use). However, if Davidson holds that there is no such thing as non and/or pre linguistic meaning, then you know I cannot agree. This paper however does not seem to be concerned with pre and/or non linguistic meaning. Luckily.

:wink:

I am compelled by the inability for theories of language(meaning?) to account for malapropisms and novelty. They've definitely went wrong somewhere along the line. I suspect that the underlying issue is the theory of meaning underwriting the rest.

Tomorrow.

So, I've read the paper and the discussion thus far. Interesting. Particularly the parts about passing and prior theories as a means to account for the ability to understand malapropisms(and novel use as well, I gather). I do want to read it all again, at least another time, prior to joining in here.

I am curious though. Would you remind me of which discussion we've had where the differences between Grice and Davidson are similar and/or reminiscent? That way I can look for those similarities upon rereading again tomorrow.

:smile:

Thanks for clearing that up.

Trump's not the only racist currently in power.