Others can say it about us, when we're mistaken about the weather, but we cannot say it about ourselves in the same scenario, when we're mistaken about the weather, without sounding absurd.
"I do not believe that it's raining outside, but I'm wrong" describes the very same scenario as "It's raining but I do not believe it".
— creativesoul
Yes. — Ciceronianus the White
Ok.
So it seems you agree with the above bit. Good. I thought we were in agreement about that much at least.
But you said there are virtually an innumerable number of true statements we cannot make about ourselves without sounding absurd. — Ciceronianus the White
Indeed I did, and there most certainly are. In light of being mistaken...
Moore provided only one example of innumerable actual situations when one holds false belief, when one does not hold the right sorts of true belief, or
when one is otherwise mistaken.
That is the key here; an irrevocably crucial consideration that seems to have been left sorely neglected.
Each and every time one is mistaken - and
those situations are innumerable - there are most certainly
at least a few true statements about the scenario, that that particular individual cannot say about themselves without sounding absurd, despite the fact that others can. That is the scenario put forth by Moore.
His subsequent 'puzzling' question, however, is far too vague, for we can make all sorts of true statements about ourselves without issue. So, asking why I cannot say something true about myself without sounding absurd doesn't put a sharp enough point on the question, especially given the rest of the hypothetical scenario he provided. A far better question would have been to ask "When I am mistaken, why can't I say the same things about myself that others do without sounding absurd?"
The absurdity is the result of
1 not being able to believe both statements within the Moorean sentence at the same time,
2 not being able to knowingly hold false belief,
3 not being able to recognize our own such mistakes while making them, and
4 being perfectly capable of stating the sentence anyway.
In what sense are the statements "I do not believe that it's raining outside, but I'm wrong?" or "It's raining but I do not believe it" true? — Ciceronianus the White
In the exact same sense that they are true when spoken by another.
The statements are true in the sense that they are meaningful and they correspond to the way things are; the case at hand; reality; the world; the universe; what's happened; states of affairs; etc.,
and that meaningful correspondence obtains regardless of whether or not the speaker actually believes the statements.
"I do not believe it's raining outside, but I'm wrong" is true if, and only if, I do not believe it is raining outside but I'm wrong. "It's raining outside, but Mac does not believe it" is true in exactly the same way.
What makes statements true(what makes a statement obtain correspondence) are actual events; what's happened, what is happening, and/or what will happen(in the case of prediction/expectation which aren't even capable if being true when spoken). If it is raining, and one does not believe it is raining, and one says(quite absurdly) "It's raining, but I do not believe it", then the sentence(both statements) would be true on both counts.
When taken separately, the one about the weather would be true if it was raining when spoken, regardless of the speaker's belief. However, "I do not believe it is raining" is true if and only if the speaker does not believe it is raining, and as such it's truth is not determined by the weather, but rather, by the speaker's belief about the weather.
I assume they'd have to be made by someone who doesn't believe something is taking place though aware it's taking place, or someone who knows something is taking place but does not believe it's not taking place. Otherwise, it strikes me they wouldn't be true statements.
Who would make such "true statements" in virtually innumerable instances? — Ciceronianus the White
All individuals that attempt to say the same things about themselves that another says so easily when the individual is mistaken about something or other. Anyone using accounting practices typically used by others as a means to talk about their own mistake,
while they are in the middle of making it.
Anyone, perhaps, looking to show the inherent inadequacies of conventional understanding(logical notation/propositional logic)?
Someone, perhaps, who took note that while others can recognize and point out that we are mistaken, while we're mistaken, it doesn't make much sense at all if we say the same things about ourselves, but they could not effectively explain how and/or why that's the case.
Someone, perhaps, looking to further discriminate between all the different meanings/uses of "I believe..."
Someone looking to further the idea that philosophy is doing something important?
No one at all practicing common parlance.