Seems as highly likely as any other in this day and age!

:smile:

His crime is entirely inferred — ernestm

That's not at all true regarding the second article. The first is a shiny object. You've been distracted by it. Don't be. Watch the congressional testimony concerning the second article. The public denouncing of the clearly outlined constitutional process, the refusal to allow several witnesses to testify under oath, not obeying the very rules which are meant to govern all politicians behaviours, etc.

Everyone is equal under the law, and is bound by it, including the president.

We need to hear the testimony of several individuals which Trump refused to allow to honor their subpoena. We need to know all of the relevant facts.

A game, a school activity, element of literature curriculum, the possibilities are endless. — Enrique

Yes. Yes. Yes.

A child's game.

The important point is that we have to help our Sumerian create the concept of a corporation for herself before we could expect her to understand usage of the word. IOW, because we can't rely on her own experience with incorporation, we'll have to rely heavily on her ability to generalize from what she does know. Her ability to generalize is something she shares with other animals. — frank

Yes. So... prior to performing such work... prior to helping the Sumerian connect all the dots by virtue of drawing all the correlations underlying our notion of incorporation, there is no meaningful equivalent notion in the Sumerian's language tool box. So, interpretation from English to Sumerian is impossible until there is a meaningfully equivalent notion in Sumerian. Translation is able to performed by first performing the practices roughly outlined heretofore.

The real damage being done during the Trump administration is left on the side. It is neglected - in part at least - as a direct result of the push towards ratings being driven by clearly immoral behaviours. Far too many Americans have granted their consent to otherwise shameful immoral behaviour. As Perry Ferrel noted back in the late eighties...

Nothing's Shocking.

I hope it will pass... like a bad case of Trumpian gas!

Should everything work out for the better, it will be a boost to the American form of government. I'm afraid that political change is often said to be slow... especially by those looking to have it slowed.

Don't believe it!

Bernie 2020!

The 2020 election stuff surrounding the first article of impeachment is a shiny object.

It's impossible to prove intent of a crime if the crime isn't performed, and now the nation's leaders are impeaching the president for exactly that. — ernestm

Trump's behaviour is the very epitome of obstructing justice.

that a very beautiful sentiment, but people don't have the ability to judge what is true at all. — ernestm

The people's minds that need changed the most will never so be if language like the above is the only tool in the toolbox...

For far too long, the American culture has glorified horrible behaviour towards others. If Mrs. Clinton could possibly feel comfortable enough to call all Trump supporters by some clearly berating derogatory namesake, then that goes to show you what counts as ethics in that community...

How can philosophers resurrect truth from its deathbed? How can philosophers find consensus on the best course forward in changing the public mind? — ernestm

Honestly though...

As long as people are media puppets, and media dictates the narrative, and media is owned by giant corporations with tremendous political influence, and there are politicians who've been enriching themselves at the same time that they are causing demonstrable financial harm to an entire population and/or swathes thereof, as long as all these things are normal...

there's little hope that what needs to happen will.

The 2018 midterms were promising though... baby steps.

Bernie 2020!

Pick any statement you like, Trump's notwithstanding, and then ask the following questions...

What would it take, what would have to be the case, what would have already had to have happened in order for that particular claim to be true?

What would it take, what would have to be the case, what would have already had to have happened in order for that particular claim to be false?

You and I seem to be in near complete agreement.

How can philosophers resurrect truth from its deathbed? How can philosophers find consensus on the best course forward in changing the public mind? — ernestm

Cultivate the sorts of thoughts that bestow the right amount of value in holding true belief about the world and/or ourselves, and seeking to rid ourselves of believing falsehoods by showing how it impedes our very ability to successfully navigate the world.

How can philosophers resurrect truth from its deathbed? How can philosophers find consensus on the best course forward in changing the public mind? — ernestm

Talk about the obvious everyday statements that are clearly true, and more importantly situate truth where it belongs... as one precipice of all human thought and belief, and thus of all human understanding.

Frankfurt's On Bullshit, which is particularly relevant to Trump and the general "post-truth" thing. — Pfhorrest

I second this...

That book is spot on!

:smile:

From the SEP article

The basic problem that radical interpretation must address is that one cannot assign meanings to a speaker’s utterances without knowing what the speaker believes, while one cannot identify beliefs without knowing what the speaker’s utterances mean. It seems that we must provide both a theory of belief and a theory of meaning at one and the same time.

Guess what I've already done?

:grin:

...while one cannot identify beliefs without knowing what the speaker’s utterances mean.

But you have previously denied this - for example, you claim that dumb animals have beliefs. — Banno

I've denied no such thing. You seem to think that I must on pains of coherency. I'm under no such obligation to the best of my knowledge.

Statements are utterances of thought and belief. Davidson's article is about the interpretation of statements/utterances(linguistically mediated/informed thought and belief).

Not all belief is existentially dependent upon language. All utterances thereof are.

So, surely you'll see here that I'm fine believing both. They are not mutually exclusive options. The quote at the top of this post is about utterances of belief. Dumb animals have beliefs. They do not have utterances thereof.

We cannot interpret a dumb animal's utterances(statements), for they have none.

Thanks for that link Banno...

The basic problem that radical interpretation must address is that one cannot assign meanings to a speaker’s utterances without knowing what the speaker believes, while one cannot identify beliefs without knowing what the speaker’s utterances mean. It seems that we must provide both a theory of belief and a theory of meaning at one and the same time.

:smile:

Glad to know that I've been on the right track all along...

:wink:

It's like you're looking for a backdoor into the article through your own intuitions. — frank

I am constantly applying and/or comparing/contrasting my own philosophical principles to everyday life... including when I'm attempting to understand some academic well respected philosopher or an other.

Intuition is overrated.

Earlier I suggested that Davidson needs Convention T to be an adequate means for translation.
— creativesoul

Tarski's truth predicate is part of an artificial scheme involving two languages: one that has a truth predicate and one that doesn't. How would you relate that to what we normally think of as translation? — frank

Artificial? I'm not sure what that's supposed to add here.

Just to make sure I understand, are you referring to the common language on the left and the meta-language on the right? Are those the two languages? If so, the meta language would have to be the one that does not have truth conditions, because the common one does.

Is that about right?

I've already rejected Convention T as a means for translation, and offered reasoning/argument in support of that rejection.

Earlier I suggested that Davidson needs Convention T to be an adequate means for translation... Banno seemed to agree.

What do you think?

What is the relationship between use and meaning? What does it mean to use words? What entails "use"? — Harry Hindu

Existentially codependent.
That question is ill conceived.
So is that one.

If the Sumerian language is capable of talking about the elemental constituents that when combined qualify as a corporation, then I see no reason to deny the translatability of that sentence from English into Sumerian. — creativesoul

That would just be a question of what counts as translation. — frank

Knowledge of which is most certainly rightfully applicable to Davidson's article. Are you agreeing or disagreeing or uncertain?

Note that we haven't been talking about Davidson's article. We're talking about the importance of generalization in learning. Cause that's what I'm pondering these days.

Not I...

I've been setting out an acceptable method/standard by which to judge the quality of Davidson's article. I've been setting out what all translation is itself existentially dependent upon, at a bare minimum. I do not see how adding yet another abstract entity such as generalization helps us to simplify and clarify what needs to be simplified and clarified.

What does all successful translation require? What does the very act of successful translation consist of? What do all examples of translation share? Are these common denominators sufficient/adequate enough, in and of themselves, to result in a case of translation?

These are the kinds of questions I'm carefully considering here.

I'm also attempting to set out the relevance of some of things Davidson says... particularly the bit about common referents... and the claim of reconnecting to an unmediated world... or words to that affect/effect.

When using two different languages, it's little more than an equivalency of meaning being drawn. That is possible because of shared truth conditions. The very same circumstances, situations, happenstances, events, states of affairs, and/or facts make both true. We check to see if they are by virtue of looking for and/or at the same actual scenarios/events.
— creativesoul

Yep. In light of this, think about how we might translate this sentence into Sumerian: "The town incorportated in 1925."

The concept of a corporation didn't exist in ancient Sumeria, which is to say we won't be able to find shared truth conditions — frank

I mentioned shared truth conditions as simple yet effective explanation of what's required for translatability as can be shown by Convention T practices. You've turned our attention to the opposite...

Looks like a modus ponens...

I'm working on an adequate refutation concerning the reliability and/or trustworthiness of modus ponens. I've recently realized that it allows false premisses to result in true conclusions and I've an issue with the very idea. I'm finding out that I'm in the minority on that.

The non translatability and lack of shared truth conditions would both directly result from different languages lacking a common referent. The concept/notion of corporation would be lacking in Sumerian. As already noted however...

If the Sumerian language is capable of talking about the elemental constituents that when combined qualify as a corporation, then I see no reason to deny the translatability of that sentence from English into Sumerian.

I would deny the interpretation of English into Sumerian, for there is no semantic equivalent of corporation. Connecting all the dots mentioned above would count as the translation, but in doing so it would add meaningful content to pre-existing Sumerian terms. That process would result in creating a notion of corporation in Sumerian language.

Contradiction.

If people use the term in asking what it is, then doesn't that mean that there isn't a clear understanding of what it is? — Harry Hindu

No...

We use every term when asking what they mean, so if what you said were true, it would mean that we do not have a clear understanding of any term...

:yikes:

We do though, so... you're quite wrong.

Well, it seems to me that you've no way of talking about what sorts of things can be true - such as knowledge claims - and what makes them so.
— creativesoul
Isn't that a fundamental philosophical problem - What is truth? — Harry Hindu

I don't find it to be.

It's certainly a commonly asked philosophical question. We look to how the term "truth" is used. We find out what is being said in those different uses(what is meant).

No problem.

Could that be done in common ordinary language?
— creativesoul

The argument I posted is as close as I could get to ordinary language. — frank

I think we can get closer still to an acceptable robust enough position using a more common - fairly ordinary - language. I mean, I think we need to further simplify, but not in mathematical terms such as a logician. Rather, I'm confident that we could much better discuss the role that meaning and truth have/play in all meaningful statements by using some of the most common words and statements.


Generally speaking, logical notation is existentially dependent upon something else being taken into account. When regarding Convention T, that something else includes any of the meaningful statements that permit it's use. I suspect that we may agree here.


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The problem is that Davidson's argument against untranslatability contains concepts that are artificial (the Tarski stuff). — frank

I think that perhaps a much broader based underlying problem is at hand; one of which that delves the understanding much deeper than just Davidson's argument. The approach is fraught from the tip-off(from the very beginning of the process).

Convention T is a logical notation practice that uses pre-existing meaningful statements. Convention T is inherently incapable of taking proper account of either the meaning or truth of the statement being rendered for it can say nothing at all about meaning and truth that are prior to meaningful statements.

Some alternative Convention T practice is existentially dependent upon different languages already talking about the same things in different terms, and our already knowing that much. It's not a process and/or method for translation so much as a display of that which has been already effectively/affectively translated. Be that as it may, there's more to be gleaned here...

When using two different languages, it's little more than an equivalency of meaning being drawn. That is possible because of shared truth conditions. The very same circumstances, situations, happenstances, events, states of affairs, and/or facts make both true. We check to see if they are by virtue of looking for and/or at the same actual scenarios/events. Think of some of the most common renderings of Convention T; the ones using both English and German. Both languages have already long since been being used in order to pick out and subsequently describe the very same directly perceptible thing as well as their directly perceptible characteristics.

This merely reminds us that the meaning and truth of statements are forever entwined. Davidson knew this, as do we all, I suppose? He certainly helped me to realize it.


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Logical notation is itself only one way that we attribute meaning. There is some sort of meaningful value given to each previously undefined term solely by virtue of our drawing a correlation between the term and it's value - whatever that may be. Convention T is itself existentially dependent upon language use, for it is existentially dependent upon pre-existing meaningful statements. Meaningful statements existed in their entirety prior Convention T.

If it is the case that both truth and meaning exist in their entirety prior to statements, then it is the case there are instances of both that Convention T cannot possibly take into account; but Nor can any other logical notation, for that matter, for much the very same reasons.

It's bad philosophy. That doesnt mean it's not food for thought or that cool stuff couldnt be inspired by it. The rose grows from poop, you know. — frank

Ow!

Well, I certainly do not think that it's a shit argument, despite my intuitive disagreements. I mean, those very well may be based up a slight misunderstanding... although, I find Davidson a bit confused and/or confusing to begin with even when I accept the notions he works with/from. That could be me though.

I like what I've seen of Soames... just so ya know. Are you Kelvin from the other site per chance?

Well, it seems to me that you've no way of talking about what sorts of things can be true - such as knowledge claims - and what makes them so. Given that the thread is about JTB, where truth is held to be a property of true propositions/statements, it seems to me that your using the term "truth" as states-of-affairs and then arguing about it is akin to using an american football in a world cup match and arguing about which football to use.

That's what.

:smirk:

The way that I have been seems adequate enough, and without all the subconscious stuff.

Could that be done in common ordinary language?

If I could explain it in enough detail, it wouldn't be a case. That just seems to be the only circumstance I can think of where it - perhaps - has what it takes to resist translation.

the truth is some state-of-affairs — Harry Hindu

I reject this notion of truth...

Depends on the claim, yes, which we may say depends on the domain of discourse. Empirical knowledge is always contingent, so there is no infallible guarantee that some claim is true; pure rational knowledge is always apodeictic, which is its own infallible guarantee that some claim is true. — Mww

That's a traditional way of thinking about it. I reject nearly every dichotomy underwriting such discourse.

So instead of keeping countries like Russia at bay with military force, we partner with them. — NOS4A2

Yeah, like cyber security!

:down: :shade:

there is no getting around the fact that no-one has an infallible guarantee that any specific claim is true... — Harry Hindu

This is false. It all depends upon the claim under consideration.

We seem to be in essential agreement. — Andrew M

I'm thinking much the same thing...

My main point about prior beliefs is that Bob would presumably just glance at the clock and automatically form a belief about the time. He's not consciously reflecting on it, weighing up evidence, or making inferences from one belief to another. How he forms his belief happens "under the hood", so to speak, as part of the brain's internal processing. — Andrew M

That's one way of putting it. Although I agree with the description as a commonly understood one, I'm very hesitant to employ the terminology as an explanation of his belief. I think we can do better, with less verbiage.

Indirectly perceptible things and/or abstract entities - it seems to me - would be prone to resisting translation. That is where we would possibly figure out that there was no common referent for some of the respective notions.

Nevermind me...

I'm on about something else, and that is irrelevant to Davidson's gripe about and/or rejection of the idea of different conceptual schemes.

There's no issue I see in this context.

I recant, and my apologies.

Cheers!

In Japan, the act is seen as sometimes a noble death. — Wallows

In very specific circumstances... it is better to die at your own hands than to die at the hands of the enemy.

So there is no such thing as suicide construed differently from other forms of death. — TheMadFool

We construe them all with language use.

:brow:

Not everyone dies at their own hands or at a time of their own choosing.

Taking one's own life - by whatever intentional means - at a time of one's own choosing is a case of suicide. From self-sacrifice for the good of others, through self-pity and loathing, whenever ones takes their own life, it is a case of suicide because it is not the same as other ways of dying...

Accidental deaths are not suicide. Homicides are not suicide.

What is the significance of the rejection of conceptual schemes if our beliefs continue to paint a picture of fundamentally different ontologies (and sister -ologies)?
— ZzzoneiroCosm

Again, a belief is statable. — Banno

You... or Davidson? Both, perhaps.

This is the bit that has always been a thorn in my side. Demanding that a belief be statable leaves far too much to the imagination. Statable by whom?