Can we agree that knowledge is information? — ovdtogt

No.

Brother you're welcome to follow Gettier's formula all you like, and we'll examine it accordingly. As I said earlier, I love these mind puzzles. Shows that some logic is anything other than infallible when used as a means to take proper account of belief.

But even if it rigidly designates Jones - and it doesn't - we could easily construct another Gettier case in which Smith's belief about Jones's coin situation is justified, true, and not knowledge.

I described such a case. You either didn't read it, or didn't understand it — Bartricks

Or I did both and already responded.

Sigh...

No, Smith's belief is about the person who will occupy the role.

But even if it rigidly designates Jones - and it doesn't — Bartricks

No? As if Smith's belief was not specifically about a particular person named Jones? As if Gettier did not say who in particular Smith's beliefs were about???

:brow:

I'll forward Gettier's own words here. I mean, there is no stronger ground for determining who Smith's belief is about in particular.

Suppose that Smith and Jones have applied for a certain job. And suppose that Smith has strong evidence for the fol1owing conjunctive proposition:

(d) Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his
pocket.

There it is, in Gettier's own words...

Jones is THE man who(Smith believes) will get the job!

QED

Now you're just making yourself look bad. I consented the earlier point about false premisses, because that's what reasonable people do when they realize that they're wrong... and I was.

However, you are wrong about Smith's belief... and so is everyone and anyone else who thinks that Smith believed anyone other than Jones would get the job. Since we know that Smith knew Jones had ten coins in his pocket, and was justified in believing that Jones would get the job, we also know that when Smith deduced "the person with ten coins in his pocket will get the job" from that that Smith was picking out Jones to the exclusion of all other people, including himself.

It's a novel approach, but dead on the mark.

Proposition is not equal to belief, which a careful assessment of Gettier's paper clearly shows, assuming the right approach. We can see this for ourselves...

As a general proposition(divorced from belief) "the person with ten coins in his pocket will get the job" is true whenever anyone with ten coins in their pocket gets the job, including Smith himself.

...and that is the sleight of hand, because...

...as a deduction of Smith's belief, "the person with ten coins in his pocket will get the job" is all about Jones... and no one else. So, it is irrefutable to say that in Smith's own mind, according to his own belief, the person being picked out to the exclusion of all others by the deduction is Jones, because Smith's belief is clearly about none other than... Jones.



Perhaps a substitution exercise will help drive the point home...

Smith's belief is that Jones will get the job, and that Jones has ten coins in his pocket. Hence, by entailment he arrives at the following...

"The person with ten coins in his pocket will get the job."

The only correct substitution for "the person with ten coins in his pocket" is Jones. Anything else, and both the truth conditions and the meaning of Smith's deductive belief changes. That would render the deduction something other than Smith's belief. Anything other than Smith's belief is unacceptable, for it is Smith's belief that is being taken account of here. Thus, anything other than Jones would be an unacceptable substitution...

Salva Veritate.

Jones did not get the job. Therefore, Smith's belief was false. False belief is not a problem for JTB. Gettier's Case I is a case of false belief.

QED

Who did Smith believe had ten coins in their pocket?

Who did Smith believe would get the job? — creativesoul

:brow:

In order to maintain your position here, you're forced to claim that Smith's belief is about someone other than Jones...

That's false on it's face.

You never directly addressed that by the way... or the following questions...

Who did Smith believe had ten coins in their pocket?

Who did Smith believe would get the job?

There's only one correct answer here my friend(s), and refutes Gettier because it show us all that Smith's belief is false, and therefore... not a problem for JTB.

Do you also agree that you're completely wrong about Gettier cases? — Bartricks

No. I have both cases right.

Gettier confuses the truth conditions of the general proposition "the person with ten coins in his pocket will get the job", with the truth conditions of Smith's belief that "the person with ten coins in his pocket will get the job". In the former(a general proposition), anyone and everyone that has ten coins in their pocket and gets the job counts as "the person with ten coins in their pocket". But in Smith's belief only Jones counts, for it is not just a proposition, but Smith's belief about Jones.

Ah, your such a childish dick!

I consent. That is modus tollens.

1. If it is Tuesday, then it is raining (false)
2 It is not raining (false)
3. Therefore it is not Tuesday (true) — Bartricks

Denying the antecedent...

Not valid.

False premisses cannot lead(validly/logically) to true conclusions.
— creativesoul

Yes. THey. Can. Christ!! — Bartricks

Well, we disagree on that don't we?

Show me.

This idea that Gettier somehow showed that JTB is flawed is just not the case. It's as if Gettier performed a slight of hand and people think it refutes JTB. When examined closely the cases are not really justified. All Gettier pointed out is the difference between a claim to knowledge (for e.g., thinking one is justifed when you're not), as opposed to actual knowledge. So, if I make a claim, and that claim appears to be JTB, but in the end it lacks proper justification, then it's simply not knowledge. There is nothing difficult here. No amount of thinking something is JTB, amounts to something actually being JTB. — Sam26

With Russell's clock, my objection is that the knowledge claim is based upon false belief, and false belief never counts as adequate justification.

With Gettier, I know many argue the justification aspect, but my own take on the belief aspect seems stronger, to me at least.

How is Case I not justified, by your lights?

The false belief that the clock is working does provide the agent with a justification for believing it is 3 o clock. — Bartricks

That's what you keep repeating, but...

False premisses cannot lead(validly/logically) to true conclusions.

But, we both know that false premisses cannot validly lead to true conclusions.

Right?

:brow:

No. I read your reply. Glad to see you're serious again.

Our respective viewpoints differ... obviously.

I've just got one simple question...

Does false belief ever count as good ground/justification?

It is the public that disagree about things, but unlike philosophers they either conclude (stupidly) that 'it's all a matter of opinion' or 'subjective' or they punch each other. — Bartricks

Or stab, shoot, and kill... often in the name of their chosen God...

We had created a God in our own image. — ovdtogt

Yup. If by "we" we mean those whose writings survived all those years and canonical revisions...

Well done!

Hey Sam! My take on both Gettier cases is that he has Smith's belief wrong(an accounting malpractice). I've set that out as clearly as I can a couple pages back. I'd be interested in your take/opinion on my refutation of those cases...

May want to start on page six, because I had forgotten a few details prior to, and as a result my report on the paper was a bit confused/confusing..

:yikes:

Believing a broken clock is working is a false belief. False belief is never good justificatory ground...

That's the simple account already given that fiveredapples just elaborately echoed...

Moving the goalposts...

Still wrong.

Mirror mirror...

You are reading a meaningful language. There are no gestures. There are no sounds. There is a meaningful language.

Nothing cryptic. Plain 'ole common sense. Your claim is false. Language is not just communication through sounds and gestures.

Online format.

Read my last post.

That is what language is: Communication through sound and gestures. — ovdtogt

Nah. That cannot be right.

No sounds or gestures in this format, but there is definitely language.

what do you find so useful in falsehoods? — ovdtogt

It's not about what I find... it's about everyday events where people intentionally use falsehoods to mislead others.

The point is that usefulness is of no use in discriminating between truth and falsehood. Discriminating between truth and falsehood is required for taking proper account of truth. Thus... usefulness is useless here...

This is self-contradictory and/or incoherent.

Let A = usefulness
Let B = truth
Let C = information
Let D = a statement
— creativesoul

And this is a totally useless statement. — ovdtogt

Sigh....

Yes 'usefulness' is a property of truth.If the 'truth' does not contain 'usefulness'(i.e information) it can not be considered 'truth'.
Usefulness is a property of information.

Unless a statement contains information, it is totally meaningless and does not contain truth.
Truth without information has no value and therefor can not be truth.
Truth without information is not truth. — ovdtogt

This is self-contradictory and/or incoherent.

Let A = usefulness
Let B = truth
Let C = information
Let D = a statement

:brow:

Bald assertions that do not even take a valid argumentative form aren't very compelling.

Usefulness can be the property of a falsehood not known to be false. — ovdtogt

And falsehood known to be false... so usefulness is of no help here when setting out truth(as distinct from falsehood).

Truth cannot be false.
Belief can.
Being falsifiable requires the ability to be false and the ability to be shown as such
Some belief can be falsifiable.
Truth cannot.

Which part are you objecting to and what grounds that objection?

Truth is grounded on belief. — Gus Lamarch

Not on my view.

Nah, you're just wrong about my position...
— creativesoul

And could you explain me why is so? — Gus Lamarch

Because I do not believe what you wrote.

Yes 'usefulness' is a property of truth. — ovdtogt

And falsehood... so usefulness is of no help here when setting out truth(as distinct from falsehood).

So contradictions and sentences without any clear reference, are meaningless. — Harry Hindu

Not what I wrote, nor does it follow from what I wrote.

Ditto thoughts...

I was actually working on something to ask, but spent too much time researching his works, and missed the deadline. Here's what I had...



Hey professor Pigliucci,

Alas, time is of the essence here...

After reading your blog Footnotes to Plato, I've come to admire the skeptical approach first set out in the section called Between strident atheism and vanilla ecumenicism. This is just the beginning of much agreement between our respective world-views. The similarity between our lines of thought reaches striking proportions. I couldn't help but to find myself in agreement as I read through your writings on a variety of different subject matters. If only I were as eloquent...

Thank you for being here.




I'm particularly intrigued by the criterion you've put forth for determining what counts as pseudo-science. To be as precise as possible, I'm skeptical of the amount of value we ought place upon one particular element therein...

Peer review.

As we all know, consensus does not guarantee truth. So, it could be the case that one follows all of the rules governing what counts as an acceptable scientific endeavor, and still yet arrives at contradictory conclusions to their contemporaries. These actual scenarios(all paradigm shifts) are the strongest empirical ground for tempering the peer review portion of the standard. Too much value placed in peer review renders an immutable - unshakably certain - standard in our current knowledge base. We will be forced to say that such cases are pseudoscience.

How do we best temper our judgment here, according to the Stoicism you advocate, particularly when judging and/or determining what counts as an acceptable theory of all human thought and belief(a notion than many find a need for)?


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


It wasn't finished because I wanted to better tie it into his thoughts about philosophy straddling between science and social structures... ah well. I'm glad to have found out about the professor.

That's probably the case. However, others become aware of these kinds of prelinguistic beliefs by observation, but only if they have the concept of belief. In other words, it's backward looking, it only happens, that I can say there are prelinguistic beliefs, from the perspective of language. It's only in language that we can talk about such beliefs. This causes confusion — Sam26

Yes, but perhaps it's a confusion that can be easily resolved by realizing that knowledge of prelinguistic belief requires language, talking about prelinguistic belief requires language, but prelinguistic belief does not... cannot. What we're taking account of is not equivalent to our accounting practices. Prelinguistic belief is akin to Mt. Everest in this way.

It seems to me that a more fundamental belief in the kind that Sam26 is trying to get at would be the belief that there is an external world. — Harry Hindu

I would also concur.