Truth - as correspondence that is prior to language acquisition, and as coherence within language use - emerges within thought and belief. Thought and belief begins simply and grows in it's complexity, as it must, according to the tenets underwriting my viewpoint. In evolutionary terms, thought and belief must evolve and they clearly do, as can be readily ascertained by careful poignent observation.

...if 'true' is a category of belief, then nothing about the real world determines what goes in that category, it's a human-made one. We decide what's in and what's out. Like 'blue'. — Isaac

We very well may decide what we choose to place into such a category, but our criterion for what counts as being true will show it's inherent weaknesses in the process, under careful scrutiny.

If "true" is a category of individual beliefs, all of which meet the criterion of being true, and true belief does not require our taking account of it in order for it to be so, then either truth is prior to language, or true belief does not require truth.

I put it to everyone participating here that true thought and/or belief is not existentially dependent upon being reported upon. In other words, some true thought and/or belief does not require language; some true thought and/or belief does not consist of language; some true belief is prior to language.

That says something important about truth, as well as something important about the different senses of the term "truth". Accompanied by the earlier post, we have thought, belief, meaning, and truth... all of which emerge simultaneously within the simplest of true thought and belief. Falsity emerges during this timeframe as well, but it is not until we come to realize our own fallibility that we become aware that we have false belief or true ones.

If we have no reasonable grounds or mechanism by which the two could be assumed to be the same then we must conclude that they would only be so by chance. — Isaac

This is rubbish.

We need not assume that our thoughts are true. We can often check and know for sure. Chance has nothing at all to do with it.

Besides that, the criticism levied has been ignored. Your claim that our perception of reality is not reality means nothing. That's trivial. Of course, our perception of reality is not equal to reality, nor need it be.

In order for you to know that we cannot and/or do not perceive anything as it is(or that we cannot perceive reality directly), you must know the difference between the two. Knowing that requires knowing both, and then performing a subsequent comparative analysis between the two. That cannot be done, of course, by your very own admission.

It's untenable.

You're good then... just checkin'. Ya never know what people know...


:wink:

I've been with Nancy for 38 years. We met on a blind date set up by a friend. Haven't been apart since...and I would not change any of the memories I have of this monogamous relationship.

ASIDE: We've been together, as I mentioned, for 38 years...and have never married. We've both just felt that no governmental agency or church need be involved in our relationship. — Frank Apisa

Without marriage, if either of you dies... they may be more involved than you'd like, and possibly in ways that you'd not imagined they could.

here's an example of you using that sense of the word measure:
According to this criterion, it would make sense to say that a mantis shrimp's eyes are measuring light frequencies and distributions...
— creativesoul — InPitzotl

An astute reader will note that it's a case of following from your use(s) and showing that it leads to a reductio ad absurdum.

Eyes do not measure. Anthropomorphism.
— creativesoul
You're reaching. — InPitzotl

:meh:

I was referring to metaphysical antirealism which is the idea that "nothing exists outside the mind" — Michael McMahon

That's radical idealism...

Why is medicare for all a bad idea? — frank

It's not. The main arguments against it involve costs, as if it is too expensive to implement. That cost objection fails to consider that it is done already by every major industrialized nation in the world, and those citizens costs - per capita - are about half. So, it is neither financially impossible nor reasonably doubtable. Just because our current system doesn't do it, does not mean it could not and should not change so that it does. Taxes will go up, but the amount is directly offset by the savings in premiums, prescriptions, and co-pays. It will save the overwhelming majority of people money.

And taxes - in general - are much better understood as user fees.

Mantis shrimp's eyes measure... what they measure. The question is what they measure. I define color in terms of what eyes measure in color vision; that's the colorimetric definition — InPitzotl

Eyes do not measure. Anthropomorphism.

You're still confused over the same point. There are three completely distinct things here: (1) frequency, (2) spectral distribution, (3) color. — InPitzotl

That's incorrect. As you yourself say, "photoreceptors are just doing what they do". And what they do, with respect to responding to light, is send signals proportional to some amount of isomerization of photopsin molecules that they contain. That's it; nothing else. That thing is (3). And if (3) cannot distinguish between spectral distributions (2), then (3) cannot be said to measure which (2) you have. If (3) cannot distinguish frequency components (1) in a spectral distribution, (3) cannot be said to measure frequencies in a spectral distribution. (3) can do neither of these things, so it measures neither.

To reach your conclusion from the assessment requires conflating (3) with (1) and (2). My assessment contains no such conflating; that's all on you. — InPitzotl

:meh:

If that were true then measuring requires only detection (3), reception, excitation, folding, and/or perception. According to this criterion, it would make sense to say that a mantis shrimp's eyes are measuring light frequencies(1) and distributions(2)...
— creativesoul
That's incorrect. — InPitzotl

I agree. That is not a correct report of what I wrote.

I've a hard leaning towards methodological naturalism
— creativesoul

There's nothing supernatural about necessary truth, such as that which is expressed by mathematics. — Douglas Alan

I agree. 3+2=5 because we won't let it equal anything else. Numbers are rigid designators. Kripke argued - quite successfully on my view - that names are as well.

Photoreceptors are part of the system used by creatures with color vision capabilities as a means for detecting the reflection and/or emission of light from a specific source. The light reflected from an apple is not effected in any way whatsoever - by us - until it interacts with our eyes. The spectral distribution emanating from an apple is processed by our visual systems without further thought.

We see distinct colors prior to naming and talking about them.

There are some interesting studies I've seen that lead us to believe that the precision with which we categorize colors can be further increased/complicated by how we talk about them early on.

I find that interesting.

Novels before the author just has no compulsory force whatsoever to me. There's not enough evidence in support of such a claim. All evidence is to the contrary.

If and when we meet space-faring aliens, I guess it will come to you as quite a surprise to you when they have "invented" the same math that we have. What will explain that, prey tell? — Douglas Alan

Yeah. I do not place excessive value upon ideas that are based upon logical possibility alone. I've a hard leaning towards methodological naturalism accompanied by the unknown and a good dash of Occam's razor....

The number three is not a name, it is an abstract entity that represents certain properties of a certain quantity. — Douglas Alan

The number three is a specific mark of our own invention. We use "3" as well as "three" to pick out a specific quantity of individual things. We discovered quantities. Actually, I think it's a bit more accurate to say that we first take note of single things(one) and pluralities(more than one), and we do this long before using different marks to pick out particular quantities.(long before knowing the referent of "two" and 2)

The predicate P that picks out chairs, existed as an abstract object in the space of predicates long before people existed. — Douglas Alan

Moby Dick there too?

Discovery is of that which exists in it's entirety prior to it's discovery. Invention is to make something novel by combining pre-existing things in order to make a new, more complex composite thereof... the invention itself.

There are no numbers in nature, aside from our accounting practices. There are pluralities. There are no predicates in nature, aside from our descriptive practices. There are rudimentary level thought and belief. The most basic of these is perhaps the attribution/recognition of causality.

I couldn't disagree more. Logic, like math, is discovered, not invented. Though I believe that everything that is invented is actually a form of discovery. — Douglas Alan

You too with the equivocation...

:meh:

The number three would exist, even if there were no intelligent beings to comprehend the number three. Likewise, the predicate P that picks out chairs exists, even if there were never any humans to breathe life into P. — Douglas Alan

The number three is the name we've attributed to a specified plurality of things... a quantity. Numbers are names for quantities.

Predicates are descriptive practices. There are no such things without common language.

So...

That is where we certainly disagree.

Descriptive practices are existentially dependent common language. Predicates are as well. Numbers are names for quantities. Names are used to pick individuals out of the world to the exclusion of all else. Naming practices are existentially dependent upon common language use.

Common language use is existentially dependent upon language users. Everything that is existentially dependent common language is equally dependent upon humans. All predicates, and all names are existentially dependent upon humans.

Where there have never been humans there could have never been naming and descriptive practices.

That's what color is. — InPitzotl

Nah. That's what your account of color is.

...we measure with this photoreceptor... — InPitzotl

If that were true then measuring requires only detection, reception, excitation, folding, and/or perception. According to this criterion, it would make sense to say that a mantis shrimp's eyes are measuring light frequencies and distributions...

Using a photoreceptor to measure requires complex thought and belief about how one sees the world via color vision capabilities. Otherwise, photoreceptors are just doing what they do which is not using tools specifically designed to increase our physiological sensory perception capabilities. All measuring is exactly that.

The set of all chairs is the set of all x such that P(x), where P is a predicate that is true for chairs and false for non-chairs. — Douglas Alan

Looks like predicate logic to me. I could be dead wrong. I do not place an excessive amount of value upon either logic(classical) or predicate logic. To be perfectly honest, I temper the confidence I have in all logic by keeping the following fact in mind...

All logical notation is existentially dependent upon something to account for, and/or take an account of. All notation is existentially dependent upon common language use. All logical notation is existentially dependent upon common language use.

Predicate logic, when used as too strict a guideline for everyday thought and belief, places a linguistic boundary around that which is not linguistic.

Human thought and belief existed in their entirety prior to the very first logical notation. That which exists in it's entirety prior to something else cannot be existentially dependent upon that something else. Rudimentary level human thought and belief is not existentially dependent upon logical notion.

Logic is the result of thinking about pre-existing thought and belief. Such thought and belief does not consist of logic. Rather, it's quite the other way 'round.

I'm still struggling a little bit here, particularly when I perform a substitution of terms with your proposed referents/definitions for those.
— creativesoul
Okay, but I'm a bit confused why you're struggling: — InPitzotl

Please. I've given due attention, and I expect the same in return.

Attend to the explanation thereof. Every answer you need from me, at this time, is there. In short.. you're equivocating terms. When the light is shed on this... we further surmise that you've contradicted yourself.

Neither is acceptable.

I guess to me, to say that something exists is merely saying that there is a predicate that when applied to everything yields some results. — Douglas Alan

When I say that something exists, I am simply abbreviating. The long version is more like...

Some things exist in their entirety prior to our awareness of them. Some things do not. Noting the difference between these sorts of things is pivotal to understanding what it is that we're discussing.

Some things existed prior to common language use. Predicates did not. Applying a predicate requires language use. Apple trees emerged onto the world stage long before humans developed the naming and descriptive practices that facilitate our ability to talk about the world and/or ourselves.

The sort of existence you've described here requires being part of language use. Some things owe their very existence to language use. Other things... not so much.

There are three completely distinct things here: (1) frequency, (2) spectral distribution, (3) color. — InPitzotl

Since what matters for detection is simply the raw number of photopsin events, and there's multiple ways of reaching that number, then we're not detecting (2)'s; we're detecting "numbers of events".
— InPitzotl

This bit leaves me a bit confused though. When you say that "we're not detecting (2)'s; we're detecting numbers of events" are you referring to us or the photoreceptors under consideration? — creativesoul

Sort of (changed from yes); I'm referring to the number of photopsin molecules (available for detection). (2) has a particular effect on our eyes. A different (2) could also have the same effect on our eyes. So call the former (2a), and the latter (2b). The effect is (3x); (2a) would have effect (3x), and (2b) would also have effect (3x). Since we can't distinguish (2a) from (2b), it doesn't make sense to say that we detect (2a). What we detect instead is (3x). 3x is "an equivalence class of spectra". 2a is just a member of that equivalence class. 2b is another member. — InPitzotl

I'm still struggling a little bit here, particularly when I perform a substitution of terms with your proposed referents/definitions for those.

You first said we're detecting the sheer number of events, and then you say we're detecting an equivalence class of spectra. Either the sheer number of photopsin events is equal to an equivalence class of spectra, or you've contradicted yourself.

Do you follow me here? I hope so, because this part is causing me to have a hard time understanding what it is that you're saying. Any help to clarify and/or reconcile this incoherence would be very much appreciated.

Yeah. I do not place much value upon logical possibility alone.

Metamers.

I don't consider chairs to be existentially dependent on us. Chairs would exist even if we didn't. — Douglas Alan

When and where there have never been humans, there could not ever have been chairs. That's what existential dependency amounts to on my view... and it's my notion. It's about initial existence(emergence) not subsistence(continued existence).

I would argue that it is the same with colors. Color vision is far from only in the eyes. There is a lot of cognitive processing that is unique to humans that goes into our color vision. And even if it were the case that all of human color vision were determined only by our human eyes, the eyes of all animals and potential aliens are going to work differently and classify crayons differently. — Douglas Alan

Colors and color vision are not equivalent. I said that what chairs are is not the same as what colors are. The former is existentially dependent upon us, the latter is not.

I've never claimed that all of human color vision is determined only by our eyes, nor would I.

But that's another matter altogether... seeing chairs and seeing colors, and not what I'm currently focusing upon.

You're still confused over the same point. There are three completely distinct things here: (1) frequency, (2) spectral distribution, (3) color.

Photons hit spots on our retina; but they aren't confined to having single frequencies (1's); they have distinct frequencies. But there's some distribution of them depending on what you're looking at... more at some frequencies than others. Because each photoreceptor is sensitive to a range of frequencies, then it's the entire distribution (2) that matters, not individual frequencies. But a given photoreceptor is simply more sensitive to some frequencies than others... at the photopsin level, it either folds or doesn't, but just has a probability of folding per photon based on the photon's frequency. That means you can make it fold with a given probability in multiple ways; you can fire less photons at the more sensitive frequencies, or more at the less sensitive ones. — InPitzotl

Thanks for the reply.

I agree that frequency, spectral distribution, and color are not equivalent. So, that is not where my confusion lies, if I am still confused about some things.

I also agree that photons travel along the same wavelength from emission through detection(photons have distinct frequencies); that different objects emit/reflect a plurality of photons, and each one at it's own frequency; that a given photoreceptor is simply more sensitive to some frequencies than others. I agree that there are different ways to cause that event(folding) such as less photons at frequencies that it's more sensitive towards or more photons at the frequencies it's less sensitive towards. All photons detected by photoreceptors travel along wavelengths within the range of frequencies that that particular photoreceptor is sensitive towards(that it is capable of detecting).

Since what matters for detection is simply the raw number of photopsin events, and there's multiple ways of reaching that number, then we're not detecting (2)'s; we're detecting "numbers of events". — InPitzotl

This bit leaves me a bit confused though. When you say that "we're not detecting (2)'s; we're detecting numbers of events" are you referring to us or the photoreceptors under consideration?

I don't think Trump will agree to debate. He has said as much. Why would he risk it? — Monitor

Risk what? His best chance to lose on purpose?

:lol:

It makes completely sense if they prefer Bernie. And why wouldn´t they?
In the event, everybody is meddling in everybody elses affairs, so the this fake meddling hysteria is complete nonsense. — Nobeernolife

Yeah. Someone mentioned plausible deniability.

:roll:

Depends I guess. If one holds to the classic (simplified) conception in which truth can only be predicated of propositions while facts simply are states of affairs (words vs things, roughly), then even to speak of 'true facts' is a kind of category mistake, or, like false facts, simply a mode of expression which is simply speaking a tautology (a 'round circle'). In this scheme one might say truths express facts or somesuch. — StreetlightX

True propositions express facts.

I like it.

"Express" may be problematic.

...philosophy to be mainly 'talking about talking', which in all fairness, does comprise a very large percentage of what goes on in this forum, too. — Wayfarer

Yep.

How many would act morally if the law did not exist?

Moral people are so regardless of what the law says.

All moral people. <-----that's the answer to your question in the OP.

A number of prominent analytic philosophers are Protestant, Catholic, or Jewish, and others, such as Wittgenstein and Rawls, clearly had a religious attitude to life without adhering to a particular religion. But I believe nothing of the kind is present in the makeup of Russell, Moore, Ryle, Austin, Carnap, Quine, Davidson, Strawson, or most of the current professoriate.

That's what makes them all great in their own respects...

:wink:

I don’t understand those who decry “big business” and lobbying. The only reason people buy out politicians and bureaucrats is because politicians and bureaucrats can be bought. We should decry the politicians and bureaucrats for setting the conditions. If they didn’t accept bribes and certain lobbying that sort of business would become untenable within a few years. — NOS4A2

It's legal, and Trump has benefitted from both sides of such monetary corruption. He actually publicly bragged about it on a national debate stage in 2016. The irony.

've can't keep track of what the disagreement here is precisely anymore. Why don't we table the discussion on whether there are colors for a moment and address an easier question: Are there chairs? — Douglas Alan

We agree that there are colors. Our disagreement got clouded by all the jargon. Upon re-reading, had I understood then what I think I understand now, this conversation would have went differently. Much of the confusion rightly lands upon my own shoulders... although not all of it. My interlocutor has erred several times when speaking for me and when drawing analogies. However, I still have a modicum of respect for his/her opinion on the matter...

Chairs are not the same scenario though. Not at all. We - and only we - determine what counts as a chair. The same is not true with colors.

So, it seems that we're not so much in disagreement aside from the claim you made that no other animal sees the frequencies that we call "red" as red. This seems odd to me because the red spectrum is not determined by us. Thus, if some other animal has similar visual capabilities perceiving and distinguishing the red spectrum from yellow and blue spectrum, there is no reason I can think of for them to not see red when frequencies along that spectrum are perceived by them.

One might as well speak of true lies (not impossible, but very ugly). — StreetlightX

There are true lies however, as a result of a lie being a statement by a speaker who is deliberately misrepresenting his/her belief. Not really ugly, but quite nuanced. What makes a statement a lie, is that it is not believed by the speaker, not that it is false. Rather, it is believed to be false by the speaker. That's another thread topic though. Just wanted to comment.

Yeah. I reject the notion of false facts. Facts must be true... You're also saying that they are not truth-apt though, and that is throwing me off...

So, it seems that the notion of "truth-apt" is what's at issue then. I suppose if facts cannot be false, but they can be true, then they must be true - by definition... on that use, or in that sense. Is that about right?

It just seems rather odd to say that something can be true but cannot be false. Facts, in this sense, are not equivalent to statements. Rather, they must be true statements as compared to just statements, which are truth-apt.

So, what makes statements true?